Archive/File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.002 Last-Modified: 1997/10/19 Page 50 II. AGREEMENT ACHIEVED, AUGUST 14-AUGUST 23, 1939 ***** Frames 69510-639513, serial 127 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, August 14, 1939-10:53 p. m. Received Moscow, August 15, 1939-4:40 a. m. No. 175 of August 14 For the Ambassador personally. I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and communicate to him the following: 1) The ideological contradictions between National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the sole reason why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood opposed to each other in two separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of a new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign policy can be brought to an end once and for all and the way lies open for a new sort of future for both countries. 2) There exist no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of Germany and the U.S.S.R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not conflict. Thus there is lacking all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the U.S.S.R. The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic area, Poland, Southeastern questions, etc. In such matters political cooperation between the two countries can have only a beneficial effect. The same applies to German and Soviet economy, which can be expanded in any direction. 3) There is no doubt that German-Soviet policy today has come to an historic turning point. The decisions with respect to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and Moscow will be of deci- Page 51 sive importance for the aspect of relationships between the German people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for generations. On those decisions will depend whether the two peoples will some day again and without any compelling reason take up arms against each other or whether they pass again into a friendly relationship. It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies. 4) It is true that Germany and the U.S.S.R., as a result of years of hostility in their respective world outlooks, today look at each other in a distrustful fashion. A great deal of rubbish which has accumulated will have to be cleared away. It must be said, however, that even during this period the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians never disappeared. The policy of both states can be built anew on that basis. 5) The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from all experience, count it as certain that the capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into the war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and of the U.S.S.R., which would profit only the Western democracies. 6) The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations desirable. Otherwise these matters, without any German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the territorial questions of Eastern Europe. The leadership in both countries should, therefore not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual lack of knowledge of views and intentions our peoples should be finally driven asunder. As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also has the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Fhrer, to set forth the Fhrer's views to Page 52 Herr Stalin. Only through such a direct discussion, in the view of Herr von Ribbentrop, can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a definite improvement in German-Russian relations. ANNEX: I request that you do not give Herr Molotov these instructions in writing, but that you read them to him. I consider it important that they reach Herr Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you at the same time to request from Herr Molotov on my behalf an audience with Herr Stalin so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip. RIBBENTROP ***** Frames 254836-254837, serial 644 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 16, 1939-2:30 a. m. SECRET No. 175 of August 15 Reference your telegram No. 175 of August 14. Molotov received with greatest interest the information I had been authorized to convey, designated it as extremely important, and declared that he would report it to his Government at once and give me an answer shortly. He could already state that the Soviet Government warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet Union and in view of my communication of today now believed in the sincerity of these intentions. In the matter of the Reich Foreign Minister coming here, he wanted to state tentatively, as his own opinion, that such a trip required adequate preparation in order that the exchange of opinions might lead to results. In this connection, he was interested in the question of how the German Government was disposed to the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and further, whether the German Government was prepared to influence Japan for the purpose of improvement in Soviet- Japanese relations and settlement of border conflicts and whether a possible joint guarantee of the Baltic States was contemplated by Germany. Page 53 With regard to sought-for expansion of commercial intercourse, M. admitted that negotiations were progressing successfully in Berlin and approaching a favorable conclusion. M. repeated that if my communication of today included the idea of a non-aggression pact or something similar, this question must be discussed in concrete terms, in order that, in the event the Reich Foreign Minister comes here, it will not be a matter of an exchange of opinion but that concrete decisions will be made. M. recognized that speed was necessary in order not to be confronted with accomplished facts, but stressed the fact that adequate preparation of the problems mentioned by him was indispensable. A detailed memorandum  on the course of the conversation will follow Thursday by special courier via plane. SCHULENBURG ***** Frames 69503-69509, serial 127 Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) SECRET I began the interview with Molotov on August la about 8:00 p m. by stating that according to information which had reached us the Soviet Government was interested in continuing the political conversations, but that it preferred that they be carried on in Moscow. Molotov replied that this was correct. Then I read to Herr Molotov the contents of the instruction which had been sent to me and the German text was immediately translated into Russian, paragraph by paragraph. I also informed Molotov about the content of the annex to the instruction which I had received. Molotov took under consideration my communication that on the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister I was to ask for an audience with Herr Stalin, as well as my statement that in addition to the conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin was a condition for the proposed visit of the Reich Foreign Minister. With regard to the desire of the Reich Foreign Minister that the content of the instruction should reach Herr Stalin in as exact a form as possible, Molotov made a gesture of assent. Molotov listened to the reading of the instruction with close [gespannter] attention, and he directed his secretary to make as extensive and exact notes as possible.  See the following document. Page 54 Molotov then declared that in view of the importance of my communication he could not give me an answer at once but he must first render a report to his Government. He could state at once, however, that the Soviet Government warmly [lebhaft] welcomed the intention expressed on the German side to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Prior to the further communication which he would make to me shortly, after securing instructions from his Government, he wanted, at the moment, to express the following views of his own with regard to the proposals of the German Government. A trip by the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow would require extensive preparation if the intended exchange of views was to produce any result. In this connection, he asked me for information as to whether the following was in accordance with the facts. The Soviet Government at the end of June of this year had received a telegraphic report from its Charg in Rome about a conference between the latter and the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano. In this conversation Ciano had said that there was a German plan under way which had as its goal a decisive improvement in German-Soviet relations. In that connection Ciano had referred to the following items in the plan: 1) Germany would not be disinclined to exercise influence on Japan for the purpose of an improvement of her relations with the Soviet Union and the elimination of the boundary disputes. 2) Further, the possibility was envisaged of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and making a joint guarantee of the Baltic States. 3) Germany was prepared to make an economic treaty with the Soviet Union on a broad basis. The contents of the foregoing points had aroused great interest on the part of the Soviet Government and he, Molotov, would very much like to know how much of the plan which Ciano had outlined in the form just mentioned to the Soviet Charg was true. I replied that the statements of Ciano apparently rested on a report of the Italian Ambassador here, Rosso, of which we had already heard. The content of this report rested principally on Rosso's deductions. To a question interjected by Molotov as to whether Rosso was inventing his information, I replied that that was only partly correct. We wanted, as Molotov knew, an improvement in German-Soviet relations and naturally had considered how such an improvement could be brought about. The result of these deliberations was contained in my communications which were known to Molotov and in the state- Page 55 ments of the Reich Foreign Minister and of Herr Schnurre to Herr Astakhov. Molotov replied that the question as to whether Rosso had informed his Government correctly did not interest him further. The Soviet Government at the present moment was interested above all in knowing whether plans such as those which were contained in Rosso's report, or something similar, actually did exist and whether the German Government was still following such a line of thought. He, Molotov, after hearing of the report from Rome had seen nothing improbable about it. The Soviet Government all through recent years had been under the impression that the German Government had no desire to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Now the situation had changed. From the conferences which had taken place in the last few weeks, the Soviet Government had gotten the impression that the German Government was really in earnest in its intentions to bring about a change in relations with the Soviet Union. He regarded the statement which had been made today as decisive and as one in which this wish was especially completely and clearly expressed. As regards the Soviet Government, it had always had a favorable attitude with regard to the question of good relations with Germany and was happy that this was now the case on the German side also. Whether the details as contained in Rosso's report were actually what the Germans had in mind was not of such overwhelming importance. He, Molotov, had the impression that there must be a great deal of truth in them, since these ideas paralleled those advanced from the German side for some months. In this connection he stated with satisfaction that the economic discussions in Berlin were continuing and apparently promised good results. I remarked that the course of the economic negotiations was satisfactory to us as well, and I asked how he envisaged the further method of procedure in the political conversations. Molotov repeated that he was interested above everything else in an answer to the question of whether on the German side there was the desire to make more concrete the points which had been outlined in Rosso's report. So, for example, the Soviet Government would like to know whether Germany saw any real possibility of influencing Japan in the direction of a better relationship with the Soviet Union. "Also, how did things stand with the idea of the conclusion of a non- aggression pact? Was the German Government sympathetically inclined to the idea or would the matter have to be gone into more deeply?" were Molotov's exact words. Page 56 I replied that, as regards the relationship to Japan, the Reich Foreign Minister had already said to Herr Astakhov that he had his own views on this matter. Thus it might be assumed that the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to interest himself in this matter also, since his influence upon the Japanese Government was certainly not slight. Molotov said that all this interested him very much and, at this point, he interjected that Ciano had told the Soviet Charg that he would strongly support the ideas in the Rosso report. He continued that it was very important for the Soviet Government in connection with the intended trip of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow to obtain an answer to the question of whether the German Government was prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact or something similar with the Soviet Union. On an earlier occasion there had been mention of the possibility of "a resurrection and revival of earlier treaties." I confirmed to Herr Molotov that we really were considering a new order of things [eine Neuordnung der Dinge] either in connection with what had gone before or perhaps on an entirely new foundation. I then asked him whether I might conclude that the questions which had been put by him would constitute the substance of the conferences with the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow and that he had only communicated them to me so that I might prepare the Reich Foreign Minister for these questions. Molotov replied that he would still have to make a further reply to me with regard to the question of the visit here by the Reich Foreign Minister. It seemed to him, however, that for such a journey a previous clarification and preparation of definite questions would be necessary, so that it would not be just conversations which were carried on in Moscow, but that decisions could be made as well. He heartily subscribed to my statement that a prompt clarification was desirable. He also had the opinion that haste was desirable, so that the march of events would not confront us with accomplished facts. He must, therefore, repeat that if the German Government was favorably inclined to the idea of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and if my statement of today included this or a similar idea, more concrete discussion of these questions should take place at once. He requested me to inform my Government in this sense. COUNT von der SCHULENBURG Moscow, August 16, 1939. Page 57 ***** Frames 178545-178547, serial 276 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizscker) Moscow, August 16, 1939. MY ESTEEMED STATE SECRETARY: With regard to my conversation of yesterday with Herr Molotov, I should like in all haste to stress especially the following: Herr Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I received the impression that the proposal of the visit of the Reich Minister was very flattering personally to Herr Molotov and that he considers it an actual proof of our good intentions. (I recall that-according to newspaper dispatches- Moscow requested that England and France send a Cabinet Minister here, and that, instead, only Herr Strang came, because London and Paris had been angry that Herr Voroshilov had not been permitted to accept the invitation to the British maneuvers, which is, in fact, quite another matter, since high Soviet Russians have heretofore never traveled abroad.) In Herr Molotov's statements yesterday, the surprising moderation in his demands on us also seems to be worthy of note. He did not once use the words "Anti-Comintern Pact," and no longer demanded of us, as he did in the last conversation, "suppression" of support of Japanese aggression. He limited himself to the wish that we might bring about a Soviet-Japanese settlement. More significant is his quite clearly expressed wish to conclude a non-aggression pact with us. Despite all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining entirely clearly what Herr Molotov desired in the matter of the Baltic States. It appears that he mentioned the question of a joint guarantee of the Baltic States as only one point in Herr Rosso's report, but did not expressly make the demand that we give such a guarantee. Such a joint guarantee seems to me at variance with the behavior of the Soviet Government in the British-French negotiations. It actually looks at the moment as if we would achieve the desired results in the negotiations here. With cordial greetings and a Heil Hitler! I am, Herr State Secretary, Your ever devoted COUNT von der SCHULENBURG Page 58 ***** Frames 69501-69502, serial 127 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Telegram URGENT BERLIN, August 16, 1939-4:15 p. m. Received MOSCOW, August 17, 1939-1 a. m. No. 179 of August 16 For the Ambassador personally. I request that you again call upon Herr Molotov with the statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to yesterday's message for Herr Stalin, a supplementary instruction just received from Berlin, which relates to the questions raised by Herr Molotov. Please then state to Herr Molotov the following: 1) the points brought up by Herr Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is, Germany is read, [bereit] to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the Soviet Government so desires, one which would be irrevocable [unkndbar] for a term of twenty-five years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, it is thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is ready, to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations. 2) The Fhrer is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation, and of the possibility of the occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of the pressing questions are desirable. For these reasons the Reich Foreign Minister declares that he is prepared to come by plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal on the basis of full powers from the Fhrer with the entire complex of German-Russian questions and. if the occasion arises [gegebenenfalls], to sign the appropriate treaties. ANNEX: I request that you read these instructions to Herr Molotov and ask for the reaction of the Russian Government and Herr Stalin. Entirely confidentially, it is added for your guidance that it would be of very special interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the end of this week or the beginning of next week. RIBBENTROP Page 59 ***** Frames 69496-69500, serial 127 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office VERY URGENT Moscow, August 18, 1939-5:30 a. m. SECRET No. 189 of August 17 Reference your telegram 179 of August 16. After I had read to Molotov the supplementary instructions, Molotov declared, without going into their content more closely, that he could give me today the answer of the Soviet Government to my communication of August 15. Stalin was following the conversations with great interest, he was being informed about all their details, and he was in complete agreement with Molotov. Here Molotov read the answer of the Soviet Government, which in the text given to me is as follows: "The Soviet Government has taken cognizance of the statement of the German Government transmitted by Count Schulenburg on August 15 concerning its desire for a real improvement in the political relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. "In view of the official statements of individual representatives of the German Government which have not infrequently had an unfriendly and even hostile character with reference to the U.S.S.R. the Soviet Government up till very recently has had the impression that the German Government was working for an excuse for a clash with the U.S.S.R., was preparing itself for such a clash, and was basing the necessity of its constantly increasing armament on the inevitability of such a clash. Not to mention the fact that the German Government by means of the so-called 'Anti- Comintern Pact' was attempting to build up a unified front of a group of states against the U.S.S.R., and was attempting with especial persistence to draw Japan in. "It is understandable that such a policy on the part of the German Government compelled the U.S.S.R. to take serious steps in the preparation of a defense against possible aggression on the part of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and also to participate in the organization of a defensive front of a group of states against such an aggression. "If, however, the German Government now undertakes a change from the old policy in the direction of a sincere improvement in political relations with the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government can look upon such a change only with pleasure and is on its own part prepared to alter its policy in the direction of an appreciable [ernsthaften] improvement in relations with Germany. Page 60 "If there be added to this the fact that the Soviet Government has never had any sort of aggressive intentions toward Germany and will not have such, and that now as previously the Soviet Government considers a peaceful solution of the questions at issue in the field of relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. as entirely possible, and that the principle of a peaceful existence of various political systems side by side represents a long established principle of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., one comes to the conclusion that for the establishment of new and improved political relations between the two countries, there are now at hand not only a real basis, but the actual prerequisites for undertaking serious and practical steps in that direction. "The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that the first step toward such an improvement in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement. "The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion of a special protocol which would define the interests of the signatory parties in this or that question of foreign policy and which would form an integral part of the pact." Next Molotov supplied the following supplementary information: 1) Economic agreements must be concluded first. What has been begun must be carried through to the end. 2) Then there may follow after a short interval, according to German choice, the conclusion of a non- aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty of 1926. In either case there must follow the conclusion of a protocol in which, among other things, the German statements of August 15 would be included. 3) With regard to the proposed trip of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow, he declared that the Soviet Government was very gratified by this proposal, since the dispatch of such a distinguished public figure and statesman emphasized the earnestness of the intentions of the German Government. This stood in noteworthy contrast to England, who, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of the second class to Moscow. A journey by the Reich Foreign Minister, however, required thorough preparation. The Soviet Government did not like the publicity that such a journey would cause. They preferred that practical work be accomplished without so much ceremony. To my remark that it was precisely by the journey of the Reich Foreign Minister that the practical goal could be speedily reached, Molotov countered that the Soviet Government nevertheless preferred the other way in which the first step had already been taken. To my question as to how the Soviet Government reacted to my communication of today, Molotov declared that today's favorable German reply had not been known to the Soviet Government when its answer Page 61 was prepared and it would still have to be examined, but that today's Soviet answer already contained all the essentials. He suggested that on the German side we take up at once the preparation of a draft for the non-aggression pact or for the reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty, as the case might be, as well as for the protocol; the same would be done on the Soviet side. I stated that I would report these proposals to my Government. With regard to the protocol, it would be desirable to have more exact information about the wishes of the Soviet Government. The conversation was concluded with Molotov's expressing the desire to be supplied as soon as possible with our drafts. SCHULENBURG ***** Frames 69492-69495, serial 127 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Telegram VERY URGENT BERLIN, August 18, 1939-10:48 p. m. Received Moscow, August l9, 1939-5:45 a. m. No. 185 of August 18 For the Ambassador personally. Reference your telegram No. 182.  Please arrange immediately another conversation with Herr Molotov and do everything possible to see that this conversation takes place without any delay. At this conference, I would ask you to speak with Herr Molotov in the following sense: The Reich Government, to its great satisfaction, has learned from his last statement the favorable attitude of the Soviet Government with regard to the remolding of German- Russian relations. We, too, under normal circumstances, would naturally be ready to pursue a re-alignment of German-Russian relations further through diplomatic channels and to carry it out in the customary way. But the present unusual situation made it necessary, in the opinion of the Fhrer, to employ a different method which would lead to quick results. German- Polish relations were becoming more acute from day to day. We had to take into account that incidents might occur any day that would make the outbreak of hostilities unavoidable. To judge from the whole attitude of the Polish Government, the developments in this  supra. Page 62 respect by no means rested with us. The Fhrer considers it necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of a German-Polish conflict while we are striving for a clarification of German-Russian relations. He therefore considers a previous clarification necessary, if only to be able to consider Russian interests in case of such a conflict, which would, of course, be difficult without such a clarification. The statement made by Herr Molotov refers to your first communication of August 15th. My supplementary instruction had gone beyond this and stated clearly that we were in complete agreement with the idea of a non-aggression pact, a guarantee of the Baltic States, and German pressure on Japan. All factual elements for immediate commencement of direct verbal negotiations and for a final accord were therefore present. Furthermore, you may mention that the first stage mentioned by Herr Molotov, namely, the conclusion of negotiations for a new German-Russian economic agreement, has today been completed, so that we should now attack the second stage.  We were, therefore, now asking for an immediate reaction to the proposal made in the supplementary instruction regarding my immediate departure for Moscow. Please add in this connection that I would come with full powers from the Fhrer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the total complex of problems. As far as the non-aggression pact especially is concerned, it seems to us so simple as to require no long preparation. We have in mind here the following three points,  which I would ask you to read to Herr M., but not to hand to him. ARTICLE 1. The German Reich and the U.S.S.R. will in no event resort to war or to any other use of force with respect to each other. ARTICLE 2. this agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature and shall be valid and undenounceable thereafter for a term of twenty-five years. Please state in this connection that I am in a position, with regard to this proposal, to arrange details in verbal discussions at Moscow  For a summary of the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of August 19, 1939, see the memorandum by Schnurre of August 29, 1930, post, p 83.  In a telegram of August 19, 1939, 1:44 p. m. (Moscow, No. 180, not printed here) Ambassador Schulenburg called attention to the fact that the following draft of a non- aggression treaty contained only two articles. Page 63 and, if occasion arises, to comply with Russian wishes. I am also in a position to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area, the problem of the Baltic States, etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems to us of considerable importance, is only possible, however, at an oral discussion. Please emphasize in this connection, that German foreign policy has today reached a historic turning point. This time please conduct conversation, except for above articles of agreement, not in the form of a reading of these instructions, but by pressing emphatically, in the sense of the foregoing statements, for a rapid realization of my trip and by opposing appropriately any possible new Russian objections. In this connection you must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is probable and that we therefore have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately. RIBBENTROP ***** Frames 69490-69491, serial 127 The German Ambassador in The Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 19, 1939-5:50 p. m. No. 187 of August 19 Reference your telegram No. 185 of August 18. The Soviet Government agrees to the Reich Foreign Minister's coming to Moscow one week after proclamation of the signing of the economic agreement. Molotov stated that if the conclusion of the economic agreement is proclaimed tomorrow, the Reich Foreign Minister might arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27. Molotov delivered to me a draft of a non-aggression pact. A detailed account of the two conversations I had with Molotov today, as well as the text of the Soviet draft, follows by wire at once. SCHULENBERG Page 64 ***** Frames 69481-69483, serial 127 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 19, 1939. SECRET No. 189 of August 19 Supplementing my telegram No. 187 of August 19. In my first conversation of today with Molotov-which began at 2 o'clock and lasted an hour-after having made the communications I had been charged with, I repeatedly tried to convince M. of the fact that a visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow was the only way of achieving the speed that was urgently called for because of the political situation. M. acknowledged the positive importance of the proposed trip, stressed the fact that the Soviet Government understood and esteemed the underlying purpose, but persisted in his opinion that for the present it was not possible even approximately to fix the time of the journey since it required thorough preparation. This applied both to the non- aggression pact and to the contents of the protocol to be concluded simultaneously. The German draft of the non- aggression pact was by no means exhaustive. The Soviet Government desired that one of the many non-aggression pacts that the Soviet Government had concluded with other countries (for example with Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) should serve as a model for the non-aggression pact with Germany. He left it to the German Government to choose from among them the one that seemed suitable. Further, the content of the protocol was a very serious question and the Soviet Government expected the German Government to state more specifically what points were to be covered in the protocol. The attitude of the Soviet Government toward treaties which it concludes was a very serious one; it respected the obligations which it undertook and expected the same of its treaty partners. To the reasons I repeatedly and very emphatically advanced for the need for haste, M. rejoined that so far not even the first step-the closing of the economic agreements- had been taken. First of all, the economic agreement had to be signed and proclaimed and put into effect. Then would come the turn of the non-aggression pact and protocol. M. remained apparently unaffected by my protests, so that the first conversation closed with a declaration on the part of M. that he had Page 65 imparted to me the views of the Soviet Government and had nothing to add to them. Hardly half an hour after the close of the conversation, M. sent me word, asking me to call on him again at the Kremlin at 4:30 p. m. He apologized for putting me to the trouble and explained that he had reported to the Soviet Government and was authorized to hand me a draft of the non-aggression pact. As far as the Reich Foreign Minister's trip was concerned, the Soviet Government agreed to Herr von Ribbentrop's coming to Moscow about a week after proclamation of the signing of the economic agreement. Thus, if this proclamation takes place tomorrow, Herr won Ribbentrop might arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27. M. did not give reasons for his sudden change of mind. I assume that Stalin intervened. My effort to get M. to accept an earlier date for the Reich Foreign Minister's trip was, unfortunately, unsuccessful. The text of the non-aggression pact draft will follow by wire. SCHULENBURG ***** Frames 69479-69480, serial 127 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 19, 1939-11:30 p. m. SECRET No. 190 of August 19 Supplementing my telegram No. 189 of August 19. The Soviet non-aggression pact draft reads as follows: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace among the nations and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement that was concluded in April 1926 between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, have reached the following accord: ARTICLE 1. Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist reciprocally from any act of violence and any aggressive action whatsoever toward each other, or from an attack on each other either individually or jointly with other powers. ARTICLE 2. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of an act of violence or attack by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner whatever give its support to such acts of that power. ARTICLE 3. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties with regard to questions of one kind of another, both Page 66 parties obligate themselves to settle these disputes and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through mutual consultation or if necessary through the creation of suitable arbitration commissions. ARTICLE 4. The present Treaty shall be concluded for a period of five years with the proviso that insofar as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiration of the term the validity of the Treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years. ARTICLE 5. The present Treaty shall be ratified in as short a time as possible, whereupon the Treaty shall enter into force. Postscript, The present Pact shall be valid only if a special protocol is signed simultaneously covering the points in which the High Contracting Parties are interested in the field of foreign policy. The protocol shall be an integral part of the Pact." SCHULENBURG ***** Frames 254844-254846, serial 644 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Telegram VERY URGENT BERLIN, August 2O, 1939-4:35 p. m. Received Moscow, August 91, 1939-12:45 a. m. No. 189 of August 20 For the Ambassador personally. The Fhrer authorizes you to present yourself to Molotov at once and hand him the following telegram from the Fhrer to Herr Stalin: "Herr Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations. 2) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of a long-range German policy. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries. The Government of the Reich is therefore resolved in such case to act entirely consistent with such a far-reaching change. 3) I accept the draft of the non-aggression pact that your Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, delivered but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible. 4) The supplementary protocol desired by the Government of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be substantially clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Page 67 Reich is not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time. 5) the tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanor toward a great power is such that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined, at any rate, in the face of this presumption, from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at its disposal. 6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has full powers to draw up and sign the non- aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler." Please deliver to Herr Molotov the above telegram of the Fhrer to Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead. RIBBENTROP ***** Frame 260314, serial 695 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Telegram No. 191 of August 21 BERLIN, August 21, 1939-10:15 a. m. Received Moscow, August 21, 1939-2:30 p. m. For the Ambassador. Please do your best to see that the journey materializes. Date as in telegram. RIBBENTROP ***** Frames 260312-260313, serial 695 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 21, 1939-5:30 p. m. SECRET Telegram No. 197 of August 21 Reference your telegrams No. 189 of August 20 and No. 191 of August 21. Page 68 Strongly stressing the extraordinary importance of, and exceptional need for haste, I delivered to Herr Molotov at 3 p. m. the Fhrer's message to Stalin, with a translation. M. read the document through and was evidently deeply impressed. He stated that he would forward the message and advise me immediately as soon as a decision was reached. I tried with all the means at my disposal to make it clear to M. that an immediate journey of the Reich Foreign Minister was absolutely- necessary in the interest of both countries. I closed with the request that, under any circumstances, I be given an answer today. I have just learned that M. wishes to see me again at 5 p. m. SCHNURRE ***** Frame 260307, serial 695 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT MOSCOW, August 21, 1939. SECRET No. 199 of August 21 Supplementing my telegram No. 197 of August 21. Molotov delivered to me at 5 p. m. Stalin's answer, couched in very conciliatory form in reply to the Fhrer's message. Stalin advises that the Soviet Government agrees to the arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister on August 23. Molotov declared that it was the desire of the Soviet Government that tomorrow morning at the latest a short factual communiqu on the contemplated conclusion of a non- aggression pact and "pending" arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister be published in Moscow. Molotov requested German assent to this by midnight. I advise consenting since the Soviet Government places itself on record through publication. Text of Stalin's letter follows at once by wire. SCHNURRE Page 69 ***** Frame 260306, serial 695 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Telegram VERY URGENT Moscow, August 21, 1939-7:30 p. m. SECRET No. 200 of August 21 Supplementing my telegram No. 199 of August 21. Text of Stalin's reply: "August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German Reich A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German- Soviet non-aggression pact will mark a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries. The people of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries. The Soviet Government has authorized me to inform you that it agrees to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23. J. Stalin." SCHULENBURG ***** Frames 0032-0033, serial F 11 Full Powers To the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop I hereby grant full power to negotiate, in the name of the German Reich, with authorized representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, regarding a non-aggression treaty, as well as all related questions, and if occasion arises, to sign both the non- aggression treaty and other agreements resulting from the negotiations, with the proviso that this treaty and these agreements shall enter into force as soon as they are signed. ADOLF HITLER RIBBENTROP OBERSALZBERG, August 22, 1939. Page 70 ***** Frames 130968-130970, serial 155 Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizscker) St. S. Nr. 614 BERLIN, August 22, 1939. After the Reich Foreign Minister late yesterday evening had briefly informed the Japanese Ambassador by telephone from the Berghof about the latest turn between Berlin and Moscow, I received Herr Oshima about midnight for a conference which lasted about one hour. The Japanese Ambassador as usual showed himself well disposed. At the same time, I discerned in him a certain uneasiness, which increased in the course of the conversation. I first described to Oshima the natural course of events which had led us to today's conclusion of a non-aggression pact. When Oshima expressed his own concern, we finally came to an agreement as to how Oshima might convince his Government of the necessity and the advantage of the current proceedings. The ideas of Oshima were, as was to be expected, along two lines: 1) If Russia were relieved of anxiety in Europe, she would strengthen her East Asiatic front and put new life into the Chinese war. 2) The jurists in Tokyo (and there were a great many of them) would debate the consistency of our present proceedings with certain earlier German-Japanese conversations. Oshima added that there was no use in trying to interfere with accomplished facts. He did, however, look for a certain shock in Japan, and he would like to abate this by making a telegraphic report tonight. My discussion was along lines somewhat as follows: 1) We were doing nothing which would put in question our friendly relationship with Japan. On the contrary, we would continue to maintain that, and we esteemed the personalities, like Oshima, who had acted and would act most vigorously to that end. 2) The present proceedings were not a cause for surprise inasmuch as the Reich Foreign Minister had informed the Ambassador some months previously that a normalization of German-Russian relations was worth attempting. 3) Such an arrangement would also put us in a position to take steps to bring about a period of quiet in Japanese- Russian relations and to insure its continuance for a considerable period of time. That Japan was at the moment not seeking a Japanese-Russian conflict was certain. I had even received from the Russian side the impression that a Moscow- Tokyo agreement would be welcomed there. Page 71 4) Since the Anti-Comintern discussions (which had been mentioned by Oshima) had been undertaken, the front of our enemies had been dislocated both by Japan and by Germany. It was clear as day that for Japan England had become Enemy No. 1, just as Germany also was threatened much less by Russian than by English policy. The agreement which was being reached with Moscow was serving the interests of both of us. 5) If Oshima referred to certain earlier German-Japanese conversations, we would not argue the point with him that we had sought tirelessly to improve German-Japanese relations. We had waited for half a year to hear some echo from Japan. The Japanese Government, therefore, had the priority and Oshima had certainly had the merit of having always recognized this, and of having urged that these negotiations be speeded up. 6) Our economic, and also certain political, discussions with Moscow had lasted for some time. The negotiations for a non-aggression pact were, however, of very recent origin. It was only in the last two or three days that the possibility of this had appeared. Polish arrogance might force us into war even in the course of this week. With only such a limited amount of time available, we had been absolutely compelled to act. The Ambassador took note of these remarks and in conclusion he assured me of his unaltered intention to work further for German-Japanese friendship. Besides. he hoped to be able to have a brief conference yet today with the Reich Foreign Minister, if the latter passed through Berlin, in order to give his report to Tokyo still more weight. If it were necessary, Oshima would come to the airfield. WEIZSCKER ***** Frame 254847, serial 644 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office Telegram  VERY URGENT Moscow, August 2X, 1939-8:05 p. m. No. 204 of August 23 Please advise the Fhrer at once that the first three- hour conference with Stalin and Molotov has just ended. At the discussion- which, moreover, proceeded affirmatively in our sense-it transpired that the decisive point for the final result is the demand of the Russians that we recognize the ports of Libau and Windau as within their sphere of influence. I would be grateful for confirmation before 8 o'clock German time that the Fhrer is in agreement, The signing  Other copies of this message and of the reply to it indicate that the messages were transmitted by telephone (frame 24017, serial 34 and frame 260299, serial 695). Page 72 of a secret protocol on delimitation of mutual spheres of influence in the whole eastern area is contemplated, for which I declared myself ready in principle. RIBBENTROP ***** Frame 24018, serial 34 The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister Telegram  No. 205 BERLIN, August 23, 1939. Reference your telegram No. 204. Answer is Yes. Agreed. KORDT ***** Frames 0019-0030, serial F 11 Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23d to 24th, Between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the One Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand VERY SECRET! STATE SECRET The following problems were discussed: 1) Japan: The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that the German- Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the Soviet Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing to our good relations with Japan, to make an effective contribution to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union and Japan. Should Herr Stalin and the Soviet Government desire it, the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to work in this direction. He would use his influence with the Japanese Government accordingly and keep in touch with the Soviet representative in Berlin in this matter. HERR STALIN replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war, it could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace-so much the better! Herr Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an  Another copy of this message (frame 260299, serial 695) indicates that it was transmitted by telephone and received at Moscow at 11 p. m. on August 23. Page 73 improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER assented to this and stressed the fact that his cooperation would mean merely the continuation of talks that he had for months been holding with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in the sense of an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Accordingly, there would be no new initiative on the German side in this matter. 2) Italy: HERR STALIN inquired of the Reich Foreign Minister as to Italian aims. Did not Italy have aspirations beyond the annexation of Albania-perhaps for Greek territory? Small, mountainous, and thinly populated Albania was, in his estimation, of no particular use to Italy. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that Albania was important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover, Mussolini was a strong man who could not be intimidated. This he had demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict, in which Italy had asserted its aims by its own strength against a hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a position at that time to give Italy appreciable support. Mussolini welcomed warmly the restoration of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. He had expressed himself as gratified with the conclusion of the Non- aggression Pact. 3) Turkey: HERR STALIN asked the Reich Foreign Minister what Germany thought about Turkey. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER expressed himself as follows in this matter: he had months ago declared to the Turkish Government that Germany desired friendly relations with Turkey. The Reich Foreign Minister had himself done everything to achieve this goal. The answer had been that Turkey became one of the first countries to join the encirclement pact against Germany and had not even considered it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the fact. HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV hereupon observed that the Soviet Union had also had a similar experience with the vacillating policy of the Turks. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER mentioned further that England had spent five minion pounds in Turkey in order to disseminate propaganda against Germany. Page 74 HERR STALIN said that according to his information the amount which England had spent in buying Turkish politicians was considerably more than five million pounds. 4) England: HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV commented adversely on the British Military Mission in Moscow, which had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated in this connection that England had always been trying and was still trying to disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. England was weak and wanted to let others fight for its presumptuous claim to world domination. HERR STALIN eagerly concurred and observed as follows: the British Army was weak; the British Navy no longer deserved its previous reputation. England's air arm was being increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots. If England dominates the world in spite of this, this was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed. It was ridiculous, for example, that a few hundred British should dominate India. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and informed Herr Stalin confidentially that England had recently put out a new feeler which was connected with certain allusions to 1914. It was a matter of a typically English, stupid maneuver. The Reich Foreign Minister had proposed to the Fhrer to inform the British that every hostile British act, in case of a German-Polish conflict, would be answered by a bombing attack on London. HERR STALIN remarked that the feeler was evidently Chamberlain's letter to the Fhrer, which Ambassador Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg. Stalin further expressed the opinion that England, despite its weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly. 5) France: HERR STALIN expressed the opinion that France, nevertheless, had an army worthy of consideration. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, on his part, pointed out to Herren Stalin and Molotov the numerical inferiority of France. While Germany had available an annual class of more than 300,000 soldiers, France could muster only 150,000 recruits annually. The West Wall was five times as strong as the Maginot Line. If France attempted to wage war with Germany, she would certainly be conquered. Page 75 6) Anti-Comintern Pact: The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that the Anti- Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the Soviet Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was able to infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the Soviet Government fully recognized this fact. HERR STALIN interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact had in fact frightened principally the City of London and the small British merchants. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and remarked jokingly that Herr Stalin was surely less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than the City of London and the small British merchants. What the German people thought of this matter is evident from a joke which had originated with the Berliners, well known for their wit and humor, and which had been going the rounds for several months, namely, "Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact." 7) Attitude of the German people to the German-Russian Non- aggression Pact: The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that he had been able to determine that all strata of the German people, and especially the simple people, most warmly welcomed the understanding with the Soviet Union. The people felt instinctively that between Germany and the Soviet Union no natural conflicts of interests existed, and that the development of good relations had hitherto been disturbed only by foreign intrigue, in particular on the part of England. HERR STALIN replied that he readily believed this. The Germans desired peace and therefore welcomed friendly relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER interrupted here to say that it was certainly true that the German people desired peace, but, on the other hand, indignation against Poland was so great that every single man was ready to fight. The German people would no longer put up with Polish provocation. 8) Toasts: In the course of the conversation, HERR STALIN spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fhrer, as follows: "I know how much the German nation loves its Fhrer; I should therefore like to drink to his health." Page 76 HERR MOLOTOV drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg. HERR MOLOTOV raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who-through his speech of March of this year, which had been well understood in Germany-had brought about the reversal in political relations. HERREN MOLOTOV and STALIN drank repeatedly to the Non- aggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation. The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER in turn proposed a toast to Herr Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a favorable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. 9) When they took their leave, HERR STALIN addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect: The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner. HENCKE Moscow, August 24, 1939. ***** Frames 0048-0050, serial F 11 Treaty of Non-aggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics August 23, 1939. The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement: ARTICLE I Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers. Page 77 ARTICLE II Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power. ARTICLE III The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests. ARTICLE IV Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party. ARTICLE V Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions. ARTICLE VI The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years. ARTICLE VII The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed. Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages. Moscow, August 23, 1939. For the Government of the German Reich: V. RIBBENTROP With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.: V. MOLOTOV Page 78 Frames 182-183, serial F 19 Secret Additional Protocol On the occasion of the signature of the Non-aggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions: 1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party. 2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement. 3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.  4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret. Moscow, August 23, 1939. For the Government of the German Reich: V. RIBBENTROP Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.: V. MOLOTOV  The German text of this article of the Protocol is as follows: "Hinsichtlich des Sdostens Europas wird von sowjetischer Seite das Interesse an Bessarabien betont. Von deutscher Seite wird das vllige politische Desinteressement an diesen Gebieten erklrt." For a statement by the Reich Foreign Minister concerning the discussion of these subjects at the time of the conclusion of the Non-aggression Pact, see Ribbentrop's memorandum for Hitler of June 24, 1940, post, p. 157.
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