Appeal Pleading 02-04, Eichmann Adolf

38. On Paragraph 107 – Greece

1. The interest in marking the Jews did not emanate from the
Accused’s Section, but was based on the instructions of more
highly placed authorities, as explained above.

2. According to the official seal Wisliceny belonged to the
BdS office and was therefore not subordinate to the Accused.

All arrangements were made by the Salonika-Aegaeis Military
Commander. The Accused’s Section simply received reports for
information purposes.

3. Italian occupied area

The Accused had no personal interest in deportation. No link
between the Accused and the evidence about killings on the
Island of Rhodes has been proved.

39. On Paragraph 108 – Bulgaria

The document from the Accused’s Section in November 1942
shows that the Foreign Ministry played a leading role in the
evacuation, and this indicates that the Ambassador’s Police
Attache took care of the technical implementation.

40. On Paragraph 109 – Italy

1. Italian occupied area

Fundamental efforts to implement measures could only
originate with the Chiefs in the RSHA and not in the
Accused’s Section. The documents reflect the endeavours of
the Foreign Ministry, the Commander of the Order Police
Daluege and Himmler.

2. Dannecker was not the Accused’s assistant, but according
to Witness Kappler’s statement received his instructions
from Mueller. Witness Kappler first heard of the Accused
after the War in May 1945.

The statement of Witness Kappler also shows that Dannecker
was subordinate to the BdS.

In the operation in Rome on 17 October 1941 it can be seen
clearly that the orders came directly from the highest
echelons and not from the Accused’s Section, who had no say
in the decisions.

41. On Paragraph 110 – Romania

1. It should be noted that the agreement concluded on 30
August 1941 “between the Germans” and Romania concerning the
sending of the Jews to concentration camps was concluded by
the German military authorities. The Accused cannot be
associated with this.

2. The security police measures referred to in the Judgment,
to prevent Jews from crossing into the Eastern Occupied
Territories can only be understood as a closing of the
border by the Border Police. If the intention was to kill
these Jews, there was no need to threaten killing.

The killing of 28,000 Jews was carried out later
independently by Operations Units and local bodies, which
could not have received any orders from the Accused’s

3. Richter was not an assistant of the Accused, but an
assistant of Ambassador Killinger’s, whose Police Attachee
he subsequently became.

The discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister on 12
December 1941 and 23 January 1942 took place as a result of
a personal instruction from the CdS.

In this connection, the statement of Ambassador Killinger
must also be referred to, according to which Richter acted
on his orders. There is no reference here to the Accused.

4. Negotiations on the carrying out of deportations take
place between Chief of Department Mueller and Mihai
Antonescu. The document to this effect is signed by Mueller
in person.

5. The prevention of emigration to Palestine is based not on
the initiative of the Accused’s Section, but on the
political instructions of the top echelons. This is
confirmed by the Foreign Ministry’s activity, which was in
no way determined by the Accused’s Section.

42. On Paragraph 111 – Hungary

1. The singling out of documents in an order which is not
arranged chronologically may give the reader of the Judgment
a wrong impression.

The Jewish Question in Hungary was dealt with in 1941 by

In a letter dated 25 September 1942 to the Foreign Ministry
the Accused refers the Foreign Ministry to measures by the
Hungarians which may be expected later.

On 10 December 1943 Veesenmayer demands that the Jewish
Question in Hungary be thoroughly tackled as part of the
Reich’s struggle for existence.

On 19 March 1944 the German troops march into Hungary.

This development was not a confirmation of the Accused’s
supposed strategic foresight.

2. The Judgment gives the impression here that the Accused
could on his own initiative have left his Berlin office in
an attempt on his part to intervene in Hungary. Nor did the
Accused move “to the scene of action”; this was done by the
leading staffs, whom he subsequently followed.

The Accused’s subordinate activities are shown in particular
by the fact that the Accused had to lead on foot to Budapest
a marching unit which had been put together (not an Eichmann
Special Operations Unit).

That meant that the Accused was eliminated as dispensable
for the important measures to be adopted in the first few
days. In such a situation it is not usual to put a
responsible staff officer in charge of a convoy.

Consequently it cannot be the case that the Accused brought
with him Himmler’s basic order about the anti-Jewish
measures to be adopted.

In the Judgment, insufficient attention is paid to the
really decisive position of BdS Geschke and Higher SS and
Police Leader Winkelmann.

3. In respect of the Accused’s special zeal as found by the
Court, attention is drawn to the fact that in the letter
from Ambassador Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop it is emphasized
that Veesenmayer had done everything to carry out the
evacuation of the Jews; the responsibility for this
therefore lies with the Accused’s lack of zeal.

4. The transports were carried out by the Hungarian
Gendarmerie combined with the influence that was brought to
bear by Veesenmayer and Winkelmann. The latter are

The report that has been submitted drawn up by official-in-
charge Dr. Grell concerning the maltreatment of Jews during
transport by police units states explicitly that the Accused
was not competent for this matter and is not responsible.

5. Insufficient light has been shed on the Accused’s
involvement in the events concerning the deportation of Jews
from the Kistarcsa camp.

The Accused’s allegedly cunning behaviour in deceiving the
Jewish Council is an assumption which cannot be reconciled
with the actual circumstances concerning the giving of
orders; the Jewish measures were carried out by the KdS
(Commander of the Security Police) and the Hungarian
Gendarmerie. These bodies were not subordinate to the
Accused. This is shown by the Commanders’ daily reports
which went to Veesenmayer via Geschke and Winkelmann.

The Accused’s alleged victory over Horthy remains a

The comments in the Judgment to the effect that the
Kistarcsa incident is very significant as proof of the
Accused’s position, obstinacy and cunning need to be
examined. Reference is made to the Accused’s testimony
before the Court.

43. On Paragraph 114 – Disbanding the Commando on 28 October

1. The Accused’s explanation of the reasons for advancing
the date of the evacuation appears convincing. It is not
obvious what other reason could have existed for this desire
for an earlier arrangement, because future developments
could not be predicted.

2. It is not correct that the Accused proposed his recall,
so to speak, as a protest against Horthy’s halting the

The reference to his task having become superfluous was
relevant because with Himmler’s decision to halt the
transports the Accused’s function had been completed. He was
not responsible for any other political measures against the
Jews. The role of Veesenmayer and Winkelmann shows how
matters proceeded thereafter.

The Commando was recalled on 28 September 1944. The fact
that the Accused received orders to remain in Hungary for
the time being, shows that he could not move as he saw fit.

44. On Paragraph 115 – Continuation of the deportations
October 1944

1. Further measures against the Jews were adopted with the
change in the political situation following the appointment
of Prime Minister Szalasi. However, this was brought about
not by the Accused, but by Veesenmayer and Winkelmann.

The Accused was recalled at Winkelmann’s initiative and was
given the order to hold definitive discussions with the
Hungarian authorities concerning the implementation of the
agreements already reached by Winkelmann and Veesenmayer.

The Accused’s subordinate position here is particularly

However, the text of the Judgment gives the impression that
the Accused became active here through his own enthusiasm.

2.The foot march from Budapest to Vienna on 10 November

The pressure for rapid deportations came from Higher SS and
Police Leader Winkelmann, at first to deport at least 25,000
instead of 50,000 for labour duties.

Veesenmayer indicates that Winkelmann would discuss further
details with the Hungarian Government.

The other explanation given after the War by those
participants who were interested in exonerating themselves
contradicts the report drawn up at the time of the events by
Dr. Breszlauer, who acted on behalf of the Embassy. In the
report of this objective Swiss, who was familiar with the
circumstances, there is the striking fact that the name of
the Accused, the man who is supposedly the central figure,
responsible for everything, is not mentioned. Nor is there
any reference here to any protest by the most senior German
bodies and generals.

An attempt to stop the march by lodging a complaint with
Veesenmayer or Winkelmann was apparently considered
pointless by the representative of the Embassy, since he
must probably have assumed that these two men were
themselves the responsible originators of the events.

44[sic] On Paragraph 116 – Transport to Vienna for war work

1. Orders for the transport were given by Kaltenbrunner at
the insistence of his friend the Mayor of Vienna, Blaschke,
without any co-operation on the part of the Accused, via
Section IVB4 in Berlin. The Accused, who was in Hungary, had
to comply with the order, which came from his former

The Court’s assumption that this “special action” is to be
equated with special treatment is incorrect. As far as the
extorted sums of money are concerned, there was no ruse by
the Accused in demanding money from the persons to be
deported in this special case. This interest existed only on
the part of the City of Vienna, which probably wanted to be
relieved of the costs of provisions for the labour
transports. The order to collect money can therefore only
have reached the Accused from Vienna via Kaltenbrunner.

2. The information provided by Witness Hansi Brand that the
Accused did not wish to bring ethnically valuable Jews from
the Carpathians and Siebenbuergen to Vienna contradicts the
Court’s assumption that precisely those Jews who were
brought to Vienna were destined in the final stage for
extermination. If this were true, the ethnically more
valuable Jews would have been the first to be rounded up for
deporting and would not have been left in the path of the
advancing Red Army.

45. On Paragraph 116 – Offer to barter one million Jews for
10,000 trucks

1. The Judgment misjudges the Accused’s attitude to the
motive behind the offer.

The Accused did not state that Standartenfuehrer Becher
overstepped his powers, but that as a result of his economic
connections he had a pleasant career, while the Accused was
always restricted to thankless and oppressive activities.

This mental process on the part of the Accused is more
convincing than an assertion on the part of the Accused,
which is far more easily made, that he proposed the
operation of bartering the Jews out of sympathy and concern
for their lives.

The Accused’s presentation shows clearly that he is not
trying to base his attitude on evasions.

2. On the content of the offer, reference is made to the
application for admitting proof made in these supplementary
grounds for appeal, that Witness Brand’s statement about the
ten per cent clause is not based on an error.

3. The Accused was unable to make preparations for
implementing the ten per cent promise, because it was not
possible for him to halt the transports; nor was this
promised to Witness Brand. The rate of the transports was
determined by the top echelons: Veesenmayer, Winkelmann,
Geschke, Mueller, Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, Ribbentrop. If, as
the Judgment assumes, the offer originated with Himmler and
was of high-level political significance, the Accused could
not be free to act as he saw fit and to halt transports and

46. On Paragraph 117

The Accused is not making unjustified efforts to shift
existing responsibility to his superiors.

1. It should be noted that when the Germans invaded Hungary,
as indicated above, the Accused was excluded because he was
in charge of the marching units. Moreover, Krumey confirms
in 1961 as a witness that after arriving in Budapest the
Accused had practically nothing to do. This is proof that
the basic measures which had to be adopted by his superiors
had not yet been adopted, or that everything required had
already been arranged by the Hungarians themselves.

2. The Accused did not need to impose his will on the
Hungarian Gendarmerie, since the latter were independently
pressing on with the persecution of the Jews, as has been
repeatedly demonstrated.

The Accused’s causing the Gendarmerie to provide trucks in
Kistarcsa is merely an assumption. There is no proof that
the Gendarmerie were compelled by the Accused.

3. The Court’s assumption that Reich Plenipotentiary
Veesenmayer’s duty was only “to report” on what had been
done cannot be reconciled with his position and his
activities regarding the Jewish Question.

4. As for the allegedly only “formal” and particularly
“loose” relationship between the Accused’s office and Higher
SS and Police Leader Winkelmann and BdS Geschke, it must be
pointed out that inter alia the RSHA writes not to the
Accused but to BdS Geschke.

The service relationships which actually existed cannot be
considered to have been ineffective simply because no
documents are available that contain orders of his superiors
to the Accused. Attention is drawn to the fact that the
Accused was in the same location as these superiors and had
no need to receive any written instructions, as orders were
given orally.

47. On Paragraphs 119/120 – Extermination and Operations
Units in Eastern Europe

1. The Judgment finds that a connection between the Accused
and the activities of the Operations Units in Poland in 1939
has not been proved.

2. The Commanders of the Operations Units did not come only
from the ranks of the RSHA, but also from the State Police
offices, BdS, the Inspectorate, SD offices, criminal
investigation department, etc.

48. On Paragraph 121

The fact that Stahlecker was in the past the Accused’s
superior has no significance for the Accused’s
responsibility. The Accused neither saw nor spoke to him

49. On Paragraph 122 – Killings by gas

The Accused’s statement to the police that killing by
gassing was considered the more “elegant” solution by senior
circles is simply an attempt to characterize these
individuals in responsible positions. The Accused said
explicitly that “perhaps” it might have been so.

50. On Paragraph 127

On Professor Gilbert’s statement concerning the shifting of
their responsibility by Goering and Ribbentrop, it should be
noted that it was the Witness’s opinion that these
individuals who bore primary responsibility wanted to
extricate themselves.

Witness Justice Musmanno made a similar point.

51. On Paragraph 129 – Conditions in the camps

The Accused had no responsibility for the conditions in the
camps. These were under the control of the WVA (Economic-
Administrative Head Office).

52. On Paragraph 130 – Conditions in ghettos

The Accused had no responsibility for the ghettos and the
conditions that prevailed there.

Last-Modified: 1999/06/15