Dr. Servatius: He goes on to say:
“I was at the time put on the train without any further
instructions.” As far as I remember, witness Hoettl
said he travelled with Kaltenbrunner.”
On the same page, he then says again:
“In actual fact I was never Reich Plenipotentiary. I am
a layman in these matters.”
On page 11, the second paragraph:
“As I see things, without the active co-operation of
the Hungarians, it would not have been possible to
carry out the anti-Jewish operations. It is only when
you are strong that you can threaten and force things
through. However, in 1943 we were no longer strong,
and in 1944 we were weak.”
On page 12, at the bottom, where he answers the seventh
question, “What was the assignment of the Eichmann Special
Commando?,” he says the following:
“I cannot say anything precise about this. I did not
have any dealings with Eichmann about this matter, nor
was I kept informed by him. As far as I know, I only
saw Eichmann once, when he presented himself to me.
This was not immediately after the entry of the German
forces, but a little later. However, it cannot have
been too late, as Winkelmann later ruled that it was no
longer permitted for SS personnel (offices) to have
direct dealings with the legation. I knew that the
Eichmann Special Commando was engaged in the
deportations of Jews. At the time the concept of the
`Final Solution’ was completely unknown to me. I did
not hear about this until Nuremberg.”
On page 13, the witness comments on document No. 212,*
{*T/1235} point 4. This concerns foreign Jews in Hungary.
At the bottom it says:
“In some instances we were informed of the decision,
insofar as we had to give an account to the Hungarian
authorities. In other cases, the decision taken in
Berlin was sent directly – as I assume – to the local
SS authorities. For example, in the documents it says
that Eichmann negotiated with Hungarian offices. If he
did this, I assume he did it on the instructions of his
superiors, because in the Third Reich it would have
been very dangerous to undertake anything like this
without instructions. If we learned about these
negotiations, we reported on them. As to Eichmann’s
powers, I myself have no knowledge.”
On page 15, the witness replies to a question from the
Attorney General as to which German authority dealt with the
foot march. He says the following:
“I cannot say that. I assume that it even took place
with, at the very least, considerable participation by
the Hungarian authorities. At that time all German
authorities, including the legation, had to release for
service at the front anyone they could at all do
without. Therefore, the German authorities would
simply no longer have had the personnel to organize and
carry through the foot march on their own. It was one
of their last attempts; nor did it have any real
purpose.
“The foot march crumbled en route. As far as I
remember, the matter was reported to me at the time. I
made enquiries of the Hungarian authorities. I was
told that there was no fuel, nor were any trains
running. The Danube was mined. In my view, there was
no point in sending tired people off in this way to act
as labourers. I no longer remember what the weather
was like at the time.”
On page 16, the witness replies to a question from the
representative of the Prosecution:
“Were you involved in the confiscation of Jewish
assets, and did you know about this?”
Answer:
“No, with one exception. That was the case of the
Weiss-Manfred Works. I only found out about this
matter as the result of a complaint from the Hungarian
Government to me. At approximately the same time,
Standartenfuehrer Becher came to see me. The Works
were to be transferred to the ownership of the SS. I
was to obtain the consent of the Hungarian Government
for this. The Hungarian Government objected in very
strong terms. I passed on their protests to Berlin, as
I thought it unwise at this point in time, to annoy the
Hungarians by such a measure which was totally
insignificant for the War. I also wished at that time
to notify Berlin of the contracts for the conveyance,
and asked Becher to give them to me. He refused.”
Dr. Servatius: There is then a discussion of the measures
against the Jews of Budapest, and document No. 666, page 4,
is shown. On this the witness explains…
Judge Raveh: But this document has not yet been submitted
to us.
Dr. Servatius: But it says here:
“The representative of Counsel for the Accused asked
for document No. 666 to be shown to the witness. The
witness stated on document No. 666, page 4, which was
shown to him…”
Presiding Judge: If this document has not yet been submitted
to us, we must now look at it.
Dr. Servatius: I should like to submit it – but I do not
have it here with me.
Presiding Judge: The same applies to exhibit T/797 as well –
this has not yet been submitted either. It is referred to
on the same page, is it not? I suggest that when you get a
chance, you go right through these statements and then
submit any documents still missing – because otherwise we
will not be able to follow the evidence properly.
Dr. Servatius: I shall subsequently submit this document at
some later stage.
On page 18, the witness states:
“I remember that there were fears of an uprising as a
result of the great concentration of Jews in Budapest.
The plan was to decentralize the Jews in camps in
Western Hungary. Where this plan came from, I am
unable to say. My visits to Lakatos were probably made
in this connection. In such a case I could not receive
instructions from any SS office, but only from the
Foreign Ministry. It may be that for security reasons,
the security authorities in the Reich required the
Foreign Ministry to take such measures. The only case
where I was approached directly by an SS department to
negotiate with the Hungarian Government was when Becher
came to see me about the Weiss-Manfred Works.”
Presiding Judge: Is that all?
Dr. Servatius: From this document, yes.
Presiding Judge: Mr. Hausner, what do you wish to say?
Attorney General: We do not need to quote anything from this
statement.
Presiding Judge: I have marked Veesenmayer’s statement XIII.
Since the Attorney General does not wish to read anything
out, who is next, Dr. Servatius?
Dr. Servatius: Your Honour, I should in this connection
like to read out passages from the Nuremberg judgment, Case
11, about the Veesenmayer case, in conjunction with this
statement by the witness.
Presiding Judge: All right.
Dr. Servatius: For the moment, I have only three copies
available; I have, for the time being, given one to the
interpreter, so that he has it available for his
translation.
Presiding Judge: Do you want everything to be translated?
Dr. Servatius: No, there are just a few passages I wish to
read out.
Attorney General: I understand that the judgment in toto has
to be an exhibit. Naturally, Counsel for the Defence is
free to read out whatever passages he chooses. But perhaps
the Court will take note of the entire judgment, either from
the Green Series, or from the special edition which Counsel
for the Defence has in his possession, as do we also, as a
Court Exhibit.
Presiding Judge: I believe this has already been discussed.
Attorney General: Yes. This has been discussed and agreed
on.
Dr. Servatius: Your Honour, I am prepared to act
accordingly. I only have a copy here called The Judgment in
the Wilhelmstrasse Trial, by Dr. Robert Kempner and
Professor Haensel, where it is reproduced. I do not have
another copy available, but I could obtain one; however, I
assume that the contents here have the requisite degree of
reliability…
Presiding Judge: Mr. Bodenheimer, would you please pass us
Case No. 11 from the Green Series.
Just a moment, Dr. Servatius. You may be seated meanwhile.
Have you located it, Mr. Bodenheimer? Would you please give
me a label for marking the exhibit. Meanwhile, I shall
formally mark this N/103, so N/103 will be the judgment in
its entirety, as it appears in the Green Series. And now we
shall designate the passages you have submitted as N/103a.
What would you now like to read out from these passages?
Dr. Servatius: First of all, paragraph II, Hungary.
Presiding Judge: On which page is this, please?
Dr. Servatius: The first page, the first sheet; it starts
with the word “Veesenmayer” in spaced type, and then there
is the penultimate paragraph, “Hungary”:
“The Fuehrer Decree of 19 March 1944 appointed the Accused
Veesenmayer as Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Greater
German Reich in Hungary, which at that time was allied with
Germany. He was responsible for overall political
development in Hungary and was to receive his instructions
from Ribbentrop.”
At the top of the next page:
“In order to carry out tasks concerning the Jewish Question,
a Higher SS and Police Leader was to join the staff of the
Reich Ambassador and act in accordance with his political
instructions.”
At the bottom of the same page, the last paragraph:
“On 16 January 1943, Luther had a talk with the
Hungarian envoy, in which he expressed his astonishment
at the dissolution on 1 January 1943 of the Hungarian
Jewish Commissariat. He again reminded the envoy that,
at all events, Hitler insisted on removing all the Jews
from Europe. The harbouring of around one million Jews
in Hungary, a friendly country, was creating major
concern in Germany, and they could not sit by and
tolerate this danger for ever without doing something.
In Luther’s opinion, the excuses which Sztojay believed
he had to present were so lame, that one could see very
clearly from his demeanour that not even he himself
believed in what he was saying. In his report, Luther
expresses the hope that our constant pressure will
eventually be successful.”
Then, on the next page, it says that the desired success has
not come about, and in order to find out why, Veesenmayer
has been sent to Hungary, and on 30 April 1943 he submitted
a long report.
In the last sentence of the first paragraph it then says:
“He confirms that Hungary has made itself into an
asylum for the Jews in Europe, in the expectation that
its hospitable attitude towards Jewry will be a
guarantee for the protection of Hungarian interests
after the end of the War. This explains Prime Minister
Kallay’s standpoint that it should be extremely obvious
that he is trying to make reparation for his
predecessor’s wrongdoing as regards the Jewish
Question.”
At the bottom of the page it says that Veesenmayer made a
second journey, and then the report continues – at the
bottom:
“The Jew is Enemy No. 1. These 1.1 million Jews are
just as many saboteurs against the Reich, and at least
as large a number – if not double the number – of
Hungarians, who are satellites of the Jews, act as
auxiliary groups and external camouflage for
implementing the large-scale sabotage and spying plan.
Reich policy has here a worthwhile and vital duty, to
tackle this problem and clean up the situation.”
On the next page, the fourth or fifth paragraph:
“For many reasons, the needs of the moment would appear
to dictate tackling the Jewish Question thoroughly.
Cleaning it up is a prerequisite for engaging Hungary,
in the Reich’s defensive and existential struggle.”
This is the fourth paragraph.
Then there are conclusions. Inter alia, it says the
following, at the end of the text, in small print:
“The appointment of suitable commissioners with
extensive powers, who must be bloodhounds for the five
districts to be created, immediate tackling of the
Jewish Question according to a plan agreed on in
advance. At the same time, the enemy must be informed
that, for every Hungarian killed by bombing, a hundred
rich Jews will be shot and their property used as
reparations for the damage caused.”
It also says there:
“The proposals outlined by Veesenmayer have been
carried out almost to the last detail, and their
spiritual father was assigned to implement them,
because he appeared to be the right man for the job.”
At the end of the page, it says:
“Veesenmayer had no experience in diplomacy, although
he was on several occasions given assignments in which
the Foreign Ministry was interested, particularly in
Serbia and Danzig. The Accused is now in vain claiming
that he did not have a bitter hatred of the Jews. He
is in vain denying having been involved by word and
deed in the dreadful mass deportations. It was he who
hatched the plan, who initiated the implementation of
these measures. Nor are we influenced by the claims
which Veesenmayer put forward in his last
interrogation, in his closing brief and his written
statement, to the effect that, in fact, Horthy agreed
with the systematic deportation and subsequent
extermination of the Jews.”
In the middle of page 174, it says:
“The report furthermore provides information about the
relationships between Veesenmayer and Hezinger and
Eichmann of the SS. The Foreign Ministry had suggested
recalling Hezinger, one of the Foreign Ministry experts
on Jewish matters detailed to the legation. Senior
Legation Counsellor Feine stated to von Thadden that
Hezinger was indispensable.”
In the next paragraph, it says:
“From this report it is also clear that Eichmann wished
to retain Hezinger, so that no major errors would be
made in dealing with the foreign Jews. Veesenmayer’s
attitude – as indicated here – completely contradicts
his testimony to the effect that Hezinger was not
subordinate to him, as he was not informed of the
details of his activity. If – as Veesenmayer is now
claiming – this action was planned and implemented by
Eichmann and Winkelmann of the SS, it would appear
extremely odd that Interior Department II, which was at
that time the Foreign Ministry department responsible
for Jewish affairs, should have considered it necessary
to inform Eichmann – who allegedly was the author of
the planned deportation – of Veesenmayer’s reports.
But that is what it did.”
On the next page, in the penultimate paragraph, there
appears the following:
“In July 1944, Horthy forbade further deportation of
Jews. Veesenmayer complained to him about this and
informed him that the dismissal of the Sztojay
government, and the intended arrest of certain members
of that government who had carried out anti-Jewish
measures, would be considered a breach of Hungarian
obligations to the Reich, and Hitler would immediately
recall his Ambassador, Veesenmayer, and take measures
to ensure once and for all that such things could never
again occur in Hungary.”
On the next page, in the middle, there appears something
Kasztner said on the question of the deportations. It says:
“Kasztner described the situation very comprehensively as
follows.
“Question: `Do you mean by that that the Accused
Veesenmayer played no role in the execution of the
deportations of the Jews, which was carried out either
– which I will assume for the moment – by Jaross, Baky,
Endre, Eichmann or Winkelmann?’
“Answer: `Counsel, I do not suppose that you would
believe that a man of Mr. Veesenmayer’s intelligence
would formally go beyond his mandate as a Ambassador of
the German Reich and personally interfere with
executive matters. Under no circumstances whatsoever
could he, or should he, have done so. Nor did he need
to do so. As I said this morning, by installing an
appropriate government in Hungary, and laying down the
general political directives for this government, that
meant that any further activity on his part, more
directly concerned with the details and with executive
measures, was no longer necessary. If I could put it
this way, he was the intellectual author, he was
definitely not the implementer.”
The part of the judgment dealing with Veesenmayer concludes
with the chapter on Serbia. In the middle of the page it
says: “On 8 December 1941…”
Last-Modified: 1999/06/14
