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Shofar FTP Archive File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-108-02

Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-108-02
Last-Modified: 1999/06/14

Dr. Servatius:  He goes on to say:

     "I was at the time put on the train without any further
     instructions."  As far as I remember, witness Hoettl
     said he travelled with Kaltenbrunner."

On the same page, he then says again:

     "In actual fact I was never Reich Plenipotentiary. I am
     a layman in these matters."

On page 11, the second paragraph:

     "As I see things, without the active co-operation of
     the Hungarians, it would not have been possible to
     carry out the anti-Jewish operations.  It is only when
     you are strong that you can threaten and force things
     through.  However, in 1943 we were no longer strong,
     and in 1944 we were weak."

On page 12, at the bottom, where he answers the seventh
question, "What was the assignment of the Eichmann Special
Commando?," he says the following:

     "I cannot say anything precise about this.  I did not
     have any dealings with Eichmann about this matter, nor
     was I kept informed by him.  As far as I know, I only
     saw Eichmann once, when he presented himself to me.
     This was not immediately after the entry of the German
     forces, but a little later.  However, it cannot have
     been too late, as Winkelmann later ruled that it was no
     longer permitted for SS personnel (offices) to have
     direct dealings with the legation.  I knew that the
     Eichmann Special Commando was engaged in the
     deportations of Jews.  At the time the concept of the
     `Final Solution' was completely unknown to me.  I did
     not hear about this until Nuremberg."

On page 13, the witness comments on document No. 212,*
{*T/1235} point 4.  This concerns foreign Jews in Hungary.
At the bottom it says:

     "In some instances we were informed of the decision,
     insofar as we had to give an account to the Hungarian
     authorities.  In other cases, the decision taken in
     Berlin was sent directly - as I assume - to the local
     SS authorities.  For example, in the documents it says
     that Eichmann negotiated with Hungarian offices.  If he
     did this, I assume he did it on the instructions of his
     superiors, because in the Third Reich it would have
     been very dangerous to undertake anything like this
     without instructions.  If we learned about these
     negotiations, we reported on them.  As to Eichmann's
     powers, I myself have no knowledge."

On page 15, the witness replies to a question from the
Attorney General as to which German authority dealt with the
foot march.  He says the following:

     "I cannot say that.  I assume that it even took place
     with, at the very least, considerable participation by
     the Hungarian authorities.  At that time all German
     authorities, including the legation, had to release for
     service at the front anyone they could at all do
     without.  Therefore, the German authorities would
     simply no longer have had the personnel to organize and
     carry through the foot march on their own.  It was one
     of their last attempts; nor did it have any real

     "The foot march crumbled en route.  As far as I
     remember, the matter was reported to me at the time.  I
     made enquiries of the Hungarian authorities.  I was
     told that there was no fuel, nor were any trains
     running.  The Danube was mined.  In my view, there was
     no point in sending tired people off in this way to act
     as labourers.  I no longer remember what the weather
     was like at the time."

On page 16, the witness replies to a question from the
representative of the Prosecution:

     "Were you involved in the confiscation of Jewish
     assets, and did you know about this?"


     "No, with one exception.  That was the case of the
     Weiss-Manfred Works.  I only found out about this
     matter as the result of a complaint from the Hungarian
     Government to me.  At approximately the same time,
     Standartenfuehrer Becher came to see me.  The Works
     were to be transferred to the ownership of the SS.  I
     was to obtain the consent of the Hungarian Government
     for this.  The Hungarian Government objected in very
     strong terms.  I passed on their protests to Berlin, as
     I thought it unwise at this point in time, to annoy the
     Hungarians by such a measure which was totally
     insignificant for the War.  I also wished at that time
     to notify Berlin of the contracts for the conveyance,
     and asked Becher to give them to me.  He refused."

Dr. Servatius:  There is then a discussion of the measures
against the Jews of Budapest, and document No. 666, page 4,
is shown.  On this the witness explains...

Judge Raveh:   But this document has not yet been submitted
to us.

Dr. Servatius:  But it says here:

     "The representative of Counsel for the Accused asked
     for document No. 666 to be shown to the witness.  The
     witness stated on document No. 666, page 4, which was
     shown to him..."

Presiding Judge: If this document has not yet been submitted
to us, we must now look at it.

Dr. Servatius:  I should like to submit it - but I do not
have it here with me.

Presiding Judge: The same applies to exhibit T/797 as well -
this has not yet been submitted either.  It is referred to
on the same page, is it not?  I suggest that when you get a
chance, you go right through these statements and then
submit any documents still missing - because otherwise we
will not be able to follow the evidence properly.

Dr. Servatius:  I shall subsequently submit this document at
some later stage.

On page 18, the witness states:

     "I remember that there were fears of an uprising as a
     result of the great concentration of Jews in Budapest.
     The plan was to decentralize the Jews in camps in
     Western Hungary.  Where this plan came from, I am
     unable to say.  My visits to Lakatos were probably made
     in this connection.  In such a case I could not receive
     instructions from any SS office, but only from the
     Foreign Ministry.  It may be that for security reasons,
     the security authorities in the Reich required the
     Foreign Ministry to take such measures.  The only case
     where I was approached directly by an SS department to
     negotiate with the Hungarian Government was when Becher
     came to see me about the Weiss-Manfred Works."

Presiding Judge: Is that all?

Dr. Servatius:  From this document, yes.

Presiding Judge: Mr. Hausner, what do you wish to say?

Attorney General: We do not need to quote anything from this

Presiding Judge: I have marked Veesenmayer's statement XIII.
Since the Attorney General does not wish to read anything
out, who is next, Dr. Servatius?

Dr. Servatius:  Your Honour, I should in this connection
like to read out passages from the Nuremberg judgment, Case
11, about the Veesenmayer case, in conjunction with this
statement by the witness.

Presiding Judge: All right.

Dr. Servatius:  For the moment, I have only three copies
available; I have, for the time being, given one to the
interpreter, so that he has it available for his

Presiding Judge: Do you want everything to be translated?

Dr. Servatius:  No, there are just a few passages I wish to
read out.

Attorney General: I understand that the judgment in toto has
to be an exhibit.  Naturally, Counsel for the Defence is
free to read out whatever passages he chooses.  But perhaps
the Court will take note of the entire judgment, either from
the Green Series, or from the special edition which Counsel
for the Defence has in his possession, as do we also, as a
Court Exhibit.

Presiding Judge: I believe this has already been discussed.

Attorney General: Yes.  This has been discussed and agreed

Dr. Servatius:  Your Honour, I am prepared to act
accordingly.  I only have a copy here called The Judgment in
the Wilhelmstrasse Trial, by Dr. Robert Kempner and
Professor Haensel, where it is reproduced.  I do not have
another copy available, but I could obtain one; however, I
assume that the contents here have the requisite degree of

Presiding Judge: Mr. Bodenheimer, would you please pass us
Case No. 11 from the Green Series.

Just a moment, Dr. Servatius.  You may be seated meanwhile.
Have you located it, Mr. Bodenheimer?  Would you please give
me a label for marking the exhibit.  Meanwhile, I shall
formally mark this N/103, so N/103 will be the judgment in
its entirety, as it appears in the Green Series.  And now we
shall designate the passages you have submitted as N/103a.
What would you now like to read out from these passages?

Dr. Servatius:  First of all, paragraph II, Hungary.

Presiding Judge: On which page is this, please?

Dr. Servatius:  The first page, the first sheet; it starts
with the word "Veesenmayer" in spaced type, and then there
is the penultimate paragraph, "Hungary":

"The Fuehrer Decree of 19 March 1944 appointed the Accused
Veesenmayer as Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Greater
German Reich in Hungary, which at that time was allied with
Germany.  He was responsible for overall political
development in Hungary and was to receive his instructions
from Ribbentrop."

At the top of the next page:

"In order to carry out tasks concerning the Jewish Question,
a Higher SS and Police Leader was to join the staff of the
Reich Ambassador and act in accordance with his political

At the bottom of the same page, the last paragraph:

     "On 16 January 1943, Luther had a talk with the
     Hungarian envoy, in which he expressed his astonishment
     at the dissolution on 1 January 1943 of the Hungarian
     Jewish Commissariat.  He again reminded the envoy that,
     at all events, Hitler insisted on removing all the Jews
     from Europe.  The harbouring of around one million Jews
     in Hungary, a friendly country, was creating major
     concern in Germany, and they could not sit by and
     tolerate this danger for ever without doing something.
     In Luther's opinion, the excuses which Sztojay believed
     he had to present were so lame, that one could see very
     clearly from his demeanour that not even he himself
     believed in what he was saying.  In his report, Luther
     expresses the hope that our constant pressure will
     eventually be successful."

Then, on the next page, it says that the desired success has
not come about, and in order to find out why, Veesenmayer
has been sent to Hungary, and on 30 April 1943 he submitted
a long report.

In the last sentence of the first paragraph it then says:

     "He confirms that Hungary has made itself into an
     asylum for the Jews in Europe, in the expectation that
     its hospitable attitude towards Jewry will be a
     guarantee for the protection of Hungarian interests
     after the end of the War.  This explains Prime Minister
     Kallay's standpoint that it should be extremely obvious
     that he is trying to make reparation for his
     predecessor's wrongdoing as regards the Jewish

At the bottom of the page it says that Veesenmayer made a
second journey, and then the report continues - at the

     "The Jew is Enemy No. 1.  These 1.1 million Jews are
     just as many saboteurs against the Reich, and at least
     as large a number - if not double the number - of
     Hungarians, who are satellites of the Jews, act as
     auxiliary groups and external camouflage for
     implementing the large-scale sabotage and spying plan.
     Reich policy has here a worthwhile and vital duty, to
     tackle this problem and clean up the situation."

On the next page, the fourth or fifth paragraph:

     "For many reasons, the needs of the moment would appear
     to dictate tackling the Jewish Question thoroughly.
     Cleaning it up is a prerequisite for engaging Hungary,
     in the Reich's defensive and existential struggle."

This is the fourth paragraph.

Then there are conclusions.  Inter alia, it says the
following, at the end of the text, in small print:

     "The appointment of suitable commissioners with
     extensive powers, who must be bloodhounds for the five
     districts to be created, immediate tackling of the
     Jewish Question according to a plan agreed on in
     advance.  At the same time, the enemy must be informed
     that, for every Hungarian killed by bombing, a hundred
     rich Jews will be shot and their property used as
     reparations for the damage caused."

It also says there:

     "The proposals outlined by Veesenmayer have been
     carried out almost to the last detail, and their
     spiritual father was assigned to implement them,
     because he appeared to be the right man for the job."

At the end of the page, it says:

     "Veesenmayer had no experience in diplomacy, although
     he was on several occasions given assignments in which
     the Foreign Ministry was interested, particularly in
     Serbia and Danzig.  The Accused is now in vain claiming
     that he did not have a bitter hatred of the Jews.  He
     is in vain denying having been involved by word and
     deed in the dreadful mass deportations.  It was he who
     hatched the plan, who initiated the implementation of
     these measures.  Nor are we influenced by the claims
     which Veesenmayer put forward in his last
     interrogation, in his closing brief and his written
     statement, to the effect that, in fact, Horthy agreed
     with the systematic deportation and subsequent
     extermination of the Jews."

In the middle of page 174, it says:

     "The report furthermore provides information about the
     relationships between Veesenmayer and Hezinger and
     Eichmann of the SS.  The Foreign Ministry had suggested
     recalling Hezinger, one of the Foreign Ministry experts
     on Jewish matters detailed to the legation.  Senior
     Legation Counsellor Feine stated to von Thadden that
     Hezinger was indispensable."

In the next paragraph, it says:

     "From this report it is also clear that Eichmann wished
     to retain Hezinger, so that no major errors would be
     made in dealing with the foreign Jews.  Veesenmayer's
     attitude - as indicated here - completely contradicts
     his testimony to the effect that Hezinger was not
     subordinate to him, as he was not informed of the
     details of his activity.  If - as Veesenmayer is now
     claiming - this action was planned and implemented by
     Eichmann and Winkelmann of the SS, it would appear
     extremely odd that Interior Department II, which was at
     that time the Foreign Ministry department responsible
     for Jewish affairs, should have considered it necessary
     to inform Eichmann - who allegedly was the author of
     the planned deportation - of Veesenmayer's reports.
     But that is what it did."

On the next page, in the penultimate paragraph, there
appears the following:

     "In July 1944, Horthy forbade further deportation of
     Jews.  Veesenmayer complained to him about this and
     informed him that the dismissal of the Sztojay
     government, and the intended arrest of certain members
     of that government who had carried out anti-Jewish
     measures, would be considered a breach of Hungarian
     obligations to the Reich, and Hitler would immediately
     recall his Ambassador, Veesenmayer, and take measures
     to ensure once and for all that such things could never
     again occur in Hungary."

On the next page, in the middle, there appears something
Kasztner said on the question of the deportations.  It says:
"Kasztner described the situation very comprehensively as

     "Question: `Do you mean by that that the Accused
     Veesenmayer played no role in the execution of the
     deportations of the Jews, which was carried out either
     - which I will assume for the moment - by Jaross, Baky,
     Endre, Eichmann or Winkelmann?'

     "Answer: `Counsel, I do not suppose that you would
     believe that a man of Mr. Veesenmayer's intelligence
     would formally go beyond his mandate as a Ambassador of
     the German Reich and personally interfere with
     executive matters.  Under no circumstances whatsoever
     could he, or should he, have done so.  Nor did he need
     to do so.  As I said this morning, by installing an
     appropriate government in Hungary, and laying down the
     general political directives for this government, that
     meant that any further activity on his part, more
     directly concerned with the details and with executive
     measures, was no longer necessary.  If I could put it
     this way, he was the intellectual author, he was
     definitely not the implementer."

The part of the judgment dealing with Veesenmayer concludes
with the chapter on Serbia.  In the middle of the page it
says: "On 8 December 1941..."

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