Session 086-05, Eichmann Adolf

Dr. Servatius: Exhibit T/1230, document No. 388. A
memorandum from the Foreign Ministry to the Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs, dated 12 October 1944. It says here
that changes in the situation make it necessary for a ruling
to be given. Reference is made to a report not available
here. In the report Ambassador Veesenmayer indicates that
the Hungarians have not so far met their undertakings to
solve the Jewish Question in Budapest as an internal
Hungarian measure, and evidently will not do so in future
either, in order to provide themselves with an alibi for a
future eventuality.

Ambassador Veesenmayer goes on to say that leaving Jews in
the German-Hungarian operations area, as the front comes
closer, constitutes an immediate danger, and therefore a
change in principle of the German attitude must be
considered, so that either they would evacuate the remaining
Jews by acting on their own, or they would exert the
requisite pressure on the Hungarian Government to this end.

At the end, on page 2, it reads:

“Inland II requests instructions as to what guidelines
should be provided to Ambassador Veesenmayer. Since
implementation of anti-Jewish measures largely depends
on whether the SS is currently able to make available
the necessary units in Budapest, instructions are
hereby requested, if this question has first to be
clarified with the Reichsfuehrer-SS, or the Head Office
for Reich Security.”

I submit as evidence document No. 532. This is a report
from Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry. It would appear
to be only a draft. It says “October 1944” without the day.
It reads:

“In view of the Reich Government’s foregoing
deportations, and the evacuation of the Jews from the
city of Budapest, the following is stated: Following
the Reich Government’s agreement to give up any
continuation of transports of Jews to Reich territory
and, in particular, the evacuation of Jews from the
municipal area of Budapest, and to accept an internal
Hungarian solution of this problem, future developments
of the Jewish Question in Hungary are proceeding in an
extremely unsystematic and unsatisfactory fashion. The
Hungarians have repeatedly stated and promised that
they are prepared, and are taking all the requisite
measures for transferring the Jews still present in
Hungary – in the main, only in the municipal area of
Budapest – and with the definition of ‘Jew’ determined
solely by Hungarian legislation – for security reasons
to camps in the western part of Hungary, and to employ
them there as labour.”

It then says: “Nothing has, however, happened, despite this
assurance.” And then, further on, “This state of affairs
does actually reflect the facts, and as things stand at
present, the possibilities of accommodation…” Oh, it says
here that the reason given for not carrying out the
operation is that all camps are now occupied by the
military, because the front has moved back. Then it says:

“This state of affairs does actually reflect the facts,
and as a result of the current situation there will
probably not be any available accommodation at all in
this area in the foreseeable future. But it must be
objected that, with somewhat more energy and less
humanitarian concern about the equipment of the camps,
it should nevertheless have been possible in the last
three months to make at least a practical start in
evacuating the Jews from Budapest.”

Then, on the next page, the first paragraph begins:

“For the German authorities, the issuing of transit
visas to the designated groups of Hungarian Jews, for
whose departure to Sweden, Palestine via Switzerland,
Portugal and Spain approval has already been given in
principle, is still to be used as a means for
compelling the fulfilment of the requisite
precondition, viz., an actual start to evacuating the
Jews from Budapest.”

Then, the next paragraph begins:

“Having regard to the reinforcement of German units in
the Hungarian area and also the approach of the front
line, consideration must inter alia be paid to the
question of whether, and if so to what extent, the
German attitude mentioned above should be basically
changed, and some form of measures adopted, in order to
ensure that the remaining Jews are evacuated from
Hungary or Budapest, either by acting on our own, or by
exerting the requisite pressure on the Hungarian
Government for this purpose.”

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/88.

Dr. Servatius: The next document is T/1234, document No.
525. This is a telegram from Veesenmayer to the Foreign
Ministry, dated 18 October 1944. It reads:

“In view of the changed political situation, the Jewish
Question has also entered a new phase.
Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, who returned to Budapest
today, as requested by the Higher SS and Police Leader
here, and as ordered by the Chief of the Security
Police, has opened negotiations with the Hungarian
authorities for fifty thousand male able-bodied Jews
from Budapest to be transferred by foot march to
Germany for labour service, with further able-bodied
male Jews immediately being used for military
fortification works in the vicinity, and the remaining
Jews all being concentrated in ghetto-like camps on the
outskirts of the town.”

Together with this document goes the next exhibit, T/1235,
document No. 212. This is a telegram dated the same day, 18
October 1944, to the Foreign Ministry. It reads:

“Following are the results of negotiations on Jewish
Question conducted by Eichmann today with new Hungarian
Minister of Interior.”

Then it says:

“(1) Despite Szalasi’s basic attitude already indicated
that no more Hungarian Jews should be evacuated to
Reich territory, Minister of Interior will try to
obtain exceptional approval of requested one-time
temporary authorization for fifty thousand male able-
bodied Jews who are urgently required for the fighter
aircraft programme on Reich territory, as well as to
replace Russian prisoners-of-war who are being used
elsewhere. Transport to be by foot march, accompanied
by German commandos; when Reich border is crossed,
brief employment on south-east rampart is envisaged.”

Then below, under 5:

“In extreme confidence it is reported that Eichmann
intends, after successful completion of the foot march
referred to, to apply later for a further fifty
thousand Jews, in order, while maintaining the basic
approach, to achieve the final goal – emptying out of
Hungarian territory.”

Witness, is what Veesenmayer writes here correct – that is
to say, that you conducted negotiations with the government
about this evacuation of fifty thousand Gypsies?* {*
Presumably a slip of the tongue on the part of Dr.
Servatius; the document refers to Jews}

Accused: Yes. According to the form and the content of
exhibit T/1234, document No. 525, I received orders to
conduct these negotiations in Hungary. I would like to make
the following specific comments on this.

The content of the document shows that Winkelmann, as the
Higher SS and Police Leader, doubtless approached the Chief
of the Security Police and the Security Service, with the
purpose of ordering order me to return (at that time I was
in Berlin), and the idea of the foot march must have come up
in Hungary, and moreover these were to be able-bodied male
Jews only, who were to be used for these military duties,
which other authorities considered to be necessary. Now,
having received an order of this nature, I certainly and
without doubt carried it out, so that the matters referred
to in document No. 212, exhibit T/1235, will basically be
correct. The details given in point 4:

“…the Eichmann Operations Units – apart from taking
over guard duties in part – will have an advisory role
only with reference to the aforementioned foot march
when the ‘Budapest Operation’ is carried out, which
operation is otherwise to be carried out by the
Hungarian gendarmerie under the previous Commissioners
on Jewish Questions – Colonel Ferenczy and Srare
Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior Laday.”

As for point 5, I would like to say that today I am unable
to state with any certainty whether or not I applied for
another fifty thousand Jews; I would tend to deny it for the
simple reason that in the original document there is no
mention of an order to this effect, and I did not do
something I had not been ordered to do. There is a document
which has been submitted to the Court, Prosecution No. 871,
which sheds further light on this.

Presiding Judge: Perhaps, before you continue, Dr. Servatius
will certainly submit it.

Dr. Servatius: Yes, I am submitting this document No. 871
as evidence.

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/89 – you may proceed.

Accused: As I was saying, the matter must have been dealt
with during the time I was in Berlin, at the request of the
Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann, as indicated in
exhibit T/1234. This document is dated 18 October 1944.
Document No. 871, exhibit N/89, is dated 24 October, six
days later. It says – it is a communication from
Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop:

“I report that yesterday, as requested urgently and
repeatedly by SA Obergruppenfuehrer Winkelmann, I asked
Szalasi to lend us at least twenty-five thousand labour
service Jews for six months, to be used on the German
fighter aircraft programme. SA Obergruppenfuehrer
Winkelmann did in fact demand fifty thousand Jews, but
to date this demand failed, due to opposition from
Hungarian Government departments.”

This form of words used by Veesenmayer, “requested
repeatedly,” shows that my view is correct.

The second part of this communication, N/89, shows that the
negotiations I was ordered to carry out with the Hungarian
Minister of the Interior were clearly not successful,
because Veesenmayer writes here:

“I considered it correct to accomplish a partial demand
first, with the intention of possibly expressing our
wishes again later. Szalasi immediately accepted this
request, but simply pointed out that Hungary itself
needs most of the Jews for field-works and other other
urgent duties, and asked me to ensure that in future
the matter be dealt with between Obergruppenfuehrer
Winkelmann and Minister Kovacs.”

The original intention – to have these male Jews, who would
be able to march, be made to walk all the way, with
personnel of the Security Police and Security Service
involved in the taking over of guard duties – doubtless
miscarried at the negotiations between Winkelmann and
Minister Kovacs, who will have posed as a threat Hungary’s
demand that the transports be guarded and accompanied
exclusively by Hungarian forces. This is proved by the
report from Dr. Leopold Breszlauer, who observed these
transports for several days on behalf of four envoys
accredited to Hungary, and who has given testimony on this
and provided a report of his experiences to the Court.

In conclusion, may I say that these documents prove that,
firstly, I did not initiate this matter, and secondly, that
I cannot have had any part in the foot marches which did
actually take place.

Dr. Servatius: As the next exhibit, I submit document No.
376. This is a communication from Ribbentrop to Ambassador
Veesenmayer personally. It is an instruction which reads as

“I would ask you not to restrain and obstruct the
Hungarians in their implementation of any measures
which will compromise them in the eyes of our enemies,
but rather to provide all possible support to them. It
is more particularly in our interest for the Hungarians
to proceed now in the most severe fashion against the

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/90.

Dr. Servatius: Next, exhibit T/1239, document No. 221.
This is a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry, from Wagner,
dated 31 October 1944, for the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs. On page 2, item 5, it reads:

“After the appointment of the Szalasi Government, a
start has been made on evacuating able-bodied Jews from
Budapest; initially, twenty-five thousand are to be
sent to the Reich for labour service, and Ambassador
Veesenmayer intends to negotiate shortly on a further
twenty-five thousand. Jews who are not able to work
are for the time being to be gathered in camps outside

There is again mention of the various actions of the Swedes,
and then, at the end, it says that the Fuehrer has decided
on the matter that one should be conciliatory, but only on
condition that Budapest is entirely emptied of its Jews.

I would beg to submit a further document, document No. 451,
if I may. This is a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry by
Wagner, dated 9 November 1944, for the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. It concerns a further deal: One thousand Jews to
be sent to Switzerland. It begins:

“In a telephone call, the Head Office for Reich
Security has reported that, as part of armaments
procurement for the Waffen-SS from neutral and enemy
foreign countries in return for releasing Jews, a
further contingent of one thousand Jews is to be
evacuated to Switzerland, as soon as the requisite
transport facilities are made available.”

It then says that this time the Swiss would at least like to
have some intimation as to when these one thousand persons
are to arrive, in order to make arrangements. And then at
the end it says: “I am duly reporting on these plans of the
SS and request instructions.”

Presiding Judge: This will be N/91.

Dr. Servatius: Witness, do you know anything about this
agreement, this transaction involving one thousand Jews?

Accused: I do not know anything about a transport
involving the figure one thousand, but possibly I am mixing
things up with figures often quoted and given in documents
of twelve hundred and seventeen hundred persons. I am
unable to say anything more precise about this.

Judge Halevi: Perhaps this is the second part of those who
were to go from Bergen-Belsen to Switzerland?

Accused: Your Honour, I assume that this is the case,
that this came to a total of seventeen hundred, which was
possibly split up, but I do not know anything further about

Dr. Servatius: As a further exhibit, I submit document No.
452, a memorandum of the Foreign Ministry, dated 11 November
1944, for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. This
summarizes the various transports to Switzerland. First
there is mention of the Weiss-Manfred Works operation. It

“On the occasion of the Weiss-Manfred Works operation,
which the Reichsfuehrer-SS discussed with the Fuehrer,
as yet totally vague plans were considered for making
use of Jews in other ways than transferring them to the
Reich for labour service, to utilize them for Germany’s
armament potential.”

I would draw attention to the fact that these are not
humanitarian considerations – rather, it is stated that
these forced labourers are of no use to the munitions
industry, so that they could be made use of in some other
manner, by turning them into hard cash.

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/92.

Dr. Servatius: I now submit the last document in this
section, document No. 104. It is a note on the Jewish
Question by Veesenmayer, for the Reich Minister of Foreign
Affairs, dated 24 October 1944.

Presiding Judge: This will be exhibit N/93.

Dr. Servatius: This is a general note on the situation of
the Jewish Question, and at the top of page 5 it reads:

“It was not until after 16 October of this year that
negotiations, with consultative participation of German
authorities, began once again, with the aim of bringing
about a Final Solution of the Jewish Question in

I assume that these are the negotiations already referred

I have no further questions to the Accused. With that, I
can conclude the section on Hungary. Tomorrow, I should
like to submit four documents on the Slovenes which have not
been presented. I shall then come to concentration camp
matters, so that I shall have some concluding questions. I
cannot yet say definitely whether I shall finish tomorrow.
Possibly I may manage to do so.

Presiding Judge: Very well.

The Court will adjourn until 8.30 tomorrow morning.

Last-Modified: 1999/06/09