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Last-Modified: 1997/10/19

Page 144

 V. FRICTION IN THE BALTIC AND THE BALKANS, JUNE 4-SEPTEMBER
                          21, 1940

                            *****
                              
Frame 112206, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 4, 1940-12:25 a. m.
Received June 4, 1940-5:15 a. m.

No. 1063 of June 3
     
     Molotov  informed me today that Ambassador von Mackensen
had  stated  to  the Soviet Charg‚ in Rome around  May  25-in
connection with the apparently imminent Italian entrance into
the  war-that  all problems in the Balkans are to  be  solved
without war, i. e., by mutual cooperation among Germany,  the
Soviet Union, and Italy.
     Molotov   requested  information  as  to  whether   this
statement by Mackensen actually reflected the opinion of  the
Reich Government and the Italian Government.
     Telegraphic instruction is requested.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112208, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 6, 1940-3:55 p. m.
Received June 6, 1940-6:30 p. m.
     
No. 1079 of June 6

     Reference your telegram of June 5, No. 938. [67]
     
     In  the  conference on June 3, Molotov  only  asked  for
information without showing any intention of wanting to  bind
the  German or Italian Government on any point. On the  other
hand,  he showed clearly that the Soviet Government would  be
very pleased if Herr von Mackensen's statement reflected  not
only his personal opinion but actually the interpretation  of
the  German and Italian Governments. The question as  to  how
possible  cooperation among the three in  the  Balkans  would
work out practically was not broached by Herr Molotov.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
[67] Not printed.
     
Page 145
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 334518-334519, serial 1228
                              
The German Foreign Office to the Representative of the German
   Foreign Office With the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
                           Moravia

IMMEDIATE
BERLIN, June 8, 1940.
CONFIDENTIAL (ALSO IN THE REICH)
Pol. V 1581g

Subject:  Hetman  Skoropadsky's contemplated visit  with  the
     Reich Protector.
     
     Reference your report of May 27, 1940-5769/D.Pol.5. [68]
     
     In view of German-Soviet relations, it appears advisable
to  avoid anything which would be likely to arouse the Soviet
Government's  distrust in the Ukranian question. Accordingly,
the   Foreign  Office  attaches  importance  to  having   the
Ukrainian  organizations  in  Greater  Germany  carry  on  no
political  activities.  This also applies  to  former  Hetman
Skoropadsky  and his movement. The importance of  the  Hetman
Movement  has  declined lately, to be sure, in favor  of  the
Ukrainian  National  Organization  (U.  N.  O.),  which   was
promoted  by the competent German internal authorities,  [69]
but  even now the Hetman still has numerous adherents at  his
disposition outside Germany, especially in the United  States
and  Canada,  where several thousand Ukrainians have  pledged
their  oath of allegiance to him and recognize his family  as
the hereditary dynasty.
     The  Foreign Office and the Gestapo are continuously  in
contact  with the Hetman, who has always maintained  a  loyal
attitude  toward  Germany. To assure him and  his  family  an
income consistent with his position, a considerable allowance
is paid to him regularly by the Foreign Office in addition to
the  monthly honorarium provided by the late Reich  President
Field Marshal von Hindenburg in 1928. Unfortunately relations
with  him have for some time been deteriorating, because  the
73-year-old  Hetman evidently considers it his main  duty  to
attack  and  cast  suspicion on the other  Ukrainian  groups,
especially the above-mentioned U. N. 0. [69]
     
By order:
v. RINTELEN
     
[68] Not printed.
[69]  The words underlined were stricken out in the draft  of
the letter.
     
Page 146

                            *****
                              
Frames 219495-219496, serial 432

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

BERLIN, June 11, 1940.
     
     The Lithuanian Minister called on me today to inform  me
of  the  further progress of the discussions with the  Soviet
Union. After the Soviet Union had raised the question of  the
safety  of the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and had rejected
the  suggestion  for  a mixed commission to  investigate  the
incidents,  the Lithuanian Government had of its  own  accord
taken a series of measures which it thought would satisfy the
Soviet  Union.  It might perhaps be admitted  that  relations
between  the  Soviet garrisons and the Lithuanian  population
had  earlier  been  treated  too  casually.  Restrictive  and
control  measures  had now been taken, and many  arrests  and
house  searches  made, etc. It was known that  no  reply  was
received to the Lithuanian suggestion of sending the  Foreign
Minister   to  Moscow.  It  was,  therefore,  all  the   more
surprising  that  not  the  Foreign  Minister  but   Minister
President Merkys was summoned to Moscow.
     On  June  7  Merkys had had his first conversation  with
Molotov. The latter had reproached him severely regarding the
safety  of  the  Soviet  garrisons  and  in  this  connection
presented  a  great many detailed incidents. Molotov  had  in
particular maintained persistently that Butayeff, a member of
the  Red  Army,  who  according  to  Lithuanian  reports  had
committed  suicide,  had  been shut by  Lithuanians.  He  had
expressed his dissatisfaction very plainly and stressed  that
the  Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior was not equal to its
task.
     In  a  subsequent conversation on June  9,  Molotov  had
brought  up questions of foreign policy, which had  increased
Lithuanian  fears regarding the course of the  conversations.
Molotov  had  maintained  that a  military  alliance  existed
between the three Baltic States and as proof had referred  to
the  frequent  meetings of the chiefs of staff of  the  three
countries  and  to other frequent conferences between  Baltic
personalities. Merkys had replied that there existed  neither
secret nor open agreements which could violate the letter  or
the  spirit of the Agreement of October 10, 1939.  There  was
the  old  political treaty between the Baltic States  but  no
military alliance. Merkys had then himself expressed the wish
to  invite  the  Foreign Minister to the  conversations.  The
latter had arrived in Moscow yesterday afternoon. Herr Skirpa
had not yet received any more recent reports. From the
     
Page 147
     
standpoint  of protocol, everything had taken place  in  very
polite form.
     The  Lithuanian Government still did not know  what  the
intentions  of  the  Soviet Union might  be.  The  Lithuanian
Government was prepared to do even more for the safety of the
garrisons  than it had done so far. If the Soviet  Union  now
made  broader  political or military demands, the  Lithuanian
Government  could  not  take  the  responsibility  for  their
acceptance.  Thus  far, the subject of Lithuania's  relations
with Germany had not been discussed during the foreign policy
conversations. However, it was no doubt to be  expected  that
the  Soviet Union would raise questions in this respect, too.
Here   I  interjected  that  there  was  nothing  in  German-
Lithuanian relations which was not or should not be known  by
the Soviet Union.
     Herr  Skirpa  asked  whether we had not  instructed  our
Ambassador  in  Moscow to make inquiries. I  replied  in  the
negative  and avoided further discussion of the  matter  with
the  remark that our Ambassador would certainly make a report
of his own accord.
     
WOERMANN

                            *****
                              
Frame 175538, serial 270

The State Secretary in the German Foreign office (Weizs„cker)
 to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

BERLIN, June 14, 1940-8:45 p. m.
Received Moscow June 14, 1940-11:30 p. m.

No. 1003 of June 13

     For   the   Chief   of  Mission  or  his  representative
personally. Strictly secret. To be deciphered personally.  To
be treated as confidential.
     
     From  a  strictly  secret  source  with  which  you  are
acquainted  it  has  come to our knowledge  that  the  Soviet
Minister in Stockholm, Frau Kollontay, recently stated to the
Belgian Minister there that it was to the common interest  of
the  European  powers to place themselves  in  opposition  to
German  imperialism. It had become evident  that  the  German
danger was far greater than had been believed.
     The  Reich Foreign Minister requests you, if opportunity
arises,   and  without  revealing  the  source,  to   discuss
tactfully  with  Molotov  the hostile  attitude  of  Minister
Kollontay toward Germany.
     
WEIZSŽCKER
     
Page 148
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112211, serial 103
     
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram

No. 1007 of June 16, 1940
Reich Foreign Minister's Special Train
     
     Reference your telegrams 1063 [71] and 1094. [72]
     
     Please  reply  orally  to  Herr  Molotov's  question  as
follows:
     
     1.  As Mackensen reported upon inquiry, he did not  make
such  a  definite  statement as was reported  by  the  Soviet
Charg‚  in  Rome to the Soviet Government. He  had,  instead,
stated  during the conversation with the Charg‚ that  in  his
opinion Germany and Italy were agreed that the Balkans should
remain  quiet  and that a settlement of the  unsolved  Balkan
question  could  probably be brought about  more  easily  and
without the use of force after the war.
     2.  The Reich Government was gratified that the war  had
not  spread  to  the Balkans. Germany was, in principle,  not
interested  there  territorially but only  commercially.  Our
attitude toward the Soviet Union in this question was finally
and irrevocably established by the definite Moscow Agreement.
     3.  Italy's  attitude toward the Balkans was  also  made
unequivocally clear by Mussolini's speech on June 10  to  the
effect  that  Italy had no intention of drawing  the  Balkans
into a war.
     
RIBBENTROP
     
[71] Ante, p. 144. ([70] not used? LWJ)
[72] Not printed.
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 214876-214877, serial 407

   The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister

                          Teletype

No. . .
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
     
     To Baumschule [73] for Sonnleitner.
     
     With reference to the despatches from Kaunas No. 96  and
No. 97 of June 15 [74] forwarded by teletype.
     The Lithuanian Minister called up at about 2 a. m. today
and  said  that, in accordance with a telephone  report  from
Eydtkuhnen, Presi-
     
[73]  Code  name  for the field office of the  Reich  Foreign
Minister.
[74] Neither printed.

Page 149
     
dent  Smetona, accompanied by an adjutant and members of  his
family, as well as General Rastaikis (who was rejected by the
Soviets   as   Prime  Minister)  and  his  brother,   Colonel
Rastaikis,  with their wives, had arrived in Eydtkuhnen.  The
Minister, moreover, reported that a number of other prominent
Lithuanian personalities were probably staying at the German-
Lithuanian  border  and that they desired to  enter  Germany.
Some  of  them would be in danger, should they fall into  the
hands of the Russians. The Minister requested that the German
border  authorities be instructed to let these  personalities
enter  Germany. The official on [night] duty replied that  he
could not initiate anything independently in this matter  and
suggested making the request again in the morning.
     By  order  of Under State Secretary Woermann  I  request
instructions  as  to  how  to treat the  application  of  the
Lithuanian   Minister.  The  question  arises  in  particular
whether  former  Interior  Minister  Skucas  and  the  former
director  of  the State Security Department, Powelaitis,  who
were  to  be  tried in accordance with point 1 of the  Soviet
ultimatum,  can  be  allowed to enter. Powelaitis,  regarding
whom  inquiry  has already been made there by  teletype,  has
loyally cooperated with German authorities in fighting Polish
intrigues.
     
Division for Political Affairs, Night Duty Officer
WELCK
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214887, serial 407

                  Foreign Office Memorandum
     
     The  High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] (Colonel von
Geldern)   reports   that   it   has   received   from    the
Counterintelligence  Office  in  K”nigsberg,  the   following
communication:
     
     Tonight  at 3 o'clock President Smetona with family  and
entourage  crossed the "green frontier." He had given  orders
to  the  Lithuanian garrisons of Mariampol and  Tauroggen  to
cross the frontier into Germany fully equipped and armed.
     
     The   High   Command  of  the  Armed   Forces   requests
instructions  as  to what action to take  if  the  Lithuanian
troops, which apparently have not yet arrived, should wish to
cross the border.
     
VON KESSEL

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
     
Page 150
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214873, serial 407
     
   The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Baumschule No. 56 of June 16, 11:15 a. m.
     
     1.  I  have already given orders through the Gestapo  to
intern  the  Lithuanian President, Smetona, with  family  and
other  functionaries who have crossed the  "green  frontier."
This will be done by the Gestapo.
     2.  If  Lithuanian troop contingents ask  permission  to
cross  the  German border, this request may be  granted.  The
troops are to be disarmed and likewise to be interned.
     3.  It is reported that a Lithuanian Colonel offered  to
have his regiment cross the border. It is requested that  the
disarming and interning of any Lithuanian soldiers who  might
cross the border be done by the Armed Forces in collaboration
with  the  Border Police. In agreement with the State  Police
please  take the measures necessary so that the border  posts
concerned may be immediately informed.
     It  is again pointed out that border crossings are to be
permitted only upon request of the Lithuanians and  that  we,
for  our  part,  must  not  do  anything  to  encourage  such
requests.
     This  communication is to be transmitted at once by  the
fastest  route,  orally  and in written  form,  to  the  High
Command  of  the  Armed  Forces [OKW] with  the  request  for
further action.
     
RIBBENTROP
     
Minute
     The  transmittal to the High Command of the Armed Forces
[OKW]  was  made immediately in accordance with instructions.
At  the same time, the High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]
was  asked  to  see  to it that in every  case  of  a  border
crossing  of  Lithuanian troop contingents a report  be  made
immediately to the Foreign Office.
     
v. d. HEYDEN RYNSCH
     
Page 151

                            *****
                              
Frame 214886, serial 407

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

SECRET
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
Pol. I M 8560g.

                         MEMORANDUM

     High  Command of the Armed Forces, Foreign  Branch  [OKW
Ausland],  Major  Krummacher, transmitted  the  following  at
11:35 a.m.:
     
                    "Order of the Fhrer
     
          1.  If  Lithuanian troops cross the  East  Prussian
     border,  they are to be disarmed. A further decision  as
     to what is to be done with them should be awaited.
          2.  At  present some German units are returning  to
     their  garrisons  in  East Prussia. They  have  received
     instructions not to undertake any maneuvers and to avoid
     anything which might look as if this return were in  any
     way connected with events in Lithuania.
          This  is  for  your  information so  that  possible
     Soviet Russian inquiries may immediately be answered  in
     this sense."
     
von GROTE
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214861, serial 407

  The Reich Foreign Minister's Personal Staff to the German
                       Foreign Office

                          Telegram
     
Baumschule No. 57 of June 16.

     Teletype  to  Herr  v.  Grundherr  [75]  via  Minister's
Office.
     
     The  Reich  Foreign Minister requests you  to  submit  a
report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States
a  tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or
whether  an attempt was made to form a bloc. Please  transmit
your report by teletype.
     
SONNLEITNER
     
[75]  Of the Political Division of the German Foreign Office,
in charge of Baltic affairs.
     
Page 152

                            *****
                              
Frames 214862-214864, serial 407

   The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister

                          Teletype

To Baumschule
BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
     
     Reference telegram Baumschule No. 57 of June 16, 1940.
     
     I. The cooperation between the Baltic States of Estonia,
Latvia,  and  Lithuania  is based on  the  Treaty  of  Mutual
Understanding  and Cooperation concluded  for  ten  years  by
these three States on September 12, 1931. In addition, Latvia
and Estonia signed a mutual defense pact on November 1, 1923.
In  practice, the political cooperation consisted  mainly  of
semiannual  conferences of Foreign Ministers and joint  press
conferences;  on  the other hand, there  has  often  been  an
abundance  of discord and rivalry within the Baltic  Entente.
Latvia    and    Estonia    explicitly    indicated     their
disinterestedness  in  the Memel and Vilna  questions,  which
were  important  to  Lithuania. The assertion,  now  made  by
Russia,   that  Lithuania  had  joined  the  Estonian-Latvian
military  pact, is, according to information available  here,
without  any foundation. Because of the very similar economic
structure   of  these  countries,  the  economic  cooperation
between the three States, in spite of much effort during  the
last  few  years,  made no appreciable  progress.  Since  the
conclusion  of  the Soviet Mutual Assistance  Pact  with  the
Baltic countries in September-October 1939 there has been  no
closer  cooperation in an anti-Russian sense among the Baltic
States.  In  view  of  the occupation of their  countries  by
Soviet  Russian  troops,  the three Baltic  Governments  were
aware of the danger of such a policy.
     II. For the same reason, there can be no question-during
the  last  few  months-of dependence  in  foreign  policy  on
Germany  by the Baltic States. The Lithuanian Government,  to
be  sure, has probably not been quite certain until the  last
few  days  whether  or  not  we were  politically  completely
disinterested in Lithuania, so that in many circles,  as  for
instance  in the case of the Lithuanian Minister here,  there
was  perhaps some hope that Germany would, in case of further
Russian  demands, put in a good word for Lithuania in Moscow,
although  there was never, of course, any occasion  given  on
our part for such an assumption.
     On  the  other  hand,  our economic relations  with  the
Baltic  States  have been strengthened very  much  since  the
beginning of the war. Regarding the great importance  of  the
Baltic States to the war economy of the Reich, please see the
attached memorandum from Minister Schnurre.
     
GRUNDHERR
     
Page 153
     
                           (Annex)
                              
                  Foreign Office Memorandum
     
     The  economic importance of the three Baltic States  for
our supply of food and of raw materials essential for war has
become  quite  considerable as a  result  of  the  commercial
treaties  concluded with these three States during  the  last
year.  In  the  course  of  the  last  six  months,  we  have
furthermore concluded secret agreements with all three States
whereby  the  entire  export of these countries,  except  the
small  part  going to Russia and another small portion  which
goes  to  neutral  countries, will be sent to  Germany.  That
means  for  all three States about 70 percent of their  total
exports. German imports from the three Baltic States will  in
the  current  year  amount to a total  of  approximately  200
million  Reichsmarks-comprising grain,  hogs,  butter,  eggs,
flax, lumber, seeds, and in the case of Estonia, petroleum.
     The  consolidation of Russian influence in  these  areas
will  seriously  endanger these necessary  imports.  For  one
thing,  the  Russians will do their utmost to  keep  the  raw
materials, and especially food, at home for their own use. On
the other hand, if part continues to go to Germany, they will
make  quite  different  demands in regard  to  deliveries  of
German  products from those made in the past  by  the  Baltic
States, so that in effect the previous exchange of goods will
break  down. We were able to make the deliveries  desired  by
the  Baltic States much more easily, and in many cases, under
the stress of circumstances, we were able to put these States
off till later.
     In  contrast, the economic interests of the Soviet Union
in  the  three  Baltic  States are of minor  importance.  The
Soviet Union was able to secure only about 10 percent of  the
export  trade of these countries for itself by means  of  the
treaties it recently concluded.
     
SCHNURRE.

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214849, serial 407
     
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
                   to all German Missions
     
                      Circular telegram
     
Pol. VI 1673
BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
     
     For    information   and   the   orientation   of   your
conversation.
     The  unresisted  reinforcement  of  Russian  troops   in
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the reorganization of  the
Governments  of  the  Baltic States, sought  by  the  Russian
Government to bring about more
     
Page 154
     
reliable  cooperation with the Soviet Union, are the  concern
of  Russia and the Baltic States. Therefore, in view  of  our
unaltered friendly relations with the Soviet Union, there  is
no  reason  for nervousness on our part, which  some  of  the
foreign  press  has  tried  to  impute  to  us  in  only  too
transparent a manner.
     Please   refrain   from  making  any  statement   during
conversations which could be interpreted as partisan.
     Please acknowledge receipt.
     
WEIZSŽCKER
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112228, serial 103
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 18, 1940-1:10 a. m.
Received June 18, 1940-4 a. m.
     
No. 1167 of June 17

     Molotov  summoned  me this evening  to  his  office  and
expressed   the   warmest  congratulations  of   the   Soviet
Government  on  the  splendid success  of  the  German  Armed
Forces.  Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet  action
against  the  Baltic  States.  He  referred  to  the  reasons
published in the press and added that it had become necessary
to  put  an  end  to all the intrigues by which  England  and
France  had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany
and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.
     For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new
Governments  the  Soviet Government had, in addition  to  the
Soviet  envoy  accredited there, sent the  following  special
emissaries:
     To   Lithuania:  Deputy  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs
Dekanosov;  to Latvia: Vishinski, the representative  of  the
Council  of Ministers; to Estonia: Regional Party  Leader  of
Leningrad Zhdanov.
     In  connection  with  the  escape  of  Smetona  and  the
possible  crossing of the frontier by Lithuanian army  units,
Molotov  stated  that  the Lithuanian  border  was  evidently
inadequately guarded. The Soviet Government would, therefore,
if  requested, assist the Lithuanian Government  in  guarding
its borders.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
Page 155
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 112240-112241, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
                              
                          Telegram
                              
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.
Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.

No. 1200 of June 23

     Reference  your  telegram No. 1065 of  the  22d  and  my
telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]
     
     Molotov  made the following statement to me  today:  The
solution  of  the  Bessarabian question  brooked  no  further
delay.  The  Soviet  Government  was  still  striving  for  a
peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should
the  Rumanian  Government decline a peaceful  agreement.  The
Soviet  claim  likewise  extended to Bucovina,  which  had  a
Ukrainian population.
     As  justification Molotov declared that, although a long
time  had  elapsed since his declaration before  the  Supreme
Soviet, Rumania had done nothing to bring about a solution of
the  Bessarabian problem. Therefore, something would have  to
be done.
     I  stated  to Molotov that this decision of  the  Soviet
Government  had not been expected by me. I had  been  of  the
opinion that the Soviet Government would maintain its  claims
to  Bessarabia-not contested by us-but would not itself  take
the  initiative  toward  their  realization.  I  feared  that
difficulties in the foreign relations of Rumania,  which  was
at  present supplying us with very large amounts of essential
military and civilian raw materials, would lead to a  serious
encroachment on German interests. I told Molotov that I would
report  to my government at once, and I requested him not  to
take  any  decisive steps before my Government  had  taken  a
stand concerning the intentions of the Soviet Government.
     Molotov promised to inform the Soviet Government  of  my
request   but  emphasized  expressly  that  the  matter   was
extremely  urgent.  Molotov added that the Soviet  Government
expected Germany not to hinder but to support the Soviets  in
their  action.  The Soviet Government on its  part  would  do
everything to safeguard German interests in Rumania.
     
[76] Neither printed.
     
Page 156
     
     Accordingly, I request immediate instruction by wire.  I
take  the  liberty  of  calling  attention  to  the  numerous
Volksdeutsche  residing in Bessarabia and Bucovina  for  whom
provision of some sort will have to be made.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 112244-112245, serial 103
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram

Moscow, June 24, 1940-6:50 p. m.
Received June 25, 1940-1 a. m.
     
No. 1212 of June 24
     
     The  following information was published by Tass in  the
Soviet  press of June 23, and previously broadcast  over  the
radio on June 22:
     
     "In  connection with the entry of Soviet troops  in  the
Baltic  countries, rumors have recently again been spread  to
the  effect  that 100 to 150 divisions have been concentrated
at  the Lithuanian-German border, that this concentration  of
Soviet  troops  was due to the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction
with  Germany's successes in the West, and that this revealed
a  deterioration in Soviet-German relations, and is  designed
to  exert  pressure on Germany. Lately, various  versions  of
these rumors are being repeated almost daily in the American,
Japanese, English, French, Turkish and Swedish press.
     Tass  is authorized to state that all these rumors,  the
absurdity  of which is obvious anyway, by no means correspond
to  the  truth.  In the Baltic countries there  are  actually
neither 100 nor 150 divisions, but altogether no more than 18
to  20 divisions, and these divisions are not concentrated at
the Lithuanian-German border but in the various districts  of
the three Baltic Republics, and their purpose is not to exert
'pressure'  on  Germany but to provide a  guarantee  for  the
execution of the mutual assistance pacts between the U.S.S.R.
and these countries.
     Responsible Soviet circles are of the opinion  that  the
spreading  of  these  absurd  rumors  aims  particularly   at
clouding  Soviet-German relations. These gentlemen,  however,
pass off their secret wishes as reality. Apparently, they are
incapable  of  grasping  the  obvious  fact  that  the   good
neighborly  relations, resulting from the conclusion  of  the
Non-aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany,  cannot
be  shaken  by  any  rumors  or petty  poisonous  propaganda,
because   these  relations  are  not  based  on  motives   of
opportunism but on the fundamental interests of the  U.S.S.R.
and Germany."
     
SCHULENBURG
     
Page 157
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112246, serial 103
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram

MOSCOW, June 24, 1940-6:49 p. m.
Received June 24, 1940-8:45 p. m.

No. 1213 of June 24

     Reference my telegram No. 1212 of the 24th.
     
     After  the  conclusion of our conversation of  yesterday
concerning Bessarabia (cf. telegram No. 1212 [1205?] of  June
23d)  Molotov, with obvious complacency, brought up the  Tass
communiqu‚ of June 22, whereupon I expressed my appreciation.
     I  infer from the wording of the communiqu‚ that  Stalin
himself is the author. The refutation of numerous rumors  now
circulating  concerning differences between Germany  and  the
Soviet   Union   and   concerning  troop  concentrations   in
connection  with Soviet operations in the Baltic region,  and
the  unequivocal  clarification  of  German-Soviet  relations
ought  to  be  altogether to our advantage at this  important
juncture.  However,  the further aim of  the  communiqu‚,  to
emphasize German-Soviet solidarity as a preparation  for  the
solution of the Bessarabian problem. is just as plain.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 179-181, serial F 19
     
    Memorandum. by the Reich Foreign Minister for Hitler
     
     The  Secret Supplementary Protocol of August  23,  1939,
reads as follows:
     [Here  follows  the  text  of the  Secret  Supplementary
Protocol of August 23, 1939, printed on page 78.]
     As  far  as I can remember the following took  place  at
that time:
     At the time of the delimitation of the mutual spheres of
interest  in  Eastern  Europe,  the  Soviets  stressed  their
interest  in  Bessarabia  when the Southeast  of  Europe  was
mentioned.   On   this   occasion   I   stated   orally   our
disinterestedness  in the Bessarabian question.  However,  in
order  not  to  put  down  explicitly  in  written  form  the
recognition of the Russian claim to Bessarabia because of the
possibility of indiscretions, with which we had to  count  in
view   of   the   then   still  very   vague   German-Russian
relationship, I chose a formulation of a general  nature  for
the  Protocol.  This was done in such a  way  that  when  the
Southeastern European problems were discussed I declared

Page 158
     
very generally that Germany was politically disinterested  in
"these  areas,"  i.  e.,  in  the Southeast  of  Europe.  The
economic  interest of Germany in these Southeastern  European
territories  was duly stressed by me. This was in  accordance
with  the  general  instructions  given  by  the  Fhrer  for
Southeastern Europe and also, as I recall it, with a  special
directive  of the Fhrer which I received before my departure
for  Moscow,  in which the Fhrer authorized  me  to  declare
German  disinterestedness in the territories of  Southeastern
Europe, even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and  the
Straits. However, the latter were not discussed.
     
R[IBBENTROP]

BAUMSCHULE, June 24, 1940.
                              
                            *****
                              
Frame 210475-210476, serial 380
     
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Transmitted by telephone on June 25, 1940-6 p. m.

No. 1074 of June 25

     For the Ambassador personally.
     
     Please call on Herr Molotov and state the following:
     1.  Germany  is  abiding by the Moscow  agreements.  She
takes, therefore, no interest in the Bessarabian question. In
this  territory  live  approximately  100,000  Volksdeutsche.
Germany  is  naturally  interested  in  the  fate  of   these
Volksdeutsche and expects their future to be safeguarded. The
Reich Government reserves the right to make certain proposals
to  the  Soviet Government at the appropriate time concerning
the  question of resettling these Volksdeutsche in  the  same
manner as the Volksdeutsche in Volhynia.
     2.  The  claim of the Soviet Government to  Bucovina  is
something  new.  Bucovina  was  formerly  an  Austrian  crown
province  and is densely populated with Germans.  Germany  is
also   particularly   interested  in  the   fate   of   these
Volksdeutsche.
     3.  In  the  rest of Rumania Germany has very  important
[st„rkste]  economic interests. These interests  include  oil
fields  as  well as agricultural land. Germany is, therefore,
as   we  have  repeatedly  informed  the  Soviet  Government,
extremely interested in preventing these areas from  becoming
a theater of war.
     4. Although fully sympathetic toward the settling of the
Bessarabian  problem, the Reich Government is, therefore,  of
the opinion that . . . [77] of the Soviet Union . . . [77] of
the Moscow agreements, everything should be done in order  to
reach  a  peaceful solution of the Bessarabian question  with
the  Rumanian  Government. For its part the Reich  Government
would be prepared, in the spirit of the Moscow agreements, to
advise Rumania, if necessary, to reach an amicable settlement
of the Bessarabian question satisfactory to Russia.
     Please point out again clearly to Herr Molotov our great
interest  in  Rumania's not becoming a  theater  of  war.  As
matters  stand,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  a  peaceful
settlement  in  accordance with Russian views  is  altogether
possible, provided the problem is properly handled.
     We  should  be grateful to the Soviet Government  for  a
communication concerning its ideas as to further treatment of
the matter.
     
RIBBENTROP
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 224890-224891, serial 459
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram
     
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 26, 1940-12:59 a. m.
Received June 26, 1940-12:25 p. m.

No. 1233 of June 25
     
Reference your telegram No. 1074 of the 25th.
     
     For the Reich Minister personally.
     
     Instruction  carried out at 9 o'clock  this  evening  at
Molotov's  office.  Molotov  expressed  his  thanks  for  the
understanding  attitude  of  the German  Government  and  its
readiness  to  support  the Soviet  Union  in  achieving  its
claims.  Molotov  stated  that  the  Soviet  Government  also
desired a peaceful solution, but repeatedly stressed the fact
that the question was particularly urgent and could brook  no
further delay.
     I  pointed  out  to Molotov that Soviet renunciation  of
Bucovina, which never belonged even to Tsarist Russia,  would
substantially   facilitate  a  peaceful   solution.   Molotov
countered by saying that Bucovina is the last missing part of
a  unified  Ukraine  and  that for  this  reason  the  Soviet
Government  must attach importance to solving  this  question
simultaneously with the Bessarabian question. Nevertheless, I
gained  the impression that Molotov did not entirely  dismiss
the possibility of
     
[77]  Omission  indicated  in  the  Moscow  Embassy  text  of
message.

Page 160

renunciation  of  Bucovina in the course of the  negotiations
with Rumania.
        Molotov   stated  that  our  wishes  concerning   the
Volksdeutsche could certainly be met in a manner  similar  to
the arrangement in Poland.
     Molotov promised to consider most favorably our economic
interests in Rumania.
     In  conclusion, Molotov stated that he would report  the
German  point of view to his Government and inform me of  its
attitude  as soon as possible. Molotov added that  there  had
been  no  discussion of the matter in Moscow or in Bucharest,
up  to  the  present. He further mentioned  that  the  Soviet
Government simply wished to pursue its own interests and  had
no  intention of encouraging other states (Hungary, Bulgaria)
to make demands on Rumania.
     
SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 224892-224893, serial 459
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
                              
                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, June 26, 1940-3:36 p. m.
Received June 26, 1940-10:35 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 1235 of June 26

     Reference my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [78]
     
     Following the conversation which the Italian Ambassador,
Rosso,  had  with Foreign Commissar Molotov on June  20,  the
latter  summoned Rosso yesterday afternoon. Molotov explained
that  he had reported the Italian Government's views  to  his
Government,  which  had approved them. The Soviet  Government
was of the opinion that Italian-Soviet relations should be re-
established quickly and definitely and should be put  on  the
same  basis  as  those of Germany and the Soviet  Government.
Molotov  stated in this connection that the Soviet Government
and  Germany  were on excellent terms and that the  relations
between  Germany and the Soviet Government were  working  out
very well.
     Molotov then declared that in his opinion the war  would
last  until  next  winter,  that there  were  some  political
questions, however, which had to be solved without delay, and
that  he  could briefly characterize the Soviet  Government's
relations with various countries as follows: With Hungary the
Soviet Government was maintaining good rela-
     
[78] Not printed.
     
Page 161

tions.  Certain Hungarian requests were considered reasonable
by the Soviet Government.
     Bulgaria  and the Soviet Union were good neighbors.  The
Soviet-Bulgarian   relations  were  strong   and   could   be
strengthened even more. The Bulgarian demands for Dobruja and
for access to the Aegean Sea were considered justified by the
Soviet  Government,  which had recognized  them  and  had  no
objections to their realization.
     The  Soviet  Union's attitude toward Rumania was  known.
The  Soviet  Union  would prefer to  realize  her  claims  to
Bessarabia (Bucovina was not mentioned) without war, but,  if
that  was  impossible because of Rumanian intransigence,  she
was  determined to resort to force. Regarding other areas  of
Rumania,   the  Soviet  Government  would  communicate   with
Germany.  The  Soviet  Government regards  Turkey  with  deep
suspicion. This was a result of Turkey's unfriendly  attitude
toward Russia and other countries, by which Molotov obviously
meant  Germany  and  Italy. Soviet suspicion  of  Turkey  was
intensified  by the Turkish attitude in regard to  the  Black
Sea,  where Turkey desired to play a dominant role,  and  the
Straits,   where   Turkey   wanted  to   exercise   exclusive
jurisdiction.  The Soviet Government was reducing  a  Turkish
threat  to  Batum,  against which it would  have  to  protect
itself  toward  the south and southeast, in which  connection
the German and Italian interests would be considered.
     In   the  Mediterranean,  the  Soviet  Government  would
recognize   Italy's  hegemony,  provided  that  Italy   would
recognize the Soviet Government's hegemony in the Black Sea.
     Ambassador  Rosso  wired  Molotov's  statements  to  his
Government with the comment that he . . .* them very sensible
and recommended that they be acted upon as soon as possible.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 210457-210458, serial 380
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
[Moscow, June 26, 1940.]

No. 1236 of June 26

     Reference my telegram No. 1233 of June 25.
     For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
     
*Group  missing,  apparently "considered". [Footnote  in  the
German text.]

Page 162
     
     Molotov summoned me this afternoon and declared that the
Soviet  Government, on the basis of his conversation with  me
yesterday,  had decided to limit its demands to the  northern
part  of  Bucovina and the city of Czernowitz.  According  to
Soviet  opinion  the  boundary  line  should  run  from   the
southernmost  point  of  the  Soviet  West  Ukraine  at   Mt.
Kniatiasa,  east  along  the Suczava and  then  northeast  to
Hertza  on  the Pruth, whereby the Soviet Union would  obtain
direct  railway connection from Bessarabia via Czernowitz  to
Lemberg.  Molotov  added that the Soviet Government  expected
German support of this Soviet demand.
     To  my  statement  that a peaceful solution  might  more
easily  be reached if the Soviet Government would return  the
Rumanian  National  Bank's  gold  reserve,  which  had   been
transferred  for safekeeping to Moscow during  World  War  I,
Molotov  declared  that  this  was  absolutely  out  of   the
question, since Rumania had exploited Bessarabia long enough.
     Regarding  further treatment of the matter  Molotov  has
the  following  idea: The Soviet Government will  submit  its
demand to the Rumanian Minister here within the next few days
and  expects  the German Reich Government at  the  same  time
urgently  to  advise the Rumanian Government in Bucharest  to
comply with the Soviet demands, since war would otherwise  be
unavoidable.  Molotov promised to inform  me  immediately  as
soon as he had spoken to the Rumanian Minister.
     Regarding the Rumanian Government's attitude toward  the
new  Soviet  Minister, Molotov appeared  to  be  annoyed  and
pointed  out  that the Minister had not yet  been  given  any
opportunity   to  present  his  credentials,   although   the
customary time had expired.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
N. B. General K”string has been informed.
     
Page 163

                            *****
                              
Frame 224898, serial 459

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, June 27, 1940-1:10 a. m.
Received June 27, 1940-6:30 a. m.

No. 1241 of June 26

     Reference my telegram No. 1236 of June 26.
     
     Molotov  just  informed  me by  telephone  that  he  had
summoned  the  Rumanian Minister at 10 o'clock this  evening,
had  informed him of the Soviet Government's demand regarding
the  cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina,
and  had  demanded a reply from the Rumanian  Government  not
later than tomorrow, i. e., on July [June] 27.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 224903, serial 459
     
   The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office

  TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM SPECIAL TRAIN TO MINISTER SCHMIDT

SECRET
June 27, 1940-10:30 a. m.

     The   following   instruction  is  to   be   transmitted
immediately  by telephone in plain to Minister  Fabricius  in
Bucharest:
     
     "You  are  requested to call immediately on the  Foreign
Minister in Bucharest and inform him as follows:
     "The  Soviet  Government has informed  us  that  it  has
demanded the cession of Bessarabia and the northern  part  of
Bucovina from the Rumanian Government. In order to avoid  war
between  Rumania and the Soviet Union we can only advise  the
Rumanian  Government  to  yield to  the  Soviet  Government's
demand. Please report by wire."
     
     End of the instruction to Bucharest.
     
RIBBENTROP

(Telephoned to Counselor of Legation Stelzer at 11:00 a. m.)
     
Page 164
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 112294-112297, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
     
Tgb. Nr. A/3192/40
Moscow, July 11, 1940.
     
     The  renewed diplomatic activity which the Soviet  Union
has  displayed during the last few weeks has naturally become
a  main  subject  of  discussion among  the  members  of  the
Diplomatic  Corps  here. Some things are not  yet  completely
clear,  as  for  instance the question as to why  the  Soviet
Union  just  at  this  time proceeded or allegedly  will  yet
proceed  against a number of countries. Most of my colleagues
are of the opinion that the Soviets, who are always very well
informed,  know or at least assume the end of the war  to  be
imminent.
     Regarding  the  action  taken against  Rumania,  it  has
aroused general surprise here that the Soviet Union has  also
demanded the northern part of Bucovina. There had never  been
any  statement of Soviet claims to this region. As is  known,
the  Soviet  Government has justified its claim by  the  fact
that  Bucovina has a Ukrainian population. This only  applies
to the northern part of the country, and the Soviet Union has
finally contented itself with this part. I cannot get rid  of
the  impression that it was Ukrainian circles in the  Kremlin
who  have advocated and put through the claim for cession  of
Northern  Bucovina.  On several occasions,  as  for  instance
during the negotiations regarding the German-Soviet border in
Poland, a very strong Ukrainian influence in the Kremlin  was
evident. Herr Stalin told me personally at that time that  he
was  prepared to make concessions north of the boundary  line
where  it  runs through White Russia, but this was impossible
in the south where Ukrainians live. Consequently, the cession
of  the  city  of  Sinyava,  very much  desired  by  us,  was
cancelled by the Soviet Government after it had first  agreed
to  it. It has not yet been possible to determine where  this
strong Ukrainian influence originates. There is no especially
influential  Ukrainian  known  to  be  among  the   immediate
entourage  of  the leaders in the Kremlin. A  clue  might  be
obtained  from the fact that young Pavlov (now in the  Soviet
Embassy  in Berlin), who is the special pet of Herren  Stalin
and  Molotov,  once  was described to me by  Stalin  as  "our
little Ukrainian."
     
Page 165
     
     The  entire political interest in Moscow is now  focused
on  events  in  the  Baltic States and what  will  happen  in
relation to Turkey and Iran.
     Most people believe that the three Baltic States will be
changed into entities completely dependent on Moscow, i.  e.,
will be incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Legations  of
the  three  Baltic  States  here  in  Moscow  expect  to   be
completely  dissolved and to disappear in a very short  time.
It  is  generally  believed that the Soviet  Government  will
demand  the  withdrawal of all foreign  missions  in  Kaunas,
Riga,  and Reval. The excitement among Lithuanians, Latvians,
and  Estonians  here  is  extremely  great.  However,  actual
developments will have to be awaited.
     This,  no  doubt, applies likewise to Turkey  and  Iran.
Both  Ambassadors here assert that neither in Moscow  nor  in
Ankara  nor in Teheran have any demands been made up  to  the
present.  However,  it  is  certain  that  the  situation  is
serious.  I  may add that, at least in Iranian circles  here,
there   is  much  resentment  against  us,  because  of   the
publication  of the sixth White Book. They believe  that  the
White  Book has induced the Soviet Government to take  action
against  Iran. However, the Iranian Ambassador  here  is  too
clever  not to see that the documents in the White Book  were
only  a pretext for the Soviet Government's conduct and  that
Moscow  would simply have found another pretext if  this  one
had not presented itself at the moment.
     Finally an interesting detail:
     The Turkish Ambassador here is telling his friends among
the diplomats that he received a plain telegram-which he even
produces-from Saracoglu on July 6, in which the latter denies
his  conversation  with  Massigli [79]  and  refers  in  this
connection to telegraphic statements from him to that effect.
In   the   same  breath,  the  Turkish  Ambassador   declares
significantly that it was very annoying that his conversation
with  American Ambassador Steinhardt [80] thus had also  been
revealed.
     
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
     
[79] French Ambassador in Turkey.
[80] American Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Page 166
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112311, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, July 13, 1940-7:04 p. m.
Received July 13, 1940-9:10 p. m.

No. 1363 of July 13
     
     Reference  your telegram of the 8th, No.  1164,  and  my
telegram of the 12th, No. 1348. [81]
     
     Molotov  summoned  me  today and stated  the  following:
Stalin  had carefully re-examined the situation with  respect
to  the strip of Lithuanian territory and has concluded  that
our   claim  to  this  strip  of  territory  and  the  Soviet
obligation  to cede it are incontestable. Under  the  present
circumstances,  however,  the  cession  of  this   strip   of
territory  would be extremely inconvenient and difficult  for
the  Soviet  Government. Therefore,  Stalin  and  he  himself
earnestly request the German Government to consider  whether,
in  conformity  with  the extraordinarily friendly  relations
between  Germany and the Soviet Union, a way cannot be  found
which  would  leave this strip of territory permanently  with
Lithuania. Molotov added that we could of course at any  time
move  the  population of German origin out of  Lithuania,  as
well  as  out  of  this strip of territory. Molotov  stressed
again  and  again  the difficulties which  would  at  present
result for the Soviet Union from the cession of this strip of
territory,  and  he made his and Stalin's request  seem  very
urgent  by repeatedly expressing hope of a German concession.
Request instructions by wire. Perhaps, the Soviet request can
be  used  to  put through our economic and financial  demands
with respect to the Baltic States.
     
SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 112312-112313, serial 104

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, July 13, 1940-9:17 p. m.
Received July 14, 1940-9:10 a. m.
SECRET

No. 1364 of July 13

     Molotov  informed  me  today that  Cripps,  the  British
Ambassador here, had been received by Stalin a few  days  ago
upon request of the
     
[81] Neither printed.
     
Page 167
     
British Government. On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gave
me a memorandum of this conversation.
     Cripps  inquired regarding the attitude  of  the  Soviet
Government toward the following questions:
     1. The British Government was convinced that Germany was
striving  for  hegemony in Europe and wanted  to  engulf  all
European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as
well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a
common  policy of self-protection against Germany and on  the
re-establishment of the European balance of power.
     2.  Irrespective of this, England would  like  to  trade
with  the Soviet Union, provided that England's exports would
not be resold to Germany.
     3.  The  British  Government was  of  the  opinion  that
unification  and leadership of the Balkan countries  for  the
purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of
the  Soviet Union. Under present circumstances this important
mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.
     4. The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was
dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the  Black
Sea.  Cripps  was  of the opinion that the interests  of  the
Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded.
     Stalin's answers are given as follows:
     1.  The  Soviet  Government was, of  course,  very  much
interested  in present events in Europe, but he (Stalin)  did
not  see  any  danger of the hegemony of any one  country  in
Europe  and  still  less  any danger  that  Europe  might  be
engulfed  by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of  Germany,
and  knew several leading German statesmen well. He  had  not
discovered  any  desire  on their  part  to  engulf  European
countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military
successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations
with  Germany.  These relations were not based  on  transient
circumstances,  but on the basic national interests  of  both
countries.
     The  so-called  European balance of power  had  hitherto
oppressed  not  only  Germany, but  also  the  Soviet  Union.
Therefore,  the  Soviet  Union would  take  all  measures  to
prevent  the re-establishment of the old balance of power  in
Europe.
     2.  The  Soviet  Union did not object  to  trading  with
England, but she contested the right of England or any  other
country to interfere with German-Soviet commercial relations.
The  Soviet Union would export to Germany, in accordance with
treaty provisions, part of the
     
Page 168
     
nonferrous  metals she bought abroad, because Germany  needed
these  metals  for  the manufacture of the war  materiel  she
delivered  to the Soviet Union. If England did not  recognize
these  conditions, trade between England and the Soviet Union
was impossible.
     3.  In  Stalin's opinion no power had the  right  to  an
exclusive  role  in the consolidation and leadership  of  the
Balkan  countries.  The Soviet Union did  not  claim  such  a
mission  either,  although  she  was  interested  in   Balkan
affairs.
     4.  Regarding  Turkey Stalin declared  that  the  Soviet
Union  was  in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction  of
Turkey  over  the  Straits  and  to  Turkey's  dictation   of
conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware
of that.

                            *****
                              
Frames 214783-214788, serial 407
     
                  Foreign Office Memorandum
     
BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
     
     The  Lithuanian Minister called on me today  and  stated
the following:
     In  view  of  the  important events in  his  country  he
considered  it  his duty not to let these  events  pass  into
history without taking action. He had summarized his attitude
toward  events in Lithuania in a letter to the Reich  Foreign
Minister.  The  presentation of this  letter  amounted  to  a
unilateral  act  on  his  part, for which  he  alone  assumed
responsibility.  He  himself  did  not  wish  to  cause   any
embarrassment to German policy by this act.
     The matter arose in the following way: Some time ago, as
a   precaution,   Foreign  Minister  Urbsys  instructed   all
Lithuanian  Ministers  to take such  a  step  in  case  of  a
transfer of sovereignty to the Soviet Union. On the basis  of
a communication between the Lithuanian Ministers he felt sure
that  a  corresponding note would be presented today  in  all
capitals  in  which Lithuania was represented.  The  Minister
then  handed me the enclosed letter, which contains  "a  most
solemn and determined protest."
     I  told Herr Skirpa that for the time being I wanted  to
keep  the  document myself, and I assumed from his statements
that  he  did not expect any comment on it. However, I  could
not  tell  him whether as the German Government we  would  be
prepared to accept such a note at all, and we would therefore
have to reserve the right to return it to him.
     
Page 169
     
     The  Minister then stated that particularly in  view  of
the known attitude of Germany he had omitted one point in the
note,  which the other Lithuanian Ministers would include  in
their notes to the governments to which they were accredited,
namely, the request that the incorporation not be recognized.
The  Minister  asked  whether he could not  at  least  orally
present  this  request here. I rejected this,  whereupon  the
Minister stated that the request was to be considered as  not
having been made. Finally, the Minister said that he intended
to  make known his action by an announcement from the  Berlin
office  of  the  Elte  Agency, since  this  appeared  to  him
necessary  for the assertion of his personal attitude  toward
events.
     I  requested the Minister to refrain from this,  and  he
promised to comply.
     Transmitted  to the Reich Foreign Minister  through  the
State Secretary with the request for instructions whether the
note  should  be  retained  here. The  Latvian  and  Estonian
Ministers may be expected to present similar notes here.  The
Latvian Minister had already made an appointment with me  for
5:30 p. m. today.
     
WOERMANN

                         [Enclosure]

  The Lithuanian Minister in Germany (Skirpa) to the Reich
                      Foreign Minister

3991

BERLIN, July 21, 1940.

     HERR  REICH  MINISTER: I have the honor, Excellency,  to
bring the following to your attention:
     As  is  already known, on June 14, 1940,  the  Union  of
Soviet   Socialist  Republics  presented  an   ultimatum   to
Lithuania under flimsy and unjustified pretexts, in which  it
was demanded:
     
     1.  that  the constitutional government of Lithuania  be
forced to resign immediately;
     2.  that  the Minister of the Interior and the Chief  of
the State Security Police be tried without preferring charges
based on law, and
     3.  that  free  and unlimited entry of  Soviet  military
forces into Lithuania be granted.
     
     On  the following day the Russian Red Army, after having
attacked   the  Lithuanian  frontier  guards,   crossed   the
Lithuanian border and occupied all of Lithuania. Furthermore,
a  puppet  government was forced upon us  by  a  high  Soviet
official  sent from Moscow for this purpose, and  the  entire
administration was put under the control of the Government of
the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Page 170
     
     In  order to incorporate Lithuania fully into the  Union
of   Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  elections  to  the   Seim
(Parliament)  were  ordered  on July  14,  resulting  in  the
greatest   falsification  of  the  will  of  the   Lithuanian
population.
     In  order  to  quell any expression of resistance,  even
before  the  elections all Lithuanian clubs and organizations
were  suppressed,  the Lithuanian press was  seized  and  its
editors  removed  by force, and the more or less  influential
personalities  in  public  life  were  arrested.  People  who
previously  were  considered open enemies of  the  Lithuanian
State  were appointed to Government offices, particularly  in
the State Security Police.
     The  Communist Party was the only political organization
which  was  allowed to function legally. And it then  exerted
the  decisive influence on the scheduled elections. Only  one
list  of  candidates was permitted, namely, the one that  was
agreeable to the Communist Party.
     In  order  to force the necessary participation  in  the
elections  anybody  who did not wish to vote  was  threatened
with  being  declared  an enemy of the people,  and  personal
attendance was strictly checked.
     It  was immediately obvious that the Seim, elected under
such circumstances, was only a blind tool in the hands of the
Communist  Party and thereby of the Government of the  Soviet
Socialist  Republics.  Today, on  July  21,  1940,  the  Seim
adopted  a  resolution to establish the Soviet system  within
the  country and to incorporate Lithuania into the  Union  of
Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia.
     All  these  measures of the Government of  the  U.S.S.R.
amount to a flagrant violation of all treaties signed between
the  Republic  of Lithuania and the U.S.S.R.,  in  particular
however:
     
     1.  of  the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, by which  the
U.S.S.R.  as  successor of the former Russian Tsarist  Empire
recognized  unconditionally the independence and autonomy  of
Lithuania, and by which she renounced forever all  rights  of
sovereignty  which Russia previously had over Lithuania  (see
article 1);
     2. of the Non-aggression Pact of September 29, 1926, and
of its renewals of May 6, 1931, and of April 4, 1934. In this
Pact   the   U.S.S.R.  obligates  herself  to   respect   the
sovereignty of Lithuania as well as her territorial integrity
and inviolability under all circumstances (see article 2) and
to refrain from any use of force (article 3);
     3. Of the Mutual Assistance Pact of October 10, 1939, in
which  the  Government  of  the  U.S.S.R.  repeats  a  solemn
assurance  to  Lithuania  not  to  violate  in  any  way  the
sovereignty of the Lithuanian State, as well as its  internal
order.
     
Page 171
     
     In  view of all these circumstances I feel compelled  as
the  Minister appointed by the constitutional agencies of the
Republic  of Lithuania and accredited to the German Reich  to
lodge  the  most  solemn and determined protest  against  the
oppression  of my country and the deprivation of  sovereignty
and national independence of Lithuania by the Union of Soviet
Socialist  Republics, and to declare that because the  above-
mentioned  resolution  of the Seim  was  imposed  by  Russian
occupation  authorities it amounts to nothing  but  the  most
outrageous falsification of the expression of the will of the
Lithuanian  people  and that it is in the  sharpest  conflict
with  the constitution and interests of the Lithuanian State'
as  well  as the free right of self-determination of nations,
and  that, therefore, it cannot be recognized as valid in any
way.
     I  avail  myself  of the opportunity to  renew  to  Your
Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
     
K. SKIRPA
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 214780-214781, serial 104

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
     
     The  Latvian Minister called on me today and gave me the
enclosed letter to the Reich Foreign Minister, in which he as
Minister  of  the "legitimate Government of Latvia"  protests
against the incorporation of Latvia into the Union of  Soviet
Socialist Republics. In this connection the Minister remarked
that  he  would  not think of creating any  difficulties  for
Germany. None could, in his opinion, result from his entering
this protest here.
     I  told  Herr  Kreewinsch that I would keep  his  letter
personally  for  the  time being. I would  notify  him  later
whether the letter could remain here or not.
     In  connection  with the memorandum of the  conversation
with  the  Lithuanian  Minister  [82]  there  is  transmitted
herewith  this  report to the Reich Foreign Minister  through
the State Secretary, with the request for action.
     
WOERMANN

[82] Ante, p. 168

Page 172

                         [Enclosure]

  The Latvian Minister in Germany (Kreewinsch) to the Reich
                      Foreign Minister

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
     
     HERR  REICH  MINISTER: I have the honor to  inform  Your
Excellency of the following:
     The  Parliament  which convened on the 21st  instant  in
Riga  has  proclaimed Latvia a Soviet Republic,  and  it  has
addressed  to  Moscow the request that Latvia be incorporated
into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This resolution
lacks  any  legal  basis, since Parliament  itself  owes  its
existence  to elections which were held under the  terror  of
Russian  occupation  and  which  could  not  in  any  way  be
considered a free expression of the popular will. Previous to
this,  the invasion of Latvia by Soviet troops was already  a
violation  of  all existing treaties between Latvia  and  the
Soviet Union.
     As  Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary  of
the  legitimate Government of Latvia I consider  it  my  duty
respectfully to inform Your Excellency of my protest  against
the above-mentioned action.
     Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
     
EDG. KREEWINSCH
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214771, serial 407
     
                  Foreign Office Memorandum
     
BERLIN, July 24, 1940.
     
     I   returned  today  in  a  friendly  manner  the  notes
regarding  the  incorporation of  their  countries  into  the
Soviet  Union  to  the Lithuanian and Latvian  Ministers  and
justified this by stating that we could accept from Ministers
only  notes  which they presented here in the name  of  their
Governments.   At   the  same  time,   in   accordance   with
instructions, I did not indicate that they were  returned  by
order of the Reich Foreign Minister.
     The  Estonian  Minister likewise wished  to  hand  me  a
similar note today. I requested him to refrain from doing so,
giving the appropriate reasons.
     The  Lithuanian  Minister informed me that  of  his  own
accord  he  had sent the Lithuanian Government a telegram  of
protest against the
     
Page 173
     
resolution  of  incorporation into the Soviet Union,  stating
among  other things that he did not consider this  resolution
binding on the Lithuanian people, the nation or himself.  The
Lithuanian and Estonian Ambassadors told me that they had not
sent a similar telegram and did not contemplate doing so.
     Furthermore,  I told the three Ministers that  they  and
the  other  members of the Legation, including  families,  if
they so desired, could remain in Germany. The three Ministers
expressed  their very great appreciation for  this  and  also
requested me to thank the Reich Foreign Minister.
     
WOERMANN
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112343, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram
     
VERY URGENT
Moscow, July 29, 1940-7:10 p. m.
Received July 29, 1940-8:20 p. m.
     
No. 1500 of July 29

     Reference my telegram of the 16th, No. 1472. [83]
     
     Molotov  summoned me today and stated  that  the  Soviet
Government  was very much interested in receiving information
about  the  subject of the recent discussions of Germany  and
Italy  with the Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Slovakian
statesmen. I replied that I did not have any information yet,
but would request it.
     Speedy  instructions by wire are requested, particularly
in  view  of the speech on foreign policy Molotov is expected
to make on August 1.
     
SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frame 112344, serial 104

The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
 to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram
     
URGENT
BERLIN, July 30, 1940.

No. 1307
     
     Reference your telegrams No. 1472 [83] and 1500.
     
     For the Ambassador personally.
     Reich  Foreign  Minister requests that you  inform  Herr
Molotov
     
[83] Not printed.
     
Page 174
     
at  the  first  opportunity of the  latest  state  visits  to
Germany, to the following effect:
     The  visit  of the Rumanian Prime Minister  and  Foreign
Minister in Germany was occasioned by the fact that the  King
of  Rumania and the Rumanian Government lately had repeatedly
requested the Reich Government to express its attitude toward
the   Hungarian   and  Bulgarian  desires  for  [territorial]
revision.  During  the  visit, the  Rumanian  statesmen  were
advised  by  us  to meet revisionist claims  on  a  fair  and
reasonable basis and to negotiate directly with the Hungarian
and  Bulgarian  Governments for this  purpose.  The  Rumanian
statesmen   now   held  out  prospects  of  initiating   such
negotiations.   During  the  Bulgarian  visit   we   notified
Bulgarian  statesmen to that effect. End of the  instructions
by the Reich Foreign Minister.
     In accordance with instructions I shall similarly inform
Ambassador Shkvarzev.
     A report by wire is requested.
     
WEIZSŽCKER
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 357760, serial 1379

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram
                              
BERLIN, August 2, 1940-4:24 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 2, 1940-8:45 p. m.

No. 1339 of August 2

     Reference your telegram of July 13, No. 1363.
     
     You  are requested to inform Herr Molotov that the Reich
Government  has taken cognizance of the wish  of  the  Soviet
Government that Germany leave to the Soviet Union  that  part
of  Lithuania allocated to Germany by the Moscow  agreements.
This  would  represent a rather considerable  change  in  the
Moscow  Treaty  to  the disadvantage of Germany.  Before  the
Reich   Government  can  consider  the  matter   in   detail,
therefore,  I should be interested in hearing what  quid  pro
quo the Soviet Government would propose.
     
RIBBENTROP
     
Page 175
                            *****
                              
Frame 211004, serial 384
     
Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister on the Reception of
  the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, on August 6, 1940

RM 21/40
     
     I  received the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, today
and  strongly  remonstrated with him regarding  the  article,
published in Riga in the newspaper Jaunakas Zinas on the  5th
instant,  entitled  "German  Communists  Against  Dictate  at
Compiegne."  I strongly emphasized that this was an  outright
inflammatory  article against Germany.  The  attacks  on  the
German   Government  contained  in  that  article  were   not
calculated  to  further good German-Russian relations,  which
after  all  were  desired  by both sides.  The  contents  and
implications of this article did not correspond to the letter
or  the spirit of the Moscow agreements. The article was also
in  diametrical opposition to the desire, recently  expressed
by  the  Fhrer  and the day before yesterday by  Molotov  in
Moscow,  of  further  strengthening  friendly  German-Russian
relations.   I  requested  the  Ambassador  to   inform   his
Government immediately of this talk and to notify it that the
Reich  Government considered it appropriate to suppress  such
articles in the future.
     Herr  Shkvarzev did not make any comment on the  article
itself, but promised to report the matter immediately to Herr
Molotov.  As  basis for his report a copy of the German  News
Agency  despatch of the 6th instant covering the article  was
handed to him.
     
     R[IBBENTROP] [85]

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 357784, serial 1379

The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet
         Union and the German Legation in Lithuania

CONFIDENTIAL
BERLIN, August 9, 1940.
W XII 5228

     For personal information only.
     
     The incorporation of Lithuania into the territory of the
Soviet Union creates a completely new situation for the Memel
Free   Port   Zone.  The  Free  Port  Zone   represented   an
international obligation,
     
[85] Signature supplied from another copy of this memorandum.

Page 176
     
made to facilitate the return by little Lithuania of her most
important port to Germany. For Russia, which has expanded and
has  at  her disposal a great number of Baltic Sea ports,  it
has lost its real significance; its continued existence would
lead  to  politically dangerous Russian privileges on  German
territory.  If  Russia should demand the continuance  of  the
Free Port Zone in Memel, the position taken here will be that
the  promises given in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of  March
22,  1939, are no longer applicable to a Lithuania which  has
been  incorporated  into  the  Soviet  Union.  The  competent
offices wild initiate the necessary steps for terminating the
present  state  of affairs. The question of handling  Russian
traffic via the German port of Memel will especially be  kept
in mind.
     
By order:

SCHNURRE
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112386, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram
     
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 13, 1940-12:25 a. m.
Received August 13, 1940-4:25 a. m.
SECRET

No. 1638 of August 12
     
     Reference my telegram of the 7th, No. 1590. [86]
     
     Concerning  the  Lithuanian strip of  territory  Molotov
today  handed  me a long memorandum stating that  territorial
compensation  was  unacceptable  to  the  Soviet  Union,  but
declaring  readiness to pay 3,860,000 gold dollars  within  2
years (i. e., half of the sum the U. S. A. paid to Russia for
the  cession of Alaska), either in gold or goods, as  Germany
may  prefer,  for the retention of the strip of territory  by
the Soviet Union.
     The  text  of the memorandum will be sent Wednesday  via
courier by plane.
     
SCHULENBURG

[86] Not printed.
     
Page 177
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 100-101, serial F 18
                              
          Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister

RM 22

Subject: Conversation with the Russian Ambassador.
     
     The Russian Ambassador made an appointment with me today
in  order to give me the answer of the Russian Government  to
the complaint concerning the article in the Latvian newspaper
Janaukas  Zinas.  He said that he had instructions  from  his
Government  to inform me that the appearance of  the  article
was  due  to  a  misunderstanding. His Government  had  given
instructions  to  Latvia, which now belonged  to  the  Soviet
Union,  that  in  the  future  such  articles  were   to   be
suppressed.
     I  answered  the Russian that I took note of that.  Such
articles  were  not advantageous for the development  of  the
good German-Russian relations which we desired. In the German
press  in turn we would not tolerate articles against Russian
conditions either.
     I  then  asked  the Ambassador what truth there  was  to
press  reports  of  a stiffening in Russo-Finnish  relations;
whether they had reached a final understanding on the  Aaland
problem or whether there were otherwise any reasons for  this
stiffening.  Herr Shkvarzev stated that he had no information
on that point.
     The  Ambassador  and  his interpreter  made  a  somewhat
dejected impression during the talk.
     
R[IBBENTROP]

BERLIN, August 14, 1940.
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 112436-112437, serial 104

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

URGENT
Moscow, August 30, 1940-10:12 p. m.
Received August 31, 1940-12:10 a. m.
     
No. 1799 of August 30

     Reference instruction W XII 5228 of August 9.
     
     Last  night Molotov asked me to see him and handed me  a
note  verbale,  [87]  in which the attention  of  the  German
Government  is called to activities of German authorities  in
the Memel Free Port Zone which
     
[87] Not printed.
     
Page 178
     
violate  rights  and  interests  of  the  Lithuanian   Soviet
Republic.  Disregarding  the  rights  fixed  in  the  German-
Lithuanian  Treaty of May 20 concerning the Memel  Free  Port
Zone  (which are quoted in detail in the note verbale) German
authorities had ordered German troops to invade the territory
of  the  Free  Zone, had discontinued the activities  of  the
Customs Office, and had declared that all Lithuanian goods in
this  zone  were  to be removed. The German  authorities  had
thereby   seriously  affected  the  economic  situation   and
commercial  possibilities of Lithuania, which now forms  part
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was of the opinion
that  the Lithuanian Soviet Republic was entitled to all  the
rights and privileges granted by the German-Lithuanian Treaty
as  well  as  by the letters exchanged between  Schnurre  and
Norkaitis on May 20, 1939, and that their validity could  not
be terminated by a unilateral act.
     Molotov  added orally that just as the German Government
takes  for granted the fulfillment of the commercial treaties
concluded between Germany and the Baltic countries,  so  also
must  the  Soviet  Government demand the  observance  of  the
German-Lithuanian Treaty with regard to the Memel  Free  Port
Zone which was likewise a commercial treaty.
     Please enable me as soon as possible to answer the  note
verbale, the text of which will follow by the next courier.
     Minister  Schnurre will give his opinion on  this  issue
separately.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
                            *****
                              
Frames 357804-357807, serial 1379

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 31, 1910-3:12 a. m.
Received Moscow August 31, 1940-10 a. m.

No. 1565 of August 30
     
     Please call on Herr Molotov and inform him orally of the
Vienna  conversations  and the German-Italian  award  in  the
Hungarian-Rumanian matter, approximately as follows:
     As  Molotov  was previously informed, both the  Rumanian
and  the  Hungarian Governments some time ago  solicited  the
advice  of  the  Fhrer and the Duce on the solution  of  the
problem  of  territorial revision. The Fhrer  and  the  Duce
urgently  advised  both  parties, as well  as  the  Bulgarian
Government,  to  come  to  an understanding  as  promptly  as
possible by way of direct, bilateral negotiations.
     
Page 179
     
     While  the  Bulgaro-Rumanian negotiations led relatively
soon  to  an  agreement in principle, and  we  can  now  look
forward  to  the early conclusion of a formal  agreement,  it
recently  became  more and more obvious that  the  Hungarian-
Rumanian   negotiations   were  running   into   very   great
difficulties   and  that  no  progress  was  discernible   in
reconciling  the  viewpoints  of  the  two  parties.   Lately
relations between Hungary and Rumania deteriorated to such an
extent that the possibility of military complications had  to
be  seriously faced. In compliance with the repeated requests
of  both  the  Hungarian  and the Rumanian  Governments,  the
Government of the Reich and the Italian Government  found  it
necessary  in  repeated personal consultations  to  influence
both  parties toward effecting a speedier understanding.  For
this  purpose, the meeting in Vienna was agreed  upon  a  few
days  ago  on  very short notice. Since the attitude  of  the
Rumanians  and of the Hungarians held out no prospect  of  an
agreement  by  direct  negotiation, and  since  both  parties
requested arbitration by Germany and Italy, the Government of
the  Reich and the Italian Government withdrew their previous
objections  to  such  arbitration and  assumed  the  task  of
settlement by arbitration.
     The Government of the Reich decided upon this course  in
agreement with the Italian Government, because it was evident
that  there  was no further prospect of reaching  a  peaceful
solution by any other means and because both Axis Powers have
a  fundamental interest in the maintenance of peace and order
in  those  areas.  This concern arises, as  has  always  been
understood  between  ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Government,
primarily  from  the  fact that Germany and  Italy  are  very
closely  involved [verkntpf] with the Rumanian economy.  So,
for example, the extraction of Rumanian oil, its shipment  to
Germany, the uninterrupted importation of Rumanian grain into
Germany,  etc., are becoming of ever more vital  significance
for  the Axis Powers. Hence an armed conflict in those areas,
whatever  its  cause, could not have been  tolerated  by  the
Axis. After the Soviet Government had peacefully settled  her
controversy with Rumania, and the Rumanian-Bulgarian  problem
likewise approached a settlement, it was imperative that  the
last  remaining  territorial problem should not  lead  to  an
armed  conflict. Because of the very complicated geographical
and  ethnological situation in Transylvania, the decision was
not  an easy one. However, we finally found a way out of  the
difficulties,  which  was based upon  a  just  and  impartial
consideration of all the interests concerned. By their award,
which  was  accepted  by  both parties  without  reservation,
Germany  and  Italy  have  now secured  the  peace  that  was
threatened in the
     
Page 180
     
Danube region. But in order to forestall once and for  all  a
repetition of differences which might easily arise  in  areas
of  such  territorial and ethnological complexity,  the  Axis
Powers have undertaken to guarantee the territory of Rumania,
which  has  now been definitively pacified. Since  the  award
necessarily involved the cession of a considerable portion of
Rumanian  territory, it was a natural need for the  Rumanians
henceforth  to be able to regard their boundary with  Hungary
and their territory in general as definitively secured. Since
the  territorial  demands made by the  Soviet  Government  on
Rumania have been settled by the cession of Bessarabia, since
the  Bulgarian  demands are now in course of being  met,  and
since Rumania, through the award, has obtained her definitive
boundary   with  Hungary,  there  could  remain   from   this
standpoint  no further objection to the granting  of  such  a
guarantee by the Axis Powers.
     Please  tell Herr Molotov on my behalf that in  view  of
the  friendly relations between our countries, I attach great
importance  to  informing  the  Soviet  Government  of  these
events.
     We assume that, from the points of view set forth above,
the  Soviet  Government,  too, will  welcome  the  settlement
achieved by the Axis and regard it as a valuable contribution
toward securing the peace in the Danube region.
     
RIBBENTROP

                            *****
                              
Frame 112444, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                        Telegram [88]

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 1, 1940-2:08 a.m.
Received September 1, 1940-4:40 a. m.
SECRET

No. 1815 of August 31
     
     Reference your telegram of the 30th, No. 1565.
     For the Reich Foreign Minister.
     
     Instruction  carried out. Molotov, who was reserved,  in
contrast  to his usual manner, expressed his thanks  for  the
information and stated as follows:
     The Soviet Government was already informed regarding the
Vienna conversations by the press and the radio. He asked  me
to  call  the attention of the German Government to the  fact
that by its action it
     
[88]  A marginal note reads: "Forwarded under No. 95 at  5:30
a.  m.,  September 1, to the Special Train. Telegram  Control
Office, September 1."
     
Page 181
     
had  violated  article  3 of the Non-aggression  Pact,  which
provided  for  consultation. The Soviet Government  had  been
confronted  with accomplished facts by the German Government;
this   violated  existing  agreements  and  conflicted   with
assurances  the Soviet Government had received  from  Germany
regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The
present  case  involved two of the Soviet Union's  neighbors,
where she naturally had interests.
     I told Molotov that I could not take a stand with regard
to  his  remarks  and  that  I would  immediately  notify  my
Government.  Personally, I supposed that there  had  been  no
time  for  consultation in the present case  because  of  the
urgency of the matter.

SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 357818-357821, serial 1379
     
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram
                              
BERLIN, September 3, 1940-6:20 a. m.
Received Moscow September 3, 1940-1:50 p. m.

No. 1580 of September 3
     
     Reference your telegram No. 1815.
     
     Please  call on Herr Molotov again and to his  statement
that  Germany,  by  her conduct in Vienna, had  violated  the
obligation  to  consult contained in article 3  of  the  Non-
aggression  Pact,  reply  in accordance  with  the  following
memorandum  and  afterwards hand him  this  memorandum  as  a
summary  of your instructions. If there is anything you  wish
to say regarding the instructions, please report to me before
you call on Molotov.
     
                   TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM:
     
     In  his  last oral discussion with Ambassador Count  von
der  Schulenburg,  when the latter acquainted  him  with  the
conferences at Vienna, Chairman Molotov said that he  had  to
call  Germany's attention to the fact that by her conduct  in
Vienna she had violated article 3 of the German-Russian  Non-
aggression  Pact  of  August 23,  1939,  which  provided  for
consultation.  The Soviet Government had been  confronted  by
Germany  with  accomplished facts,  which  violated  existing
agreements   and  conflicted  with  assurances   the   Soviet
Government  had received from Germany regarding questions  of
common  interest  to  the  two countries.  The  present  case
involved  two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, in  which  she
naturally had interests.
     
Page 182
     
     Conscious  of  her friendly relations  with  the  Soviet
Union, which have developed in a manner satisfactory to  both
parties.  and have been intensified both in the economic  and
in  the  political field since the conclusion of the treaties
of  1939,  the  Government of the Reich takes  the  following
position  on the construction placed by the Soviet Government
on the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact:
     In  article 3 of the German-Russian Non-aggression  Pact
an  obligation was agreed upon for reciprocal information and
consultation  on  questions  of  interest  to  both  parties.
Likewise  at  Moscow at the delimitation  of  the  respective
spheres  of influence, an interest in Bessarabia was stressed
on  the part of Soviet Russia, while Germany declared herself
disinterested in these areas. But that Germany  is  intensely
concerned in the remaining Rumanian territories and the other
problems  of the Danube region, and is even vitally concerned
there,  in  view of the close interpentration of  the  German
economy  with Rumania, particularly in the questions  of  oil
and  grain,  is  generally  known  and  has,  moreover,  been
communicated  to  the Soviet Government on various  occasions
and been recognized by it in its entirety. On the other hand,
after  the  settlement  of the Bessarabian  question  a  like
interest in the rest of Rumanian territory on the part of the
Soviet  Union  is not evident, and has not been expressed  to
the  Government of the Reich, either at the Moscow settlement
or later. The same is true of Hungary. Hence the existence of
mutual  interests  within the meaning of  the  Non-aggression
Pact  of  Moscow is out of the question here. Thus,  even  if
Rumania  and  Hungary are neighboring countries, Germany  has
certainly  not  committed a violation of the  obligation  for
mutual consultation.
     The  Government of the Reich, moreover, believes  itself
the   more  justified  in  this  view,  in  that  the  Soviet
Government itself, on the occasion of various political moves
in  the  recent  past,  by no means considered  the  fact  of
contiguity to Germany of the territories affected by her acts
as a reason for prior consultation with the Government of the
Reich. In this connection, the Government of the Reich refers
to Russian action in the Baltic States, especially Lithuania.
In  the  latter  case,  besides the fact  that  Lithuania  is
adjacent  to  Germany, an obligation existed to surrender  to
Germany a certain area in the southwest of Lithuania  in  the
event  that the Soviet Union should take special measures  on
Lithuanian  territory for the safeguarding of her  interests.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union effected a military occupation
of  that  area  also,  although as a result  of  the  Russian
measures  it  should  have been treated forthwith  as  German
territory. Only
     
Page 183
     
after representations by the Government of the Reich was this
question reopened.
     Further,  one  might  add  that  at  the  occupation  of
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina the Government of the  Reich
likewise  received  only very short notice  from  the  Soviet
Government,  although  in  view of the  many  Germans  living
there, in this case also, Germany had a special interest, and
although the Government of the Reich had already pointed  out
that   for   Germany  it  was  a  new  issue   [ein   Novum].
Nevertheless,  in  view  of its cordial  relations  with  the
Soviet  Union  and  in its desire to see  the  Danube  region
remain  at  peace, the Government of the Reich took  it  upon
itself  to give the Rumanian Government, which had  made  the
most  importunate  representations  for  assistance  to   the
Government  of  the Reich, the stern advice  to  settle  this
question  peacefully,  which  meant  the  cession   of   that
territory to the Soviet Union.
     In  conclusion, the Government of the Reich  would  like
further  to  observe  with reference to  the  statement  that
Germany  had  confronted the Soviet Union  with  accomplished
facts,  that while the moves of the Soviet Union were planned
moves  for  the  occupation  of various  territories  in  the
neighborhood of Germany and were not previously announced  to
the   Government  of  the  Reich,  the  steps  of  the  Reich
Government  in  the  case of Rumania and Hungary  served  the
purpose of securing the peace in the Danube region, which was
gravely  threatened by the tension between the two countries,
and  this  could  only  be accomplished by  rapid  diplomatic
intervention.  Moreover,  the  Government  of  the  Reich  is
probably  not mistaken in believing that by its  campaign  of
pacification in the Danube area it has rendered a substantial
service to all countries bordering on that area.
     
RIBBENTROP

                            *****
                              
Frames 357823-357824, serial 1379

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 4, 1940-5:30 p. m.

No. 1841 of September 4

     Reference your telegram No. 1580 of September 3.
     
     I would appreciate authorization to supplement the ideas
contained  in the memorandum to be handed to Molotov  in  the
sense that the
     
Page 184
     
Soviet  Government  really  set  off  the  great  complex  of
questions  by its settlement of the Bessarabian  matter  with
unexpected speed and that it had thereby forced us, in  order
to avoid military complications in the Balkans, to take quick
decisions  in  the matter of the Rumanian-Hungarian  dispute.
The  beginning  of  the  next to the last  paragraph  of  the
memorandum  might give the Soviet Government  the  chance  to
protest  that, before its action in Bessarabia, it had  given
the  German Government the opportunity to state its views and
had waited for the latter.
     Further I would suggest deleting, in the third paragraph
of  the  memorandum,  the words: " . . .  and  has  not  been
expressed  to  the  Government of the Reich,  either  at  the
Moscow  settlement  or  later," because  they  could  provide
Molotov  with  the opportunity again to revert  to  the  talk
between Mackensen and the Soviet Charg‚ in Rome last May (see
our  telegrams No. 1063 of June 3, No. 1079 of  June  6,  No.
1094 of June 7, [89] and the telegraphic instruction No. 1007
of  June 15 [16]) and to state that the Soviet Government had
at the time repeatedly demonstrated its interest.
     Furthermore,   my  interview  with  Molotov   would   be
substantially facilitated if I were enabled at the same  time
to  communicate to him the position of the German Government,
for  which Molotov has in the meantime pressed several times,
in the matter of the strip of Lithuanian territory as well as
in  the  question  of the Free Port Zone of  Memel  (see  our
telegrams No. 1799 and 1800 of August 30). [90] The  question
of  the Free Port Zone of Memel was taken up with Schnurre on
September 2 by Mikoyan in a manner which leaves no  doubt  as
to  the  resentment felt by the Soviet Government, and  makes
much  more difficult the further pursuit of our interests  in
the  Baltic  States. (See telegram No. 1829 of September  3).
[91]
     Please wire instructions.
     
SCHULENBURG

[89] Telegram of June 7 not printed.
[90] Latter not printed.
[91] Not printed.
     
Page 185
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112457, serial 104
     
  The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram
     
STATE SECRET
BERLIN, September 5, 1940.
     
No. 1604
     
     The  Navy  intends  to abandon the base  on  the  Murman
Coast, as such are now available in Norway. Please inform the
Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Government of
the  Reich,  convey  our thanks for valuable  assistance.  In
addition to the official note, the Commander-in-Chief of  the
Navy  intends  also to express his gratitude  in  a  personal
letter   to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Soviet   Navy.
Therefore please wire when notification has been made.
     
WOERMANN

                            *****
                              
Frames 357827-357830, serial 1379
     
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram
     
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 6, 1940-4:35 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 6, 1940-10 a. m.

No. 1609 of September 5

     For the Ambassador personally.
     Reference your telegram No. 1841.
     
     To  your  suggestions  I state the  following  for  your
information:
     1)  It  is  correct  that  the Hungarian  and  Bulgarian
revisionist  demands on Rumania were set  in  motion  by  the
occupation  of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. However,  we
cannot  very well claim that it was the Russian action  which
made  our  diplomatic intervention so urgent  that  for  this
reason  it  was  no longer possible for us  to  approach  the
Soviet  Union.  Besides, the necessity for  swift  diplomatic
action   is  emphasized  in  the  closing  sentence  of   the
memorandum.  You will please insert therefore, in  the  first
sentence of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum,
after  the  words  "occupation  of  Bessarabia  and  Northern
Bucovina,"  the  qualifying  clause:  "which  also  gave  the
impulse for the launching of revisionist demands on Rumania."

Page 186
     
     2)  That the Soviet Government, before the occupation of
Bessarabia  and  Northern  Bucovina,  formally  gave  us   an
opportunity  to  express our views is  not  disputed  in  our
memorandum,  but it is stressed that it gave us only  a  very
short period in which to do so. In this regard, therefore,  a
change in the memorandum is not necessary.
     3)  The  words in the third paragraph of the memorandum,
stating  that a like interest in Rumania on the part  of  the
Soviet  Union  was  not expressed to the  Government  of  the
Reich, either at the Moscow settlement or later, please leave
unchanged.  If  Herr Molotov should object  that  the  Soviet
Government  had  demonstrated its interest in Rumania  during
discussion  of  the  conversation between Mackensen  and  the
Soviet Charg‚ in Rome, the reply should be made that such  an
interest could not be inferred from his inquiry at that time,
as  he had then only inquired about the attitude of the Reich
Government toward an alleged statement of Mackensen, which in
fact  he  had  not made in the sense imputed to him  at  all.
Besides, I might tell you for your personal information  that
this  passage  in our memorandum is of particular  importance
because  we  are  anxious at this opportunity to  demonstrate
once  and  for  all to the Soviet Union that we  have  really
vital  importance  [Bedeutung] and predominant  interests  in
Rumania  which  led  us to guarantee the  Rumanian  territory
within  its  present borders. Please bear  this  in  mind  in
connection with the orientation of your conversations now and
in  the  future  as well. If necessary, you could  point  out
orally  to  Herr  Molotov in this connection that  after  the
settlement of the Bessarbian question the purely geographical
contiguity  of  the  Soviet Union to  Rumania  could  not  be
invested  with  a  significance  comparable  to  the   German
interests  in  Rumania.  The Soviet  Union,  in  contrast  to
Germany,  certainly  has  sufficient  oil  wells  and   grain
production, so that her relationship to Rumania for this very
reason  could decidedly not be placed on a level  with  ours.
But  please  do  not of your own accord give occasion  for  a
discussion in such detail.
     4)  I  leave  it  to  you whether or not  you  think  it
opportune  to bring up on this occasion the question  of  the
strip of Lithuanian territory. If you think it advisable, you
may  tell  Herr Molotov that the Government of the  Reich  is
prepared  in  principle,  against adequate  compensation,  to
forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which
was  agreed upon in Moscow. The compensation which the Soviet
Union has offered is certainly not acceptable to us. At the
     
Page 187
     
moment  we are engaged in drawing up a proposal for  adequate
compensation and we shall soon approach the Soviet Government
with this proposal.
     5)  On  the other hand, I request you not to broach  the
question of the Free Port of Memel on this occasion. We  must
persist  in  our  view  that  we  cannot  grant  the   Soviet
Government a free port zone in Memel. But this question  will
have to be discussed separately with the Soviet Government.
     Please  report  by wire on the course of your  interview
with Herr Molotov.
     
RIBBENTROP
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 112472, serial 104
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram
     
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 10, 1940-12:55 a. m.
Received September 10, 1940-4:30 a. m.

No. 1884 of September 9
     
     Reference your telegram No. 1609 of the 5th.
     For the Reich Minister personally.
     
     Instruction  carried out. Handed memorandum  to  Molotov
this  evening.  Molotov  read  it  through  attentively   and
declared  that  the matter was so important  for  the  Soviet
Government  that it would reply in writing.  But  he  had  to
state  now,  that the position taken by the German Government
could  not  alter the Soviet position. The Soviet  Government
persisted  in  its  view  that  the  conduct  of  the  German
Government  in Vienna was not entirely in good  faith  [nicht
ganz  loyal], as [the German Government] could not have  been
in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania
and  Hungary. The Soviet Government was, however, by no means
disputing  the  fact  that Germany had special  interests  in
Rumania.
     To  justify his position, Molotov pointed out  that  the
entire world press assumed as a matter of course that in  the
present  case a consultation between Germany and  the  Soviet
Union had certainly taken place.
     
SCHULENBURG
     
Page 188
     
                            *****
                              
Frame 214737, serial 407
     
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
     
                          Telegram
     
URGENT
Moscow, September 10, 1940-5:58 p. m.
Received September 11, 1940-8 p. m.

No. 1900 of September 11
     
     Reference your telegram No. 1649 of the 10th. [92]
     
     Molotov  displayed great interest in, and had me  repeat
several  times,  the statement that "the  Government  of  the
Reich    is   prepared   in   principle,   against   adequate
compensation,  to  forego  the  cession  of  the   strip   of
Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow." I  had
the impression that Molotov was satisfied. The statement that
the  compensation offered was certainly not acceptable to  us
and  that  we  were engaged in drawing up a counter-proposal,
Molotov noted with interest, without any further comment.
     
SCHULENBURG

[92] Not printed.

     
                            *****
                              
Frames 0463-0464, serial F 5
     
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
     
                          Telegram
     
RAM 37 g. Rs.
BERLIN, September 16, 1940.

No. . .
     
     For the Ambassador personally.
     
     Please  call  on  Herr  Molotov  on  the  afternoon   of
September   21,  if  by  that  time  you  are  not  otherwise
instructed,  and  communicate to him verbally  and  casually,
preferably while engaged on another errand, the following:
     The continued penetration of English planes into Germany
and  into  the  territories  occupied  by  Germany  makes  it
necessary  to strengthen the defenses at several points,  and
particularly  in northern Norway. Part of this  reinforcement
is  an  antiaircraft  artillery battalion,  which,  with  its
equipment,   is   to   be  stationed  in   northern   Norway.
Investigation of the transport facilities revealed  that  for
this  purpose the route by way of Finland would  present  the
least difficulty. This
     
     
Page 189
     
antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda
on  September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail,
and the rest by road.
     The   Finnish   Government,  appreciating  the   special
circumstances, has granted the German request to permit  this
transport to take place.
     We  are anxious to inform the Soviet Government of  this
step  in  advance.  Wire  report that  instruction  has  been
carried out.
     We  assume-and  request  express  confirmation-that  the
Soviet  Government  will  keep  this  communication  strictly
secret.
     
RIBBENTROP

                            *****
                              
Frame 0464-serial F 5
     
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Minister in Finland
                          (Blcher)
     
                          Telegram
     
No. . .
BERLIN, September 16, 1940.
     
     For the Minister personally.
     
     Arrangements  have  been  made  by  German  and  Finnish
military  authorities for the transport  of  an  antiaircraft
artillery  battalion  through Finland.  I  wired  the  Moscow
Embassy in this matter as follows:
     Insert [preceding document].
     End of telegram to Moscow.
     Please  notify the Foreign Minister in Helsinki  on  the
afternoon of September 21 of the step which is being taken in
Moscow.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****
                              
Frames 112531-112538, serial 104
                              
   Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
                        (Schulenburg)
     
SEPTEMBER 21, 1940.
     
     Subject: Interview with Molotov on Vienna conversations.
     
     Before my departure for Berlin, Molotov received me at 5
p. m. on September 21, 1940. On this occasion he handed me an
exhaustive  memorandum [93] in reply to the German memorandum
on the subject of
     
[93] For text, see enclosure to this document.

Page 190
     
the  Vienna conversations, which I had transmitted to him  on
September 9, 1940, on behalf of the Government of the  Reich.
[94]
     In  the  course  of  the  interview,  Molotov  explained
verbally   the   contents   of  the  memorandum,   expressing
essentially the same ideas as on September 9. (See memorandum
of Hilger, Counselor of Embassy, of September 18, 1940.) [95]
     When  I  pointed  out that I could not recall  that  he-
Molotov-had ever spoken of German support for the  claims  of
the  Soviet Government to Southern Bucovina and that I  could
merely  remember  the casual little phrase  that  the  Soviet
Government would "for the present" confine itself to Northern
Bucovina,  Molotov replied that apparently he had  made  this
remark in an indefinite way at the time.
     Then  Molotov reverted-repeatedly-to the last  paragraph
of  the  memorandum, in which he emphasized that an amendment
or  annulment of article 3 of the Non-aggression Treaty might
be discussed, if this article inconvenienced us in any way or
had proved restrictive.
     I  replied that in my opinion the German Government  had
no intentions at all along these lines.
     Herr  Molotov further stated that the German  action  at
Vienna  had given the foreign press cause to speak of German-
Russian disagreements and to assert that the guarantee of the
Rumanian  border  was directed against the Soviet  Union.  It
would  have been easy to forestall such rumors by asking  the
Soviet  Government in advance about its intentions.  In  this
case,  the Soviet Government would have given the unequivocal
reply that it had no aggressive designs on Rumania.
     In  conclusion, Herr Molotov repeated his  request  that
during  my  stay  in Berlin I do everything  to  clarify  the
position of the Soviet Government on this question, which, of
course, I promised to do.
     
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
     
Moscow, September 21, 1940.
     
                         [Enclosure]
     
 The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
       Union to the German Embassy in the Soviet Union
     
     In   reply   to   German  Ambassador   Count   von   der
Schulenburg's  memorandum of September 9 of  this  year,  the
People's  Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the  honor  to
state as follows:
     
[94]  For text, see telegrams from the Reich Foreign Minister
to  the  German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Nos. 1580  of
September 3 and 1609 of September 5, 1940, ante, pp. 181  and
185.
[95]  Not  printed.  For  the  Ambassador's  account  of  his
presentation  of the German memorandum, see his telegram  No.
1884 of September 9, 1940, ante, p. 187.
     
Page 191
     
     1) In reply to the declaration of the People's Commissar
for  Foreign  Affairs, V. M. Molotov, of August  31  of  this
year,  to the effect that the Government of the German  Reich
had  disregarded article 3 of the treaty of consultation, the
Government  of the German Reich states that Germany  did  not
violate  her obligation to consult. In justification  of  its
position,  the  Government of the German Reich  states  that,
after  the solution of the Bessarabian question, the U.S.S.R.
and Germany, from the standpoint of the Moscow Non-aggression
Pact,  no  longer  had any common interests with  respect  to
Rumania and Hungary.
     The  Soviet  Government is of the opinion  that  such  a
construction   by   the  Government  of  the   German   Reich
contravenes  article 3 of the Treaty of August 23,  1939,  by
virtue  of  which the contracting parties obligate themselves
in the future to "maintain continual contact with one another
for   the  purpose  of  consultation  in  order  to  exchange
information on problems affecting their common interests."
     There  is no doubt that the decisions reached at  Vienna
regarding   the  transfer  of  a  considerable   portion   of
Transylvania  to Hungary and regarding the guarantee  of  the
national  territory of Rumania by Germany and  Italy  involve
the  very questions that affect the common interests  of  our
countries and consequently make the consultation provided for
in  article  3  of the Treaty of August 23, 1939  obligatory.
Definite  information regarding the above-mentioned decisions
at Vienna was not given by the Government of the German Reich
to  the Soviet Government until after the Vienna Award, which
confronted the Soviet Government with an accomplished fact.
     The  Soviet Government must also point to the fact  that
the  granting of the guarantee to Rumania in respect  to  her
national territory gave justification for the assertion  that
this  action  of  the  Government of  the  German  Reich  was
directed against the U.S.S.R. As is known, assertions of this
kind  actually received a wide circulation. If, however,  the
Government  of the German Reich had approached the Government
of   the   U.S.S.R.  on  this  question  in  advance,   every
justification  for the circulation of such  assertions  would
have  disappeared and the Government of the German  Reich  at
the  same  time  would have fully convinced itself  that  the
U.S.S.R.   does  not  intend  to  threaten  the   territorial
integrity  of Rumania. From this is evident the extraordinary
importance   of   timely  information  and  consultation   on
questions affecting the common interests of the U.S.S.R.  and
Germany.

Page 192
     
     The  Soviet Government regrets to have to state that the
view  expressed in the reply of the Government of the  German
Reich  of  September 9 of this year is also at variance  with
the declaration made on June 23 of this year by Count von der
Schulenburg on behalf of the Government of the German  Reich.
As  is known, the Government of the German Reich in that case
replied-to  a  specific inquiry of the Soviet Government-that
the  obligation to inform and consult arising from article  3
of  the Treaty is applicable to the countries of southeastern
Europe  and  the Balkans. It appears from the foregoing  that
the  Government  of  the German Reich in June  of  this  year
recognized  the obligation to consult on questions concerning
such  countries as Rumania and Hungary, particularly on  such
important  questions  as those dealt with  at  Vienna,  which
affect the interests of the U.S.S.R.
     The Soviet Government, for its part, considers it as its
duty  to  state that it reaffirms its declarations concerning
the  recognition of the special economic interests of Germany
in  Rumania,  especially  in the  domain  of  oil  and  grain
supplies.  At  the  same time, however, it  is  compelled  to
declare  that the inference which might be drawn  from  Count
von  der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year
is  incorrect:  that  after the solution of  the  Bessarabian
question the Soviet Government had recognized in its entirety
the  exclusive  interest of Germany in the Rumanian  question
and  also  in other questions affecting the Danube basin.  In
reality,  the  Soviet Government has neither  orally  nor  in
writing recognized any such rights on the part of Germany.
     2)  To justify the omission of such a consultation  with
the  Government of the U.S.S.R. in the Vienna decisions,  the
Government of the German Reich cites the fact that  allegedly
the  Government  of  the U.S.S.R. did not  consult  with  the
Government  of the German Reich, either, on its  measures  in
the  Baltic  States, especially in Lithuania, and  gave  only
short notice with regard to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina.
     The  Soviet  Government must, in the first place,  point
out  that  during  the entire period of the validity  of  the
Treaty of August 23, 1939 the Government of the German  Reich
did  not once declare that the Soviet Government had violated
its  treaty  obligations or had failed to  consult  with  the
Government   of  the  German  Reich  on  the  above-mentioned
questions. The Soviet Government is of the opinion  that  the
best way to establish mutual understanding and to secure  the
complete and effective performance of the obligations imposed
by  the Treaty is by a timely declaration of claims that  may
arise, in case
     
Page 193
     
there  actually  are such claims. The Soviet Government  must
point  out  that  during the whole year that  the  Treaty  of
August  23, 1939 has been in effect it kind not received  any
such declarations or claims from the Government of the German
Reich.
     To  turn to the substance of the above-mentioned matter,
the  Soviet Government believes it necessary to declare  that
the  said statement of the Government of the German Reich  is
not  in accord with the real situation. The Soviet Government
not  only  informed  the Government of the  German  Reich  in
advance  regarding the measures it intended to  take  in  the
Baltic  States,  especially in Lithuania, but  even  received
from  the Government of the German Reich on June 17  of  this
year  a communication stating that the measures taken by  the
Soviet Government in those countries were regarded by Germany
as measures which concerned solely the Soviet Union and those
countries.  Such  a  declaration from the Government  of  the
German  Reich  was  entirely  comprehensible  to  the  Soviet
Government,  as  Germany  had  as  recently  as  August  1939
recognized  the  special interests of  the  Soviet  Union  in
respect  to  the  Baltic States, and the measures  which  the
Soviet  Union  had  taken regarding those states,  especially
Lithuania,  in  no way went beyond the scope of  the  Soviet-
German  Pact of August 23, 1939. In regard to a certain  area
in the Southeast of Lithuania, however, the Soviet Government
in June of this year clearly confirmed the rights of Germany,
and  reserved  its new proposals concerning  this  Lithuanian
area  for  a special arrangement with the Government  of  the
German Reich.
     The   same  holds  true  as  regards  the  question   of
Bessarabia  and  Bucovina,  in regard  to  which  the  Soviet
Government  held  a consultation with the Government  of  the
German Reich, at which it met the viewpoint of the Government
of   the  German  Reich  by  substantially  paring  down  its
intentions  with  regard to Bucovina. At  the  same  time  it
voiced the hope that the Government of the German Reich would
give its support in the future, when the question of Southern
Bucovina  was  reopened.  This  declaration  of  the   Soviet
Government met with no objection from the Government  of  the
German Reich.
     Its  attitude  on questions pertaining to  Rumania  was,
moreover, communicated by the Soviet Government on June 25 of
this  year  to  the  Italian Government through  the  Italian
Ambassador,  Herr  Rosso,  and  it  was  convinced  that  the
Government of the German Reich would be duly informed of this
communication   of   the   Soviet   Government.    In    this
communication, the Soviet Government, while emphasizing  that
it  wished  to  obtain  from Rumania merely  what  rightfully
belonged  to  it, declared: "Regarding other  territories  of
Rumania, the
     
Page 194

U.S.S.R. is mindful of the interests of Italy and Germany and
is  prepared to come to an understanding with them  on  these
questions."
     On  the  basis of the foregoing explanations, the Soviet
Government deems it necessary to declare that the measures it
took  in  regard to the Baltic States and in Bessarabia  were
entirely  in accord with the Soviet-German Treaty, while  the
new  and  lesser problems which were not anticipated in  this
Treaty  are  being solved and will be solved  by  the  Soviet
Government in consultation with the Government of the  German
Reich.
     Hence  the  reference by the Government  of  the  German
Reich to the measures carried out by the Soviet Union in  the
Baltic  region  as an explanation of the failure  to  consult
with  the Soviet Government regarding the Vienna decision  is
not confirmed by the facts and therefore not justified.
     3)  In  conclusion  the Government of the  German  Reich
points  to  the  circumstance that in  the  solution  of  the
Hungarian-Rumanian dispute on August 30 it had to proceed  by
swift diplomatic intervention.
     Here  the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall
that  this  question  had been considered  as  early  as  the
conferences in Salzburg between the Government of the  German
Reich  and  the Governments of Hungary and Rumania and  that,
consequently,  the  Government  of  the  German   Reich   had
sufficient  time at its disposal to consult with  the  Soviet
Government on this question.
     The aforesaid circumstances, therefore, cannot serve  as
justification for the failure of the Government of the German
Reich  to  comply with the obligation to consult, imposed  by
the  Non-aggression Treaty, in the Rumanian question  and  in
the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute.
     The  Soviet  Government  is firmly  convinced  that  the
precise and strict observance of this Treaty, particularly of
article  3  of the Treaty, is also one of the most  important
conditions  in the matter of the pacification of  the  Danube
region,  to  which  reference is made in  the  memorandum  of
September 9 of this year.
     In  conclusion, the Soviet Government deems it necessary
to  add to the foregoing considerations that, if article 3 of
the Non-aggression Treaty involves certain inconveniences and
restrictions  from  the standpoint of the Government  of  the
German  Reich, the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate
on  the  question  of  an amendment to or  deletion  of  this
article  of  the Treaty. The Soviet Government  considers  it
desirable  to have a special agreement to consider  the  time
and manner of dealing with this question.
     Moscow, September 21, 1940.
     

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