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Shofar FTP Archive File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Testimony-Abroad/Alfred_Six-02

Last-Modified: 1999/06/14

I do not know whether Eichmann was able to grant exemptions.
Had I wished to obtain an exemption or something similar for
a Jew, I would not have gone to Eichmann, as he was an
exponent of the other side.  I would first have gone to a
head of a foreign mission, and perhaps then to Schellenberg,
who had a reputation for being able to arrange such
exemptions.  I was able to succeed in doing this several
times.  As to whether Eichmann himself ever granted an
exemption, I do not know.  Given the structure of the Head
Office for Reich Security, it was impossible for a Section
Head to grant exemptions from the orders of his superior on
his own authority or over the head of his superior.  Very
many members of the Head Office for Reich Security were
removed from their posts, and this was certainly one of the
reasons why everybody was very careful not to exceed their
authority.  There were no instructions giving Section Heads
prior permission for making exceptions.  This applies to the
Head Office for Reich Security generally, and not
specifically to Eichmann's Section.

I am not familiar with Eichmann's various powers.  However,
there is no doubt that he had wider powers than other
Section Heads.  This was the general view in the Head Office
for Reich Security.  The general impression was that
Eichmann was not only under Mueller's orders, but that he
was somewhat on the same level as Mueller.  Mueller was
known as one of the worst instigators, and I would say that
the two were very well matched.  Under a different superior
than Mueller, Eichmann's powers would probably not have been
as extensive as they actually were.  It was known that
Eichmann had access to Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner, although
I cannot now give any actual facts to attest to that.  I
also saw Eichmann in Heydrich's antechamber _ as far as I
remember, definitely once or twice.  I went to see Heydrich
every three or four weeks at the conferences of Department
Chiefs.  Eichmann did not take part in these conferences.
It was known that Kaltenbrunner had a personal preference
for dealing with counterespionage matters.  In addition, as
the war continued and the domestic political situation
worsened, Mueller had increasingly to deal with domestic
policy matters.  That may have contributed to Eichmann's
becoming increasingly independent.  Before he worked in the
Head Office for Reich Security, Mueller worked under Himmler
in the Political Police in Bavaria, and before that he was a
police commissioner.  Himmler brought him into the Secret
State Police.  Mueller was not originally a National
Socialist, but rather a dedicated Political Police
specialist.  In my view, that was another reason why
Eichmann's superior considered Eichmann to be particularly
suited for his job, as he was a National Socialist of long
standing.  I believe that Heydrich in particular attached
value to Eichmann's Section being in the hands of a National
Socialist of long standing.  In my opinion, Mueller and
Eichmann teamed up fairly well.  The main occupation of
Mueller himself was persecuting or combatting Communists.  I
know that in all discussions Mueller talked about the
Communist danger.  As far as I remember, he did not in these
discussions talk about the Jewish danger.  However, today I
am unable to remember any details.  Mueller was known as the
Communists' Mueller.  While I was working with Eichmann in
the Security Service Head Office, I found him to be a
relatively simple, intellectually uninteresting and not
particularly gifted, but very snappish, SS man.  His duties
then were fairly low-level.  His superior at the time,
Wisliceny, was a rather robust man, who kept him well under
control.  I believe that Eichmann's later development was
basically influenced by the essential feature of his
character, i.e., a simple way of thinking and the urge to
find favour with his superior.  Eichmann believed absolutely
in National Socialism.  Essentially, the world was fulfilled
for him by means of the Nazi outlook on life.  His whole
attitude meant that Eichmann would not exceed the limits of
the instructions he received.  I would have noticed if
Eichmann had exceeded his instructions when I was working in
the Security Service Head Office.  I am not, however, able
to remember anything of this kind.  I believe that, when in
doubt, Eichmann always acted in accordance with Party
doctrine in its most extreme interpretation.  I myself did
not have sufficient contact with Eichmann to be able now to
provide information about his personal inclinations.
Eichmann was an unconditional National Socialist, and his
view of the world was determined by National Socialism.  I
assume that, in his own area, Eichmann felt himself to be
the executor of those points of the programme which referred
to it.  As long as Eichmann was subordinate to me, I do not
remember him making any anti-Jewish statements or proposals.
It was not in his nature to make proposals which went
further than the anti-Jewish measures envisaged at that

Until 1939 I was the head of Central Departments II1 and II2
in the Security Service Head Office.  From 1939 until I left
for the Foreign Ministry I was, with interruptions, Head of
Department VII in the Head Office for Reich Security.

In the Security Service Head Office, Eichmann was
subordinate to me from 1937 to 1938, but not directly.
Wisliceny was Eichmann's direct superior.  I no longer
remember the name of Wisliceny's direct superior, whose
direct superior I was myself.  In the Head Office for Reich
Security, Eichmann was not my subordinate, neither did he
have any other official relationship with me.

As of 1938, the general guidelines for appointment to the
Security Service Head Office were: National Socialist
attitude on the part of the applicant, prior knowledge of a
specialized area, and, as far as possible, academic
qualifications.  The pre-1938 staff of the office were
mainly SS members of long standing.  Formally, the members
of the Security Service Head Office had to be convinced
National Socialists.  Exceptions were made in the case of
sought-after experts.  Eichmann was certainly not such an

Apart from the report on his journey to Palestine, I am not
familiar with and do not remember any of Eichmann's reports
from that period when he was subordinate to me in the
Security Service Head Office.  Eichmann did not make his
journey to Palestine on his own _ he went with Hagen; as far
as I know, the report on this journey was written by Hagen.
I must have read the Palestine report, I suppose.  However,
I no longer remember the contents of this report.  When
Eichmann was no longer subordinate to me, I ceased to
receive any reports from him.  From document No. 2, which
has been shown to me, I see from the reference Hg, and also
from the title, that the report was in fact written by
Hagen.  As I can see from looking at document No. 2, the
report is very superficial.  Today, I do not remember
whether I approved the report at the time or not.  As I have
said, I no longer remember the contents of the report.

As a Section Head, Eichmann was entitled to make use of the
rank of an SS Fuehrer.  On 15 September 1937 he was
recommended in a Fuehrer minute by the Section Head of the
Central Department for an appointment as SS
Untersturmfuehrer.  I approved of this recommendation.  I
said then that there were no objections to the promotion, as
Eichmann satisfied the normal requirements.  Once Eichmann
had been proposed for promotion by his immediate superior
and his colleagues, the promotion was more or less a
foregone conclusion.

I am familiar, from the Nuremberg Trials, with documents
which show that in the Head Office for Reich Security
illegal assignments were ordered.  These included such
things as the Venlo news reconnaissance actions, and the
attack on the Gleiwitz broadcasting station.  There were no
such cases involving my activities in Department VII of the
Head Office for Reich Security, as is shown in the decision
of the Second Nuremberg Military Tribunal.  Neither do I,
nor did I at that time, know of any unlawful orders which
involved the sphere of Section IVB4.  Legal thinking at the
time held that the killing of persons without the sanction
of martial law and without legal proceedings was unlawful.
There was controversy about the question of the unlawfulness
of killings in areas which were under martial law.
According to the American attitude, any such killing was
unlawful, while the Accused at Nuremberg pleaded that they
were acting under the compulsion of superior orders.  There
does not appear to have been any homogeneous attitude to
this question in law, in the light of what I have gathered
from the documents and statements presented at the Nuremberg
Trials.  I still remember what I stated in my trial in
Nuremberg.  The statement I made then is my attitude to the
matter.  During the War I also did not consider mass
shootings or mass executions without any legal proceedings
to be lawful, and I said as much at Nuremberg.  During the
War there were also some other officers who professed the
same point of view.  During the War it was at least possible
to try and be transferred away from an Operations Unit.  I
myself made such a successful attempt.  It was also possible
in some other cases which were referred to at Nuremberg.  In
the last resort, everyone could take the ultimate way out,
by shooting himself.  When I was transferred back, I was not
demoted and did not suffer any disadvantages except for the
fact that, until his death, I had a continual feud with
Heydrich.  There doubtless were cases where transfers from
an Operations Unit involved disadvantages.  However, I
cannot now remember individual cases.  In any case, no one
was shot because of this, as far as I am aware.  There was
also the possibility of volunteering from the Head Office
for Reich Security to serve at the front or to be released
for some other duty.  I was to be stationed again on the
front from mid-1942 on, but just before I was due to leave,
I was released to join the Foreign Ministry.  After six
months of intelligence work in the Foreign Ministry, I was
appointed Envoy, First Class, as an assistant director in
the ministry.  Thus I did not suffer any disadvantages in
connection with this transfer, either.  However, that was
probably due to Heydrich's death.  I am acquainted with
instances where Security Service Leaders were released on
their own request by the Head Office for Reich Security for
other duties.

I know nothing about special assignments from Heydrich to

At the beginning of July 1941, I was appointed _ on
Heydrich's orders _ Commander of the Moscow Advance
Commando. The task of the Advance Commando, in co-operation
with the fighting forces, was to secure valuable files and
the contents of archives and libraries in Moscow.  The
commando consisted of twelve to fourteen interpreters.
According to reports submitted, it first carried out such
duties in Smolensk.  After the advance to Moscow was delayed
in August 1941, I managed to be recalled to Berlin.  After
my departure, Nebe put the Moscow Advance Commando under his
control (see Documents Volumes 2_4, Six, in the Second
Nuremberg Military Tribunal).

I did not deal with tracking down Soviet Commissars in
prisoner-of-war camps, nor did I receive any orders to this
effect which I failed to carry out.  This point was the
subject of the criminal proceedings against me at the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal.  In the judgment of the
Military Tribunal, I received confirmation of the fact that
this was not my assignment.  However, the Ludwigsburg
Central Office for the Investigation of National Socialist
Crimes determined unequivocally a year ago that an SS
Fuehrer of the same name had carried out such shootings in
Northern Russia.

I was not present at the discussions in Pretzsch and Berlin
before the outbreak of the war with Russia, because at that
time I was still on active service (Reich Division, 1st
Artillery Regiment).  At that time the regiment was
stationed on the Polish_Russian border in the deployment
zone.  The leader of Operations Unit B, Nebe, who had
seconded several interpreters to me for the Moscow Advance
Commando, gave me the same explanation when we met in Minsk
about the task of the Operations Units that Ohlendorf gave
at Nuremberg.

I got to know Nebe around 1937 or 1938.  I knew him as the
chief of the Berlin Criminal Investigation Police.  My
relations with him were extremely bad, and this was
generally known.  According to what Nebe said, the
Commissars were considered to be a threat to the safety of
the troops behind the lines.  I gathered from his comments
that the Commissars were to be shot by the Operations Units.
Nebe did not talk about shooting the Jewish civilian
population.  I did not consider the Jewish civilian
population to be a danger to the safety of the troops.

 I came to Minsk on 4 July 1941 together with the fighting
forces, while fighting was still going on.  I remained there
about a week and left around 12 or 13 July 1941.  A
prosecution document in the Nuremberg Trial shows the
precise date of my departure.  I did not see any Jews _
whether German or others _ at Minsk who had been deported to
Minsk.  I consider it out of the question for such
deportations to have taken place at that time, as the town
had been evacuated by the Russians and fighting was still
taking place in the immediate vicinity.  There were no mass
executions in Minsk during my stay there.
I know nothing about any connection or organizational
co_operation between Eichmann and the Operations Units.

I do not know what the "Brown Folder" is.

I was the head of the Politico-Cultural Department of the
Foreign Ministry until the end of the War.

In the Second Trial of the American Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, I was sentenced to twenty years in prison.  The
sentence was commuted, by way of pardon, to ten years.  The
verdict says that it cannot be stated with scientific
exactitude that I participated actively in the SS murder
programme, but that I was nevertheless a member of this
criminal organization and was guilty on all three counts.

My knowledge of the individual Departments of the Head
Office for Reich Security is based on the organization work
plan and is to be gathered from the information I have
indicated above.

I am not aware of other cases where the Section Head had a
higher rank than the group leader.

I do not know whether Eichmann received direct assignments
from the Chief of the Security Police.  It was not customary
for Section Heads to receive assignments from the Chief of
the Security Police directly.  I am not aware of such
instances, either.

As it developed, the Head Office for Reich Security was
housed in various buildings in Berlin according to the
Departments.  Mueller's entire group (Department IV), except
for Eichmann's Section, was housed in the building of the
Secret State Police in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse.
Eichmann's Section was in the Kurfuerstenstrasse.  I never
saw the building in which this Section was housed.  My
Department was also housed in a four-storey building.   This
was necessary because of the extent of the archives and the

I do not know whether Eichmann himself had access to

I was present at the meeting of Information Office XII in
Krumhuebel.  I gave a lecture on the organization of world
Jewry.  I presented in detail the contents of this lecture
when I was in the witness box at Nuremberg.  I would refer
to this document.  According to a piece of evidence produced
as a copy, I am said to have called the aim of German policy
on Jews "the physical extermination of Jewry."  With the
same arguments that I advanced then, I challenge the
authenticity of this piece of evidence also today.  As far
as I know, the participants at that meeting were exclusively
from the German representations abroad.  There were no
Specialists on Jewish Affairs.  I remember that Ambassador
Schleier and Legation Counsellor von Thadden were present.
Eichmann was not present, nor was anyone from the Security
Police.  As far as I can remember, the purpose of the
meeting was to counter Jewish propaganda abroad.  The so-
called Final Solution of the Jewish Question was not
discussed at this meeting.  I believe that, apart from
Schleier and von Thadden, the participants in the meeting
did not have information about the current situation of the
Final Solution.

In September 1940, I was due to land in England together
with the German airborne troops.  The task assigned to me
was that of an adviser on Military Police and Security
Police matters to the Supreme Commander who was to be
appointed by the Luftwaffe.  Field Marshal Milch had
required Heydrich to provide someone suitable.  My name was
given to him, and I had presented myself to him.  There were
no instructions for the activities planned for Great

Read, approved and signed
(-) Alfred F. Six

The witness was sworn.
In witness whereof
(-) Eisenbraun (-) Freese
Assistant Judge Court Official

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