The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression
Volume I Chapter XIII
Germanization & Spoliation

[Page 1038]


The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (c), which involved the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer was unquestioned.

These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940, written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters "K" and "J" on the first Pg. on the left side, and the handwriting is unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:

"On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia].

"Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.

"After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this way, three ways of solution were indicated:

"a. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.

"b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most

[Page 1039]

radical solution, namely, the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore, the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable period of time.

"c. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint. This will take place, among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words, by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.

"The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation. "Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be handled roughly and should be eliminated. "The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

"After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (c) (Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protector for years to come.

"From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as annex.)

"The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia."

Infantry Lt. General." (862-PS)

Solution (a), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies

[Page 1040]

between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have involved the erection of a German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented effective inter- communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have been frustrated. Solution (a) was rejected because the surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a "residual Bohemia," would have remained to plague the conspirators.

Solution (b), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs, was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.

Solution (c) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This solution first provided for the assimilation of about one half of the Czechs. This meant two things: (a) enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially qualified, and (b) deportation to slave labor in Germany for others. "Increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory", as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany.

Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation "by all sorts of methods" of the other half of the Czech population, particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated, "elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated," meant that intellectuals and other dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or immediately exterminated.

In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical application of the conspirators' philosophy as expressed in Himmler's speech referred to above:

"Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves *** or we destroy this blood." (L-70)

The original plaintext version of this file is available via ftp.

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