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Shofar FTP Archive File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-06-02

Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-06-02
Last-Modified: 1999/06/15

In its Judgment, the Court doubts the truth of the
testimonies of Mr. and Mrs. Brand on the subject of the so-
called ten per cent clause, which was most important.

Thus, the other witnesses, too, might have committed
reasonable mistakes which may be put down to many
psychological factors. The time which has elapsed makes it
difficult to distinguish between truth and untruth.

The Accused too, in the beginning, had to find his way, and
he may have been mistaken in some matters. However, it
cannot be assumed, generally, that his testimony was false
in every instance.

As to the Accused's position in a number of territories, I
wish to comment on the Attorney General's statements as

The Generalgouvernement

It is striking that the Accused, in whom allegedly most
extensive powers had been vested, is not mentioned at all in
the voluminous diary of Governor General Frank. Judge
Carmel, who was examined as a witness, also stated that
Eichmann's name is not mentioned at all in this documentary

This ought to provide food for thought. Is it reasonable to
assume that the Accused was really the decisive personality
in the matter of the persecution of the Jews? The diary has
been submitted to the Court, T/253. The testimony of the
witness, Judge Carmel, was given in Session 24 (Vol. I, pp.

Furthermore, the Attorney General selected France as an
example of the Accused's activity. However, he did not refer
to the document filed by the Defence together with the
Grounds of Appeal for the purpose of elucidation. It is true
that it transpires from this document that the Accused
transmitted instructions, but it was only at the order of
the Commander of the Security Police and the SD, Dr.
Knochen, that the arrest of the Argentinian Jews was carried

Everything done by the Accused in France was only for the
purpose of the technical implementation of the deportation.
The settling of technical questions was, therefore, also the
purpose of the Accused's journey to Paris which has been
mentioned in this connection. There, the Accused transmitted
the instructions on the spot. The deportations had already
been ordered, and this was the specific reason for his

For the same reason, too, the Section Heads were ordered to
come to Berlin in order to receive technical instructions.
It is sufficiently proved by documentary evidence who was
the person responsible for the deportations in France. The
accusation made against the Accused, that he ought not to
have carried out these deportations, is laid at the door of
the wrong person. The accusation should be addressed to the
military commander, General Freiherr von Stuelpnagel, who,
at first, demanded the deportation of 1,000 Jews.
Furthermore, it ought to be addressed to Ambassador Abetz
and his Counsellor at the Embassy, Zeitschel, who intervened
in Berlin. It ought to be addressed to Himmler and his
Higher SS and Police Leader in France, Oberg, and in the end
to the Commander of the Security Police and the SD,
Dr.Knochen, who was entrusted with the implementation of the

Justice Silberg Dr. Servatius, Dr. Knochen was Commander of
the Security Police and the SD in Paris, isn't that correct?

Dr. Servatius:  He was Commander of the Security Police and
the SD, attached to the military commander in France.

Justice Silberg:   Now, would you please look at the exhibit
attached to the Grounds of Appeal.

Dr. Servatius:  I do not have this exhibit before me, but I
am familiar with it.

Justice Silberg:  Well, you will find that the first cable
quoted in this exhibit was written by Eichmann. It reads:
"...and to all Commanders of the Security Police and the
SD." That means that Eichmann issued an order to the
Commanders of the Security Police and the SD, and that
afterwards this Commander issued the order or the
instruction. You quote three exhibits in this document: the
first exhibit T/25(1), then T/25(2) and T/25(3). Is that

Dr. Servatius:  Yes, these are the documents.

Justice Silberg Now you will see that exhibit T/25(1),
signed by Eichmann, is directed to "all the Commanders of
the the Security Police and the SD." Is that correct or not?
That is the first document. The second document, marked
T/25(2), was issued by the Commander of the Security Police
and the SD, and one obtains the distinct impression that
Knochen carried out Eichmann's order. Both documents, it is
true, were issued on the same date, but from the arrangement
within the exhibit itself, it appears that the order was
given, at first, by Eichmann to Knochen and to all the
others, and that in the second document Knochen executed the
order and gave instructions to round up the Argentinian

Attorney General:  Eichmann's order is dated 27 January,
and Knochen's order 28 January. This is not the same date,
so  that Knochen executed the order one day later.

Justice Silberg:  But I quoted the cable. The cable itself
is dated 28 January.

Attorney General:  This is the date of the stamp at the top
of the document; but the date of the cable itself is 27

Justice Silberg:  I have quoted the cable. The cable reads:
registered 28 January.

Attorney General:  But the date of the cable is 27 January.

Justice Silberg:   Then it is even more convincing.

Dr. Servatius:  May I explain something in this respect: the
fact is that the Accused, according to the order given to
him, passes on the instructions to his subordinates; however
the implementation - and that is the point in issue - the
order is issued by the Commander of the Security Police, and
Eichmann was not entitled to cause anything to be done in
France on his own initiative, without an order being issued
which set the entire operation in motion. In my opinion, it
contradicts every concept of organization to hold the
officers of the administrative apparatus responsible for
carrying out the instructions of those who issue the orders,
through the intermediary of that apparatus.

President:  The learned Attorney General did not argue
otherwise. What the Attorney General argued is that, outside
Germany, the Appellant gave the instructions and the locally
competent authorities carried them out. This was his
argument throughout. He never alleged that the Appellant in
person came to Poland in order to make arrangements for the
deportation. He never alleged that the appellant came to
France in person in order to make arrangements for the
deportation, for the evacuation.

Dr. Servatius:  That is correct. But the Attorney General:
also argued that the Accused, on his own initiative, caused
the issue of the orders in such a way. Actually, these  were
deportation orders which were transmitted, or which had
already been passed on to the offices through other
channels.  I now come to Hungary.

In Hungary, too, the Accused was not empowered to cause
anything to be done without the involvement of the
commanders. Reich Plenipotentiary Veesenmayer, when examined
as a witness, with good reason claims to be unable to
remember that he had ever been in that position. The Higher
SS and Police Leader General Winkelmann likewise claims that
he no longer remembers that, according to official
instructions of the Embassy, he was at the same time in
charge of Jewish affairs. Winkelmann states as a witness:
"Occasionally I heard from Eichmann about measures against
the Jews, and this set me thinking."

The actual functions of Winkelmann and Veesenmayer in
deporting the Jews is shown distinctly by the documentary
evidence. In my opinion, it is impossible, in view of these
documents, to saddle the Accused with the responsibility for
the deportations from Hungary.

It has been alleged that the Accused collaborated with the
Hungarian Gendarmerie. In this respect, I refer to the note
of Reich Plenipotentiary Veesenmayer to the Hungarian
Government, dated 19 May 1944, exhibit N/93. It states
there: The German Security Police will assist the Hungarian
Gendarmerie, in an advisory capacity, in the rounding-up of
the Jews. The Commander of the Security Police is Geschke,
and Winkelmann is his superior.

The Accused could not induce the Hungarians, of his own
will, to carry out deportations. Deportations were a
political matter of the highest import, which could be
ordered only by the Reich Plenipotentiary, together with
Winkelmann. This became distinctly evident when the
Accused's commando was dissolved and he returned to Berlin.
It is shown by repeated consultations between Winkelmann and
the Hungarians. No delay was caused to these negotiations.
It was only for the purpose of carrying out what had been
agreed upon, that Winkelmann urgently requested the
Accused's return.

It has been proposed that the Accused's position be viewed
in a particular light by singling out certain details and
connecting him with them. In so doing, a distorted picture
is created by linking them together. I have already
commented on this.

Now some further remarks. First of all regarding the
Operations Units.

It has been suggested that the Accused's involvement with
the Operations Units can be concluded from his attendance on
the occasion of the first briefing of the commanders of
these Units. However, the witness Blume who was mentioned in
that connection by the Attorney General, exhibit T/306,
stated that during the period of May-June 1939 numerous
meetings had taken place during which the commandos were
informed of the scope of their functions. But the Accused
attended the first meeting only. However, it cannot be
assumed that already during this first meeting the non-
official secret order of extermination was revealed.

President:  Do you mean May-June 1941?

Dr. Servatius:  Yes, that must be 1941.

As to the compilation of the reports of the Operations Units
with which the Accused has been charged, it appears  from
Noske's affidavit, T/307, that Eichmann did not deal with
summarizing these reports. In any case, exhibit T/102 should
be decisive in proving the lack of the Accused's involvement
with the Operations Units. According to that document, a
special commando staff had been established in the RSHA. The
document is a letter, dated 21 October 1941, from Group IID
of the RSHA to all Section Heads and units .

Regarding the October-November 1944 foot march from
Budapest, the following has to be added:

In the Attorney General's description of the Accused's
responsibility, it is striking that the report of the
Embassy Secretary, Dr. Breslauer, has not been mentioned.
This report of an eye-witness, already mentioned by me, does
not fit the description of the Prosecution. No evidential
value can be attributed, in this connection, to the report
in the so-called Sassen Document. Even where the Accused
made some corrections, this cannot be construed as an
approval of the remaining text. The text was basically so
inaccurate  that minor corrections were not sufficient to
put it right. The Accused rewrote entire pages containing
corrections. However, these were not produced.

Justice Silberg:  Dr. Servatius, what was your comment on
the issue of the march, regarding the Accused's
responsibility for the march, what have you to say about

Dr. Servatius:  I have already explained that the march was
decided upon by Winkelmann and Veesenmayer, and that later
on Eichmann joined in the operation. It was carried out by
the Arrow Cross and the Hungarians.

Regarding the Wallenberg affair:

0It was only at the present stage that the Attorney General
dwelt in particular upon the threat to murder Legation
Secretary Wallenberg. Up to then, it seemed that he
disregarded it as not being capable of proof. In my opinion,
it is in fact not capable of proof.

The contents of exhibits T/1243 and T/1244 should be
submitted to a more accurate scrutiny and then the following
facts will be ascertained without much effort: According to
the letter from the Foreign Ministry, the threat of murder
was made by the Head of the SS Commando for Jewish Affairs.
This officer, according to the explanation of the Attorney
General, was the Higher SS and Police Leader, that is to
say, Winkelmann. The threat was delivered to a clerk in the
Embassy by a Mr. Eichmann. Therefore, this messenger
Eichmann was not known to the Embassy as the notorious
persecutor of the Jews. This, however, must have been so, as
the Embassy had to handle Jewish affairs regularly, and as
far as they were concerned, the person in authority was SS
Commander Winkelmann. It therefore becomes apparent that the
responsible person must have been Winkelmann.

Justice Silberg:  Dr. Servatius, it seems to me that you are
mistaken. It reads here: "The Commander of the SS Commando
for the Solution of the Jewish Question." Winkelmann  never
had such a title. Now, as for the words "by a Mr. Eichmann"
- that is to say that the reference is to some other
Eichmann  - Veesenmayer knows perfectly well who is the
person in question, and he states, in his reply: "SS
Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann." After all, it is Veesenmayer
who replies to that letter.

Dr. Servatius:  The situation is as follows: the commander
of the Commando is Winkelmann, for Winkelmann is responsible
for Jewish affairs in the Embassy. In his testimony as a
witness he has stated that he had never heard about this
matter, and that he had heard about Eichmann only
occasionally and had had his own thoughts on this subject.
Moreover, it can hardly be assumed that the Accused Eichmann
went to the Embassy and delivered his message to a clerk.

The second document comes from Grell and he expresses his
opinion without having heard the Accused. He thinks that
there are just complaints against Wallenberg's behaviour.

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