IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
R.S.B.C. 1996, c.210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
B E T W E E N:
A N D:
North Shore Free Press Ltd. doing business as “North Shore
and Doug Collins
A N D:
Deputy Chief Commissioner of the British Columbia Human
A N D:
Attorney General of British Columbia
A N D:
League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Tom W. Patch
Counsel for the Complainant: Thomas W. Bulmer
Counsel for the Respondents: David F. Sutherland
Counsel for the Deputy Chief Commissioner: Angela Westmacott
and Deirdre A. Rice
Counsel for the Attorney General: Lisa J. Mrozinski
Counsel for B’Nai Brith Canada: Marvin Kurz
Place and date of hearing: Victoria, British Columbia, July
20, 21, 22, and 24, 1998
 Harry Abrams, the Complainant, is an active member of
the Jewish community in Victoria. In the winter of 1993-
1994, he began reading a new newspaper, The Daily Victorian,
which was delivered free to his home and office. The
newspaper carried columns by Doug Collins. Mr. Abrams became
concerned about these columns which contained, in his
opinion, race-baiting themes including content that vilified
Jews (among others). It appeared to him that this content
was present in nearly all of Mr. Collins’ columns. Mr.
Abrams learned that the columns he was reading were
syndicated versions of columns that appeared on a regular
basis in the North Shore News newspaper, which is
distributed in the communities across from Vancouver on the
North Shore of Burrard Inlet.
 On May 27, 1994, Mr. Abrams filed human rights
complaints alleging that the North Shore Free Press Ltd.,
doing business as “North Shore News” (the “North Shore
News”), Robert H. Howse, doing business as “The Daily
Victorian”, and Doug Collins published or caused to be
published articles that discriminate against Jewish persons
and are likely to expose those persons to hatred or contempt
on the basis of their race, religion and ancestry, contrary
to s. 2 of the Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, now s.
7 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (the
“Code”). In particular, he alleged “that the continual
barrage of articles written by Mr. Doug Collins promoting
his views on Holocaust revisionism and Jewish conspiracies,
have a cumulative affect [sic] of promoting hatred and
contempt towards Jewish people” (Exhibits 1 and 2).
 The Particulars of Allegation refer to four columns
in support of the complaints: (a) “News flash! Daily press
discovering free speech”, published January 12, 1994 in the
North Shore News (Appendix 1); (b) “Hollywood propaganda”,
published in the North Shore News on March 9, 1994 (Appendix
2); (c) “Pondering far better than pandering folks”,
published in the North Shore News on March 23, 1994
(Appendix 3); and (d) “Some value freedom of the press, some
don’t”, published in the North Shore News on June 26, 1994
(Appendix 4). Doug Collins wrote all of these columns.
 These complaints were initially referred to hearing
by the B.C. Council of Human Rights on August 19, 1996. On
January 1, 1997, the Council of Human Rights was replaced by
the B.C. Human Rights Commission and the B.C. Human Rights
Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). Under s. 50(7) of the Code, this
matter is deemed to have been referred to the Tribunal for
 The Complainant applied to have these complaints and
a complaint which he had filed on behalf of Iranian,
Japanese, Chinese and Sikh persons heard together with a
complaint made by the Canadian Jewish Congress (the “CJC”)
against Doug Collins and the North Shore News. The CJC, Mr.
Collins and the North Shore News opposed the application. On
March 13, 1997, I decided that the complaints should not be
heard together: Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore Free
Press Ltd. (No. 3) (1997), 30 C.H.R.R. D/3. The CJC
complaint was subsequently heard and decided by the
Tribunal: Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore Free Press
Ltd. (No. 7) (1997), 30 C.H.R.R. D/5 (the “CJC case”).
 On January 14, 1998, the Respondents served a Notice
of Constitutional Question in this matter alleging that s.
7(1) of the Code infringes s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) and is not saved by
s. 1 of the Charter or, alternatively, that s. 7(1) of the
Code is not a “limit prescribed by law” for the purposes of
s. 1 of the Charter. As a result of that Notice, the
Attorney General of British Columbia (the “AG”) became
 On January 19, 1998, the Deputy Chief Commissioner of
the B.C. Human Rights Commission (the “DCC”) filed a Notice
of Intention to Participate in this hearing as a party
pursuant to s. 36 of the Code.
 The Respondents applied to have those portions of the
complaints dealing with constitutional issues, including
their challenge to the constitutional validity of s. 7 of
the Code, severed from and heard after the merits of the
complaint. I allowed the application on April 2, 1998 (see
 These complaints were scheduled to be heard with a
complaint made by Mr. Abrams against the North Shore News
and Doug Collins on behalf Iranian, Japanese, Chinese and
Sikh persons. The Complainant subsequently withdrew that
complaint and the Tribunal issued a discontinuance order on
May 14, 1998.
 The Daily Victorian is no longer in business.
Following notification by the Complainant that he was
withdrawing his complaint against Robert Howse doing
business as The Daily Victorian, the Tribunal issued a
discontinuance order on May 22, 1998.
 On July 16, 1998, I granted the League for Human
Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada limited intervenor status (see
 The hearing into the merits of the complaint
commenced on July 20, 1998, with the hearing on the
constitutional issues to proceed at a later date, if
necessary. At the outset of the hearing, prior to any
opening statements, the Respondents informed me that they
would not be participating in this portion of the hearing
except to introduce written submissions concerning the
interpretation of s. 7 of the Code. After providing me with
those written submissions, they left the hearing. Although
they reserved the right to return to the hearing, they did
not do so. As a result of their decision to be absent, the
Respondents did not give any opening statements, did not
examine or cross-examine witnesses, did not provide any
evidence in response to the complaint and, except for the
written submissions related to interpretation of the Code,
did not present any closing argument. They presented no
defence to the complaint. I understand that it is their
intention to participate in the second part of the hearing
which will deal with their constitutional challenge to the
 Section 7 of the Code states as follows:
7. (1) A person must not publish, issue or display, or cause
to be published, issued or displayed, any statement,
publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other
a. indicates discrimination or
an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or
class of persons, or
b. is likely to expose a
person or a group of persons to hatred or contempt
because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin,
religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental
disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or
group of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication
or to a communication intended to be private.
At the hearing, the Complainant withdrew those portions of
the complaint based on s. 7(1)(a) of the Code.
 As a result of these preliminary matters, the scope
of this decision is relatively narrow. The issues that I
must determine at this stage are:
1) What is the proper interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) of
2) Did the Respondents publish or cause to be published
statements that are likely to expose Jewish persons to
hatred or contempt contrary to s. (7)(1)(b) of
3) If the Respondents published statements that
contravene s. 7(1)(b) of the Code, what remedy is
What is the proper interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code
 The interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code was
considered in the CJC case. Tribunal Member Iyer determined
that the phrase “hatred or contempt” should be accorded the
same meaning as that given in Canada (Human Rights
Commission) v. Taylor,  3 S.C.R. 892. In Taylor, the
Court held at 928:
The reference to “hatred” _ speaks of “extreme” ill-will and
an emotion which allows for “no redeeming qualities” in the
person at whom it is directed. “Contempt” appears to be
viewed as similarly extreme, though is felt by the Tribunal
to describe more appropriately circumstances where the
object of one’s feelings is looked down upon_. [Hatred and
contempt thus refer to] unusually strong and deep-felt
emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification_.
 Tribunal Member Iyer then considered the meaning of
“likely to expose”. After reviewing decisions in other
jurisdictions, she concluded (at D/27-D/28, para. 128):
The s. 7(1)(b) inquiry is therefore not into whether the
communication in issue is likely to persuade a recipient to
feel hatred or contempt, but about whether the communication
is likely to increase the risk of manifestation of hateful
or contemptuous behavior. In other words, can it be said
that the effect of the message is to increase the likelihood
that members of the target group will be exposed to hatred
or contempt because the message makes it more acceptable
(and so more likely) for recipients to express or act upon
their feelings of hatred or contempt for members of the
target group? This is an assessment which can be made on a
reasonable person standard. (Emphasis in original)
 Tribunal Member Iyer determined (at D/28, para.
130) that the assessment of an expression under s. 7(1)(b)
requires the application of a two-part test:
First, does the communication itself express hatred or
contempt of a person or group on the basis of one or more of
the listed grounds? Would a reasonable person understand
this message as expressing hatred or contempt?
Second, assessed in its context, is the likely effect of the
communication to make it more acceptable for others to
manifest hatred or contempt against the person or group
concerned? Would a reasonable person consider it likely to
increase the risk of exposure of target group members to
hatred or contempt?
Both aspects of this test are derived from Ms. Iyer’s
interpretation of the meaning of the words “likely to expose
_ to hatred or contempt”. There is dispute about whether
this test is appropriate. This is the only issue on which
the Respondents made any submissions.
 The Respondents submit that the first part of this
test limits the application of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code. The
interpretation, in effect, rewrites the legislation and is,
therefore, an inappropriate “reading down” of the
legislation. They submit that Tribunal Member Iyer exceeded
her authority and urge me to decline to follow her decision
to “read down” the legislation. The Complainant, the DCC,
the AG and the Intervenor all disagree with the Respondents’
position; however they vary in the extent to which they
support of the interpretation adopted in the CJC case.
 The submissions on this point, which I will discuss
more fully below, raise two issues:
a) Did the Tribunal in the CJC case
inappropriately read down s. 7(1)(b) of the Code?
b) If so, should I apply the two-part test
described in the CJC case?
a) Did the Tribunal in the CJC case inappropriately read
down s. 7(1)(b) of the Code?
 To determine whether the Tribunal inappropriately
read down the legislation, it is necessary to understand
what is meant by the concept of “reading down”. Reading down
may be used as a tool of statutory interpretation.
Alternatively, it may be used as a constitutional remedy to
remove constitutionally impermissible applications of the
legislation. The focus and framework of the CJC case was on
the constitutionality of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code. Ultimately,
no constitutional infringement was found. Tribunal Member
Iyer did not utilize “reading down” as a constitutional
remedy. The focus of my analysis is not on the
constitutionality of s. 7(1)(b); rather, my analysis
addresses questions of statutory interpretation.
 The analysis of “reading down” as a tool of
statutory interpretation starts with the principle that
legislation is presumed to be enacted within the limits of
the constitutional authority of the legislature. Professor
Ruth Sullivan, in Driedger on the Construction of Statutes,
3d ed. (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1994), at 322-
23, describes the presumption of compliance with
It is presumed that legislation is enacted in compliance
with the limits on jurisdiction imposed by constitutional
law. There are two ways of understanding this presumption.
The first evolved in the context of challenges to the
Constitution Act, 1867 and is concerned primarily with
validity. Where legislation is open to two interpretations,
one of which would render the legislation invalid, the
courts prefer the interpretation that avoids invalidity.
This preference for the validating interpretation is a way
for the courts to minimize interference with the legislative
branch while at the same time discharging their duty to
enforce constitutional norms.
The other way of understanding the presumption of
constitutional compliance is less concerned with validity.
It focuses on the substantive content of entrenched
constitutional norms. This includes most obviously the
values embodied in the Charter _. The idea here is that
constitutional values should be relied on in interpretation
because they play a central role in the legal and political
culture of Canada and constitute an important part of the
context in which legislation is made and applied. Given
their importance, legislatures are presumed to respect them
and courts, as guardians of the constitution, appropriately
rely on them in interpreting legislation.
 The first aspect, preference for a valid
interpretation, is described by Lamer J. in Slaight
Communications Inc. v. Davidson,  1 S.C.R
Although this Court must not add anything to legislation or
delete anything from it in order to make it consistent with
the Charter, there is no doubt in my mind that it should
also not interpret legislation that is open to more than one
interpretation so as to make it inconsistent with the
Charter and hence of no force or effect.
 In Driedger, the author concludes (at 324) that
“[w]here a validating interpretation is plausible and
appropriate in the circumstances, it is not necessary to
declare legislation invalid in order to secure compliance
with constitutional norms.”
 The second aspect of the presumption of
constitutional compliance is that legislation is to be
interpreted to comply with constitutional values. In R. v.
Zundel,  2 S.C.R. 731 at 771, McLachlin J. summarized
the case law:
These authorities confirm the following basic propositions:
that the common law should develop in accordance with the
values of the Charter _ and that where a legislative
provision, on a reasonable interpretation of its history and
on the plain reading of its text, is subject to two equally
persuasive interpretations, the Court should adopt that
interpretation which accords with the Charter and the values
to which it gives expression_.
 The presumption of constitutional compliance is
rebuttable. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop,  1
S.C.R. 554 at 581-82, Lamer C.J. stated:
Absent a Charter challenge of its constitutionality, when
Parliamentary intent is clear, courts and administrative
tribunals are not empowered to do anything else but apply
the law. If there is some ambiguity as to its meaning or
scope, then the courts should, using the usual rules of
interpretation, seek out the purpose of the legislation and
if more than one reasonable interpretation consistent with
the purpose is available, that which is more in conformity
with the Charter should prevail.
But, I repeat, absent a Charter challenge, the Charter
cannot be used as an interpretive tool to defeat the purpose
of the legislation or to give the legislation an effect
Parliament clearly intended it not to have.
 “Reading down” is an interpretive technique used by
the courts and administrative tribunals to give effect to
the presumption of constitutional compliance. According to
Driedger (at 327): “In reading down, the potential scope of
legislation is narrowed to exclude applications that are
grammatically possible but constitutionally impermissible.”
 In Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,  2 S.C.R.
1031 at 1053-54, Chief Justice Lamer addressed the
limitations of the application of the presumption of
constitutionality in interpreting legislation:
In my view, therefore, the presumption of constitutionality
can sometimes serve to rebut the presumption that the
legislature intended that effect be given to the “plain
meaning” of its enactments. It is important to note,
however, that the process of invoking the presumption of
constitutionality so as to arrive at an interpretation
different from that that would ordinarily result from
applying the rules of statutory construction leads to
essentially the same result as would be reached by adopting
ordinary interpretation, holding that the legislation is
unconstitutional, and “reading it down” as a remedy under s.
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In light of this essential
similarity between the two processes, it is clear that
courts relying on the presumption of constitutionality to
interpret legislation must take into account the principles
I identified in Schachter [v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 679],
supra, in the context of “reading down” as a constitutional
remedy. As I stated in that case (at p. 715), “respect for
the role of the legislature and the purposes of the Charter
are the twin guiding principles” when crafting a remedy
under s. 52; in my view, they also provide guidance when
interpreting legislation in light of the presumption of
constitutionality. In this latter context, the former
principle imposes a requirement that any alternative
interpretation adopted in preference to the “plain meaning”
must itself be one that is reasonably supported by the terms
of the legislation. As I observed in Schachter at pp. 708-9:
Where the choice of means is unequivocal, to further
the objective of the legislative scheme through different
means would constitute an unwarranted intrusion
into the legislative domain.
Thus, merely invoking the presumption of constitutionality
does not give a court complete freedom to depart from the
terms of a statute employed by the legislature. Rather, the
presumption is simply a factor that on some occasions tips
the scales in favour of one interpretation over another
construction that, in the absence of this consideration,
would appear to be the most strongly supported by the rules
of statutory construction. If the terms of the legislation
are so unequivocal that no real alternative interpretation
exists, respect for legislative intent requires that the
court adopt this meaning, even if this means that the
legislation will be struck down as unconstitutional.
 As I understand the authorities, it is proper for an
administrative tribunal to interpret legislation in the
manner that is most consistent with Charter values. Where
there is ambiguity in the legislation, the tribunal is not
required to adopt the most obvious interpretation or the one
that is most consistent with ordinary principles of
statutory construction if there is another reasonable
interpretation that is more consistent with Charter values.
A tribunal may not adopt an interpretation which is not
plausible on a plain reading of the legislation or which is
inconsistent with the purposes of the legislation. It is
also inappropriate for a tribunal to effectively rewrite the
legislation, through interpretation, to ensure compliance
with the Charter.
 In the CJC case, Tribunal Member Iyer was clearly
alive to these issues. In her reasons (at D/24, para.109),
In approaching the task of statutory interpretation in light
of the Charter, the objective is to give the statute that
meaning it can reasonably bear which is most consistent with
the Charter’s values. That is, the statute should be read in
such a way as to increase the likelihood that it would be
found to be constitutionally valid if assessed against the
Charter. _ However, the statutory language cannot be
stretched beyond what is reasonable. Interpreting
legislation in light of the Charter is confined to reading
the legislation as drafted; it is not the equivalent of a
“reading in” or “reading down” remedy that is available once
legislation has been found to be unconstitutional.
 I have reached the same conclusion. The question I
must answer is whether, for the purposes of the present
case, Tribunal Member Iyer’s interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) is
one that the legislation can reasonably bear. This is not an
appeal of my colleague’s decision. The purpose of this
analysis is not to determine whether the decision in the CJC
case was correct; rather, the purpose is to determine
whether the interpretation applied in the CJC case is one
that, in my view, is beyond my authority to make.
 The portion of Ms. Iyer’s interpretation that is
troublesome to some parties is the first part of the two-
part test. That step asks whether a reasonable person would
understand the message as expressing hatred or contempt. At
D/28, para. 131, Tribunal Member Iyer explained the
rationale for this step:
The first requirement flows from an appreciation of the
constraints on restrictions on freedom of expression imposed
by the Charter. In my view, the section would be too
chilling of fair commentary on sensitive and controversial
issues if a message that was not hateful or contemptuous in
itself could be caught by this prohibition. McLachlin J.’s
dissent in Taylor, supra, at 965-68 _, identifies this as an
important factor in her concern about the overbreadth of s.
13(1). I believe it can be addressed, at least in part, by
confining the scope of s. 7(1)(b) to messages that are
themselves hateful or contemptuous. This is also, in my
view, a reasonable reading of the language of the section.
 The Respondents submit that this part of the test
limits the application of the section, and that the Tribunal
adopted this part of the test explicitly to reduce the risk
that the section may infringe the Charter. They submit that
there is nothing in the legislation that limits the
application of the section to messages that express hatred
or contempt. The Tribunal, therefore, intruded into the
function of the legislature. It is not safe to assume that
the legislature would have adopted the section as
interpreted by the Tribunal. The Respondents submit that the
Tribunal rewrote the legislation, which it cannot do.
 In essence, the Respondents’ position is that the
interpretation adopted in the CJC case, which required that
the impugned messages be understood as expressing hatred or
contempt, set a higher threshold than the Legislature
intended. In other words, the Tribunal made the test too
difficult for the Complainant to meet. I note that
acceptance of the Respondents’ position would lead to an
interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code that is less
favourable to the Respondents, with respect to the merits of
the complaint, than the interpretation adopted by Ms. Iyer.
However, the interpretation advanced by the Respondents
would, arguably, benefit the Respondents in their challenge
to the constitutionality of the provision.
 Although the DCC and the Intervenor, supported by
the Complainant, dispute that the Tribunal inappropriately
read down the legislation, they appear to question whether
the interpretation adopted by the Tribunal is entirely
consistent with the purposes of the legislation. In her
reasons, Tribunal Member Iyer states that a communication
which is not itself hateful or contemptuous but which has
the effect of increasing the risk of exposing the target
group to hatred or contempt does not contravene s. 7(1)(b).
The DCC submits that isolating “content” from “effect”
_ is difficult to reconcile with the purposes set out in s.
3(a) and (b) of the Code, namely to foster a society in
which there are no impediments to full and free
participation and to promote a climate of understanding and
mutual respect where all are equal in dignity and rights.
_ the objective of the section requires an emphasis upon
discriminatory effects _. [T]he purpose and impact of human
rights codes is to prevent discriminatory effects rather
than to stigmatize and punish those who discriminate.
The Intervenor submits that a two-part test that considers
the content of a message without reference to its effect may
be inconsistent with the effects-based purposes of the Code.
 The AG is unequivocal in supporting the
appropriateness of the interpretation given to the section
by Ms. Iyer. The AG submits that the Charter played a
limited role in the derivation of the two-part test. The key
to the Tribunal’s interpretation lies in the Tribunal’s
exploration of the meaning of the phrase “likely to expose”
within the context of the purpose of human rights codes. The
AG submits that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the words
of s. 7(1)(b) is a reasonable reading which has “the
salutary effect of also according with the Charter’s
injunction to ensure freedom of expression is restricted as
little as possible.”
 On my reading of Ms. Iyer’s reasons, the Charter
played an important role in the development of the two-part
test. Ms. Iyer is clear that the first part of the test
flows from an appreciation of the constraints on
restrictions of freedom of expression imposed by the
 Nevertheless, I agree with the substance of the AG’s
position. That is, in interpreting the Code as she did, Ms.
Iyer engaged in a consideration of the meaning of the words
“likely to expose” in light of the purposes of this Code and
human rights codes generally. At D/27-28, paras. 128-129,
I believe that consideration of the general role and purpose
of human rights statutes leads to an alternative
interpretation of “likely to expose” that is both a
reasonable reading of the words and which more closely
accords with the Charter’s injunction to ensure that freedom
of expression is restricted as little as possible. Human
rights codes do not act directly on people’s minds, they
modify people’s behaviour. They are based on a recognition
that deep-seated, historic prejudices against persons or
groups because of identifiable personal or attributed
characteristics are a sad reality within our society, and
that, as far as possible, we should prevent discriminatory
actions consequent upon such beliefs from being visited upon
members of vulnerable groups. Consistent with this
orientation, s. 7(1)(b) of the Code is not so much concerned
with the existence of hatred or contempt towards a
vulnerable person or group, it is directed at the
manifestation of hatred or contempt. The s. 7(1)(b) inquiry
is therefore not into whether the communication in issue is
likely to persuade a recipient to feel hatred or contempt,
but about whether the communication is likely to increase
the risk of manifestation of hateful or contemptuous
This reading of s. 7(1)(b) rests on the assumption that deep-
seated feelings of hatred and contempt for certain groups
already exist in our society and flows from judicial
recognition of “historically disadvantaged groups” _. The
expression of these hateful or contemptuous feelings can be
legitimized, and the risk of exposure to such manifestations
thereby increased, by hateful or contemptuous communications
which create an environment that suggests that the
expression of such views is acceptable. If this happens, the
risk of victimization of the vulnerable group – their
experience of hatred and contempt – will increase. In my
view, this is what s. 7(1)(b) seeks to prevent. To the
extent that the expression in issue makes it more acceptable
to express or manifest hateful or contemptuous beliefs
against a person or group characterized by a listed ground,
whether those beliefs are pre-existing or have been caused
by the expression, it is “likely to expose” a person or
group to hatred or contempt. (Emphasis in original)
 Clearly, and as noted by Ms. Iyer (at D/29, para.
138), other less restrictive interpretations are possible.
She chose the one that, in her view, was most consistent
with Charter values. In my view, her interpretation is a
reasonable one considering the language and purposes of the
Code. Her analysis is consistent with the purposes referred
to by both the DCC and the Intervenor. It is focused on a
consideration of the likely effect of communications on
target groups (see D/28, para. 134). It seems to me that
respect for freedom of expression, as enshrined in the
Charter, is also consistent with the purposes of the Code,
that is, to foster a society in which there are no
impediments to full and free participation in the economic,
social, political and cultural life of British Columbia (the
Code, s. 3(a)), and to promote a climate of understanding
and mutual respect where all are equal in dignity and rights
(the Code, s. 3(b)). Seeking an interpretation that balances
the protection against messages that are likely to expose
persons to hatred and contempt with the right to freely
express opinions that may be unpopular or controversial is
consistent with the purposes of the Code. In my opinion,
Tribunal Member Iyer did not inappropriately read down the
b) Should this Tribunal apply the two-part test described
in the CJC case?
 The fact that the CJC Tribunal did not
inappropriately read down the legislation does not mean that
I must apply the two-part test. The Complainant and the
Intervenor submit that a two-part test is unnecessary – a
one-step test that considers both the content and effect of
the message is preferable. The DCC submits that the two-part
test should be applied flexibly to allow a consideration of
effects to inform the analysis of whether the expression is
hateful or contemptuous, and vice versa. The AG submits that
the two-part test is appropriate. The Respondents submit
that the two-part test is a remedy derived from s. 52 of the
Charter; as such, I should not consider reading down the
legislation until that part of the hearing that will address
the constitutional challenge to the legislation. I have
concluded that the two-part test is not a constitutional
remedy; rather it derives from an appropriate process of
statutory interpretation. Therefore, I need not address the
Respondents’ argument on this point.
 The starting point for a consideration of this issue
is the rule that an administrative tribunal is not bound by
its prior decisions. Indeed, administrative agencies are
obliged not to treat earlier decisions as precedent. The
purpose of this rule is to ensure flexibility: see Robert W.
Macaulay and James L. H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure
Before Administrative Tribunals (Scarborough: Carswell,
1997) at 6-5 to 6-9; Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd. v.
International Woodworkers, Local 2-69,  1 S.C.R. 282
 Macaulay and Sprague describe the purpose of this
rule at 6-6:
In performing their mandates agencies should strive for
continuity, consistency and a degree of predictability.
Justice demands that equality of treatment and impartiality
prevail when the merits of a case are considered. On the
other hand, in the face of legal uncertainties and novel
situations, it is not desirable to accord precedent and
stare decisis a pivotal role. _
Decisions of administrative agencies do not create
precedents for anyone, including the agency. They are, at
best, persuasive. While agencies should strive for
consistency they are not bound by a mechanistic application
of earlier administrative decisions. Rigid adherence to
consistency can discredit an agency’s ability to improvise
 There is also value in consistency. In Domtar Inc.
v. Quebec (Commission d’appel en matiŠre de l‚sions
professionnelles),  2 S.C.R. 756 at 784-85, the Court
quoted with approval the following statements about the
value of consistency:
Consistency is a desirable feature in administrative
decision-making. It enables regulated parties to plan their
affairs in an atmosphere of stability and predictability. It
impresses upon officials the importance of objectivity and
acts to prevent arbitrary or irrational decisions. It
fosters public confidence in the integrity of the regulatory
process. It exemplifies “common sense and good
administration”. (H. Wade MacLauchlan, “Some Problems with
Judicial Review of Administrative Inconsistency” (1984), 8
Dalhousie L.J. 435 at 446.)
_[consistency] helps to build public confidence in the
integrity of the administrative justice system and leaves an
impression of common sense and good administration. It might
be added, as regards administrative tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions, that the specialized nature of
their jurisdiction makes inconsistencies more apparent and
tends to harm their credibility. (Suzanne Comtois, “Le
contr“le de la coh‚rence d‚cisionnelle au sein des tribunaux
administratifs” (1990), 21 R.D.U.S. 77 at 77-78.)
 In Tremblay v. Quebec (Commission des affaires
sociales),  1 S.C.R. 952 at 968, Gonthier J. said that
“the objective of consistency responds to litigants’ need
for stability but also to the dictates of justice.” And, in
Consolidated-Bathurst, supra, Gonthier J. said at 327:
It is obvious that coherence in administrative decision
making must be fostered. The outcome of disputes should not
depend on the identity of the persons sitting on the panel
for this result would be [translation] “difficult to
reconcile with the notion of equality before the law, which
is one of the main corollaries of the rule of law, and
perhaps also the most intelligible one”_.
 According to Macaulay and Sprague (at 6-8 to 6-9):
The purpose of not encumbering agencies with the dead weight
of precedent is to guarantee a flexibility and
responsiveness in their decision-making which is not always
forthcoming in the courts. Hence all the need to consider
each case on its own merit. The danger is, however, that in
releasing agencies from the moorings of stare decisis, they
are being furnished, in effect, with a licence to be
inconsistent. Inconsistency creates its own form of
injustice, because it theoretically obviates the need to
treat like cases alike. Furthermore, it means that a party
may tailor its activities according to a give [sic] line of
agency decisions, only to one day have the same agency
“repent and recant”, thereby throwing its affairs into
 This is only the second opportunity the Tribunal has
had to consider the interpretation of s. 7(1)(b) of the
Code. There are no judicial decisions in this jurisdiction
on the issue. The public is best served by a consistent
application of the law. However, that law should be flexible
enough to ensure that it can evolve to deal with the broad
range of circumstances that may arise. I do not think the
interests of justice would be served by rigidly applying a
test that was developed after so little experience with the
legislation. Nor should the considerations described by the
Tribunal when applying that test be seen as exhaustive.
 In my view, when assessing whether an expression
violates s. 7(1)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal should
consider whether the communication, viewed objectively, is
hateful or contemptuous and, assessed in its context,
whether the likely effect of the communication is to make it
more acceptable for others to manifest hatred or contempt
against the person or group concerned. I do not view the two-
part “test” described in the CJC case as a rigid test that
must be mechanistically applied in every case. Rather, it
provides an analytical framework for assessing both the
content and the effect of publications. There may be a
variety of analytical frameworks that will permit a
consideration of both the content and the effect of a
message that would withstand a constitutional challenge.
However, for the purpose of this case, I intend to use this
two-part test as the framework for my analysis. The test is
well reasoned and understandable. It encompasses, with some
modifications, those considerations which I consider to be
necessary in determining whether a publication contravenes
s. 7(1)(b). Moreover, Ms. Iyer’s interpretation was informed
by the submissions she received and the cases she considered
with respect to Charter values. Because of the severance of
constitutional issues, I did not have that opportunity. In
short, I find the two-part test to be a useful analytical
framework that is worth developing through its application
in similar cases.
Did the Respondents publish or cause to be published
statements which are likely to expose Jewish persons to
hatred or contempt contrary to s. (7)(1)(b) of the Code?
 Human rights hearings are similar in form to
judicial proceedings. They are adversarial. When weighing
evidence the Tribunal usually has the opportunity of
comparing the evidence of one witness against that of
witnesses for an opposing party, or of assessing the
reliability of the evidence after it has been tested through
cross-examination. That assessment is informed by the
submissions of all parties. In this case, all of the
submissions I received supported the Complainant’s position
that the statements published by the Respondents in the
columns in question were likely to expose Jewish persons to
hatred or contempt. This is not surprising. The Respondents
chose not to participate in the hearing except to provide
written argument concerning the interpretation of the Code.
(As already noted, the Respondents’ position on
interpretation would lead to an interpretation that is less
favourable to the Respondents than the interpretation
adopted by Ms. Iyer.) As a result, all of the witnesses were
called in support of the Complainant. Their evidence was not
tested through cross-examination. It is not appropriate for
me to attempt to fill the vacuum left by the Respondents’
absence, especially when the Respondents deliberately chose
not to participate. Nevertheless, I must assess the evidence
presented at the hearing to determine whether it is
sufficient to establish a contravention of s. 7(1)(b) of the
 The complaint initially encompassed four columns,
all written by Mr. Collins. The Complainant alleged that Mr.
Collins’ columns have a cumulative effect of promoting
hatred or contempt towards Jewish people. At the hearing,
the Complainant relied upon a number of columns that were
not part of the original complaint. Although I admitted them
into evidence at the hearing (Exhibit 3), I have not found
them to be helpful except as evidence of the context in
which the other four articles were published. Only the
Complainant provided any evidence in relation to the
additional articles. Moreover, they did not form part of the
Particulars of Allegation provided to the Respondents as
part of the original complaint. It is possible, albeit
unlikely, that the Respondents would have presented evidence
to respond to the columns had they known that the
Complainant intended to rely on them at the hearing. My
analysis will therefore be limited to the four columns that
were part of the initial complaint.
a) Were the statements hateful or contemptuous?
 The Complainant testified about his understanding of
the messages conveyed in each of the columns. In summary, he
understood the columns to convey messages of Jewish
conspiracy, Holocaust-denial and persecution by Jewish
pressure groups of those who disagree with them. He felt
that the first column (Appendix 1) trivialized the
Holocaust. It was described as the “six million matter” or
the “six million story”. The column characterized the
Holocaust as a hoax and propaganda exercise perpetrated by
Jews. The column also portrayed those who deny the Holocaust
as being unfairly persecuted by Jews. The Complainant said
that the second article, “Hollywood propaganda” (Appendix
2), suggests that there are not real survivors of the
Holocaust; that it is a fraud perpetrated on the world. It
suggests the Holocaust itself was a swindle. It also
suggests that the Jews control the media. He found similar
themes in “Pondering far better than pandering” (Appendix 3)
and “Some value freedom of the press, some don’t” (Appendiix
 Dr. Lionel Kenner is a retired professor of
philosophy. He was not called as an expert witness. He is
Jewish and lives in North Vancouver. The North Shore News is
delivered free to his door and most other residences in the
community. His interpretation of the articles was similar to
the Complainant’s. He understood them to suggest that
various Holocaust deniers are heroic victims of censorship;
that the Jews are using the Holocaust “story” to raise
money; that the Jews control the press and Hollywood; that
the Holocaust is not an historical fact and that the six-
million figure is inflated. He testified that the messages
conveyed by Mr. Collins are the same as those conveyed by
the neo-Nazi movement. He stressed that he is not saying
that Mr. Collins intends to be a Nazi. However, he described
Mr. Collins as, in effect, the “voice of the neo-Nazi
movement on the North Shore” – “he sings the same song which
The Expert Evidence
 Dr. Frances Henry is a professor of anthropology who
specializes in race relations. I determined that Dr. Henry
is an expert in race relations and discrimination, qualified
to provide an opinion on anti-Semitism in society, and on
the identification and effect of anti-Semitic propaganda
reported in the media in Canada which would encompass the
messages contained in Mr. Collins’ articles. Her evidence
was that the “new” anti-Semitism places great emphasis on
Holocaust-denial and belief in Jewish conspiracies and
control of governments. She noted that racism may be
expressed overtly or may be covert. It has become more
subtle in recent years. In her view, the more serious forms
of racism are those that are hidden in popular culture, such
as in the words, images and descriptions used by media
writers. Dr. Henry stated that good examples of such imagery
can be found in Mr. Collins’ articles.
For example, he trivializes the Holocaust as the “six
million matter” or the “six million story”. He refers to
anti racist action in the Professor Phillipe Rushton matter
as being the work of “Third World thugs and white lunatics”.
Holocaust survivors who are being compensated by the German
government are described as being “an endless number” when
in fact, there were very few survivors. The movie
Schindler’s List is referred to as “Swindler’s List.” Mr.
Collins alludes to one of the strongest dimensions of
current anti-Semitism when he quotes and vehemently agrees
with an American journalist who wrote that “its not Jewish
tragedy that’s remembered this week; its Jewish power to
which homage is being paid.” In these and other citations
from these articles, Mr. Collins is expressing often in an
indirect and rather more subtle way, the tenets and beliefs
which underlie anti-Semitism” (Exhibit 12, p. 6).
 Dr. Henry noted (at Exhibit 12, p. 8) that, by
exaggerating the power of Jewish people to control the
media, Mr. Collins is reflecting one of the main stereotypes
often used against Jews; that is, their supposed control
over key institutions which shape public views. She
testified that Mr. Collins expresses anti-Semitic views
indirectly. For example, he doesn’t deny the Holocaust;
rather, he says the numbers are greatly exaggerated. He
doesn’t use overtly racist comments, and he calls attention
to power and control by using techniques of trivialization;
“_ in other words, you have to read it fairly carefully to
get the impact of what he’s really saying.” (Transcript, 22
July 1998, pp. 34-35)
 Dr. Henry concluded as follows:
In sum, it is my opinion that any reasonable person would
perceive discriminatory and biased ideas and statements in
the four articles written by Doug Collins. Although he does
not make overtly anti-Semitic statements, the tone of the
articles reveals little regard for Jewish people or their
history. Mr. Collins perpetuates the stereotypes against
Jews especially those which allege widespread power and
influence. _ The ideas and statements contained in these
four articles reflect and, in fact, reinforce common anti-
Semitic stereotypes. Mr. Collins not only expresses
discriminatory attitudes but also exposes Jewish people to
hatred and contempt. (Exhibit 12, pp. 14-15)
 Dr.. Barbara Harris is a professor in linguistics. I
determined that she is an expert in sociolinguistic
analysis, qualified to give an opinion regarding the
messages contained in the four articles that were the basis
of these complaints. She applied a process known as
discourse analysis to the four articles. Discourse analysis
“is also known as `sociolinguistic analysis’, and it
essentially looks at language in its interactional phase, as
between _a writer and reader(s)” (Exhibit 9, p. 1). In her
analysis she considers “the linguistic details in a social
context, _ the lexicon that Mr. Collins uses, the rhetorical
devices that he employs, and the pragmatics, involved, i.e.
how his word choices and writing techniques relate to the
 Dr. Harris testified that she had concluded from a
sociolinguistic point of view that the columns convey the
following messages: (a) that the magnitude of the Holocaust
has been grossly exaggerated out of motives of greed; (b)
that a Jewish conspiracy exists in Hollywood to offer a
barrage of pro-Holocaust propaganda at the expense of other
legitimate topics; (c) that those who deny the Holocaust are
the victims of Jews, the Canadian Jewish Congress and others
who support the truth of the Holocaust; (d) that Jews
persecute those who believe the Holocaust has been
overstated; and (e) that Jews are the real aggressors and
should be equated with Nazis.
 In her report she concludes:
In short, these four articles are full of pejorative and
derogatory language, and the rhetoric depends on devices
intended to put the author in good light _ expressed through
faulty analogies, specious arguments and undocumented
`facts’. To the uncritical reader, they would undoubtedly
say that Jews are powerful, vindictive, and hypocritical in
upholding the historicity of an event the magnitude of which
Collins and his fellows deny. On analysis, these articles
certainly use language that conveys a discriminatory
message, and imposes a burden on the Jewish community as a
whole by convincing readers not only of the gross
exaggeration of the Holocaust but of the reality of a Jewish
conspiracy to persecute those who hold this view. (Exhibit
 Dr. Morton Weinfeld is a professor of sociology. He
did not testify at this hearing. However, an expert report
that he submitted at the hearing into the CJC complaint, and
a transcript of his evidence from that hearing were entered
into evidence before me. Before leaving this hearing,
counsel for the Respondents expressed his support for the
admission of Dr. Weinfeld’s report and transcript into
evidence. I admitted his evidence as an expert in the areas
of ethnic and race relations, ethnicity and public policy in
modern Jewish studies. He is qualified to give an opinion on
the identification and effect of hate speech. His evidence
relates only to the “Hollywood propaganda” column.
 His conclusion was that that column “specifically
reinforces several well known and well documented anti-
Semitic stereotypes.” The column accuses Jews of: (a) being
dishonest and untrustworthy; (b) being motivated mainly by
greed and money; (c) controlling the media (and Hollywood)
and using it for “Jewish” objectives; (d) deliberately
exaggerating the magnitude of the Holocaust, claiming that
“hundreds of thousands” of Jews perished; and (e) being
vengeful and anti-German. He notes:
All these reinforce classic and current anti-Semitic
stereotypes. A clear if unstated undercurrent throughout the
column is the suggestion of conspiratorial forces at work,
to pull off this `swindle’ of the Holocaust and Hollywood’s
recognition of it. The conspiratorial motif is another
staple of anti-Semitica, from The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion, to the present day. (Exhibit 15, p. 4)
 The Complainant, the DCC and the Intervenor all
submit that it is important to examine the messages within
the context of the persecution of Jews. They rely primarily
on the report of Dr. Leonidas Hill for evidence of the
history of anti-Semitism. Dr. Hill is a professor of history
at the University of British Columbia. He too provided an
expert report to the CJC hearing. The Respondents took no
position on the admissibility of that report in this
hearing. I found him to be qualified as an expert in the
history and origins of anti-Semitism. I admitted his report
into evidence (Exhibit 13). Like the Weinfeld report, it
addresses only the “Hollywood propaganda” column.
 Dr. Hill observes that the present manifestations of
anti-Semitism developed in the period after the Second World
War. When the Federal Republic of Germany acknowledged war
crimes against the Jews by paying reparations to Israel,
Nazis, neo-Nazis and anti-Semites denied that the Nazis had
attempted to exterminate large numbers of Jews, especially
in gas chambers. Holocaust deniers do not accept the written
evidence from Nazi records concerning the death camps.
According to Dr. Hill:
At the heart of this kind of anti-Semitism is an attempt to
maintain the myth of a Jewish plot or conspiracy, in this
case supposedly to sustain Israel and to slander German
history and bleed the German people through reparations.
(Exhibit 13, p.5)
 Dr. Hill concludes that anti-Semitism has many
layers reaching back through most of recorded history.
Social problems have been blamed on Jewish conspiracies for
centuries. Anti-Semites spread slander about Jews most
frequently through subtle and devious means by using code
words and insinuation, and thereby strive to stimulate
others to share their hatred of Jews.
 Dr. Hill noted that Mr. Collins taps many of the
currents that run through the history of anti-Semitism. The
column’s assertion of a coordinated Jewish domination of
Hollywood is consistent with “the mythology about Jewish
control of Bay Street or Wall Street or of newspapers,
radio, television, cultural and academic life” (Exhibit 13,
p. 6). Mr. Collins’ “Hollywood propaganda” article suggests
that the story of Schindler is propaganda and a swindle,
despite the historical foundation for the story. He also
suggests a much larger conspiracy by Jews to effect a
swindle. Mr. Collins suggests that the number of between
five and six million victims of the Holocaust is widely
accepted because of Jewish propaganda. Dr. Hill also states
that Mr. Collins promotes mistrust and contempt by
suggesting that Jews are deceitful and conspire to swindle
the non-Jewish world for their own gain.
 The Complainant also tendered into evidence a
summary of the opinion of Dr. Phyllis Senese (Exhibit 8).
Dr. Senese teaches at the University of Victoria,
specializing in the intellectual and social history of
Canada. The Complainant had given the Respondents notice
that he intended to call Dr. Senese as an expert witness.
She was not called. The exhibit appears to be little more
than notes of her intended evidence. I have not given any
weight to her opinion except to note that there is nothing
in it that is inconsistent with the evidence of the other
experts concerning the presence of anti-Semitic content in
Mr. Collins’ four columns.
 In the CJC case, Tribunal Member Iyer asked the
question: “Would a reasonable person understand this message
as expressing hatred and contempt?” In answering this
question, she considered the content and tone of the message
and the vulnerability of the target group. While I accept
both the objective standard reflected in the question and
the factors considered by Ms. Iyer, in my view, the question
to ask is: Would a reasonable person, informed about the
context, understand the message as expressing hatred or
 Context formed part of Ms. Iyer’s analysis of the
meaning of the message. Her “reasonable person” was someone
assumed to share the characteristics of the message’s
audience and who would, therefore, be informed about at
least the community and cultural contexts (see D/47, para.
247). Where we may part is on the importance of context at
this stage of the analysis. Ms. Iyer placed significantly
more weight on context in the portion of her analysis
dealing with the impact of the message (see D/47, para.
248). I do not make that distinction. In my view, context is
critical in understanding the meaning of a message. The
meaning conveyed by an expression may vary depending on its
context. An expression that appears neutral or innocuous out
of context may take on a very different meaning when put in
its proper context. Context for this purpose includes not
only the publication context but also the social and
historical contexts. The “reasonable person” is not a purely
abstract entity. The person is someone of this place and
this time, with knowledge of the past and present. The
reasonable person brings with him or her a set of social and
personal characteristics (albeit characteristics that are
unknown). What a reasonable person will understand will
depend on the extent to which they are informed of the
context of the message. Accordingly, that context must be a
consideration in this part of the test.
 Tribunal Member Iyer concluded (at D/48, para. 252)
that the “Hollywood propaganda” column was anti-Semitic but
did not “capture the degree of calumny, detestation or
vilification signified by `hatred or contempt’ as the phrase
is used in s. 7(1)(b) of the Code.” The DCC and the
Intervenor take issue with that conclusion. Their position
is stated succinctly by the DCC: “Anti-Semitism considered
in its proper context constitutes hate speech.” Dr. Henry
stated that her operational definition of anti-Semitism was
“the particular form of racism which promotes negative
stereotyping and hatred against Jews”. Dr. Harris testified
that, by definition, anti-Semitism conveys hatred against
 It is understandable that the term “anti-Semitism”
is viewed by many as being synonymous with “hatred of Jews”.
There is clearly a close association. Indeed, it may be
that, when used in casual speech, they are synonymous.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided a
definition of “hatred” that must be used when applying the
Code. The DCC provided me with three dictionary definitions
of “anti-Semitic”. The Penguin Canadian Dictionary (1990)
defines “anti-Semite” as “one who hates Jews”; the Concise
Oxford Dictionary (7th ed.) (1982) defines “anti-Semite” as
“hostile to Jews”; the Gage Canadian Dictionary (1997)
defines “anti-Semitism” as “a dislike or hatred of Jews;
prejudice against Jews”. These definitions include conduct
that would not meet the high threshold for hate speech
described in Taylor; i.e., “unusually strong deep-felt
emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification.” In my
view, labeling a message as “anti-Semitic” is not sufficient
to demonstrate that it conveys hatred or contempt within the
meaning of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code. It is necessary to go
behind the label and inquire into the nature of the anti-
 In this case, the columns contain themes that
reinforce some of the most virulent forms of anti-Semitism.
They convey notions that Jews conspire to manipulate
society’s most important institutions for their own gain;
and that, through control of the media, they have
perpetrated a massive fraud to exaggerate their suffering
during the Holocaust. The Jews are portrayed as selfish,
greedy and manipulative.
 In the CJC case (at D/48, para. 252), Tribunal
Member Iyer aptly described the tone of the “Hollywood
propaganda” column as “nasty”, “deliberately provocative and
insulting”, and said that it “is mean-spirited and expresses
a smug self-satisfaction in the author’s apparent success in
freeing himself from the grip of the `propaganda’ by which
the rest of society are still duped.” In this case, the
Complainant alleges that the cumulative effect of Mr.
Collins’ columns is hateful or contemptuous. In my opinion,
collectively, and through repetition of anti-Semitic themes,
the columns take on a vicious tone that taps into a
centuries-old pattern of persecution and slander of Jews.
They perpetuate the most damaging stereotypes of Jews.
 As noted in the CJC case, the Jews remain a
vulnerable group. Tribunal Member Iyer stated (at D/21,
The anti-Semitism context was succinctly described by La
Forest J. in Ross [v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,
 1 S.C.R. 825], supra, at 875 as a recognition that
Jews are “an historically disadvantaged group that has
endured persecution on the largest scale”. The existence and
expression of anti-Semitism in Canada and elsewhere, both
past and present, is beyond doubt. The fact that many of the
leading Charter cases on freedom of expression and
discrimination involve anti-Semitic speech and activities is
a telling indication of the persistence of anti-Semitism in
Canada and the continuing vulnerability of the Canadian
Jewish community to it: see Keegstra [v. R.,  3 S.C.R.
697]; Taylor; R. v. Andrews,  3 S.C.R. 870; R. v.
Zundel,  2 S.C.R. 731; Ross.
 Considering the content and tone of the columns and
the vulnerability of the target group, I am satisfied that a
reasonable person, informed of the context of the messages,
would understand the messages within them as expressing
hatred and contempt, that is, that the columns collectively
convey “unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of
detestation, calumny and vilification.”
b) Is the likely effect of the communication to make it
more acceptable for others to manifest hatred or contempt
against the person or group concerned?
 In the CJC case, Tribunal Member Iyer concluded (at
D/48, para. 256) that the second part of the test
_ requires an objective and contextualized assessment of the
likely impact of the impugned publication in terms of
whether it will legitimize the expression or other
manifestation of hatred or contempt by others against the
particular person or group.
 Factors to be considered at this stage include the
credibility likely to be accorded the expression, and how it
is presented. The vulnerability of the target group and the
degree to which the expression reinforces existing
stereotypes will be considered here, as they were in the
first stage. In my view these are appropriate
 Dr. Hill concluded:
In _ [the “Hollywood propaganda”] article Mr. Collins has
asserted anti-Semitic fictions in the face of serious
scholarship and rational argument. These lies fuel anti-
Semitism, which in practice results in intolerance and
mistreatment of Jews. The purpose of these lies is to
stimulate hatred and contempt towards Jews. The effect of
these lies is to enrage and frighten Jews. Those who
perpetrate these lies are by definition anti-Semites.
Mr. Collins’ column contributes to the hatred of the Jews
because his writings echo the themes and anti-Semitic
canards found in the history of anti-Semitism. He promotes
mistrust and contempt by suggesting that Jews are deceitful
and conspire to swindle the non-Jewish world for their own
gains. Mr. Collins poses as a dauntless civil libertarian
and a champion of free speech. The pose has made it possible
for him to continue publishing his anti-Semitic diatribes in
newspapers such as The North Shore News. Access to
publication makes him credible to some of those who are
already inclined to be anti-Semitic and to those who tend to
believe anything that appears in print. (Exhibit 9, p. 7)
 According to Dr. Henry, racist expression has become
subtler over the years. The subtle and less overt racist
messages reflected in the four columns are more damaging
than overt ones. She testified:
I think the subtle forms influence more people. Whereas the
more overt forms tend to influence or reinforce those who
already also have this kind of sentiment. I think the danger
in this kind of journalism is that people who are not in the
completely bigoted camp, but the ones who are thinking and
aren’t sure and who are bordering on racist sentiment are
the most influenced by this kind of journalism because they
say: Well this is really, you know, what I think. And we
have a reputable journalist telling us this. So on the one
hand this kind of journalism does reinforce the extreme
right. But on the other hand I think its more important role
is its influences on those who lean towards bigotry but
aren’t quite sure. And they have their views affirmed by
journalism of this kind. (Transcript, 22 July 1998, pp. 35-
 Dr. Henry also testified that the repetition of the
messages would have a cumulative effect, similar to the
technique used by television evangelists. Similarly, Dr.
Harris testified that repetition increases the effect of a
Because the more you read something, essentially – again,
this is venturing into psycholinguistics – but it’s
generally found when you’re looking at perception of
language, that the more you hear something, the more
something is repeated, the more likely the hearer, or the
reader is to believe it. I mean, that’s the whole technique
on which brainwashing is based after all. (Transcript, 21
July 1998, pp. 247-248)
 Both Dr. Henry and Dr. Robert Anderson, head of the
Communication Department at Simon Fraser University,
provided evidence concerning the impact of columns published
in a community newspaper.
 According to Dr. Henry, the print media is a major
transmitter of society’s cultural standards, myths, values,
roles and images. It may be used to reinforce and reproduce
racism through negative stereotyping, ethnocentric
judgements, marginalization of minority groups and the
racialization of issues such as crime and immigration. As
one of the most influential institutions in society, the
media mold the opinion of large segments of the population
and help create the public agenda and public discourse. The
power of the media to use propaganda techniques to
disseminate a particular point of view enables journalists
such as Mr. Collins to effectively transmit messages against
Jews. She wrote that the fact that these messages are
published in a community newspaper is significant. Community
newspapers are distributed widely with little or no charge.
The messages contained in them are likely to reach a
 Dr. Anderson’s report was filed in the CJC case. He
was qualified as an expert in the role of the media and
specifically the role of community newspapers. His report
had been provided to the Respondents in accordance with the
Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124. They took no position
on its admissibility. I admitted it as Exhibit 14. Dr.
Anderson did not testify. His report discussed the effect of
publications in a community newspaper such as the North
Shore News. Dr. Anderson pointed to “an established and
growing body of opinion that the forms of prejudice and
structural discrimination in the past have been framed and
explained, and then often justified, in and through the
press” (Exhibit 14, p. 2). These activities of the media
have contributed to the mobilization of large numbers of
people to carry out the intimidation and persecution of
target social and ethnic groups.
 Dr. Anderson noted that community newspapers play an
important role in a large city because major newspapers
cannot provide details about all local events. He stated
that the North Shore News would be widely read and have
influence. Columnists in a community newspaper may play a
relatively important role. Dr. Anderson concluded that, if a
column expressed hatred or contempt for a particular
religious or ethnic group, the publication would likely
expose the group to hatred or contempt.
 The Respondents did not present any evidence.
Therefore, I do not know if there were other columns,
editorials, or letters to the editor that may have
ameliorated the effects of Mr. Collins’ columns. I have only
the evidence of the witnesses who testified and the experts
who provided reports to me. They all support the
Complainant. The ultimate decision about whether the columns
at issue contravene s. 7(1)(b) of the Code is for me to
make. In doing so, it is open to me to accept all, none or
part of the evidence of any expert. The Respondents were
provided with copies of the expert reports prior to the
hearing. They had an opportunity to present evidence to
rebut the opinions or to impugn the reliability of the
expert’s opinions through cross-examination. In this case,
the Respondents have provided me with no reason to disregard
any of the experts’ opinions. All of this evidence, to
varying degrees, expresses subjective opinions in areas that
do not allow for precise measurement. Nevertheless, except
as indicated elsewhere in these reasons, I have found the
expert opinions to be helpful.
 The Jewish people remain a vulnerable group. The
messages contained in the articles repeatedly reinforce
existing anti-Semitic stereotypes and theories. They were
published in a widely distributed community newspaper. The
context in which the columns were published gives a gloss of
respectability to the views they express. In my opinion, the
evidence establishes that a reasonable person would conclude
that these columns, considered in their historical and
social context, are likely to make it more acceptable for
others to manifest hatred or contempt against Jewish people.
 Individually, and taken out of context, each of the
four columns at issue might not convey messages that meet
the high threshold that is necessary to be considered hatred
or contempt within the meaning of s. 7(1)(b) of the Code.
However, collectively they do. They repeatedly reinforce
some of the most virulent forms of anti-Semitism. They
convey the message that Jews, individually and collectively,
are selfish, greedy and manipulative; that they have
conspired to control government institutions and the media;
and that they use that control to perpetuate inflated
figures concerning the victimization of Jews during the
Holocaust and to persecute anyone who speaks out against
 The publication of these messages in a community
newspaper that is delivered to almost every home in the
community is likely to increase the risk to Jewish people of
being exposed to hatred or contempt because of their race,
religion or ancestry. Mr. Collins expresses hatred or
contempt indirectly and subtly. He does not overtly incite
hateful or contemptuous expressions. However, he reinforces
negative stereotypes of the Jews that have been promulgated
for centuries. Further, publication of these ideas in a
credible newspaper increases the likelihood that others will
manifest hateful and contemptuous views in a more directly
 I find that the four columns, which were written by
Doug Collins and published by the North Shore News, and
which were the basis for this complaint, are likely to
expose Jewish persons to hatred or contempt because of their
race, religion or ancestry contrary to s. 7(1)(b) of the
 According to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code, if a complaint
of discrimination is found to be justified, the Tribunal
must order that the Respondents cease the discriminatory
practice and refrain from engaging in similar conduct.
Accordingly, I order the Respondents to cease publishing
statements that expose or are likely to expose Jewish
persons to hatred or contempt and to refrain from committing
the same or a similar contravention.
 The Code also provides the Tribunal with broad
discretionary powers to remedy the effects of conduct that
contravenes the Code. This is the first case in this
jurisdiction where a complaint under s. 7(1) has been found
 It is important to keep in mind that the purposes of
the Code are remedial, not punitive: see, for example,
Taylor, supra at 933. As noted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board),  2
S.C.R. 84 at 90, human rights legislation is aimed at
ameliorating the effects of discrimination, rather than
punishing the perpetrator.
 The Complainant submits that an order of $2,000
would be appropriate to compensate him for his loss of self
respect and dignity. In addition, he suggests that the
Respondents should be ordered to pay $5,000 per article to
charity to ameliorate the effect of the discrimination. He
also submits that the Respondents should be required to
publish an apology to the Jewish community. The DCC supports
the Complainant’s position that the circumstances warrant an
award of damages to the Complainant and an order requiring
publication of a formal apology.
 Section 37(2)(d) of the Code gives me the discretion
to award the Complainant an amount that I consider
appropriate to compensate him for injury to dignity,
feelings and self respect. The Complainant testified as
follows about the effect of this article on him:
_ I entered into this because of a concern, security concern,
because of what has happened in history against my people,
against my own experiences that I’ve had with anti-Semitism,
because I have experienced my share of it in certain
respects. And I wanted to do something perhaps that could
stem the matter, that would provide – perhaps, if there was
a possibility of achieving justice, and also showing that
this – these are lies, these are distortions, this is
against humanity, that people – nobody should have to endure
this. Not Jews. Not anybody who is identifiable by
characteristics that they cannot change.
I do not choose to be a Jew. I was born this way. I carry
myself proudly that I am, but to change that, that’s it.
That’s who I am. And I have no particular malevolence
towards anybody. I just want to get on with my life and have
a family and have a business, just like anybody else would
want to pursue their life. But, unfortunately, there are
these projects. There is this stuff going on where lies are
being spread about us and it’s being done so – done so in a
representative systematic fashion. (Transcript, 20 July
In response to follow up questions from his counsel, the
Complainant explained that he felt “[i]t’s a threat. It’s
very uncomfortable” and that he has “reason to fear”. The
Complainant also testified that he is under surveillance.
Two of his conversations (one with a reporter, the other
with his wife) were surreptitiously recorded and played back
over his home telephone.
 I am unable to place weight on the evidence
concerning the surveillance. To be the victim of such
conduct would undoubtedly be frightening. However, there is
no evidence before me as to the identity of the perpetrator
of the surveillance or the reason for it. There is nothing
to link Mr. Collins’ columns to the surveillance.
Nevertheless, I accept that the Complainant suffered injury
to his dignity and feelings of self respect as a result of
the columns written and published by the Respondents. I have
found no cases in which an award has been given for injury
to feelings resulting from hate speech. Compensation has
been awarded in cases involving other forms of speech that
contravenes the Code, for example, sexual or racial
 Considering the remedial purposes of the Code, I see
no basis for denying compensation in cases of hate speech.
Neither do I see any basis for applying different principles
to compensate complainants in cases involving hate speech.
Considering the nature of the speech, its frequent
repetition, and the fear it caused the Complainant, an award
of $2,000 to compensate the Complainant for injury to
dignity and feelings of self respect is appropriate and I so
 There may be cases where there is evidence that a
charitable organization has been directly affected by a
contravention of the Code, in which case compensation under
s. 37(2)(d) would be appropriate. That is not the case here.
However, s. 37(2)(c) provides the Tribunal with the
discretion to order that a person who has been found to have
contravened the Code “take steps _ to ameliorate the effects
of the discriminatory practice”. An award to ameliorate the
effects of a s. 7 contravention is possible. However, s. 7
differs from other liability-creating provisions of the Code
in that its focus is preventative. It prohibits conduct that
is “likely” to expose protected groups to harm. It does not
require proof that the publications actually caused harm. In
order to justify an ameliorative award, it must be evident
that the award will be used to reduce the effects of the
conduct. So, for example, an award might be made under this
section to enable a charitable organization to print a
pamphlet that would be delivered freely throughout the
community, or to engage in educational public meetings. An
award under this section that was not directed at
ameliorating the effects of the contravention would be
 There was little evidence of the impact of these
column on the Jewish communities where they were published.
The Complainant testified that there was concern in the
Victoria community. A few people got together and contacted
The Daily Victorian’s advertisers to express their concerns.
Concerns were also brought to the attention of City Council,
which resulted in a motion that hate propaganda not be
distributed at Victoria City Hall. The Daily Victorian went
out of business. (I have no evidence concerning the reasons
for its demise.) There is no evidence that Mr. Collins’
columns were subsequently published or distributed in
Victoria. The Complainant entered evidence to show that Mr.
Collins’ columns have been reproduced on the Internet
(Exhibits 5 & 6). There is no evidence, however, that the
presence of these columns on the Internet has caused actual
harm. Mr. Kenner testified about the impact on him as a
Jewish member of the North Shore community. He described his
reaction to the columns as “Indignant _ outraged
intellectually at the dishonesty”. He also testified that he
was aware of an incident in which a swastika was drawn on a
synagogue. There is no evidence that links that incident to
Mr. Collins’ columns. In addition, the Complainant entered
into evidence a transcript of the testimony of Dr. Elterman
during the CJC case (Exhibit 7). In it he describes the
circumstances which led the CJC to file its complaint with
the Council of Human Rights. The CJC received a number of
faxes following publication of the “Hollywood propaganda”
column asking what the CJC was going to do about it. He also
testified that the article was “_ putting forward an
injurious, harmful message about Jewish people which causes
great suffering, anguish in Jewish people to read _”.
 The Complainant submits that an award should go to a
charity. Given the sparse evidence concerning the actual
effect of the columns on the Jewish community, I do not
think it would be appropriate to order a large award to
remedy the effect of the columns. A small award to a named
charity would be appropriate if it were clear that the
charity would use the award to ameliorate the effects of the
prohibited conduct. The Complainant does not suggest how
such an award might serve to ameliorate the effects of the
publications at issue. In these circumstances, an award to a
charitable organization is not appropriate.
 The Complainant and the DCC submit that it would be
appropriate to order the Respondents to publish a formal
apology to the Jewish community. I have no doubt that an
apology, sincerely made, would go a long way towards
assuaging the ill feelings generated by Mr. Collins’
columns. There is, however, no indication that the
Respondents feel any remorse or regret about any harm caused
by these publications. I can see little value in compelling
an insincere apology, especially in a context where, through
its editorial control of the content of its publication, the
North Shore News has the ability to undermine any
ameliorative effect such an apology might have. I therefore
decline to order that the Respondents issue a formal
 I think it is important, however, that the
Respondents’ readers be made aware of this decision and the
reasons for it. I therefore order that the Respondents
publish the Summary that accompanies this decision in one of
the next three regular issues of the North Shore News. The
Summary must be printed unedited and in the usual format and
typeface of the North Shore News. This order does not limit
the Respondents’ ability to report on or comment on this
decision in any way.
 In summary, I order the following:
1.That the Respondents Doug Collins and the North Shore News
cease publishing statements that are likely to expose Jewish
persons to hatred and contempt and refrain from committing
the same or a similar contravention; 2.That Doug Collins and
the North Shore News pay $2,000 to the Complainant Harry
Abrams as compensation for the injury they have caused to
his dignity and self respect; 3.That the North Shore News
publish in one of its next three editions the Summary that
accompanies these reasons.
The Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the
 As I noted in the introduction to these reasons,
issues related to the constitutional validity of the Code
were severed from the issues that I have decided in these
reasons. I reserve the right to hear and decide those
Tom W. Patch, Tribunal Member
Vancouver, British Columbia
February 2, 199
Appendix 1 January 12, 1994
News flash! Daily press discovering free speech
“On the Other Hand”
AMAZING! THE Vancouver dailies have discovered political
correctness and freedom of speech. Sort of.
I know this because in December the Sun deplored the gag on
the Teale manslaughter trial in Ontario.
“What’s next?” it asked. “Will Canada Post start censoring
Don’t those dopes know that Customs and Excise already
censors Christmas mail if it happens to be a gift in the
form of Professor Arthur Butz’s Hoax of the Twentieth
Century or some other politically incorrect work?
The Province has waxed even bolder. It has denounced
political correctness in the universities and has defended
Will the dailies now discover that people have been hounded
for having the wrong opinions ever since the hate laws were
passed in 1971, especially if those opinions annoy the
Canadian Jewish Congress?
The truth is that the Sun and Province were early
worshippers at the altar of political correctness. Didn’t
they back the prosecutions against Keegstra and Zundel?
And didn’t they grovel to the pressure groups when Zundel
was charged under the “spreading false news” law for saying
that something didn’t happen, namely, the six million
Spreading false news? Santa Claus and the weatherman spread
false news. Anyone who reports what the politicians say is
probably spreading false news, too.
And our daily duo went into ecstacies when David Irving the
British author and historian was put in handcuffs and
clapped into jail pending his expulsion from this country
for having the wrong opinions.
The Province editorial headline was “Shutting out hatred.”
And we got an amazing bit of false news from that newspaper
in the claim that “no country encourages free speech more
“In Canada,” the fatuous piece continued, “you can climb on
your soapbox and say whatever you want.”
So you can – if you are prepared to risk a spot in jail. Or
being fired from your job. Or fined under B.C.’s Bill 33.
“Good riddance,” Mr. Irving, was the Province’s punchline.
The Sun was even more keen.
“Who’s on watch?” it asked editorially in saying that Irving
was a criminal. Hadn’t he been fined under German hate laws
“for insulting the memory of the dead” in alleging that the
six million story was untrue?
The Sun much approved of the Ottawa Thought Police order
barring Irving from entering Canada.
But if his stuff is so ridiculous, why should he be barred?
Do we bar flat-earthers?
That “Who’s on watch” headline deserves an answer. Which is:
Not the Vancouver Sun. Nor the Province. Nor any of our
daring mainstream media commentators.
If they were on watch on some of the more touchy questions
they wouldn’t last long.
As in the west, so in the east. In New Brunswick Malcolm
Ross was bundled out of the classroom when the Atlantic
Jewish Council turned on the heat.
He had never aired his views in class. They just didn’t like
his privately published books.
New Brunswick’s lickspittle attorney general added his voice
to the chorus.
“There is no place in our society for dangerous thoughts,”
he said. Great stuff, eh?
But just before Christmas the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
took a different view. It said that a human rights
inquisition had denied Ross’ human rights. (So what else is
Five minutes later, Irving Abella of the Canadian Jewish
Congress popped up to say he was “dumbfounded.”
He wants Ross kept out of the classroom anyway and has asked
New Brunswick to take the case to the Supreme Court of
Predictably, in a piece that read like a CJC handout, the
Vancouver Sun stepped up to say that the judges were wrong
and that Ross was indeed a purveyor of dangerous thoughts.
In Toronto, another teacher, Paul Fromm, was moved after an
agitation action was started by one Bernie Farber, another
Fromm’s offence was to ask a facetious question about
Indians and scalping at some gathering of earnest left-wing
He is also against immigration, which makes him a “racist.”
When Professor Phillipe Rushton of Ontario’s Western
University did some politically incorrect racial research,
the usual censors demanded that he be fired, a wish echoed
by the then Premier Peterson. He wasn’t, but Third World
thugs and white lunatics forced him to do his lectures on
closed circuit TV.
The Province now says we shouldn’t be like some of those bad
Americans and call people Nazis when we want to shut them
“Let’s not have it happen here,” it declares.
It should know, but apparently doesn’t, that it’s been
happening here for a long time.
“On the Other Hand”
PROPHECY IS risky. But today I prophesy that the Steven
Spielberg movie Schindler’s List will run away with the
I make that forecast without having seen it and without
having any intention of doing so, since it must be the 555th
movie or TV program on the “holocaust.”
Fifty years after the war one tires of hate literature in
the form of films.
B.C. schoolchildren are being trooped in to see this effort.
In the name of piety, of course.
But wasn=t it Elie Wiesel, a major holocaust propagandist,
who said the world should never stop hating the Germans?
Such indoctrination goes on even though Germans born after
1925 or so are no more responsible for the Hitler period
than are the Eskimos.
Why we are [sic] getting such an overdose of a bad thing?
One reason is that it is profitable in more ways than one.
Billions of dollars are still being paid out in compensation
to Israel and “survivors,” of whom there seem to be an
endless number — paid out by those same Germans who were
not responsible for Hitler.
Anyway, Swindler’s List will hit the Academy bell because
Hollywood is Hollywood and what happened to the Jews during
the Second World War is not only the longest lasting but
also the most effective propaganda exercise ever.
It is so effective that the mere mention of Auschwitz makes
even babes feel guilty.
Dr. Goebbels himself couldn’t have done any better. And
didn’t. From his seat in hell he must be envious.
Hardly a day goes by but that press, radio and television
don’t mention something about the six million.
The figure is nonsense but media folk go on parroting what
everyone “knows.” I used to do the same.
That’s the safe way, too, for as a recent article in Vanity
Fair magazine put it, if you question the official version
you can expect trouble. But that=s an understatement. You
will be damned as “anti-Semitic,” racist and even Nazi.
After half a century of this the moguls of the movie world
reckoned the time was right to cash in in a big way. And
Spielberg reckoned it was time for him to cash in, too.
“Movie of the year! Spielberg takes on the Holocaust!”
screamed the cover-page in Newsweek magazine. You would have
thought the war had just ended and that the film was the
biggest event since the Battle of Britain.
Critics have fawned on it, especially in the U.S., where
many of them work for Jewish-owned media and know how to
adjust their safety belts. Others simply reflect what they
have been programmed to reflect.
Only one critic has described Spielberg’s effort as three
hours of propaganda. He was with the Jewish-owned New York
Good for him. And them. The exception that proves the rule.
In time of war, propaganda is justified. Fifty years on,
it’s a bit much. But it comes about because the Jewish
influence is the most powerful in Hollywood.
One is not supposed to say that, of course. It’s the
ultimate in political incorrectness.
But would it be out of order to say such a thing if the
Catholics ran Hollywood and we got a stream of Catholic
propaganda? I don’t think so.
There have been many holocausts but most of them have hardly
warranted a paragraph, let alone movies.
Has anyone ever made a film about the two million Armenians
killed by the Turks? Or the slaughter of 500,000
How about the uprooting of 10 million Germans from their
homes in East Prussia and Silesia, the murdering of tens of
thousands of them by the Red Army and the raping of their
women, young and old?
In August 1945, Winston Churchill warned that terrible
things were happening. I myself watched masses of desperate
refugees streaming into the British Zone of Occupation. (And
yes, I know what the Germans did to the Russians.)
The Japanese were also skilled in the killing game. Didn=t
they murder countless Chinese? And Brits and Aussies
remember how prisoners were worked and starved to death. And
But there has been only one movie on the miseries of life
and death in South East Asia — Bridge on the River Kwai.
Certainly, there has been no constant propaganda barrage. So
now it’s all licky-licky for the Japanese. But not for the
Am I suggesting that Hitler wasn’t Hitler or that hundreds
of thousands of Jews didn’t die in the camps and elsewhere,
as did many non-Jews? No. But propaganda is selective and
Hollywood propaganda is the most selective of all.
So I won’t be watching the Academy Awards. Let me know if my
little prediction is wrong.
March 23, 1994
Pondering far better than pandering, folks
“On the Other Hand”
REGULAR READERS may remember that I did a column recently on
the movie Schindler’s List, in which I hewed to the view
that I was tired of holocaust propaganda.
I called it Swindler’s List, since even the wife of the dead
hero has said that he was a scoundrel. But right away, the
Canadian Jewish Congress was on its feet calling for blood.
In Toronto, the CJC’s Bernie Farber said I had “clearly
crossed the bounds of decency.” Well, I’m damned!
Nearer home, Michael Elterman of the Pacific Region of the
CJC said the congress was “pondering legal action.”
One mustn’t criticize their favourite movie, you see. Least
of all must you question the six million story. Not that
mine was a movie criticism per se. As I pointed out, I had
no intention of seeing it. What I was criticizing was
Hollywood’s ever-flowing stream, this being about the 555th
film on the same topic.
So I fear I am now listed as an anti-Semite, a description
designed to put the evil eye on critics and shut them up.
I am in distinguished company.
President George Bush was an anti-Semite when he failed to
deliver a $10 billion loan to Israel
quickly enough. (Israeli cabinet minister calls Bush liar,
anti-Semite – news story of Sept. 16, 1991).
Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan came in for it, too,
when he referred to the American capital as “Israeli-
occupied territory.” And he is another “holocaust denier”.
Columnist Joseph Sobran is also a villain. His stuff goes to
70 U.S. newspapers and he had dared to say that there is NO
particular “holocaust”. This has been a century of
“We are kidding ourselves,” he wrote, “if we talk as if
there was anything unique about what the Nazis did.”
And Sobran has a definition of anti-Semitism that is
different from Elterman’s:
He says an anti-Semite used to be someone who hated Jews.
Now it is anyone who is hated BY Jews.
Let me stress that there are plenty of Jews who might be
considered to be “anti-Semites” in that they don’t wholly
hew to the party line:
How about Rabbi Eli Hecht, who reviewed the film for the Los
Angeles Times? His article was headed, “When will Jews let
Michael N. Dobkowski is a professor of religious studies and
has had this to say, long before the film was made:
“Too many books are written on the Holocaust. There are too
many films and television plays that exploit the subject_
There may, in fact, be `no business like Shoah (holocaust)
“The popularization and commercialization of the Holocaust
is not only unhistorical but anti-historical_.”
Frank Rich, a movie critic for the New York Times, and a
Jew, accepts the six million story but wasn’t too keen on
the Spielberg movie.
He mentioned the “pseudo-documentary camera work” and said
that Schindler’s List “is the (Jewish) culture’s new
Messiah; the antidote to the terrifying 1993 Roper
Organization poll in which 22% of the American public
expressed doubt that the Nazi extermination of the Jews
In this case “antidote” is another word for propaganda.
The propaganda is relentless, and includes the “Holocaust
Museum” in Washington. And what did another Jew have to say
Writing in the Washington Post when the Museum opened, M.J.
“It’s not Jewish tragedy that’s remembered this week; it’s
Jewish power to which homage is paid.”
Quite. For the Jews who died in the camps and were
persecuted in Europe were not Americans. They were
By that measure, there should be about ten “holocaust
museums” in the American capital. But you only get one guess
as to why there is only one.
In today’s press, the power referred to by Bukiet is
reflected in the silence of the media lambs and the lambs of
You have to look to relatively small publications for much
of the countervailing material.
Consider this comment by associate professor Daniel Vining
in the highbrow US Magazine Chronicles on the situation in
“Six million is a number like any other number; you would
expect to find an exhaustive analysis of it in the
statistical and demographical literatures, but you don’t.
The reason is that it is a taboo subject_
“If you try to find out the number, your colleagues will
shun you. Worse, you might lose your job.”
I wish the CJC good luck with its pondering. As you can see,
I do a lot of pondering too. But no pandering.
Incidentally, didn’t I predict that Schindler’s List would
sweep the Academy Awards? And didn’t I tell you why?
Take a bow Doug.
June 26, 1994
Some value freedom of the press, some don’t
“On the Other Hand”
Freedom is the greatest toy in the world_ But it don’t work
so good in practice as is does in speeches. – Will Rogers.
WHAT WOULD happen if some right-wing or religious group
tried to put newspapers out of action, prevented people from
speaking at meetings, or was able to get national media to
There would be shock headlines. Open-liners would flap their
lips to bits. Parsons would salt their soup with tears.
Jewish groups in Canada have done all of the above.
Is it “anti-Semitic” to say so? Only if facts are. Besides,
it’s not hard to be an anti-Semite. When the Hebron massacre
ocurred a reader complained to the Times-Colonist in
Victoria that it was anti-Semitic to report that a Jew did
Media folk are usually discreet where Jewish doings are
concerned. It’s a byproduct of the inflated six million
That’s why there was no fuss when David Irving was jailed
and deported for being a “holocaust denier.” Yes, Ottawa can
be tough with a dissident historian, but immigrant killers,
crooks and big-time welfare cheats roam our streets
Speakers whose views don’t suit Jewish groups often find
that their hall and hotel bookings are cancelled.
That happened to Irving and the Canadian Jewish Congress and
B’Nai B’rith [sic] took credit for it in the Jewish press.
Paul Fromm of Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform and Ron
Gostick of the Canadian League of Rights have been given
similar treatment. In New Brunswick teacher Malcolm Ross was
removed from the classroom because Jews didn’t like his
privately published books.
And now let’s take a look a t the campaign to squelch The
It is a novelty paper that runs stories from Victoria’s
past. And contrary to its title it came out weekly, not
Until it made the mistake of picking my column, that is.
A Jewish city councillor who said he believed in freedom of
expression (but not in city hall, obviously) proposed that
the paper be banned from those precincts. And it was.
The occasion was all the spittle that was flying over my
“Swindler’s List” piece on Steven Spielberg’s propaganda
movie – and never mind that the film had been denounced by
some Jewish writers, too.
Leading the mob was a megamouth called Howie Siegel,
described in the Times-Colonist as “a prominent Jewish
Siegel was quoted as saying:
“I told him (the Victorian’s editor) that if he did not stop
running Collins’ stuff I was going to take it upon myself to
go to every one of his advertisers_ and I will do everything
in my power to see that this paper stops publishing, is
Didn’t the Nazis also destroy newspapers?
Bundles of the offending sheet were whipped out of hotels
and restaurants and heaped, one supposes, on Heil Siegel’s
Advertisers were subjected to round-the-clock harassment and
Siegel told one who refused to be bullied that he – the
advertiser – was “an out-and-out Nazi.”
Last week, boasting about his exploits in Victoria’s left-
wing Monday magazine, Siegel described himself as a “yappy
But he’s more than that.
The Victorian now totters along with one edition a month.
Such intimidation is not confined to Canada. An American
professor, Daniel R. Vining, wrote recently in the highbrow
Chronicles magazine that to question the six million story
is a good way for academics to lose their jobs.
In Australia, radio commentator Terry Lane stated in the
Australian Jewish News, which presumably is not anti-
“I have said publicly that I will never write or speak on
the subject of Israel or Palestine ever again. Here is why:
“The Zionist lobby in this country is malicious, implacable,
mendacious and dangerous_
“What’s more, once the expression `anti-Semite’ hits the
air, or, heaven forfend, the sacred `six million’ is
uttered_ not one manager or editor will defend an underling.
We are thrown to the jackals.
“I surrender. To the Zionist I say, `You win.’ To the
Palestinians, forgive my cowardice.”
Phillip Adams of The Australian also had his woes. He
thought he had a lot of friends in the Jewish community
until he reportedly said something out of line. Then:
“I suddenly became the Jews’ worst enemy. _All in all, it
was such a bruising and unpleasant experience that I decided
not to write on Jewish matters again.”
It’s easy to squelch a struggling newspaper. But the
infrequent editions of The Daily Victorian still contain a
Collins column. Some people believe in freedom of the press
and some don’t.