Archive/File: people/i/irving.david/libel.suit/transcripts/day016.11
Last-Modified: 2000/07/20
Q. Yes. Well, will you accept that that particular page
comes from a file of over thousand such pages, just one
file, and I do not know how many reports are on
that one
page, there are about 15 items on that one page,
so?
A. Seven.
Q. Would it surprise you to
hear that in the British archives
we have, I suppose, several hundred thousand
intercepted
SS and police messages?
A. I would not challenge the
figure.
. P-76
Q. Do you know from the works
of Richard Brightman, like this
book here, 'Official Secrets', that we, British,
and the
Americans also through us, were familiar with the
killing
operations being conducted by the SS on the
Eastern Front?
A. We -- as I understand
Brightman's book, we were getting
the Police battalion reports which were in a lower
code
between late July and early September or mid
September,
which Daluege instructed them to send things by
courier
and not by radio.
Q. 1941 you are talking
about?
A. 1941.
Q. Yes. Is it known to you
that the reason why Daluege
ordered the code change is because Winston
Churchill
actually made a speech in 1941 relying on the
intercepts,
talking for the first time about these appalling
atrocities being conducted by the SS?
A. I have no single document
that establishes a causal
connection but there is a chronological meeting --
chronologically, it is a possible interpretation.
Q. Have you seen intercepted
messages passed, intercepted by
the British, intercepts by the British of messages
passed
by Himmler to the Einsatzgruppen chiefs, like
Jeckeln or
Stahlecker?
A. There is the August 1st
telegramme, I think it is -- I do
not believe it is a radio message -- in which he
instructs
them to kill the men and chase the women into the
swamps.
. P-77
Q. There is that one, but I
am still concentrating on just
these British intercepts, these tens of thousands
of
intercepted Nazi SS and police messages. You
suggest this
was just at police battalion level?
A. The reports on the
killings that I read in Brightman were
police battalion reports back to Daleuge. Now,
whether
these -- and he first saw them in the United
States which
may have gotten part of, I do not know to what
percentage
of the British intercepts were available to him in
the
United States and how much he may have included of
London
records, since I just do not know what he has
looked.
Q. But if these tens of
thousands of messages contained,
shall we say, a random selection of intercepts,
there was
no methodological reason why it should only be
intercepts
relating to shootings rather than to anything
else, would
it surprise you to hear that there are only
references in
these tens of thousands of messages to shootings
and no
references whatsoever to gassings?
A. It would not surprise me
because we have no intercepts
that I know of between Himmler and Globocnik, that
this
was not the way in which they communicated to the
Soviet
Union.
Q. Are you familiar with the
fact that the British official
historians, Sir Frank Hinsley, summarized these
and
similar messages in the British Official History,
this was
the first clue that we had that these existed?
. P-78
A. I believe he said he
looked at a few of them, that he did
not study that issue in detail, but that he did
write
books that were on the British intelligence and
referred
to these, yes.
Q. Do you know that he read
the reports, the daily reports,
from the Kommandants of the seven principal
concentration
camps, Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald, and so on,
back to
Berlin for a number of months over the winter of
1942 to
1943?
A. I did not know that, but
again I would say that Operation
Reinhardt was not part of the concentration camp
system
and would not have been in the same chain of
command.
Q. What archeological
investigations have been conducted in
recent years at any of the camp sites that you are
alluding to, like Treblinka, Maidonek, Sobibor and
Belzec?
A. At the moment, I
understand that they are doing
archeological excavations in Belzec, that I do not
believe
at the moment they are doing them in Sobibor or
Treblinka. They have made memorials there.
Chelmo, they
have created again in the forest where the graves
were a
series of memorials that represent where the
trenches
were. Whether that was based on somebody that
knew or
whether that was just placed there, I just do not
know.
Q. So there has been no
systematic effort to try to quantify
the scale of killing that went on in these camps?
A. Belzec, I believe it is
the first time at which they are
. P-79
doing, which was the most -- the one that does not
have a
developed memorial is the one which they are doing
at the
moment archeological excavation.
Q. Just finally on your
paragraph 3.2, you said there that as
far as the shootings go, we have a lot of
documentary
evidence, but for gassings we have to rely on
eyewitness
and circumstantial evidence.
A. For the three camps of
Operation Reinhardt. We do have
some documentary evidence concerning Zemblin(?)
and the
gas vans working with the Einsatzgruppen and
documents, a
few documents, relating to Chelmo. The documents
relating
to Operation Reinhardt, I have argued, presents
the case
that lots of people went here and were never seen
again,
but the written documents do not specify why they
were
never seen again. They do not specify a method of
killing.
Q. Do the documents specify
that they were killed or do we
have to conclude that?
A. Well, if 20 miles or 20
kilometres from Treblinka the
Kommandant complains that the Jews are not buried
well
enough and that they have got a pestilential smell
20
kilometres away, it would indicate a large number
of Jews
had been killed.
Q. Do you find that credible,
plausible eyewitness evidence,
that people can smell something 20 kilometres
away?
A. If the wind was blowing
the right way from Treblinka, I
. P-80
would think that was very credible.
Q. Do you have no problem
with any of the eyewitnesses, with
accepting the evidence that they have given, the
various
eyewitnesses, whether evidence given in court
procedures
or afterwards, more recently, do you not suspect
that they
may have been subjected to some kind of duress or
bribery
or promises of better conditions or promises of an
alleviated sentence if they would just sign the
document?
A. I think one has to assume
there is potential problems with
all eyewitnesses, but this is one of the materials
we
have. It is a kind of source the historians have
always
used and must be used with care, but I would argue
that
one does not write it off categorically because it
has
potential problems.
Q. So, as an historian, it is
your duty to weigh evidence
then?
A. Yes.
Q. To look at it and say,
"This one I accept and that one
seems implausible"?
A. Or accept parts of this
because he was in a position to
have seen this himself. The second part of it may
be
hearsay and, therefore, it is no more reliable
than what
somebody else told him. So you can have parts of
testimony that have greater evidentiary weight --
I would
give them greater evidentiary weight than other
parts.
Q. You have to rely on your
own integrity and your own
. P-81
judgment in deciding what to select and what to
omit?
A. Historians are always
making decisions about selection of
documents. We are in a constant process of
selection.
Q. And, obviously, in a
constant process of compression too
because you start off with an immense shelf of
documents
you have to compress into a reasonable length of
manuscript?
A. Yes. We always have to
make decisions about what is more
important than something else.
Q. Yes, and you would be
indignant if somebody called you
perverse or manipulative or if you were accused of
distorting because you left out a paragraph that
just
repeated what the paragraph above had said?
A. It would depend entirely
on the context. If I had made a
very egregious mistake and was caught out, I guess
I would
not have a right to be indignant.
Q. Have you ever made
mistakes?
A. Of course historians make
mistakes, yes.
Q. Indeed. But nobody has
accused you of wilfully distorting
or manipulating because you have made a mistake?
A. I have been accused of
wilfully distorting.
Q. Have you misread words in
handwriting sometimes, in German
handwriting?
A. I may have. I do not know
that anyone has called it to my
attention but I certainly have been accused by
someone who
wished me no good will of manipulating evidence.
. P-82
Q. Have you ever read the
book by, I think it is, Mr Paget QC
who was the Defence counsel of Manstein?
A. No, I have not read that
book.
Q. Manstein, of course, was
put on trial for war crimes?
A. By the British, yes.
Q. By the British, yes. I
cannot ask you about what it
contains. The Jager document, the Jager report
now -- I
am now on page 7, paragraph 4.4, my Lord -- is
this a
document from the Moscow archives, was it a
Nuremberg
document?
A. I believe it is a Riga
document, the Jager report.
MR JUSTICE GRAY: Are you on 4.5?
MR IRVING: 4.4, my Lord. We are looking at the
Jaeger
document which is item 1944. You seem to prefer
to
work ----
A. I am sorry, it is a Moscow
document.
Q. You seem to prefer to work from printed volumes of documents?
A. That will depend. If I am doing a detailed study of
something like the Vehrmacht role in the shootings in
Yugoslavia or the Police 101, I work in the original sources.
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