The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service
November 2, 1941
OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT USSR No. 128
- Einsatzgruppe C
- Location: Kiev
As to purely execution matters, approximately 80,000 person have been liquidated by now by the Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe.
Among these are approximately 8,000 person convicted after investigation of anti-German or Bolshevist activities.
The remainder was liquidated in retaliatory actions.
Several retaliatory measures were carried out as large-scale actions. The largest of these actions took place immediately after the occupation of Kiev. It was carried out exclusively against Jews and their entire families.
The difficulties resulting from such a large-scale action, in particular concerning the round-up, were overcome in Kiev by requesting the Jewish population to assemble, using wall posters. Although at first only the participation of 5-6000 Jews had been expected, more than 30,000 Jews arrived who, until the moment of their execution, still believed in their resettlement, thanks to extremely clever organization [propaganda].
Even though approximately 75,000 Jews have been liquidated in this manner, it is evident at this time that this cannot be the best solution of the Jewish problem. Although we succeeded, particularly in smaller towns and villages, in bringing about a complete liquidation of the Jewish problem, nevertheless, again and again it has been observed in the larger cities that after such an action, all Jews have indeed been eradicated. But, when after a certain period of time a Kommando returns, the number of Jews still found in the city always surpasses considerably the number of executed Jews.
Besides, the Kommandos have also carried out military actions in numerous cases. On request of the Army, separate platoons of the Kommandos have repeatedly combed the woods searching for partisans, and have accomplished successful work there.
Besides, prisoners-of-war marching along the highways were systematically overtaken [by the Kommandos of the EG]. All those elements were liquidated who did not possess identification papers and who were suspected, once set free, of [possibly] committing acts of sabotage against the German Army, the German authorities, or the population. In numerous cases, systematic searches for parachutists were carried out, with the result that approximately 20 parachutists were captured, among them a Russian who, at his interrogation supplied extremely important information to the Army.
Finally, it should be mentioned that prisoners-of-war were taken over from the prisoner assembly points and the prisoner-of-war transit camps, although at times, considerable disagreements with the camp commander occurred.
Collaboration with the Wehrmacht and the Secret Field Police
This concerns the relation of the Einsatzgruppe and its Kommandos with other offices and authorities. Its relation to the Army is especially noteworthy. From the outset, the Einsatzgruppe succeeded in establishing excellent terms with all Army headquarters. This made it possible for the Einsatzgruppe never to operate in the rear of the military zone. On the contrary, the request was frequently made by the Army to operate as far on the front as possible. In a great number of cases, it happened that the support of the Einsatzkommandos was requested by the fighting troops. Advance detachments of the Einsatzgruppe also participated in every large military action. They entered newly captured localities side by side with the fighting troops. Thus, in all cases, the utmost support was given. For example, in this connection, it is worth mentioning the participation in the capture of Zhitomir, where the first tanks entering the city were immediately followed by three cars of Einsatzkommando 4a.
As a result of the successful work of the Einsatzgruppe, the Security Police is also held in high regard, in particular by the HQ of the German Army. The liaison officers stationed in Army HQ are loyally briefed of all military operations, and, besides, they receive the utmost cooperation. The Commander of the 6th Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Richenau, has repeatedly praised the work of the Einsatzkommandos and, accordingly, supported the interests of the SD with his staff. The extraordinary success of the Kommandos was a contributing factor: for example, the capture of Major-General Sokolov, then information concerning a plan by parachutists to blast a bridge, and the transmission of other important military information.
Only with respect to the Jewish problem could a complete understanding with junior Army officers not be reached until quite recently. This was most noticeable during the taking over of prisoner-of-war camps. As a particularly clear example, the conduct of a camp commander in Vinitsa is to be mentioned. He strongly objected to the transfer of 362 Jewish prisoners-of-war carried out by his deputy, and even started court martial proceedings against the deputy and two other officers. Unfortunately, it often occurred that the Einsatzkommandos had to suffer more or less hidden reproaches for their persistent stand on the Jewish problem. Another difficulty was added by the order from the Army High Command prohibiting entry by the SD into the POW transit camps. (1) These difficulties have probably been overcome by now due to a new order from the Army High Command. This order clearly states that the Wehrmacht has to cooperate in the solution of this problem, and, in particular, that the necessary authorizations must be granted the SD to the fullest extent. However, it became evident in the past few days that this policy-making order still has not reached lower [military] authorities. In the future, further cooperation and assistance by the Wehrmacht authorities can be expected. As far as the province of the 6th Army HQ is concerned, Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau issued an order on October 10, 1941, which states clearly that the Russian soldier has to be considered in principal to be a representative of Bolshevism and thus to be treated accordingly by the Wehrmacht.
No difficulties whatsoever resulted from the cooperation with the Secret Military Police. To be sure, it was noted that the Security Military Police preferred to handle matters concerning the Security Police only, evidently because of a lack of other duties; however, these defects were always eliminated following consultation. Besides, the latest order of the Chief of the Military Police has probably eliminated any remaining doubts. The exchange of informational material between the SD and the GFP took place without any disagreement. The original doubts whether the GFP would not retain some of the cases were not justified. Besides, it has already been ordered by Army HQ and its staff that matters concerning the Security Police have to be immediately transferred to the Kommandos.
As for the counter-intelligence offices in the rear, the work there is running smoothly. Counter-intelligence officers regularly visit [EK Hqts] and Kommandos in order to transfer files, as well as to receive orders.
Since the work of the Security Police has been carried out smoothly and has won high recognition, it can be assumed that this present relationship will also be maintained in the future.
(The Einsatzgruppen Reports by Yitzak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski and Shmuel Spector, editors. p. 217-220)
For additional information about the mobile killing units, and what the Allies had discovered about their operations, see Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew by Richard Breitman, and Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland by Christopher R. Browning
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
Home · Site Map · What's New? · Search Nizkor