Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Volume I Chapter IX Collaboration with Italy & Japan

The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Last-Modified: 1996/06/06

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Nine

[Page 840]


In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried
forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and
remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The
conspirators then projected the Nazi plan upon a universal
screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New World of
the United States of America. As a result, the wars of
aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across
the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost
to the day, in surrender ceremonies aboard a United States
battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.

A. Formal German — Japanese — Italian Alliances.

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the
Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in
Berlin on 125 January 1936 (2508-PS). This agreement, on its
face, was directed against the activities of the Communist
International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6
November 1937 (2506-PS).

It is an interesting fact — specially in light of the
evidence to be presented regarding Ribbentrop’s active
participation in collaboration with the Japanese — that
Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at
Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop
was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler’s
Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-
Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation
of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese
Governments signed another pact at Berlin — a ten-year
military-economic alliance (264-PS). Again Ribbentrop signed
for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister:
This Tripartite Pact pledged

[Page 841]

Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and collaboration
with each other in the establishment of a “new order” in
Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part:

“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as
a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation
of the world be given its own proper place. They have
therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with
one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the
regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to
establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to
promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there.
Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to
extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of
the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a
direction similar to their own, in order that their
aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may
thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany,
Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:

“Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the
leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of
a new order in Europe.

“Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order
in Greater East Asia.

“Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to
cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They
further undertake to assist one another with all
political, economic and military means, if one of the
three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at
present not involved in the European war or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict.”


“Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force
immediately upon signature and shall remain in force
for ten years from the date of its coming into force.”

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold
announcement to the world that the leaders of Germany,
Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to
achieve world domination and to establish the “new order”
presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the
Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow
into Austria early in 1938.

A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the
United States at the time of the signing of the Tripartite
Pact, is relevant in this connection. Mr. Hull declared:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the
view of

[Page 842]

the Government of the United States, substantially
alter a situation which has existed for several years.
Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all
a relationship which has long existed in effect and to
which this Government has repeatedly called attention.
That such an agreement has been in process of
conclusion has been well known for some time, and that
fact has been fully taken into account by the
Government of United States in the determining of this
country’s policies.” (2944-PS)

No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and
negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27
September 1940. Nevertheless, one example of the type of
German-Japanese relationship existing before the
formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy — the
record of a conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler
and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This
record, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, reads: “File

“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation
ranged over the following subjects:

“1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much,
especially because it had been spiritually warranted in
all its features.

“2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate
the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer
mold. He also told me that, together with German
counter-espionage (Abwehr), he was undertaking long-
range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia
and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine.
However, this organization was to become effective only
in case of war.

“3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10
Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier.
These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number
of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across,
had been shot at the frontier.” (2195-PS)

B. Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan

The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic
alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the
Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they
were at war and against those with whom they contemplated
war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course
strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship
with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in
fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried
out her “stab in the back” by declar-

[Page 843]

ing war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi
conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on
the other side of the world.

The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration
was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth
of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
United States of America.

(1) Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth. At
least as early as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators
undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by
exhortations to commit aggression against the British
Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On
that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with
General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which
he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the
British in the Far East as soon as possible. (1834-PS)

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation
of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent
copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his
various ambassadors and ministers for their “strictly
confidential and purely personal information,” with the
further note that “these statements are of fundamental
significance for orientation in the general political
situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report
stated, in part:

“Strictly secret

“from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign
Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13
February 1941.”


“After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM
[Reich Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador
Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had
pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many
doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west
these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM]
regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan,
for which he had been working with the Ambassador for
many years already, had come into being only after
various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not
been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however,
that they are together now. ”

*** Now the German-Japanese alliance has been
concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit
for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the

[Page 844]

the question of its further development: now stands in
the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for
Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining
the intended air and U-boat warfare against England, he

“*** Thereby England’s situation would take
catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is
prepared; its execution, however, depends on various
factors, above all on weather conditions.”

“The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would
encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal,
but superior to a combined English-American air force
at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was
unlimited. The same was true for our airplane
production capacity. As far as quality is concerned
ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing
about the American) and we were on the way even to
enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the
antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced.
Since the army had been supplied far beyond its
requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up
(the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because
of the immense stock of material), production would now
be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and
antiaircraft guns.

“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has
been won to-day militarily, economically and
politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly
and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer
was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory
and determined to bring the war to a quick and
victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan
was of importance. However, Japan in its own interest,
should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy
England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the
other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far
East, a position which it could acquire only through
war. There were three reasons for quick action:

“1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow
against the center of the British Empire (threat to
India, cruiser-warfare, etc.) The effect upon the
morale of the British people would be very serious and
this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

“2. A surprising intervention by- Japan was bound to
keep America out of the war. America, which at present
is not

[Page 845]

armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her
Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even
less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise
respect the American interests, there would not even be
the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of
lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans.
It was very unlikely that America would declare war if
it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan
takes the Philippines without America being able to do
anything about it.

“3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to
be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself
already during the war the position she wants to hold
in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty.
Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that
he would do everything to carry through this policy.”

The subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument is noteworthy. First
he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already
practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he
suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more
quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was propitious
for Japan’s entry. Then, referring to the spoils of
conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to
pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted,
implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty.

The remainder of Ribbentrop’s argument shows something of
the real nature of the German-Japanese alliance:

“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it
was Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm
after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the
other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply
into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s
victory on the continent has brought now, after the
conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages
for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably
weakened; Japan had been able to close in steadily on
Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed
enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two
nations. Due to our geographical situation we should
have to carry the main burden of the final battle in
the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
should arise we should have to carry the main burden
also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan
would find itself confronted by a world-coalition
within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The
fate of both

[Page 846]

nations was being determined now for centuries to come.
The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three
countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany
would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic
idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these
statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was
determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich
Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems
which would arise after the war for. the parties of the
Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would
require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization
should take place, but a solution should be found on a
basis of parity particularly in the economic realm. In
regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the
principle that a free exchange of trade should take
place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal
basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian
sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he
conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade
and make trade agreements directly with the independent
states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while
Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade
agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand,
Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two
economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant- the
other preferences with regard to third parties. The
Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.”

The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign
Minister, is clear. The participation of the German military
representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars
of aggression is shown in a Top Secret order signed by
Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled “Basic Order No. 24
Regarding Collaboration with Japan” C-75). It is dated 5
March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s
conference with Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed
in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. Two copies of
this order, identical except for handwritten notations
presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the
prosecution. Document G75 is Copy No. 2 of the order,
distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy (the OKM). Copy No. 4,. designed for the
Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab — the Operations Staff

[Page 847]

of the High Command of the Armed Forces — was found in the
OKW files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff
was Jodl.

Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration
with Japan (C-75). It reads:

“Only by Officer

“Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

“Fuehrer’s Headquarters
5 March 1941

[Various handwritten notations and stamps]

“Basic Order No. 24
regarding collaboration with Japan

“The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:

“1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on
the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as
possible to take active measures in the Far East.
Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and
the center of gravity of the interests of the United
States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

“The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the
prospects of success for Japan in view of the still
undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its
adversaries. The “Barbarossa” operation will create
particularly favorable political and military
prerequisites for this. [Marginal note “slightly

“2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is
essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential
with all means available.

“For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of
the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and
generous manner with Japanese desires for information
regarding German war and combat experience and for
assistance in military economics and in technical
matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor
should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority
should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
which would have the most immediate application in
waging war.

[Page 848]

“In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions,
to himself.

“3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two
parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

“This will be subject to the following guiding

“a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be
stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and
thereby keeping the United States out of the war.
Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or
economic interests in the Far East which would give
occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese

“b. The great successes achieved by Germany in
mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable
to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose.
In this connection every opportunity to support German
mercantile warfare must be exploited.

“c. The raw material situation of the pact powers
demands that Japan should acquire possession of those
territories which it needs for the continuation of the
war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber
shipments must be carried out even after the entry of
Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance
to Germany.

“d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British
position in the Far East would mean a decisive success
for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of
British naval power extending to those of American
naval power only if the entry of the United States into
the war cannot be prevented — will result in weakening
the enemy’s system of power in that region and also,
just like the attack on sea communications, in tying
down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia) .

“A date for the beginning of operational discussions
cannot yet be fixed.

“4. In the military commissions to be formed in
accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such
questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the
three participating powers. These will include
primarily the problems of economic warfare.

“The working out of the details is the responsibility
of the “Main Commission” with the cooperation of the
Armed Forces High Command.

[Page 849]

“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of
the Barbarossa operation.

“The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
“Signed in draft: Keitel

“Correctness certified by
Lieutenant Commander” (C-75)

It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators’
cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with
Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan
to aggression against Singapore and other British Far
Eastern bases.

A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after
the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 (C-75) and was attended
by Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record
of this meeting discloses that Raeder, then Commander in
Chief of the Navy, made the following calculations:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of
US A. for war against Japan; inferiority of US Fleet vis-a-
vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for
this action, but according to all declarations made by
Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the US A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against US A.
She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as
soon as possible.” (C-152)

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that
military staff conferences had already been held with
the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese
military support against the British and to urge their
immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the
record of this meeting establishes this:

“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese
officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds
to land in England.” (C-152)

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the
Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their
performance under the contract.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to

[Page 850]

induce the Japanese to aggression against the British
Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The
following is a report of their conversations, found in the
German Foreign Office Archives:


“The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka
about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in
Moscow, where they had left of. He expressed the opinion,
that it would probably be best, in view of the whole
situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians
too far. He did not know how the situation would develop.
One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would
strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was
ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that
Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without
fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part
of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of
the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any
time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try
to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however
enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be
finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of
course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants
to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain
from such an undertaking because of possible fears of

“He could not know of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He
(the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that
a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of
possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the
Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between
Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the
situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were
not probable, would have to be considered possible.”


“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In
view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible
attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the

[Page 851]

intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral
Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during
this year would have its hands so full in the English home
waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able
to send even a single ship to the Far East. General Admiral
Raeder had described the US submarines as so bad that Japan
need not bother about them at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a
very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it
also held the view that, in case of a clash with the
American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without
trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not
take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with
the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five
years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for
this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before
deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one
hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the
other hand there was the probability of losing the
Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course,
this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because
of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to
offset such a loss.

“In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted
as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key
‘position of England in the East. Therefore it might be
possible that his attitude toward the British would appear
to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should
not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only
in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool
the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one
day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

“In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were
based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack
against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation
with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM
remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a
famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then
the nation will be united.” The Japanese need to be

[Page 852]

shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed
in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.”


“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance
in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been
broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a
German written promise of assistance.

“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these
questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to
procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer — who
probably must be considered the greatest expert on military
questions at the present time — could advise Japan on the
best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on
aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could
draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for
the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in
the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus
the British fleet would be forced to disappear from
Singapore immediately.

“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

“The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed
new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified
positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael,
which he could make available to the Japanese.

“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the
younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close
friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval
forces would need three months until they could capture
Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled
this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger
which threatened from America, for six months. If, however,
the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the
operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the
situation with America would become extremely critical and
he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese
attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They
could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2

“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over
the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture
of Singapore.” (1877-PS)

On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted,

[Page 853]

bentrop again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the
Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The
notes of this conference, which were also found in German
Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following exchange:

“*** In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was
now awakening and, according to the Japanese
temperament, would take action quickly after the
previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign
Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to
accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the
Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of
the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
armament, and with the resignation from the League of


“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German
Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the
ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant
power on the European Continent.

“In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again
summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back
to Japan with him from his trip:

“1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of
this year the world would realize this. Even England
would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed
before then, and America would also have to resign
herself to this fact.

“2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan
and Germany. The future of both countries could be
regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan
should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany
in Europe and Africa.

“3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war.
But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the
war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in
the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it
offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever
return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives
of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her
to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (1882-PS)

Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen
pursuing the same tack previously noted: Germany has already
won the war for all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will
hasten the inevitable end. And Japan had better get the
positions she wants during the war. Ribbentrop’s assurances,
(1877-PS) that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the
Soviet Union

[Page 854]

if Japan entered the conflict, and his continual references
to the weakness of the United States scattered throughout
his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the

The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret
report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache
in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last
sentence in paragraph 1, states:

“The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila
stand.” (1538-PS)

The fact appears from this sentence that the German military
were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational
plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had

(2) Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the USSR The
Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a
Japanese “stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Here again Ribbentrop appears as a
central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24
regarding collaboration with Japan (C-75), the Nazi
conspirators had been preparing “Fall Barbarossa”, the plan
for attack on the USSR Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however,
that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the
Barbarossa operation”. (C-75)

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister
Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance
of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at
things to come. Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest
part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the
Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the
USSR would try to avoid developments leading to war,
nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not
probable, would have to be considered possible. (1877-PS)

Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these
remarks in April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the
Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the USSR in
June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room
for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop dispatched a coded
telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo (2896-PS).
Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows:

“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It
would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news
from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to

[Page 855]

I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the
Japanese Policy, end in the Japanese Foreign Minister,
first of all because the present Japanese government
would really act inexcusably toward the future of its
nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to
solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all
time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese
matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a
report which coincides with our own observations as far
as we are able to judge at the present war situation,
it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the
matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as
her military preparations are completed.”

“However, I ask you to employ all available means in
further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war
against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have
mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner
this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural
objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on
the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts.
After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of
the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so
gigantic, that the question of England’s collapse or
the total destruction of the English islands,
respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America
totally isolated from the rest of the world would then
be faced with our taking possession of the remaining
positions of the British Empire which are important for
the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable
conviction that a carrying through of the new order as
desired by us will be a matter of course, and there
would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together
and encounter every action of the Americans with the
same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as
often as possible and in detail on the political
situation there.”

Ott’s reply to this telegram (2897-PS), dated 13 July 1941,
was as follows:

(Secret Cipher System)

“Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.
Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.

As fast as possible!

“#1217 dated 13.7
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[Page 856]
Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign

Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941

“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s
entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible.
Especially using arguments of personal message of
Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince
Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office,
Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business
men. I believe that, according to military
preparations, Japanese participation will soon take
place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to
fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups
which, without unified command, follows various aims
and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed

Ott.” (2897-PS)

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his
exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against
the USSR Three documents, covering July of 1942 and March
and April of 1943, record these exhortations.

The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima,
Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter
of background, it may be noted that at that time German
armies were sweeping forward in the USSR and the fall of
Sevastapol had just been announced. The discussion proceeded
as follows:

“Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort,
on 9 July 1942.

“He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the
Ambassador at this time when the situation was as
described, because now a question of fateful importance
had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: if
Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the
moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He
thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now,
it would lead to her (Russia’s final moral collapse; at
least it would hasten the collapse of her present
system. In any case, never again would Japan have such
an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once
and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He
had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the
Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to
emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack
Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an
undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese
operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the
halfway mark, and we

[Page 857]

do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not
mutually profitable.” (2911-PS)

Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6
March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the
strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the
USSR had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February
1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated the German
forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the
north and west their winter offensive had recovered large
areas from the hands of the invaders. In addition, combined
US and British forces had already: landed in North Africa.
The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument reflects the changed
military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of “so
sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is
noted, in this regard, that the month of February 1943 had
also seen the end of organized Japanese resistance on the
island of Guadalcanal. The conference went as follows:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a
telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of
his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the
German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of
a common conference between the Japanese Government and
the Imperial headquarters, during which the question
was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
result is the following: the Japanese Government
absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from
Russia, and completely understands the desire of its
German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the
war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the
Japanese Government, considering the present war
situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the
conviction that it -would be in the common interest not
to start the war against ,Russia now. On the other
hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the
Russian question.

“The Japanese Government has the intention to become
aggressive again in the future on other fronts.

“The RAM brought up the question after the explanation
by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the
war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages
the war against the common enemies, England and
America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more
defensively. However, it would be more correct that all
powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine
their forces to defeat England and America, but also
Russia together. It is not good when one part must
fight alone. One cannot overstrain the

[Page 858]

German national strength. He has worried silently that
certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion
and who propagate it, that Germany would come through
the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should
consolidate itself further at first, before it makes
further and utmost efforts.”

“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the
attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after
all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the
South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on
all fronts except those in China — there are mostly
very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack
on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked
himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready
for that”. (2954-PS)

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with
Oshima about three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top
secret notes of this conference reveal the following:

“The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed
again that without any doubt this year presented the
most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt
strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at
her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would
never again be as weak as she is at the moment.” (2929-

(3) Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese
Against the United States. The Nazi preparations and
collaboration with the Japanese against the United States
present a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis
themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of
the fomenting of war in the Pacific.

In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the
USSR, reference has been made to certain documents relating
to the United States. Those documents will be taken up
again, in their relevant passages, to show their particular
application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the
Japanese to war against the USSR, documents have been
introduced chronicling conferences which took place after
the dates of 7 December 1941 and 11 December 1941 when the
Japanese and German Governments, respectively, initiated and
declared aggressive war against the United States. These
documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and acceptance
of the direction in which their actions were

[Page 859]

leading, as well as the universal aspects of their
conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.

(a) Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States.

The Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States
must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and
their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all
plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United
States was Intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938,
when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed
Austria and were perfecting their plans for occupation of
Czechoslovakia.. This speech was delivered to
representatives of the aircraft industry And the copy which
the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the
enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to
General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental
research for the Luftwaffe (R140). The statement in the
covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy of
the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of
his long speech, Goering called for increased aircraft
production and referred to the necessity for full
mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued:

“I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies
with 5-tons of explosives as far as New York and back.
I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so
that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth
of the arrogant people over there.” (R-140)

Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of
realization at that time, either technically or in the face
of the Nazi conspirators’ schedule of aggression that has
already been outlined. During the period of their
preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up
though the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R.,
it is only reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators
were not disposed to involve the United States in war at
that time.

Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of
war against the United States of America at a later date was
on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document
which was found in the files of the OKL, the German Air
Force, (376-PS). This memorandum is marked “Chefsache” —
the German designation for Top Secret — and is directed
from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General,
presumably a Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major
of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison
Officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the
staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes
as a “brief

[Page 860]

resume of the military questions current here”, is dated 2
October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph 5
states: “5. The Fuehrer i8 at present occupied with the
question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a
view to the prosecution of war against America at a later
date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon
here. Essential conditions are at the present:

“a. No operational commitment
“b. Portuguese neutrality
“c. Support of France and Spain

“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and
holding air bases and o the question of supply is
needed from the GAF.

“Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself
from Ic Kurfurst (G. in C.- GAF Rear Hq.). I would like
to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied
with the information he desires.” (376-PS)

The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further
indicated by paragraph 7:

“7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference,
especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the
fact that in his opinion too many details of our
knowledge of American aircraft industry are being
published in the German press. The matter has been
discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed
out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but
have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you
on its own merits.” (376-PS)

Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence
resulting from early gains in the aggression against the
USSR, the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary
preparations for the attack on the United States. This top
secret order, found in files of the German Navy, reads:

“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No.
32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the
following principles to govern the strength of
personnel and of material supplies:

“1. In general: The military domination of Europe after
the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the
Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. As
far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the
Armoured units will be greatly increased.

“Naval armament must be restricted to those measures
which have a direct connection with the conduct o the
war against England and, should the case arise, against

[Page 861]

“The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air
Force, which must be greatly increased in strength.” (C-

(b) Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United
States. From the documents just quoted, it appears that the
Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military
plans of their own against the United States. The Nazi over-
all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a
complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the
Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to
the Japanese to undertake an assault against British
possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered
war against the United States.

It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding
collaboration with the Japanese (C-75), which was issued on
5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3a
as aiming at “forcing England to the ground quickly and
thereby keeping the United States out of the war”.
Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated
within the framework of that Policy the possibility of the
United States’ entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the
Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by
Japan on United States’ possessions practically
simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as
actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of
the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No.
24 stated in subparagraph 3 (c):

“c. The raw material situation of the pact powers
demands that Japan should acquire possession of those
territories which it needs for the continuation of the
war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber
shipments must be carried out even after the entry of
Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance
to Germany.” (C-75)

The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately
below subparagraph 3 (d):

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of
British naval power extending to those of American
naval power only if the entry of the United States into
the war cannot be prevented — will result in weakening
the enemy’s system of power in that region and also,
just like the attack on sea communications, in tying
down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).” (C-

In these passages there is a clear envisionment of US
involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital
threat to United States’ interests if Japan were to capture
Singapore was also clearly envisaged by Raeder in his
meeting of March 1941 with Hitler. Keitel, and Jodl, in
which he stated:

[Page 862]

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
favourable (whole English Fleet contained:
unpreparedness of USA. for war against Japan:
inferiority of US Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan
is indeed making preparations for this action, but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers
she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land
in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her
efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan
has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions
regarding the USA. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against USA. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon
as possible.” (C-152)

Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of US involvement
as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging
on the Japanese. In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the
Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained
in (1834-PS), Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise
intervention by Japan was bound to keep the United States
out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk
either her fleet or the possibility of losing the
Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two
paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the
pretense that the United States would not be involved:

“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if
America should declare war because of Japan’s entry
into the war, this would mean that America had had the
intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even
though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry
into the war would, as explained above, be by no means
decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign
Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary
lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry
into the war would be canceled by Japan’s entry into
the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the
Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy,
in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East,
this would represent the biggest chance for the
countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war
rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is
convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a
complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that
unfortunately he does not think the Americans would

[Page 863]

do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in
Japanese waters.” (1834-PS)

In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the
mutual interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and
suggests coordinated action. He indulged in a typical bit of
Nazi cynicism:

“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the
question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that
the contracting powers might be required, on the basis
of new affronts by the USA., to break off diplomatic
relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally
determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power
Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also
jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the
eyes of the people in the USA. to the situation and
under certain conditions bring about a swing toward
isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had
to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in
the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers
should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The
question, however, was in no way acute at the time.”

Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop — this time in a
conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka —
discussed the possible involvement of the United States.

The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were
urging the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital
interests of the United States and could lead the US to
involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict. This
fact is clear from the report of the conference between
Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin
on 4 April 1941 (1881-PS). The report states, in part:

“*** Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the
Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in
Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the
wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was
in need of German help particularly concerning the U-
boat warfare, which could be given by making available
to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan
would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
States. In case that the country should decide to
attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to
be prepared for a fight with the United States, because
in that case America probably would side with Great
Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the
United States would be restrained by diplomatic
exertions from entering

[Page 864]

the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy
had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is,
with war against America. They were of the opinion that
such a war would extend for five years or longer and
would take the form of guerrilla warfare in the Pacific
and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this
reason the German experiences in her guerrilla warfare
are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question
how such a war would best be conducted — and how all
the technical improvements of submarines, in all
details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
exploited by Japan.

“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should
see to it that the proper German authorities would
place at the disposal of the Japanese those
developments and inventions concerning Navy and Army,
which were needed by the Japanese.

“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany
too considered a conflict with the United States
undesirable, but that it had already made allowances
for such a contingency.”


“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the
Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order
that the proper German authorities would place at the
disposal of the Japanese the latest improvement and
inventions, which are of interest to them, because the
Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict
with the United States.

“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka
explained further that he has always declared in his
country that sooner or later a war with the United
States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to
drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict
would happen rather sooner than later. His
argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk
upon herself of a fight against America?” (1881-PS)

The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the
probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern
conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on
their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually
preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore,
the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were.
This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German
military attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (1538-PS). The
attache reports

[Page 865]

the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the
war in the event Germany should become involved in war with
the United States. In paragraph 1, this sentence appears:

“Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila
stand.” (1538-PS) .

A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United
States at this point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view
of their press of commitments elsewhere and their aggressive
plans against the USSR, set for execution in June of 1941,
their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the
United States not be involved in war at that time.
Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary
plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic
Islands document (376-PS) . They were repeatedly urging the
Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth,
just as they would urge them to attack the USSR soon after
the launching of the Nazi invasion. They were aware that the
course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far
East would probably lead to involvement of the United
States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told
Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had
fully realized the implications of the move against
Singapore. They knew also that the Japanese Army and Navy
were preparing operational plans against the United States.
They knew at least part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They
accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging
on the Japanese and pushed their Eastern allies still
farther along that course. On 4 April 1941, Hitler- told the
Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan were to
become involved in war with the United States, Germany would
immediately take the consequences and strike without delay.
The following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-
Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941:

“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer
pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately
take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with
the United States. It did not matter with whom the
United States would first get involved, if with Germany
or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one
country at a time, not to come to an understanding with
the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this
one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as
already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict
between Japan and America, because the strength of the
tripartite powers lies in their

[Page 866]

joined action. Their weakness would be if they would
let themselves be beaten individually.” (1881-PS)

Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike
against the United States:

“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the
situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in
similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland,
declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was
of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable
conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable
fight at a time when he himself was still young and
full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was
proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not
hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of
the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence
favored those who will not let dangers come to them,
but who will bravely face them.” (1881-PS)

Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance,
encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State
the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi
encouragement and promise of support did not end there.
Another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo
regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister,
dated 130 January 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read
as follows:

“The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his
viewpoint that the difference of opinion between Japan
and the US is very great. The Japanese Government since
it sent Ambassador Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he
told me. He is convinced that this position is in our
favor and makes the United States think that her entry
into the European war would be risky business. The new
American proposal of 25 November showed great
divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
differences of opinion concern, for example, the
further treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest
(one word missing) however resulted from the US attempt
to make the three-power agreement ineffective. US
suggested to Japan to conclude treaties of non-
aggression with the US, the British Empire, the Soviet
Union, and other countries in order to prevent Japan’s
entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers.
Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty
obligations and for this reason American demands are
the greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American
relations. He avoided discussing concessions promised
by the US and merely mentioned that grave decisions
were at stake.

[Page 867]

“The US is seriously preparing for war and is about to
operate a considerable part of its fleet from Southern
Pacific bases. The Japanese Government is busy working
out an answer in order to clarify its viewpoint. But he
has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the
American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.

“Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and
she hopes that in that case Germany and Italy,
according to the Three Power Agreement, would stand at
her side. I answered that there could be no doubt about
Germany’s future position. The Japanese Foreign
Minister thereupon stated that he understood from my
words that Germany in such a case would consider her
relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I
answered, according to my opinion, Germany was
certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the
two countries over this situation.

“Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was
possible that he would come back to this point soon.
The conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
confirmed the impression that the US note, in fact, is
very unsatisfactory even for the compromise-seeking
politicians here. For these circles America’s position,
especially in the China question, is very
disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three-Power Pact
as being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-
US negotiations seems to point to the fact that the
Japanese Government is becoming aware of the necessity
of close cooperation with the Axis powers.” (2898-PS)

Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano
during the period 13 February 1941 to 18 February 1941 fill
in the picture (2987-PS). These are taken from notes which
Ciano jotted down in the course of his daily business as
Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5
December read:

“December 3.
“Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an
audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement
on the progress of the negotiations with America,
concluding with the assertion that they have reached a
dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the
Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on
America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities
and proposes the signature of an agreement not to
conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating
this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave
fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with

[Page 868]

Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with
the communication and said: “We are now on the brink of
the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
September 1939.” What does this new event mean? In any
case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his
maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war
immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly
by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore,
this event also means that every prospect of peace is
becoming further and further removed, and that it is
now easy — much too easy – to predict a long war. Who
will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis
that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s answer
will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to
the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies
continue to give way under the pressure of an
unexpected Soviet offensive.

“Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely
cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot
get out of it, but the idea of provoking America’s
intervention pleases the Germans less and less.
Mussolini, on the other and, is pleased about it. ***”

“A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness.
After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to
answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent
Mackenson to my house to submit-a plan for a triple
agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the
pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to
awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter
was very glad I hadn’t ***”

It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement
was reached. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without
previous warning or declaration of war commenced an attack
against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the
British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On
the morning of 11 December, four days after the Japanese
assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war
on the United States. (2507-PS)

The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United
States resolved that “the state of war between the United
States and the Government of Germany which has thus been
thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared”.

[Page 869]

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive
intentions and declaration of war against the United States,
the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan
incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to
result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining
their preference that the United States not be involved in
the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct
possibility, even probability of such involvement as a
result of the actions they were encouraging; they were aware
that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the
United States; and they accepted the consequences by
assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the
United States should a US-Japanese conflict result. In
dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the
completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured. But those
documents which have been discovered, and introduced into
evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack
was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their
collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and
encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor
as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

The entry in the Ciano Diary for 18 February 1941 gives an
interesting sidelight on Ribbentrop’s reaction to the
Japanese sneak attack:

“A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is
overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is
so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am
not too sure about the final advantages of what has
happened. One thing is now certain: that America will
enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so
long that she will be able to realize all her potential
force. This morning I told this to the King who had
been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting
that in the “long run” I may be right. Mussolini was
happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite
clarification of relations between America and the
Axis.” (2987-PS)

A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador
Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the
presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The
subject matter was the Pearl Harbor attack. The top secret
notes-of this conference read in part:

“*** First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with
the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German
Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his

[Page 870]

ices in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation,
which has now obtained its culmination in a close
brotherhood of arms.

“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great
honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this
brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany
and Japan.

“The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration
of war!” This method is the only proper one. Japan
pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own
system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But
if one sees that the other is interested only in
putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is
not willing to come to an agreement, then one should
strike — as hard as possible, indeed — and not waste
time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear
of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself
negotiated with infinite patience at times, for
example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
realized, that the other did not want to come to an
agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities.
He would continue to go this way in the future.” (2932-


Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I, Pg. 5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F) 7; V. Vol. I, Pg. 28,29

[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document

[Page 871]

number indicates that the document was referred to during
the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the
reason given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]

*376-PS; Top secret memorandum signed
by Major Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, concerning current
military questions, including question of occupation of
Atlantic Islands referring to the United States. (USA 161) .
Vol. III, Pg. 288

*1538-PS; Report from German Military
Attache in Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, 24 May
1941. (USA 154) . Vol. IV, Pg. 100

*1834-PS; Report on conference
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129)
Vol. IV, Pg. 469

*1866-PS; Description; Record of conversation
between Reich Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May 1941.
(GB 273) Vol. IV, Pg. 499

*1877-PS; Report on conversation
between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin, 29 March 1941.
(USA 152) Vol. IV, Pg. 520

*1881-PS; Notes on conference between
Hitler and Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop, in Berlin, 4
April 1941. (USA 33) Vol. IV, Pg. 522

*1882-PS; Notes on conference between
and Matsuoka in Berlin, 4/5/1941. (USA 153) Vol. IV, Pg. 526

[Page 872]

*2195-PS; File memorandum on
conversation with Oshima, 31 January 1939, signed Himmler.
(USA 150) Vol. IV, Pg. 852

2506-PS; Protocol of Adherence by
Italy to Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 November 1937, published in
Documents of German Politics, 1940, 4th edition. Vol. V, Pg.

*2507-PS; Note from Ribbentrop to US
Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, 11 December 1941, containing
German Declaration of War on United States, published in
Documents o German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1, No. 74, pp.
497-9. (USA 164) . Vol. V, Pg. 241

*2508-PS; German-Japanese Agreement
against the Communist International, 125 January 1936,
signed by Ribbentrop. Documents of German Politics, Vol. 4.
(GB 147) . Vol. V, Pg. 242

*2643-PS; Announcement concerning
Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, 27
September 1940, signed by Ribbentrop for Germany. 1940
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149) . Vol.
V, Pg. 355

*2896-PS; Telegram from Ribbentrop to
German Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July 1941. (USA 155) .
Vol. V, Pg. 564

*2897-PS; Telegram from German
Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941. (USA
156) . Vol. V, Pg. 566

*2898-PS; Telegram from German
Ambassador to Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 130 January 1941.
(USA 163) . Vol. V, Pg. 566

*2911-PS; Notes on conversation
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July 1942. (USA 157) . Vol.
V, Pg. 580

[Page 873]

*2929-PS; Notes on conversation
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 18 April 1943. (USA 159) .
Vol. V, Pg. 603

*2932-PS; Notes on conference between
Hitler and
Oshima, 14 December 1941. (USA 165). . Vol. V, Pg. 603

2944-PS; Statement by US Secretary of
State, 27 September 1940, published in Peace and War, US
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. . Vol. V, Pg. 624

2945-PS; Joint resolution by the US
Senate and House of Representatives declaring state of war
with Germany, 11 December 1941, published in Peace and War,
US Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. . Vol. V, Pg. 625

*2954-PS; Minutes of conversation
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. (USA 158; GB
150) . Vol. V, Pg. 658

*2987-PS; Entries in diary of Count
Ciano. (USA I66) . Vol. V, Pg. 689

*3054-PS; “The Nazi Plan”, script of
a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)
. Vol. V, Pg. 801

3598-PS; Intercepted Japanese
Diplomatic message, Tokyo to Berlin, 130 January 1941. .
Vol. VI, Pg. 308

3599-PS; Intercepted Japanese
Diplomatic message, Rome to Tokyo, 13 February 1941. . Vol.
VI, Pg. 310

3600-PS; Intercepted Japanese
Diplomatic message, Tokyo to Berlin, 6 December 1941. . Vol.
VI, Pg. 312

3733-PS; Minutes of interview held on
19 August 1941, between Vice-Minister Aman and Ambassador
Ott. . Vol. VI, Pg. 545

*3780-PS; Record of Fuehrer’s conference with
Oshima, 5/27/1944, concerning Japanese treatment of American
terror pilots. (GB 293) . Vol. VI, Pg. 655

[Page 874]

*3817-PS; File of correspondence and
reports by Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. (USA 790) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 752

*C-74; Top Secret Order concerning
personnel and materiel program, signed by Hitler, 14 July
1941. (USA 162) . Vol. VI, Pg. 905

*C-75; OKW Order No. 24 initialed
Jodl, signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, concerning collaboration
with Japan. (USA 151) . Vol. VI, Pg. 906

C-147; Extracts from Directive No.
18, signed by Hitler, 12 November 1940. . Vol. VI, Pg. 957

*C-152; Extract from Naval War Staff
files, 18 March 1941, concerning audience of C-in-C of Navy
with Hitler on 1 March 1941. (GB 122) . Vol. VI, Pg. 966

*D-656; Extract of 29 November 1941
from Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by Japanese
Government between 1 July 1941 and 18 February 1941. (GB
148) . Vol. VII, Pg. 160

*D-657; Extract of 18 February 1941
from Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by Japanese
Government between 1 July 1941 and 18 February 1941. (GB
149) . Vol. VII, Pg. 163

*R-140; Secret letter from Goering’s
adjutant, Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing transcript
of Goering’s speech of 8 July to representatives of aircraft
industry. (USA 160) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 221