The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Shofar FTP Archive File: people/r/rauff.walter/Rauff-deposition-translation


Archive/File: people/r/rauff.walter/Rauff-deposition-translation
Last-Modified: 2002/03/22


[Nizkor's thanks to Roberto Muehlenkamp for this translation.]

SS  Obersturmfuehrer Walter Rauff, head of division II  D  at
the [I]Reichssicherheitshauptamt[/I], the Reich Main
Security Office, became  a celebrity due to a number of very
detailed and  telling letters  that  were  written by or
addressed  to  him.  The  most notable of these were the
following:

1.   Letter to the Criminal Technical Institute dated 26
  March 1942. A facsimile, transcription of the original
  text and translation can be viewed under the following link:
  http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420326-rauff-sonderwagen/

2.   Letter by Dr. August Becker to Rauff dated 16 May 1942.
  A transcription of the original German text can be found
  under the following link:
  
  http://www.nsarchiv.de/einsatzgruppen/gaswagen/becker/an_rauff.shtml

      A partial translation of that letter can be found
under the following link:

  http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/b/becker.august/becker-to-rauff.051642

3.   Letter by Willy Just to Rauff dated 5 June 1942. A
     facsimile, transcription of the original text and
     translation can be viewed under the following link:

  http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauffspezialwagen/


After the war, Rauff managed to escape from American
captivity in Italy and found save haven in Chile, from where
he could not be extradited to Germany or any other country
under the Chilean statute of limitations.

In 1972, however, he voluntarily made a deposition in a
criminal procedure against another SS officer, Bruno
Streckenbach, before the embassy of the Federal Republic of
Germany in Santiago de Chile. A transcription of the
protocol of this deposition can be found under the following
link:

http://www2.ca.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/r/rauff.walter/WalterRauff.1972.txt

What follows is my translation of this transcription.

[quote][From: ZSL, II 415 AR-Z 1310/63-E32, Bl.534-549,
StA Hamburg Az. 147 Js 31/67.
Copy kindly made available by ZSL.

    (Blackening due to data confidentiality reasons were
    rendered with XXXXXXXXX)]

[Reference 45 from: Sonderdruck: M.Beer, _Die Entwicklung der 
Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden_, Miszelle, VfZ 37(3), pp.403-417 (1987)]

[p.1]-------------------------------------------------------------------

         Embassy
         Of the
   Federal Republic of Germany
         Santiago

Santiago, 28 June 1972


RK Sk 1600


               Interrogation Protocol
              ------------------------
                          
Present LR I Dr. XXXXXXXXX, authorized to carry out
all consular tasks, XXXXXXXXXX as protocol writer
in the preliminary judicial investigation against

         Bruno Streckenbach

Suspect of murder (NSG)

There appeared
at the request of the Hamburg County Court, examining magistrate 4

-    Az.: (54) 3/70 - of 1 March 1972

1.) County Court Counselor XXXXX, examining
                           magistrate 4 at the
                           Hamburg County Court
                           
2.) Public Prosecutor XXXXXXXXX, public prosecution
      at the Hamburg County Court
      
3.) Attorney at Law Dr. XXXXXXXXX, as defender of the suspect

4.) the witness Walter Rauff.

The witness was admonished to tell the truth,
informed of the consequences of an untrue deposition
and interrogated as follows:

1. Personal Data:
      My name is Walther Rauff, 66 years old, living
      in XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, widower,
      industrialist, German national. No relative or
      in-law of the suspect. Informed about his right
      to refuse a deposition according to paragraph
      55 StPO [German law of criminal procedure],
      he is willing to make a deposition.

                                              - 2 -

[p.2]-------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 2 -

2. On the Subject Matter:

      Between 1924 and the end of 1937 I was at the
Reich Navy. I left  the  Navy  at  my own request and
was discharged  with  all honors.  "With all honors"
means that I had the right to  wear  a uniform and
was entitled to a pension.

       I  now searched for a new employment
corresponding  to  my training.  During  my  time  at
the Reich  Navy,  I  had  me  SAObergruppenfhrer von
Jagow, who had been a reserve officer  with me.  He
called me one day and told me that he had talked
about  a job  for me with Heydrich. I was to present
myself at the  office of   the  [I]Geheime  Staatspolizei[/I]  
to  Dr.  Best.  At  this presentation  Dr. Best told me that I
was supposed  to  begin  my work  at  the  SD main
office on 7.1.1938. It was  foreseen  that during
six  months  I should go through all departments  of
the security  police, the SD and the crime police on
an  information basis. I began my rounds with
Schellenberg at the SD main office. After a few
weeks, however, the original plan was dropped. I  was
now  put  in  charge  of  the personal and material
mobilization preparations for the SD and the security
police. This means  that I  was  to check which
members of the SD and the security  police would  in
case of mobilization have to stay at their posts
under all circumstances.

      In this area I remained until the merger of SD
and security police to constitute the
[I]Reichssicherheitshauptamt[/I]. As far as  I
remember, that must have occurred at about the time
of  the beginning of the war with Poland.

      During  the  Polish campaign I was in Berlin.
During the Norwegian campaign I was  in  Oslo to organize 
the news communications with Germany from there. Heydrich had
told me that thereafter  I could for some time go
back to the navy.  From  the beginning of 1940 onward
I thus was with the navy for at least  a year,
clearing mines in the Channel. In the first months of
1941 I  was  called back to Berlin. As they told me,
Heydrich  himself had requested me from Raeder.

                                              - 3 -

[p.3]-------------------------------------------------------------------


                          - 3 -

       I  now  became head of division II D at the
RSHA. In  this division all technical matters were
regulated. The division II  D (technology) consisted
of 6 or 7 sections. I was head of division until
several months after the death of Heydrich.
Thereafter  I was sent to an assignment in Africa
with Rommel.

       When  Heydrich went to Prague as a Protector I
accompanied him there to organize the local news
network. During this time  I often  traveled  between
Berlin and  Prague.  When  the  attempt occurred  I
was  in  Berlin and about to leave  for  Rome.  When
Heydrich's  aides  told me that his life  was  not
in  danger  I traveled  to  Rome.  As far as I
remember I stayed  at  the  RSHA another      3   -
4  months  after  Heydrich's  death.   I   think
Kaltenbrunner  had  already been nominated
Heydrich's  successor when  I  went to Africa. If I'm
now being told that Kaltenbrunner took  charge only
at the beginning of 1943 and that Heydrich died on  4
June 1942, however, I would like to say that I had
already gone to Africa at the time Kaltenbrunner took
charge.

       If  I'm asked for the head of department II, I
remember  a small public servant whose name I don 't
recall at the Moment. If the  name  Dr. Siegert is
mentioned, I can only say  that  I  was referring  to
him. The first dead of department II, however,  was
Dr.  Best. At any rate I remember that Dr. Best had
been head  of department II since the constitution of
the RSHA, although I  can no longer say today when it
was that he left the RSHA.

      The head of department I (personnel) since the
merger of security police and SD to the RSHA was
Streckenbach, as far as I remember. If I am asked
whether after the constitution of the RSHA the former
department I was split into the new departments I
and II, I have no memory of such a process.
      If further confronted with the name Dr.
Nockemann, I can say that he also was, as far as I
remember, head of department II.
                                              - 4 -

[p.4]-------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 4 -

       About  Dr. Nockemann I remember that he had a
car accident at  which  his wife and his driver lost
their lives. Dr.Nockemann then  left  the department
II and was later killed in  action  in Russia. I
cannot say, however, when the accident was and when
he left the department II. I would now say that Dr.
Siegert was  Dr. Nockemann's successor, but I cannot
state this with certainty.

       How  long Streckenbach was head of department
I,  I  don't know  either. I cannot even say if he
ever left the RSHA. Neither can  I say with certainty
if he was still head of department when I left the
RSHA and went to Africa. A successor of Streckenbach
I do  not  know.  Even  if  confronted with the
names  Schulz  and Ehrlinger  I  cannot remember them
as successors of Streckenbach, although I well know
Ehrlinger as a person.

       I  would still like to clarify that I was with
Rommel only for a short time and already returned to
Berlin before the battle of  El Alamein. My stay in
Berlin, however, was also a short  one and
thereafter I went to Tunis with my people. Already
since  I first  left  for  Africa  I  had no  longer
taken  any  care  of procedures in Berlin, especially
at the RSHA.

       I know that the relationship between Best and
Heydrich was a  very  tense  one. I know that Best
wanted to  leave  the  RSHA because he didn't get
along with Heydrich.

        If  asked  for  the  relationship  between
Heydrich  and Streckenbach, I think that Streckenbach
was very reserved towards Heydrich  and by no means
approved to all of Heydrich's measures. As  far  as I
can judge, however, the relation between  Best  and
Heydrich  was  tenser  than  the  one  between
Streckenbach  and Heydrich. I would like to add,
however, that I had much  more  to do   with  Best
than  with  Streckenbach.  In  response  to  the
corresponding question I would further like to stress
that I  got to  know  nothing from Heydrich about his
relation  to  Best  and Streckenbach.
                                              - 5 -

[p.5]-------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 5 -

       This because, although Heydrich had also been
a member  of the  navy, I had no personal contact
with him. My first  personal encounter  with
occurred only after I had been at  the  SD  main
office for more than on year.

       Gradually  I  became aware that there were
many  intrigues inside the RSHA. I don't know what professions 
Streckenbach  had had  before,  in  my  opinion  
he made  his  way straightly  and correctly  at  the  
RSHA, which was bound to  shock  a  man  like
Heydrich.  As the main source of my experience in
this respect  I can name Dr. Pl”tz, who was a good
friend of mine. I also learned something  through
Kluckhon. I cannot  say  to  what  areas  the
measures  of  Heydrich  to  which Streckenbach  did
not  approve referred,  but  I  can  state  with
certainty  that  there  were differences between him
and Heydrich.

       About the relationship between Streckenbach
and Himmler  I know nothing.

      I don't know if Streckenbach was in any way
involved in the administration of department II, but
I don't think he was. As far as I can remember Dr.
Siegert was full head of department and not just  in
charge  of heading department II on behalf  of
someone else.

      Also after having been shown Heydrich's letter
of 20.6.1941 (sheet  6802) I can only say that I
cannot remember  ever  having seen  this  letter.
Even  after having taken  knowledge  of  the contents
of this letter I cannot remember that Dr. Siegert
should have headed department II only in someone
else's representation.

       Of the Russian campaign I was informed
officially only  on the  night  before  the
commencement of this  campaign.  On  that evening  I
learned from Heydrich at the RSHA or at  some  other
place  I don't remember that the campaign against
Russia  was  to begin the next morning. Up to this
communication I had
                                              - 6 -

[p.6]-------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 6 -

      no concrete indications whatsoever that a
campaign against Russia was imminent and when such a
campaign would begin.

      I can neither remember today that for this
Russian campaign special detachments
[[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I]]and units should  have been
constituted in Pretzsch,Dbe and Bad Schmiedeberg.
Only  the place  Bad  Schmiedeberg is in some way in
my  memory  today  in connection with the formation
of special detachments,  because  I was  responsible
for  their equipment I would  not  have  known,
however,  where the coming assignment would take
place.  In  this context  I  would like to point out
that the special  detachments were  not  equipped
with  winter clothing  as  would  have  been
necessary for an assignment in Russia.

       For  the  provision of the motor vehicles of
the  security police  my  subordinate Pradel was
responsible. Pradel,  who  had come  from the order
police, didn't like me and was in a  certain conflict
with  me.  As  to whether I had  differences  with
him regarding  the  provision  of  motor  vehicles
for  an  upcoming assignment  after  my  return from
the  navy,  I  consider  that possible, but cannot
remember it exactly. I can neither  remember having
had a meeting with Streckenbach in this respect.

       I  have been shown the respective statements
of Pradel  in his  interrogation on 30.3 1971 (Sheet
6965 f, 6969). I can  only say  the  following  about
this: The major  Puschke  that  Pradel mentions  is
not known to me; I always dealt on a higher  level,
i.e.   with   General  Fellgiebel  in  matters  of communication
material. In matters of motor vehicles I dealt at a
similar level with the OKW, without however being
still able to provide a name. It  is not correct
that, as Pradel states, I only returned to the
department  from the navy after the commencement of
the  Russian campaign.  I  neither  remember to have
spoken  about  the  motor vehicles  with
Streckenbach. I cannot say whether in  preparation of
the coming assignment Streckenbach
                                              - 7 -

[p.7]-------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 7 -
       beyond mere matters of personnel, but I don't
think he was either.  At  any rate I don't remember
that he in any way  became active on  the  area of the
material equipment,  for  which  the
competence resided with department II. I can neither
remember  to have  taken  part  in a meeting headed
by Streckenbach  in  which issues of the coming
assignment were discussed.

        When  asked  how  the  representation  of
Heydrich was regulated,  I  remember  that  at  the  beginning
Heydrich  was represented  by  Dr.  Best.  I  cannot  say,
however,  if   this regulation was kept until Dr.
Best lets the RSHA. In this context I  would  like
to  point  out  that Heydrich  was  an  extremely
suspicious man who don't liked it if another sat on
his chair and ruled on his behalf.

       How  the  issue of Heydrich's representation
was regulated when  I  returned to the RSHA at the
beginning of  1941  I  don't know.  I  can  only
assume that someone represented  him  in  his
absence,  without however being able to say who that
could  have been.  Also  for the time of his activity
in Prague and  for  the time  after  his  death  I
don't know  what  the  representation regulation was.
I can only assume that during this time the heads of
department were directly subordinated to Himmler.
Furthermore a  man like for  instance Mueller would never 
have  subordinated himself to Strechenbach or another 
head of department at the same level.

       As  far  as I know there very several
candidates  for  the succession of Heydrich, but I am
not able to give names  in  this respect. Whether
Streckenbach was being considered as a successor I
don't know, but I consider it possible as he had a
good name at the  security police and the SD, this
not for having  played  the wild  man  but  for  his
being calm and objective.  The  fact  of
Kaltenbrunner  having then become Heydrich's
successor  surprised at least me.

      I neither now anything about whether there was
a regulation regarding  the  representation  of  one
head  of  department  by another.  I  would
personally say that  in  case  of  impediment
affecting one head of department the respective

                                              - 8 -

[p.8]------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 8 -

      head of division became active under his own
responsibility or turned directly to the head of the
main office.

       Of  the  measures against the Jews in Russia I
knew  right from  the start. I never got to know
officially, however, on what order  the  killing of
the Jews was based. While I  got  to  know
after  the  war  that  there was a so called  Fhrer
order,  the content  of  which  was the liquidation
of the  Jews  for  racial reasons,  I cannot remember
that during the war it had ever  been said  that
there was such an order. Of the existence of  such
an order  I  should  have been informed for my
activity  in  Tunis, because  there  were  many Jews
there  who  even  worked  for  us voluntarily without
anything happening to them.

        Already  during  the  Polish  campaign  I
had  heard  of liquidation measures against the Jews,
without being  still  able today  to say whether I
got to know that officially in the course of meetings
or from any conversations.

       I  have  been shown the protocols of the
meetings  of  the heads  of  department  in  the
autumn  of  1949.  Although  I  am mentioned as a
participant in most of these meetings and although
the  initial under the protocols is without doubt my
own, I  have no  memory  at this time of having taken
part in these  meetings. Herewith  I by no means
intend to question the accuracy of  these protocols.
If I think about this issue, I consider  it  possible
that  in my above mentioned capacity as mobilization
organizer  I took  part  in  these meetings and,
being the youngest  of  those present, was put in
charge of writing the protocol.

      Upon questions by the public prosecutor. 
      ----------------------------------------

      It was not part of my tasks as mobilization
organizer to take care of the setting up of the
special unit [[I]Einsatzkommandos[/I]]. That was not
even being discussed at the time.

       The  occupation of the CSR was a sort of acid
test for  my activity  as  mobilization organizer,
because  at  that  time  it turned  out that a part of
the men who went on assignment  should
have  remained behind. That's why a new listing of
those men  who under any circumstances

                                              - 9 -

[p.9]------------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 9 -

      had to stay on their post was made.

       Due  to  the  experiences in the CSR  the
setting  up  of [I]Einsatzgruppen[/I] was organized
prior to the Polish campaign. I  was involved in this in
regard to the technical equipment  of
these  detachments. The instructions for this I
received  on  the one  hand from Oberfuehrer Albert,
the head of department I of the SD main office, and
from Dr. Best on the other.

      Regarding the equipment of the
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I] in the Russian  campaign I must
have received my instructions  from  the then  in
charge head of department, without being able to say
if at  the time it was Dr. Nockemann or Dr. Siegert.
I thing that  I returned  from  the navy in March or
April of 1941.  Whether  the preparations for the
Russian campaign in regard to the  equipment of the
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I] had already commenced at this
time I don't know.

      I know nothing of an organization order for the
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I] in the Russian campaign that
was signed by all participants.

      The fuel required by the [I]Einsatzgruppen[/I]
was provided by the Wehrmacht. That had been agreed
upon at the highest level. The  required  ammunition
was supplied  directly  to  us  by  the Wehrmacht
pursuant to negotiations with the  Wehrmacht,  and
we then  sent  it to the [I]Einsatzgruppen[/I]. There
was  thus  no direct   delivery   of  ammunition  by
the  Wehrmacht   to   the [I]Einsatzgruppen[/I],  as
far  as   I   know.   The   mentioned negotiations
were even conducted by Heydrich himself  whenever  I
was  not  getting any further. I personally can thus
not  imagine that  Streckenbach should have told
something about  "Barbarossa" to a subordinate like
Pradel for negotiations with the Wehrmacht. The
required  drivers  were taken from  the  existing
ranks  of drivers or from slightly wounded who
returned from the front  and were  still
operational. I don't know anything  about  the  NSKK
[[I]Nationalsozialistisches    Kraftfahrerkorps[/I],
National Socialist  Truck Drivers' Association]
having been turned  to.  I consider it doubtful that
Streckenbach should have told Pradel to get in touch
with the NSKK in this respect.

                                              - 10 -

[p.10]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 10 -

       It  may be that I talked with Streckenbach
about personnel matters  in regard to the
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I], but  I  have  no concrete
recollection of such a meeting. I actually know  of
no single  positive case in which I went to
Streckenbach in  service matters.  I last saw
Streckenbach in 1960 or 1962 when I  was  in Germany.
I was sitting in a cafe in Munich back then and
casually saw Streckenbach passing by. We talked then,
but not about common matters of service.

       I  cannot remember Streckenbach having been
leader  of  an [I]Einsatzgruppe[/I] during the Polish
campaign and later head of the security police in
Cracow.

       Of  the liquidation measures in Poland I must
have got  to know through meetings of the heads of
department. A memory of  my own  in  regard to these
matters I no longer have today.  I  know that  in one
of these protocols liquidation measures towards  the
Polish intelligentsia were mentioned. Whether the
liquidation  of Jews  was  mentioned in other
protocols I don't know.  I  neither recall  if  at
the lime there was a separation between  a  "short
term  goal"  and  a  "final goal". Whether I
concluded  from  the meetings of the heads of
department already at that time that the Jews  were
to be generally annihilated or whether that  was
even expressly mentioned at the meetings of the heads
of department  I no  longer know. I would say,
however, that such would have  been recorded in the
protocols if it had been expressly discussed.

       If  in the protocol about the meeting on 21.9.
1939 it  is said  that Jewry was to be concentrated
in the cities in ghettoes to  make possible a better
control and their being pushed away at a  later
stage, I cannot say today what was meant by pushing
away at that time (sheet 1713). As becomes apparent
from the protocols of  the  heads of department there
is no mention yet of  a  final solution  therein,
which means that I must revise  my  deposition
insofar as I stated above that I knew of the general
liquidations already in September 1939.

                                              - 11 -

[p.11]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 11 -

       If  in the protocol about the meeting of 27.9.
1939 it  is further  stated (sheet 1714) that
shootings were now only  to  be carried out in case
of self defense and escape attempt while  all order
procedures  must be handed over to military
tribunals  to give them so much work that they could
no longer cope with it,  I cannot say with certainty
what is behind that. I presume that  at the  time
the  Wehrmacht had complained  about  some
shootings, because  the  Wehrmacht was the highest
judge in the  front  line area  and didn't like
anyone else to carry out shootings or other judicial
measures in their area. If it is further stated  in
the mentioned protocol that of the political
leadership only 3 % were still  left  (sheet  1713),
I cannot say  what  happened  to  the remaining  97
%. Probably a great part of them fled to the  East.
At  any  rate  I consider it impossible that the 97 %
were  shot beforehand,  because  for  that  there
were  to  many  partisans afterwards who were led by
members of the intelligentsia.

      If in the protocol of 16.10.1939 (sheet 1723)
it is further stated  that  C  addressed the
liquidation of leading  Poles  and mentioned   lists
to  be  presented  by  the  leaders   of the
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I], I no longer have any memory
thereof today.

      The old problem of SD-police and Wehrmacht
mentioned in the remark of 5.10. 1939 (sheet 1720 )
was the one that the Wehrmacht hat  absolute
priority in the front line area but  the  security
police and SD carried out tasks that were up to the
Wehrmacht  to carry  out  but could not be carried
out by it. Thus  there  were always  quarrels. It may
be, but it is not necessarily  so,  that such
differences also related to shootings. How this
problem came up  again, however, after Heydrich had
declared at the meeting of 19.9 1939 (sheet 1705)
that his meeting with Colonel Wagner could be  called
a very favorable result in the co-operation  with
the Wehrmacht, I don't know.

                                              - 12 -

[p.12]-----------------------------------------------------------------


                          - 12 -

       Whether I asked to take part in the meetings
of the  heads of  department  I don't know. It is
possible that I  should  have done that in regard to
the equipment problems.

The file notes were meant for our own files, not for
Heydrich.

       All these assessments of the protocols don't
bring me  any memory  of  my own about the
occurrences at the time, although  I have  thought
about them several times after such a protocol  was
first sent to me.

       Regarding the annihilation of Jews in Russia I
know  that gas  vans were used for this purpose. I
cannot say, however, from when  on  and to what
extent this happened. I used to think  that the thing
with the gas vans started at the time when I was at
the navy.  Today  I have doubts about this and
consider  it  possible that  this  matter only got
going after I had returned  from  the navy.  At any
rate I now that at some time after my return I  saw
two  of  these gas vans standing in the yard, which
Pradel showed to  me.  Somehow I then also learned
that the gas vans were  used for the execution of
sentences and for the killing of Jews.

       I  consider it impossible that Pradel should
have  carried out  the  development of the gas vans
on his own  initiative.  He must  have  received an
order for this either  from  me  or  from another
superior standing above me.

       Whether at that time I had doubts against the
use  of  gas vans I cannot say. The main issue for me
at the time was that the shootings  were  a
considerable burden for the man  who  were  in charge
thereof and that this burden was taken off  them
through the use of the gas vans.

       I  don't  think  that Dr. Siegert was
involved  in  these matters at the time, although he
probably knew about them.

       It  is correct that I received something from
Becker about the  used  of  gas vans. I myself had
told Becker to  send  me  a corresponding report.

                                              - 13 -

[p.13]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 13 -

I  cannot  explain  why in the letter from section
II  A  2  of 19.11.1942 (sheet 3698 and following)
shown to me Dr. Siegert  is mentioned as "head of
department in representation" and why  this letter is
also signed by Streckenbach "in representation".

       I  can  remember  no  process from department
II  that  I submitted to Streckenbach.

       It  is  not  correct that I belonged to the
same  training course as Heydrich at the navy. He had
entered the navy in  1922, whereas I came in only in
1924. He was a radioman, I was  a  mine seeker,  and
he was on shore while I was on board.  Due  to  all
these reasons there was no personal contact between
us during  my time at the navy. For this reason I did
not turn to Heydrich when I  left  the  navy, my
connection was the already  mentioned  von Jagow.
Later  however there were closer personal contacts
at  a familiar level, without that having had any
consequences in terms of service let alone brought me
advantages.

       Heydrich  was  an insanely ambitious man, a
fox  who  was extremely suspicious and tolerated no
one next to let alone above him. He was also a person
who could not lose. Not even in a game. Accordingly
the relation between him and all other persons  at  a
very  high  level,  such  as for example
Streckenbach,  was  very difficult  due  to
Heydrich's personality. I can thus  repeat  my
statement mentioned above that an honest and straight
person like Streckenbach had a shocking effect on
Heydrich.

       I cannot positively remember having witnessed
Streckenbach and Heydrich together, but it is
probable that I did. At least  I would  heard  one
of them talk about the other and  heard  about their
relation from Heydrich's adjutants. From all  this  I
can draw  the  conclusion  that  the relation  among
them  was  very reserved.
                                              - 14 -

[p.14]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 14 -
 A concrete example for differences between Heydrich
 and Streckenbach I cannot name.

        Dr.Ploetz   got   along  well  with  everyone,
including Streckenbach. Whether he was a friend of
Streckenbach's  I  don't know.  Dr. Ploetz was
everything other than a soldier, how he  got his  job
as an adjutant I do not know. Like everyone else he
Dr. Ploetz  was  also  to  carry out an assignment
with  the  fighting troops at Heydrich's wish. It is
correct, however, that Ploetz got to  the  front  only
after  Heydrich's  death.  The  front  line
assignment desired by Heydrich, at least for the
leaders, was  to take  place  at  the Waffen SS or
the Wehrmacht. I  know  nothing about  Heydrich
having opposed a transfer to there.  He  however
reserved  himself the right to decide himself on  the
time  when that  was to happen. Assignments with the
security police in  the occupied territories he did
not consider as front line duty.


      Upon questions by the defender 
      ------------------------------
      
Do  you  assume  that the contents of the meetings
of  heads  of department  and  of
[I]Einsatzgruppen[/I] leaders and  respective
protocols, especially the protocol of 27.9. 1939
(sheet 1710  and following) was communicated to other
persons than those mentioned in the file note?

I  am of the opinion that the contents of the
protocols were  not even  communicated to the persons
listed at the beginning of  the protocol, because
these protocols carry no distribution  plan.  I think
that these protocols were made mainly as memory
helpers for myself.

      When confronted with the statement in the
protocol of 27.9.1939 that deportations of Jews into
the foreign language [I]Au[/I] and pushing them over
the demarcation line had been authorized by the
Fuehrer, I say that this meant the pushing away of the
Jews from the German territories as far as possible
to the east. If in this context a killing of the Jews
had also been mentioned, I would certainly have taken
that into the protocol.

                                              - 15 -

[p.15]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 15 -

       If in this protocol it is further mentioned
that shootings are  from  now  on  to be carried out
in case of self-defense  or escape attempts while all
other procedures are to be handed  over to military
tribunals, this means that all previous shootings had
bee  based  on procedures, i.e. judicial procedures
or  judicial verdicts, insofar as they were not
related to cases of flight  or self-defense.

       If  in  this protocol it is further mentioned
that of  the political leadership in the occupied
territories a maximum of 3 % were still lift, then
this number was certainly mentioned at  the time. I
don't consider it to be correct, however, and think
that a  much  higher  percentage was still left. I
also  consider  the
numbers  mentioned by Becker in his report to  have
been  highly exaggerated in order to make an
impression.

      When confronted with the following
characterization of Heydrich: "Vindictive person,
exceptionally fast on the uptake, always exactly
informed. Arguing with him was useless - he stuck to
decisions that were often against any reason - during
such arguments he made tough and unjust statements to
the point of being insulting, leaving no room for
opposition", I would as a complement to what I above
said about Heydrich myself underwrite this statement
word by word as being accurate.
      Upon question by the public prosecutor:
  I myself never tried to fight through an argument
                        with
Heydrich because that was useless. If not even a man
like Dr. Best could measure up to him, how am I
supposed to have done that. I never experienced a
confrontation between Dr. Best and Heydrich myself,
however, and I cannot give another concrete example
either of Heydrich having been inaccessible to other
points of view and having stuck to a position once
taken even against better knowledge. I can only say
on the basis of my personal contact with him that the
stated characterization is accurate, and I can for
example point out that in Prague during visits of the
state president he declared that he would only
approach him

                                              - 16 -

[p.16]-----------------------------------------------------------------

                          - 16 -

      to a certain extent and stuck to this position
even after a young man from the diplomatic service
who was in charge of the protocol had told him that
he should approach him further. In this context I
would like to repeat that Heydrich could not bear to
lose in a game and that therefore my comrades and I
in Prague had agreed to let him win at "Doppelkopf"
[a card game].

   On the other hand it is certainly correct that
Heydrich could be a very charming and attentive host.

      Schellenberg was a man just as pathetically
ambitious as Heydrich.

      Approved after dictation and signed.

                                       Walter Rauff
[signature]
                                     . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .  . . . .
                                       Walter Rauff
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Protocol writer
Dr. KXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
                   [Seal: Embassy
                    of the Federal Republic
                    Counsel 1st Class of Germany
                    Santiago][/quote]



Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor

© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and to combat hatred. Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.