Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-16-responsibility-14-07 Last-Modified: 1997/05/13 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume Two, Chapter XIV [Page 835] Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the notation of any actions in violation of International Law: "There was an order -- I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction -- that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this should be so. "Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats." (382-PS) Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (D-60) was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam trawler, the "Noreen Mary," which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat shows that [Page 836] at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (D- 645). At 2055 hours the log reads: "Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given]. "Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes." (D-645) There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry: "Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern." (D-645) The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action: "Recognized success: Fishing vessel 'Noreen Mary' sunk by flak." An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the "Noreen Mary" at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and continues as follows: "At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north- westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs." ******* "When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping the "By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire. "The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned [Page 837] the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water. "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour." (D-645) The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues: "Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his body. *** I had 14 shrapnel wounds." ******* "This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore. "As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured." (D-645). The next case is that of the ship "Antonico", which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647): "*** That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because [Page 838] she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine." (D-647) The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident. A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated: "Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters -- dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and-call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed from Britain and America." (D-646-A) This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers. After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS). An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty [Page 839] sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate states: "*** I have compiled from them [captured documents the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who- attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London." Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among hose who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and as undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy.
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