Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Pleading-02-04 Last-Modified: 1999/06/15 38. On Paragraph 107 - Greece 1. The interest in marking the Jews did not emanate from the Accused's Section, but was based on the instructions of more highly placed authorities, as explained above. 2. According to the official seal Wisliceny belonged to the BdS office and was therefore not subordinate to the Accused. All arrangements were made by the Salonika-Aegaeis Military Commander. The Accused's Section simply received reports for information purposes. 3. Italian occupied area The Accused had no personal interest in deportation. No link between the Accused and the evidence about killings on the Island of Rhodes has been proved. 39. On Paragraph 108 - Bulgaria The document from the Accused's Section in November 1942 shows that the Foreign Ministry played a leading role in the evacuation, and this indicates that the Ambassador's Police Attache took care of the technical implementation. 40. On Paragraph 109 - Italy 1. Italian occupied area Fundamental efforts to implement measures could only originate with the Chiefs in the RSHA and not in the Accused's Section. The documents reflect the endeavours of the Foreign Ministry, the Commander of the Order Police Daluege and Himmler. 2. Dannecker was not the Accused's assistant, but according to Witness Kappler's statement received his instructions from Mueller. Witness Kappler first heard of the Accused after the War in May 1945. The statement of Witness Kappler also shows that Dannecker was subordinate to the BdS. In the operation in Rome on 17 October 1941 it can be seen clearly that the orders came directly from the highest echelons and not from the Accused's Section, who had no say in the decisions. 41. On Paragraph 110 - Romania 1. It should be noted that the agreement concluded on 30 August 1941 "between the Germans" and Romania concerning the sending of the Jews to concentration camps was concluded by the German military authorities. The Accused cannot be associated with this. 2. The security police measures referred to in the Judgment, to prevent Jews from crossing into the Eastern Occupied Territories can only be understood as a closing of the border by the Border Police. If the intention was to kill these Jews, there was no need to threaten killing. The killing of 28,000 Jews was carried out later independently by Operations Units and local bodies, which could not have received any orders from the Accused's Section. 3. Richter was not an assistant of the Accused, but an assistant of Ambassador Killinger's, whose Police Attachee he subsequently became. The discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister on 12 December 1941 and 23 January 1942 took place as a result of a personal instruction from the CdS. In this connection, the statement of Ambassador Killinger must also be referred to, according to which Richter acted on his orders. There is no reference here to the Accused. 4. Negotiations on the carrying out of deportations take place between Chief of Department Mueller and Mihai Antonescu. The document to this effect is signed by Mueller in person. 5. The prevention of emigration to Palestine is based not on the initiative of the Accused's Section, but on the political instructions of the top echelons. This is confirmed by the Foreign Ministry's activity, which was in no way determined by the Accused's Section. 42. On Paragraph 111 - Hungary 1. The singling out of documents in an order which is not arranged chronologically may give the reader of the Judgment a wrong impression. The Jewish Question in Hungary was dealt with in 1941 by Hitler-Ribbentrop-Himmler. In a letter dated 25 September 1942 to the Foreign Ministry the Accused refers the Foreign Ministry to measures by the Hungarians which may be expected later. On 10 December 1943 Veesenmayer demands that the Jewish Question in Hungary be thoroughly tackled as part of the Reich's struggle for existence. On 19 March 1944 the German troops march into Hungary. This development was not a confirmation of the Accused's supposed strategic foresight. 2. The Judgment gives the impression here that the Accused could on his own initiative have left his Berlin office in an attempt on his part to intervene in Hungary. Nor did the Accused move "to the scene of action"; this was done by the leading staffs, whom he subsequently followed. The Accused's subordinate activities are shown in particular by the fact that the Accused had to lead on foot to Budapest a marching unit which had been put together (not an Eichmann Special Operations Unit). That meant that the Accused was eliminated as dispensable for the important measures to be adopted in the first few days. In such a situation it is not usual to put a responsible staff officer in charge of a convoy. Consequently it cannot be the case that the Accused brought with him Himmler's basic order about the anti-Jewish measures to be adopted. In the Judgment, insufficient attention is paid to the really decisive position of BdS Geschke and Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann. 3. In respect of the Accused's special zeal as found by the Court, attention is drawn to the fact that in the letter from Ambassador Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop it is emphasized that Veesenmayer had done everything to carry out the evacuation of the Jews; the responsibility for this therefore lies with the Accused's lack of zeal. 4. The transports were carried out by the Hungarian Gendarmerie combined with the influence that was brought to bear by Veesenmayer and Winkelmann. The latter are insistent. The report that has been submitted drawn up by official-in- charge Dr. Grell concerning the maltreatment of Jews during transport by police units states explicitly that the Accused was not competent for this matter and is not responsible. 5. Insufficient light has been shed on the Accused's involvement in the events concerning the deportation of Jews from the Kistarcsa camp. The Accused's allegedly cunning behaviour in deceiving the Jewish Council is an assumption which cannot be reconciled with the actual circumstances concerning the giving of orders; the Jewish measures were carried out by the KdS (Commander of the Security Police) and the Hungarian Gendarmerie. These bodies were not subordinate to the Accused. This is shown by the Commanders' daily reports which went to Veesenmayer via Geschke and Winkelmann. The Accused's alleged victory over Horthy remains a speculation. The comments in the Judgment to the effect that the Kistarcsa incident is very significant as proof of the Accused's position, obstinacy and cunning need to be examined. Reference is made to the Accused's testimony before the Court. 43. On Paragraph 114 - Disbanding the Commando on 28 October 1944 1. The Accused's explanation of the reasons for advancing the date of the evacuation appears convincing. It is not obvious what other reason could have existed for this desire for an earlier arrangement, because future developments could not be predicted. 2. It is not correct that the Accused proposed his recall, so to speak, as a protest against Horthy's halting the transports. The reference to his task having become superfluous was relevant because with Himmler's decision to halt the transports the Accused's function had been completed. He was not responsible for any other political measures against the Jews. The role of Veesenmayer and Winkelmann shows how matters proceeded thereafter. The Commando was recalled on 28 September 1944. The fact that the Accused received orders to remain in Hungary for the time being, shows that he could not move as he saw fit. 44. On Paragraph 115 - Continuation of the deportations October 1944 1. Further measures against the Jews were adopted with the change in the political situation following the appointment of Prime Minister Szalasi. However, this was brought about not by the Accused, but by Veesenmayer and Winkelmann. The Accused was recalled at Winkelmann's initiative and was given the order to hold definitive discussions with the Hungarian authorities concerning the implementation of the agreements already reached by Winkelmann and Veesenmayer. The Accused's subordinate position here is particularly clear. However, the text of the Judgment gives the impression that the Accused became active here through his own enthusiasm. 2.The foot march from Budapest to Vienna on 10 November 1944. The pressure for rapid deportations came from Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann, at first to deport at least 25,000 instead of 50,000 for labour duties. Veesenmayer indicates that Winkelmann would discuss further details with the Hungarian Government. The other explanation given after the War by those participants who were interested in exonerating themselves contradicts the report drawn up at the time of the events by Dr. Breszlauer, who acted on behalf of the Embassy. In the report of this objective Swiss, who was familiar with the circumstances, there is the striking fact that the name of the Accused, the man who is supposedly the central figure, responsible for everything, is not mentioned. Nor is there any reference here to any protest by the most senior German bodies and generals. An attempt to stop the march by lodging a complaint with Veesenmayer or Winkelmann was apparently considered pointless by the representative of the Embassy, since he must probably have assumed that these two men were themselves the responsible originators of the events. 44[sic] On Paragraph 116 - Transport to Vienna for war work 1. Orders for the transport were given by Kaltenbrunner at the insistence of his friend the Mayor of Vienna, Blaschke, without any co-operation on the part of the Accused, via Section IVB4 in Berlin. The Accused, who was in Hungary, had to comply with the order, which came from his former Section. The Court's assumption that this "special action" is to be equated with special treatment is incorrect. As far as the extorted sums of money are concerned, there was no ruse by the Accused in demanding money from the persons to be deported in this special case. This interest existed only on the part of the City of Vienna, which probably wanted to be relieved of the costs of provisions for the labour transports. The order to collect money can therefore only have reached the Accused from Vienna via Kaltenbrunner. 2. The information provided by Witness Hansi Brand that the Accused did not wish to bring ethnically valuable Jews from the Carpathians and Siebenbuergen to Vienna contradicts the Court's assumption that precisely those Jews who were brought to Vienna were destined in the final stage for extermination. If this were true, the ethnically more valuable Jews would have been the first to be rounded up for deporting and would not have been left in the path of the advancing Red Army. 45. On Paragraph 116 - Offer to barter one million Jews for 10,000 trucks 1. The Judgment misjudges the Accused's attitude to the motive behind the offer. The Accused did not state that Standartenfuehrer Becher overstepped his powers, but that as a result of his economic connections he had a pleasant career, while the Accused was always restricted to thankless and oppressive activities. This mental process on the part of the Accused is more convincing than an assertion on the part of the Accused, which is far more easily made, that he proposed the operation of bartering the Jews out of sympathy and concern for their lives. The Accused's presentation shows clearly that he is not trying to base his attitude on evasions. 2. On the content of the offer, reference is made to the application for admitting proof made in these supplementary grounds for appeal, that Witness Brand's statement about the ten per cent clause is not based on an error. 3. The Accused was unable to make preparations for implementing the ten per cent promise, because it was not possible for him to halt the transports; nor was this promised to Witness Brand. The rate of the transports was determined by the top echelons: Veesenmayer, Winkelmann, Geschke, Mueller, Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, Ribbentrop. If, as the Judgment assumes, the offer originated with Himmler and was of high-level political significance, the Accused could not be free to act as he saw fit and to halt transports and extermination. 46. On Paragraph 117 The Accused is not making unjustified efforts to shift existing responsibility to his superiors. 1. It should be noted that when the Germans invaded Hungary, as indicated above, the Accused was excluded because he was in charge of the marching units. Moreover, Krumey confirms in 1961 as a witness that after arriving in Budapest the Accused had practically nothing to do. This is proof that the basic measures which had to be adopted by his superiors had not yet been adopted, or that everything required had already been arranged by the Hungarians themselves. 2. The Accused did not need to impose his will on the Hungarian Gendarmerie, since the latter were independently pressing on with the persecution of the Jews, as has been repeatedly demonstrated. The Accused's causing the Gendarmerie to provide trucks in Kistarcsa is merely an assumption. There is no proof that the Gendarmerie were compelled by the Accused. 3. The Court's assumption that Reich Plenipotentiary Veesenmayer's duty was only "to report" on what had been done cannot be reconciled with his position and his activities regarding the Jewish Question. 4. As for the allegedly only "formal" and particularly "loose" relationship between the Accused's office and Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann and BdS Geschke, it must be pointed out that inter alia the RSHA writes not to the Accused but to BdS Geschke. The service relationships which actually existed cannot be considered to have been ineffective simply because no documents are available that contain orders of his superiors to the Accused. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Accused was in the same location as these superiors and had no need to receive any written instructions, as orders were given orally. 47. On Paragraphs 119/120 - Extermination and Operations Units in Eastern Europe 1. The Judgment finds that a connection between the Accused and the activities of the Operations Units in Poland in 1939 has not been proved. 2. The Commanders of the Operations Units did not come only from the ranks of the RSHA, but also from the State Police offices, BdS, the Inspectorate, SD offices, criminal investigation department, etc. 48. On Paragraph 121 The fact that Stahlecker was in the past the Accused's superior has no significance for the Accused's responsibility. The Accused neither saw nor spoke to him again. 49. On Paragraph 122 - Killings by gas The Accused's statement to the police that killing by gassing was considered the more "elegant" solution by senior circles is simply an attempt to characterize these individuals in responsible positions. The Accused said explicitly that "perhaps" it might have been so. 50. On Paragraph 127 On Professor Gilbert's statement concerning the shifting of their responsibility by Goering and Ribbentrop, it should be noted that it was the Witness's opinion that these individuals who bore primary responsibility wanted to extricate themselves. Witness Justice Musmanno made a similar point. 51. On Paragraph 129 - Conditions in the camps The Accused had no responsibility for the conditions in the camps. These were under the control of the WVA (Economic- Administrative Head Office). 52. On Paragraph 130 - Conditions in ghettos The Accused had no responsibility for the ghettos and the conditions that prevailed there.
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