The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)
Last-Modified: 1996/06/05
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Nine
[Page 794]
12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR
A. Inception of the Plan.
The point of departure for the story of the aggression
against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On
that day – just a week before the invasion of Poland — the
Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of
Non-Aggression with the USSR This Treaty (TC-25) contained
two significant articles:
“Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to
refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive
action, or any attack against one another, whether
individually or jointly with other powers.”
“Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between
the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind
whatsoever, the two partners would clear away these
disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of
views or if necessary by arbitration commission.” (TC-
25)
The Treaty was signed for the USSR by the Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov, and for the German Government by
Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise
to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of
the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation
for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop
himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese
Ambassador, Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report
of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain
German diplomats in the field for their strictly
confidential and purely personal information (1834-PS).
Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the USSR
in the following words:
“Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a
treaty with Russia — a necessity for avoiding a two-
front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan.
The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for
the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German
victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty
with Russia.” (1834-PS)
In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the
Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of
arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find
that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges,
as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them
to do so. That they did so regard it is evident from the
fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in
progress, they began to consider the pos-
[Page 795]
sibility of launching a war of aggression against the USSR
In a speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters at Munich in
November 1943, Jodl admitted that:
“Parallel with all these developments realization was
steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly
nearer from the Bolshevik East — that danger which has
been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly,
for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored.
However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this
danger steadily in view and even as far back as during
the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental
decision to take steps against this danger the moment
our military position made it at all possible.” (L-172)
At the time this statement was made, however, the Western
Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East
necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22
June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed
at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the
exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The
view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance
lay in the elimination of the USSR as a political factor,
and in the acquisition of lebesraum at her expense, had long
been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been
completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in
progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms
and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat
Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw
materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration
of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by
conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany
now found herself made such action appear both desirable and
practicable.
As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint
from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet
Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the
Chief of the Wirtschaft Rustug Amt, or Office for Economy
and Armaments, of the OKW (Wi Rue Amt). General Thomas tells
about receiving this information from Goering in his draft
of a work entitled “Basic Facts For a History of German War
and Armaments Economy,” which he prepared during the Summer
of 1944 (235-PS). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas
discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and
relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and
well under this agreement and were requesting war materials
in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early
1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans.
However, at page 315 he has the
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following to say about the change of heart expressed by the
German leaders in August of 1940:
“On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference
with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the
Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only
till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further
interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.
This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give
priority to matters concerning Russian War-Economy.”
(235-PS)
This statement will be referred to again later in the
discussion of preparations for the economic exploitation of
Soviet territory. At that time too, evidence will be
presented that in November of 1940 Goering categorically
informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the USSR
Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of
the Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months
in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the
East in the way of construction projects and strengthening
of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass
unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service.
Counterintelligence measures were obviously called for. In
an OKW directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter-
Intelligence Service Abroad on 6 September 1940, such
measures were ordered (1229-PS). This directive pointed out
that the activity in the East must not be permitted to
create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive
was being prepared and outlined the line for the
counterintelligence people to take to disguise this fact.
The text of the directive indicates, by necessary
implication, the extent of the preparations already
underway. It provides:
“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the
weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown
on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.
“These regroupings must not create the impression in
Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East.
On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and
highly trained German troops are stationed in the
Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the
Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can
at any time protect our interests — especially on the
Balkan — with strong forces against Russian seizure.
“For the work of our own intelligence service as well
as for the answer to questions of the Russian
intelligence service, the following directives apply:
[Page 797]
“1. The respective total strength of the-German troops
in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by
giving news about a frequent change of the army units
there. This change is to be explained by movements into
training camps, regroupings.
“2. The impression is to be created that the center of
the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the
Gouvernement, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and
that the massing in the North is relatively
unimportant.
“3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the
units, especially of the armored divisions, things are
to be exaggerated, if necessary.
“4. By suitable news the impression to be created that
the antiaircaft protection in the East has been
increased considerably after the end of the campaign in
the West and that it continues to be increased with
captured French material on all important targets.
“5. Concerning improvements on railroads, roads,
airdromes, etc., it is to be stated that the work is
kept within normal limits, is needed for the
improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and
serves primarily economical traffic. “The supreme
command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
correct details, i. e., numbers of regiments, manning
of garrisons, etc., will be made available to the
defense for purposes of counter espionage.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
by order of
/signed/ Jodl.” (1229-PS)
Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders
and called for a continuation of preparations, promising
further and more definite instructions as soon as this
preliminary work produced a general outline of the army’s
operational plans. This order was contained in a Top Secret
directive from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters No. 18, dated 12
November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (444-
PS). The directive begins by saying that:
“The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made
along the following lines.” (444-PS)
It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the
policy regarding relations with other countries and says
regarding the USSR:
“*** 5. Russia
“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim
of
[Page 798]
clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being.
Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all
preparations for the East which have already been
verbally ordered will be continued.
“Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the
general outline of the Army’s operational plans has
been submitted to, and approved by me.” (444-PS)
On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the
Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer
concerning the progress of the plans for the coming
operation against the USSR A report of this conference with
Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents,
all labelled annexes and all bearing on all Barbarossa (1799-
PS). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the
Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab and was apparently an inclosure to
that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates
the state which planning for this aggression had reached six
and a half months before it occurred:
“Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.
“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then
reports about the planned operation in the East. He
expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The
main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in
Moscow and in Lenin
“The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the
discussed operational plans and adds the following: The
most important goal is to prevent that the Russians
should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance
should be combined until the Russian air force will be
unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and,
on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled
to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial
territories. In this way we should be able to achieve
the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its
regeneration.
“The first commitment of the forces should take place
in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy
units possible.”
“It is essential that the Russians should not take up
positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140
Divisions as planned for the entire operation is
sufficient.” (1799-PS)
[Page 799]
By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s
operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic
strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army,
Navy, and Air Forces for Barbarossa — Directive No. 21 —
was issued (446-PS). This directive marks the first time the
plan to invade the USSR was specifically referred to in an
order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also
marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to denote
the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most
significant passages in that directive-is the opening
sentence:
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush
Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end
of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa).” (446-
PS)
The directive continues:
“Preparations requiring more time to start are — if
this has not yet been done — to begin presently and
are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941.”
“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention
of an attack will not be recognized.” (446-PS)
The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the
intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the
Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called
for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The
directive concluded as follows:
“V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-
Chief on their further plans based on this letter of
instructions.
“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed
Forces are to be reported to me through the High
Command, also in regard to their time.” (446-PS)
The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl,
Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature.
It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order
itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined,
that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It
was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was
intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various
services which received the order understood it as an order
to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical
staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and
preparation which they immediately undertook in order to
implement the general scheme set forth in the basic
directive.
[Page 800]
C. Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation
of Barbarossa.
The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early
compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21
(446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be
reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed
Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial
amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part
in the coming campaign- and the manner in which it was
preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following
passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the
attack at this early date:
7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
“Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the
Armed Forces”. (C-35) (“Ia” is, in this case, the
abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of
the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy’s
objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many
tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently
typical to give an idea of all: “II. Objectives of War
Against Russia. d. To harass the Russian fleet by surprise
blows as:
“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the
war of air force units against strong points and combat
vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (C-35)
This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning
which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost
six months before the operation actually got underway. It is
but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which
demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of
the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.
Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February
contains at least several references to the planning and
preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19
February 1941 is typical:
“In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for
which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a
transfer of some can only be considered after
conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.” (C-33)
On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess
the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa.
The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume,
which was
[Page 801]
the code name for the North African Operation. Attending
this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army
General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including,
Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (872-PS). During the
course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General
Staff gave a long report out enemy strength as compared with
German strength, and about the general overall operational
plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at
various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract
from this report, although written in a semishorthand form,
is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate
timetables had already been set up for the deployment of
troops, as well as for industrial operations:
“The intended time period was discussed with a plan.
1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel)
2nd ” ” ”
transfer now, Front — Germany — East from the middle
of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in
the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being
withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable
reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now
on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the
occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out
only under difficulties.. Industrial traffic is
hampered by transport movements. From the middle of
April, Hungary will be approached about the march
through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of
April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part
of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code
word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa
and Gibraltar.]
“In industry the full capacity time-table is in force.
No more camouflage.
“From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable
forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code
word for the planned operation against England] can no
longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in
the East is quite recognizable.
“The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita [Marita
was the code word for the action against Greece]
divisions complete the picture of the disposition of
forces on the plan. “C-in-C Army requested that he no
longer have to employ
[Page 802]
5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready
as reserves for commanders in the West.
“Fuehrer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold
its breath and make no comment.” (872-PS)
This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is
sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy
regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far
along with their preparations even as early as February 1941
— almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the
attack was actually launched. The conference report
summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as
they affected Barbarossa, as follows:
“Conclusions: “1. Barbarossa
“a. The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the
operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must
be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession
of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
“b. The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the
plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as
soon as possible.
“c. Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking
part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any
necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania
with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.
“d. It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out
Attila (auxiliary measure).
“e. The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be
camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary
measure Marita.” (872-PS)
As the plans for the invasion became more detailed,
involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the
Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on
the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For
example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be
sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of
Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt.
In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the
camouflage for the operation was based and requested that
the organization Todt follow the same line (874-PS). This
letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi
conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their
treacherous attack:
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 1941
DRAFT
“Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)
“For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the
Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the
diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary
prerequisites for the success of the operations.
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued
guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more
detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim
essentially at continuing preparations for the attack
against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously
the actual preparations for deployment in the East
should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to
divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack
against England. In order to insure success for these
measures, it is indispensable that these same
principles are being also followed on the part of the
Organization Todt.
“K. J. W.”
[Initials of
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS)
On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to
Fuehrer Order #21 (446-PS), which was issued in the form of
“Directives for Special Areas” (447-PS). This detailed
operational order, which was issued more than three months
in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the
plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I
of the directive is headed “Area of Operations and Executive
Power” and outlines who was to be in control of what and
where. It states that while the campaign is in progress, the
Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power in
territory through which the army is advancing. During this
period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with
“special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in paragraph
2b:
“*** b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS
is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special
tasks for the preparation of the political
administration, tasks which result from the struggle
which has to be carried out between two opposing
political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the
Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his
own responsibility. The executive power invested in the
Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and
[Page 804]
in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by
this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS
that through the execution of his tasks military
operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be
arranged directly through the OKH with the
Reichsfuehrer SS.” (447-PS)
The order then states that, in time, political
administration will be set up under Commissioners of the
Reich. The relationship of these officials to the army is
discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3:
“c. As soon as the area of operations has reached
sufficient depth, it is to be limited n the rear. The
newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of
operations is to be given its own political
administration. For the present, it is to be divided,
according to its genealogic basis and to the positions
of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries),
Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these
territories the political administration is taken care
of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their
orders from the Fuehrer.
“3. For the execution of all military tasks within the
areas under political administration in the rear of the
area of operations, commanding officers who are
responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
“The commanding officer is the supreme representative
of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the
bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the
tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a
supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this
capacity he is responsible primarily for the following
tasks.
“a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the
Reich in order to support him in his political task.
“b. Exploitation of the country and securing its
economic values for use by German industry (see par.
4). (447-PS)
The directive also outlines the responsibility for the
administration of economy in the conquered territory. This
provision is also contained in Section I, paragraph 4:
“4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of
the administration of economy in the area of operations
and in the territories of political administration to
the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the
‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution of the task. Special
orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (447-
PS)
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply,
and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals
with the
[Page 805]
relations with certain other countries and states, in part,
as follows:
“III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary
and Finland.
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries
shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign
Office, and according to the wishes of the respective
high commands. In case it should become necessary
during the course of the operations to grant special
rights, applications for this purpose are to be
submitted to the OKW.” (447-PS)
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden:
“IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for
troops, no special authority is to be granted the
commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled
and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-
transports against sabotage and attacks.
“The Chief of the High Command Of the Armed Forces
“signed: KEITEL” (447-PS)
As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive
No. 21 (446-PS), the plan originally contemplated that the
attack would take place about 15 May 1941. In the meantime,
however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in
a campaign in the Balkans and wee forced to delay Barbarossa
for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a
document (C-170) which has been identified by Raeder as a
compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff
War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had
access to the Admiralty files and contains file references
to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item
dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows:
“Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for
about five weeks. All measures which can be construed
as offensive actions are to be stopped according to
Fuehrer order.” (C-170)
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently
straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-
Day as 22 June more than seven weeks away. A “Top Secret”
report of a conference with the Chief of the Section
Landsverteidigung of the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab on 30 April
1941 states, in the first two paragraphs:
[Page 806]
“1. Timetable Barbarossa:
The Fuehrer has decided:
Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23-May
maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the
beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not
yet reached the appointed areas.
“2. Proportion of actual strength n the plan
Barbarossa:
Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately
of the same strength.
Sector Middle: Great German superiority.
Sector South: Russian superiority.” (873-PS)
Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day,
preparations for the attack were so complete that it was
possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate
timetable showing in great detail the disposition and
missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (C-
39) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was
the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the
Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as
follows:
“Top Military Secret
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op)
“Fuehrer’s Headquarters
(no date)
“Top Secret (Chefsache)
Only through officer
“21 copies
3rd copy Ob. d. m.
I op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures: —
“The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a
foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’.
If alterations should be necessary during execution,
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be
informed.
“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
signed: Keitel”
(C-39)
The document then proceeds to outline the state of
preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six
paragraphs covering the status on that date under six
headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army;
Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the
document is in tabular form with six
[Page 807]
columns headed from left to right at the top of each page —
Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item
appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in
the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300
hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled
(saetester Anhaltetermin)” (C-39). Under the column headed
OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or
further confirmation of start of attack by code word:
‘Dortmund'” (C-39). In the Remarks column appears the
statement that: “Complete absence of camouflage of formation
of Army point of main effort (Schwerpunkt), concentration of
armour and artillery must be reckoned with” (C-39). The
entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation
which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy,
and OKW and provides as follows:
“Invasion Day
“H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and
crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330
hours”. (C-39)
In the Remarks column it is stated that:
“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting
owing to weather on the part of the Air Force.” (C-39)
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those
quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and
missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final
reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941 8
days before “D-day” (C-78). This order, signed by Hitler’s
Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows:
“TOP SECRET
Only by Officer
“Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant
“at Berchtesgaden
9th June 1941
“To the Fuehrer
Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret
“Top Secret
“Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’
“1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces have ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the
Commanders of Army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air
Commanders of equal rank.
“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941,
at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
[Page 808]
“3. Time Table.
“a. 11.00 hrs “Silver Fox”
“b. 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs Army Group South
“c. 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs Lunch party for all
participants in conference
“d. From 15.30 hrs Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group
“Center” in this order.
Participants see enclosed list of participants.
(list of names, etc. follows)
“(signed) Schmundt
Colonel of the General Staff and Chief
Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”.(C-78)
There is attached a list of participants and the order in
which they will report. The list includes a large number of
the members of the High Command and General Staff Group as
of that date. Among those to participate were Goering,
Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the
premeditation and calculation which marked the military
preparations for the invasion of the USSR Starting almost a
full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi
conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of
their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that
thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be
associated with the German character. The leading roles were
performed in this preparation by the military figures —
Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
D. Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoilation of the
USSR
Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion
from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and
detailed planning was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to
insure that their aggression would prove economically
profitable. The motives which led the conspirators to plan
and launch attack were both political and economic. The
economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the
Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other
supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they
conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of
their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need was
translated as a right, and they early began planning
[Page 809]
and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that
every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap
in the course of their aggression would be exploited to
their utmost benefit.
As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the Wi Rue
Amt, received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on
the USSR, which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet
war economy. In November 19408 months before the attack
Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned
operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were
commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to
be occupied in the course of such operation (235-PS).
Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by
virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan.
Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early
planning in these terms:
“*** In November, 1940, the Chief of the Wi Rue
together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann,
Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the
Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
“By reason of these directives the preliminary
preparations for the action in the East were commenced
by the office of WiRue at the end of 1940.
“The preliminary preparations for the action in the
East included first of all the following tasks:
“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian
Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its
associate industries.
“2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big
armament centers and their dependency one on the other.
“3. Determine the power and transport system for the
industry of the Soviet Union.
“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and
petroleum (crude oil)
.
“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than
armament industries in the Soviet Union.
“These points were concentrated in one big compilation
‘War Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with
detailed maps, etc.”
“Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the
important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of
economy in the German Russian language for the use of
the German War Economy Organization.
“For the processing of these problems a task staff,
Russia,
[Page 810]
was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel
Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General
Schubert. The work was carried out according to the
directives from the Chief of the Office, resp. the
group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with
the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and
any other persons, possessing information on Russia.
Through these intensive preparative activities an
excellent collection of material was made, which proved
of the utmost value later on for carrying out the
operations and for administering the territory.” (2353-
PS)
By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had
proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization
was needed. General Thomas held a conference with his
subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A
memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and
dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows:
“The general ordered that a broader plan of
organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.
“Essential Points:
“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the
Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the
measures of the four-year plan.
“2. The organization must include everything concerning
war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be
made already a special mission of State Secretary
Backe.
“3. Clear statement that the organization is to be
independent of the military or civil administration.
Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the
central office in Berlin.
“4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:
a. Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind
the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of
supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.
b. Administration of the occupied industrial districts
and exploitation of economically complimentary
districts.
“5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term
war economy inspection is to be used preferably,
instead of armament inspection.
“6. In view of the great field of activity, the
organization must be generously equipped and personnel
must be correspondingly numerous. The main mission of
the organization will consist of seizing raw materials
and taking over all
[Page 811]
important concerns. For the latter mission reliable
persons from German concerns will be interposed
suitably from the beginning, since successful operation
from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of
their experiences. (for example, lignite, ore,
chemistry, petroleum).
“After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col.
Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such
an organization within one week.
“Close cooperation with the individual sections in the
building is essential. An officer must still be
appointed for Wi and Rue, with whom the operational
staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give
each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the
new plan regarding Russia.
“Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin
the second half of next week. Also, the four officers
who are ordered to draw up the individual armament
inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the
end of next week.
Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those
attending as a Captain, was apparently the junior officer
present. Presumably it fell naturally to his lot to prepare
the minutes of the meeting.
The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas
was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly
recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March
1941 (447-PS). The order stated that the Fuehrer had
entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of
economy in the area of operations and political
administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn
had delegated his authority to the-Chief of the Wi Rue Amt
(Thomas). (447 PS)
The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the
meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29
April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of
the Armed Forces to explain the organizational setup of
Economic Staff Oldenburg. (Oldenburg was the code name given
to this economic counterpart of Barbarossa.) Section I of
the report of this conference (1157-PS) deals with the
general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had
developed. The report begins:
[Page 812]
“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at
1000
hours on 29 April 1941
I.
Welcome
“Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational
structure of the economic sector of the action.
“Barbarossa — Oldenburg
“As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous
procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform
concentration in one hand of all economic operations
and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall
direction of the economic administration in the area of
operations and in the areas under political
administration.
“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an
economic general staff, working under the director of
the industrial armament office (Chef Wi Rue Amt).
“Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general
staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the
drive itself is the Economic Staff Oldenburg for
special duties under the command of Major General
(Generalleutnant) Schubert.
“His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided
are:
5 economic inspectorates
23 economic commands
12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important
places within the area of the economic commands.
“These offices are used in the military rear area; the
idea is that in the territory of each Army Group. an
economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat
of the commander of the military rear area, and that
this inspectorate will supervise the economic
exploitation of the territory.
“A distinction must be made between the military rear
area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the
rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last
economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi)
of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison
officer of the industrial armament office within the
supreme command of the armed forces at the army
headquarters commands. For the battle area he has
attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaisance
and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil,
agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and
means of production.
“In the territory between the battle and the military
rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at
the various field commands are placed at the disposal
of the
[Page 813]
liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in
order to support the army headquarters commands
specialists responsible for supplying the- troops from
the country’s resources and for preparing the
subsequent general economic exploitation.
“While these units move with the troops, economic
inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices
remain established in the locality.
“The new feature inherent in the organization under the
command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does
not only deal with military industry, but comprises the
entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no
longer to be designated as offices of the military
industries or armaments, but quite generally as
economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.
“This also corresponds with the internal organization
of the individual offices which, from the Economic
Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires
a standard subdivision into three large groups, i.e.
“Group H dealing with troop requirements, armaments,
industrial transport organization.
“Group L which concerns itself with all questions of
feed and agriculture, and
“Group W which is in charge of the entire field of
trade and industry, including raw-materials and
suppliers; further questions of forestry, finance and
banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of
commodities and manpower allocation.
“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for
Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems
falling within the field of activities of Group W are
dealt with by General v. Hanneken.” (1157-PS)
The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions,
personnel and staffing problems, and similar details.
These documents portray the calculated method with which the
-Nazi conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and
loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators
not only planned to stage an attack on a neighbor they had
pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip
that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means
of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for
plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would
necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the
inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The story
[Page 814]
of how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be
presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.)
E. Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression.
As has already been indicated, and as will be later more
fully developed, there were both economic and political
motives for the action of the Nazi conspirators in invading
the Soviet Union. The economic aspects have been discussed.
Equally elaborate planning was engaged in by the Nazi
conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim
of their aggression. That political aim may be described as
the elimination of the USSR as a powerful political factor
in Europe, and the acquisition of Lebensraum. For the
accomplishment of these purposes the Nazi conspirators
selected as their agent Rosenberg.
As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his
staff!, prepared a memorandum on the USSR (1017-PS). This
memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement
with the USSR which would result in a quick occupation of an
important part of that country. The memorandum then
considers what the political goal of such occupation should
be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This
memorandum begins:
“Subject: The USSR
“Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia,
is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types,
which has come into being through the annexation of
states of a related or even of an essentially alien
character.
“A military conflict with the USSR will result in an
extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and
large section of the USSR It is very probable that
military action on our part will very soon be followed
by the military collapse of the USSR The occupation of
these areas would then present not so many military as
administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises
the first question:
“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military
and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political
foundations for a future organization of the area also
a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be
extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the
political goal which is to be attained, for it will,
without doubt, also have an effect on military
operations.
“If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in
the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as
the goal of military operations, one may conclude that:
“1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast
proportions;
[Page 815]
“2. From the very beginning, the treatment of
individual -sections of territory should, as regards
administration, as well as economics and ideology, be
adapted to the political ends we are striving to
attain;
“3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these
vast areas, such as, in particular, the ensuring of
essential supplies for the continuation of the war
against England, the maintenance of production which
this necessitates and the great directives for the
completely separate areas, should best be dealt with
all together in one place.
“It should again be stressed here that, in addition,
all the arguments which follow of course only hold good
once the supplies from the area to be occupied which
are essential to Greater Germany for the continuance of
the war, have been assured.
“Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia’s
population the following national or geographical
units:
“a. Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.
“b. White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.
“c. Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
“d. The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.
“e. The Don area with Rostov as its capital.
“f. The area of the Caucasus.
“g. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.” (1017-
PS)
The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or
geographical units thus listed in some detail. At the end of
the paper the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly
outlines his plan in these terms:
“The following systematic constructional plan is
evolved from the points briefly outlined here:
“1. The creation of a central department for the
occupied areas of the USSR, to be confined more or less
to wartime.
“Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich
authorities, it would be the task of this department
“a. To issue binding political instructions to the
separate administration area, having in mind the
situation existing at the time and the goal which is to
be achieved.
“b. To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the
war from all the occupied areas.
“c. To make preparations for, and to supervise the
carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily
important questions for all areas, as for instance,
those of finance and
[Page 816]
funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and
food;
“2. The carrying out of sharply defined
decentralization in the separate administration area,
grouped together by race or by reason of political
economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar
tasks assigned to them.
“As against this, an administrative department,
regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a
purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged,
might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its
purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to
carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only
by economic considerations, and this might impede the
carrying out of the political task and, in view of its
being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly
even prevent it.
“The question therefore arises, whether the opinions
which have been set forth should not, purely for
reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from
the very beginning when organizing the administration
of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of
the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration
which arise from that alone, and also in view of the
living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are
totally different from those of Western Europe, the
whole question of the USSR would require different
treatment from that which has been applied in the
individual countries of Western Europe.
“2.4.41” (1017-PS)
It is evident that the “presently envisaged” administration
operating on a purely economic basis, to which this
memorandum objects, was the Economic Staff Oldenburg which
was set up under Goering and Thomas.
Rosenberg’s statement of the political purpose of the
invasion and his analysis of methods for achieving it
apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Fuehrer Order
dated 20 April 1941 he was named “Commissioner for the
Central Control of Questions Connected with the East-
European
Region”. This order is part of a correspondence file
regarding Rosenberg’s appointment (865-PS). Hitler’s order
reads as follows:
“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my
Commissioner for the central control of questions
connected with the East-European Region.
“An office, which is to be established in accordance
with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby
entrusted to him.
[Page 817]
“The necessary money for this office is to be taken out
of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
“Fuehrer’s Headquarters 20 April 1941.
(signed) Adolf Hitler
“Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery
(signed) Dr. Lammers”
This particular copy of the Fuehrer’s Order was enclosed in
a letter which Dr. Lammers wrote to Keitel requesting
cooperation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a
Deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows:
“The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery
“Berlin W8 21st April 1941
VossStrasse 6
At present Fuehrer
Headquarters, mail
without exception to
be sent to the Berlin
address.
“To: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces,
General Field Marshal Keitel “Personal.
By courier
“My dear General Field Marshal,
“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer’s
Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central
control connected with the East European Region. In
this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the
necessary preparations for the probable emergency with
all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be
authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest
cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive
information from them, and summon the representatives
of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In
order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the
commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the
time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities
should be informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter
Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the
Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister
of Economics and you, yourself.
“Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the
Fuehrer’s
[Page 818]
wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task
imposed upon him.
“It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that
you name a representative in your office, with whom the
office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in
addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to
whom you should communicate the contents of this
letter. “I should be obliged if you would acknowledge
the receipt of this letter.
“Heil Hitler,
Yours very sincerely,
Dr. Lammers.” (865-PS)
Keitel wrote Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and
telling of his compliance with the request:
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“25 April 1941
“Most Secret
“By courier
“To:
“The Head of the Reich Chancellery,
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
“Personal
“Dear Reich Minister.
“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer’s
Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central
control of questions connected with the East European
Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl,
Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my
permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his
Deputy.
“Heil Hitler
“Yours very sincerely,
“K.
25/4”
(865-PS)
Keitel also wrote Rosenberg, telling of his compliance with
Lammers’ request:
[Page 819]
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
25th April 1941
“Most Secret
“By courier
“To:
“Reichsleiter Rosenberg
“Personal.
“Dear Reichsleiter,
“The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy
of the Fuehrer’s Decree, by which he has appointed you
his Commissioner for the central control of questions
connected with the East European Region. I have charged
General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces
Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General
Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far
as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is
concerned, to deal with him only.
“Heil Hitler
“Yours very sincerely,
“K.
25/4”
(865-PS)
Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg
began building his organization, conferring with the various
ministries, issuing his instructions, and generally making
the detailed plans and preparations necessary to carry out
his assigned mission. Although Rosenberg’s files, which were
captured intact, were crowded with documents evidencing both
the extent of the preparation and its purpose, the citation
of a small number which are typical should be sufficient.
All the documents now discussed were found in Rosenberg’s
files.
In a memorandum dated 8 May 1941, entitled “General
Instructions for all Reichcommissars in the occupied Eastern
Territories”, Rosenberg gives instructions to his chief
henchmen and outlines clearly the political aims and
purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the
English translation the following remarks appear:
“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim
to free the German Reich from the Great Russian
(grossrussisch) pressure for centuries to come. This
does not only correspond with German interests, but
also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism
was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest
and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened
Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich
has to beware of starting a campaign against
[Page 820]
Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the
reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of
what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of
the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg
have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the
situation today. This has been done on the part of the
National Socialist movement to correspond to the
Leader’s political testament as laid down in his book,
that now the military and political threat, from the
East shall be eliminated forever.
“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to
its historical and racial conditions into Reichs-
Commissariats, each of which bears within itself a
different political aim. The Reich Commissariat
Eastland (Ostland) including White-Ruthenia will have
the task, to prepare, by way of development into a
Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer
cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an
independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia
with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal
State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must
put her own house in order for the future. These
general viewpoints are explained in the following
instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that
there are still a few general considerations which
possess validity for all Reich Commissars.” (1030-PS)
The fifth paragraph presents an interesting rationalization
of a contemplated robbery:
“The German people has achieved, in the course of
centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern
European area. Nearly its entire real estate property
was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of
thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were
deported or, like in the Baltic territories, were
cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during
the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to
proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of
the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have
become property of the people of Greater Germany,
irrespective of the consent of the former individual
proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the
right (assuming that it has not already been done
during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The
manner of compensation and restitution of this national
property, will be subject to different treatment by
each Reich Commissariat.” (1030-PS)
“An Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic
Countries
[Page 821]
and White Russia” (1029-PS) is typical of the directives
issued to each of the appointed commissioners. This order is
amazingly frank in outlining the intentions of the Nazi
conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in
the course of their aggression. It begins:
“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have
constantly been in close relationship with the German
people. A 700 year old history has moulded the inner
sympathies of the majority of the races living there in
a European direction, and has added this region to the
living space of Greater Germany.
“The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and White Russia [last words added in pencil]
must be to strive to achieve the form of a German
Protectorate, and then transform the region into part
of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially
possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and
banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of
Greater Germany.
“For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region
was a land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must
endeavor to make this surplus once more available to
the German people, and, if possible, to increase it.
With regard to the process of germanizing or
resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly
germanized to the extent of 50o by Danish, German and
Swedish blood and can be considered as a kindred
nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being
assimilated is considerably smaller than in Esthonia.
In this country stronger resistance will have to be
reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will
have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to
be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the
emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to
promote very intensive Germanization (on the East
Prussian border).”
*******
“The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office
in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily
positive one. A country which 700 years ago was
captured by German Knights built up by the Hanseatic
League, and by reason of a constant influx of German
blood, together with Swedish elements, was a
predominantly Germanized land, is to be established as
a mighty, German borderland. The preliminary cultural
conditions are available everywhere, and the German
Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a
[Page 822]
later emigration to all those who have distinguished
themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who
gave their lives during the war, and also to all who
fought in the Baltic campaign never once lost courage,
fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic
civilization from Bolshevism. For the rest, the
solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic
question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and
it must be settled on these lines.” (1029-PS)
These two directives are sufficiently typical of the lot to
show the extent of the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it
was hoped would be achieved thereby. They are reinforced by
a later report of Rosenberg’s. On 28 June 1941, less than a
week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full
report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th
of April (1039-PS). This report makes disclosures concerning
the number of conspirators who worked with and assisted
Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this phase of
the aggression and the extent to which practically all the
ministries and offices of both the State and the Party were
involved in this operation. The report was found in
Rosenberg’s files and, although it is rather long, it is of
sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups and
organizations to justify quotation in full:
“Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European
Questions
“Immediately after the notification of individual
Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer’s decree of
20.4.1941 a conference with the Chief of the OKW [Armed
Forces High Command] took place. After presentation of
the various political aims in the proposed
Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal
requirements for the East, the Chief of the OKW
explained that a deferment (OK-stelung) would be too
complicated in this case and that this matter could be
carried out best by direct cancellation
(Abkommandierung) by command of the Chief of the OKW.
Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate
command which established the basis for the coming
requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer
General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations
which then commenced relative in all questions of the
Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of
the OKW in collaoration with officials of my office.
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the
effect that under the given confidential circumstances
my office
[Page 823]
could in no way deal with any representatives of people
of the East-European area. I asked him to do this
insofar as the Military intelligence required it, and
then to name persons to me who could count as political
personalities over and above the military intelligence
in order to arrange for their eventual commitment
later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish
not to recognize any political groups among the
emigrants would be considered by him and that he was
planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.
“Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von
Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the
historical and political conceptions of the Eastern
problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a
representative of my office to the Supreme Commander of
the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and
to the army groups for questions relative to political
configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime
this has been done.
“Already at the outset there was a discussion with
Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk,
who appointed as his permanent deputy
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily
conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with
reference to the war economic intentions of the
Economic Operational Staff (Wirtshaftsfuehrungsstab)
East. In this connection I had conferences with General
Thomas, State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) Koerner,
State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke,
General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was
reached in the eastern questions as regards direct
technical work now and in the future. A few problems
regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich
ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and
will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the
Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I am in no way
intended to found an economic department in my office,
economics would rather be handled substantially and
practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons
appointed by him, however the two responsible
department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr.
Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial
Director Riecke for food economies, would be placed in
my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here
political aims with the economic necessities, in a
department which would have to unite yet other persons
for such coordinating work, depending on later and for
work (political leadership of
[Page 824]
labor unions, construction etc.). After notification of
the Reich foreign minister, the’ latter appointed
Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my
office. For the requested representation in the
political department of my office (headed by
Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry
released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known
to me for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for
years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary will
be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the
foreign office regarding its wishe’s for the assignment
of its representatives to the future Reich
commissioners.
“The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary
Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete
agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions
on all political and other essays, speeches,
proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great
number of substantial works for propaganda would be
delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda
ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole
practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be
subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment
and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the
propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly
to my department ‘Enlightenment and Press’
.(Aufklaerung und Presse) and in addition appoints a
permanent press liaison man. All these activities have
been going on for some time, and without attracting
attention to my office in any way, this agreement on
contents and terminology takes place continually every
day.
“Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister
Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of
communication and setting up of all technical
necessities in future occupied territories; with
Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces,
with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in
detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary
officials for the commissariats. According to the
present estimate there will be four Reichs
Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall
propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons
to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats
(24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional
(Gebiet) Commissariats (over 900). A General
Commissariat would correspond to a former
Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a
Maingovernment. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4
Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is
the
[Page 825]
minimum number which appears necessary for a future
civil government and/or administration. A portion of
the officials has already been requested on the basis
of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.
“In the same manner conferences have taken place with
the Reich Physicians Leader (Reichsaerztefuehrer) Dr.
Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service,
and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties
of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly
discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to
insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned
after the end of the operations. A conference with
Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment
first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction
Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite
administratively under one leadership the whole
Construction Service.
“Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his
chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of
four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to
start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the
prospective native tongues were considered. According
to the latest information the technical forces, for
this work are already at the border and may be
committed at any time to determine whether the
prerequisites for printing shops are present.
“Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader
(Korpsfuehrer) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth
leadership to assure a necessary and suitable
mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the
Chief of Staff (Stabschef) of the SA. He was asked to
make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders
for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The
personnel suggestions together with other suggestions
will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement
has been reached with the Reich organizational leader
(Reichsorganisationsleiter), who has instructed the
commander of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the
swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit
them into Kroessinsee for schooling and instruction on
the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner
for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member
Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over
already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in
connection with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an
eminently important problem, particularly also in
connection with the economic
[Page 826]
leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have
been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially
have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared
necessary under certain conditions.
“Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the
Police to the new order in the East have taken place.
Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by
the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer
[SS Lt Gen] Heydrich which do not appear supportable to
me for the complete authority of the German Reich
government in the East. Also the documents of this
problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for
decision.
“Aside from these negotiations I received the
responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely
Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt,
Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr.
Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of
political objectives I instructed the above-named
persons in confidence about the necessary attitude,
with the request to tone down the whole terminology of
the press, without issuing any statements.
“The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern
question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which
I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a
few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later
be turned over to the press for development, deal with
the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the
economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the
peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern
since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933,
statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans
in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus,
of Turkestan. Extensive works are in preparation for
the foundation of legal administration: German law in
the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine, influence of
the German language on the Ukrainian language, the
Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In
addition a number of articles are being prepared in
Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening
the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in
Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis
for newspaper articles in the newly occupied
territories. Finally, after extensive work, an
ethnological map of the East based on the most recent
statistical reports has been printed in great number
and made available to all offices. This map can be used
as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the
north as well as in
[Page 827]
the south, and offers points of departure for fixing
the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.
“As a result of these conferences, conducted for the
most part by myself, continuous consultation and
organizational preparation is under way through my
office and through those of the liaison men delegated
from the other offices of the Party and the State. I
may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at all
possible under present condition, is in full swing.
Aside from the General and Chief commissariats more
than 900 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must
all be manned by political leaders, representatives of
the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior. The work in the East differs basically
from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count
on every technical installation and a cultured
population here in the big cities, that is not the case
in the East. There literally everything will have to be
prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic
spaces — not only an auto park but a great number of
typewriters, office material, above all medical
supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does
not appear possible to accomplish such a project
suddenly in 14 days, therefore all these arrangements
had to be set in full motion already now on my
responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer’s decree.
“The structure of my office itself is temporarily
organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer’s
order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter
Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has
negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole
time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop
all aspects down to the details. A political department
has been founded for the execution of the substantial
work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt
(deputy General Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares
the various books and pamphlets for information. A
great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed
by him which will then have been scattered over the
Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also
for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are
addressed directly to the individual races. I do not
care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay
these originals before the Fuehrer at the first
opportunity with the request to check the contents and
determine the time of the eventually approved appeals.
The political department is also undertaking a thorough
investigation of all those, with the
[Page 828]
exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as
advisors for the administration of the various
nationalities. Continuous discussions about this
subject are under way with representatives of the OKW,
the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of
economic-political cooperation has been founded under
direction of Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. A department
of ‘Law, Finance, and Administration’ has been taken
over by Regierungspraesident Runte. A department for
Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the
development of this question does not appear urgent.
Also the department ‘Enlightenment and Press’. It is
occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy
Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who
command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages.
The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef)
for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar
are under discussion in order to decide them in that
sense if possible. “Thus I hope that when, after
preliminary conclusion of the military action the
Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I
shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far reaching
preparations, up to those points of special and
personal nature which
the Fuehrer alone can decide.” (1039-PS)
(As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet
prosecuting staff, it will be shown how all this planning
and preparation for the elimination of the USSR as a
political factor were actually carried out. The planned
execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders was,
for example, but a part of the actual operation of the
program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make
impossible its early resurrection as a European Power.)
Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the
invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators
proceeded to carry out their plans and on 22 June 1941
hurled their armies across the borders of the USSR In
announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a
proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: “I
have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe
again into the hands of our soldiers.”
This announcement told the world that the die had been cast;
that the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before
and secretly and continuously developed since then had now
been brought to fruition. The Nazi conspirators, having
carefully and completely planned and prepared this war of
aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.
F. The Motives for the Attack.
It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany
bound by solemn covenant not to attack the USSR, but
throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the
invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its
agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive
intentions toward the territories of the German Reich.
General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of
“Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments
Economy” (2353-PS), that insofar as the German-Soviet trade
agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets
carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end.
Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were
usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw
material being thus delivered was considered essential to
the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side
too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded,
the Nazis cared less about maintaining their obligations. At
page 315 of his book Thomas says:
“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries
diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the
East were already under way.
“The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned,
right up to the start of the attack; even during the
last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far
East were completed by Express transit trains.” (2353-
PS)
Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more
forcefully:
“In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June,
1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a
great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the
directive that, in order to camouflage German troop
movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must
be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians
only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered
orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of
individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it
impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed
forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter
into numerous individual negotiations with German firms
in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the
German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry
was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it
were impossible to fill them within the limits of the
time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May
especially, large deliveries had to be made to the
Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the
[Page 830]
equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance
Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during
its transportation as to make it impossible for it to
be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning
of the German attack.” (2353-PS)
Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty
obligations with Germany, but she had no aggressive
intentions toward German territory. A file on Russo-German
relations found in the files of the Naval High Command,
covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack (C-
170), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be
sufficient to quote a few entries, which include reports
from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941.
Entry 165 reads:
“165 A 22,29 4 June
“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-
Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full
satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do
everything to prevent a conflict with Germany.” (C-170)
Entry 167 reads:
“167 A 22.53 6 June
“Ambassador in Moscow reports *** Russia will only
fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered
in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All
military preparations have been made quietly — as far
as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy
still strives as before to produce the best possible
relationship to Germany as good.” ( C-l 70)
Entry 169 also reiterates this point: “169 A 22.65 7 June
“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow ***. All
observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone
are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing
everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire
behavior of the Government, as well as the attitude of
the press, which reports all events concerning Germany
in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view.
The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with
Germany proves the same thing.” (C-170)
The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the
Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty
breaches. No doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the
materials presented on planning and preparation, more than
one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi
conspirators to launch their aggression against the USSR All
of them, however, appear to
[Page 831]
blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into
which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi
ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the
USSR This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative,
“Drang Nach Osten,” had been a cardinal principle of the
Party almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases
of political strategy and economic aggrandizement.
Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful
force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German
ambition, and acquisition of Lebensraum. Economically, it
offered opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of
food, raw materials, and other supplies. Undoubtedly the
demands of the German War economy for food and raw material
served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of
this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing
in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators
the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of
eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable
opponent on the continent.
As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail
in Mein Kampf, where he stated? at page 641 of the Houghton
Mifflin English edition:
“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a
special examination the relation of Germany to Russia:
“1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive
concern of all German foreign affairs; and
“2. This question is also the touchstone for the
political capacity of the young National Socialist
movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”
Again, at page 654 of the same edition:
“And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line
beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war
period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years
ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south
and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the
east. At long last we break off the colonial and
commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to
the soil policy of the future.
“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily
have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”
The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is
clearly reflected in the stated purposes, previously
discussed, of the organization which Rosenberg set up to
administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a speech
which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to
the people most interested in the problem of the East, he
restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political
basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with
[Page 831]
the economic goal (1058-PS). A short extract from that
speech reads as follows:
“The job of feeding the German people stands, this
year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of
Germany’s claims on the East; and here the southern
territories and the northern Caucasus will have to
serve as a balance for the feeding of the German
people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation
on our part to feed also the Russian people with the
products of that surplus territory. We know that this
is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very
extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any
doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very
hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision
will have to determine to which extent industries can
still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The
consideration and execution of this policy in the
Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its
future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as
might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of
the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of
Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which
requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this
decision will also be approved by a coming Russia
later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the
Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last
200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic
craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain
hereditary talents, but these talents are different
from these of the Western people. The fight between
Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation.
The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now
close the West to the Russians, they might become
conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the
area to which they belong. An historian will maybe see
this decision in a different light, in hundreds of
years than it might appear to a Russian today.” (1058-
PS)
As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators
to defeat Britain had served further to strengthen them in
their belief in the political necessity of eliminating the
Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could
completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.
The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the
previous discussion of the organization set up under Goering
and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of
the territory to be occupied. The purely materialistic basis
for the attack was unmistakable. If any doubt existed that
at least one of
[Page 833]
the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and
raw material needed for the Nazi war machine, regardless of
the consequences to the Russian people which such robbery
would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum
showing clear and conscious recognition by the Nazis that
their plans would no doubt result in starving to death
millions of people. (2718-PS) On 20 June 1941 General Thomas
wrote a memorandum along a similar line, in which he stated
that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s present conception
of the German economic- policy concerning raw materials
(1456-PS). This policy expressed the theory that less
manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw
materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in
lieu of such raw materials. This memorandum reads, in part:
“The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer,
which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has
been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:
“1. The course of the war shows that we went too far in
our autarchical endeavors. It is impossible to try and
manufacture everything we lack, by synthetic
procedures, or other measures. For instance, it is
impossible to develop our motor fuel economy to a point
where we can entirely depend on it. All these
autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of
manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it.
One has to choose another way. What one does not have,
but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men
which is necessary one single time, will not be as
great as the one that is currently needed for the
running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim
must also be to secure all territories, which are of
special interest to us for the war economy, by
conquering them.
“At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued
the statement where I made it clear that a completely
autarchical economy is impossible for us, because the
need of men will be too great. Nevertheless, my
solution was always to provide the necessary reserves
for missing stocks respectively to secure the delivery
in wartime through economic alliances.” (1456-PS)
On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to
an end. In view of the solemn pledge of non-aggression; the
base and sinister motives involved; the months of secret
planning and preparation; and the suffering intentionally
and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be too much to
say that in the history of relations between sovereign
nations, a blacker chap-
[Page 834]
ter has never been written than the one which tells of the
Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of
the Soviet Union.
—————————–
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I, Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F) 6; V. Vol. I, Pg. 27,29
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]
*444-PS; Original Directive No. 18
from Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialled
by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution
of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB
116) . Vol. III, Pg. 403
[Page 835]
*446-PS; Top Secret Fuehrer Order No.
21 signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Warlimont and
Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia
(case Barbarossa). (USA 31) . Vol. III, Pg. 407
*447-PS; Top Secret Operational Order
to Order No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning
Directives for special areas. (USA 135) . Vol. III, Pg. 409
*864-PS; Top Secret Note, 20 October
1939, on conference between Hitler and Chief OKW concerning
future relations of Poland to Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA
609) . Vol. III, Pg. 619
*865-PS; Correspondence between
Keitel, Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, concerning
appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW representatives
with Rosenberg. (USA 143) . Vol. III, Pg. 621
*872-PS; Memorandum of Discussion
between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case
“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African operation). (USA
134) . Vol. III, Pg. 626
*873-PS; Top secret memorandum of
discussion with the Chief “L”, 30 April 1941, about the
invasion of Russia. (USA 137) . Vol. III, Pg. 633
874-PS; Draft letter to Todt,
initialled K, J, and W, 9 March 1941, concerning Deception
measures. . Vol. III, Pg. 634
876-PS; Letter from Keitel, 12 May
1941, concerning Deception of the enemy. . Vol. III, Pg. 635
886-PS; Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941,
on courts martial and treatment of enemy civilians in the
district “Barbarossa”, signed by Keitel for Hitler, and
initialled by Jodl. . Vol. III, Pg. 637
[Page 836]
*1017-PS; Memorandum entitled
“Memorial No. 1 regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found in
Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 142) . Vol. III, Pg. 674
*1019-PS; Appendix to Memorandum No.
2. Recommendation as to the personnel for the Reich
Commissariats in the East and for the Political Central
Office in Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823) . Vol. III, Pg.
681
*1029-PS; Paper entitled
“Instructions for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8
May 1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 145) .
Vol. III, Pg. 690
*1030-PS; General instructions for
all Reich Commissars in the Occupied Eastern Territories, 8
May 1941, found in Rosenberg file. (USA 144) . Vol. III, Pg.
692
1034-PS; Minutes of discussion
concerning Construction and Administration, 22 June 1941. .
Vol. III, Pg. 693
*1039-PS; Report concerning
preparatory work regarding problems in Eastern Territories,
28 June 1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146)
. Vol. III, Pg. 695
*1058-PS; Excerpt from a speech, 20
June 1941, by Rosenberg before people most intimately
concerned with Eastern Problem, found in his “Russia File”.
(USA 147) . Vol. III, Pg. 716
1156-PS; Report to Goering from Chief
of Office for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 March 1941. .
Vol. III, Pg. 808
[Page 837]
*1157-PS; Report on conference, 29
April 1941, concerning top secret plan for Economic
exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg Plan). (USA 141) .
Vol. III, Pg. 811
*1229-PS; OKW Directive to the German
Intelligence Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6
September 1940. (USA 130) . Vol. III, Pg. 849
1316-PS; Top secret note for files on
conference of 21 March 1941 concerning employment of
Quartermaster General. . Vol. III, Pg.908
*1317-PS; Top secret notes taken by
Hamann of a discussion of the economic exploitation of
Russia, presided over by General Thomas, 28 February 1941.
(USA 140) . Vol. III, Pg. 911
*1456-PS; Thomas memorandum 20 June
1941; Keitel consulted about resources of USSR. (USA 148) .
Vol. IV, Pg. 21
*1517-PS; Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning
discussion with the Fuehrer, 114 February 1941. (USA 824) .
Vol. IV, Pg. 55
*1799-PS; Annex 1 to report of Chief
of General Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, concerning
planned operation in the East. (USA 131) . Vol. IV, Pg. 374
*1834-PS; Report on conference
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) .
Vol. IV, Pg. 469
*2353-PS; Extracts from General
Thomas’ Basic Facts for History of German War and Armament
Economy. (USA 35) . Vol. IV, Pg. 1071
*2718-PS; Memorandum “About the
result of today’s discussion with State Secretaries about
Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) . Vol. V, Pg. 378
3014-PS; Affidavit of General Ernst
Koestring, former German military attache in Moscow,
concerning planning for the attack on the USSR in early
August 1940.; Vol. V, Pg. 734
[Page 838]
3031-PS; Affidavit of General
Warlimont, 121 January 1945, stating that first directive
for campaign against USSR was issued in August 1940. . Vol.
V, Pg. 740
3032-PS; Affidavit of General Walter
Warlimont, 121 January 1945, stating that the projected
campaign against USSR was first made known to him at
conference with Jodl, 29 July 1940. . Vol. V, Pg. 741
*3054-PS; “The Nazi Plan”, script of
a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA
167). . Vol. V, Pg. 801
3579-PS; Memorandum, signed Schnurre,
on the status of deliveries under German-Russian economic
agreement, 28 September 1940. . Vol. VI, Pg. 276
*C-33; Entries in Naval War Diary,
concerning operation “Barbarossa” and “Marita”. (USA 133) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 846
*C-35; Entry in Naval War Diary,
January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132) . Vol. VI, Pg. 846
C-37; References to operation
“Barbarossa”‘ in the German Naval War Diary, June 1941. .
Vol. VI, Pg. 854
*C-38; Letter, 13 June 1941,
requesting decision on action against enemy submarines and
Order to attack Soviet submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 855
*C-39; Timetable for Barbarossa,
approved by Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138) . Vol.
VI, Pg. 857
*C-50; Covering letters and Order of
13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of
civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA
554; GB 162) . Vol. VI, Pg. 871
[Page 839]
C-51; Order signed by Keitel, 27 July
1941, for destruction of all copies of Order of 18 May 1941
(document C-50) without affecting its validity. . Vol. VI,
Pg. 875
C-53; Order signed by Keitel, 20
September 1940, concerning Military Missions to Rumania. .
Vol. VI, Pg.877
C-54; Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941,
concerning military activities in Rumania. . Vol. VI, Pg.
877
*C-77; Memorandum from Chief of High
Command to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146) . Vol.
VI, Pg. 908
*C-78; Schmundt’s Order of 9 June
1941, convening conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA
139) . Vol. VI, Pg. 909
C-150; Letter from Hitler to General
Antonescu, 18 June 1941. . Vol. VI, Pg. 963
*C-170; File of Russo-German
relations found in OKM files covering the period 25 August
1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) . Vol. VI, Pg. 977
*L-172; “The Strategic Position at
the Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture delivered
by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and
Gauleiters. (USA 34) . Vol. VII, Pg. 920
*TC-25; Non-aggression Treaty between
Germany and USSR and announcement of 25 September 1939
relating to it. (GB 145) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 375
Statement XIV; Hungarian Relations
with Germany Before and During the War by Nicholas Horthy,
Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946.
Statement XV; Why Hungary Went to War
Against the Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., Nurnberg,
3 May 1946. . Vol. VIII, Pg. 767
