Appeal Pleading 02-03, Eichmann Adolf

25. On Paragraph 91 – Special Account “W”

Only the money paid into this account was available as part
of the measures for providing for the Jews.

The assumption that the outstanding balance passed into the
hands of the RSHA because all assets were blocked is
incorrect. These assets were confiscated by the Chief
Financial Director, who in certain cases is still in
possession of such assets to this very day. Such cases are
claims for the return of assets which have been considered
invalid for formal reasons, such as failure to apply within
the required period.

Registration of assets was governed by regulations. Those
involved here were the Reich Ministry of Economics, the
Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, the
Foreign Exchange Search Office and the Security Police.

The Emigration Funds in Vienna and Prague were similarly
governed by regulations. The Accused could not dispose of
these assets as he saw fit.

26. On Paragraph 94 – Evacuation to Theresienstadt

The content of the guidelines for evacuation to
Theresienstadt was laid down by the Accused’s superiors.

This can also be seen from the content which indicates that
the Accused was unable to issue any orders of his own to the
places of reception and the superiors there.

27. On Paragraph 95 – Remaining Jewish assets

The orders concerning the composition of the directives were
given by Kaltenbrunner and signed by him.

28. On Paragraph 96 – Seizure of property through transfer
to the Reich Association

(1) No assets were transferred to the RSHA via the Accused’s

The Chief Financial Director had to confiscate these assets.
As long as the Jewish Communities were subject to the Reich
Association, they had to obtain permission in respect of
supervision and disposition from the local offices of the
Security Police. This was governed by the relevant

The Accused could also not dispose as he saw fit of the
Emigration Fund.

Moreover, as a result of an order from Himmler assets
subsequently went to the Economic-Administrative Head
Office. This can be seen from a Defence document.

(2) It is erroneous to assume that the Accused’s Section
controlled the public property of German Jewry, although at
first sight it might seem that this was the case. However,
in this respect Paragraph 57 of the Judgment is referred to,
under which the Minister was empowered to dissolve existing
Jewish organizations or to require them to merge in the
Reich Association.

In this way the German Reich Government gave the Minister an
instrument for complete supervision, as is stated in the
Judgment. Thus it was not the Accused who had to take
decisions in that regard. The list of Jewish communities
drawn up by the Accused’s Section and the order to merge in
the Reich Association is thus simply the implementation of
the authorization by the Minister to which reference has
been made.

(3) Kaltenbrunner’s circular dated 5 March 1943 about the
assets of foreign Jews.

From the circular it may be deduced that the Foreign
Ministry had already unsuccessfully made attempts with the
foreign governments to seize these Jewish-owned assets. It
is self-evident that the Foreign Ministry was now trying to
pursue this aim further by blocking the assets, as the
circular shows.

It is also striking that the circular dated 23 September
1943, mentioned in the Judgment, is also not signed by the
Accused, but by his superior, Mueller. This must also
exonerate the Accused.

29. On Paragraph 97 – Pattern of evacuation

If there was no material difference between the various
areas in question, because all the authorities here were in
that regard subordinate to Department IV of the RSHA, they
were not, however, subordinate to the Accused as Specialist
Officer, but to the Chief of Department and his superiors.

In Jewish affairs the authorities obtained their
instructions not from the Accused, but from the Chief of
Department or the CdS.

The Accused’s Section simply had to implement what had been
ordered, and to deliver the instructions that had been

30. On Paragraph 98 – Activities in Jewish affairs outside
the Reich

It must be remeberede that the “Advisers” were attached to
the diplomatic representatives as aides to the Police
Attaches who were located at these diplomatic

In contrast, the BdS had no “Advisers,” but only the
Specialist Officers who were subordinate to him in his
Department for Jewish Affairs. The BdS was the superior of
his Specialist 0Officers in both the material and the
disciplinary sphere.

It is therefore not correct, as it says in the Judgment,
that Advisers and Specialist Officers were directly
subordinate to the Accused. It is true that these
individuals received professional orders from the CdS and
the Chief of Department IV, which the Accused’s Section
passed on; but not one of the Specialist Officers of a State
Police office was subordinate to Section IVB4.

By way of proof, reference is made to the agreement in
principle between Himmler and Ribbentrop, as well as between
the CdS and the Foreign Ministry concerning the Police

This appears from the correspondence between the BdS Paris,
Dr. Knochen, and the Chief of Department, Mueller.

31. On Paragraph 100 – France

1. It is not correct that Dannecker, Roethke and Brunner
were Advisers from the Accused’s Section; they were
Specialist Officers attached to the Senior Commander of the
Security Police and the SD, Dr. Knochen, Paris. This can be
seen from the letterheads.

The hierarchical arrangement is particularly obvious from
the order concerning the arrest of Argentinian Jews on the
basis of an instruction issued via the Accused’s Section on
28 January 1944.

This instruction only becomes operative through the BdS
Knochen, who on the same day issues the implementation order
to all the police stations subordinate to him to arrest the
Jews. This document, in a French translation, is printed in
the journal “La Revue du Centre de Documentation Juive
Contemporaine,” Special Issue 21/22, page 48, “Le Dossier
Eichmann,” June 1960, Paris 4 E, 17 Rue Geoffroy – L’Asnier.
A copy is enclosed.

2. According to the Judgment, Dannecker claims that he
demanded for hinself a central role in his capacity as the
Specialist Officer of the BdS, as part of Ambassador Abetz’
endeavours. Abetz was the driving force. This is shown by
the documents contained in Poliakov’s book (Red), The Third
Reich and its Servants, pp. 103 ff.

3. If a “decision” was taken in the discussion of 1 July
1942, this is correct only to the extent that a decision was
taken to implement then what Himmler had ordered in terms of

The figures for France and Belgium were also reduced by
Himmler himself in agreement with the Head of the Military
Administration in Belgium.

The order by Himmler mentioned in the Judgment was precisely
the reason why the Accused had to travel to Paris and pass
on the order there.

4. The case described which is supposed to demonstrate the
Accused’s rage and harshness cannot in fact give rise to the
conclusion which the Court draws from it.

The Accused’s displeasure related here not to the
deportation of the Jews, but to the demand for surplus
trains. These could only be obtained with great difficulty,
and an announcement by the Railways Authority that the
trains had run empty could lead to reproaches being made at
the timetable conference and complaints to the Accused’s

The claim that the Accused is supposed on this occasion to
have said that he would drop France as a country for
evacuation must be the result of a misunderstood abridged
report. Such a measure was, under the prevailing conditions,
so far beyond the realm of the possible that this comment
appears meaningless.

If the trains subsequently started running again, the
continuation of the deportations is to be ascribed not to
the Accused, but to the fact that the leadership maintained
and even stepped up its Jewish policy.

5. The number of those to be deported, the place of
destination and the category of persons (including children)
was determined neither by the Accused nor by one of the
members of his Section.

6. Concerning the Jews in Monaco, it was not the Accused who
did not refrain from their persecution, but the top leaders.

The Accused’s trip which is in question here was ordered by
his superior. As a Sspecialist Officer, the Accused could
not undertake a trip to Southern France as he saw fit.

An accurate picture of what occurred here can only be
obtained by taking into account the efforts made by the
highest placed bodies in the Italian occupied area in
Southern France.

In order to assess this matter, it is necessary to consider
not just those documents which deal with Monaco on their
own, but the documents available, some 25 in number, which
concern Southern France and Italy must be added to them. The
resultant overall picture differs from that assumed in the

It can be seen that out of the many who were indisputably
involved in the persecution of the Jews, the Accused was not
the central point of the circle of those who were
subordinate to him at home and abroad. He was not the pivot
round which everything rotated.

7. Belgium

It is not correct that the Accused’s Section planned the
evacuation of 10,000 Jews. It was Himmler who planned and
issued the orders. The Military Commander in Belgium went to
Himmler’s field command post, and there the figure was set
at 20,000.

In addition, Luther from the Foreign Ministry also became
involved. Documents to this effect are available.

32. On Paragraph 101 – Holland

Zoepf was not one of the Accused’s men: he was a Specialist
Officer with the BdS in Holland.

The person who determined the arrangements made there was
the Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter. His reports are
available, and in them he himself says that he was the
person who arranged matters.

The measures originated with Himmler; he also received
reports from Rauter on their implementation, and in a
memorandum he commended this as “very good.”

The dispute between Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart and
Kaltenbrunner shows clearly that it was not the Accused who
had to decide, but the quarelling higher authorities.

For an understanding of the context it is also of importance
that as early as February 1942, Himmler notified the
Economic-Administrative Head Office (Pohl and Gluecks) that
they should find locations for the reception of transports
of Jews, since major economic assignments were imminent.

33. On Paragraph 102 – Norway

The Judgment does not refer to the Reich Commissioner’s
instructions for the measures against the Jews as well as
the other orders that were issued.
The repeated reference to the “Accused’s Section, with
signature” gives a distorted overall picture.

34. On Paragraph 103 – Denmark

The documents show:

who issued the orders (Hitler, Ribbentrop, Himmler);

who was in charge of the deportations (Mildner);

that Mildner as BdS went to Berlin to the Chief of
Department Mueller, in order to stop the deportations;

that this step was unsuccessful because of the orders issued
by higher authorities.

Von Thadden’s statement of May 1945 shows the Witness’s
efforts to keep the Foreign Ministry out of this matter.

For his part, Mildner attempted to diminish his
responsibility for the deportations, as confirmed by Reich
Plenipotentiary Best prior to 1945.

35. On Paragraph 104 – Slovakia

(a) 1st phase

Wisliceny did not act as Adviser on Jewish Affairs on behalf
of the Accused’s Section.

Nor was Wisliceny only “formally” attached to Ambassador
Ludin in Pressburg (Bratislava).

Ludin himself has also stated that the first wave of
deportations occurred on his orders and at his instigation,
also through the Foreign Ministry.

(b) 2nd phase: After 16 February 1942

1. On 13 March 1942, although it had been announced that the
Accused would arrive in Bratislava for preliminary
discussions, he did not do so, coming only much later,
namely on the day of Heydrich’s assassination.

In March 1942 Heydrich himself was in Bratislava. An item of
evidence to this effect is available.

Ambassador Ludin received his instructions through the
Foreign Ministry.

The outcome of his negotiations with the Slovak Government
concerning deportations is indicated in the Judgment. This
shows that here the Accused did not issue any instructions.

The report of the Accused’s Section (bearing Guenther’s
signature) simply repeats what Ambassador Ludin himself had

The report serves as confirmation of the Accused’s assertion
that in such cases his Section had only been active in terms
of reporting.

2. On visits to camps which were considered undesirable, the
Accused is not giving his own opinion, but that of his
superiors. It could not be left up to the Accused to take an
independent decision on such a question, because this
involved the leadership’s entire policy of extermination. It
was a basic question for the leadership.

3. At the time of the uprisings in the autumn of 1944 the
Accused was not in Hungary [sic], and he cannot be held
responsible for the deportations at that time.

36. On Paragraph 105 – Croatia

1. Abromeit did not deal with the deportations on behalf of
the Accused’s Section; he was an aide of the Police Attache.
In his statement given as early as May 1945, this Police
Attach, Hahn, refers not to the Accused but to the Chief of
Department Mueller.

Guenther’s query as to when “one” intends to begin the
evacuation confirms that the Accused’s Section could not
itself undertake anything, but had to enquire what another
body was doing.

2. The thwarting of the departure of Jews for Palestine was
not the result of any independent order from the Accused’s
Section, but can only be the result of orders from his
superiors, which were passed on by the Section. The highest
level of the leadership pursued an unwavering course, as is
proved by many documents. The Accused was unable to modify
this course, but had to follow it.

37. On Paragraph 106 – Serbia

1. On the marginal comment “Eichmann proposes shooting,” the
Accused gave his version in his examination.

When the Accused had this note submitted to him for the
first time, he spontaneously considered it possible that his
superiors might have expressed such a view. On subsequent
reflection he recognized, however, that neither his superior
Mueller nor he himself could have given the military
authorities such an indication.

The Accused’s supposition that the note might represent a
misrepresentation by Rademacher is not out of the question.

However, there is also the possibility that the Accused,
angry at being approached by the Foreign Ministry in
connection with a matter concerning the military
authorities, made an unthinking comment to the effect that
the army would have to suppress the danger of rebellion.
This brief incident was not so striking that the Accused
should have remembered it many years later. What is
characteristic of the Accused’s attitude is that he rejects
the possible explanation offered by Rademacher.

2. In the RSHA there were no “Amtsleiter” (Heads of
Departments) who could have been informed; the term should
be Chiefs of Department (Amtschefs). The Accused cannot be
understood as being an “Amtsleiter.”

3. Operations Unit

The assumption that the Operations Unit active here could
have received instructions via the Accused’s Section appears

In Serbia, there was no Adviser on Jewish Affairs who could
have received instructions directly.

The Commander of the Operations Unit was so unfamiliar with
the Accused that he gave him a higher rank and in his
statement incorrectly indicates his Section as being a main
department of the Security Police. For a commander who must
have been familiar with the hierarchical arrangements on the
basis of his experience, this is a statement which rather
tends to exonerate the Accused.

Last-Modified: 1999/06/15