Archive/File: people/i/irving.david/libel.suit/transcripts/day017.06
Last-Modified: 2000/07/20

   MR IRVING:  I have not come across them in this witness report.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Paragraph 4.2.1, I thought it was.
   A.   I may have mentioned them briefly.
   MR IRVING:  I would have remembered them if -- I think they
        must be in the Longerich report, my Lord.
   MR RAMPTON:  It is in Longerich.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is certainly there, but this is
another
        guideline, is it not, at 4.21?
   A.   4.2.1, the Heydrich order of July 2rd, which we
discussed
        yesterday, is his summary to the higher SS and police
        leaders of his oral instructions to the Einsatzgruppen
        leaders on June 17th, five days before the invasion.
This
        is when he includes among those to be shot will be
Jews in
        state and party positions.
   MR IRVING:  This is the document your Lordship wanted
        translated yesterday.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  These are guidelines at that stage?
   A.   Yes.  This is the guidelines of early July -- in fact,
the
        guidelines of late June, prior to the invasion,
because he
        is summarising what was already given to the
        Einsatzgruppen on the eve of the invasion.
   MR IRVING:  This is Heydrich, of course, who is two or
three
        rungs down the hierarchy, is he not?
   A.   Very close to Himmler.
   Q.   Yes.  The question, witness, which I asked you just
before
        that little discursive, are you familiar with the
military

.          P-47



        planning documents or working papers that led to these
        three documents we were just talking about, the
        guidelines, not these ones, but the May 19th
guidelines?
   A.   I have, I think, briefly seen in the Hans Adolf
Jacobsen
        study his account of the emergence of the Commissart
order
        and the Krasvnik(?) article on the emergence of the
        military jurisdiction order.  I have not worked on
those
        in the archives, but I have seen other historians'
studies
        of those two particular cases.
   Q.   Are you familiar with the private diary of General
Franz
        Halder, the Chief of the German Army General Staff?
   A.   Yes, I have read parts of that.
   Q.   Would you agree that in that private diary, which was
        written by him in shorthand (so it was of a very
        confidential nature) it emerges that the German Army
were
        the source of the inspiration for those documents, in
        other words, it did not come from Hitler down to the
Army;
        it went from the German Army effectively up to Hitler
or
        up to the German High Command, they wanted ----
   A.   I cannot say that that was my impression from Halder,
but
        I would have to disagree in the sense that we have
        Hitler/Jodl conversation in early March, in which Jodl
        then comes back to the Generals and says, "Hitler
wants us
        to do something in terms of the" ----
   Q.   The Commissarts?
   A.   --- "Commissarts" and the negotiations over the
shaping of

.          P-48



        the military jurisdiction order comes I think from a
        similar instigation from above, that the Army is not
to be
        involved in disciplining the behaviour of troops
against
        the civilian population which previously would have
been
        primed under martial law.
   Q.   Would you identify Jodl to the court, please?
   A.   Jodl is, if I get it right, the Chief of Staff of the
High
        Command.
   Q.   Was he Chief of the Operations Staff at the German
High
        Command.
   A.   High Command, not the Army, the Arm Forces High
Command,
        the global one.
   Q.   And if Hitler, as Supreme Commander, was having this
        discussion with the Chief of Staff of the German High
        Command, then it must have been a discussion of a
military
        nature rather than ideological nature?
   A.   Not if he wants the Army to take part in and not to be
a
        problem concerning this war of destruction.  If the
        military is to take part in a wider kind of war, not
to
        conceive of this war is a war like they fought against
the
        French, and that they are to remove themselves from or
to
        give to their own officers a new understanding that
        certain kinds of behaviour, the troops will no longer
be
        subject to the jurisdiction of military court martial
and
        will not be criminalized.  Now, this has to go to the
        Army.  But that certainly cannot be said to be ----

.          P-49



   Q.   But this is the military discipline?
   A.   Yes, but it is an issue of military discipline that is
        completely related to the notion of this wider war of
        destruction.  It is not compartmentalized to military
        operations but to the ideological war.
   Q.   Is it not likely, in fact, that Hitler would have
these
        discussions with the German High Command on the
military
        side of the problem and he would have similar
discussions
        with Himmler on the ideological side of the problem,
and
        these documents only refer, therefore, to the military
        side of the problem.
   A.   I disagree totally.  That certainly is the postwar
plea of
        the German Generals of self-exculpation, but I think
the
        documents we see is that he makes very clear to the
        Generals that this a multi-dimensional war, and that
he
        does not compartmentalize.  He wants the Army to
revise
        its multiple court martial code.  He wants the Army to
        take part in the finding of the Commissarts and either
        shooting them or turning them over to the SS, that he
does
        not compartmentalize this war.
   Q.   We so far have not mentioned one very important
conference
        that took place around this time after Barbarossa,
which
        is the conference of July 16th 1941.  You are familiar
        with this?
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  If there is a document, can we go -- I am
        quite keen to pick up these points and not deal with

.          P-50



        them  ----
   MR IRVING:  It certainly be referenced by Longerich.  It is
not
        referenced by this witness in his report, but it is
one
        with which he is quite familiar, my Lord.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It does not make it any easier, but if we
can
        identify and locate these documents.
   MR IRVING:  I was going to ask one question on this
conference
        really which is -- are you familiar with the
conference to
        which I am referring?
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  This is for my benefit rather than yours
or
        Professor Browning's.
   MR IRVING:  Are you familiar with the conference to which I
am
        referring?
   A.   This is July 16th conference?
   Q.   July 16th.  Hitler, Rosenberg, Martin Bormann wrote a
        memorandum on it?
   A.   Lammers, I believe, was present.
   Q.   Lammers was present, Himmler was present?
   A.   No, Himmler is not present.  Himmler met with Hitler
on
        15th and left for Lublin.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am sorry, I am going to ask you to
pause. I
        think I really must have the document, if only a
reference
        to it.
   A.   It is a Nuremberg document.  I think it is L...
   MR RAMPTON:  I can help.  Page 57.  Longerich 1, paragraph
        15.7.

.          P-51



   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr Irving,
but
        I have to try to digest all this and it is easier.
   MR IRVING:  Problem is, my Lord, that both the witness and
        I have all this in our heads.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, but it is quite important that you
get
        it into my head too.
   MR IRVING:  It is not an easy task.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am sorry to hear you say that.
   MR RAMPTON:  If your Lordship wants to see the German?
   MR IRVING:  My Lord, the reason I said this is because it
has
        taken me 35 years to get it into my head, the whole
        history
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
   MR RAMPTON:  It has only taken me nine months!  It is 4.2,
if
        your Lordship would like to see another splodgy German
        document.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It may be that now you have given me the
        reference here, I can follow it up.  Is it paragraph
15?
   MR RAMPTON:  Paragraph 15.7.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Then it is in the transcript at least so
        I can go back to it.  Yes, Mr Irving, follow that up
if
        you want to.
   MR IRVING:  All that I want to say is, I mean, I have no
idea
        where this question and answer is now going to lead.
It
        may harm, it may help me.  This was a very important,
top
        level conference deciding areas of responsibility in
the

.          P-52



        Eastern territories; is that right?
   A.   Immediately after that conference, the next, they
issued
        the Fuhrer decrees delineating the responsibilities of
        Himmler and Rosenberg, the SS and the civil
administration
        for the occupied territories, Soviet territories.
   Q.   And this, effectively, gave Himmler absolutely police
        control over all these regions, is that correct, the
        executive control?
   A.   It put the SS in a very dominant position.
   Q.   In the rear areas?
   A.   Actually, I think it gave him powers -- at least
        Einsatzgruppen already had powers to operate all the
way
        up to the front, and this established in a sense that
that
        would become permanent as the SS positions are changed
        from mobile units to a permanent police structure on
        occupied territory.
   Q.   I think that, Professor, you once mentioned that the
        Jewish problem was mentioned in this conference, but
that
        is not correct, is it?
   A.   I do not think he does mention that.  He does talk
about
         "shooting anyone who looks askance at us and isn't it
        good that Stalin has called for a guerilla war because
it
        gives us the pretext", I believe is the word, "to
shoot
        anyone that we want?".  I do not believe that I have
said
        that ----
   Q.   That is a very interesting phrase.  What was the
phrase he

.          P-53



        used?  "It gives us the pretext to shoot"----
   A.   "To shoot anyone who so much as looks askance at us" I
        believe is the ...
   Q.  "Schief schaut"
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The German is there on page 57 if you
want to
        look at the footnote.
   MR IRVING:  Effectively, "Anybody who stands in our way or
        looks like he might stand in our way"?
   A.   Well, it does not even say "stand in our way", "looks
        askance at us", I believe, is a much wider shooting
        licence than "stands in our way".
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  What does "nur schief schaut" mean?
   MR IRVING:  "Looks askance", literally.
   A.   "Gives us a twisted look" or "looks askance at us".
   MR IRVING:  Anybody whose face does not fit would be
another
        way of saying it?  It is a pretty broad kind of
        directive.
   A.   It is an open shooting licence.
   Q.   Yes, but there is no reference to the Jewish problem
at
        all?
   A.   Not a specific reference, no.
   Q.   Yes.  Just that Himmler has now given, effectively,
carte
        blanche?
   A.   Yes.
   Q.   We will deal with that, I think, in more detail, my
Lord,
        when we come to Longerich?

.          P-54



   A.   You were still asking me my view of the decision-
making
        process.  Do you wish me to continue?
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
   MR IRVING:  If you have had after thoughts, yes.  My view
(and
        I would wish you to correct it) is that the German
Army
        provided the impetus for these orders, and that this
is
        evidenced in the papers of the German High Command
where
        the position papers are, effectively, written by
German
        Army officers and also from the diary of General Franz
        Halder.  In other words, that the initiative did not
come
        from Hitler?
   A.   I would disagree.  I would say that the open
invitation
        for these proposals comes from Hitler and, in terms of
        guidelines and policies, it is the response of the SS
and
        the military and the economic planners to turn into
        reality this vague vision of a war of destruction in
an
        ideological crusade against the Soviet Union.
   Q.   When you say you disagree, is this just a gut feeling
or
        do you have any specific document you want to
reference?
   A.   I think we have both the Jodl/Hitler meeting and
Jodl's
        response, and we have the meeting of March 30th with
the
        Generals in which he again makes clear to them his
desire
        to have a war of destruction, a war that is not fought
by
        the ground rules of a conventional war.
   Q.   The latter meeting is, of course, recorded in detail
in
        the diary of General Halder, is it not?

.          P-55



   A.   Yes.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Again it would help me, rather than just
        having this ----
   MR IRVING:  Interesting discussion.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY: --- debate between the two of you if ----
   A.   That would be 15.3, page 56, of Longerich, again where
he
        emphasises the dual nature of the war, the struggle of
two
        world views against one another.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The Jodl/Hitler meeting, can you pinpoint
        that for me?
   A.   March 3rd.
   MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I mean, in terms of where I find a
        reference.
   A.   15.1.
   MR RAMPTON:  Page 55, my Lord.

Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor