The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)
Last-Modified: 1996/06/05
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Nine
[Page 760]
10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND
LUXEMBOURG
The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was
the cockpit of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European
powers in 1839. That guarantee was observed for 75 years,
until it was broken by the Germans in 1914, who brought all
the horrors of war, and the even greater horrors of German
occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a
still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in
1940.
Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of
1907 (TC-3; TC-4), the Locarno Arbitration and Conciliation
Convention of 1925, in which Belgium’s independence and
neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced recourse to
war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and
Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands
(TC-16). Article I of the latter treaty provides:
“The contracting parties” (the Netherlands and the German
Reich) “undertake to submit all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them which it has not been
possible to settle by diplomacy, and which have not been
referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, to
be dealt with by arbitration or conciliation as provided.”
(TC-16)
Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation.
The last article, Article 21, provides that the Convention
shall be valid for ten years, and then shall remain in force
for successive periods of five years until denounced by
either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany
at all.
The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to
the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of
Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg,
executed at Geneva in 1929 (TC-20). The first few words of
Article 1 are familiar:
“The contracting parties undertake to settle by
peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever
which may arise between them and which it may not be
possible to settle by diplomacy.” (TC-20)
Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful
settlement of disputes, which are in the common form.
Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and
Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in
1933. Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany
under the
[Page 761]
Weimar Republic with regard to the treaties which had been
entered into. Nothing more occurred to alter the position of
Belgium until March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland
and announced the resumption of conscription. And Hitler, on
7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the
obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact,
the reason being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet
Pact of 1935. There was no legal foundation for this claim
that Germany was entitled to renounce obligations under the
Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the air, in the sense
that it had itself entered into various obligations under
the Locarno Pact in return-for the liabilities which other
nations acknowledged, and now one of those liabilities,
namely, the liability of Germany to observe the act, had
been renounced.
And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized
the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave
solemn assurance he used the word “solemn” — which amounted
to a full guarantee (TC-3). In April 1937, France and
England released Belgium from her obligations under the
Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence
and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of
assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of
those facts that Germany on 13 October 1937, gave a clear
and unconditional guarantee to Belgium:
“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to
make the following communication to Your Excellency:
The German Government has taken cognizance with
particular interest of the public declaration in which
the Belgium Government defines the international
position of Belgium. For its part, it has repeatedly
given expressions, especially -through the declaration
of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of
30 January 1937, to its own point of view. The German
Government has also taken cognizance of the declaration
made by the British and French Governments on 24 April
1937 ***
“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty
of Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous
of strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two
countries, the German Government regards it as
appropriate to define now its own attitude towards
Belgium. To this end, it makes the following
declaration: First, the German Government has taken
note of the views which the Belgian Government has
thought fit to express. That is to say, (a) of the
policy of independence which it intends to exercise in
full sover-
[Page 762]
eignty; (b) of its determination to defend the
frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any
aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory
from being used for purposes of aggression against
another state as a passage or as a base of operation by
land, by sea, or in the air, and to organize the
defense of Belgium in an efficient manner to this
purpose. Two: The German Government considers that the
inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common
interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its
determination that in no circumstances will it impair
this inviolability and integrity and that it will at
all times respect Belgian territory except, of course,
in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a military
action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in
which Germany is involved. The German Government, like
the British and French Governments, is prepared to
assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack or
to invasion. ***” (TC-34)
The following reply was made:
“The Belgian Government has taken note with great
satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this
day by the German Government. It thanks the German
Government warmly for this communication.” (TC-34)
Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to
this small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her,
and its assertion that the integrity of the Belgian frontier
was a common interest between her and Belgium and the other
Western Powers: Yet eighteen months afterwards Germany had
violated that assurance.
That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to
the leaders and to the high command of Germany can be seen
from a document which came into existence on 24 August 1938,
at the time when the Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and
when it was uncertain whether there would be war with the
Western Powers. This Top Secret document is addressed to the
General Staff of the 5th Section of the German Air Force,
and deals with the subject, “Extended Case Green —
Appreciation of the Situation with Special Consideration of
the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer had been asked to
prepare this appreciation. The last paragraph (No. H) reads:
“Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and
Navy. ***
“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands,
represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution
of the air war against Great Britain as well as against
France.
Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the
opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an
occupation of this area could be carried out and how
long it would take, and in this case it would be
necessary to reassess the commitment against Great
Britain.” (375-PS)
It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared
this document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders
of the German nation and the High Command would not pay the
smallest attention to the fact that Germany had given her
word not to invade Holland or Belgium. It was recommended as
a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the knowledge
that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that
view, treaties would be completely ignored. Such was the
honor of the German Government and of its leaders.
In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been
peacefully annexed, and the time had come for further
guarantees. Assurances which were accordingly given to
Belgium and the Netherlands on 28 April 1939 (TC-30). A
guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a speech by Hitler
in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a communication
from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to
Hitler’s intentions (TC-42-A). In “The Nazi Plan,” a motion
picture shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution
(3054-PS), the delivery by Hitler of this part of this
speech was shown. Hitler appeared in one of his jocular
moods, as his words were greeted and delivered in a jocular
vein; The film shows that Goering, who sits above Hitler in
the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke
being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that
Germany could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors.
In this speech Hitler declared:
“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give
him an assurance that the German fighting forces will
not attack the territory or possessions of the
following independent nations, and above all, that they
will not march into them. And he goes on to name the
following as the countries in question: Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria,
Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.
“Answer: I started o by taking the trouble to find out
in the case of the countries listed, firstly, whether
they feel themselves threatened, and secondly and
particularly, whether this question Mr. Roosevelt has
asked us was put as
[Page 764]
the result of a demarche by them or at least with their
consent.
“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases
took-the form of a blunt rejection. Actually, this
counter-question of mine could not be conveyed to some
of the states and nations listed, since they are not at
present in possession of their liberty (as for instance
Syria), but are occupied by the military forces of
democratic states, and therefore, deprived of all their
rights.
“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on
Germany have received much more binding assurances and,
above all, much more binding proposals than Mr.
Roosevelt asked of me in his peculiar telegram.” (TC-42-
A)
Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting
in the presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite
absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling
‘against its neighbors. The hollow falsity of that
declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by the
minutes of Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May (79). The
first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer,
Goering, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl’s
deputy), and various others. The purpose of the conference
was an analysis of the situation, which proceeded in this
fashion:
“What will this struggle be like?”
*******
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by
armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be
ignored.”
*******
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the
Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning
speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on
Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.” (L-79)
In Hitler’s speech on 22 August, the following passage
occurred:
“Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider
this impossible.
“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch,
Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that
all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend
their neutrality by all available means. England and
France will not violate the neutrality of these
countries.” (798-PS)
Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the
Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian Government:
“In view of the gravity of the international situation,
I am
[Page 765]
expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to
transmit to Your Majesty the following communication:
“Though the German Government is at present doing
everything in its power to arrive at a peaceful
solution of the questions at issue between the Reich
and Poland, it nevertheless desires to define clearly,
here and now, the attitude which it proposes to adopt
towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become
inevitable.
“The German Government is firmly determined to abide by
the terms of the declaration contained in the German
note of 13 October 1937. This provides in effect that
Germany will in no circumstances impair the
inviolability of Belgium and will at all times respect
Belgium territory. The German Government renews this
undertaking; however, in the expectation that the
Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an
attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will
tolerate no violations on the part of a third power,
but that, on the contrary, she will oppose it with all
the forces at her disposal. It goes without saying that
if the Belgium Government were to adopt a different
attitude, the German Government would naturally be
compelled to defend its interests in conformity with
the new situation thus created.” (TC-36)
It seems likely that the decision having been made to
violate Belgian neutrality, those last words were put in to
afford some excuse in the future.
A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty
the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939
(TC-40). Likewise assurances were given to Luxembourg at the
same time. – It is in the same terms as the other two
assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee with the
sting in the tail (TC-42). Poland was occupied by means of a
lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces
were free for other tasks. The first step that was taken, so
far as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned, was a
German assurance on 6 October 1939, as follows:
“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the
state I tried to create friendly relations with
Belgium. I renounced any revision or any desire for
revision. The Reich has not made any demands which
would in any way be likely to be considered in Belgium
as a threat.” (TC-32)
A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same
day:
“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the
traditional
friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any
existing differences between the two countries and has
not create any new ones.” (TC-32)
The value of these pledges of Germany’s good faith is shown
by an order issued on the very next day, 7 October. This
order was from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von
Brauchitsch, and was addressed to various Army Groups. The
third paragraph provided:
“The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be
observed only.
“At the same time, Army Group B has to make all
preparations according to special orders, for immediate
invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the
political- situation so demands.” (2329-PS)
Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:
“Preparations should be made for offensive action on
the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the
area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack
must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as
possible. ***”
*******
“The object of this attack is to acquire as great an
area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as
possible.” (C-62) That document is signed by Hitler
himself. It is addressed to the Supreme Commander of
the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and
Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15
October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It was signed by
Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was
addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of
the Army. It declared, in part: “It must be the object
of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to occupy — on
receipt of a special order — the territory of Holland,
in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.”
(C-62)
The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the
West Frisian islands.
It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate
the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All
that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the
weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no
hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken again.
Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance
of combining with themselves and their neighbors.
Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Command-
[Page 767]
ers of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how
the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent
passages: “Contrary to previously issued instructions, all
action intended against Holland may be carried out without a
special order which the general attack will
start.
“The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be
anticipated ahead of time.”
*******
“Wherever-there is no resistance, the entry should
carry the character of a peaceful occupation.”
*******
“At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian
islands -situated just off the coast, for the present
without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas
line.”
“The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the
airborne operation only after the possession of bridges
across the Albert Canal” (in Belgium) “has been
assured.” (440-PS)
In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in
paragraph 5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature
of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.
A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of
Keitel, in the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army,
Navy, and Air force. It states that if a quick break-through
should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out
the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows clearly that the
Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The occupation
of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some
other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea
and air warfare,” and “b Taking of one or more Maas
crossings between Namur and Dinant ***.” (C-10)
From November until March of 1940 the High Command and .the
Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as
they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg,
Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements
are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7
November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed
either by Keitel or by Jodl. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing
in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of
which they were in possession, but they were only partially
successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order
to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group
Luftflotte — the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for
offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It
deals with the dis-
[Page 768]
position of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the
Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of
the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly
directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle,
with the strongest possible air-force support, through the
Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational
details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium
and in Holland. (TC-58)
The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February
1940 entry in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:
“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague
they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary
by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop
units near the town.
“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with
violent action against the Dutch air force.” (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be
made in the centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote:
“Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to
undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case
‘Yellow.’ ”
On 3 March, he recorded the answer:
“Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before
case ‘Yellow’, with a few days’ interval.”
And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this
entry:
“Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures;
according to reports of the intelligence service the
British have asked for permission to march in, but the
Dutch have refused.” (1809-PS)
In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were
actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor.
Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans’ own
intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their
neutrality.
At 4:30 a.m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit,
and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded
with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by
Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches
of neutrality before this action was taken.
After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait
accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives
of the three Governments some hours later and handed them
documents which were similar in each case, and which are
described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what
happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian
report:
“From 4:30 information was received which left no
shadow
of doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first
reported in the east. At five o’clock came news of the
bombing of two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of
the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at
the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle
station.”
“At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room,
he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”
[Belgian Foreign Minister] “stopped him ‘I beg your
pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.’ And in an
indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government’s
protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just
attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-
five years that Germany has committed a criminal
aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What
has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the
aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest
of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian
Government. It is through the attack itself that
Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the
undertakings given by her on 13 October 1937, and
renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The
act of aggression committed by Germany, for which there
is no justification whatever, will deeply shock the
conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held
responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend
herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot
be vanquished’.”
*******
“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had
brought: ‘I am instructed by the Government of the
Reich,’ he said, ‘to make the following declaration: In
order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland,
and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have
been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the
Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure the
neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of
arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich
will bring up an armed force of the greatest size, so
that resistance of any kind will be useless. The
Government of the Reich guarantees Belgium’s European
and colonial territory, as well as her dynasty, on
condition that no resistance is offered. Should there
be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of
her country and loss of her independence. It is
therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the
population be called upon to cease all resistance and
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that the authorities be given the necessary
instructions to make contact with the German Military
Command.”
*******
“In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had
by his side the Secretary-General of the Department,
interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he
said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a task.’
After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to
pointing out that he had already replied by the protest
he had just made. ***” (TC-58)
The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours
after the invasion had started, read in part as follows:
“The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts
as to what was the chief aim of the British and French
war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to
other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as
auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.
“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy
Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up
a new front against Germany in this region. It was only
Germany’s last minute action which upset the project.
Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this
before the eyes of the world.
“Immediately after the British-French action in
Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up
their policy of war expansion in another direction. In
this respect, while the retreat in flight of the
British troops from Norway was still going on, the
English Prime Minister announced that, as a result of
the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once
more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the
full weight of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that
English and French units were already on the way to
Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of
English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss
over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of
prestige before their own people and before the world,
and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been
chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.
“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the
Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite
another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion
manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the
direction of the next English-French attack. For, as
the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim
of England and France is the
[Page 771]
carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack
on Germany in the West, so as to advance through
Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.
“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability
of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood
that these two countries in the event of a war of
Germany against England and France would maintain the
strictest neutrality. “Belgium and the Netherlands have
not fulfilled this condition.” (TC-57).
The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile
expressions in the Belgian and the Netherlands Press, and to
allege attempts by the British Intelligence to bring a
revolution into Germany with the assistance of Belgium and
the Netherlands. Reference is made to military preparation
of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has
fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in
regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the
Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the
neutrality of these two countries, although no instances
were given (TC-57). The document continued:
“In this struggle for existence forced upon the German
people by England and France, the Reich Government is
not disposed to await submissively the attack by
England and France and to allow them to carry the war
over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory.
It has therefore now issued the command to German
troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by
all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.”
(TC-57)
It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously
adverted to, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. It
is now known that for months preparations had been made to
violate the neutrality of these three countries. This
document is merely saying, “The orders to do so have now
been issued.”
A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed
to the representative of the Netherlands Government; and a
memorandum was sent to the Luxembourg Government, which
enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the
Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The second
paragraph of the latter declared:
“In defense against the imminent attack, the German
troops have now received the order to safeguard the
neutrality of these two countries ***”. (TC-60)
The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime
which was committed against her is contained in TC-59.
[Page 772]
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM,
THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I, Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V. Vol. I, Pg. 27,29
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]
*375-PS; Case Green with wider
implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe
General Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84) . Vol. III, Pg. 280
*440-PS; Directive No. 8 signed by
Keitel, 20 November 1939, for the conduct of the war. (GB
107) . Vol. III, Pg.397
*798-PS; Hitler’s speech to
Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA
29) . Vol. III, Pg.581
[Page 773]
*1809-PS; Entries from Jodl’s diary,
February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) . Vol. IV, Pg.377
*2329-PS; Order by Commander in Chief
of the Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105) . Vol. IV, Pg.1037
*3054-PS; “The Nazi Plan”, script of
a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)
. Vol. V, Pg.801
*C-10; OKW directive, 28 November
1939, signed by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th Flieger
Division. (GB 108) . Vol. VI, Pg.817
*C-62; Directive No. 6 on the conduct
of war, signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; directive by
Keitel, 15 October 1939 on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) . Vol. VI,
Pg.880
*C-72; Orders postponing “A” day in
the West, November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) . Vol. VI,
Pg.893
*L-52; Memorandum and Directives for
conduct of war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540) . Vol.
VII, Pg. 800
*L-79; Minutes of conference, 23 May
1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future
aims”. (USA 27) . Vol. VII, Pg. 847
*TC-3; Hague Convention (3) Relative
to opening of Hcstilities. (GB 2) . Vol. VIII, Pg.279
*TC-4; Hague Convention (5)
Respecting Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in War on Land. (GB 2) . Vol. VIII, Pg.282
*TC-13; Arbitration Convention
between Germany and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB
15) . Vol. VIII, Pg.320
*TC-16; Convention of Arbitration and
conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands, signed at
The Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 337
[Page 774]
*TC-19; Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris.
1929 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. 97-101. (GB 18)
. Vol. VIII, Pg.359
*TC-20; Treaty of Arbitration and
Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, signed at
Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98) . Vol. VIII, Pg.362
*TC-30; German assurance to Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April 1939, from
Documents of German Politics, Part VII, I, pp. 13,9,172-175.
(GB 78) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 379
*TC-32; German assurance to Norway, 6
October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII,
p. 350. (GB 80) . Vol. VIII, Pg.381
*TC-33; German assurance to Belgium
and the Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from Documents of
German Politics, Part IV, pp. 42 43. (GB 99) . Vol. VIII,
Pg. 381
*TC-34; German Declaration to the
Belgian Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100) . Vol. VIII,
Pg.381
*TC-36; Declaration made by
Ambassador of Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102) . Vol.
VIII, Pg.382
TC-37; German assurance to Belgium, 6
October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII,
p. 351. . Vol. VIII, Pg.383
*TC-40; Declaration of German
Minister to the Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103) . Vol.
VIII, Pg. 383
TC-41; German assurance to the
Netherlands, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German
Politics, Vol. VII, p. 351. . Vol. VIII, Pg. 384
*TC-42; German assurance to
Luxemburg, 26 August 1939. (GB 104)
German assurance to Luxemburg, 28 April 1939. (GB
101) . Vol. VIII, Pg.384
[Page 775]
*TC-57; German ultimatum to Belgium
and the Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German
Politics, Part VIII, pp. 142-150. (GB 112) . Vol. VIII,
Pg.416
*TC-58; “Belgium, the official
account of what happened 1939-1940”. (GB 111) . Vol. VIII,
Pg.421
*TC-58-A; Secret instruction to the
Commander of 2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane of 10
January 1940. (GB 110) . Vol. VIII, Pg.423
*TC-59; Protest from Belgium, 10 May
1940, following German aggression. (GB 111) . Vol. VIII,
Pg.429
*TC-60; German memorandum to
Luxemburg, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics,
Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113) . Vol. VIII, Pg.431
Affidavit H; Affidavit of Franz
Halder, 22 November 1945. . Vol. VIII, Pg.643
**Chart No. 12; German Aggression.
(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) . Vol. VIII, Pg.781
**Chart No. 13; Violations of
Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed
to Tribunal.) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 782
