Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Pleading-02-03 Last-Modified: 1999/06/15 25. On Paragraph 91 - Special Account "W" Only the money paid into this account was available as part of the measures for providing for the Jews. The assumption that the outstanding balance passed into the hands of the RSHA because all assets were blocked is incorrect. These assets were confiscated by the Chief Financial Director, who in certain cases is still in possession of such assets to this very day. Such cases are claims for the return of assets which have been considered invalid for formal reasons, such as failure to apply within the required period. Registration of assets was governed by regulations. Those involved here were the Reich Ministry of Economics, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, the Foreign Exchange Search Office and the Security Police. The Emigration Funds in Vienna and Prague were similarly governed by regulations. The Accused could not dispose of these assets as he saw fit. 26. On Paragraph 94 - Evacuation to Theresienstadt The content of the guidelines for evacuation to Theresienstadt was laid down by the Accused's superiors. This can also be seen from the content which indicates that the Accused was unable to issue any orders of his own to the places of reception and the superiors there. 27. On Paragraph 95 - Remaining Jewish assets The orders concerning the composition of the directives were given by Kaltenbrunner and signed by him. 28. On Paragraph 96 - Seizure of property through transfer to the Reich Association (1) No assets were transferred to the RSHA via the Accused's Section. The Chief Financial Director had to confiscate these assets. As long as the Jewish Communities were subject to the Reich Association, they had to obtain permission in respect of supervision and disposition from the local offices of the Security Police. This was governed by the relevant regulations. The Accused could also not dispose as he saw fit of the Emigration Fund. Moreover, as a result of an order from Himmler assets subsequently went to the Economic-Administrative Head Office. This can be seen from a Defence document. (2) It is erroneous to assume that the Accused's Section controlled the public property of German Jewry, although at first sight it might seem that this was the case. However, in this respect Paragraph 57 of the Judgment is referred to, under which the Minister was empowered to dissolve existing Jewish organizations or to require them to merge in the Reich Association. In this way the German Reich Government gave the Minister an instrument for complete supervision, as is stated in the Judgment. Thus it was not the Accused who had to take decisions in that regard. The list of Jewish communities drawn up by the Accused's Section and the order to merge in the Reich Association is thus simply the implementation of the authorization by the Minister to which reference has been made. (3) Kaltenbrunner's circular dated 5 March 1943 about the assets of foreign Jews. From the circular it may be deduced that the Foreign Ministry had already unsuccessfully made attempts with the foreign governments to seize these Jewish-owned assets. It is self-evident that the Foreign Ministry was now trying to pursue this aim further by blocking the assets, as the circular shows. It is also striking that the circular dated 23 September 1943, mentioned in the Judgment, is also not signed by the Accused, but by his superior, Mueller. This must also exonerate the Accused. 29. On Paragraph 97 - Pattern of evacuation If there was no material difference between the various areas in question, because all the authorities here were in that regard subordinate to Department IV of the RSHA, they were not, however, subordinate to the Accused as Specialist Officer, but to the Chief of Department and his superiors. In Jewish affairs the authorities obtained their instructions not from the Accused, but from the Chief of Department or the CdS. The Accused's Section simply had to implement what had been ordered, and to deliver the instructions that had been issued. 30. On Paragraph 98 - Activities in Jewish affairs outside the Reich It must be remeberede that the "Advisers" were attached to the diplomatic representatives as aides to the Police Attaches who were located at these diplomatic representations. In contrast, the BdS had no "Advisers," but only the Specialist Officers who were subordinate to him in his Department for Jewish Affairs. The BdS was the superior of his Specialist 0Officers in both the material and the disciplinary sphere. It is therefore not correct, as it says in the Judgment, that Advisers and Specialist Officers were directly subordinate to the Accused. It is true that these individuals received professional orders from the CdS and the Chief of Department IV, which the Accused's Section passed on; but not one of the Specialist Officers of a State Police office was subordinate to Section IVB4. By way of proof, reference is made to the agreement in principle between Himmler and Ribbentrop, as well as between the CdS and the Foreign Ministry concerning the Police Attaches. This appears from the correspondence between the BdS Paris, Dr. Knochen, and the Chief of Department, Mueller. 31. On Paragraph 100 - France 1. It is not correct that Dannecker, Roethke and Brunner were Advisers from the Accused's Section; they were Specialist Officers attached to the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD, Dr. Knochen, Paris. This can be seen from the letterheads. The hierarchical arrangement is particularly obvious from the order concerning the arrest of Argentinian Jews on the basis of an instruction issued via the Accused's Section on 28 January 1944. This instruction only becomes operative through the BdS Knochen, who on the same day issues the implementation order to all the police stations subordinate to him to arrest the Jews. This document, in a French translation, is printed in the journal "La Revue du Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine," Special Issue 21/22, page 48, "Le Dossier Eichmann," June 1960, Paris 4 E, 17 Rue Geoffroy - L'Asnier. A copy is enclosed. 2. According to the Judgment, Dannecker claims that he demanded for hinself a central role in his capacity as the Specialist Officer of the BdS, as part of Ambassador Abetz' endeavours. Abetz was the driving force. This is shown by the documents contained in Poliakov's book (Red), The Third Reich and its Servants, pp. 103 ff. 3. If a "decision" was taken in the discussion of 1 July 1942, this is correct only to the extent that a decision was taken to implement then what Himmler had ordered in terms of figures. The figures for France and Belgium were also reduced by Himmler himself in agreement with the Head of the Military Administration in Belgium. The order by Himmler mentioned in the Judgment was precisely the reason why the Accused had to travel to Paris and pass on the order there. 4. The case described which is supposed to demonstrate the Accused's rage and harshness cannot in fact give rise to the conclusion which the Court draws from it. The Accused's displeasure related here not to the deportation of the Jews, but to the demand for surplus trains. These could only be obtained with great difficulty, and an announcement by the Railways Authority that the trains had run empty could lead to reproaches being made at the timetable conference and complaints to the Accused's superiors. The claim that the Accused is supposed on this occasion to have said that he would drop France as a country for evacuation must be the result of a misunderstood abridged report. Such a measure was, under the prevailing conditions, so far beyond the realm of the possible that this comment appears meaningless. If the trains subsequently started running again, the continuation of the deportations is to be ascribed not to the Accused, but to the fact that the leadership maintained and even stepped up its Jewish policy. 5. The number of those to be deported, the place of destination and the category of persons (including children) was determined neither by the Accused nor by one of the members of his Section. 6. Concerning the Jews in Monaco, it was not the Accused who did not refrain from their persecution, but the top leaders. The Accused's trip which is in question here was ordered by his superior. As a Sspecialist Officer, the Accused could not undertake a trip to Southern France as he saw fit. An accurate picture of what occurred here can only be obtained by taking into account the efforts made by the highest placed bodies in the Italian occupied area in Southern France. In order to assess this matter, it is necessary to consider not just those documents which deal with Monaco on their own, but the documents available, some 25 in number, which concern Southern France and Italy must be added to them. The resultant overall picture differs from that assumed in the Judgment. It can be seen that out of the many who were indisputably involved in the persecution of the Jews, the Accused was not the central point of the circle of those who were subordinate to him at home and abroad. He was not the pivot round which everything rotated. 7. Belgium It is not correct that the Accused's Section planned the evacuation of 10,000 Jews. It was Himmler who planned and issued the orders. The Military Commander in Belgium went to Himmler's field command post, and there the figure was set at 20,000. In addition, Luther from the Foreign Ministry also became involved. Documents to this effect are available. 32. On Paragraph 101 - Holland Zoepf was not one of the Accused's men: he was a Specialist Officer with the BdS in Holland. The person who determined the arrangements made there was the Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter. His reports are available, and in them he himself says that he was the person who arranged matters. The measures originated with Himmler; he also received reports from Rauter on their implementation, and in a memorandum he commended this as "very good." The dispute between Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart and Kaltenbrunner shows clearly that it was not the Accused who had to decide, but the quarelling higher authorities. For an understanding of the context it is also of importance that as early as February 1942, Himmler notified the Economic-Administrative Head Office (Pohl and Gluecks) that they should find locations for the reception of transports of Jews, since major economic assignments were imminent. 33. On Paragraph 102 - Norway The Judgment does not refer to the Reich Commissioner's instructions for the measures against the Jews as well as the other orders that were issued. The repeated reference to the "Accused's Section, with signature" gives a distorted overall picture. 34. On Paragraph 103 - Denmark The documents show: who issued the orders (Hitler, Ribbentrop, Himmler); who was in charge of the deportations (Mildner); that Mildner as BdS went to Berlin to the Chief of Department Mueller, in order to stop the deportations; that this step was unsuccessful because of the orders issued by higher authorities. Von Thadden's statement of May 1945 shows the Witness's efforts to keep the Foreign Ministry out of this matter. For his part, Mildner attempted to diminish his responsibility for the deportations, as confirmed by Reich Plenipotentiary Best prior to 1945. 35. On Paragraph 104 - Slovakia (a) 1st phase Wisliceny did not act as Adviser on Jewish Affairs on behalf of the Accused's Section. Nor was Wisliceny only "formally" attached to Ambassador Ludin in Pressburg (Bratislava). Ludin himself has also stated that the first wave of deportations occurred on his orders and at his instigation, also through the Foreign Ministry. (b) 2nd phase: After 16 February 1942 1. On 13 March 1942, although it had been announced that the Accused would arrive in Bratislava for preliminary discussions, he did not do so, coming only much later, namely on the day of Heydrich's assassination. In March 1942 Heydrich himself was in Bratislava. An item of evidence to this effect is available. Ambassador Ludin received his instructions through the Foreign Ministry. The outcome of his negotiations with the Slovak Government concerning deportations is indicated in the Judgment. This shows that here the Accused did not issue any instructions. The report of the Accused's Section (bearing Guenther's signature) simply repeats what Ambassador Ludin himself had said. The report serves as confirmation of the Accused's assertion that in such cases his Section had only been active in terms of reporting. 2. On visits to camps which were considered undesirable, the Accused is not giving his own opinion, but that of his superiors. It could not be left up to the Accused to take an independent decision on such a question, because this involved the leadership's entire policy of extermination. It was a basic question for the leadership. 3. At the time of the uprisings in the autumn of 1944 the Accused was not in Hungary [sic], and he cannot be held responsible for the deportations at that time. 36. On Paragraph 105 - Croatia 1. Abromeit did not deal with the deportations on behalf of the Accused's Section; he was an aide of the Police Attache. In his statement given as early as May 1945, this Police Attach, Hahn, refers not to the Accused but to the Chief of Department Mueller. Guenther's query as to when "one" intends to begin the evacuation confirms that the Accused's Section could not itself undertake anything, but had to enquire what another body was doing. 2. The thwarting of the departure of Jews for Palestine was not the result of any independent order from the Accused's Section, but can only be the result of orders from his superiors, which were passed on by the Section. The highest level of the leadership pursued an unwavering course, as is proved by many documents. The Accused was unable to modify this course, but had to follow it. 37. On Paragraph 106 - Serbia 1. On the marginal comment "Eichmann proposes shooting," the Accused gave his version in his examination. When the Accused had this note submitted to him for the first time, he spontaneously considered it possible that his superiors might have expressed such a view. On subsequent reflection he recognized, however, that neither his superior Mueller nor he himself could have given the military authorities such an indication. The Accused's supposition that the note might represent a misrepresentation by Rademacher is not out of the question. However, there is also the possibility that the Accused, angry at being approached by the Foreign Ministry in connection with a matter concerning the military authorities, made an unthinking comment to the effect that the army would have to suppress the danger of rebellion. This brief incident was not so striking that the Accused should have remembered it many years later. What is characteristic of the Accused's attitude is that he rejects the possible explanation offered by Rademacher. 2. In the RSHA there were no "Amtsleiter" (Heads of Departments) who could have been informed; the term should be Chiefs of Department (Amtschefs). The Accused cannot be understood as being an "Amtsleiter." 3. Operations Unit The assumption that the Operations Unit active here could have received instructions via the Accused's Section appears unfounded. In Serbia, there was no Adviser on Jewish Affairs who could have received instructions directly. The Commander of the Operations Unit was so unfamiliar with the Accused that he gave him a higher rank and in his statement incorrectly indicates his Section as being a main department of the Security Police. For a commander who must have been familiar with the hierarchical arrangements on the basis of his experience, this is a statement which rather tends to exonerate the Accused.
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