Last-Modified: 1996/06/06
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Nine
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8. AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND AND FRANCE
A. Treaties Breached.
In addition to the general treaties involved — The Hague
Convention in respect of the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes (TC-2); other Hague Conventions of
1907 (TC-3; TC-4); the Versailles Treaty (TC-9) in respect
of the Free City of Danzig; and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (TC-
19)two specific agreements were violated by the German
attack on Poland. These were the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925,
and the Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into
between Germany and Poland 26 January 1934.
The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty (TC-15) declares in the
preamble and Articles 1 and 2:
“The President of the German the Polish Republic:
“Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and
Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences
which might arise between the two countries;
“Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty
or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
international tribunals;
“Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State
cannot be modified save with its consent;
“And considering that sincere observance of the methods
of peaceful settlement of international disputes
permits of resolving, without recourse to force,
questions which may be-come the cause of division
between States;
“Have decided …”
“Article 1: All disputes of every kind between Germany
and Poland with regard to which the Parties are in
conflict as to their respective rights, and which it
may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal
methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision
either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, as laid down
hereafter.”
“Article 2: Before any resort is made to arbitral
procedure before the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the
Parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable
settlement, to a permanent international commission,
styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission,
constituted in accordance with the present Treaty.” (TC-15)
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Thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for
arbitration and for conciliation. Germany, however, in
September 1939 attacked and invaded Poland without having
first attempted to settle its disputes with Poland by
peaceful means.
The second specific treaty, the German-Polish Declaration of
26 January 1934, reads in part:
“The German Government and the Polish Government
consider that the time has come to introduce a new era
in the political relations between Germany and Poland
by a direct understanding between the States. They have
therefore decided to establish by the present
declaration a basis for the future shaping of those
relations.
“The two Governments assume that the maintenance and
assurance of a permanent peace between their countries
is an essential condition for general peace in Europe.”
*******
“The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of ten
years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of
ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two
governments six months before the expiration of that period
of time, it shall continue in effect but can then be
denounced by either government at a time of six months and
at any time in advance.” (TC-21)
B. German Intentions Before March 1939.
It has been previously shown that the actions against
Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the
preparation for further aggression. Even at that time,
before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia,
they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and
France, if necessary, to achieve those aims. They
appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do
so. Furthermore, although not until after March 1939, did
they commence upon their immediate and specific preparations
for a specific war against Poland, nevertheless, they had
for a considerable time before had it in mind specifically
to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs.
During this period alsoand this happens throughout the whole
story of the Nazi regime in Germanyas afterwards, while they
were making their preparations and carrying out their plans,
they were giving to the outside world assurance after
assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their
real object.
When the agreement with Poland was signed in January 1934,
Hitler had this to say:
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“When I took over the Government on the 30th of
January, the relations between the two countries seemed
to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that
the existing differences which were due to the
Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the
mutual tension resulting therefrom would gradually
crystallize into a state of hostility which, if
persisted, might too easily acquire the character of a
dangerous traditional enmity.”
*******
“In the spirit of this Treaty the German Government is
willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations
with Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of
unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of
useful cooperation. It is a matter of particular
satisfaction to us that in this same year the National
Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to
effect a similar clarification of its relations with
its Polish neighbor.” (TC-70)
That was in 1934. Three years later, again on 30 January,
speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said:
“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing
tension and thereby contributed considerably to an
improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall
an agreement with Poland which has worked out to the
advantage of both sides. True statesmanship will not
overlook reality but consider them. The Italian nation
and the new Italian state are realities. The German
nation and the German Reich are equally realities, and
to my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish
nation and the Polish state have also become a
reality.” (2368-PS)
That was on 30 January 1937.
On 24 June 1937, a “Top Secret Order (C-175) was issued by
the Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, signed “Von Blomberg”. There is the notation
at the top, “Written by an Officer. Outgoing documents in
connection with this matter and dealing with it in principle
are to be written by an officer.” With it is enclosed a
Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed
Forces, to come into force on 1 August 1937. The enclosed
directive is divided into Part 1, “General Guiding
Principle”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike Eventualities”; Part 3,
“Special Preparations”. The substance of the document
justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an
attack from any side.
The second paragraph states:
“*** The intention to unleash a European war is held
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just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the
politically fluid world situation, which does not
preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous
preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.
“To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the
military exploitation of politically favorable
opportunities should they occur.” (C-175)
The preparations which are to be made are then set forth:
“*** The further working on mobilization without public
announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a
position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both
as regards strength and time.”
“Special preparations are to be made for the following
eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria;
warlike entanglement with Red Spain.” (C-175)
Another passage shows clearly how they appreciated at that
time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia
might well involve them in war.
“*** England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war
against us.” (C-175)
Part 2 of this directive, dealing with “Probable warlike
eventualitiesConcentrations,” states:
“1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
“Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent.
Belgium may side with France, either at once or later
or not at all. It is also possible that France may
violate Belgium’s neutrality if the latter is neutral.
She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg.” (C-175)
Part 3, which deals in part with “Special Case Extension Red-
Green,” declares:
“The military political starting point used as a basis
for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated
if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side
of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would
be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent.
The political leaders will therefore do everything to
keep these countries neutral, above all England and
Poland.” (C-175)
The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that
at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the
likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England and
Poland and France, and were prepared to do so. On 6 November
1937, Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellery,
the minutes of
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which, referred to as the Hossbach notes, contain the
remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland, and
France:
“The Fuehrer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is
the security and preservation of the nation and its
propagation. This is consequently a problem of space’.”
(386-PS)
Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as
“participation in world economy”, and declared:
“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary,
is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor
which at all times has been the cause of the formation
of states and movements of nations.” (386-PS)
*******
“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British
Empire, has proved that every space expansion can only
be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks.
Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor
today has space been found without an owner. The
attacker always comes up against the proprietor.” (386-
PS)
On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the
Reichschancellery was taking place, a communique was being
issued as a result of the Polish ambassador’s audience with
Hitler (TC-73 No. 8). In the course of this conversation,
the communique stated:
“It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should
not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig
question.” (TC-73 No. 33)
On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum
for the Fuehrer. This document is headed, “Very Confidential
— Personal Only”, and is entitled “Deduction on the report,
German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-
German relations.” It states in part:
“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself
to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or
later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the
hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among
Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are
not merely playing a part that has been given to them.
Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and
England eventually be forced to drift into separate
camps and will they march against each other one day To
answer this question, one must realize the following:
“Change of the status quo in the east in the German
sense can only be carried out by force. So long as
France knows that England, which so to speak has taken
on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her
side, France’s fight-
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ing for her eastern allies is probable in any case,
always possible, and thus with it war between Germany
and England. This applies then even if England does not
want war. England, believing she must attend her
borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically
by France. In other words, peace or war between England
and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who
could bring about such a war between Germany and
England by way of a conflict between Germany and
France. It follows therefore that war between Germany
and England on account of France can be prevented only
if France knows from the start that England’s forces
would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
victory. Such a situation might force England, and
thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong
Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate.
“This position would arise for instance if England,
through insufficient armament or as a result of threats
to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e. g.,
Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military
forces in other places, would not be able to assure
France of sufficient support in Europe.”
The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong
partnership between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a
summary:
“Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by
us.
“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in
regard to the protection of the interests of our
friends.
“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-
hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that
is to say, a tightening of our friendship with Italy
and Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose
interests conform with ours directly or indirectly.
“Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of
the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in
this way can we confront England be it in a settlement
or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute
opponent in this game of diplomacy.
“The particular question whether in the event of a war
by Germany in central Europe France and thereby England
would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the
time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on
military considerations which cannot be gone into
here.” (TC-75)
Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been
on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, “I
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should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints
verbally.” (TC-75)
On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that
1 speech he said
“In the fifth year following the first great foreign
political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with
sincere gratification to be able to state that in our
relations with the state with which we had had perhaps
the greatest difference, not only has there been a
‘detente,’ but in the course of the years there has
been a constant improvement in relations. This good
work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at
the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since
the League of Nations finally gave up its continual
attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of
great personal attainments as the new commissioner,
this most dangerous spot from the point of view of
European peace has entirely lost its menacing
character. The Polish State respects the national
conditions in this state, and both the city of Danzig
and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to an
understanding has been successfully paved, an
understanding which beginning with Danzig-has today, in
spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers,
succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the
relations between Germany and Poland and transforming
them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a
stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the
foundation for the task which is ahead of us,peace.”
(2357-PS)
A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, “Organizational
Study 1950,” originated in the office of the Chief of the
Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force.
Its purpose was said to be: “The task is to search, within a
framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most
suitable type of organization of the Air Force.” (L-43). The
result gained is termed, Distant Objective.” From this is
deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the
process, which is called, “Final Objective 1942.” This in
turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal
for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group
Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc. (L-43)
The Table of Contents is divided into various sections.
Section I is entitled, “Assumptions.” In connection with the
heading “Assumption I, frontier of Germany”, a map is
enclosed (Chart No. 10). The map shows that on 2 May 1938
the Air Force was
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in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the
boundaries of the Reich.
The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum:
“Consideration of the principles of organization on the
basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in
Section 1:
“1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England,
France, and Russia.” (L-43)
The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-
four Geschwader employed against England, very much
concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to
say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full
use of their range, they can reach all English territory
down to the last corner. Under the paragraph “Assumption”
double heading 2, the “Organization of Air Force in
peacetime” is shown and seven group commands are indicated:
(1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) Munich; (4) Vienna; (5)
Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. (L-43)
Finally, the study declares:
“The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air
Force grows in strength, the more imperative it
becomes, to have locally bound commands ***” (L-43)
The original of this document is signed by an officer who is
not at the top rank in the German Air Force, and the
inferences that can be drawn from it should therefore not be
over-emphasized. At least, however, it shows the lines upon
which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at
that time.
On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign
Minister succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to
him as “The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary.” The
document reads as follows:
“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech
problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict
with the Entente. Neither France nor England are
looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both
would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she
should, without direct foreign interference and through
internal signs of disintegration, due to her own
faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process,
however, would have to take place step by step and
would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining
territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of
territory.
“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough
for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch
inactively, and not even if this action should come
quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any
definite time and this fruit could be plucked without
too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired
developments.
“For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at
present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-
Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to
now, is to be taken up gradually. The international
conviction that the choice of nationality was being
withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework,
notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of
dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not
be finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well.
The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however,
would not as yet be clearly decided by this, but would
nevertheless be definitely sealed.
“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to
be recommended because of our relationship with Poland.
It is unavoidable that the German departure from the
problems of boundaries in the southeast and their
transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles
sit up. The fact [is] that after the liquidation of the
Czech question, it will be generally assumed that
Poland will be the next.in turn.
“But the later this assumption sinks in in
international politics as a firm factor, the better. In
this sense, however, it is important for the time
being, to carry on the German policy, under the well
known and proved slogans of ‘the right to autonomy’ and
‘Racial unity’. Anything else might be interpreted as
pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance
to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more
energetically, than our forces could stand up to.” (TC-
76)
That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was
leading up to the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day
or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler
made a speech. On 26 September he said:
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that
when this problem is solved there will be no more
territorial problems for Germany in Europe.” (TC-29)
A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September,
with no precise date, and entitled “Opinion on the ‘Draft
Study of Naval Warfare against England’,” stated as follows:
“There is full agreement with the main theme of the
study.”
*******
“If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power who needs not only
sufficient
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colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean.” (C-25)
That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich
agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not,
of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and
intended. As a result, the conspirators were not prepared
straight away to start any further aggressive action against
Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were
gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now
that they intended and had taken the decision to proceed
against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely
occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions,
Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on
Poland.
It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his
military commanders at a later date, that, in his own words,
from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich
agreement, but that he had to have the whole of
Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed
in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did
at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of
Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in
March. Immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied,
preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland,
which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi excuse or
justification for their attack on that country.
The earlier discussions between the German and Polish
governments on the question of Danzig, which commenced
almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September
1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, until the
remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March
of the following year. A document taken from the Official
Polish White Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took
place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October,
where Ribbentrop had discussions with M. Lipski, the Polish
ambassador to Germany. The report states:
“In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was
present, von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a
general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between
Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the
retention of railway and economic facilities there.
Poland would agree to the building of an extra-
territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze.
In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility
of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by
twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German
frontiers.”
*******
“Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von
Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an
agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with
the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the
substance of this conversation to you.” (TC-73 No. 44)
It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed
Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was
raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the
seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the
whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it will become ever
more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators were
really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind
of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for
attacking Poland.
Another document taken from the Polish White Book (TC-73 No.
45) sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish
Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German
government in reply to the suggestions put forward by
Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part
reviews he history of Polish-German relationship and
emphasizes the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig.
Paragraph 6 of the document states:
“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the
Polish government, the Danzig question is governed by
two factors: the right of the German population of the
city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life
and development; and the fact that in all matters
appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected
with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is
definitely bound up with Poland.” (TC-73 No. 45)
The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under
the statute, and continues as follows:
“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration,
and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations
by way of a friendly understanding with the government
of the German Reich, the Polish government proposes the
replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its
prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement.
This agreement should guarantee the existence of the
Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national
and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish
government must state that any other solution,
[Page 684]
and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free
City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a
conflict. This would not only take the form of local
difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.
“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions,
I am ready to have final conversations personally with
the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it
necessary, however, that you should first present the
principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual
contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be
dangerous for the future.” (TC-73 No. 45)
The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely
successful from the German point of view. The Nazis had put
forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the
Reich, which they might well have known would have been
unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish government
had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles
had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not
agreed, which is exactly what the German government had
hoped for. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to
the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been
accomplished.
Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the
Polish government had offered to enter into discussions with
the German government, another top secret order was issued
by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by Keitel
(C-137). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. The order is
headed “First Supplement to Instruction dated October 21
1938,” and reads:
“The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three
contingencies mentioned in the instructions of October
21 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the
Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by
surprise.
“The preparations will be made on the following basis:
Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig,
exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war
against Poland.” (C-137)
The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and
therefore the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with
Poland. But Keitel’s order shows how the German government
answered the Polish proposal to enter into discussions.
On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler.
(TC-73 No. 48). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first
part of that conversation, of which that document is an
account, Hitler offered to answer any questions. He said he
had always followed the policy laid down by the 1934
agreement. He discussed
[Page 685]
the question of Danzig and emphasized that in the German
view it must sooner or later return to Germany. The
conversation continued:
“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very
difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s
suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland,
and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only
people thinking politically but the widest spheres of
Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
matter.
“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve
this -problem it would be necessary to try to find
something quite new, some new form, for which he used
the term ‘Korperschaft,’ which on the one hand would
safeguard the interests of the German population, and
on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the
Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at
ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and
nothing would be done to render difficult the situation
of the Polish Government.” (TC-73 No. 48)
It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed
(C-137) orders had already been issued for preparations to
be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some
six weeks later Hitler assured the Polish Foreign Minister
that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be
quite at his ease. -On the day after the conversation
between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as
follows:
“Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the
Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his
conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he
had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time
he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to
the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the
Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of
agreement.”
*******
“In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that
Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis
of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for
the further building up of friendly relations. It was
necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the
difficulties as would respect the rights and interests
of the two parties concerned.” (TC-73 No. 49)
Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one
expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month,
January 1939, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of
which the following is a pertinent extract:
[Page 686]
“In accordance with the resolute will of the German
National Leader, the continual progress and
consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and
Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us,
constitute an essential element in German foreign
policy. The political foresight, and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides
to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a
guarantee that all other problems arising in the course
of the future evolution of events will also be solved
in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and
understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future
with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations.” (2530-PS)
Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave
further assurances of the good faith of the German
Government. (TC-73 No. 57)
In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That
seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely
strengthened the German position against Poland. Within a
week of the completion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia
heat was beginning to be applied on Poland.
On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw
Ribbentrop. The nature of the conversation was generally
very much sharper than that of the discussion between
Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand Hotel,
Berchtesgaden:
“I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he
had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-
German relations in their entirety. “He complained
about our Press, and the Warsaw students’
demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”
*******
“Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the
conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the
Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of
guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in exchange for a motor
road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He
said that there had been further conversations between
you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had
pointed out the great difficulties in the way of
accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand
that all this had made an unfavorable impression on the
Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive
reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M.
von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only
yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in
favor of good relations with Poland and had expressed a
desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the
subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop
indicated that he was under the impression that
difficulties arising between us were also due to some
misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem
needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his
opinion our two States were dependent on each other.”
*******
“I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of
the Czechoslovakian question, there was no
understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was
already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow,
for, despite our disputes with the Czechs they were
after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the
position was far worse. I emphasized our community of
race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we
had given in their achievement of independence. I
pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I
indicated that the Polish man in the street could not
understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of
Slovakia, that protection being directed against
Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a
serious blow to our relations.
“Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that
this could be discussed.
“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a
conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop
remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few
days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk
should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come
to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his
offers.
“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything
about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of
Lithuania.
“Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr.
Urbsys on the latter’s return from Rome, and they had
discussed the Memel question, which called for a
solution.” (TC-73 No. 61 )
That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon
learned what the solution to Memel was. On the next day
German armed forces marched in.
As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was
growing both in the government of Great Britain and the
Polish govern-
[Page 688]
ment, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking
conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime
Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He
explained the results of the conversations that had been
taking place between the British and Polish Governments:
“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now
proceeding with other governments. In order to make
perfectly clear the position of His Majesty’s
government in the meantime before those consultations
are concluded, I now have to inform the House that
during that period, in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the
Polish government accordingly considered it vital to
resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s
government would feel themselves bound at once to lend
the Polish government all support in their power. They
have given the Polish government an assurance to this
effect.
“I may add that the French government have authorized me to
make it plain that they stand in the same position in this
matter as do His Majesty’s Government.” (TC-72 No. 17)
On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by
the Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance
the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which
Poland assured Great Britain of her support should Great
Britain be attacked. (TC-72 No. 18)
The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and
Great Britain were feeling at that time appears to have been
justified. During the same week, on 3 April, an order,
signed by Keitel, emanated from the High Command of the
Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The subject
is “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.” The order
reads:
“Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed
Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.
“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will
be issued in the middle of April. Their basic
principles remain unchanged.
“Part II ‘Fall Weiss’ [the code name for the operation
against Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of
the Fuehrer will be appended later.
“The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to
‘Fall Weiss’:
“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the
operations can be carried out at any time from 1
September 1939 onwards.
[Page 689]
“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been
directed to draw up a precise time-table for ‘Fall
Weiss’ and to arrange by conferences the synchronized
timings between the three branches of the armed forces.
“3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and
the details for the time-table must be submitted to the
OKW by 1 May 1939.” (C-120)
This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW.
Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is
annexed. It reads:
“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks
of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in
accordance with these for the conduct of the war.
“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed
Forces must be prepared for the following
eventualities:
“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
protection against surprise air attacks.
“II. ‘Fall Weiss’
“III. The annexation of Danzig.
“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of
military authority in East Prussia in the event of a
warlike development.” (C-120)
Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and
OKW. Annex I to this order, which concerns the safeguarding
of the frontiers of the German Reich, declares:
“*** Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state
of Defense or State of War, as defined in the
Reichdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not
be declared. All measures and demands necessary for
carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws
valid in peacetime.” (C-120)
The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons,
followed by the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was
seized upon by the Nazi government to urge on the crisis
which they we developing in Danzig between themselves and
Poland.
On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in
which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was
incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and
Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason
of entering intO that agreement, Poland had unilaterally
renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent
passages from that memorandum:
“The German government have taken note of the Polish-
[Page 690]
British declaration regarding the progress and aims of
the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and
Great Britain. According to this declaration there had
been concluded between the Polish government and the
British government a temporary understanding to be
released shortly by a permanent agreement which will
provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland
and Great Britain in the event of the independence of
one of the two states being directly or indirectly
threatened.” (TC-72 No. 14)
The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three
paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland.
It continues:
“*** The agreement which has now been concluded by the
Polish government with the British government is in
such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations
of a few months ago that the German government can take
note only with surprise and astonishment of such a
violent reversal of Polish policy.
“Irrespective of the manner in which its final
formulation may be determined by both parties, the new
Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact
of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and
of the present state of political relations, is
directed exclusively against Germany. “From the
obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it
appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstance,
to take an active part in any possible German-British
conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany,
even should this conflict not affect Poland and her
interests. This is a direct and open blow against the
renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934
declaration.”
*******
“The Polish government, however, by their recent
decision to accede to an alliance directed against
Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer
a promise of help by a third power to the direct
guarantee of peace by the German government. In view of
this, the German government are obliged to conclude
that the Polish government do not at present attach any
importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish
problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with
the German government. The Polish government have thus
abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the sapping of
German-Polish relations.” (TC-72 No. 14)
All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the
fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been
issued
[Page 691]
and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise
timetable.
The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last
negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the
21st which the German government had made for the return o
Danzig, the autobahn, and the railway. It mentions the
promise by Germany of the twenty-five year guarantee, and
continues:
“The Polish government did not avail themselves of the
opportunity offered to them by the German government or a
just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safe-
guarding of Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby
for permanent strengthening of the friendly,. neighbourly
relations between the two countries. The Polish government –
even rejected German proposals made with this object.
“At the same time the Polish government accepted, with
regard to another state, political obligations which
are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning
or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26
of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish government
arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration
null and void.” (TC-72 No. 14)
In the last paragraph the German government says, that
nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly
relations with Poland.
On the same day that memorandum,was issued, 28 April, Hitler
made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in
effect, the terms of the memorandum. He repeated the demands
and offers that Germany made in March, and went on to say
that the Polish government have rejected his offer. He
expressed his disappointment:
“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible
attitude of the Polish government. But that alone is
not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland,
like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the
pressure of a lying international campaign, that it
must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has
not called up a single man and had not thought of
proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said,
this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will
one day decide whether it was really right to refuse
the suggestion made this once by me. This, as I have
said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question
which intimately affects the German people, by a truly
unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of
both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was
not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a
receiving party, because it should be beyond
[Page 692]
all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The
intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was
merely invented by the International Press, led, as you
know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an
obligation on the part of the Polish government for
mutual assistance. ***” (TC-72 No. 13)
The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was
everything that the German government was saying at that
time. Hitler, who may very well have had a copy of the
orders for “Fall Weiss” in his pocket as he spoke, announced
publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was an
invention of “the International Press.”
In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish
government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the
objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of
force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two
countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other
friendly means. The Polish government states its awareness
of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has
long been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish
government sets out again its part of the recent
discussions. The Polish government states that it
communicated its views to the German government on 26 March,
and that it then proposed Joint guarantees by the Polish and
German governments of the City of Danzig, based on the
principles of freedom for the local population in internal
affairs. The Poles stated their preparedness to examine the
possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities. They
received no reply to those proposals. The Polish position is
summarized in one sentence:
“It is clear that negotiations in which one State
formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to
accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in
the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are
incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of
Poland” (TC-72 No. 16).
The Polish government proceeds to reject the German
accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible
with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. It states that
Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with
other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still
willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany
wish to do so. (TC-72 No. 16)
The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and
dated 10 May (C-120). Copies went to the various branches of
the OKW, and with them apparently were enclosed
“Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our
own economy.”
[Page 693]
Not only were military preparations being carried out
throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every
other kind of preparation was being made for war at the
earliest moment.
This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with
the conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The
report of this meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (L-
79). In his address to the conference Hitler cried out for
lebensraum, and said that Danzig was not the dispute at
all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the
east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack
Poland.
Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present.
The following is a significant paragraph:
“If there were an alliance of France, England and
Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be
constrained to attack England and France with a few
annihilation blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility
of a peaceful settlement with England.” (L-79)
So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to
attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack
England and France.
C. Final Preparations: June-September 1939
(1) Final Preparations of the Armed Forces. A precise
timetable for the attack had been called for. On 22 June
1939 it was ready. It provided as follows:
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted
to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a preliminary
timetable’ for ‘Fall Weiss’ based on the particulars so
far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force.
Details concerning the days preceding the attack and
the start of the attack were not included in this
timetable.
”The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the
main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy,
Army and Air Force and made the following comments on
individual points:
“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling
up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the
maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian
establishments, employers or other private persons who
make enquiries should be told that men are being called
up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units
it is intended to form for these maneuvers.
“It is requested that directions to this effect be
issued to subordinate establishments.” (C-126)
[Page 694]
All this became relevant later, when the German government
made allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles.
This order shows that in June the Germans were mobilizing,
only doing so secretly. The order continues:
“For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in
the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of
the Army proposed should take place from the middle of
July, must not be carried out.” (C-126)
The order is signed by Keitel.
A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that
order, reads in part:
“Attached are Operational Directions for the employment
of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by
way of precaution, in the event of the intention to
carry out ‘Fall Weiss’ remaining unchanged. F.O. U-
Boats [Doenitz] is handing in his Operation Orders by
12 August.” (C-126)
Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air
and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of
Danzig. It provides:
“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of
Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces
must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order
to protect the German population. There will be no
hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the
occupation takes place without the force of arms.” (C-
30)
The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be
effected. All this again becomes more relevant in the
subsequent discussion of the diplomatic action of the last
few days before the war, when Germany was making specious
offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means.
This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken,
and that nothing would change that decision. During July,
right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to
arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take
part in the coming occupation.
The reports which were coming back almost daily during this
period from Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig,
to the British Foreign Minister, and published in the
British Blue Book, show the kind of thing that was
happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows:
“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti
arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize
Danzig Hemwehr.
“All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which
consti-
[Page 695]
tute a popular public promenade on western fringe of
the city, have been closed with barbed wire and
‘verboten’ notices.
“The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards:
‘Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret
consequence.’ “Master of British steamer ‘High
Commissioner Wood’ whilst he was roving Koenigsberg
from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable
military activity, including extensive shipment of
camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by
small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized
steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens,
etc., left Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg
after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin.”
(TC-71).
And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July
states:
“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable,
advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about
thirty military lorries with East Prussian license
numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field
kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were
also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which
he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three
six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There
were about 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole
place is extensively fortified with barbed wire.” (TC-
71).
On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically
complete, Hitler and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their
intentions to their allies, the Italians. It will be
recalled that one of the passages in Hitler’s speech on 23
May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said,
“Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and
the Japanese.” (L-79). Now, when the preparations were
complete, Hitler disclosed his intentions to his Italian
comrades in the hope that they would join him. Ciano was
surprised at Hitler’s attempt to persuade the Italians to
come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of
the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He
therefore tried to dissuade Hitler from starting o until the
Duce could have a little more time to prepare himself. (TC-
77)
The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German
intention to attack England ar.d France ultimately, if not
at the me time as Poland. In trying to show the strength of
Germany and its certainty of winning the war as a means of
persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler declared:
“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate
reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse
before any of the ships now under construction could be
taken into
[Page 696]
service. As far as the land army was concerned, after
the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been
called to the colors. If England kept the necessary
troops in her own country she could send to France, at
the most, two infantry divisions and one armored
division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber
squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the
outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once
attack England and the English fighters would be
urgently needed for the defense of their own country.
“With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer
said that in the event of a general war, after the
destruction of Polandwhich would not take longGermany
would be in a position to assemble hundreds of
divisions along the West Wall and France would then be
compelled to concentrate all her available forces from
the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere
on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also
thought that the French would find it no easier to
overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the
West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme
doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven in quality.
Together with a few parade divisions, there were large
numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak
in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the
moment neither France nor England could help her in
this respect.
“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the
Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain
these weapons and German superiority would thereby be
diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and
Cracow, the population of their areas was different.
Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position
of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
and one-half million were German, about four million
were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine
Poles were much less in number than the total
population and, as already said, their striking power
was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances
Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the
shortest time.
“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had
made it clear that in any case in the event of a
conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of
Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present
moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable
conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile
Poland remained on Germany’s
[Page 697]
eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East
Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further
contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia.
This would not be necessary in the event of a previous
liquidation.”
*******
“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said
that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had
made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the
Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must
take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression
that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a
precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had
justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general
easterly and northeasterly direction of a German
policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the
Baltic countries, had been Germany’s undisputed sphere
of influence since time immemorial, as the
Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy.
For economic reasons also, Germany needed the
foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions.” (TC-
77)
Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the
persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers,
but economic reasons — the need for foodstuffs and timber from
Poland. The minutes of the Italo-German meeting continue:
“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only
material, although the city had the greatest harbour in
the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an
ancient German city awakening sentimental feelings for
every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account
of this psychological element in public opinion. To
make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should
suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a
large Italian minority was being treated brutally on
Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that
Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this
kind.
“Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer’s statement,
first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side
over the completely unexpected seriousness of the
position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in
those which took place during his Berlin visit had
there been any sign from the German side that the
position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the
Danzig question would be settled in the course of time.
On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction
that a conflict with the Western Powers was
unavoidable, had assumed
[Page 698]
that he should make his preparations for this event; he
had made plans for a period of two or three years. If
immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce, as he
had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German
side, but for various reasons he would welcome the
postponement of a general conflict until a later time.
“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position
of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed
that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to
that country but would develop into a general European
war.” (TC-77)
Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any
immediate action. He argued further
“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis
Powers should make a gesture which would reassure
people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and
Germany.” (TC-77)
The Fuehrer’s answer was clear:
“The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish
problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited
until the autumn, the more difficult would military
operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of
September, weather conditions made air operations
hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of
the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by
the autumn rains, would be such as to make them
impossible for motorized forces. From September to May,
Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any
kind of military operations. Poland could, however,
occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be
able to do anything about it since they obviously could
not bombard or destroy the place.” (TC-77)
The Germans could not possibly bombard or destroy any place
such as Danzig where there happened to be Germans living.
The discussion continued:
“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer’s view,
the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer
answered that this settlement must be made one way or
another by the end of August. To the question of
Ciano’s as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed,
Hitler answered that Poland must give up political
control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests
would obviously be reserved and that Polish general
behavior must contribute to a general lessening of the
tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept
this solution since, up to the present, the German
proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this
proposal personally to Beck at his visit to
Obersalzberg. They were ex-
[Page 699]
tremely favorable to Poland. In return for the
political sur, render of Danzig, under a complete
guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of
a connection between East Prussia and the Reich,
Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-
year pact of friendship and the participation of Poland
in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the
proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine
it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of
English intervention. The general Polish aims could be
seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of
East Prussia, and even proposed to advance to Berlin.”
(TC-77)
The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on
the following day:
“The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite
conclusions: (1) in the event of any further
provocation, he would immediately attack; (2) if Poland
did not clearly and plainly state her political
intention, she must be forced to do so.”
*******
“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply
not exist further in the world through lack of space;
not only was there no more space, but existing space
was completely blockaded by its present possessors;
they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and
deluded themselves about their riches. The Western
Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the
world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their
class. This psychological element of contempt was
perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It
could only be settled by a life and death struggle
which the two Axis partners could meet more easily
because their interests did not clash on any point.
“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient
domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The
Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the
words that Italy already was the dominant power in the
Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that
Germany must take the old German road eastwards and
that this road was also desirable for economic reasons,
and that Italy had geographical and historical claims
to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had
recognized it and had said as much in his well-known
letter to Mazzini. The interests of Germany and Italy
went in quite different directions and there never
could be a conflict between them.
“Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in
yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and
Germany
[Page 700]
would have their backs free for work against the West.
The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so
that for 50 years she would be incapable of fighting.
In such a case, matters in the West could be settled.
“Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear
explanation of the situation. He had, on his side,
nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He
asked for more definite information on one point in
order that the Duce might have all the facts before
him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision
because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with
Poland could be localized on the basis of long
experience. HeCianoquite saw that so far the Fuehrer
had always been right in his judgment of the position.
If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had
to take certain measures of precaution, and therefore
Ciano would put the following question:
“The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which
he would take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of
serious provocation, and (2) if Poland did not make her
political position clear. The first of these conditions
depended on the decision of the Fuehrer, and German
reaction could follow it in a moment. The second
condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano
therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must
have satisfied Germany about her political condition.
He realized that this date depended upon climatic
conditions.
“The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must
be made clear at the latest by the end of August.
Since, however, the decisive part of military
operations against Poland could be carried out within a
period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need
another four weeks, it could be finished at the end of
September or the beginning of October. These could be
regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the
last dates on which he could begin to take action was
the end of August.
“Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his
youth he had favored German-Italian cooperation, and
that no other view was expressed in his books. He had
always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally
suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts
of interest between them. He was personally fortunate
to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there
was one other statesman who would stand out great and
unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend
was for him a matter of real personal satisfaction,
[Page 701]
and if the hour of common battle struck, he would
always be found on the side of the Duce.” (TC-77)
(2) Economic Preparations. If the military preparations were
throughout this period nearing their completion, at the same
the economists had not been idle. A letter dated 25 August
from Funk to the Fuehrer, reads:
“My Fuehrer!
“I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most
friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my
birthday. How happy and how grateful to you we ought to
be for being granted the favor of experiencing these
overwhelmingly great and world-changing times and
taking part in the mighty events of these days.
“The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering,
that you, my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in
principle the measures prepared by me for financing the
war and for shaping the relationship between wages and
prices and for carrying through emergency sacrifices,
made me deeply happy. I hereby report to you with all
respect that I have succeeded by means of precautions
taken during the last few months, in making the
Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so
unassailable, that even the most serious shocks the
international money and credit market cannot affect us
in the least. In the meantime I have quite
inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of the
Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad
which it was possible to lay hands on. Under the
proposals I have prepared for a ruthless elimination of
all consumption which is not of vital importance and of
all public expenditure and public works which are not
of importance for the war effort, we will be in a
position to cope with all demands on finance and
economy, without any serious shocks. I have considered
it my duty as the General Plenipotentiary for Economy
appointed by you to make this report and solemn promise
to you, my Fuehrer.
“Heil my Fuehrer /signed/ Walter Funk.” (699-PS)
It is difficult in view of that letter to see how Funk can
claim that he did not know of the preparations and of the
intentions of the German government to wage war.
(3) The Obersalzburg Speech. On 22 August 1939, Hitler
addressed his commanders in chief at Obersalzburg. (1014-
PS). At the date preparations were complete. In the course
of his speech Hitler declared:
[Page 702]
“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we
were determined from the beginning to fight the Western
powers.”
*******
“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a
certain line. Even if war should break out in the West,
the destruction of Poland shall be the primary
objective.”
*******
“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the
war never mind whether it be plausible or not. The
victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the
truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the
Right is what matters but Victory.”
*******
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
come sooner or later. I had already made this decision
in spring, but I thought that I would first turn
against the West in a few years, and only afterwards
against the East.” (1014-PS)
These passages emphasize the intention of he Nazi government
not only to conquer Poland but ultimately, in any event, to
wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.
In another significant passage, Hitler stated:
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will
supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It
is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only
afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will
make a proposal for mediation.
“The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been
made for the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way
is open for the soldier, after I have made the
political preparations.”
“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the
assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.”
(798-PS)
(4) Diplomatic Preparations: Provoking the Crisis. On 23
August 1939, the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby
Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the
Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under
the statute setting up the constitution of the Free City.
(TC-72 No. 62). That event was, of course, aimed at stirring
up feeling in the Free City at that time.
At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured
by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The affidavit
of General Lahousen (Affidavit A) refers to the provision of
[Page 703]
Polish uniforms to the SS Forces for these purposes, so that
dead Poles could be found lying about on the German side of
the frontier. Three short reports found in the British Blue
Book corroborate this affidavit. They are reports from the
British ambassador in Warsaw.
The first of them is dated 26 August, and reads:
“Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.
“Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from
East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire.
Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is
being returned.
“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near
Szczyglo, twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing
shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with
machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested
vigorously to Berlin.
“Gazeta Polska, in inspired leader, today says these
are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts
of aggression of para-military disciplined detachments
supplied with regular army’s arms, and in one case it
was a regular army detachment. Attacks more or less
continuous.
“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm
and strong attitude of defence. Facts spoke for
themselves and acts of aggression came from German
side. This was best answer to ravings of German press.
“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German
detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and
wounded another.” (TC-72 No. 53)
The next report is dated the same date, 26 August and reads:
“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story
recounted by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that
twenty-four Germans were recently killed at Lodz and
eight at Bielsko. Story is without any foundation
whatever.” (TC-72 No. 54)
The report of the next day, 27 August, reads as follows:
“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-
treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are
gross exaggeration, if not complete falsification.
“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of
situation by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so
far as I can ascertain, the rest of Poland is still
completely calm.
“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda
methods regarding Czechoslovakia last year.
[Page 704]
“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate
German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that
has since March [when the rest of Czechoslovakia was
seized] exacerbated feeling between the two
nationalities. I suppose this has been done with object
(a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing
public opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or
apparent aggression in Poland.
“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two
latter objects.
“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned
by Herr Hitler.
“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority
is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged
sufferings of Germans in Poland where, be it noted,
they do not amount to more than 10 per cent of
population in any commune.
“8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted
that, if Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole
purpose of destroying Polish independence.
“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on
Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing
everything possible to prove that Herr Hitler’s
allegations regarding German minority are false.” (TC-
72 No. 55)
Further corroboration of General Lahousen’s affidavit is
contained in a memorandum of a conversation between the
writer and Keitel. That conversation with Keitel took place
on 17 August, and went as follows:
“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said
that he would not pay any attention to this action, as
the Fuehrer had not informed him, and had only let him
know that we were to furnish Heydrich with Polish
uniforms. He agrees that I instruct the General Staff.
He says that he does not think much of actions of this
kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they
have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask
the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this
special action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided
that this action would be executed only by the Army.”
(795-PS)
That was the position at the end of the third week in August
1939. On 22 August the Russian-German Non-aggression Pact
was signed in Moscow. The orders to invade Poland were given
immediately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour
was actually to be in the early morning of 25 of August.
[Page 705]
(5) Pleas for peace. On the same date, 22 August, news reached England
that the German-Russian agreement was being signed. The significance of
that pact from a military point of view to Germany was obvious, and the
British government immediately made their position clear in one last
hope, that the German government might possibly think better. The Prime
Minister wrote to Hitler as follows:
“Your Excellency.
“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain
measures taken by His Majesty’s Government, and
announced in the press and on the wireless this
evening.
“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s
Government, been rendered necessary by the military
movements which have been reported from Germany, and by
the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-
Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to
indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf
of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be
reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made.
Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-
Soviet Agreement, it can not alter Great Britain’s
obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s Government
have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which
they are determined to fulfill.
“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government
had made their position clear in 1914, the great
catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not
there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s
Government are resolved that on this occasion there
shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
“If the case should arise, they are resolved, and
prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at
their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end
of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous
illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will
come to an early end even if a success on any one of
the several fronts on which it will be engaged should
have been secured.” (TC-72 No. 56).
The Prime Minister therefore urged the German government to
try to solve the difficulty without recourse to the use of
force. He suggested that a truce should be declared while
direct discussions between the two governments, Polish and
German, might take place. Prime Minister Chamberlain
concluded:
“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to
avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In
view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may
follow from the
[Page 706]
action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency
will weigh with the utmost deliberation the
considerations which I have put before you.” (TC-72 No.
56).
On the following day, 23 August, Hitler replied to Prime
Minister Chamberlain. He started off by saying that Germany
has always sought England’s friendship, and went on to say
that Germany, “like every other State, possesses certain
definite interests which it is impossible to renounce.” The
letter continued as follows:
“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of
Danzig, and of the Corridor by the method of
negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly
unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated
by England regarding a German mobilization against
Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards
Roumania, Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called
guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given,
had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate
on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable
for Germany also. “The unconditional assurance given by
England to Poland that she would render assistance to
that country in all circumstances regardless of the
causes from which a conflict might spring, could only
be interpreted in that country as an encouragement
thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a
charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one
and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland.
“The atrocities which then have been taking place in
that country are terrible for the victims, but
intolerable for a great power such as the German Reich,
which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during
these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous
breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City
of Danzig, has made demands in the character of
ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic
strangulation.”
*******
“Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the
persecution of the Germans.”
*******
“The German Reich government has received information
to the effect that the British government has the
intention to carry out measures of mobilization which,
according to the statements contained in your own
letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone.
This is said to be true of France as well. Since
Germany has never had the intention of taking military
measures other than those of a defensive character
[Page 707]
against England, or France, and, as has already been
emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the
future intend, to attack England, or France, it follows
that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime
Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a
contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich.
I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event
of these military announcements being carried into
effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the
German forces.”
*******
“The question of the treatment of European problems on
a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on
Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime
committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and
consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after
a change of spirit on the part of the responsible
powers can there be any real change in the relationship
between England and Germany. I have all my life fought
for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by
British diplomacy — at any rate up to the present —
has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an
attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in
the future, nobody could be happier than I.” (TC-72 No.
60).
On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual
Assistance was signed in London. Each government undertook
to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression
against either by any third power. (TC-73 No. 91)
A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier
addressed a letter to Hitler, which reads as follows:
“The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of
your personal communication ***.
“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest
responsibility which two heads of the governments can
possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding
the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace
and work, I feel I owe it to you personally, and to
both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still
rests in your hands.
-“You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards
Germany, nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your
nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to
strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but
also sincere cooperation in their own interests, as
well as in those of Europe and o the whole world.
Unless you credit the French people with lower sense of
honor, than I credit the German Nation with; you cannot
doubt that France loyally fulfills her obligations
[Page 708]
towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am
fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.
“These two convictions are fully compatible.
“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful
solution of the international crisis, with all honor
and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace
exists on all sides.
“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that
of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee
Poland’s readiness, which she has always shown to
submit to the mutual application of a method of open
settlement, as it can be imagined between the
governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest
conscience I can assure you that among the differences
which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the
question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be
submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a
peaceful and just solution.
“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is
nothing in France’s clear and loyal solidarity with
Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice
the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity
has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today,
from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.
“In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no
high-minded human being could understand it, if a war
of destruction was started without a last attempt being
made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and
Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty
work for this aim, without any prejudice to German
honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French
and the German people, and who am on the other hand
bound to Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a
promise, am prepared, as head of the French government,
to do everything an upright man can do to bring this
attempt to a successful conclusion.
“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You
know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the
devastations of that war have left in the conscience of
the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The
picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your outstanding
role as the leader of the German people on the road of
peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the
common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a
reply to this suggestion.
“If French and German blood should be shed again, as it
was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more
murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight,
believing in its own
[Page 709]
victory. But the most certain victors will
bedestruction and barbarity.” (TC-78)
On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier’s letter of 26
August. The sense of it was very much the same as that which
he -wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the
letter which he had received from him earlier in the week.
(TC-79)
After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German
Government could no longer be in any doubt as to the
position of both the British and French Governments in the
event of German aggression against Poland. But the pleas for
peace did not end there. On 24 August President Roosevelt
wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish
Republic (TC-72 No. 124). His letter stated in part:
“In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April,
I stated that it appeared to me that the leaders of
great nations had it in their power to liberate their
peoples from the disaster that impended, but that
unless the effort were immediately made with good will
on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive
solution to existing controversies, the crisis which
the world was confronting must end in catastrophe.
Today that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand
indeed.
“To the message which I sent you last April I have
received no reply, but because my confident belief that
the cause of world peace — which is the cause of
humanity itself — rises above all other
considerations, I am again addressing myself to you,
with the hope that the war which impends and the
consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.
“I therefore urge with all earnestness — and I am
likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland
— that the Government of Germany and Poland agree by
common accord to refrain from any positive act of
hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that
they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the
controversies which have arisen between them by one of
the three following methods:
“First, by direct negotiation;
“Second, by the submission of these controversies to an
impartial arbitration in which they can both have
confidence; or
“Third, that they agree to the solution of these
controversies through the procedure of conciliation.”
(TC-72 No. 124).
Hitler’s answer to that letter was the order to his armed
forces to invade Poland on the following morning. The reply
to Mr.
[Page 710]
Roosevelt’s letter from the President of the Polish
Republic, however, was an acceptance of the offer to settle
the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested.
(TC-72 No. 126)
On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German
Government,
President Roosevelt wrote again:
“I have this hour received from the President of Poland
a reply to the message which I addressed to your
Excellency and to him last night.”
The Polish reply is then set out.
“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that
the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were
just and reasonable.
“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has
made it plain that the Polish Government is willing,
upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to
solve the controversy which has arisen between the
Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct
negotiation or the process of conciliation.
“Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may
still be restored that the nations of the modern world
may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful
and happier relationship, if you and the Government of
the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of
settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All
the world prays that Germany, too, will accept.” (TC-72
No. 127)
But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it
pay heed to the Pope’s appeal on the same date, 24 August
(TC-72 No. 139). It is an appeal in similar terms. There was
yet a further appeal from the Pope on 31 August:
“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending
negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such
as the whole world continues to pray for.” (TC-72 No.
141).
Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the
Pope referred as “pending negotiations”, were unhappily,
completely bogus negotiations insofar as Germany was
concerned. They were put forward simply as an endeavor to
dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting
her obligations to Poland. The final German “offers” were no
offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never
any intention behind them of entering into discussions,
negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful
settlement with Poland. They were merely an attempt to make
it easier to seize and conquer Poland than it would likely
be if England and France were to observe the obligations
they had undertaken.
[Page 711]
(6) Events of the Last Week in August, 1939. This was the
progress of those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-
Soviet Pact was signed. On 24 August, orders were given to
the German armies to march the following morning. After
those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the
German Government that the British and Polish Governments
had signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of mutual
assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the
British Prime Minister had made a statement in the House of
Commons and a joint communique had been issued, on 6 April,
that the two nations would in fact assist one another if
either were attacked; but no formal agreement had been
signed.
Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given
by Hitler, the news came that such a formal document had
been signed. The invasion was thereupon postponed for the
sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and
France out of the war — not to cancel the war, but solely
to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having
postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communique to
Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin,
which was a mixture of bribe and threat, and with which he
hoped to persuade England to keep out.
On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British
Government’s reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply
stressed that the differences ought to be settled by
agreement. The British Government put forward the view that
Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any agreement reached
should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not these
proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to
Germany are of no great matter. For once it had been made
clearas it was in the British Government’s reply of 28
Augustthat England would not be put off assisting Poland in
the event of German aggression, the German Government had no
concern with further negotiation but was concerned only to
afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent
itself from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the
appeals to reason that were being put forward.
On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to
Sir Neville Henderson the German Government’s answer to the
British Government’s reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear
that the whole object of this letter was to put forward
something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler agreed to
enter into direct conversatiOns as suggested by the British
Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be
based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of
the whole of the Corridor.
[Page 712]
It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged
that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put
forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, plus the
arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad
running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That demand
was unacceptable at that time. To make quite certain of
refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor.
There was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole
territory must become German.
Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be
accepted, Hitler stated: “On those terms I am prepared to
enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is
urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the
Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow
night, the 30th of August.”
This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the
29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London;
and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish
Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in
Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if
indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish
Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It
allowed Poland no opportunity for discussing the matters at
all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer
amounted to an ultimatum.
At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville
Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to
the message that had been handed to him the previous
evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page
document which purported to be the German proposal to be
discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish
Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to
hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no
copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there
was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having
before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously
and magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish
Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to
be asked whether he came with full powers. When he replied
that he did not, Ribbentrop said that he would put the
position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was
much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that
time, because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his
Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid
down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the fol-
[Page 713]
lowing morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31
August, at 9 o’clock, the German radio broadcast the
proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville
Henderson the night before, saying that these were the
proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no
Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the
German Government assumed that they were turned down. That
broadcast at 9 o’clock on the evening of 31 August was the
first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposal, and it
was the first that the British Government or its
representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what
had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused
to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast, at 9:15 — perhaps while the broadcast was
still in its course — a copy of those proposals was handed to
Sir Neville Henderson for the first time.
This summary of events during that last week of August 1939
is based upon the contents of several documents which will now
be alluded to.
In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was
asked the question:
“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister
in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the
end of March or the beginning of April, was it not
fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was
impossible?” (TC-90)
This was Goering’s answer:
“Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction,
but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer.
When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had
given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was
also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians
took Bessarabia -nothing happened, and this made a big
impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time
Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the
beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her
official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on
the telephone and told me that he had stopped the
planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British
intervention.’ So then I asked him, ‘Do you think that
it will be any different within four or five days?’ At
this same time — I don’t know whether you know about
that, Colonel — I was in connection with Lord Halifax
by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic
channels to do everything to stop war
[Page 714]
with England. After the guarantee I held an English
declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in
the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia, I
told him that from now on if he tried to solve the
Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of
England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.” (TC-90)
The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows:
“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the
campaign against Poland were originally supposed to
have been completed by the end of August 1939?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’
“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order
for the campaign against Poland came some time between
15 August 1939 and 20 August 1939 after the signing of
the treaty with Soviet Russia.” [The dates obviously
are wrong].
“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’
“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the
campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the
24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until
September the 1st in order to await the results of new
diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’ ” (TC-90)
In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted
war with England. It will be recalled, however, that after
the speech of Hitler on 22 August to his commanders-in-
chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his
exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play
their part. (798-PS)
Hitler’s verbal communique, as it is called in the British
Blue Book, which he handed to Sir Neville Henderson on 25
August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-
Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from aiding
Poland, commences by stating Hitler’s desire to make one
more effort to prevent war. In the second paragraph he
asserts again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable:
“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish
these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier
and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet
and order, but also in the interests of European peace.
“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved.
The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was
not in the least calculated to induce any change in the
German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech
could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany
and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of
1914
[Page 715]
to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no
longer have to fight on two fronts. Agreement with
Russia was unconditional and signified a change in
foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very
long time. Russia and Germany would never again take up
arms against each other. Apart from this, the
agreements reached with Russia would also render
Germany secure economically for the longest period of
war.” (TC-72 No. 68)
Then comes the bribe.
“The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be
solved and will be solved. He is however prepared and
determined after the solution of this problem to
approach England once more with a large, comprehensive
offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case
also he will be capable of being great in his action.
And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire
and is ready to pledge himself personally for its
continued existence and to place the power of the
German Reich at its disposal on condition that his
colonial demands, which are limited, should be
negotiated by peaceful means. ***” (TC- 72 No. 68)
Again Hitler stressed irrevocable determination never to
enter into war with Russia. He concluded as follows:
“If the British Government would consider these ideas a
blessing for Germany and also for the British empire, a
peace might result. If it rejects these ideas there
will be war. In no case will Great Britain emerge
stronger; the last war proved it. The Fuehrer repeats
that he himself is a man of ad infinitum decisions by
which he is bound, and that this is his last offer.”
(TC-72 No. 68)
The British Government was not of course aware of the real
object that lay behind that message, and, taking it at its
face value, wrote back on 28 August saying that they were
prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler
that the differences must be settled, as follows:
“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government a
reasonable solution of the differences between Germany
and Poland could and should be effected by agreement
between the two countries on lines which would include
the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests, and
they recall that in his speech of the 28th of April the
German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
interests to Poland.
“But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter
to the German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His
Majesty’s Government consider it essential for the
success of the discussions which would precede the
agreement that it should be
[Page 716]
understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at
would be guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty’s
Government would be ready if desired to make their
contribution to the effective operation of such a
guarantee.”
“*******
“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make
their own attitude plain in the particular matters at
issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the
German Chancellor will not think that, because His
Majesty’s Government are scrupulous concerning their
obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all
their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
which may command itself both to Germany and to
Poland.” (TC-72 No. 74)
That reply knocked the German hopes on the head. The Nazis
had failed despite their tricks and their bribes to dissuade
England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was
now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as
quickly as possible and saving face as much as possible.
In his interview with Hitler, Sir Neville Henderson
emphasized the British attitude that they were determined in
any event to meet their obligations to Poland. The interview
concluded as follows:
“In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he
willing to negotiate direct with the Poles? and Was he
ready to discuss the question of any exchange of
population? He replied in the affirmative as regards
the latter. There I have no doubt that he was thinking
at the same time of a rectification of frontiers. As
regards to the first, he said he could not give me an
answer until after he had given the reply of His
Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which
such a document deserved. In this connection he turned
to Ribbentrop and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal
Goering to discuss it with him.’ ” (TC-72 No. 75)
The German reply, as outlined before, was handed to Sir
Neville Henderson at 7.15 P.M. on 29 August. The reply sets
out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in a
previous note, and goes on to say that the German Government
is prepared to enter into discussion on the basis that the
whole of the Corridor as well as Danzig shall be returned to
the Reich. The reply continues:
“The demands of the German Government are in conformity
with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to
this territory which has always been recognized as
being necessary; viz., return of Danzig and the
Corridor to Germany, the
[Page 717]
safeguarding of the existence of the German national
group in the territories remaining to Poland.” (TC-72
No. 78)
It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right
to the Corridor has been “recognized” for so long. On 28
April, Hitler demands consisted only of Danzig, the
Autobahn, and the railway. But now Hitler’s aim was to
manufacture justification and to put forth proposals which
under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain
accept. The note states:
“The British Government attach importance to two
considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an
imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as
possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the
existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately
safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by
means of international guarantees.
“On this subject, the German Government makes the
following declaration:
“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful
outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the
English proposal and to enter into direct discussions.
They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as
the result of the impression made upon them by the
written statement received from the British Government
that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance
with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador.”
“*******
“For the rest, in making these proposals the German
Government have never had any intention of touching
Poland’s interests of questioning the existence of an
independent Polish State. The German Government,
accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the
British Government’s offer of their good offices in
securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary
with full powers. They count on the arrival of this
Emissary on Wednesday, 30 August 1939.
“The German Government will immediately draw up
proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and
will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the
British Government before the arrival of the Polish
negotiators.” TC-72 No. 78)
That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously
explained, insufficient time was allowed for the Polish
Emissary to reach Berlin by midnight the following night.
Sir Neville Henderson’s account of his interview on the
evening of 29 August summarizes what took place then:
“I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum,
but
[Page 718]
after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von
Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to
stress urgency of the moment when the two fully
mobilized armies were standing face to face.” (TC-72
No. 79)
Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville
Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous
meeting on midnight of 30 August, at the time the Polish
Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that the
British Government reciprocated the desire for improved
relations. It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its
interest to other friends in order to obtain an improvement
in the situation. It understood that the German Government
accepts the condition that the settlement should be subject
to international guarantee. The British Government makes a
reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward
in their last letter, and is informing the Polish Government
immediately. Lastly, the British understand that the German
Government is drawing up the proposals. (TC-72 No. 89)
Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at
midnight on 30 August:
“I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to
accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested
that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German
proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and
to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government
with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added
that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s
Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw
to temporize negotiations.
“Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy
document which he read out in German aloud at top
speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me
I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or
more articles which it contained. Though I cannot
therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: ***”
“*******
“When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these
proposals in accordance with undertaking the German
reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too
late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin
by midnight.
“I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin
on 30th August constituted in fact, an ultimatum in
spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me
yesterday. This he denied,
[Page 719]
saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my
imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal
procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish
Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had
summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for
communication to Polish Government. In the most violent
terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask
the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish
Ambassador asked him for interview it might be
different. I said that I would naturally inform my
Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those
were his personal views he would bring all that I had
said to Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to
decide.
“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr
von Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant
interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He
inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilization, but
I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany
had also mobilized as Herr Hitler himself had admitted
to me yesterday.” (TC-772 No. 92)
Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany
ad also given the orders to attack Poland some days before.
On the following day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M.
Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with
Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski’s account of the conversation:
“I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked
if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake
negotiations. I said no. He then asked whether I had
been informed that on London’s suggestion the German
Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate
directly with a delegate of the Polish Government,
furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to
have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied
that I had no direct information on the subject. In
conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had
thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would
communicate my demarche to the Chancellor.” (TC-7 No.
112)
But it was too late. The orders had already been given on
that day to the German Army to invade. A “Most Secret order”
signed by Hitler, described as his “Direction No. 1 for the
conduct of the war,” dated 31 August 1939, reads in part:
“Now that all the political possibilities of disposing
by peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern
Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are
exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.
“The attack on Poland is to be carried out in
accordance with
[Page 720]
the preparations made for ‘Fall Weiss’, with the
alterations which result, where the Army is concerned,
from the fact that it has in the meantime almost
completed its dispositions.
“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain
unchanged.
“Date of attack — 1 September 1939
“Time of attack — 04:45 [inserted in red pencil]
“This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay
of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.
“In the West it is important that the responsibility
for the opening of hostilities should rest
unequivocally with England and France. At first purely
local action should be taken against insignificant
frontier violations.” (C-126)
That evening, 31 August, at nine o’clock, the German radio
broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which they
were willing to enter into discussions with the Polish
Government. The proposals were set out at length. By his
time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish
Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their
written copy of them. This is a document which seems
difficult to explain other than as an exhibition or an
example of hypocrisy. The second paragraph states:
“Further, the German Government pointed out that they
felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer
of an understanding available to the British Government
by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.”
The manner in which they did that has been shown. The German
Broadcast continued, that instead of the arrival of an
authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government
of the Reich received to their readiness for an
understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization; and
that only toward 12 o’clock on the night of 30 August 1939
did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British
readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.
The fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Reich
did not arrive, removed the necessary conditions for
informing His Majesty’s Government of the views of the
German Government as regards the possible basis for
negotiation. Since His Majesty’s Government themselves had
pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland,
the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave
the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation
of the last British note, precise information as to the text
of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis
for negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish
Plenipotentiary. The Broadcast thereafter went on to
[Page 721]
set out the Nazi version of the story of the negotiations
over the last few days. (TC-73 No. 113)
On 1 September, when his armies were already crossing the
Polish frontier, Hitler issued this proclamation to his
Armed Forces:
“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good
neighborly relations as aimed at by me, wants to force
the issue by way of arms.
“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody
terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of
frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great
power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect
the Reich’s frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts
I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet
force with force.
“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination
take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights
of the German people.
“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high
tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and
to do his duty to the last.
“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are
the representatives of National Socialist Greater
Germany.
“Long live our people and the Reich.” (TC-54)
So that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He
had afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at
that time anyway, it did not matter what people said about
it afterwards.
“The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we
told the truth or not. Might is what counts — or
victory is what counts and not right.” (1014-PS)
On that day, 1 September, when news came of this invasion of
Polish ground, the British Government, in accordance with
their treaty obligations, sent an ultimatum to the German
Government, in which it stated:
“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless
the German Government are prepared to give His
Majesty’s Government satisfactory assurances that the
German Government have suspended all aggressive action
against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw
their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.” (TC-72
No. 110)
At 9 o’clock on 3 September the British Government handed
[Page 722]
a final ultimatum to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It read in part:
“*** Although this communication was made more than
twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but
German attacks upon Poland have been continued and
intensified. I have accordingly the honor to inform you
that, unless not later than eleven o’clock, British
Summer Time, today 3d September, satisfactory
assurances to the above effect have been given by the
German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s
Government in London, a state of war will exist between
the two countries as from that hour.” (TC-72 No. 118)
And so it was that at 11 o’clock on 3 September a state of
war existed between Germany and England and between Germany
and France. The plans, preparations, intentions, and
determination to carry out this assault upon Poland which
had been going on for months, for years before, had come to
fruition despite all appeals to peace, all appeals to
reason. It mattered not what anybody but the German
Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else but
the German nation thought they had. If there is any doubt
left about this matter, two more documents remain for
consideration. Even now, on 3 September, Mussolini offered
some chance of peace. At 6:30 hours on 3 September Mussolini
sent a telegram to Hitler:
“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary
at the Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs: “Italy sends the information, leaving, of
course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still
has a chance to call a conference with France, England
and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would
leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2.
Calling the conference within two or three days. 3.
Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would
be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand
today.
“This idea which originated from the Duce has its
foremost exponent in France.
“Danzig is already German and Germany is holding
already securities which guarantee most of her demands.
Besides, Germany has had already its ‘moral
satisfaction.’ If it would accept the plan for a
conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the
same time prevent a war which already today has the
aspect of being universal and of extremely long
duration.” (1831-PS)
[Page 723]
Perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s
aims were, for his offer was turned down in the illuminating
letter which Hitler was to write in reply:
“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at
mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only
under condition, that there would be a possibility to
give me certain guarantees that the conference would be
successful. Because, for the last two days the German
troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance
in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate
the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic
intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could
have been found, if England would not have been
determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have
not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not
believe that peace could have been maintained for more
than one-half year or one year. Under these
circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything,
the present moment was better for resistance. At
present, the superiority of the German armed forces in
Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the Polish
Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt
whether this fast success could be achieved in one or
two years. England and France would have armed their
allies, to such an extent that the crushing technical
superiority of the German Armed Forces could not have
become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the
fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own
fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also
aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently
and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the
moment for resistance in such a way that the
probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe
in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a rock.
Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you
think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I
acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I
believe also — even if we march now over different
roads — that fate will finally join us. If the
National Socialist Germany were destroyed by the
Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have
to face a grave future. I was personally always aware
of this community of the future of our two governments
and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the
situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief
remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant
things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant
tasks, but di-
[Page 724]
rect all on acts in the light of great operational
considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the
Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our
action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender.
Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan.
The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all
expectations. The superiority of our air force is
complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in
Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France
can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment
will come when we can confront the enemy also there
with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks,
Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to
me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in
the future.” (1831-PS)
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, DANZIG,
ENGLAND AND FRANCE
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F) 4; V. Vol. I Pg. 26,29
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]
[Page 725]
*386-PS; Notes on a conference with
Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937,
signed by Hitler’s adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November
1937. (USA 25) Vol. III, Pg. 295
*388-PS; File of papers on Case Green
(the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by
Schmundt,Hitler’s adjutant, April-October 1938,. (USA 26)
Vol. III, Pg. 305
*699-PS; Letter from Funk to
Hitler,25 August 1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB
49) Vol. III, Pg. 509
*789-PS; Speech of the Fuehrer at a
conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme
Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) Vol. III, Pg.572
*795-PS; Keitel’s conference, 17
August 1939, concerning\ giving Polish uniforms to Heydrich.
(GB 54) Vol. III, Pg.580
*798-PS; Hitler’s speech to
Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA
29) Vol. III, Pg.581
*1014-PS; Hitler’s speech to
Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. (USA 30) Vol. III,
Pg.665
*1639-A-PS; Mobilization book for the
Civil Administration, 1939 Edition, issued over signature of
Keitel. (USA 777) Vol. IV, Pg. 143
*1780-PS; Excerpts from diary kept by
General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) Vol. IV,
Pg.360
[Page 726]
1796-PS; Notes to the War Diary from
March 1939 to January 1940. Vol. IV, Pg.370
1822-PS; Telegram from Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Rome to Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Berlin,25 August 1939, concerning conference with Mussolini
and Ciano. Vol. IV, Pg.459
1823-PS; Hitler reply to Mussolini,
27 August 1939, concerning attitude of Italy in conference
of25 August 1939. Vol. IV, Pg.462
1828-PS; Memorandum handed to German
Foreign Office by Count Magistrate in Rome, 7 August 1939.
Vol. IV, Pg.463
*1831-PS; Correspondence between
Hitler and Mussolini, September 1939. (GB 75) Vol. IV,
Pg.463
1832-PS; Telephone report of Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome, 27 August 1939. Vol.
IV, Pg.468
1889-PS; Account of conference of
Fuehrer and Italian Ambassador Attolico, 31 August 1939.
Vol. IV, Pg.528
*2327-PS; Two top secret memoranda,
14 June 1939, concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA 39)
Vol. IV, Pg.1035
*2357-PS; Speech by Hitler before
Reichstag, 20 February 1938, published in Documents of
German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. 50-52. (GB 30) Vol. IV,
Pg.1099
*2368-PS; Hitler’s speech before
Reichstag, 30 January 1937, published in Documents of German
Politics, Part VI, 2, p. 42. (GB 26) Vol. IV, Pg.1102
*2530-PS; Ribbentrop’s speech in
Warsaw, 25 January 1939, published in Voelkischer
Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) Vol. V, Pg. 267
[Page 727]
*2751-PS; Affidavit of Alfred
Naujocks, 20 November 1945. (USA 482) Vol. V, Pg. 390
2817-PS; Telegram from German
Embassy, Rome, to Ribbentrop, concerning answer of Duce to
Hitler’s second letter, 27 August 1939. Vol. V, Pg.452
*2818-PS; Secret additional protocol
to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany and
Italy. (GB 292) Vol. V, Pg.453
2834-PS; Letter from Mussolini to
Fuehrer, 25 August 1939. Vol. V, Pg.502
*2835-PS; German Foreign Office
memorandum on conversation between Ribbentrop and the Duce,
10 March 1940. (GB 291) Vol. V, Pg.502
*2846-PS; Affidavit of Edwin
Lahousen, 13 November 1945 Vol. V, Pg. 507
*2897-PS; Telegram from German
Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941. (USA
156) Vol. V, Pg.566
*3054-PS; “The Nazi Plan”, script of
a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)
Vol. V, Pg.801
*C-23; Unsigned documents found in
official Navy files containing notes year by year from 1927
to 1940 on reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18
February 1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49) Vol.
VI, Pg. 827
*C-30; Air-Sea Forces Orders for
Occupation Danzig, 27 July 1939. (GB 46) Vol. VI, Pg.831
*C-120; Directives for Armed Forces
193940 for “Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. (GB 41)
Vol. VI, Pg.916
*C-126; Preliminary Time Table for
“Fall Weiss” and directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45)
Vol. VI, Pg.932
[Page 728]
*C-137; Keitel’s appendix of 124
January 1938 to Hitler Order of October 21 1938. (GB 33)
Vol. VI, Pg.949
*C-142; Intention of the Army High
Command and Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538) Vol.
VI, Pg.956
*C-172; Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss”
signed by Doenitz. (GB 189) Vol. VI, Pg. 1002
*C-175; OKW Directive for Unified
Preparation for War 1937-1938, with covering letter from von
Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA 69) Vol. VI, Pg. 1006
*D-738; Memorandum on second
conference between German Foreign Minister with Hungarian
Prime and Foreign Minister on 1 May 1939. (GB 290) Vol. VII,
Pg. 193
*L-43; Air Force “Organizational
Study 1950”, 2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.) Vol.
VII, Pg.788
*L-79; .. Minutes of conference, 23
May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and
future aims”. (USA 27) Vol. VII, Pg.847
*L-172; “The Strategic Position at
the Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture delivered
by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and
Gauleiters. (USA 34) Vol. VIII, Pg. 920
*R-100; Minutes of instructions given
by Hitler to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939. (USA
121) Vol. VIII, Pg.83
*TC-2; Hague Convention (1) for
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes197. (GB 2) Vol.
VIII, Pg.276
*TC-3; Hague Convention (3) Relative
to opening of Hostilities. (GB 2) Vol. VIII, Pg.279
[Page 729]
*TC-9; Versailles Treaty, Section XI,
Article 100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3) Vol. VIII, Pg. 290
*TC-15; Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB 16) Vol.
VIII, Pg.331
*TC-18; Declaration concerning wars
of aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee of League of
Nations, 24 September 1927. (GB 17) Vol. VIII, Pg.357
*TC-19; Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris.
1929 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. 97-101. (GB 180)
Vol. VIII, Pg. 359
*TC-21; German-Polish Declaration, 26
January 1934. (GB 24) Vol. VIII, Pg. 368
*TC-28; German assurance to
Czechoslovakia, 26 September 1938, from Documents of German
Politics, Part VI, pp. 34346. (GB 22) Vol. VIII, Pg. 378
*TC-29; German assurances to Poland,
26 September 1938, from Documents of German Politics, Part
VI, p. 336. (GB 32) Vol. VIII, Pg. 378
*TC-53-A; Marginal note to decree of
final incorporation of Memel with German Reich, 23 March
1939, from Documents of German Polities, Part VII, p. 552.
(GB 4) Vol. VIII, Pg. 408
*TC-54; Proclamation of the Fuehrer
to German Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) Vol. VIII,
Pg. 408
*TC-70; Hitler’s Reichstag speech
concerning agreement with Poland, 30 January 1934, from
Voelkischer Beobachter, 31 January 1934. (GB 25) Vol. VIII,
Pg. 433
*TC-71; Reports of British Consul in
Danzig, July 1939. (GB 47) Vol. VIII, Pg. Vol. VIII, Pg. 434
*TC-72 No. 13; British Blue Book.
Hitler’s Reichstag speech, 28 April 1939. (GB 43) Vol. VIII,
Pg. 438
[Page 730]
*TC-72 No. 14; British Blue Book.
German memorandum renouncing 1934 agreement, 28 April 1939.
(GB 42) Vol. VIII, Pg. 441
*TC-72 No. 16; British Blue Book.
Polish Government’s reply, 5 May 1939, to 28 April memo. (GB
44) Vol. VIII, Pg. 445
*TC-72 No. 17; British Blue Book.
British Prime Minister’s statement in House of Commons, 31
March 1939. (GB 39) Vol. VIII, Pg. 450
*TC-72 No. 18; British Blue Book.
Anglo-Polish communique issued 6 April 1939. (GB 40) Vol.
VIII, Pg. 450
*TC-72 No. 53; British Blue Book.
Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB
51) Vol. VIII, Pg. 451
*TC-72 No. 54; British Blue Book.
Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB
52) Vol. VIII, Pg. 452
*TC-72 No. 55; British Blue Book.
Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw, 27 August 1939. (GB
53) Vol. VIII, Pg. 452
*TC-72 No. 56; British Blue Book.
British Prime Minister’s letter to Hitler, 22 August 1939.
(GB 55) Vol. VIII, Pg. 453
*TC-72 No. 60; British Blue Book.
Hitler’s reply to British Prime Minister, 23 August 1939.
(GB 56) Vol. VIII, Pg. 455
*TC-72 No. 62; British Blue Book.
Danzig Senate Decree appointing Forster Head of State, 23
August 1939. (GB 50) Vol. VIII, Pg. 457
*TC-72; No. 68; British Blue Book.
Hitler’s verbal communique to Sir Neville Henderson,25
August 1939. (GB 65) Vol. VIII, Pg. 458
*TC-72 No. 74; British Blue Book.
British Government’s reply, 28 August 1939, to Hitler’s
message of 25 August. (GB 66) Vol. VIII, Pg. 460
[Page 731]
*TC-72 No. 75; British Blue Book.
Hitler and Sir N. Henderson conversation, 28 August 1939.
(GB 67) Vol. VIII, Pg. 463
*TC-72 No. 78; British Blue Book.
Hitler’s reply to British Government, 29 August 1939. (GB
68) Vol. VIII, Pg. 466
*TC-72 No. 79; British Blue Book.
Hitler and Sir N. Henderson conversation, 29 August 1939.
(GB 69) Vol. VIII, Pg. 469
*TC-72 No. 89; British Blue Book.
British Government’s reply, 30 August 1939, to German
communication of 29 August. (GB 70) Vol. VIII, Pg. 470
*TC-72 No. 92; British Blue Book.
Ribbentrop and Sir N. Henderson conversation, midnight 30
August 1939. (GB 71) Vol. VIII, Pg. 472
*TC-72 No. 110; British Blue Book.
British Government’s ultimatum, 1 September 1939. (GB 74)
Vol. VIII, Pg. 473
TC-72 No. 113; British Blue Book.
Copy German proposals handed to Sir N. Henderson 9:15 P.M.,
31 August 1939. Vol. VIII, Pg. 474
TC-72 No. 118; British Blue Book.
British Government’s final ultimatum, 3 September 1939. Vol.
VIII, Pg. 474
TC-72 No. 124; Description; British Blue Book.
President Roosevelt’s appeal to Hitler, 24 August 1939. (GB 59
Vol. VIII, Pg.475
*TC-72 No. 126; British Blue Book.
President Moscicki’s reply to President Roosevelt,25 August
1939. (GB 60) Vol. VIII, Pg. 476
*TC-72 No. 127; British Blue Book.
President Roosevelt’s second appeal to Hitler, 25 August
1939. (GB 61) Vol. VIII, Pg. 477
*TC-72 No. 139; British Blue Book.
The Pope’s appeal, 24 August 1939. (GB 62) Vol. VIII, Pg.
477
*TC-72 No. 141; British Blue Book.
The Pope’s appeal, 31 August 1939. (GB 63) Vol. VIII, Pg.
480
[Page 472]
*TC-73 No. 33; Polish White Book.
German-Polish communique, 5 November 1937. (GB 27) Vol.
VIII, Pg. 480
*TC-73 No. 44; Polish White Book.
Lipski, Ribbentrop luncheon, conversation, 24 October 1938.
(GB 27-A) Vol. VIII, Pg.483
*TC-73 No. 45; Polish White Book.
Beck’s instructions to Lipski, 31 October 1938. (GB 27-B)
Vol. VIII, Pg. 484
*TC-73 No. 48; Polish White Book.
Beck and Hitler conversation, 5 January 1939. (GB 34) Vol.
VIII, Pg.486
*TC-73 No. 49; Polish White Book.
Beck and Ribbentrop conversation, 6 January 1939. (GB 35)
Vol. VIII, Pg.488
*TC-73 No. 57; Polish White Book.
Hitler’s Reichstag speech, 30 January 1939. (GB 37) Vol.
VIII, Pg.488
*TC-73 No. 61; Polish White Book.
Ribbentrop and Lipski conversation, 21 March 1939. (GB 38)
Vol. VIII, Pg.489
*TC-73 No. 91; Polish White Book.
Anglo-Polish Agreement,25 August 1939. (GB 57) Vol. VIII,
Pg.492
*TC-73 No. 112; Polish White Book.
Ribbentrop-Liski conversation, 31 August 1939. (GB 72) Vol.
VIII, Pg.494
*TC-73 No. 113; Polish White Book.
German broadcast 9 P.M. 31 August 1939. Vol. VIII, Pg.495
*TC-75; Memo for the Fuehrer, 2
January 1938, concerning Anglo-German relations. (GB 28)
Vol. VIII, Pg.513
*TC-77; Note for Reichsminister, 26
August 1938. (GB 31) Vol. VIII, Pg.515
*TC-78; Memorandum of conversation
between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August 1939. (GB
48) Vol. VIII, Pg.529
[Page 733]
*TC-78; French Prime Minister’s
letter to Hitler, 26 August 1939. (GB 58) Vol. VIII, Pg.531
*TC-79; Hitler’s reply to French
Prime Minister, 27 August 1939. (GB 58) Vol. VIII, Pg.531
*TC-90; Goering’s interrogation, 29
August 1945. (GB 64) Vol. VIII, Pg. 534
*TC-91; Ribbentrop’s interrogation,
29 August 1945. (GB 276) Vol. VIII, Pg. 535
Affidavit A; Affidavit of Erwin
Lahousen, 21 January 1946, substantially the same as his
testimony on direct examination before the International
Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 21 January 1945 and 11
February 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg.587
*Chart No. 10; 1938 Proposals for
Luftwaffe Expansion 1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) Vol. VIII,
Pg.779
**Chart No. 12; German Aggression.
(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) Vol. VIII, Pg. 781
**Chart No. 13; Violations of
Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed
to Tribunal). Vol. VIII, Pg. 782
