00011353.gif [letterhead] COORDINATOR Of INFORMATION 270 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK April 27, 1942 MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel William J. Donovan FROM: J. (?) WARBURG SUBJECT: Hitler's speech The outstanding points about the Hitler speech seem to be these: 1. There seems to have been no good reason for making the speech expect the necessity for dealing with the German internal situation. (a) The whole first part seems to attempt to say to the German people: "I did not start this war. The British and the Jews did." The length of this section would indicate that there must be people in Germany who feel that this is Hitler's war and who are dissatisfied with it. (b) The section which deals with the winter campaign is defensive in nature. It seems in a way to apologize for certain severe measures which had to be taken, which clearly indicates that there was, if not mutiny, at least widespread dissatisfaction among the troops. We have had such stories of dissatisfaction from various sources. (') The promises that the railroads will work better, the supply organizations be more effective, etc. imply that they have broken down during the war. (d) The violent denunciation of RAF bombings and the threat of reprisals seems to have been purely for German consumption, since this whole section was omitted from the English version transmitted to England. This section was therefore not intended to frighten the British but to reassure the Germans. The implication is that the Germans are badly rattled by the RAF bombings. 2. It is notable that the speech contains no promise of victory in 1942, or, for that matter, any other time. It stresses the necessity for avoiding defeat, but lacks any of the assurance of previous speeches. 00011354.gif page 2 3. The speech contains the flat statement that the outcome of this war will be settled on the eastern front. This falls right into the line we have been taking of telling the Germans that unless Hitler [unreadable] in breaking [unreadable] of the war this summer his defeat is certain. 4. It is [unreadable] that Hitler stressed the submarine as the weapon by which he would reduce England. There is no hint of invasion, and aerial warfare is only mentioned as a reprisal measure. 5. The speech showed a good deal of preoccupation with the commando raids. 6. The whole climax of the speech - his request for absolute power over every German - speaks for itself. Obviously, Hitler has this power already. The fact that he made this strange demand to the Reichstag is a clear indication of some sort of trouble at home. The suspicion that this was a plant in order to create false hopes among the United Nations is probably not justified, because references to the home front and to the degree were omitted from most of the short wave summaries sent out to foreign countries. 7. Finally, it is interesting to note the increasing number of references to the Almighty and to Providence, which may perhaps indicate that Hitler has lost some of his confidence in himself and in German arms. Conclusion: We believe the speech warrants the inference that Germany was suffering more [unreadable] during the winter than we have been inclined to assume, that the Germans are themselves quite worried, and that they are probably going into this spring and summer with a far less definite plan and with less confidence than we have been inclined to assume.
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