The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Shofar FTP Archive File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-01-06

Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-01-06
Last-Modified: 1999/06/15

In both cases the Accused became involved only at a later
stage in order to arrange for the transportation.

Justice Silberg:  Who convinced the station master at the
French border to let these Jews pass, under the pretext that
this was a military transport?  Was this not the personal
intervention of the Accused?  After all, the Vichy regime
was not bound to receive them. The deportation went to the
West and not to the East. The Vichy regime in France was not
bound to receive them. The Accused deceived the station
master, telling him that this was a military transport. Was
that not an independent action?

Dr. Servatius:  It is true that this was an independent
action in the carrying out of deportations, but the
deportation and the rounding up did not take place on the
Accused's initiative. Had the transports disguised as
military transports not passed the border, the Jews would
not have returned to their homes in Wuerttemberg. Probably,
they would have been sent directly to a concentration camp -
to the East. The Jews who were transported to the East went
to their death. However, it was not the Accused's function
to determine the place of destination; this was done by
someone else. Those people had to be brought to the South of
France, and at that stage this obstacle arose which he had
to overcome. However, this cannot lead to any conclusion as
to the deportation and the extermination.

Justice Silberg:  Who carried out the round-up at the local
level?  Is it not true that this round-up of the Jews was
carried out by the "IdS" (Commander of the Security Police)?

Dr. Servatius:  Yes, I have already mentioned that the local
commanders carried out the round-up. But they did so in
exercising their own authority. The Accused only gave
professional instructions to the officer in charge in
France. But nothing was achieved by the mere issue of these
professional instructions. They had to be carried out by the
Commander of the Security Police, and he was also capable of
doing so. He also maintained direct contact with the RSHA.
His superior was the Higher SS and Police Leader who was
Himmler's direct representative. Had Himmler wished that
something different be done, these intentions would have
been transmitted to the Commander of the Security Police,
through the intermediary of the Higher SS and Police Leader.
What happened on this occasion was only the written
implementation of the deportation which had been ordered.

Justice Silberg:  You are confusing the BdS with the IdS. The
senior SS commander was at the front. I am asking you, who
rounded up the Jews in Germany itself?  They were rounded up
by the inspectors of the IdS, and the IdS were subordinates
of the Accused.

Dr. Servatius:  There were no inspectors in the territories
under military occupation. There, the title commander was
used. In the old, civilian, territories, the name inspector
was retained. That is the difference, but the activity was
the same.

I shall now deal with the deportations from France. The
documents produced by the Defence clearly show who was, in
fact, the driving force behind the deportation and round-up.

Defence exhibit N/36 contains the proposal of Ambassador
Abetz made to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, dated 17
August 1940, namely to remove all Jews from the occupied
territories. They were to be deprived of their property
which was to be disposed of for the benefit of the Germans.

Defence exhibit N/37 is a further teleprint message from
Ambassador Abetz to the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ribbentrop, dated 1 October 1940. It contains the proposal
of proceedings for the collective extradition of German and
Austrian Jews in France. This was to be the first step
towards the solution of the Jewish Question in France.

A further Defence exhibit is N/37, also originating from
Ambassador Abetz, dated 3 April 1941.  The Ambassador
requests that pressure be brought to bear on the French
Government to enact legislation on the subject of the Jews,
by which Jewish emigration should be encouraged, so that
deportation could be carried out later. It cannot be shown
that similar pressure was exercised by the Accused at any
place. Allegations to the contrary are based upon a
combination of single occurrences which, in my view, are

In this connection, the Judgment of the District Court
refers to a memorandum drawn up by the officer in charge in
the department of the Senior Commander of the Security
Police, Roethke, according to which the Accused threatened
not to use France any more as a country from which
deportations would be carried out. However, actually, this
was not a matter of principle, but only a dispute in respect
of a train which had been made available for transportation
from Bordeaux. This was a dispute between those offices
involved in the transport, arising from the apprehension of
a complaint to be expected from the Reich Railway
Administration, that the rolling stock made available with
great difficulties was not being utilized. This cannot lead
to the conclusion that the Accused had a discretionary power
of his own as to whether or not to round up Jews in France.
That technical dispute has nothing to do with this aspect.
President:  Dr. Servatius, I refer to exhibit T/613. This is
a document signed by Mueller, in which he refers to that
part of France occupied by the Italians, who raised
obstacles and were making difficulties. Mueller writes that
the Appellant was now negotiating with the Italians, in
order to convince them to remove the obstacles. What is the
connection between this activity and transportation?

Dr. Servatius:  That is correct. However, this does not
concern the Accused's Section, but the Head of the
Department, Mueller, and the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Ribbentrop, who together with Mueller, had recently
visited Mussolini. I can elaborate further on this question
in relation to Southern France.

President:  I wish to clarify my question. If you say  that
what Mueller wrote there is a lie, that will be the end of
the matter. I shall accept that reply. But if you say that
the Appellant is busy trying to persuade the Italians to
refrain from making difficulties, then I ask you once again.
I do not understand. According to the argument of the
Defence, the Accused's responsibility was solely to take
care of transportations. What is the connection between this
matter and his efforts to persuade the Italians to remove
the obstacles, to behave better?  If Mueller lied, I
understand this reply. But if Mueller did not lie, then what
is the explanation?

Dr. Servatius:  What Mueller stated is correct, but this was
a special assignment. I have already mentioned that Mueller
and Ribbentrop visited Mussolini, because in the territories
occupied by Italy results which would have been obtained
there if German methods had been applied were not

The Accused was called upon to become involved in this
matter, and in this connection, mention is also made of
Monaco, where he likewise was called into action.  However,
this was an activity outside the scope of his normal work,
but he had been called upon to act precisely because of the
special operation in Southern France. But the matter
remained in the hands of Mueller personally and of

President Just another question in connection with Monaco.
If I am not mistaken, in the matter of Monaco, the Appellant
in person requested the intervention of the German Foreign
Ministry in the matter of the extradition of Jews. This is
mentioned in exhibit T/495.

Dr. Servatius:  If my memory serves me properly, this is
correct, although I am not absolutely certain. I believe
that was because this was a special operation.

President:  But my question is: If this was a Sonderaktion
(special operation) and the initiative originated from
Germans in Germany, like Abetz and Ribbentrop, why should
the Appellant apply to the Foreign Ministry to intervene in
the matter of Monaco? After all, Ribbentrop himself is the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, why did he need the
intervention of the Foreign Ministry to exercise its
influence upon Monaco?

Dr. Servatius:  I can only assume that it was because Mueller
and Ribbentrop worked together and Mueller entrusted one of
his subordinates with additional duties which were beyond
his own work capacity. However, the driving force in
Southern France was also the Commander of the Security
Police, Dr. Knochen. Defence exhibit N/40 refers to this. On
13 January 1943 he writes to Mueller, to General Mueller,
that he, Mueller, should urge the Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler
to put an end to the favourable attitude of the Italians
towards the Jews, otherwise it would be impossible to
continue with the implementation of the policy concerning
the Jews as understood by the Germans.

This is the beginning of the process by which Ribbentrop was
called upon to co-operate, as well as the visit to
Mussolini. A number of documents submitted deal with
individuals, such as the police officer Togliatti who had
been sent by Mussolini, and I know that there are still two
other persons who are living in France.  These were,
therefore, special measures ordered to be taken. However, I
am dealing with the general deportation and the round-up.

Justice Silberg:  Was it not the duty of the Foreign Ministry
to apply to the Government of Monaco? This would seem to be
the direct channel, isn't that so?

Dr. Servatius:  That is correct.

Justice Silberg:  And von Thadden was the officer in charge
in the Foreign Ministry?

Dr. Servatius:  That is correct.

Justice Silberg:  Von Thadden writes in exhibit T/492:  "I do
not know how Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann established
contact with the Government of Monaco and whether the
population was involved in that respect." That is to say, an
official of the Foreign Ministry does not know how Eichmann
established contact with the Government of Monaco. In any
case, he knows that this was not done through the
intermediary of the Foreign Ministry.

Dr. Servatius:  This can be explained only as follows:   Von
Thadden was sitting in his office, while Ribbentrop, Mueller
and the Accused, who was entrusted with the assignment, were
in leading positions, and the office did not know the
particulars of what had happened and was surprised. This
appears from the letter.

Inasmuch as the territorial division into police districts
is concerned, Belgium was attached to France. In Belgium,
too, it cannot be said that the Accused played a leading
role in the matter of deportations. Here the beginnings of
the deportations are especially clear. It was intended to
deport 10,000 Jews. The military commander went to Himmler's
Field Headquarters, and together they increased the number
to 20,000. The Accused is confronted with a fait accompli
and has to accept this decision as a subordinate and has to
carry it out.

President:  How do you explain, Dr. Servatius, T/513, a
document signed by the Appellant and addressed to someone in
the Navy, in Belgium, a certain - I cannot pronounce his
name - Anlaos, ordering him to evacuate stateless Jews?

Dr. Servatius:  I can't explain that, it was beyond the
ordinary scope of his functions.

President:  That is why I asked you. This is certainly not
connected with transportations.

Dr. Servatius:  I cannot explain it at present. However, it
contradicts what was the normal course of action. I think I
remember what the Accused said at the First Instance in
respect to similar matters: When a deportation took place,
various matters had to be taken care of; certain persons
were left behind, or there were general instructions as to
who was to join the deportation, and thus this matter came
within the scope of technical matters.

In concluding this part, I shall refer to Hungary. In this
connection, too, the District Court did not pay sufficient
attention to the documents submitted on behalf of the
Defence. The Reich Plenipotentiary, Veesenmayer, was not
merely a person entrusted with reporting, as stated in the
Judgment, but one of the main actors. In exhibit N/73,
Veesenmayer informs the Foreign Ministry that every three to
four days trains transporting 5,000 Jews - a total of 50,000
Jews - were made available for departure. He says that
Winkelmann made agreements in respect of these transports,
and he asks that decisions be taken as regards their

Justice Silberg:  Can you tell me the date of N/73?

Dr. Servatius:  The next document to which I wish to refer,
the reply to the previous one, bears the date 19 April

Attorney General  If it please the Court, N/73 is dated  15
April 1944.

Dr. Servatius:  The reply, exhibit N/72, contains information
that the Accused was entrusted by Kaltenbrunner with
procuring freight cars and setting up a timetable, and there
you have a neat distribution of tasks. Exhibit N/74 provides
a complete and clear picture of Veesenmayer's activities.
Veesenmayer writes to the Foreign Ministry:  "I ask for
postponement of the evacuation of the fifty thousand
Jews...which was requested by Hungary." The reply of
Ambassador Ritter, Foreign Ministry, addressed to
Veesenmayer, is dated 27 April 1944, and is exhibit N/75.

Justice Silberg:  What date?

Dr. Servatius:  27 April 1944. The document reads: "In the
matter of transportation of the 50,000 Jews, a decision will
be taken by the Head of the SIPO and the SD." He continues:
"Responsibility for the delay lies with the authorities
responsible for the evacuation of the Jews, who have delayed
the departure of the Jews made available for that purpose."
The insistence of the Foreign Ministry becomes quite
manifest in this document; the Accused is even  reproached
as having been guilty of lack of zealousness in arranging
the trains for that purpose.

I further refer to exhibit N/76, dated 8 May 1944, submitted
by the Defence. In this document Veesenmayer informs the
Foreign Ministry that the Economic- Administrative Head
Office will make the necessary dispositions for the
assignment of 100,000 Jewish forced labourers requested by
Organization Todt. This statement confirms that the
aforesaid office will determine the place of destination of
the deportation and will dispose of the Jews at the end of
the deportation. That means that it is not the Accused.

A further document, exhibit N/79, is worthy of note. In this
document, at a meeting with the Foreign Ministry, Professor
Six suggests that an earlier date be fixed for the
evacuation of Budapest.

Justice Silberg:  What is the date of this document?

Dr. Servatius:  Unfortunately, I do not have it here at this
moment. Anyhow, it was prior to the invasion, and it does
not concern the final event.

Attorney General  6 June 1944.

Dr. Servatius:  Even if that happened some months before the
evacuation of Budapest, it is nevertheless relevant in
respect of the allegation in the indictment that the
Accused, at that time, on his own initiative, had urged the
fixing of an earlier date, so as not to leave the Jews time
for escape.  I refer now to exhibit N/80, dated 7 July 1944.
It shows General Winkelmann in full action. He writes, on 7
July 1944, to Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler in person,
complaining that  Veesenmayer is too soft, and that he ought
to be ordered to bang on the table. On the other hand, the
Accused, who was  in the limelight in these proceedings,
recedes into the background.

President:  Dr. Servatius, could this be an appropriate place
to take a break?

Dr. Servatius:  Yes.

President:  How much more time will you need?

Dr. Servatius:  About an hour, I think.

President:  We will continue tomorrow morning.

Dr. Servatius:  As Your Honour pleases.

President:  The hearing will continue tomorrow morning at

Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor

© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and to combat hatred. Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.