[Page 450]
3. AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA
A. The Events Leading up to the Autumn of 1937 and the
Strategic Position of the National Socialists in Austria.
(1) The National Socialist Aim of Absorption of Austria. In
order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators
proceeded after the meeting in the Reichschancellery on 5
November 1937, at which Hitler laid plans for the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia (86-PS), it is advisable to
review the steps which had already been taken in Austria by
the National Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The
position which the Nazis had reached by the Fall of 1937
made it possible for them to complete their absorption of
Austria much sooner and with less cost than was contemplated
in this meeting.
The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of
the German National Socialists. On the first page of Men
Kampf, Hitler had written, “German-Austria must return to
the great German motherland.” He continued by stating that
this purpose, of having common blood in a common Reich,
could not be satisfied
[Page 451]
by a mere economic union. This aim was regarded as a serious
program which the Nazis were determined to carry out.
This fact is borne out by an affidavit executed in Mexico
City on 28 August 1945 by George S. Messersmith, United
States Ambassador in Mexico City (1760-PS). Mr. Messersmith
was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin
from 1930 to the late Spring of 1934. He was then made
American Minister in Vienna, where he stayed until 1937. In
this affidavit states that the nature of his work brought
him into frequent contact with German Government officials,
many of whom were, on most occasions, amazingly frank in
their conversations, and made no concealment of their aims.
In particular, Mr. Messersmith states that he had contact
with the following twenty governmental officials, among
others: Hermann Goering, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht,
Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Josef
Goebbels, Richard Walter Darre, Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich
Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk,
General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral
Karl Doenitz, Dr. Behle, Dr. Stuckart, Gustav Krupp von
Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. Mr. Messersmith further states
that in addition to this contact with officials of the
Government he maintained contact with individuals in all
parties in Germany in order to keep himself and the
Government informed of political developments in Germany.
With regard to the Austrian matter, he states that from the
very beginning of the Nazi Party he was told by both high
and secondary government officials in Germany that
incorporation of Austria into Germany was both a political
and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going
to be accomplished “by whatever means were necessary.” He
further states:
“I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone
in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was
going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were
irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt
which ever existed in conversations or statements to me
was ‘how’ and ‘when.’ ” (1760-PS).
As Mr. Messersmith relates, at the beginning of the Nazi
regime in 1933 Germany was too weak to make open threats of
force against any country. It developed a policy of securing
its aims in Austria in the same manner as in Germanyby
obtaining a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the
Ministry of Interior which controls the police, and quickly
eliminating the opposition t. Mr. Messersmith states that
throughout his stay in Austria he was told on any number of
occasions by high officials
[Page 452]
of the Austrian Government, including Chancellor Dollfuss,
Chancellor Schuschnigg, and President Miklas, that the
German Government kept up constant pressure upon the
Austrian Government to appoint ministers with Nazi
orientation.
(2) Pressure Used, Including Terror and intimidation,
Culminating in the Unsuccessful Putsch of 25 July 1934. To
achieve their end the Nazis used various pressures. They
used economic pressure. The law of 24 March 1933 imposed a
prohibitive 1,000 reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria,
thus bringing hardship to Austria, which relied heavily on
its tourist trade (Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, I, 311). The
Nazis used propaganda. And they used terroristic acts,
primarily bombings.
Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (1760-PS) goes into some detail
with respect to these means. Although they were committed by
National Socialists in Austria, high Nazi officials in
Germany admitted to Mr. Messersmith that they were
instigating and directing these waves of terror in Austria.
They made no effort to conceal their use of terror, which
they justified on the ground that terror was a necessary
instrument to impose the will of the party not only in
Germany but in other countries. Mr. Messersmith recalls
specifically that General Milch of the Air Force stated that
the terrorism in Austria was being directed by the Nazi
Party in Berlin.
Mr. Messersmith points out that all these outrages were a
common occurrence. They had peaks and distinct periods, one
in mid-1933 and another in early 1934. He points out that
the wave of outrages in May and June 1934 diminished
markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and
Mussolini in Venice, in mid-June 1934. (At that time
Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government
and interested in its independence.) Mr. Messersmith’s
affidavit quotes extensively from dispatches sent from the
American Legation in Vienna to the State Department during
this period. These dispatches indicate that the terror was
often directed at Catholic Churches and institutions, and at
railways and tourist centers.
Mr. Messersmith also recalls that in addition, the Nazis
maintained a threat of violent action against Austria
through the “Austrian Legion.” This was a para-military
force of several thousand men, armed by the Nazis in
Germany, and stationed in Germany near the Austrian border.
It included Austrian Nazis who fled from Austria after
committing crimes.
These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria
continued until July 25, 1934. On that day members of the
NSDAP at-
[Page 453]
tempted a revolutionary putsch and killed Chancellor
Dollfuss. A message from Mr. Hadow, of the British Legation
in Vienna, to Sir. John Simon contains details of the putsch
(2985-PS). The official version of events given verbally by
the Austrian Government to the diplomatic Corps; as set
forth in this document, stated approximately a hundred men
attempting the putsch seized federal Chancellery. Chancellor
Dollfuss was wounded in trying to escape, being shot twice
at close quarters. The Radio Building the center of the town
was overwhelmed, and the announcer compelled to broadcast
the news that Dollfuss had resigned and Doctor Rintelen had
taken his place as Chancellor.
Although the putsch failed, the insurgents kept control of
the Chancellery Building and agreed to give it up only after
they had safe conduct to the German border. The insurgents
contacted Herman Minister, Dr. Rieth, by telephone, and
subsequently had private negotiations with him in the
building. At about 7:00 they yielded the building, but
Chancellor Dollfuss died about 7:00 p. m., not having had
the services of a doctor.
The German Government denied all complicity in the putsch
and assassination. Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on
the ground that he had offered a safe-conduct to the rebels
without making inquiry of the German Government, and had
thus without any reason dragged the
German Reich into an internal Austrian affair. This
statement appears in the letter which Hitler sent to von
Papen on 26 July 1934. (2799-PS)
Although the German Government denied any knowledge or
complicity in this putsch, there is ample basis for the
conclusion that the German Nazis bear responsibility for the
events. Light is shed on this matter in the extensive record
of the trial of the Austrian Nazi, Planetta, and others who
were convicted for the murder, and in the Austrian Brown
Book issued after July 25. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit
offers further evidence:
“The events of the Putsch of 25 July 1934, are too
well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I
need say here only that there can be no doubt that the
Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials
from Germany through their organization in Austria made
up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the
German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all
that was going to happen and that was being planned.
The German Legation was located directly across the
street from the British Legation and the Austrian
secret police kept close watch on the persons who
entered the German Legation. The British had their own
secret service in Vienna at the time and they also
[Page 454]
kept a discreet surveillance over people entering the
German Legation. I was told by both British and
Austrian officials that a number of the men who were
later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having
been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German
Legation. In addition, I personally followed very
closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never doubted
on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was
in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents
in Austria; these agents being both German and
Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with
the Putsch and the detail in connection therewith. I
recall too very definitely from my conversations with
the highest officials of the Austrian Government after
the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been
in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by
the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the
Putsch been successful.
“It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally
sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch but there is
no question that he was fully familiar with all these
plans and must have given his assent thereto and
connived therein.
“As this Putsch was so important and was a definite
attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and
resulted in the murder of he Chancellor of Austria, I
took occasion to verify at the time for myself various
other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was
not only made with the knowledge of the German
Government but engineered by it. I found and verified
that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told
Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that
there would be a Nazi Government in Vienna in a month.”
(1760-PS)
Mr. William Dodd, Ambassador of the United States to
Germany, published in 1941 his Diary, covering the years
1933-1938 (2832-PS). The diary contains an entry for 26 July
1934, which makes the following observations. First,
Ambassador Dodd noted that in February, 1934, Ernst
Hanfstaengl had advised him that he had brought what was
virtually an order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria
alone and to dismiss and silence Theodor Habicht, the German
agent in Munich who had been agitating for annexation of
Austria. On 18 June, in Venice, Hitler was reported to have
promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone.
Mr. Dodd further states:
“On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria
by Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on
Lake Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment
of German
[Page 455]
bombs and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That
looked ominous to me, but events of the kind had been
so common that I did not report it to Washington.
“Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as
late as eleven o’clock, the government issued formal
statements to the newspapers rejoicing at the fall of
Dollfuss and proclaiming the Greater Germany that must
follow. The German Minister in Vienna had actually
helped to form the new Cabinet. He had, as we now know,
exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi
murderers should be allowed to go into Germany
undisturbed. But it was realized about 12 o’clock that,
although Dollfuss was dead, the loyal Austrians had
surrounded the government palace and prevented the
organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the
murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry
therefore forbade publication of the news sent out an
hour before and tried to collect all the releases that
had been distributed. A copy was brought to me today by
a friend.
“All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel
murder and declared that it was simply an attack of
discontented Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria
shows that thousands of Austrian Nazis living for a
year in Bavaria on German support had been active for
ten days before, some getting across the border
contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to
return to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was
still making radio speeches about the necessity of
annexing the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs to the
Third Reich, in spite of all the promises of Hitler to
silence him. But now that the drive has failed and the
assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German
Government denounces all who say there was any support
from Berlin.
“I think it will be clear one day that millions of
dollars and many arms have been pouring into Austria
since the spring of 1933. Once more the whole world is
condemning the Hitler regime. No people in all modern
history has been quite so unpopular as Nazi Germany.
This stroke completes the picture. I expect to read a
series of bitter denunciations in the American papers
when they arrive about ten days from now.” (2832-PS)
In connection with the German Government’s denial of any
connection with the putsch and the murder of Dollfuss, the
letter of appointment which Hitler wrote to Vice-Chancellor
von Papen on 26 July 1934 is significant. This letter
appears in a standard German reference work, Dokumente der
Deutschen Politik, II,
[Page 456]
Page 83 (2799-PS). (In considering the letter the report
widespread at the time should be recalled, that von Papen
narrowly missed being purged on 30 June 1944, along with
Ernst Roehm and others.) The letter reads as follows:
“Dear Mr. von Papen
“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to
suggest to the Reichs President the removal of the
German Minister to Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post,
because he, at the suggestion of Austrian Federal
Ministers and the Austrian rebels respectively consent
to an agreement made by both these parties concerning
the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to Germany
without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an
internal Austrian affair without any reason.
“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor
which was strictly condemned and regretted by the
German Government has made the situation in Europe,
already fluid, more acute, without any fault of ours.
Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if possible
an easing of the general situation, and especially to
direct the relations with the German Austrian State,
which have been so strained for a long time, again into
normal and friendly channels.
“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to
take over this important task, just because you have
possessed and continue to possess my most complete and
unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together
in the Cabinet “Therefore, I have suggested to the
Reichs President that you, upon leaving the Reich
Cabinet and upon release from the office of
Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission
to the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a
limited period of time. In this position you will be
directly subordinated to me.
“Thanking you once more for all that you have at one
time done for the coordination of the Government of the
National Revolution and since then together with us for
Germany, I remain,
Yours, very sincerely,
Adolf Hitler.”
Four years later, on 25 July 1938, after the Anschluss with
Austria, German officials no longer expressed regrets over
the death of Dollfuss. They were eager and willing to reveal
what the
[Page 457]
world already knew-that they were identified with and
sponsors of the murder of the former Chancellor. A dispatch
from the American Consul General in Vienna to the Secretary
of State, dated 26 July 1938, relates to the Nazis’
celebration of the murder of Dollfuss, held on 24 July 1938
and 25 July 1938, four years after the event. It states:
“The two high points of the celebration were the
memorial assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, capital of
the province of Carinthia, where in 1934 the Vienna
Nazi revolt found its widest response, and the march on
the 25th to the former Federal Chancellery in Vienna by
the surviving members of the SS Standarte 89, which
made the attack on the Chancellery in 1934a
reconstruction of the crime, so to say.
“The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed
by the Fuehrer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence
of the families of the 13 National Socialists who were
hanged for their part in the July putsch. The lagenfurt
memorial celebration was also made the occasion for the
solemn swearing in of the seven recently appointed
Gauleiters of the Ostmark.
“From the point of view of the outside world, the
speech of Reichs Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable
for the fact that after devoting the first half of his
speech to the expected praise of the sacrifices of the
men, women and youths of Austria in the struggle for a
greater Germany, he then launched into a defense of the
occupation of Austria and an attack on the ‘Iying
foreign press’ and on those who spread the idea of a
new war. The world was fortunate, declared Hessr that
Germany’s leader was a man who would not allow himself
to be provoked. ‘The Fuehrer does what is necessary for
his people in sovereign calm. *** and labors for the
peace of Europe’ even though provocators, ‘completely
ignoring the deliberate threat to peace of certain
small states,’ deceitfully claim that he is a menace to
the peace of Europe.
“The march on the former Federal Chancellery, now the
Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time
schedule of the original attack. The marchers were met
at the Chancellery by the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-
Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled a memorial
tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the Standarte
marched to the old RAVAG broadcasting center from which
false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been
broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet.
Steinhausl, the present Police President of Vienna, is
a member of the S. S. Standarte 89″. (L-273)
[Page 458]
The original plaque is now rubble. But a photograph of it
was found in The National Library in Vienna. [The photograph
was offered in evidence at the trial. See 2968-PS.] The
plaque reads: “154 German men of 89 SS Standarte stood up
here for Germany on 26 July 1934. Seven found death at the
hands of the hangman”. The words chosen for this marble
tablet, and it may be presumed that they were words chosen
carefully, reveal clearly that the men involved were not
mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded
as German men, were members of a para-military organization,
who stood up here “for Germany.” In 1934 Hitler repudiated
Dr. Rieth because he “dragged the German Reich into an
internal Austrian affair without any reason”. In 1938 Nazi
Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took
credit for it, and took responsibility for it.
(3) The Program Culminating in the Pact of 11 July 1936. In
considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in
Austria between 25 July 1934 and November 1937, there is a
distinct intermediate point, the Pact of 11 July 1936.
Accordingly, developments in the two-year period, July 1934
to July 1936, will first be reviewed.
(a) Continued Aim of Eliminating Austria’s Independence
Conversation and Activities of von Papen. The Nazi
conspirators pretended to respect the independence and
sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss
stated in Mein Kampf. But in truth and in fact they were
working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian
State.
A dramatic recital of the position of von Papen in this
regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. It
states:
“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation,
he greeted me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I
can control the conversation.’ In the baldest and most
cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of
Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was
Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been
charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for
Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting
control of Austria was to be the first step. He
definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine
and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to
work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and Southeast. He said that
he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to
gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal
Innitzer, towards
[Page 459]
that end. He said that he was telling me this because
the German Government was bound on this objective of
getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there
was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy
and that of France and England was not realistic.
“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him
in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he
had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he
had to say although I already knew what his
instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have
him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up
and told him how shocked I was to ear the accredited
representative of a supposedly friendly state to
Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in
activities to undermine and destroy that Government W
which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of
course this conversation was between us and that he
would of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with
regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of
the absolute frankness and directness with which high
Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.”
******
“On the surface, however, German activities consisted
principally of efforts to win the support of prominent
and influential men through insidious efforts of all
kinds, including the- use of the German Diplomatic
Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von
Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on
a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of
the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them
later informed me, that Germany w;as bound to prevail
in the long run and that they should join the winning
side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and
influence under German control. Of course, openly and
outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would
respect Austrian independence and that all that she
wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian
Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and
Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and
replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ Austrians,
which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of
von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.
“In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-
Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a
conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked
‘Yes, you have your
[Page 460]
French and English friends now and you can have your
independence a little longer’. The Foreign Minister, of
course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing
is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told
me that he had replied to von Papen ‘I am glad to have
from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with
what your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you
have taken-such pains to deny.’
“Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes,
particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others
who had long favored the ‘Grossdeutschum’ idea, but who
nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of
the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von
Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as
ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of
these Austrians in this respect.” (1760-PS)
(b) Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program
of Armed Preparedness. The wiles of von Papen represented
only one part of the total program of the Nazi conspiracy.
At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced
underground during this period, were carried on.
Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit discloses the following: The
Nazi organization, weakened in the events following the
putsch, began reorganization work. An informant furnished
the Austrian Government with a memorandum of a meeting of
Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria, September, 1934. The
memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for new
terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons
cooperating with the Schuschnigg Government when the next
action against the Government took place, and to appear
disposed to negotiate but to arm for the struggle. A copy of
this memorandum was furnished to Mr. Messersmith. At the
same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in
Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a
continuing menace for Austria. (1760-PS)
The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria
is corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis,
Rainer 812-PS). (812-PS contains three parts. First there is
a letter dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at
Salzburg, to Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter
encloses a letter dated 6 July 1939, written by Rainer to
Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that
letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the events in
the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day before
the invasion of Austria.)
The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was
asked
[Page 461]
to prepare a short history of the role of the party. He
states that after the Anschluss Hitler and the general
public gave Seyss-Inquart alone credit for effecting the
Anschluss. It is Rainer’s belief in that credit belongs to
the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain
underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that
the Party as a whole is entitled to “the glory which was
excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”.
Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer
said, and wrote to Rainer asking for an explanation. To
avoid misunderstanding, Rainer prepared for Seyss-Inquart a
copy of his letter to Buerckel and his report.
The Rainer report tells of the disorganization of the Nazi
party in Austria and of its reconstitution. The second and
third paragraphs of the report state:
“Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended
with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July
rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The
result was a complete destruction of the organization;
the loss of entire groups of fighters through
imprisonment or flight into the ‘Alt-Reich’; and with
regard to tie political relationship of Germany to
Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of
the Austrian State by the German Government. With the
telegram to PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute
normal relationships between the two states, the
Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle;
and a new method of political penetration was to begin.
By order of the Fuehrer the landesleitung Munich was
dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own
resources.
“There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party
in Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine
Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by
the interference of the police; there was no liaison
between the formations, and frequently there were two,
three or more rival leaderships. The first evident,
acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn
1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed
Landesbauernfeuhrer (leader of the country’s farmers)
by Hess). He endeavored to bring about a political
appeasement by negotiations with the government, with
the purpose of giving the NSDAP legal status again,
thus permitting its political activities.
Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction
of the illegal political organization, at the head of
which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.” (812-PS)
(c) Secret Contacts Between German Officials, Including
[Page 462]
Papen, and the Austrian Nazis: the Use by the Austrian Nazis
of “Front” Personalities. Two cardinal factors about the
Nazi organization in Austria should be borne in mind. First,
although the Fuehrer had on the surface cast the Austrian
Nazis adrift, in fact German officials, including Papen,
maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis, in line
with Hitler’s desires. German officials consulted and gave
advice and support to the organization of the Austrian
Nazis. In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an
illegal organization, organizing for the eventual use of
force in an “emergency.” But in the meanwhile they deemed it
expedient to act behind “front” personalities, such as Seyss-
Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality.
Mr. Messersmith relates in his affidavit that he obtained a
copy of a document outlining this Nazi program.
“For two years following the failure of the July 25
Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria.
Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder
of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this
inactivity was in accordance with directives from
Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to
my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January,
the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
furnished me a document which I considered accurate in
all respects and which stated:
‘The German Minister here, von Papen, on the
occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received
three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long
conversations, and he also took this opportunity
to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these
conversations the following instructions were
given to him:
‘During the next two years nothing can be
undertaken which will give Germany external
political difficulties. On this ground, everything
must be avoided which could awaken the appearance
of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of
Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also
for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the
present prevailing difficult crisis in the
National Socialist Party in Austria, although he
is convinced that order could be brought into the
Party at once through a word from him. This word,
however, he will, for foreign political reasons,
give all the less, as he is convinced that the,
for him, desirable ends may be reached also in
another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared
to the German Minister here, this does not
indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of
Austria’s independence. Also, before every-
[Page 463]
thing, Germany cannot for the present withdraw
Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in
spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make
every effort to bring help to the persecuted
National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a
result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave
the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks
a month were to be set aside for this end (support
of National Socialists in Austria). The control
and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be
entrusted to Engineer Reinthaller, who, through
the fact that he alone had control over the money,
would have a definite influence on the Party
followers. In this way it would be possible to end
most quickly and most easily the prevailing
difficulties and division in the Austrian National
Socialist Party.
‘The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen
that the recently authorized foundation of German
“Ortsgruppen” of the National Socialist Party in
Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria)
would be so arranged as not to give the appearance
that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian
internal affairs.” (1760-PS)
The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel
in July 1939, outlines the further history of the party and
the leadership squabbles following the retirement of
Reinthaller. In referring to the situation in 1935, he
mentions some of the contacts with the Reich Government in
the following terms:
“In August some further arrests took place, the victims
of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also
Globocnik and Rainer. SCHATTENFROH then claimed,
because of an instruction received from the imprisoned
LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country leader. A
group led by engineer RAFFELSPERGER had at this time
also established connections with departments of the
Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial
Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a
political motto in the form of a program for the
fighting movement of Austria.” (812-PS)
The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in
1936:
“The principles of the construction of the organization
were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal
fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret
organization, in a simple manner, and without
compromise, according to the principle of organization
an elite to be available to the illegal land-party
council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
opportunities should be taken and all legal people and
legal
[Page 464]
chances should be used without revealing any ties with
the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation
between the illegal party organization and the legal
political aides was anchored at the top of the party
leadership. All connections with the party in Germany
were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
Fuehrer. These said that the German state should
officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian
NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda,
press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in
the foreign countries bordering Austria.
“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-
Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter which
originated from Seyss Inquart’s support of the July
uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good
position in the legal field and especially ell-
established relations with Christian-Social
politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of
the ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ and became a party member
when the entire ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ was incorporated
into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good
position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau
who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11
July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of
these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to
the Fuehrer as being a trusted person.” (812-PS)
The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the
Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and
awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret
contacts with Reich officials, and using “front”
personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.
The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more
discreet in their activities and could be referred to as
“Nationalists”. They presented, supported, and obtained
consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by
out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did
not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was
made Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a
trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of the
Styrian-Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly
influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936.
That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to
trust Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July
1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goering (2219-PS). The
letter ends with the “Heil Hitler” close and is not signed,
but it was undoubtedly written by Seyss-Inquart. It was
found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files. On the first
page of the letter there
[Page 465]
appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English
translation, reading: “Air Mail. 15 July, 1515 hours,
Berlin, brought to Goering’s office.”
The main text of the letter consists of a plea for
intercession behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got
in Buerckel’s bad graces. An extract from the letter, which
shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler and the
aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight for the
Anschluss with all the means this disposal, reads:
At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939
“To the General Field Marshal
*******
“If I may add something about myself, it is the
following: I know that I am not of an active fighting
nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this
time of pronounced activism (Aktivismus) this will
certainly be regarded as a fault in m,y personality.
Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to
the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany
(Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER. And if some people
are already tired out from the struggle and some have
been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere
and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also
the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934 I
conducted myself as a regular member of the party. And
if I had quietly, in whatever form,, paid my membership
dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in
December 1931. I probably would have been an
undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member
of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the
union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight
this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give
the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires.
I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I
have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination
because I and my friends had to fight against the whole
political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have
led to our political annihilation; it would have
deprived the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry
out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as
became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been
fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path
which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not
to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and would
with-
[Page 466]
out hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied
that at one point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool
in his work, even though my former attitude even now
gives occasion to very worthy and honorable party
comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
attention to such things because I am satisfied with
the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him
have of me.” (2219-PS)
A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how
Papen thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be
used to effect the aim of Anschluss. It consists of a report
entitled “Review and Outlook, One Year after the Death of
Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the success that the
Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a
martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of
Austria, Papen stated:
“National Socialism must and will overpower the new
Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria
that the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German party
and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought
of National Socialism to groups of people of a
different political makeup, the answer must rightly be
that the national revolution in Germany could not have
been brought about in a different way. But when the
creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
completed, National socialism could, in a much wider
sense than this is possible through the present party
organizationat least apparently, certainly become the
rallying point for all racially German units beyond the
borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot
be achieved today with any centralized tendency. If
this recognition would once and for all be stated
clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily
become possible to effect a break-through into the
front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day
designated as ‘The German Day’ as in old times and the
proclamation of a national socialistic peoples’ front,
would be a stirring event for alI beyond the borders of
the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
legitimistic Count Dubsky rote in his pamphlet about
the ‘Anschluss’: The Third Reich will be with Austria,
or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win
it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this
task ***” (2248-PS)
Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned,
show that he maintained covert contact with the National
Socialist groups in Austria. From the very start of his
mission Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the
principle of National Socialism for “National Germans”
outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for
Anschluss, and although he preferred to use the principles
of National
[Page 467]
Socialism rather than rely on the party organization, he
was prepared to defend the party organization as a
necessary means of establishing those principles in the
German Reich.
(d) Assurances and Reassurances. The German Government did
more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with
Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of
providing assurances that it had no designs on Austria’s
independence. If Austria could but hope for the execution of
those assurances, she could find her way clear to the
granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic
and internal pressures.
A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17
May 1935, indicated that a forthright, credible statement by
Germany reassuring Austria would be most useful for German
diplomatic purposes and the improvement of relationships
between Austria and German groups in Austria (2247-PS).
Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Social-
Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of
Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade
Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to
emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he
obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal National Socialists. His letter states in part:
“*** I suggest that we take an active part in this
game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg
and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a
home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The
possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between
Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in
such way that he would submit the offer to the
government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise
of interests. According to the convincing opinion of
the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the
totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be
replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part
of the Christian-elements which favors the Greater
Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the
national independence of Austria and guarantees full
freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a
result of such a compromise the Austrian government
would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of
these forces. A further consequence of this step would
be the possibility of the participation of Germany in
the Danube pact, which
[Page 468]
would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the
settlement of relations between Germany and Austria.
Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence
on the European situation and especially on our
relationship with England. One may object, that Mr.
Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a
pattern, that he will rather in all probability
immediately communicate our offer to our opponents. Of
course, one should first of all explore the possibility
of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the
use of ‘Go betweens’. The possibility exists. If Mr.
Schuschnigg finally says ‘No’ and makes our offer known
in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse but,
on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to
make peace with Austria would be revealed — without
prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the
case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I
consider it completely possible, that in view of the
far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-
Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within
the federal government (Bundesreich), Mr. Schuschnigg
will grasp this last straw — always under the
supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as
a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark
of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming
success of this step, we would again establish our
active intervention in Central European politics,
which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian
political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success,
both morally and practically. Since there are 2 weeks
left to accomplish very much work in the way of
explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is
necessary. The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister)
shares the opinion presented above and the Reich
Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to
discuss it with you my Fuehrer.
(Signed) Papen”. (2247-PS)
In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible
assurance, of Austria’s independence. As he put it, Germany
had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere
effort at peace. And she might be able to convince
Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government
with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen
her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.
Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address
Hitler responded to Papen’s suggestion, asserting:
“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the
[Page 469]
internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to
conclude an Anschluss”. (TC-26)
Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler
announced, for a complexity of reasons, a policy completely
at variance with their intentions, which had been and
continued to be to interfere in Austria’s internal affairs
and to conclude an Anschluss.
(e) Temporary Countenance of a Quiet Pressure Policy. On 1
May 1936 Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow
or the day after Germany would fall upon Austria. His words
were published in the Voelkische-Beobachter, SD, 2-3 May 1936,
p. 2. (2367-PS)
If Hitler meant what he said, it as only in the most literal
and misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria
“tomorrow or the day after”. For the conspirators well knew
that the successful execution of their purpose required for
a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in
Austria.
A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William
Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, called upon von
Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May
1936, recounts von Neurath’s explanation why Germany was
trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the
Nazis in Austria (1150). The Nazis ere growing stronger in
Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young
people. And the German Government was doing nothing active
in foreign affairs until the Rhineland, reoccupied two
months before, had been “digested”, and until fortifications
were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy
still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany
wished to avoid any involvement with Italy.
(f) The agreement of 11 July 1936. But if Germany was not
yet ready for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic
position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which
influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to
Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points out,
Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had em,barked on her
Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the
refortification of the Rhineland, strengthened Germany’s
position (1760-S). This weakening of Austria helped pave the
way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (TC-22)
The formal part of the agreement of 11 July 1936, between
the German Government and the Government of the Federal
State of Austria, looks like a great triumph for Austria. It
contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria,
in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, will
regard herself as a German state. But the other two
provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full
sovereignty of Austria, and that it regards
[Page 470]
the inner political order of Austria (including the question
of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal concern of
Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor
indirect influence.
But there was much more substance to the day’s events. Mr.
Messersmith’s summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is
more revealing:
“Even more important than the terms of the agreement
published in the official communique, was the
contemporaneous informal understanding, the most
important provisions of which were, that Austria would
(1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to
positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to
give the ‘national opposition’ a role in the political
life of Austria and within the framework of the
Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save
those convicted of the most serious offenses. This
amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government
and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first
penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the
Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment
of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister
Without Portfolio”. (1760-PS)
These and other provisions of the secret part of the
Agreement of July 11 are set forth briefly and in general
terms in an affidavit by Kurt Schuschnigg, former Chancellor
of Austria, dated 19 November 1945 (2994-PS). By two of
those provisions Austria agreed to permit Nazi organizations
on Austrian soil,-and also use of the swastika and singing
of the Horst Wessel songall for German subjects. On its
credit side, Austria was to get repeal of the 1,000 mark
barrier on tourist trade, and in general tourist trade
between the two countries was to resume.
In view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis, these were
substantial concessions made by Austria to obtain Germany’s
diplomatic, formal assurance of Austrian independence and
nonintervention in Austrian internal affairs. The release of
imprisoned Nazis to the community presented potential police
problems. And as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934
dispatch, quoted in his affidavit, any prospect that the
National Socialists might come to power would make it more
difficult to obtain effective police and judicial action
against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the future Nazi
Government against those taking action against Nazis even in
the line of duty (1760-PS). The preservation of internal
peace in Austria was thus dependent upon Germany’s living up
to its obligations under the Accord.
[Page 471]
(4) Germany’s Continuing Program of Weakening the Austrian
Government.
(a) Germany’s Instructions to the Austrian National
Socialists Concerning Future Plans. In the pact of 11 July
1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly
the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of
Austrian National Socialism. On 16 July 1936, just five days
later, Hitler violated that provision. The report of
Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel states:
“*** At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of
the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on
what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile
Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his
successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936,
Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the
‘Obersalzburg’ where they received a clear explanation of
the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July
1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg,
where they received a complete report from Rainer on the
statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for
carrying out the fight. At the same conference the
Gauleiters received organizational instructions from
Globocnik and Hiedler.”
*******
“Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt.
Gen. (Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed
commission which as appointed, in accordance with the
state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct
execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler
was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the party
in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his
efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together
with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of
the peasants, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and
Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as
well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.” (812-
PS)
A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr.
Messersmith describes it briefly in-his affidavit:
“The sequel of the agreement was the only one which
could have been expected in view of all the facts and
previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in
Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain
Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in
frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to
form an organization through which the Nazis could
carry on their opera-
[Page 472]
tions openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There
were formed in Austria several organizations which had
a legal basis but which were simply a device by which
the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek
inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most
important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the
sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior
Glaise-Horstenau. Through! the influence of Glaise-
Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this
organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made
specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the
degree to which the situation in Austria had
disintegrated as a result of the underground and open
Nazi activities directed from Germany.” (1760-PS)
A report from Papen to Hitler dated 1 September 1936
indicates Papen’s strategy after 11 July 1936 for destroying
Austria’s independence. Papen had taken a substantial step
forward with the agreement of July 11. Incidentally, after
that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador.
Now his tactics were developed in the following terms, as
explained in the last three paragraphs of his letter of
September 1:
“*** The progress of normalizing relations with Germany
at the present time is obstructed by the continued
persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by
the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in
personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they
are definitely not to be expected prior to the
conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances
(Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of
his intention, to offer him the porte folio of the
Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle
(Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side,
continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly
intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.
The proposed conference on economic relations, taking
place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool
for the realization of some of our projects. In
discussion with government officials as well as with
leaders of the illegal party Leopold and Schattenfroh)
who conform completely with the agreement of July 11. I
am trying to direct the next developments in such a
manner to aim at corporative representation of the
movement in the fatherland front (Vaterlaendischen
Front) but nevertheless refraining from putting
National-socialists in important positions for the time
being. However such positions are to be occupied only
by personalities, having the
[Page 473]
support and the confidence of the movement. I have a
willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-
Horstenau. (Signature) Papen” (2246-PS)
To recapitulate, this report of von Papen, discloses the
following plans:
1. obtaining a change in personnel in Ministry of Security
in due course;
2. obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement
in the Fatherland Front;
3. not putting avowed National-Socialists in important
positions yet, but using “nationalist” personalities;
4. using economic pressure, and “patient psychological
treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at
changing the regime.”
(b) Nazi Demands and Demonstrations. The Nazi demanded even
more open recognition. In January 1937 Captain Leopold
submitted a memorandum of demands. They are listed in Mr.
Messersmith’s affidavit (1760-PS). They were not formally
received by the Austrian Cabinet, but they were known to and
considered by the Cabinet. They included the following
demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations
suffered for National Socialist or National activity or
sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists,
including freedom of political activity and cultural
activity; (3) abolition of laws and sanctions used by the
Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocated
cooperation on the basis of political principles including:
A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet;
an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a
politiCal aim; the application of anti-Semitic measures; and
an early plebiscite on Anschluss.
Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit also states that these demands,
and Leopold’s petition for a nationalistic party, were
supported by frequent demonstrations and much propaganda
work. As early as 29 July 1936, hen the Olympic Torch was
carried through Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders.
From that time on there were frequent arrests for
distributing illegal literature or staging illegal
demonstrations. (1760-PS)
(c) Schuschnigg’s Concessions. Gauleiter Rainer’s historical
review points out that due to the activities of the Reich
officials ad the Austrians who acted as the Nazi “fronts”,
it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart
as Staatsrat (Councillor of State) in July, 1937. (812-PS)
Schuschnigg’s affidavit mentions the Olympic Torch incident,
Page 474]
and in addition the demonstration of the illegal Nazis at
the time of the visit of von Neurath to Vienna in February
1937. Schuschnigg also points out other examples of the
pressure increasingly exerted by Germany on Austria. One of
his main reasons for entering into the July 11 agreement was
to eliminate Germany’s 1,000 mark penalty on tourists to
Austria. The penalty was removed, but Germany made it
illegal for a tourist to bring more than 5 marks out of the
country. And German buyers of cattle and wood purchased only
from Austrian Nazis. (2994-PS)
Schuschnigg further reports that the incidents and pressure
culminated in the so-called Tav Plan, discovered by the
Austrian police in November, 1937, containing instructions
for unrest to break out among the Nazis at a prearranged
time. The German Government would submit an ultimatum that
National-Socialists must be brought into the Government or
the German Army would invade. (2994-PS)
It may be recalled that during this period Schuschnigg made
concessions. He appointed Seyss-Inquart as Councillor of
State in July, 1937. He had previously appointed a
“Committee of Seven” to discuss with him the desires of the
national opposition. He played a delaying game, presumably
in the hope that a change in the foreign situation would
provide him with external support.
B. Germany’s Diplomatic Preparations for Conquest.
The program of the Nazi conspiracy aimed at weakening
Austria externally and internally, by removing its support
from without as well as by penetrating within. This program
was of the utmost significance, since the events of 25 July
1934 inside Austria were overshadowed by the fact that
Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and
poised them there as a strong protector of his northern
neighbor.
Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria, and
steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control
over that country, required removal of the possibility that
Italy or any other country would come to Austria’s aid. But
the program of the conspiracy for the weakening and
isolation of Austria was integrated with its foreign policy
program in Europe generally.
The Nazi conspirators’ diplomatic preparation for war is
described in a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith
(2385-PS), which may be summarized as follows: In 1933 the
Nazis openly acknowledged the ambition to expand the
territorial borders of the Reich to include Austria and
Czechoslovakia. As for the other countries of Southeast
Europe, the professed objective was stated
[Page 475]
at that time not in terms of territorial acquisition but
rather in terms of political and economic control. And the
stated objectives were not limited to Southeast Europe, for
important Nazis even in 1933 were stating their desire for
the Ukraine as the granary of Germany.
When they came to power, the Nazis had two principal
objectives. They wanted to establish their power in Germany.
And they wanted to rearm and establish Germany’s armed
power. They wanted peace until they were ready. But they
wanted to acquire the ability to carry out their program in
Europe by force if necessary, although preferably by a
threat of force. They accordingly remarked upon their vast
rearmament program. It proceeded very rapidly. Goering and
General Milch often said to Messersmith or in his presence
that the Nazis were concentrating on air power in their
rearmament, as the weapon of terror most likely to give
Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be
developed most rapidly.
In addition to material preparation for war, there was
preparation for war in the psychological sense. Throughout
Germany youth of all ages could be observed in”military
exercises and field maneuvers.
Moreover, as Mr. Messersmith also observes,
“Military preparation and psychological preparation ere
coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so
disunite and isolate their intended victims as to
render them defenseless against German aggression.”
(2385-PS)
In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and
diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant
military power on the continent. She had woven a system of
mutual assistance in the West and in the East. The Locarno
Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian alliance,
guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West.
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania were allied in the
Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by
mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had
likewise been allied against external aggressiOn. Italy had
made plain her special interest in Austrian independence.
Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to
break up the existing alliances and understandings, to
create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and
the other Eastern European powers.
Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with
promises of economic gain for cooperating with Germans. To
some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of
terri-
[Page 476]
torial and economic rewards. She offered Carinthia, in
Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia
to Hungary and part of Poland. She offered Yugoslav
territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering
land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.
Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:
“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the
German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany
began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises
of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular
they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav
reaction, I reported at the time:
*** The major factor in the internal situation in the
last week has been the increase in tension with respect
to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. *** There
is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his
trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about
six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get
a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist
Government came into power in Austria. *** The Nazi
seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause
trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people
there who look with a great deal of benevolence on
those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days
following July 25.
“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to
Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their
cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the
proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned
from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and
von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were
spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in
which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to
get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive
any of these countries for they knew that the intention
of Nazi Germany vas to take all.
“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate
objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna
saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made
promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the
same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian
territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave
me the same information.
“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men
who
[Page 477]
made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool
Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had
begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program.
In an official despatch to the Department of State from
Vienna dated 10 October 1935, I wrote as follows:
*** Europe will not get away from the myth that
Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people
and that they are “diplomat of the old school.” They
are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just
because the outside world looks upon them as harmless,
they are able to work more effectively. They are able
to sow discord just because they propagate the myth
that they are not in sympathy with the regime.” (2385-PS)
In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these
divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using
as its agents in making these promises men who on outward
appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true
that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international
obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s
hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness
to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries
was not influenced by those considerations alone.
Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was willing to go to
some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence. All
these countries found it possible to believe apparently
substantial personages, like von Neurath, for example. They
were led to rely on the assurances given, which seemed more
impressive since the diplomats making them ere represented
as men who were not Nazis and would not stoop to go along
with the base designs of the Nazis.
Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in
terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They
signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed
a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of both France and England,
they limited their statement of intentions-and harped on
fears of Communism and war.
In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by
notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High
ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly
stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her
international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany’s interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in
his affidavit:
“High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain
official contact, particularly men such as Goering,
Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darre and others,
repeatedly scoffed at my
[Page 478]
position as to the binding character of treaties and
openly stated to me that Germany would observe her
international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany’s interests to do so. Although these statements
were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to
others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing
any secret for on many occasions they expressed the
same ideas publicly.” (2385-PS)
France and Italy worked actively in Southeastern Europe to
counter Germany’s moves. France made attempts to promote an
East Locarno Pact and to foster an economic accord between
Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to
organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy.
But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its promises
of loot, by continuing its armament, and by another
significant stratagem. The Nazis stirred up internal
dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended victims.
They supported the Austrian Nazis and the Henlein Party in
Czechoslovakia. They probed hat Goebbels called the “sore
spots.” In Yugoslavia they played on the differences between
the Croats and the Serbs, and in particular played on the
fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria, a fear
which was very real in Yugoslavia. In Hungary, Poland, and
Rumania they stirred up other fears and hatreds. These
measures had considerable effect in preventing these
countries from joining any which were opposed to German
designs.
The Nazis consolidated their power in Germany very quickly.
The German people became increasingly imbued with the Nazi
military spirit. Within Germany, resistance to the Nazis
disappeared. Army officers, including many who originally
aided the Nazis with the limited objective of restoring the
German Army, increasingly became imbued with aggressive
designs as they saw how remarkably their power was growing.
The power of Nazi Germany outside the borders of the Reich
increased correspondingly. Other countries feared its
military might. Important political leaders in Yugoslavia,
in Hungary, and in Poland became convinced that the Nazi
regime would gain its ends and that the best course as to
play along with Germany. These countries became apathetic
toward the development of Anschluss with Austria and
cooperative toward the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr.
Messersmith’s despatches from Europe to the State
Department, setting out the developments in these countries,
are included in his second affidavit. (2385-PS)
As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord
between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia
Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent
France from
[Page 479]
reaching agreement with them and to block an East Locarno
Pact. A Mr. Messersmith states:
“While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with
Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia
provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord
between Italy and France and England, and to win Italy
over to acceptance of Germany’s program in exchange for
German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.” (2385-
PS)
That paved the way for the Austro-German declaration of 11
July 1936. And in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the
hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy in an
alliancethe Rome-Berlin Axis. This, together with Germany’s
alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England-and
increased the relative strength of Germany.
And so, by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic
field, among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a
position for themselves so that they could seriously
consider plans for war and outline a time-table. That time-
table was developed in the conference with Hitler in the
Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937. (386-PS)
C. Crystallization of the Plan to Wage Aggressive War in
Europe and to Seize Austria and Czechoslovakia. At the
meeting of the conspirators in the Reichschancellery on 6
November 1937, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany should
have more space in Europe (386-PS). It was concluded that
the space required must be taken by force, three different
cases were outlined as possibilities, and it was decided
that the problem would have to be solved before the period
1943 to 1945. The nature of a ar in the near future was
envisaged, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany’s military
political position the first aim of the Nazis in every case
of entanglement by war must be to conquer Czechoslovakia and
Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from
the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. Hitler
then calculated that the conquest of Czechoslovakia and
Austria would constitute the conquest of food for from five
to six million people, assuming that the comprehensive
emigration of one million from Austria could be carried out.
He further pointed out that the annexation of the two states
to Germany would constitute a considerable relief, both
militarily and politically, since they would provide shorter
and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for
other purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution
of new armies. (386-PS)
[Page 480]
The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization in the
policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their
aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch
was attempted, using the personnel of the Austrian Nazis,
but that failed. The next period was one of surface
recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of
devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis
internally in Austria. Now, however, it became clear that
the need for Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive
purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was sufficiently great to
warrant the use of force in- order to obtain Austria with
the desired speed. The Nazis were, in fact, able to secure
Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed
from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the
German military machine in motion and making a threat of
force. The German armies were able to cross the border and
secure the country without the necessity of firing a shot.
Careful planning for war and the readiness to use war as an
instrument of political action made it possible in the end
for the Nazis to master Austria without having to fight for
it.
The German High Command had previously considered
preparations against Austria. On 24 June 1937 the Reich
Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
General von Blomberg, issued a Top Secret Directive (C-175).
The importance of this directive, establishing a unified
preparation of the Armed Forces for war, is indicated by the
fact that the carbon copy received by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy was one of only four copies. This directive from
General von Blomberg stated that the general political
situation indicated that Germany need not consider an attack
from any side, and also that Germany did not intend to
unleash a European war. It then stated, in point 1:
“Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation,
which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a
continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed
Forces.
“a. to counter attacks at any time
“b. to enable the military exploitation of politically
favorable opportunities should they occur.” (C-175)
The directive then indicated that there would be certain
preparations of a general nature for war.
“2. The preparations of a general nature include:
“a. The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the
German Armed Forces, even before the completion of
rearmament and full preparedness for war.
“b. The further working on ‘Mobilization without public
[Page 481]
announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in a
position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both
as regards strength and time.” (C-175)
The directive finally indicated, in Part 3, that there might
be special preparation for war in Austria:
“Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her
restoring the Monarchy.
“The object of this operation will be to compel Austria
by armed force to give up a restoration. ”making use
of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian
people, the march in will be made in the general
direction of Vienna and will break any resistance.” (C-
175)
This plan is indicated in the document as having been
superseded by new and more detailed plans following the
meeting of 5 November 1937.
The plans of the conspirators were further revealed in two
conversations held by William Bullitt, United States
Ambassador to France with Schacht and with Goering in
November, 1937. Both Schacht and Goering told Bullitt that
Germany was determined to annex Austria. Goering further
added that there could be no final solution of the Sudeten-
German question other than inclusion in the Reich. (L-151)
D. Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions:
Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938.
Chancellor Schuschnigg states in an affidavit (2995-PS) that
in 1938 von Papen suggested to him that he should meet
Hitler at Berchtesgaden. After several discussions
Schuschnigg agreed to go, provided three conditions were
met:
(1) He must be invited by Hitler.
(2) He must be previously informed of the precise agenda and
assured that the agreement of 11 July 1936 would be
maintained.
:(3) There was to be an agreement in advance that the
communique to be published at the end of the meeting would
affirm the 11 July 1936 agreement.
Von Papen brought back word from Hitler inviting Schuschnigg
and agreeing with these conditions, particularly the
maintenance of the July 1936 treaty. (2995-PS)
The official German communique of this conference between
Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938
was calm (2461-PS). The communique stated that the
unofficial meeting was caused by the mutual desire to
clarify by personal conversations the questions relating to
the relationship between
[Page 482]
the German Reich and Austria. The communique listed, as
among those present, Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister
Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and von
Papen. The communique concluded: “Both statesmen are
convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the
same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful
development of the European situation.” (2461-PS). A similar
communique was issued by the Austrian Government.
In fact, as a result of the conference great concessions
were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The
principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian
communique dated 16 February 1938 (2464-PS). The communique
announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet,
including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the position
of Minister of Security and Interior. In addition,
announcement was made of a general political amnesty to
Nazis convicted of crimes. (2464-PS)
Two days later, on 18 February 1938, another concession was
divulged in the official German and Austrian communique
concerning the equal rights of Austrian National Socialists
in Austria (2469-PS). The communique announced that pursuant
to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National
Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the
single legal political party of Austria.
Schuschnigg’s affidavit on his Berchtesgaden visit on 12
February 1938 (2995-PS) points out that considerable
pressure was brought to bear on him at the Berghof. Several
Generals Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau, names which were
omitted from the formal communique later issuedwere present
on his arrival. The conference started with a two-hour
conference between Schuschnigg and Hitler alone. Hitler made
no precise demands but attacked Schuschnigg violently. In
the words of the affidavit:
“I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after
arriving at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with
Hitler. Hitler and I were alone for two hours. Hitler
attacked in a violent manner the politics of Austria,
both of the past and present. He furthermore informed
me that he, Hitler, had ‘decided to bring the Austrian
question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to
immediately use military force.’ At no time during the
first two hours of our conversation did Hitler ever
make any precise demands or requests of me, but spent
the whole of the two hours accusing me and menacing me
as a traitor to Austrian politics. Especially he
informed me that, according to his knowledge, Austria
could no longer reckon
[Page 483]
with any assistance from other European Powers, and
that Austria now stood alone in the world. He
furthermore added ‘Schuschnigg, you now have the chance
to put your name alongside the names of other famous
German leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp,
Goebbels, and others.’ ***”. (2995-PS)
After Hitler’s violent threats, Schuschnigg had discussions
of a calmer nature with von Ribbentrop and von Papen. They
talked soothinglY and comfortingly to Schuschnigg but
reached the same conclusion, that he should yield to German
demands, which in practical effect meant Nazi control of the
Government of Austria.
“I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called
before Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of
Franz von Papen, Ribbentrop exhibited to me a
typewritten draft containing the conditions and demands
made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He furthermore
added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, ‘that
these demands that I now offer to you are the final
demands of the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not
prepared to further discuss them’. He further stated
that, ‘you must accept the whole of these demands
herein contained’. Ribbentrop then advised me to accept
the demands at once. I protested, and referred him to
my previous agreements with von Papen, made prior to
coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to
Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted
with such unreasonable demands as he had then and there
placed before me. Von Papen, still present, apologized
and informed me that he, von Papen, was entirely
surprised and not at all informed about the aims of the
Fuehrer as here laid down. He further stated, and
informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his
advice and that he should now accede to, and sign,
these demands. He furthermore informed me that I could
be assured that Hitler would take care that, if I
signed these demands and acceded to them, that from
that time on Germany would remain loyal to this
Agreement and that there would be no further
difficulties for Austria.” (2995-PS)
Finally, after obtaining some minor concessions from
Ribbentrop, Schuschnigg met with Hitler again. This time
Hitler not only put pressure upon Schuschnigg, but also,
upon learning that the approval of President Miklas of
Austria as necessary, indicated clearly to Schuschnigg that
military action would follow if Miklas did not approve the
agreement. In the words of Schuschnigg’s affidavit:
[Page 484]
” I further state and say, that I then went before
Hitler again. Hitler was very excited and informed me
that he would make a final test with Austria, and
stated further: that you must fulfill the conditions of
the demands made by me on you within three days, or
else I will order the march into Austria.” I replied:
“I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill
your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria,
and that obligation you attempt to place upon me is the
duty only of the Federal President, Miklas; I am only
able to sign the draft, and, when I arrive in Vienna,
to present it to the Federal President. Hitler then
flung open the door and yelled Keitel. At the same
time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then came
in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again
called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler,
informed me as follows: “For the first time in my life,
I have changed my mind. You must sign the demands that
I have made upon you, then report them to the Federal
President, Miklas, and within three days from now
Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise things
will take their natural course. I then agreed to sign
the demands and, while waiting in Hitlers private room,
he, Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz
von Papen, who was also present, “herr von Papen,
through your assistance I was appointed Chancellor of
Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the abyss of
communism. I will never forget that. Papen replied: Ja,
wohl, Mein Fuehrer.
“I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence
of Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler,
signed the demands, and retained a copy for the
Austrian Government.
“I further state and affirm that, on the way back to
Vienna from Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen informed me
as follows: Now you have your own impression of how
excited the Fuehrer can get, but that happens very
seldom, and I am convinced that the next time you meet
him, you will have an amicable conversation with him.”
(2995-PS)
The pressure put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden is also
disclosed in von Papens notes on his last meeting with
Schuschnigg on 26 February 1938, the last two paragraphs
of which read:
“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread
opinion that he had acted under brutal pressure” in
Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able
to state that he had always and at every point had
complete freedom
[Page 485]
of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually
been under considerable moral pressure, he could not
deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore
that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had
not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I
asked him whether without the pressure he would have
been ready to make the concessions he had made late in
the evening. He answered: “To be honest, No! It appears
to me of importance to record this statement.” (1544-
PS)
For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at
Berchtesgaden kept up the pretense that there had been no
pressure. But General Jodl, writing the account of current
events for his diary, was more candid. This hand-written
diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden but
also the fact that for somedays thereafter, General Keitel
and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming
military pressure, in order to coerce President Miklas into
ratifying the agreement. And so the Nazi conspirators kept
up the military pressure, with threats of invasion, for some
days after the Berchtesgaden conference, in order to produce
the desired effect on Miklas. (1780-PS)
The following entries, for Feb. 11-Feb. 14 were made in
Jodls diary:
“11 February:
“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with
General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg.
Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being
put under heaviest political and military pressure. At
2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
“13 February:
“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself
to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrers
order is to the effect that military pressure shamming
military action should be kept up until the 15th.
Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and
submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
“14 February:
“At 2:40 oclock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives.
Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence
office VII and initiates the different measures.
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the
impression is created that Germany is undertaking
serious military preparations.” (1780-PS)
The proposals for deceptive maneuvers mentioned by Jodl
were signed by Keitel. Underneath his signature
appeared
[Page 486]
a pencilled note that the Fuehrer approved the
proposals. Among the rumors which Keitel proposed for
the intimidation of Austria were the following:
“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may
lead to the conclusion of military preparations against
Austria.
“a. through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,
“b. through our customs personnel (staff) at the
frontier,
“c. through travelling agents.
“3. Such news could be:
“a. Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the
Sector of the VII A.K.
“b. (Rolling Stock) is being assembled in Munich,
Augsburg, and Regensburg.
“c. Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna
has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a
matter of fact, this is the case).
The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria,
have called up reinforcements.
Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of
the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of
Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.” (1775-PS)
The pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in
due course, as is shown in the communiques already referred
to, President Miklas ratified the Berchtesgaden agreement,
which foreshadowed a National Socialist Austria.
E. Events Culminating in the German invasion on 12 March 1938.
(1) The Plebiscite. The day after his appointment as
Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a
conference with Hitler. (2484-PS)
On 9 March 1938, three weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been
put in charge of the police, Schuschnigg announced that he
would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria on the following
Sunday, 13 March 1938. The question was: “Are you for an
independent and social, a Christian, German and united
Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was clearly
compatible with the agreement made by the German Government
on 11 July 1936, and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12
February 1938. More-
[Page 487]
over, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a
plebiscite on the question of Anschluss. But the Nazis
apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote
on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not
tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the
Schuschnigg Government. They took this occasion to overturn
the Austrian Government.
Although the Plebiscite was not announced until the evening
of 9 March, the Nazi Organization received word about it
earlier in the day. It was determined by the Nazis that they
had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation, and that
they would prepare a letter of protest against the
Plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg, and that
pending Hitler’s approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to
negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.
In the words of Gauleiter Rainer’s report to
Reichscommissioner Buerckel:
“The Landesleitung received word about the planned
plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9
March 1938 at 10 a. m. At the session which was called
immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he
had known about this for only a few hours, but that he
could not talk about it because he had given his word
to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he
made us understand that the illegal information we
received was based on truth, and that in view of the
new situation, he had been cooperating with the
Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner,
Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present
at the first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it
was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed
immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer
to intervene must be given to him by way of an official
declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to
Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate
with the government until clear instrUctions and orders
were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and
Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and
only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by
Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March
1938.” (812-PS)
(2) Germanys Preparation for the Use of Force. When news of
the Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous
amount of activity. Hitler was determined not to tolerate
the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers
and ordered preparation for the march into Austria. He made
diplomatic prepara-
[Page 488]
tions by explaining in a letter to Mussolini the reasons why
he was going to march into Austria. In the absence of von
Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von
Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.
The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s
diary give a vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The
entry for 10 March 1938 reads:
“By surprise and without consulting his ministers,
Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March,
which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists
in the absence of plan or preparation.
“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same
night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v.
Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee.
General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as
Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District
leader (Gauleiter) Buerckel in the Palatinate. General
Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the
Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give
him the old draft.
“Prepare case Otto.
“1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational
Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being
detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign
Office.
“Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian
Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini
and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer
to take action.
“1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command
of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps;
without reserve Army.” (1780-PS)
In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed
Forces, dated 11 March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and
Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed political and military
intentions:
“1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to
invade Austria with armed forces to establish
constitutional conditions and to prevent further
outrages against the pro-German population.
******
“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for
this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready
for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200
hours. “I reserve the right to give permission for
crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide
the actual moment for invasion.
[Page 489]
“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression
that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian
brothers. It is in our interest that the whole
operation shall be carried out without any violence but
in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the
population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided.
If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
ruthlessly by force of arms.” (C-102)
An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl
provided further:
“If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are
encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as
hostile.
“The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends
especially as Mussolini has declared himself
uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question”.
(C-103)
The military preparations for invasion were complete.
3 The Events of 11 March in Austria. The events of 11 March
1938 in Austria are available in three separate accounts.
Although these accounts differ in some minor details, they
afford each other almost complete corroboration with regard
to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria
of its sovereignty.
The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed
by Schuschnigg (2996-PS). Schuschnigg first states that he
had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and
that Seyss-Inquart had made some procedural objections but
in general indicated his general willingness to support the
plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March 10 thinking the
plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of March
11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and
that German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10
a. m. Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-
Horstenau. Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and
reported that Hitler was in a rage. (2996-PS)
Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums
presented by the German Government:
“Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the
telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap
of paper which he held in his hand, the contents of a
telephone call which he alleged was just then received
by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read
it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor must revoke
the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour,
and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige
herself to carry out a plebiscite concerning the
[Page 490]
Anschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the
German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier.
“I further state and say that after informing the
Federal President of this demand made on Austria by
Germany, we decided to recall the plebiscite, and
thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau
of our intentions.
“Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone
and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of
the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few
minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and
informed me further, as follows:
“I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and
Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg, as follows:
“The situation can only be saved by Austria when
Schuschnigg resigns as Chancellor of Austria within two
hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief
of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not
inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will
suppose that you are hindered from doing so”.
“I then reported to the Federal President the new
developments, and after some conversation with him and
other members of the Government, I decided to resign.
The Federal President reluctantly accepted my
resignation at 3:30 p.m. on the afternoon of 11 March
1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-
Inquart as the Federal Chancellor-he therefore asked me
to continue my duties until he had decided who would
succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and
remained as caretaker Chancellor from 3:30 p.m., 11
March 1938 until about 11:30 p.m. the same night, when
Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal
Chancellor.
“I further state and say that at about 3:30 p.m. on the
afternoon of 11 March
[Page 491]
1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government
contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to
ascertain if the demands that had been then and there
made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of
the German Government. The Military Attache of Germany
in Vienna, one Lieutenant General Muff, came before the
Austrian Federal President and repeated the contents of
the German ultimatums that had previously been
delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.
“I furthermore state and say, that the Federal
President at about 7:30 or 8:00 oclock p.m. on the
night of 11 March 1938 ordered me, as caretaker
Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to
protest against the demands made on Austria during that
day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that
Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of
Germany through superior force ** *.” (2996-PS)
The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner
Buerckel also discusses the events of March 11. In general,
Rainer’s report corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (812-
PS)
Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March
1938. This document, which was found in a building of the
courtyard of the German Air Ministry, is a binder containing
typed transcripts of some 27 telephone conversations, held
in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on 11 March 1938 and
up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were conducted by
Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler (299-PS).
(For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are
marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z
and then beginning again with AA).
The first group of conversations took place between Field
Marshal Goering, who was identified-as F., and Seyss-
Inquart, who was identified as S. The transcript is in part
in the language of these two persons and is in part a
summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p.m. the
following conversation occurred:
“F- How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he
with you?
Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:
“F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do
you have any news?
“S: The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for
Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other
gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having
called off the elections, extensive precautionary
measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8
p.m.
“F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by
Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any
respect. At this moment he could not commit himself
officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In
calling off the elections, he could see a postponement
only, not a change of the present situation which had
been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor
Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
[Page 492]
“Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the
Fuehrer. Afterwards F. phoned again S. This
conversation was held at 15:05.
“F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with
the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he
did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government
because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and
therefore further confidence in his future actions did
not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and
the others, are being requested to immediately hand in
their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask
the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a
period of one hour no report had come through the
assumption would be made that S. would no more being
the position to phone. That would mean that the
gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then
told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed
upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by
the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet
would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (2949-PS, Part A)
Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for
Schuschnigg to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later
he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must
resign. When informed at about an hour later that
Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that in addition it
was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the
Cabinet.
An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German
Embassy in Vienna. He was concerned that the Nazi Party and
all its formations should be legalized promptly:
“Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been
legalized ?
“Dombrowski: But that is ** * it isn’t necessary to
even discuss that.
“Goering: With all of its organizations.
“Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this
country.
“Goering: In uniform ?
“Dombrowski: In uniform.
“Goering: Good.
“Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA
and SS have
already been on duty for one-half hour which means
everything is all
right.” (2949-PS, Part C)
In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed
by
[Page 493]
7:30.p. m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered
to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the
cabinet:
“Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the
Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One
thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy
and Commerce.
“Dombrowski: That’s understood.
“Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of
Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be
taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the
Justice Department.
“Dombrowski: Yes, yes.
“Goering: Give me the name.
“Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law.- Isn’t that
right?
“Goering: Yes ?
“Dombrowski: Yes.
“Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (2949-
PS, Part C)
About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering
received the news that. Miklas was refusing to appoint
Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He issued instructions for
an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The telephone
conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as follows:
“G: Now remember the following: You go immediately
together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal
President that if the conditions which are known to you
are not accepted immediately, the troops who are
already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will
march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will
cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and
demand to be admitted for conference immediately.
Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas’
position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke.
Just through the false report we received before action
was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the
invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria.
The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be
held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that
Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal
Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is
broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the
immediate restoration of the Party with all its
organizations (again interruption)
[Page 494]
and then call out all the National Socialists all over
the country. They should now be in the streets. So
remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General
Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform
him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4
hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4
minutes.” (2949-PS, Part E)
An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively
interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and
Seyss-Inquart. When told that Miklas had refused to appoint
Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied:
“Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him;
just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that
SI shall call on the National Socialists guard, and in
5 minutes the troops will march in by my order”. (2949-
PS, Part H)
After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone
and informed Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his
old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to
him and there might be definite word in about ten minutes.
The conversation proceeded as follows:
“G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he
comes back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation
in the Reich Chancelleryas usually, but it has to be
done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact.
I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then
you have to take over the power; all right?
“S: But if he threatens?
“S: Well, I see, then we shall be ready (atreten).
“G: Call me via Blitz.” (2949-PS, Part H)
It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a
plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained
obdurate. The plan involved both the use of the National
Socialist forces in Austria and invasion y German troops.
Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-
Inquart had another conversation. This was after the
ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that
Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows:
“G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then
you make sure that you get the power. Notify the
leading people about the following which I shall tell
you now ! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes
resistance, will immediately be subjected to our court-
martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is
that clear?
“G: Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make
any difference.
“S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any
resistance.
“G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did
not authorize you, and that also can be considered as
resistance.
“G: Well, now you are officially authorized.
“G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (2949-PS, Part I)
Another historical eventthe famous telegram which Seyss-
Inquart sent to the German Government requesting it to send
troops into Austria to help put down disorderwas discussed
over the telephone. A conversation held at 8:48 between
Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows:
“G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is,
that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government,
that he keeps the radio stations occupied.
“K: Well, we represent the Government now
“G: Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen
carefully: The following telegram should be sent here
by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes:
“The provisional Austrian Government which after the
dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it
its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends
to the German Government the urgent request, to support
it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For
this purpose it asks the German Government to send
German troops as soon as possible”.
“K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets,
but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with
the professional groups (?) ” (2949-PS, Part L)
And a few minutes later the conversation continued as
follows:
“G: Then our troops will cross the border today
“G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as
possible.
[Page 496]
“K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the
Federal Chancery.
“G: Please, show him the text of the telegram and do
tell him that we are asking himwell, he does not even
have to send the telegramall he needs to do is to say:
agreed.
“G: Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place.
Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!” (2949-PS, Part L)
It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A),
held at 3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to
send the telegram agreed upon. But now the matter was so
urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the
telegram over the telephone.
And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m., a conversation between Dr.
Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows:
“D: I need the telegram urgently.
“K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart
agrees.
“D: This is marvelous. Thank you.
“K: Listen to the radio. News will be given.
“K: From Vienna.
“D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?
“K: Ja wohl!” (2949-PS, Part M)
(4) The Order to Invade Austria. Communications with Austria
were now suspended. But the German military machine had been
set in motion. A Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045
hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the
invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with
the German ultimatum. The directive reads:
“Re: Operation Otto
“Directive No. 2
“1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian
government have not been fulfilled.
“2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to
withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to
avoid fighting.
“The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its
own accord.
“3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the
entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will com-
[Page 497]
mence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on
12.3.
“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting
all forces to
the full, as quickly as possible.
(signed) ADOLF HITLER” (C-182)
(5) Communications with Rome — Avoidance of Disaster. But at
the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this
military undertaking, they still had a question mark in
their minds Italy. Italy had massed forces on the Italian-
Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July 1934 putsch.
Italy had traditionally been the political protector of
Austria.
At 10:25 p.m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from
Prince Philip of Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had
just returned from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had
accepted the whole affair in a very friendly manner. The
telephone conversation went thus:
“H (Hessen): I have just come back from Palazzo
Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-
friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been
informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news.
He had then said it would be a complete impossibility.
It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So
he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and
it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said
that Austria would be immaterial to him.
“F (Fuehrer): Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will
never forget him for this.
“F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still
ready to make a
quite different agreement with him.
“H: Yes, I told him that, too.
“F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I
shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin,
nothing matters.
“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.
“F: Listen, I shall make any agreementI am no longer in
fear of the terrible position which would have existed
militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You
may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never,
never shall I forget that.
“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.
“F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he
should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can
be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might
happen, even if the whole world were against him.
[Page 498]
“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.” (2949-PS, Part N)
It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (1780-PS)
to the letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this
letter, dated 11 March 1938, after stating that Austria had
been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote: “I have decided
to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and
tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility
of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and
by its own decision.” He stated that this was only an act of
self-defense, that he had no hostile intentions toward
Italy. (2510-PS)
After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler
communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time
by telegraph: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this”
(2467-PS)
(6) The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Late in
the evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-
Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-
Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. (2465-PS)
(7) Later Communications with London — Misleading
Explanations. On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the
invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich
by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their
conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed
and misled other nations:
“G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the
administration of the current government procedures
(Fuehrung der Regierungsgeshaft). And therefore I
wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in
Austria, that you can hear over the radio.
“R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?
“G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is
completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved,
when he talked to me last night. You must remember it
was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now,
I mainly want to talk about political things. Well,
this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just
foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National
Socialist ministers and the representatives of the
people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum.
Later on, more and more prominent people of the
Movement Party participated, and as a natural result,
the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to
back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up
against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then
we told them we would not
[Page 499]
allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no
circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order,
or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been
armed, and were already making demonstrations, which
were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on;
naturally, all these facts caused some danger for
Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that
Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the
Fatherland Front (Vaterlandsche Front) would fight to
its last man; one could not know that they would
capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who
already had taken over the government asked us to march
in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the
frontier since we could not know whether there would be
a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which
can be proved by documents. ***”
“******
“G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if
you spoke already to these people. I want that you once
more, but no not at all once more, but generally
speaking tell the following to Halifax and
Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given
any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because
the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-
Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we
have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President,
but it also was given by the others and as far as I
know just a military attache came along, asked by S-I,
because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask
whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German
troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore,
I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as
by telegram to send troops because he did not know
about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so
on; because arms had been distributed there. And then
he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react
since they always had had such a big mouth.
“R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in
Vienna, is everything settled yet?
“G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with
some companies, in order to secure the airfield and
[Page 500]
they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of
the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian
troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian
troops did not withdraw but that they got together and
fraternized immediately with the German troops,
wherever they were stationed.” (2949-PS, Part W)
In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting
explanations — that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart
alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military
attache, came along merely to answer a technical question;
and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by
telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best
be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time
and place:
“G: Well, do come ! I shall be delighted to see you.
“R: I shall see you this afternoon.
“G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am
sitting here on my balconyall covered with blankets in
the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to
drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are
twittering, and here and there I can hear over the
radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over
there.
“R: That is marvelous.” (2949-PS, Part W)
The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics
employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12
March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British
Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as
follows:
“With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th,
I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith
a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von
Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained
therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to
Baron von Neurath at the same time.” (3045-PS)
The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British
Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
“Dear Reich Minister,
“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding inter
alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his
replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new
Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be
National Socialists, and the re-
[Page 501]
admission of the Austrian Legion to the country with
the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
“I am instructed by my Government to represent
immediately to the German Government that if this
report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to
register a protest in the strongest terms against such
use of coercion backed by force against an independent
State in order to create a situation incompatible with
its national independence.
“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already
been informed in London, such action is found to
produce the greatest reactions of which it is
impossible to foretell the issues.” (3045-PS)
Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938.
He first objected to the fact that the British Government
was undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s
independence:
“In the name of the German Government I must point out
here that the Royal British Government has no right to
assume the role of a protector of Austria’s
independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations
on the Austrian question, the German Government never
left any doubt with the Royal British Government that
the formation of relations between Germany and Austria
could not be considered anything but the inner concern
of the German people and that it did not affect third
Powers.” (3287-PS)
Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s
ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true
version of events:
“*** Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced,
on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and
arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an
election within a few days which, under the prevailing
circumstances, and especially according to the details
provided for the execution of the election, could and
was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically
the predominant majority of the population of Austria.
As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a
flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden,
led to a very critical point in Austria’s internal
situation. It was only natural that the members of the
then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the
decision for an election protested very strongly
against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred
in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the
resignation of the former Chancellor and in the
formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful
[Page 502]
pressure to bring about this development. Especially
the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor, that the German Government had presented
the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is
a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to
appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form
a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German
Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German
troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is
that the question of sending military or police forces
from the Reich was only brought up when the newly
formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already
published by the press, to the German Government,
urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as
soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order
to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria,
the German Government then decided to comply with the
appeal addressed to it.
“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that
the attitude of the German Government, as,asserted in
your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable
reactions. A complete picture of the political
situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon
today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation
can take place only if eventually a third party should
try to exercise its influence, contrary to the peaceful
intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government
on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be
incompatible with the right of self-government of the
German people.” (3287-PS)
In light of the documents already. adverted to, this version
of events given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.
F. The Invasion and Absorption of Austria.
(1) The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in
Fact. In accordance with the directive of March 11 (C-182),
the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on
12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German
people announcing and purporting to justify the invasion (TC-
47). The British Government and the French Government filed
protests.
The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists
swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart
welcomed Hitler at Linz and they both expressed their joy
over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared
Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. (2485-
PS)
[Page 503]
A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the
Secretary of State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what
was happening in Vienna:
“Secretary of State,
70, March 12, noon.
“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping
leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its
possession National Socialist Austria and its new
government in true indivisible union’.
“Continual rumors small German troop movements into
Austria and impending arrival Austrian legion.
“SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.
“Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and
Schmidt rumored arrested
“Himmler and Hess here.
WILEY” (L-292)
(2) Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law.
The la-making machine was put to work on the task of
consolidation. First, Miklas was caused to resign as
resident (2466-PS). Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and
President. He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of 13
March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the German
Reich, which in turn vas incorporated into the Reich Statute
of Reunion passed the same day (2307-PS). This Federal
Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the
German Reich.
By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated
Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides:
“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence
of Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a
treaty between that State and the principle Allied and
Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence
shall be inalienable, ***”
Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the
Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:
“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise
than with the consent of the Council of the League of
Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence
of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any
act which might directly or indirectly or by any means
whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and
until er admission to membership of the League of
Nations, by participation in the affairs of another
Power.”
[Page 504]
This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to
be held on 10 April 1938, concerning the question of
reunion. But this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could
only confirm the union. It could not undo Germany’s union
with and control over Austria. To illustrate the way in
which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria
occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than
review some of the statutes passed within the month. Hitler
placed the Austrian Federal Army under his command and
required all members of the Army to take an oath of
allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (2936-PS).
Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to
take an oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer
of the German Reich and People; Jewish officials, as
defined, were not permitted to take the oath. (2311-PS)
Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various
Reich laws, including the law of 1933 against formation of
new parties and the 1933 law for the preservation of unity
of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler, Frick, and Goering
ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the
central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria
with the German Reich. (1060-PS)
In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign
to ensure acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels
established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna (2935-PS).
The ballot, addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian
Army as “German soldier”, asked the voters whether they
agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification” on 13
March 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (1659-
PS). The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the
plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in
the basic law of March 13.
(2307-PS)
(3) The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions.
Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria,
and its determination to execute that aim in the way and at
the time that it did (with threat of military force,
quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the
importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression.
The conference of the conspirators held on 5 November 1937,
which laid plans for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as
objectives in Austria the conquest of food, through
expulsion of a million people, and an increase in fighting
strength in part through the improvement in frontier. (386-
PS)
Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided
ready cash, taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Govern-
[Page 505]
ment. One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was
an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk, and
Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the
Austrian National Bank. (2313-PS)
Austria yielded human resources. Three months after
Anschluss, there was enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old
men to report for active military service. (1660-PS)
And the acquisition of Austria improved the military
strategic position of the German Army. In a lecture
delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the
Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938:
“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it
not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also
had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting
strength and of materially improving our strategic
position. Whereas up till then the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of
France and an air base for the Allies, in particular
Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by
pincers. Its own strategic position ha now become so
unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with rigor before effective aid
from the WEST could be expected to arrive.” (L-172)
The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second
part of their second phase of their aggressions.
Czechoslovakia was next.
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3 (a, b); V. Vol. I Pg. 23-24,29
[Page 506]
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]
*386-PS; Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant,
Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25) Vol. III Pg. 295
*812-PS; Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 August 1939 and
report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Gauleiter Buerckel,
6 July 1939 on events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March
1938. (USA 61) Vol. III Pg.586
**1060-PS; Order pursuant to law
concerning Reunion of Austria with German Reich, 16 March
1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 249. (Referred to
but not offered in evidence.) Vol. III Pg.717
*1544-PS; Von Papen’s notes, 26
February 1938, on his parting visit with Chancellor
Schuschnigg. (USA 71) Vol. IV Pg.103
[Page 507]
**1659-PS; Second Order concerning
Plebiscite and Election for the Greater German Reichstag of
24 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303.
(Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol. IV Pg.170
1660-PS; Decree for registration for
active service in Austria in the year 1938 of 16 June 1938.
1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 631. Vol. IV Pg.170
*1760-PS; Affidavit of George S.
Messersmith, 28 August 1945. (USA 57) Vol. IV Pg.305
*1775-PS; Propositions to Hitler by
OKW, 14 February 1938. (USA 73) Vol. IV Pg.357
*1780-PS; Excerpts from diary kept by
General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) Vol. IV
Pg.360
*2219-PS; Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart to Goering,
14 July 1939. (USA 62) Vol. IV Pg.854
*2246-PS; Report of von Papen to
Hitler, 1 September 1936, concerning Danube situation. (USA
67) Vol. IV Pg.930
*2247-PS; Letter from von Papen to
Hitler, 17 May 1935, concerning intention of Austrian
government to arm. (USA 64) Vol. IV Pg.930
*2248-PS; Report of von Papen to
Hitler, 27 July 1935, concerning National Socialism in
Austria. (USA 63) Vol. IV Pg.932
*2307-PS; Law concerning reunion of
Austria with German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB 133) Vol. IV Pg.997
**2310-PS; First Decree of Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor concerning Introduction of German Reich
Law into Austria, 15 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 247. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.)
Vol. IV Pg.1004
[Page 508]
**2311-PS; Decree of Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor concerning Administration of the Oath to
Officials of Province of Austria, 15 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 245. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) Vol. IV Pg.1004
**2313-PS; Order for Transfer of
Austrian National Bank to Reichsbank, 17 March 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 254. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) Vol. IV Pg.1005
**2367-PS; Hitler’s speech of 1 May
1936, published in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern German
edition, 2 May 1936-3 May 1936. (Referred to but not offered
in evidence.) Vol. IV Pg.1006
*2385-PS; Affidavit of George S.
Messersmith, 30 August 1945. (USA 68) Vol. V Pg. 23
*2461-PS; Official German communique
of meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February 1938,
published in Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI,
Part 1. (GB 132) Vol. V Pg.206
*2463-PS; Telegram from Seyss-Inquart
to Hitler, 11 March 1938, published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (USA 703) Vol. V Pg.207
**2264-PS; Official Austrian
communique of the reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet and
general political amnesty, 16 February 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.
(Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.208
**2465-PS; Announcement of
appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, 11 March
1938, published in Documents of German Politics, 1938, Vol.
VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol.
V Pg.209
[Page 509]
**2466-PS; Official communique of
resignation of Austrian President Miklas, 13 March 1938,
published in Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI,
Part 1. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol. V
Pg.209
2467-PS; Hitler’s telegram to
Mussolini from Linz, 13 March 1938, published in Documents
of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. Vol. V Pg.210
**2469-PS; Official German and
Austrian communique concerning equal rights of Austrian
National Socialists in Austria, 18 February 1938, published
in Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.
(Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.210
**2484-PS; Official German communique
of visit of Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to Hitler,
Berlin, 17 February 1938, published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.234
**2485-PS; Address by Federal
Chancellor Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City Hall at Linz,
12 March 1938, published in Documents of German Politics,
Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to but not introduced
in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.234
2510-PS; Hitler letter to Mussolini,
11 March 1938, published in Documents of German Politics,
Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 135-7, No. 24. Vol. V Pg.244
[Page 510]
*2799-PS; Letter from Hitler to von
Papen, 26 July 1934, published in Documents of German
Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. 38. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.441
2831-PS; Letter from Office of
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German
Government to Reich Chancellery, inclosing report on
Political situation in Austria, 14 January 1937. Vol. V
Pg.498
*2832-PS; Entry for 26 July 1934 from
Ambassador Dodd’s diary. (USA 58) Vol. V Pg.500
2909-PS; Affidavit of August
Eingruber, 9 November 1945. Vol. V Pg.578
**2935-PS; Order concerning
establishment of Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, 31 March
1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 350. (Referred to
but not offered in
evidence.) Vol. V Pg.604
**2936-PS; Instruction of the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army,
13 March 1938, published in Documents of German Politics,
1938, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to but not offered
in evidence.) Vol. V Pg.604
*2949-PS; Transcripts of telephone
calls from Air Ministry, 11 March 1938-14 March 1938. (USA
76) Vol. V Pg.628
*2968-PS; Memorandum from US Army
officer concerning plaque erected in Austrian Chancellery in
memoriam to killers of Dollfuss. (USA 60) Vol. V Pg.677
2985-PS; Telephone message of Mr.
Hadow British Legation, Vienna, to Sir John Simon, 26 July
1934. Vol. V Pg.687
[Page 511]
*2994-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von
Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, concerning
Austrian-German Treaty of 11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection
to admission in evidence upheld) Vol. V Pg. 703
2995-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von
Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, concerning his
visit to Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Vol. V Pg.709
2996-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von
Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, concerning events
of 11 March 1938. Vol. V Pg.713
*3045-PS; Letter, 12 March 1938, to
British Embassy enclosing letter from Henderson to Halifax,
11 March 1938. (USA 127) Vol. V Pg.765
*3054-PS; “The Nazi Plan”, script of
a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)
Vol. V Pg.801
3062-PS; Memorandum found in
Goering’s office, 19 November 1936, concerning Guido
Schmidt, Foreign Minister of Austria under Schuschnigg. Vol.
V Pg.868
*3254-PS; The Austrian Question, 1934-
1938, by Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA 704) Vol. V
Pg.961
*3270-PS; Goering’s speech on 27
March in Vienna, published in Documents of German Politics,
Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183. (USA 703) Vol. V Pg.1047
*3271-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart
to Himmler, 19 August 1939. (USA 700) Vol. V Pg.1047
[Page 512]
*3287-PS; Letter from von Neurath to
Henderson, 12 March 1938. (USA 128) Vol. V Pg.1090
*3308-PS; Affidavit by Paul Otto
Gustav Schmidt, 28 November 1945. (GB 288) Vol. V Pg.1100
3390-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 25 October 1937. Vol. VI Pg. 105
3392-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 3 September 1937. Vol. VI Pg.109
3395-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to
Keppler, 3 September 1937. Vol. VI Pg.113
*3396-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart
to Dr. Jury. (USA 889) Vol. VI Pg.114
*3397-PS; Letter from Keppler to
Seyss-Inquart, 8 January 1938. (USA 702) Vol. VI Pg.115
3400-PS; Minutes of meeting of German
Association, 28 December 1918, and Constitution and By-Laws
thereof found in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for period
of 1918 to 1943. Vol. VI Pg.118
*3425-PS; Voluntary statement made by
Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, 10 December 1945. (USA
701) Vol. VI Pg.124
3467-PS; Law on Limitation of travel
to Republic Austria 29 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, No. 57, p. 311. Vol. VI Pg.169
*3471-PS; Letter from Keppler to
Bodenschatz, 21 February 1938, with | enclosures noting activity of
Leopold as leader of Austrian Nazis and possible appointment
of Klausner as his successor. (USA 583) Vol. VI Pg.195
[Page 513]
*3472-PS; Letter from Keppler to
Goering, 19 February 1938, requesting that Leopold be
forbidden to negotiate with Schuschnigg except with approval
of Reich authorities. (USA 582) Vol. VI Pg.196
*3473-PS; Letter from Keppler to
Goering, 6 January 1938, giving details of Nazi intrigue in
Austria. (USA 581) Vol. VI Pg.196
3574-PS; Filing notice regarding
discussion between Chief of CI and Chief of Foreign CI on 31
January 1938, 2 February 1938, signed Canaris. Vol. VI
Pg.265
3576-PS; Letter from Keppler to
Goering, 19 February 1938, with enclosure reporting on
situation in Austria as of 18 February. Vol. VI Pg.271
3577-PS; Letter presumably from
Buerkel to Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March 1938, concerning
Aryanization of Jewish-held business in Austria and
disposition of resulting funds. Vol. VI Pg.275
*C-102; Document signed by Hitler
relating to operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA 74) Vol.
VI Pg.911
*C-103; Directive signed by Jodl, 11
March 1938, on conduct towards Czech or Italian troops in
Austria. (USA 75) Vol. VI Pg.913
*C-175; OKW Directive for Unified
Preparation for War 1937-1938, with covering letter from von
Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA 69) Vol. VI Pg.1006
*C-182; Directive No. 2 from Supreme
Commander Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA
77) Vol. VI Pg.1017
*L-150; Memorandum of conversation
between Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1936. (USA 65) Vol. VII Pg.890
*L-151; Report from Ambassador
Bullitt to State Department, 23 November 1937, regarding his
visit to Warsaw. (USA 70) Vol. VII Pg.894
*L-172; “The Strategic Position at
the Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture delivered
by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and
Gauleiters. (USA 34) Vol. VII Pg.920
*L-273; Report of American Consul
General in Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July 1938,
concerning anniversary of assassination of Chancellor
Dollfuss. (USA 59) Vol. VII Pg.1094
L-281; Text of Schuschnigg radio
address of 11 March 1938, contained in telegram from
American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of State, 11
March 1938. Vol. VII Pg.1096
L-291; Telegram from American Embassy
Berlin to Secretary of State, 11 March 1938, concerning
Austrian situation. Vol. VII Pg.1097
*L-292; Telegram of American Consul
General in Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March 1938,
concerning propaganda dropped over Vienna. (USA 78) Vol. VII
Pg.1098
L-293; Telegram from American Legation in
Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March 1938. Vol. VII
Pg.1098
*TC-26; Agreement between Austria and
German Government and Government of Federal State of
Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) Vol. VIII Pg.369
*TC-26; German assurance to Austria
21 May 1935, from Documents of German Politics, Part III, p.
94. (GB 19) Vol. VIII Pg.376
TC-47; Hitler’s Proclamation of
Invasion of Austria, 12 March 1938. Vol. VIII Pg.398
Affidavit H; Affidavit of Franz
Halder, 22 November 1945. Vol. VIII Pg.643
**Chart No. 11; Aggressive Action
1938-39. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) Vol. VIII
Pg.780
**CHart No. 12; German Aggression.
(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.) Vol. VIII Pg.781
**Chart No. 13; Violations of
Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed
to Tribunal.) Vol. VIII Pg.782
