Session 086-02, Eichmann Adolf

Dr. Servatius: The next exhibit is T/1193, document No.
152. This is a communication from Veesenmayer, dated 25 May
1944, to the Foreign Ministry. He reports:

“Evacuation from Carpathian area and Transylvania
proceeding smoothly as planned. To date some 150,000
dispatched to destination. With increased use of
waggon space, evacuation operation from aforementioned
zones can be completed by 17 June.”

The next, exhibit T/1196, document No. 1342. This is a
report on the continuation of these measures.

“On 7 June a start will be made on concentrating
operations in the northern and north-western areas.
Finally, the same measures will be implemented in the
south and south-west.”

Then, further down, at the bottom of page 3, it says:

“It is considered extremely important for the offices
of the Foreign Ministry to continue to participate in
the same way as has so far been the case with

Presiding Judge: But here this appears in connection with
Jews of foreign nationality, not in general.

Dr. Servatius: Yes, this is something which has already
been emphasized earlier. This relates again to foreigners
who are present in these areas, and they are to be interned
in a special camp. They are certainly not to be released.

The next document is No. 629, not yet submitted, and I now
present it as evidence. This is a note from the Press
Department of the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Schmidt, dated 27
May 1944. He is making suggestions about the large-scale
operation against the Jews of Budapest and says that some
outward causes must be created, such as to explain that
subversive plans have been discovered, and “a particularly
flagrant incident must be publicized as the cause for the
large-scale round-up.” At the bottom, there is a
handwritten note saying, “the State Secretary asks for the
above suggestions from Ambassador Schmidt to be passed on to
Ambassador Veesenmayer, and to ask for his reaction.”

Presiding Judge: I mark this N/78.

Dr. Servatius: I shall now discuss exhibit T/1199, document
No. 630. This is a communication from von Thadden, Foreign
Ministry, about the planned Jewish operation. At the
bottom, there is a handwritten note to the effect that, in
order to facilitate implementation of the operation – then
there is something I cannot make out – perhaps news items
from abroad could also be prepared in advance. This shows
that the Foreign Ministry was dealing with this matter.

The next document has not yet been submitted. I present
document No. 631. This is another communication from von
Thadden and states his view on a consultation between
directors. The decision about the preparations for the
large-scale operation is to be postponed until receipt of
Veesenmayer’s written opinion, and then it says, and I

“At the same time I made a suggestion, which apparently
received the approval of the State Secretary and Under-
Secretary Hencke, that it should be put to Ambassador
Veesenmayer that if there was no preparation on a
propaganda level, the date for the large-scale Budapest
operation should be set in agreement with us.”

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/79.

Dr. Servatius: The next exhibit is T/1200, document No.
632. This is Veesenmayer’s reply, dated 8 June 1944, on
propaganda preparations. He says that propaganda
preparations are pointless, and will instead produce a
counter-effect, as it is common knowledge that for weeks
property has been confiscated, and that freedom of movement
is curtailed.

The next exhibit is T/1208, document No. 385. This is a
communication from Veesenmayer, dated 14 June, to the Office
of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. Here he writes
that as a result of the stringent measures Jews are now
migrating from Slovakia to Hungary…

Presiding Judge: The other way round.

Dr. Servatius: Quite right – the other way round;
previously, large numbers of Jews migrated from Slovakia to
Hungary, and now, due to the stringent measures, a reverse
migration is to be noted. And then he says – there is
another sentence in between – “Work at this end would be
considerably facilitated if radical anti-Jewish measures
were also taken in Slovakia.” And then, at the end:
discussion with Ludin in Pressburg to work out joint
practical proposals.

Next, exhibit T/1211, document No. 114. This is
correspondence between the Mayor of Vienna and
Kaltenbrunner. Kaltenbrunner refers to a letter dated 7 June
1944 from the Mayor of the City of Vienna, Blaschke, and
informs him that he is able to send him the labourers he has
requested, that is to say, Jews from Hungary. The letter

“Dear Blaschke, for the special reasons indicated by
you – and, in fact, SS Brigadefuehrer Dr. Dellbruegge
has written to me in the same connection – I have in
the meanwhile given orders for some evacuation
transports to be routed to Vienna-Strasshof.”

Next, exhibit T/1123, document No. 638. This is a
communication from the Foreign Ministry, signed Wagner,
dated 15 June 1944, about an incident on a transport,
robbing of Jews, maltreatment, and apparently shooting of
Jews. In the last paragraph it says: “Request immediate
clarification with Eichmann’s office, putting an end to
abuses, and telegraphed report.”

Exhibit T/1124 [document No.639]. Veesenmayer reports to
the Foreign Ministry with regard to this enquiry. This

“Investigations were initiated immediately. According
to information from Obersturmbannfuehrer, it is
probable that the Slovak reports are correct, since the
recently assigned transport detail no longer consists
of tested SD personnel, but mainly of extremely young,
recently recruited ethnic German SS from the Backa and
Banat regions, who have on various occasions shown
extreme moral shortcomings. Further report will be
sent after conclusion of enquiries which are underway.

Next exhibit, T/1125 [document No.640]. German legation,
Budapest, signed Grell, to the Foreign Ministry, dated 2
August 1944. It reads: “The affair has been investigated by
the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the Security
Service in Hungary” (I shall omit the next phrase) “who has
reported on the result to the Head Office for Reich
Security.” It continues: “In general, the incident occurred
as reported, the shooting was necessary in order to maintain
discipline in the transport.” This shows that the legation
is trying to gloss over the affair.

This communication is particularly important because of the
question of competence. The investigation was instigated by
the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the Security
Service, and not, therefore, by Eichmann. The intervening
phrase explains this: “The Special Operations Units of SS
Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann is responsible solely for the
technical implementation of the transports.”

Next, exhibit T/1203, document No. 419. Telegram from
Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry, dated 27 June 1944. By
way of introduction it says:

“Head Office for Reich Security IV has informed
Eichmann Special Operations Units here that, in reply
to a question from the Senior Commander of the
Security Police, Greece, he has been instructed to
treat the Jews of Hungarian nationality who are still
in Greece no longer separately, but, after seizing
their assets, to transfer them to Germany.”

This is important because it shows that the orders for
Greece did not come from the Accused, but from the Head
Office for Reich Security, Berlin, where the Accused was not
stationed at that time.

I offer as evidence document No. 992. This is a letter from
Winkelmann directly to Himmler, dated 7 July 1944. In it he
proposes a more energetic approach. In the first sentence
he says:

“In the last week there has been a large number of
incidents here which might well arouse concern in other
regions. The Nuncio and Prince Primate Seredy (a
Magyarized Slovak) keep intervening with the Regent in
favour of the Jews of Budapest.”

On the last page but one, in the middle, at the beginning of
the paragraph, Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann says
the following:

“From what I have seen in the last week, I consider
that it is really necessary for the work of the
government to be examined very closely by the German
authorities. The best thing, obviously, would be if
the Fuehrer were to summon the Regent, in order to put
his opinion to him with all clarity. What must be
ensured is that Veesenmayer at last receives strict
instructions to bang on the table here.”

Then, on the last page, the matter of the transfer of the
Weiss-Manfred Works comes up. It says there:

“On 4 July 1944 Becher invited me to take part in a
discussion he had with Imredy about the Weiss-Manfred
Works. Other participants in the discussion were the
Economic Affairs Commissioner, Dr. Boden, and Consul
Rekowski. Imredy had, in a previous discussion, asked
a whole series of questions which he wanted Becher to
answer. According to what Imredy said, Becher had
already answered all the questions satisfactorily,
except for two.

“The first question related to what Sztojay had already
maintained, as to whether the Reichsfuehrer-SS would
agree to the contract being valid only for the duration
of the War. That was refused. Becher explained to
Imredy that the Reichsfuehrer-SS would certainly agree
that after the end of the War there could be a
discussion as to whether the contract was to remain in
force or be changed in some way.

“The second question concerned the nationality of the
Director General. The Hungarians wanted a Hungarian
(the word is not clear in print here). Becher told
them that such a demand was totally unacceptable, since
the Director General would have to be someone who would
receive his orders directly from the Reichsfuehrer-SS
and must therefore have his complete confidence.”

That can only mean Mr. Becher.

Presiding Judge: I mark this exhibit N/80.

Dr. Servatius: I proceed now to file 38. First of all,
exhibit T/1190, document No. 447. This is a communication
from Ambassador Altenburg to Veesenmayer, dated 20 July
1944. The communication states the following: “On the
evening of 19 July, the London broadcasting station
broadcast the following under the title `Germany wants to do
business with Jewish blood’,” and then it more or less says
that it is the Brand operation which is being referred to.
Brand received his assignment in the middle of May. This
announcement will have to be reread attentively later on in
the appropriate context. There is no reference to the use
of the catch phrase, “The mills of Auschwitz would be
stopped,” that is to say, that there would be no more
deportations. Nothing along those lines can be seen in the
announcement. I should now like to ask the witness a few
questions, how he came to Hungary, and how this affair came

Witness, how did you come to be detailed to Hungary?

Accused: Around 10 March 1944, my Department chief,
Mueller, informed me that I was to go to Mauthausen and to
report there to the Senior Commander of the Security Police
and the Security Service for Hungary, to work as a
Specialist Officer. Himmler, he said, had ordered the
deportation of all Jews from Hungary and, for strategic
reasons, there would have to be a combing operation from
east to west.

Dr. Servatius: So you reported to the Senior Commander of
the Security Police – that was Winkelmann.

Accused: So I went to Mauthausen, and I reported, but it
was not Winkelmann, but Geschke, Dr. Geschke, who at that
time was an SS Standartenfuehrer and Ministerial Counsellor.

Dr. Servatius: What sort of assignment did you get from

Accused: First of all, there were questions relating to
the transfer to Hungary of the command of the Senior
Commander of the Security Police that had to be discussed.

Dr. Servatius: I gather that you took the command to
Hungary; when did you get there?

Accused: Not only did I have to make the transport
arrangements to get the command of the Senior Commander of
the Security Police to Hungary, but I was also ordered
actually to take the commando of the Order Police to

Dr. Servatius: And when did you arrive?

Accused: This commando must have arrived around the 20th
or 21st. Today, I can no longer say exactly when; a fast
advance commando reached Budapest by the 20th, I believe,
but that did not belong to my column.

Dr. Servatius: What happened to the marching unit, once you
arrived in Vienna? Was it disbanded, or did it remain in

Accused: This marching commando or unit immediately
disbanded according to competence – the Order Police went to
the Order Police Office, and the Security Police to the
Security Police Office.

Dr. Servatius: Under whose command were you?

Accused: I was under the command of the Senior Commander
of the Security Police and the Security Service, as a
Specialist Officer.

Dr. Servatius: Were other Security Service departments also
working in Hungary?

Accused: There were all sorts of Commanders of the
Security Police and the SD – some five to eight of them –
throughout the whole of Hungary; they were also under the
orders of the Senior Commander of the Security Police, and
the Senior Commander of the Security Police was under the
orders of the Higher SS and Police Leader.

Dr. Servatius: What was the role of these commanders, and
what was their assignment?

Accused: The Commanders of the Security Police and the
Security Service were purely executive posts, and they had
to carry out exactly the same routine work as a State Police
Office or State Police Regional Headquarters. My assignment
was not yet clear at the beginning: The deportations were
due to be carried out, but first the preparatory
negotiations had to be set in motion with the Hungarian
Government departments. And as shown by the documents,
these negotiations were set in motion by the
Plenipotentiary, and the first result of these negotiations
is to be found in document 675, exhibit N/73, of 15 April
1944. I was now to set in motion all the negotiations and
discussions necessary to establish a timetable, but even
that was dealt with differently in Hungary, and the same
document shows that the details of the evacuation were
worked out between the Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelman
and Veesenmayer, and Veesenmayer himself enquired from the
Reich authorities about the destination of the transports.

Dr. Servatius: Witness, right at the beginning there were
arrests, and confiscations were made – was that your doing?

Accused: It was not up to me to carry out confiscations,
nor to make arrests; this assignment was exclusively that of
the Commander of the Security Police and the Security
Service, as I shall shortly show on the basis of various
documents. But I must first say that at the beginning, in
the very first days, members of my operations unit,
Obersturmbannfuehrer Krumey and Wisliceny, did serve with
the Commander of the Security Police and the Security
Service for Budapest, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer and
Oberregierungsrat Trenker, as shown by document No. 813,

Dr. Servatius: Witness, if that is so, what was left for
you as your activity – it is not clear to me what you still
had to do.

Accused: I said this before in my Statement, when I was
interrogated, to the Israeli police captain who was
interrogating me – I know it sounds unlikely, but the
documents bear me out – I myself was only marginally
involved with drawing up the timetable, because the high-
level superiors, Winkelmann and Veesenmayer, personally made
the arrangements for this matter in Hungary.

And so, at the beginning, the only thing left for me to do
was to ensure that my superiors were kept constantly
informed and up to date. Having, in accordance with my
instructions, visited the various departments in the
Ministry of the Interior, such as State Secretary Endre, or
having assessed the day-to-day work of the Hungarian
gendarmerie and reported on it, because one of my liaison
officers was working there as an adviser in the operations
department of the Hungarian gendarmerie – not as an adviser,
but simply as an observer, the Hungarian gendarmerie had no
need of advice from German forces – I really had nothing
further to do in relation to this particular assignment.

Last-Modified: 1999/06/09