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Page 195
VI. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE THREE POWER PACT, SEPTEMBER 25-
NOVEMBER 26, 1940
*****
Frames 0452-0454, serial F 5
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Embassy in the
Soviet Union
Telegram
STRICTLY SECRET
BERLIN, September 25, 1940.
STATE SECRET
RAM. 33/40 g. Rs.
No. 1746
Strictly secret. Exclusively for the Charg‚ in person.
The following instruction is only to be carried out if
on Thursday you receive from my Ministerial Office by
telephone or telegraph the word "Execution."
Please call on Herr Molotov on Thursday, September 26,
and tell him on my behalf that in view of the cordial
relations existing between Germany and the Soviet Union I was
desirous of informing him in advance, in strict confidence,
of the following:
1) The warmongering agitation in America, which at this
stage of the final defeat of England is seeking a last outlet
in the extension and prolongation of the war, has led to
negotiations between the two Axis powers on the one hand and
Japan on the other, which will result, presumably in the next
few days, in the signing of a military alliance between the
three powers.
2) This alliance, consistent with its origin, is
directed exclusively against American warmongers. To be sure,
this is, as usual, not expressly stated in the treaty, but
can be unmistakably inferred from its terms.
3) The treaty, of course, does not pursue any aggressive
aims against America. Its exclusive purpose is rather to
bring the elements pressing for America's entry into the war
to their senses, by conclusively demonstrating to them that
if they enter the present struggle, they will automatically
have to deal with the three great powers as adversaries.
Page 196
4) From the beginning of their negotiations, the three
treaty powers have been in complete agreement that their
alliance shall in no way affect the relationship each of them
has with the Soviet Union. In order to dispel any doubt of
this abroad as well, a special article was inserted in the
treaty to the effect that the existing political relations
[Status] between each of the three treaty powers and the
Soviet Union shall not be affected by the treaty. This
proviso means, therefore, that not only the treaties
concluded by the three powers with the Soviet Union,
particularly the German-Soviet treaties of the autumn of
1939, shall remain in full force and effect, but that this
applies in general to the entire political relationship to
the Soviet Union.
5) The pact would probably serve as a damper on the
warmongers, especially in America, would operate against a
further extension of the present war, and perhaps, in this
sense would serve the restoration of world peace.
6) At this opportunity please also tell Herr Molotov
that I had taken cognizance of the memorandum handed to Count
Schulenburg on September 21 and that I intended shortly to
address a personal letter to Herr Stalin in which I would
reply to the memorandum in the spirit of German-Russian
friendship, but beyond that would frankly and confidently set
forth the German conception of the present political
situation. I hoped that this letter would contribute anew to
the strengthening of our friendly relations. Besides, the
letter would contain an invitation to Berlin for Herr
Molotov, whose return visit we were expecting after two
visits to Moscow and with whom on this occasion I should like
to discuss important questions relating to the establishment
of common political aims for the future.
(Reich Foreign Minister)
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 112539, serial 104
Foreign Office Memorandum
URGENT
W 4499g
It is necessary to obtain a decision from the Fhrer
regarding the continuance of trade with the Soviet Union. The
directives issued during the last few weeks by the Reich
Marshal concerning the absolute priority of all armament
contracts and the further increasing of these armament
contracts make it impossible for German industry
Page 197
to execute, in addition to these contracts, the scheduled
deliveries to Russia. In this state of affairs, it will be
impossible to balance the considerable deficit already
existing in German deliveries. On the contrary, a further
great lag in German deliveries must be expected.
The Moscow negotiations on the balancing of the
deliveries were broken off on the 12th of this month as the
delegation had not sufficient authority to reply to the
Soviet proposals. If satisfactory replies are not given
Moscow soon, a suspension of the Russian deliveries to
Germany is to be expected. This applies particularly to the
Russian supplies of grain and oil. The continuance of the
exchange of goods with the Soviet Union at the present level
depends on whether the Russian transactions have a priority,
as before, or at least a preferential parity with the
armament contracts. This can only be decided by the Fhrer.
The German economic authorities, especially the Reich
Ministry for Economic Affairs, are finding themselves unable,
because of the directives which have been issued, to deal
with the question of foreign trade with Russia
constructively.
Herewith to be submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.
General Thomas informs me that the Reich Marshal expects
my report on the Moscow negotiations soon. I request an
opportunity to report in person first.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, September 26, 1940.
*****
Frames 0455-0457, serial F 5
The German Charg‚ in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 27, 1940-5:13 a. m.
Received September 27, 1940-9:15 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
STATE SECRET
No. 2041 of September 26
Reference your telegram of the 26th, No. 1746. [96]
For the Reich Foreign Minister in person.
Instruction carried out with Molotov tonight at 10 p. m.
as directed.
Molotov listened very attentively to the communication.
At item 6) Molotov showed evident satisfaction and said that
at the moment an
[96] Reference is to the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram
No. 1746 of September 25, 1940, dispatched from Berlin on
September 26, ante, p. 195
Page 198
indication of his attitude was not necessary, as the reply to
the letter that the Reich Foreign Minister intended to send
to Stalin would provide an opportunity for it.
Before Molotov went into the matter of the military
alliance with Japan, he inquired-on the basis of a
telegraphic report from the Soviet Embassy in Berlin-
regarding a German-Finnish agreement, which, according to a
Finnish communiqu‚, provided for the granting of passage for
German troops through Finland to Norway, and which was
referred to by Press Chief Schmidt at his press conference.
At the same time Molotov mentioned a report from the Berlin
Office of the United Press, which was broadcast over the
radio, stating that German troops had landed in the Finnish
port of Vasa. I said that I had no further information on the
subject.
Thereafter Molotov stated as follows on the subject of
the military alliance: He gratefully tool: note of the
communication from the Reich Foreign Minister. The Soviet
Embassy in Tokyo had a few days ago reported on a plan for
such an agreement. The Soviet Government, was, of course,
extremely interested in this question, because it involved a
neighboring country to which the Soviet Union was linked by
numerous interests. Hence it was understandable that the
Soviet Government not only had a great interest, but also the
desire to be informed in advance regarding the agreement and
its contents. This desire the Soviet Government based on
articles 3 and 4 of the Non-aggression Treaty. If the reverse
were the case, the Soviet Government would also inform us in
advance and communicate to us the contents of the treaty. The
Soviet Government so construed article 4 that it was entitled
to see the treaty between the Axis Powers and Japan and to
receive information of any secret protocols and agreements as
well, for which confidential treatment was promised in
advance. He asked to be informed whether the German
Government concurred in his interpretation of article 4 and
reiterated his desire to be acquainted with the contents of
the treaty before its signing, in order to be able to express
his views on it. If, contrary to his expectation, the German
Government did not agree with his interpretation of article
4, he asked that the position of the German Government be
communicated to him.
As particularly significant in Molotov's utterances
appear to me:
1) The great interest he showed in the treaty with
Japan.
2) The constant harping on article 3 and especially
article 4 of the Non-aggression Treaty, in which connection
he quoted article 18 [sic] verbatim.
Page 199
3) The insistence on seeing the text of the treaty,
including the secret portions.
After Molotov had concluded his statements on the
question of the military alliance, he reverted again to the
German-Finnish agreement referred to at the beginning and
declared that for the last three days the Soviet Government
had received reports relative to the landing of German troops
at Vasa, Uleaborg and Pori, without having been informed
thereof by Germany.
The Soviet Government wished to receive the text of the
agreement on the passage of troops through Finland, including
its secret portions. This demand, too, was based on articles
3 and 4 of the Non-aggression Treaty. If we concurred in this
interpretation of the articles mentioned, he asked to be
informed as to the object of the agreement, against whom it
was directed, and the purposes that were being served
thereby. The agreement was being discussed in public, while
the Soviet Government knew nothing about it.
I told Molotov that I would communicate his statements
to my Government.
TIPPELSKIRCH
*****
Frames 0458-0462, serial F 5
Foreign Office Memorandum
STATE SECRET
W 4520/40 g Rs.
1) In the period from August 24 to September 12 of this
year, negotiations took place in Moscow at the request of the
Russians, for the purpose of reviewing the status of the
shipments from both sides under the Commercial Treaty of
February 11, 1940. The negotiations revealed that German
deliveries for the first half-year fell short of the
commitment in the Treaty by roughly 73 million Reichsmarks.
The Russians handed in proposals for the balancing of this
deficit which amounted substantially to a shortening of the
delivery periods. Negotiations were temporarily broken off on
September 12, in order that we might reexamine the Soviet
proposals in Berlin and work out German counterproposals for
additional shipments to the Soviet Union. The Russians stated
that. in accordance with the Treaty provisions, they would
temporarily suspend their shipments, if neither their
proposals nor our counterproposals led to the projected ratio
of deliveries.
Page 200
2) The German commitments for the coming half-year are:
to February 11, 1941 RM. 233
million
to May 11, 1941 RM. 311
million
including the undelivered balance of 73 million
Reichsmarks mentioned above.
This must be augmented by German shipments in return for
Bessarabian grain and Bessarabian oil seed (RM. 40 million)
and shipments in return for the German raw-material imports
from the Baltic territories. The survey undertaken jointly
with the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs and the High
Command of the Armed Forces revealed that if the armament
program ordered by the Fhrer is carried out, neither a
balancing of the existing deficit of 73 million Reichsmarks
nor the delivery on schedule of the remainder of the German
commitment is possible. In addition, there is the directive
issued by the Reich Marshal to avoid shipments to Russia
which would directly or indirectly strengthen Russia's war
potential. If these decisions are upheld, the suspension of
Russian shipments to Germany must shortly be expected.
3) This means that the large deliveries of raw
materials, especially of grain, petroleum, cotton, precious
and nonferrous metals, phosphate, will cease, at least for a
time, and at the best will recommence later on a much smaller
scale and with great sacrifices of German supplies.
Particularly serious, in the opinion of the Reich Food
Ministry, would be the effect on grain supplies. Russia has
supplied us to date with almost one million tons of grain.
Russia is the only country that has a good grain harvest and
therefore might be in a position to continue with large
shipments. The Reich Food Ministry points out that the
national grain reserve will be used up in the current crop
year, so that we would enter the next crop year without such
a reserve.
4) The Reich Minister for Economic Affairs, the Reich
Food Minister, and the High Command of the Armed Forces
requested us to obtain from the Fhrer another decision
regarding the continuation of trade with the Soviet Union.
Raw material deliveries from Russia can only be kept at
approximately their present level if the German shipments to
the U. S. S. R. are prepared at the rate indicated under item
2 (RM. 233 million, RM. 311 million and 40 million
Reichsmarks of Bessarabian grain, etc.), and, as formerly,
receive a priority or at least a preferred parity rating as
against the armament contracts. Since supplies of machinery,
of rolling mill products and
Page 201
coal are principally involved, such an arrangement can only
be made at the expense of the armament contracts.
5) The Russians, presumably reacting to the changed
German attitude, have cancelled all long-range projects in
the Commercial Treaty of February 11, 1940. This means that
they do not wish to receive long-term deliveries of
processes, installations, and capital goods, but restrict
themselves to goods which will benefit their economy,
especially their military rearmament, within the next 8 to 10
months. Hence the impact on our own military requirements in
the resulting narrower sphere of machinery and rolling mill
products is much more severe than formerly.
6) The supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a
very substantial prop to the Germany war economy. Since the
new commercial treaties went into effect, Russia has supplied
over 300 million Reichsmarks worth of raw materials, roughly
100 million Reichsmarks of which was grain. Russia has thus
far received compensation only in the amount of about 150
million Reichsmarks. The striking disproportion between
German and Russian deliveries is evident from the fact that
in August, as against 65 million Reichsmarks of Russian
deliveries, there were only 20 million Reichsmarks of German
deliveries. Our sole economic connection with Iran,
Afghanistan, Manchukuo, Japan and, beyond that, with South
America, is the route across Russia, which is being used to
an increasing extent for German raw material imports (soy-
beans from Manchukuo).
BERLIN, September 28, 1940.
SCHNURRE
Submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister as directed.
SCHNURRE [97]
BERLIN, September 28, 1940.
[97] An appended handwritten note reads as follows: "The
contents of the Memorandum were read to the Reich Marshal,
who agreed with the views of Minister Schnurre. Sch [?]30/9"
*****
Frames 112554-112558, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Embassy in the
Soviet Union
Telegram
RUSH
BERLIN, October 2, 1940.
No. 1787
Reference your telegram No. 1041 [2041]. [98]
[98] Ante, p 197.
Page 202
Please call on Herr Molotov again and, in reply to his
statement, tell him as follows:
I.
The German-Finnish agreement he mentioned involved a
purely technical matter of military communications without
political implications. Just as we reached an understanding
with Sweden about similar transport through Swedish territory
to the areas of Oslo Trondheim, and Narvik, an understanding
was reached with Finland about transit to the area of
Kirkenes. The area of Kirkenes, which needed military
protection against England because of the mines there, can be
reached by us by land only through Finnish territory. The
transport went by way of Uleaborg and Vasa, but not by way of
Pori. In view of the purely technical communications aspect
of the matter we naturally saw no reason expressly to notify
the Soviet Government of it. The understanding with Finland
was reached by an exchange of notes, which contains verbatim
the following four points:
"1. The Finnish Government' upon request of the
Government of the Reich, grants the through-transport of
mat‚riel with escort personnel from the northern ports of the
Baltic Sea by way of Rovaniemi and the northern Arctic Ocean
Road to Kirkenes in Northern Norway.
"2. The Government of the German Reich shall duly
indicate to the Finnish Government the ports of debarkation
selected, the number of the transport vessels, the dates of
sailing and arrival, and the scheduled daily stages of the
transports in Northern Finland.
"3. The Government of the German Reich shall notify the
Finnish Government at least one day in advance of the arrival
of the transport vessels .
"4. Ordnance shall be shipped apart from the troops in
separate freight cars. A special agreement will be made
regarding the number of officers and men for the guard
details on the freight cars carrying ordnance."
Should Herr Molotov expressly ask for it, you are
authorized to hand him the text of the foregoing four points
in the form of a memorandum.
II.
In respect to the Three Power Pact between Germany,
Italy and Japan, Herr Molotov will surely have seen from the
contents of the Pact, which have meanwhile been published, as
well as from the official statement made by the German
Government in connection with it, that the question raised by
him in regard to articles 3 and 4 of the German-Soviet Non-
aggression Pact was pointless. The three partners
Page 203
were from the beginning in complete agreement that their
accord should in no way affect the Soviet Union. Therefore
the most comprehensive formula imaginable was selected in
article 5 of the Pact, which made it clear that not only the
treaties concluded with the Soviet Union, but also the entire
political relationship to the Soviet Union was left entirely
unchanged by the Pact. Therefore there can be no question of
a coalition of powers which was directly or indirectly
aligned against the Soviet Union in the sense of article 4 of
the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. On the contrary, it
was clearly stated in the declaration of the German
Government that the parties to the Three Power Pact were
looking toward further favorable developments in the
relations already existing with the Soviet Union.
Since the whole relationship of Germany, and the
relationship of Italy and Japan to the Soviet Union as well,
was left out of the picture by an express stipulation in the
Three Power Pact, it therefore did not affect common German-
Soviet interests and thus did not come under the provision
for consultations III article 3 of the German-Soviet Non-
aggression Pact. Nevertheless, I considered it proper to
inform Herr Molotov as soon as there was a definite prospect
that the Pact would be signed. Actually, the last decisions
in this connection were not made in Tokyo until September 27.
Moreover, you are explicitly authorized by me to tell
Herr Molotov most emphatically that no agreements of any sort
have been made with Japan other than the published text of
the Treaty. There were no secret protocols nor any other
secret agreements.
In a few days I expect to dispatch to Herr Stalin the
letter which I promised.
(Reich Foreign Minister)
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 112559-112560, serial 104
The German Charg‚ in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 4, 1940-10:40 p. m.
Received October 5, 1940-6:30 a. m.
No. 2095 of October 4
Reference your telegram of the 2d, No. 1787.
For the Reich Minister personally.
Page 204
Molotov received me today at 6 p. m., after he had at
first asked me to call at 5; when I drove into the Kremlin I
met the English Ambassador in his car. Molotov apologized
upon greeting me, for having had to change the time of the
visit because of pressure of business.
To the communications I made in accordance with
instructions, Molotov made the following remarks.
I. German-Finnish Agreements.
Under the German-Russian accord, Finland, as we knew,
belonged to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The
interest of the Soviet Union in the agreement was therefore
understandable and for this reason the Soviet Union wanted to
be duly informed. The Soviet Government was anxious, if
possible, to be given additional, more detailed information
about the German-Finnish agreement, especially regarding the
number of German troops involved and the duration of the
agreement (whether meant for a single action or for a longer
period?), and also whether all the German troops would go
only to Kirkenes.
To my query as to whether the Soviet Government had not
also been informed by the Finnish Government, Molotov replied
in the negative and added that the Finnish Government had
informed him "at about the time of the publication of the
report", but it kind not yet replied to the questions
addressed to it.
I told Herr Molotov that I would communicate his wish to
Berlin and remarked that, as far as I knew, it was not our
intention to retain German troops in Finland and that,
moreover, the agreement was conditional upon the threat to
Kirkenes by England.
Upon his request, I left with Herr Molotov the text of
the four points.
II. Three Power Pact.
Herr Molotov: The Soviet Government would have to
examine the matter closely since my communications contained
views of the German Government with regard to the
interpretation of articles 3 and 4 of the German-Soviet Non-
aggression pact. He could, therefore, say nothing further on
this at the moment.
TIPPELSKIRCH
Page 205
*****
Frames 112565-112566, serial 104
Foreign Office Memorandum [99]
W 4646/40g
OCTOBER 8, [1940]-7:30 p. m.
To the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.
Please send the following by teletype to Fuschl:
In the matter of the granting of the Petsamo nickel
concession the Finnish Government finds itself exposed to
daily increasing pressure from the Soviet Government. The
Finns are afraid that bad intentions lie concealed behind
Molotov's persistence. If the Finnish Government yields to
Russian pressure and by national emergency legislation
cancels the present Canadian nickel concession and gives it
to the Soviet Government, an unpleasant and unfavorable
situation would arise for us: Our own nickel interests, which
had been established in the negotiations with the Finnish
Government, would be completely wiped out, as Russia will not
respect the German-Finnish agreements. With the transfer of
the nickel concession Soviet Russia will acquire exclusive
territorial influence in this area as well and thereby border
directly on the area of Kirkenes, which is protected by our
troops. The military, and the Reich Marshal in particular,
have voiced the hope that we shall not lose Petsamo. The
deputy of the Reich Marshal, Lt. Col. Veltjens, has, among
other things, obtained an option for the nickel concession,
as compensation for the German supplies of arms.
Up to now the Foreign Office has been telling the Finns
that Germany will confine herself to carrying out the German-
Finnish nickel contracts and will not on her own initiative
take up the question of the concession with the Russians. It
will now be necessary to go beyond that and to strengthen the
Finnish will to resist. They should be told we were in favor
of their holding the question of the concession in abeyance
and not definitely concluding the matter by the transfer to
Russia. It is not necessary to comply with the wish of the
Finns that we support their attitude in Moscow.
Minister Schnurre requests an opportunity to report
personally on this situation and on the present status of the
delivery of arms to Finland. The matter is urgent, since
otherwise it must be expected that the Finns will give in.
[99] A notation reads "By teletype to Fuschl, No. 34." At
Fuschl, near Salzburg was a residence of the Reich Foreign
Minister.
Page 206
*****
Frame 112568, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Embassy in the
Soviet Union
Telegram
BERLIN, October 9, 1940.
No. 1832
Please call on Herr Molotov tomorrow, Thursday, and
communicate to him the following. I request you, however, not
to let this communication appear as the real reason for your
call, but rather to use some other reason and merely to
introduce the following as incidental to the discussion of
the other subject.
Lately there have appeared in the English press various
reports concerning the dispatch of fairly large German
military units to Rumania. These reports are entirely
tendentious. The truth of the matter is this: On the basis of
the guarantee given it by the Axis Powers, the Rumanian
Government some time ago made a request of us to make
available to it, for the training of the Rumanian army, a
German military mission with certain instruction units from
the German army. In view of our interest in seeing that quiet
and order are maintained in the Balkans, and in order to
protect our oil and grain interests against any attempt on
the part of England to disturb them, we declared ourselves
willing to accede to the Rumanian request. As the Soviet
Union is well aware, we have a vital interest in these
territories, which we cannot leave exposed to the menace of
the English, whose press continually plays with such ideas.
In view of the friendly relations existing with the Soviet
Government, we wished to inform her of this.
I have already informed Ambassador Shkvartsev in the
same sense today.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 112577-112578, serial 104
The German Charg‚ in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 10, 1940-11:20 p. m.
Received October 11, 1940-3:25 a. m.
No. 2142 of October 10
Reference your telegram No. 1832 of October 9.
I called on Molotov today at 6:30 p. m. I used as the
occasion of my visit the message that Hilger had given to
People's Commissar
Page 207
Mikoyan three days ago regarding the impending arrival of a
German delegation for the purpose of resuming economic
negotiations. I stressed the fact that in view of the
importance of the question I was very anxious to inform him-
Molotov-too, that the delegation led by Schnurre would be
strengthened by influential personalities who were authorized
to make independent decisions and that as a result of the
preliminary work done in Berlin we had the impression that a
basis for an understanding had been created.
Molotov appeared interested, inquired about the exact
date of Schnurre's arrival and stated that we now had to
await the results of the negotiations.
After that I brought the conversation around informally
to the real purpose of my visit and gave Molotov the
prescribed information, to which he listened with interest.
After I had finished Molotov stated that if it were only a
question of "instruction units" the numerical strength of the
German troop units in Rumania could not be very large. To
Molotov's question as to whether I knew the number of German
troops sent to Rumania I replied in the negative, but I again
stressed the vital German interest in those territories,
which had to be protected against any danger from the
English. Molotov did not wish to admit the existence of such
danger, remarking with a smile that England now had other
worries and ought to be glad to save her own life.
In conclusion, Molotov inquired regarding the
information which he had recently requested in the Finnish
matter, to which I replied that this information would
presumably be brought back by the Ambassador, who would
return in a few days.
TIPPELSKIRCH
*****
Frames 0433-0451, serial F 5
Letter From the Reich Foreign Minister to Stalin
BERLIN, October 13, 1940.
MY DEAR HERR STALIN: Over a year ago, through your
decision and the Fhrer's, the relations between Germany and
Soviet Russia were reexamined and put on a completely new
basis. I believe that the decision to reach an understanding
between our two countries-which resulted from the realization
that the Lebensrame of our peoples adjoin each other but
need not necessarily overlap, and which led to a delimitation
of mutual spheres of influence and to the German-Soviet
Russian Non-aggression and Friendship Treaties-has proved ad-
Page 208
vantageous to both sides. I am convinced that the consistent
continuance of this policy of good neighborliness and a
further strengthening of the political and economic
collaboration will redound to the greater and greater benefit
of the two great peoples in the future. Germany, at any rate,
is prepared and determined to work to this end.
With such a goal, it seems to me, a direct contact
between the responsible personalities of both countries
becomes particularly important. I believe that such a
personal contact through other than the customary diplomatic
channels is indispensable from time to time in authoritarian
regimes such as ours. Today I would, therefore, like to
review briefly the events since my last visit to Moscow.
Because of the historical importance of these events and in
continuation of our exchange of ideas of last year, I would
like to review for you the policy which Germany has pursued
during this period.
After the conclusion of the Polish Campaign we became
aware-and this was confirmed by many reports which were
received during the winter-that England, faithful to her
traditional policy, was building her whole war strategy on
the hope of an extension of the war. The attempts made in
1939 to win over the Soviet Union to a military coalition
against Germany had already pointed in this direction. They
were frustrated by the German-Soviet Russian Agreement. Later
on, the attitude of England and France in the Soviet Russian-
Finnish conflict was similar.
In the spring of 194O, these concealed intentions became
quite evident. With this began the active phase of the
English policy of extending this war to other peoples of
Europe. After the end of the Soviet Russian-Finnish War,
Norway was selected as the first target. By the occupation of
Narvik and other Norwegian bases, Germany's iron ore supplies
were to be cut off and a new front established in
Scandinavia. It was only due to the timely intervention of
the German leadership in Berlin and to the quick blows of our
troops-who chased the English and the French out of Norway-
that all of Scandinavia did not become a theater of war.
Several weeks later this Anglo-French game was to be
repeated in Holland and Belgium. And here, too, Germany was
able at the eleventh hour to prevent the contemplated thrust
of the Anglo-French armies against the Ruhr Region (of which
we had been informed some time before) by decisive victories
of our armies. Today, even in France, "England's continental
sword," it has become apparent to most Frenchmen that their
country in the last analysis had to bleed to death as a
victim of this traditional "humanitarian" policy of Eng-
Page 209
land. As to the present English rulers, who declared war on
Germany and who thereby plunged the British people into
misfortune, even they themselves were finally no longer able
to conceal their traditional British policy and their
contempt for their own allies. On the contrary, when fate
turned against them, all their hypocritical protestations
ceased. With true English cynicism, they have treacherously
forsaken their friends. In fact, in order to save themselves
they slandered their erstwhile allies, and later on they even
openly opposed them by force. Andalsnes, Dunkerque, Oran,
Dakar, are names which-it appears to me-could sufficiently
enlighten the world on the value of England's friendship.
However, on this occasion we Germans, too, learned a lesson:
that the English are not only unscrupulous politicians, but
also bad soldiers. Our troops have routed them wherever they
accepted battle. The German soldier was superior to them
everywhere.
The Balkans were the next aim of the English policy of
extending the war. According to reports which have reached
us, all sorts of plans were repeatedly drawn up there this
year, and in one instance their execution was already
ordered. That those plans were not duly carried out was-as we
know today-due exclusively to the almost unbelievable
dilettantism and the astonishing discord among the political
as well as the military leaders of England and France.
Germany's foes have endeavored to conceal from the world
their measures for extending the war, and they have tried
before the whole world to brand our exposure of these English
methods of extending the war as n maneuver of German
propaganda. In the meanwhile, fate would have it that
documents of inestimable importance fell into the hands of
the German armies advancing with lightning speed in the
various theaters of war. As is well known, we succeeded in
capturing the secret political files of the French General
Staff, which were already prepared for shipment, and thereby
obtained incontrovertible proof of the correctness of our
reports regarding the intentions of our adversary and the
conclusions we had drawn from them. A number of these
documents, as you will remember, have already been published
in the press, and an enormous amount of material is still
being translated and examined. If needed, it is to be
published in a White Book. With truly striking conclusiveness
the background of the English war policy is here revealed.
You will understand that we are gratified at being able to
open the eyes of the world to the unprecedented incompetence
as well as to the almost criminal recklessness with which the
present English rulers, by their declaration of war on
Page 210
Germany, plunged into misfortune not only their own people
but also other peoples of Europe. But even beyond that, the
documents at our disposal prove that the gentlemen from the
Thames would not have shrunk from attacking completely
disinterested nations, merely because they continued their
natural trade with Germany despite British representations
and even threats. Undoubtedly, the Soviet-Russian oil centers
of Baku and the oil port of Batum would even this year have
become the victim of British attacks, if the collapse of
France and the expulsion of the British Army from Europe had
not broken the British spirit of aggression and put an abrupt
end to these activities.
Nevertheless, recognizing the complete absurdity of
continuing this war, on July 19 the Fhrer again offered
peace to England. After the refusal of this last oder Germany
is now determined to prosecute the war against England and
her Empire until the final defeat of Britain. This fight to
the finish is now in progress and will only end when the foe
is annihilated militarily or when a real understanding is
assured through elimination of the forces responsible for the
war. It does not matter when this takes place.
For one thing is sure: the war as such has been won by
us anyway. It is only a question of how long it will be
before England, under the impact of our operations, admits to
complete collapse.
In this final phase of the war, to guard against any
moves which England might yet make in her desperate
situation, the Axis, as an obvious precaution, was forced to
secure its military and strategic position in Europe as well
as its political and diplomatic position in the world. In
addition, it had to safeguard the requirements for
maintaining our economic life. Immediately after the end of
the campaign in the West, Germany and Italy started with this
task, and now they have carried it out in its broad outlines.
In this connection there may also be mentioned the-for
Germany-unprecedented task of securing her Norwegian coastal
positions all the way from the Skagerrak to Kirkenes. Germany
has therefore entered into certain purely technical
agreements with Sweden and Finland, of which I have already
fully informed you through the German Embassy. They are
exclusively for the purpose of facilitating supply of the
coastal cities in the North (Narvik and Kirkenes)-which are
difficult for us to reach by land-by shipping supplies via
the territory of these countries.
The policy which we have recently pursued in the
Rumanian-Hungarian controversy is similarly oriented. Our
guarantee to Rumania is due exclusively to the necessity of
protecting this Balkan
Page 211
region-which is especially important from the standpoint of
the German supplies of oil and grain-against any disturbance
by war, sabotage, etc., in the interior of this area, as well
as against invasion attempts from the outside. The anti-
German press tried at that time to place on the guarantee of
the Axis Powers to Rumania constructions the purpose of which
was all too apparent. The truth of the matter is that toward
the end of August-as we know-the situation between Rumania
and Hungary, fomented by English agents as the notorious
agitators in the Balkans, had reached such a point that the
outbreak of war was imminent and, in fact, air skirmishes had
already occurred. It was obvious that the peace could be
saved in the Balkans only through the most rapid diplomatic
intervention. There was no time for any negotiations or
consultations. Matters had already gone too far from a
military standpoint. This accounts for the completely
improvised meeting in Vienna and the award within 21 hours.
It is, therefore, probably superfluous to emphasize that the
tendency shown in the anti-German press at that time-to
construe these German-Italian actions as aimed against the
Soviet Union-was entirely unfounded and dictated solely by
the intention to disrupt relations between the Axis and the
Soviet Union.
The German Military Mission, too, sent a few days ago at
the request of the Rumanians, together with the attached
instruction units of the German Armed Forces, which again was
taken as an occasion for flimsy speculations by our foes,
serves both to train the Rumanian Army and to safeguard
German interests, because the German economy and the
economies of these territories are closely interdependent. If
England, as some reports seem to indicate, really intended to
undertake some action against the oil fields of Rumania for
instance, we have indeed already taken measures to give the
appropriate answer to such British attempts at intervention
from abroad or of sabotage from within. In view of the
completely misleading and tendentious press reports, which
have been increasing in number during the last few days, I
informed your Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, a few days ago as
to the true motives for our action and of the measures
actually taken.
In connection with the sabotage attempts by the British,
the question raised by your Government concerning
reorganization of the regime on the Danube is of some
importance. I may inform you that, in agreement with the
Italian Government, we shall make proposals in the next few
days which will take into account your wishes in the matter.
Page 212
After these measures to safeguard the position of the
Axis in Europe, the principal interest of the Reich
Government and of the Italian Government during recent weeks
was aimed at preventing the spread of the war beyond Europe
into a world conflagration. For, as the hopes of the English
of finding allies in Europe faded, the English Government
intensified its efforts to support particularly those circles
which in the democracies overseas aimed at an entry into the
war against Germany and Italy and on the side of England. In
contrast to this was the interest of those peoples which were
animated in the same degree by the desire for a New Order in
the world as against the congealed plutocratic democracies
and which saw, just as we did, these interests threatened by
a further extension of the European War into a world
conflagration. This condition applied particularly to Japan.
Some time ago, therefore, upon orders from the Fhrer, I sent
an emissary to Tokyo to ascertain unofficially whether the
common interests could be expressed in the form of a pact
directed against the further extension of the war to other
peoples. The exchange of ideas which followed very soon
resulted in a complete and general consensus between Berlin,
Rome, and Tokyo, on the fact that, in the interest of an
early restoration of peace, any further spread of war should
be prevented and that the best way to counteract the
warmongering of an international clique would be by a
military alliance of the Three Powers. Thus, despite all the
British intrigues, the Berlin Treaty was concluded with
surprising rapidity-as I was able to advise you through the
Embassy as soon as the final agreement had been reached on
the day before the signing. I believe that the conclusion of
this Treaty will hasten the downfall of the present English
rulers, who are alone in opposing the final restoration of
peace, and that it will thereby serve the interests of all
peoples.
As to the question of the attitude toward the Soviet
Union of the three partners to this Alliance, I should like
to state in advance that from the very beginning of the
exchange of views all Three Powers held equally to the
opinion that this Pact was not aimed in any way against the
Soviet Union; that, on the contrary, the friendly relations
between the Three Powers and their treaties with the Soviet
Union should remain completely unaffected by this agreement.
This attitude has, indeed, found its formal expression in the
text of the Berlin Treaty. As to Germany, the conclusion of
this Pact is the logical result of a conception of foreign
policy-long adhered to by the Reich Government-in which both
friendly German-Soviet cooperation and friendly German-
Japanese cooperation have a place side by side and
Page 213
undisturbed. Beyond that, however, friendly relations between
Germany and Soviet Russia as well as friendly relations
between Soviet Russia and Japan, together with the friendship
between the Axis Powers and Japan, are logical elements of a
natural political coalition which, if intelligently managed,
will work out to the best advantage of all the powers
concerned. You will remember that at the time of my first
visit to Moscow I discussed similar ideas with you quite
frankly and that I offered our good offices for the
adjustment of differences still existing at the time between
the Soviet Russians and the Japanese. I have endeavored since
then to work in this direction, and I would welcome it, if
the trend toward reaching an understanding with the Soviet
Union-which is becoming more and more clearly manifest in
Japan, too-could lead to its logical goal.
In summing up, I should like to state that, in the
opinion of the Fhrer, also, it appears to be the historical
mission of the Four Powers-the Soviet Union. Italy, Japan,
and Germany-to adopt a long-range policy and to direct the
future development of their peoples into the right channels
by delimitation of their interests on a worldwide scale.
In order further to clarify issues of such decisive
importance for the future of our peoples and in order to
discuss them in concrete form, we would welcome it if Herr
Molotov would pay us a visit in Berlin soon. I should like to
extend a most cordial invitation to him in the name of the
Reich Government. After my two visits to Moscow, it would now
be a particular pleasure for me personally to see Herr
Molotov in Berlin. His visit would then give the Fhrer the
opportunity to explain to Herr Molotov personally his views
regarding the future molding of relations between our two
countries. Upon his return, Herr Molotov will be able to
report to you at length concerning the aims and intentions of
the Fhrer. If then-as I believe I may expect-the opportunity
should arise for further elaboration of a common policy in
accordance with my foregoing statements, I should be happy to
come to Moscow again personally in order to resume the
exchange of ideas with you, my dear Herr Stalin, and to
discuss-possibly together with representatives of Japan and
Italy-the bases of a policy which could only be of practical
advantage to all of us.
With best regards I remain
Respectfully yours,
RIBBENTROP
Page 214
*****
Frame 0430, serial F 5
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 18, 1940-12:08 a. m.
Received October 18, 1940-1:50 a. m.
STATE SECRET
No. 2200 of October 17
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
Today I handed Herr Molotov the letter intended for Herr
Stalin and strongly urged him to accept the invitation to
Berlin as soon as possible. Molotov stated again that he
could not deny that he owed a visit to Berlin, but that he
would have to reserve his answer until after he had studied
the letter.
I then touched upon the complaints of the resettlement
commissions in the Balkan countries and in Bessarabia.
Molotov, of course, attempted to dispute the justice of the
complaints, but in the end he promised to reexamine them.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 0429, serial F 5
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
SONNENBURG, October 18, 1940.
Received Berlin October 18, 1940-3:30 p. m.
Transmitted to Moscow, 5:15 p. m.
STATE SECRET
No. 1878
For the Ambassador personally.
I request immediate information by wire as to why my
letter to Stalin was not delivered to the Soviet Russian
Government until October 17, and why, in keeping with the
importance of its contents and the entire matter, the letter
addressed to Stalin was not-as I had taken for granted-
delivered by you to Herr Stalin at a personal audience.
RIBBENTROP
Page 215
*****
Frames 0427-0428, serial F 5
The German, Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, October 19, 1940-3:20 p. m.
Received October 19, 1940-6 p. m.
STATE SECRET
No. 2209 of October 19
Reference your telegram of the 18th, No. 1878.
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
I handed Molotov the letter intended for Stalin after
careful examination of the factual and personal situation
here. After I had informed Molotov, in accordance with
instructions of some time ago, of your intention to address a
letter to Stalin and of its probable contents, a proposal on
my part to hand the letter directly to Stalin would have
caused serious annoyance to Herr Molotov. It seemed to me
imperative to avoid this, in view of the fact that Molotov is
the closest confidant of Stalin and that we will have to deal
with him on all great political issues in the future.
In addition, Stalin has recently shown a strong reserve
in public, and I was therefore justified in assuming that he
would avoid a personal meeting with me on some pretext or
other. In this connection, I may recall the statement in the
Soviet press of September 7, according to which Stalin had
not seen me for more than 6 months. Insistence upon a
reception by Stalin might easily have been construed on the
Soviet side as a reaction to this published statement.
That the letter was not delivered until October 17 is
explained by the fact that I did not arrive in Moscow until
the evening of October 15, because the plane was late. Before
the letter was handed over, we first had to translate it into
Russian, since we know from experience that translations made
by the Soviets are bad and full of inaccuracies. Considering
the extraordinary political significance of the letter it was
extremely important to transmit to Stalin a translation that
was flawless as to form and content lest the letter convey an
inaccurate impression. Because of the length and importance
of the letter it was not possible, despite the most strenuous
efforts, to translate it into Russian and to prepare a final
copy in Russian in a shorter space of time.
SCHULENBURG
Page 216
*****
Frames 0431-0432, serial F 5
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 22, 1940-5:02 a. m.
Received October 22, 1940-7:35 a. m.
No. 2236 of October 21
Reference your telegram of October 20, No. 1890. [1]
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Tonight Molotov handed me Stalin's sealed answer
together with a copy. The form and style of the letter leave
no doubt that the letter was composed by Stalin personally.
Literally translated, the letter reads as follows:
"MY DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: I have received your
letter. I thank you sincerely for your confidence, as well as
for the instructive analysis of recent events which is
contained in your letter.
I agree with you that a further improvement in the
relations between our countries is entirely possible on the
permanent basis of a long-range delimitation of mutual
interests.
Herr Molotov admits that he is under obligation to pay
you a return visit in Berlin. He hereby accepts your
invitation.
It remains for us to agree on the date of arrival in
Berlin. The time from the 10th to the 12th of November is
most convenient for Herr Molotov. If it is also agreeable to
the German Government, the question may be considered as
settled.
I welcome the desire expressed by you to come to Moscow
again in order to resume the exchange of ideas begun last
year on questions of interest to both our countries. and I
hope that this wish will be realized after Herr Molotov's
trip to Berlin.
As to joint deliberation on some issues with Japanese
and Italian participation, I am of the opinion (without being
opposed to this idea in principle) that this question would
have to be submitted to a previous examination.
Most respectfully yours"
Molotov added orally that he planned to arrive in Berlin
on the 10th, 11th or 12th of November. No decision has yet
been reached concerning the duration of his stay. It was to
be made dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.
Hilger will arrive in Berlin Thursday morning, will
bring along Stalin's original letter and discuss further
details of the visit there.
[1] Not printed.
Page 217
Molotov requested that the whole affair be treated in
strict confidence for the time being.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 112626, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, November 2, 1940-2:30 a. m.
Received November 2, 1940-7:50 a. m.
No. 2313 of November 1
Reference my telegram No. 2310. [2]
For the State Secretary.
In today's discussion between Schnurre and Mikoyan,
Mikoyan complained in a tone of obvious annoyance that we
were not willing to undertake the delivery of war materiel
desired by the Soviet Government, yet we were delivering war
materiel to Finland and other countries.
This is the first time that our deliveries of arms to
Finland have been mentioned by the Soviets.
SCHULENBURG
[2] Not printed.
*****
Frames 46290-46313, serial 66
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign
Minister and the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, in the Presence of the
Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Dekanosov, as Well as Counselor of Embassy Hilger and
Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters; Held in Berlin
on November 12, 1940
RM 41/40
After some introductory words the Reich Foreign Minister
stated that since the two visits which he had made to Moscow
last year much had happened. Referring to the talks which he
had had in Moscow with the Russian statesmen, and
supplementing what he had recently written in the letter to
Stalin, he now wanted to make a few more statements regarding
the German view of the general situation and on Russo-German
relations, without thereby anticipating the Fhrer,
Page 218
who would talk in detail with Herr Molotov in the afternoon
and would give him his considered opinion regarding the
political situation. After this discussion with the Fhrer,
there would be further opportunities for talks with the Reich
Foreign Minister, and it might he assumed that this German-
Russian exchange of views would have a favorable effect upon
the relations between the two countries.
Molotov replied that the contents of the letter to
Stalin, which already contained a general review of events
since last fall, were known to him, and he hoped that the
analysis given in the letter would be supplemented by oral
statements of the Fhrer with regard to the over-all
situation and German-Russian relations.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in the letter to
Stalin he had already expressed the firm conviction of
Germany, which he wished to stress again on this occasion,
that no power on earth could alter the fact that the
beginning of the end had now arrived for the British Empire.
England was beaten, and it was only a question of time when
she would finally admit her defeat. It was possible that this
would happen soon, because in England the situation was
deteriorating daily. Germany would, of course, welcome an
early conclusion of the conflict, since she did not wish
under any circumstances to sacrifice human lives
unnecessarily. If, however, the British did not make up their
minds in the immediate future to admit their defeat, they
would definitely ask for peace during the coming year.
Germany was continuing her bombing attacks on England day and
night. Her submarines would gradually be employed to the full
extent and would inflict terrible losses on England. Germany
was of the opinion that England could perhaps be forced by
these attacks to give up the struggle. A certain uneasiness
was already apparent in Great Britain, which seemed to
indicate such a solution. If, however, England were not
forced to her knees by the present mode of attack, Germany
would, as soon as weather conditions permitted, resolutely
proceed to a large-scale attack and thereby definitely crush
England. This large-scale attack had thus far been prevented
only by abnormal weather conditions.
On the other hand, England hoped for aid from the United
States, whose support, however, was extremely questionable.
Regarding possible military operations by land, the entry of
the United States into the war was of no consequence at all
for Germany. Germany and Italy would never again allow an
Anglo-Saxon to land on the European Continent. The aid which
England could get from the American fleet was also very
uncertain. Thus, America would confine herself to
Page 219
sending war materiel, primarily planes, to the British. How
much of this materiel would really arrive in England it was
difficult to say. It might be assumed, however, that as a
result of the measures taken by the German Navy, shipments
from America would arrive in England only in very meagre
quantities, so that in this respect, too, American support
was more than doubtful. Under these circumstances, the
question of whether America would enter the war or not was a
matter of complete indifference to Germany.
As to the political situation, the Reich Foreign
Minister remarked that now, after the conclusion of the
French campaign, Germany was extraordinarily strong. The
Fhrer would probably give Herr Molotov further information
on this point. The course of the war had brought neither
losses of personnel-as regrettable as the sacrifices might be
for the families directly afflicted-nor material losses of
any importance. Germany, therefore, had at her disposal an
extraordinarily large number of divisions, and her air force
was constantly growing stronger. The submarines and other
naval units were continually being augmented. Under those
circumstances, any attempt at a landing or at military
operations on the European Continent by England or by England
backed by America was doomed to complete failure at the
start. This was no military problem at all. This the English
had not yet understood, because apparently there was some
degree of confusion in Great Britain and because the country
was led by a political and military dilettante by the name of
Churchill, who throughout his previous career had completely
failed at all decisive moments and who would fail again this
time.
Furthermore, the Axis completely dominated its part of
Europe militarily and politically. Even France, which had
lost the war and had to pay for it (of which the French,
incidentally, were quite aware) had accepted the principle
that France in the future would never again support England
and de Gaulle, the quixotic conqueror of Africa. Because of
the extraordinary strength of their position, the Axis Powers
were not, therefore, considering how they might win the war,
but rather how rapidly they could end the war which was
already won.
As a result of this whole development, i. e., the
natural desire of Germany and Italy to end the war as rapidly
as possible, both countries had looked around for friends who
pursued the same interest, that is, who were against any
extension of the war and aimed at a speedy conclusion of the
war. The Tripartite Pact between Germany,
Page 220
Italy, and Japan had been the result of these efforts. The
Reich Foreign Minister could state confidentially that a
number of other countries had also declared their solidarity
with the ideas of the Three Power Pact.
In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized
that during the talks on the Three Power Pact, which were
concluded very rapidly, as he had already stated in the
letter to Stalin, one idea had been paramount in the minds of
all three participants, namely, that the Pact should not in
any way disturb the relationship of the Three Powers to
Russia. This idea had been advanced by the Reich Foreign
Minister and had been at once spontaneously approved by Italy
and Japan. Japan, in particular-whose friendship for Germany,
in view of the warmongering agitation in the United States,
was of special importance in the interest of preventing a
spread of the war-had given it her backing. Relations with
Russia were clarified in article 5 of the Tripartite Pact of
Berlin and had actually been the first subject settled.
The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that from the
very first moment of his Moscow visit he had made clear his
view that in the basic foreign policy of the New Germany,
friendship with Japan (as expressed in the Tripartite Pact)
and friendship with Russia were not only absolutely
consistent with each other but could be of positive value in
the realization of this foreign policy so far as the desire
for a speedy end to the war is concerned-a desire which was
surely shared by Soviet Russia. Molotov would recall that the
Reich Foreign Minister had stated in Moscow that Germany
would very much welcome an improvement in relations between
Russia and Japan. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) had taken
with him to Germany Stalin's concurrence in the idea that it
would also be in the Russian interest if Germany would exert
her influence in Tokyo in favor of a Russo-Japanese
rapprochement. The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that he
had consistently exerted this influence in Tokyo, and he
believed that his work had to a certain degree already been
effective. Not only since his Moscow visit, but even seven to
eight years ago, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) in
conversations with the Japanese had always advocated Russo-
Japanese accord. He took the position that just as it had
been possible to delimit the mutual spheres of interest
between Soviet Russia and Germany, a delimitation of
interests could also be achieved between Japan and Russia.
With regard to her Lebensraum policy, Japan now was oriented
not toward the East and North, but toward the South, and the
Reich Foreign Minister
Page 221
believed that by his influence he had contributed something
to this development. Another reason why Germany had striven
for an understanding with Japan was the realization that
England would some day go to war against the Reich.
Therefore, in good season Germany had adopted an appropriate
policy toward Japan.
The Fhrer now was of the opinion that it would be
advantageous in any case if the attempt were made to
establish the spheres of influence between Russia, Germany,
Italy, and Japan along very broad lines. The Fhrer had
considered this question long and thoroughly, and he had
reached the following conclusion: By reason of the position
which the four nations occupied in the world, a wise policy
would normally direct the momentum of their Lebensraum
expansion entirely southward. Japan had already turned toward
the South, and she would have to work for centuries in order
to consolidate her territorial gains in the South. Germany
had defined her spheres of influence with Russia, and after
the establishment of a new order in Western Europe she would
also find her Lebensraum expansion to be in a southerly
direction, i. e., in Central Africa in the region of the
former German colonies. Similarly Italian expansion was to
the south in the African portion of the Mediterranean. i. e.
North and East Africa. He, the Foreign Minister, wondered
whether Russia in the long run would not also turn to the
South for the natural outlet to the open sea that was so
important for Russia. These were, the Reich Foreign Minister
stated in conclusion, the great concerns which during recent
months had frequently been discussed between the Fhrer and
himself and which were also to be presented to Molotov on the
occasion of the Berlin visit.
To a question by Molotov as to which sea the Reich
Foreign Minister had meant when he had just spoken of access
to the sea, the latter replied that according to German
opinion great changes would take place all over the world
after the war. He recalled the fact that he had declared to
Stalin in Moscow that England no longer had the right to
dominate the world. England was pursuing an insane policy,
for which she would some day have to pay the cost. Germany
believed, therefore, that great changes would occur in the
status of British imperial possessions. Thus far, both
partners had benefited from the German-Russian Pact, Germany
as well as Russia, which was able to carry out her rightful
revisions in the West. The victory of Germany over Poland and
France had contributed considerably to the successful
achievement of these revisions. Both partners of the German-
Russian Pact had together done some good business.
Page 222
This was the most favorable basis for any pact. The
question now was, whether they could not continue in the
future also to do good business together and whether Soviet
Russia could not derive corresponding advantages from the new
order of things in the British Empire, i. e., whether in the
long run the most advantageous access to the sea for Russia
could not be found in the direction of the Persian Gulf and
the Arabian Sea, and whether at the same time certain other
aspirations of Russia in this part of Asia-in which Germany
was completely disinterested-could not also be realized.
The Reich Foreign Minister further brought up the
subject of Turkey. Thus far that country had outwardly had an
alliance with France and England. France had been eliminated
by her defeat, and England's value as an ally would become
more and more questionable. Therefore, Turkey had been clever
enough in recent months to reduce her ties with England to a
level that amounted really to nothing more than the former
neutrality. The question arose as to what interest Russia had
in Turkey. In view of the imminent end of the war, which was
in the interest of all countries, including Russia, he
believed that Turkey should be induced to free herself more
and more from the tie with England. He (the Reich Foreign
Minister) did not want to pass final judgment on details, but
he believed that with the adoption of a common platform by
Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan Turkey ought gradually to
be steered toward these countries. Thus far, he had not
discussed these matters with the Turks in any concrete way.
He had only stated in a confidential talk with the Turkish
Ambassador that Germany would welcome it if Turkey, by
pursuing in intensified degree her present political line,
would arrive at absolute neutrality, and he had added that
Germany did not make any claims whatsoever to Turkish
territory.
The Reich Foreign Minister further declared that in this
connection he understood completely Russia's dissatisfaction
with the Straits Convention of Montreux. Germany was even
more dissatisfied, for she had not been included in it at
all. Personally he (the Reich Foreign Minister) was of the
opinion that the Montreux Convention, like the Danube
Commissions, must be scrapped and replaced by something new.
This new agreement must be concluded between those powers
that were particularly interested in the issue, primarily
Russia, Turkey, Italy, and Germany. It was clear that Soviet
Russia could not be satisfied with the present situation.
Germany found the idea acceptable that in the Black Sea
Soviet Russia and the adjacent countries should enjoy certain
privileges over other countries of the
Page 223
world. It was absurd that countries that were thousands of
miles away from the Black Sea should claim to have the same
rights as the Black Sea powers. The new Straits agreement
with Turkey would, moreover, have to secure certain special
privileges to Russia, on the details of which he could not
yet comment at the moment, but which would have to grant to
the warships and merchant fleet of the Soviet Union in
principle freer access to the Mediterranean than heretofore.
Russia was entitled to that. He (the Reich Foreign Minister)
had already discussed these matters with the Italians, and
the arguments which he had just indicated had received most
sympathetic consideration in Italy. It appeared advisable to
him that Russia, Germany, and Italy should pursue a common
policy toward Turkey in order to induce that country without
loss of face to free herself from her ties with England,
which could hardly be pleasing to the three countries. Turkey
would thereby not only become a factor in the coalition of
powers against the spread of war and for an early
establishment of peace, but she would also be prepared to
scrap the Montreux Convention voluntarily and, in conjunction
with these three countries, to create a new Straits
convention which would satisfy the just demands of all and
give Russia certain special privileges. In this matter they
might consider jointly whether it would not be possible to
recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey.
The Reich Foreign Minister summed up the matter by
stating that the following issues were involved-
1. To consider jointly how the countries of the
Tripartite Pact could reach an agreement of some kind with
the Soviet Union, expressing the Soviet Union's solidarity
with the aim of the Tripartite Pact, namely the prevention of
the spread of war and the early establishment of world peace.
Moreover, other common issues could be designated on
which the countries wished to collaborate and, finally,
mutual respect for one another's interests might be agreed
upon. These were approximately the guide lines for such a
contemplated agreement. The details would have to be
discussed further. If these arguments appeared acceptable to
the Soviet Government, a joint declaration by the Soviet
Government and the powers of the Tripartite Pact pledging the
early restoration of peace would in effect result.
2. Joint examinations as to whether in some way the
interests of the four countries could be clarified for the
future on a very long-range scale.
Page 224
3. The issue of Turkey and the Straits question were
also involved.
On all these points, it was to be kept in mind that the
Reich Foreign Minister did not yet wish to make any concrete
proposals; he had only presented a summary of the ideas which
the Fhrer and he had in mind when the letter to Stalin was
sent. If, however, these ideas appeared feasible to the
Soviet Government, the Reich Foreign Minister would be quite
ready to come to Moscow himself and discuss the matters
personally with Stalin. He wondered whether the simultaneous
presence of his Italian and Japanese colleagues, who, as far
as he knew, were also prepared to come to Moscow, could be of
advantage in the matter. Of course, the relationship of
Russia to the Axis, as well as relations between Russia and
Japan, would first have to be clarified through diplomatic
channels.
At the end the Reich Foreign Minister added another
remark regarding his recent conversation with the Chinese
Ambassador. He had not been prompted from any direction to
hold this conversation, but he had had indications that the
Japanese would not have any objections to it. In line with
the efforts to bring about a speedy end to the war, he had
asked himself whether there was not the possibility of
reconciling the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and
Japan. He had not, by any means, offered Germany's mediation,
but, in view of the long and friendly relations existing
between Germany and China, had merely informed Marshal Chiang
Kai-shek of the German view. Japan was about to recognize the
Nanking Government; on the other hand, reports were current
to the effect that Japan as well as China desired to seek a
compromise. Whether these reports were based on fact could
not be definitely ascertained. It would undoubtedly be well,
however, if a compromise between the two countries could be
found. For this reason he (the Reich Foreign Minister) had
summoned the Chinese Ambassador in order to communicate to
him the German position on this question, since he did not
consider it impossible that something was being initiated
between Japan and China of which he wished to inform Molotov
during this exchange of ideas.
Molotov agreed with the remark concerning the advantages
of a Sino-Japanese accord and replied to the statements of
the Reich Foreign Minister by saying that they had been of
great interest to him and that an exchange of ideas regarding
the great problems concerning not only Germany and Soviet
Russia but also other states as well might, indeed, be
useful. He had well understood the statements of the Reich
Foreign Minister regarding the great importance of the
Page 225
Tripartite Pact. As the representative of a non-
belligerent country, however, he had to ask for a number of
explanations in order to ascertain more clearly the meaning
of the Pact. When the New Order in Europe and the Greater
East Asian Sphere were discussed in the Treaty, the concept
of a "Greater East Asian Sphere" was quite vague, at least
for a person who had not participated in the preparation of
the Pact. Therefore, it would be important for him to obtain
a more accurate definition of this concept. Moreover, the
participation of the Soviet Union in the actions envisaged by
the Reich Foreign Minister must be discussed in detail, and
that not only in Berlin, but also in Moscow.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the concept of
the Greater East Asian Sphere had been new to him, too, and
that it had not been defined to him in detail either. The
formulation had been suggested in the last few days of the
negotiations, which, as already mentioned, had proceeded very
rapidly. He could state, however, that the concept of a
"Greater East Asian Sphere" had nothing to do with the vital
Russian spheres of influence. During the pact negotiations,
as already mentioned, the first matter discussed was that
nothing aimed directly or indirectly against Russia might be
included in the Pact.
Molotov replied that precision was necessary in a
delimitation of spheres of influence over a rather long
period of time. Therefore, he had asked to be informed of the
opinion of the authors of the Pact or, at least, of the
opinion of the Reich Government on this point. Particular
vigilance was needed in the delimitation of the spheres of
influence between Germany and Russia. The establishment of
these spheres of influence in the past year was only a
partial solution, which had been rendered obsolete and
meaningless by recent circumstances and events, with the
exception of the Finnish question, which he would discuss in
detail later. It would necessarily take some time to make a
permanent settlement. In this connection, in the first place,
Russia wanted to come to an understanding with Germany, and
only then with Japan and Italy, after she had previously
obtained precise information regarding the significance, the
nature, and the aim of the Tripartite Pact.
At this point the conversation was interrupted in order
to give the Russian delegates time for breakfast in a small
circle before the conversation with the Fhrer began.
SCHMIDT
(Minister)
BERLIN, November 13, 1940.
Page 226
*****
Frames 0281-0259 [sic], serial F 3
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Fhrer and the
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in the
Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, the Deputy
People's Commissar, Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor
of Embassy Hilger and Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as
Interpreters, on November 12, 1940
STATE SECRET
Fh. 32/40 g. Rs.
After some words of welcome, the Fhrer stated that the
idea that was uppermost in his mind in the conversations now
taking place was this: In the life of peoples it was indeed
difficult to lay down a course for development over a long
period in the future and the outbreak of conflicts was often
strongly influenced by personal factors; he believed,
nevertheless, that an attempt had to be made to fix the
development of nations, even for a long period of time, in so
far as that was possible, so that friction would be avoided
and the elements of conflict precluded as far as humanly
possible. This was particularly in order when two nations
such as the German and Russian nations had at their helm men
who possessed sufficient authority to commit their countries
to a development in a definite direction. In the case of
Russia and Germany, moreover, two very great nations were
involved which need not by nature have any conflict of
interests, if each nation understood that the other required
certain vital necessities without the guarantee of which its
existence was impossible. Besides this, both countries had
systems of government which did not wage war for the sake of
war, but which needed peace more than war in order to carry
out their domestic tasks. With due regard for vital needs,
particularly in the economic field, it should really be
possible to achieve a settlement between them, which would
lead to peaceful collaboration between the two countries
beyond the life span of the present leaders.
After Molotov had expressed his entire agreement with
these arguments, the Fhrer continued that it was obviously a
difficult task to chart developments between peoples and
countries over a long period. He believed, however, that it
would be possible to elaborate clearly and precisely certain
general points of views quite independently of personal
motives and to orient the political and economic interests of
peoples in such a manner as to give some guarantee that
conflicts would be avoided even for rather long periods. The
situation in which
Page 227
the conversation of today was taking place was characterized
by the fact that Germany was at war, while Soviet Russia was
not. Many of the measures taken by Germany had been
influenced by the fact of her belligerency. Many of the steps
that were necessary in the course of the war had developed
from the conduct of the war itself and could not have been
anticipated at the outbreak of war. By and large, not only
Germany but also Russia had gained great advantages. On
further consideration, the political collaboration during the
one year of its existence had been of considerable value to
both countries.
Molotov stated that this was quite correct.
The Fhrer declared further that probably neither of the
two peoples had realized its wishes 100 percent. In political
life, however, even a 20-25 percent realization of demands
was would a good deal. He believed that not every wish would
be fulfilled in the future either, but that the two greatest
peoples of Europe, if they went along together, would, in any
case gain more than if they worked against each other. If
they stood together, some advantage would always accrue to
both countries. If they worked against each other, however,
third countries would be the sole gainers.
Molotov replied that the argument of the Fhrer was
entirely correct and would be confirmed by history; that it
was particularly applicable to the present situation,
however.
The Fhrer then went on to say that proceeding from
these ideas he had again quite soberly pondered the question
of German-Russian collaboration, at a time when the military
operations were in effect concluded.
The war had, moreover, led to complications which were
not intended by Germany, but which had compelled her from
time to time to react militarily to certain events. The
Fhrer then outlined to Molotov the course of military
operations up to the present, which had led to the fact that
England no longer had an ally on the continent. He described
in detail the military operations now being carried out
against England, and he stressed the influence of atmospheric
conditions on these operations. The English retaliatory
measures were ridiculous, and the Russian gentlemen could
convince themselves at first hand of the fiction of alleged
destruction in Berlin. As soon as atmospheric conditions
improved, Germany would be poised for the great and final
blow against England. At the moment, then, it was her aim to
try not only to make military preparations for this final
struggle, but also to clarify the political issues which
would be of
Page 228
importance during and after this showdown. He had, therefore,
reexamined the relations with Russia, and not in a negative
spirit, but with the intention of organizing them positively-
if possible, for a long period of time. In so doing he had
reached several conclusions:
1. Germany was not seeking to obtain military aid from
Russia;
2. Because of the tremendous extension of the war,
Germany had been forced, in order to oppose England, to
penetrate into territories remote from her and in which she
was not basically interested politically or economically;
3. There were nevertheless certain requirements, the
full importance of which had become apparent only during the
war, but which were absolutely vital to Germany. Among them
were certain sources of raw materials which were considered
by Germany as most vital and absolutely indispensable.
Possibly Herr Molotov was of the opinion that in one case or
another they had departed from the conception of the spheres
of influence which had been agreed upon by Stalin and the
Reich Foreign Minister. Such departures had already occurred
in some cases in the course of Russian operations against
Poland. In a number of cases, on calm consideration of the
German and Russian interests, he (the Fhrer) had not been
ready to made concessions' but he had realized that it was
desirable to meet the needs of Russia half-way, as, for
instance, in the case of Lithuania. From an economic point of
view, Lithuania had, it is true, had a certain importance for
us, but from a political point of view, we had understood the
necessity of straightening out the situation in this whole
field in order thereby to prevent in the future the spiritual
revival of tendencies that were capable of causing tension
between the two countries of Germany and Russia. In another
case, namely, that of the South Tyrol, Germany had taken a
similar position. However, in the course of the war, factors
had arisen for Germany which could not have been anticipated
at the outbreak of the war, but which had to be considered
absolutely vital from the standpoint of military operations.
He (the Fhrer) now had pondered the question how,
beyond all petty momentary considerations, further to clarify
in bold outline the collaboration between Germany and Russia
and what direction future German-Russian developments should
take. In this matter the following viewpoints were of
importance for Germany:
1. Need for Lebensraum [Raumnot]. During the war Germany
had acquired such large areas that she would require one
hundred years to utilize them fully.
2. Some colonial expansion in Central Africa was
necessary.
Page 229
3. Germany needed certain raw materials, the supply of
which she would have to safeguard under all circumstances.
And
4. She could not permit the establishment by hostile
powers of air or naval bases in certain areas.
In no event, however, would the interests of Russia be
selected. The Russian empire could develop without in the
least prejudicing German interests. (Molotov said this was
quite correct.) If both countries came to realize this fact,
they could collaborate to their mutual advantage and could
spare themselves difficulties, friction, and nervous tension.
It was perfectly obvious that Germany and Russia would never
become one world. Both countries would always exist separate
from each other as two powerful elements of the world. Each
of them could shape its future as it liked, if in so doing it
considered the interests of the other. Germany herself had no
interests in Asia other than general economic and commercial
interests. In particular, she had no colonial interests
there. She knew, furthermore, that the possible colonial
territories in Asia would probably fall to Japan. If by any
chance China, too, should be drawn into the orbit of the
awakening [erwachenden] nations, any colonial aspirations
would be doomed to disappointment from the start in view of
the masses of people living there.
There were in Europe a number of points of contact
[Berhrungsmomenten] between Germany, Russia, and Italy. Each
one of these three countries had an understandable desire for
an outlet to the open sea. Germany wanted to get out of the
North Sea, Italy wanted to remove the barrier of Gibraltar,
and Russia was also striving toward the ocean. The question
now was how much chance there was for these great countries
really to obtain free access to the ocean without in turn
coming into conflict with each other over the matter. This
was also the viewpoint from which he looked upon the
organization of European relations after the war. The leading
statesmen of Europe must prevent this war from becoming the
father of a new war. The issues to be settled had, therefore,
to be settled in such a manner that, at least in the
foreseeable future, no new conflict could arise.
In this spirit, he (the Fhrer) had talked with the
French statesmen and believed that he had found among them
some sympathy for a settlement which would lead to tolerable
conditions for a rather long period and which would be of
advantage to all concerned, if only to the extent that a new
war did not again have to be feared immediately. Referring to
the preamble of the Armistice Treaty with France, he had
pointed out to P‚tain and Laval that, as long as the
Page 230
war with England lasted, no step might be taken which would
in any way be incompatible with the conditions for ending
this war against Great Britain.
Elsewhere, too, there were problems such as these, but
ones which arose only for the duration of the war. Thus, for
instance, Germany had no political interests whatsoever in
the Balkans and was active there at present exclusively under
the compulsion of securing for herself certain raw materials.
It was a matter of purely military interests, the
safeguarding of which was not a pleasant task, since, for
instance, a German military force had to be maintained in
Rumania, hundreds of kilometers away from the supply centers.
For similar reasons the idea was intolerable to Germany
that England might get a foothold in Greece in order to
establish air and naval bases there. The Reich was compelled
to prevent this under any circumstances.
The continuation of the war under such circumstances was
of course not desirable. And that is why Germany had wanted
to end the war after the conclusion of the Polish campaign.
At that time England and France could have had peace without
personal sacrifices; they had, however, preferred to continue
the war. Of course, blood also creates rights, and it was
inadmissible that certain countries should have declared and
waged war without afterward paying the cost. He (the Fhrer)
had made this clear to the French. At the present stage of
developments, however, the question was which of the
countries responsible for the war had to pay more. At any
rate, Germany would have preferred to end the war last year
and to have demobilized her army in order to resume her
peacetime work, since from an economic point of view any war
was bad business. Even the victor had to incur such expenses
before, during, and after the war that he could have reached
his goal much more cheaply in a peaceful development.
Molotov concurred in this idea, stating that in any case
it was vastly more expensive to attain a goal by military
measures than by peaceful means. The Fhrer pointed out
further that under the present circumstances Germany had been
forced by wartime developments to become active in areas in
which she was politically disinterested but had at most
economic interests. Self-preservation, however, absolutely
dictated this course. Nevertheless, this activity of Germany-
forced upon her in the areas in question-represented no
obstacle to any pacification of the world which would later
be undertaken, and which would bring to the nations working
toward the same end that for which they hoped.
Page 231
In addition, there was the problem of America. The
United States now pursuing an imperialistic policy. It was
not fighting for England, but only trying to get the British
Empire into its grasp. They were helping England, at best, in
order to further their own rearmament and to reinforce their
military power by acquiring bases. In the distant future it
would be a question of establishing a great solidarity among
those countries which might be involved in case of an
extension of the sphere of influence of this Anglo-Saxon
power, which had a more solid foundation, by far, than
England. In this case, it was not a question of the immediate
future; not in 1945, but in 1970 or 1980, at the earliest,
would the freedom of other nations be seriously endangered by
this Anglo-Saxon power. At any rate, the Continent of Europe
had to adjust itself now to this development and had to act
jointly against the Anglo-Saxons and against any of their
attempts to acquire dangerous bases. Therefore, he had
undertaken an exchange of ideas with France, Italy, and
Spain, in order with these countries to set up in the whole
of Europe and Africa some kind of Monroe Doctrine and to
adopt a new joint colonial policy by which each of the powers
concerned would claim for itself only as much colonial
territory as it could really utilize. In other regions, where
Russia was the power in the foremost position, the interests
of the latter would, of course, have to come first. This
would result in a great coalition of powers which, guided by
sober appraisal of realities, would have to establish their
respective spheres of interest and would assert themselves
against the rest of the world correspondingly. It was surely
a difficult task to organize such a coalition of countries;
and yet, to conceive it was not as difficult as to carry it
out.
The Fhrer then reverted to the German-Russian efforts.
He understood thoroughly Russia's attempts to get ice-free
ports with absolutely secure access to the open sea. Germany
had enormously expanded her Lebensraum in her present eastern
provinces. At least half of this area, however, must be
regarded as an economic liability. Probably both Russia and
Germany had not achieved everything they had set out to do.
In any case, however, the successes had been great on both
sides. If a liberal view were taken of the remaining issues
and due regard were taken of the fact that Germany was still
at war and had to concern herself with areas which, in and
for themselves, were of no importance to her politically,
substantial gains for both partners could be achieved in the
future, too. In this connection the Fhrer again turned to
the Balkans and repeated that Germany
Page 232
would at once oppose by military action any attempt by
England to get a foothold in Salonika. She still retained
unpleasant memories from the last war of the then Salonika
Front.
To a question of Molotov's as to how Salonika
constituted a danger, the Fhrer referred to the proximity of
the Rumanian petroleum fields, which Germany wished to
protect under all circumstances. As soon as peace prevailed,
however, the German troops would immediately leave Rumania
again.
In the further course of the conversation, the Fhrer
asked Molotov how Russia planned to safeguard her interests
in the Black Sea and in the Straits. Germany would also be
prepared at any time to help effect an improvement for Russia
in the regime of the Straits.
Molotov replied that the statements of the Fhrer had
been of a general nature and that in general he could agree
with his reasoning. He was also of the opinion that it would
be in the interest of Germany and the Soviet Union if the two
countries would collaborate and not fight each other. Upon
his departure from Moscow, Stalin had given him exact
instructions, and everything that he was about to say was
identical with the views of Stalin. He concurred in the
opinion of the Fhrer that both partners had derived
substantial benefits from the German-Russian agreement.
Germany had received a secure hinterland that, as was
generally known, had been of great importance for the further
course of events during the year of war. In Poland, too,
Germany had gained considerable economic advantages. By the
exchange of Lithuania for the Voivodeship of Lublin, all
possible friction between Russia and Germany had been
avoided. The German-Russian agreement of last year could
therefore be regarded as fulfilled, except for one point,
namely, Finland. The Finnish question was still unsolved, and
he asked the Fhrer to tell him whether the German-Russian
agreement, as far as it concerned Finland, was still in
force. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, no changes
had occurred here. Also, in the opinion of the Soviet
Government the German-Russian agreement of last year
represented only a partial solution. In the meanwhile, other
issues had arisen that also had to be solved.
Molotov then turned to the matter of the significance of
the Tripartite Pact. What was the meaning of the New Order in
Europe and in Asia, and what role would the U.S.S.R. be given
in it? These issues must be discussed during the Berlin
conversations and during the contemplated visit of the Reich
Foreign Minister to Moscow, on which the Russians were
definitely counting. Moreover, there were issues
Page 233
to be clarified regarding Russia's Balkan and Black Sea
interests with respect to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. It
would be easier for the Russian Government to give specific
replies to the questions raised by the Fhrer, if it could
obtain the explanations just requested. It would be
interested in the New Order in Europe, and particularly in
the tempo and the form of this New Order. It would also like
to have an idea of the boundaries of the so-called Greater
East Asian Sphere.
The Fhrer replied that the Tripartite Pact was intended
to regulate conditions in Europe as to the natural interests
of the European countries and, consequently, Germany was now
approaching the Soviet Union in order that she might express
herself regarding the areas of interest to her. In no case
was a settlement to be made without Soviet Russian
cooperation. This applied not only to Europe, but also to
Asia, where Russia herself was to cooperate in the definition
of the Greater East Asian Sphere and where she was to
designate her claims there. Germany's task in this case was
that of a mediator. Russia by no means was to be confronted
with a fait accompli.
When the Fhrer undertook to try to establish the above-
mentioned coalition of powers, it was not the German-Russian
relationship which appeared to him to be the most difficult
point, but the question of whether a collaboration between
Germany, France, and Italy was possible. Only now that he
believed this problem could be solved, and after a settlement
in broad outlines had in effect been accepted by the three
countries, had he thought it possible to contact Soviet
Russia for the purpose of settling the questions of the Black
Sea, the Balkans, and Turkey.
In conclusion, the Fhrer summed up by stating that the
discussion, to a certain extent, represented the first
concrete step toward a comprehensive collaboration, with due
consideration for the problems of Western Europe, which were
to be settled between Germany, Italy, and France, as well as
for the issues of the East, which were essentially the
concern of Russia and Japan, but in which Germany offered her
good offices as mediator. It was a matter of opposing any
attempt on the part of America to "make money on Europe." The
United States had no business either in Europe, in Africa, or
in Asia.
Molotov expressed his agreement with the statements of
the Fhrer regarding the role of America and England. The
participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to
him entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia
was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object. In
that case he saw no difficulties in the matter
Page 234
of participation of the Soviet Union in the common effort.
But the aim and the significance of the Pact must first be
more closely defined, particularly because of the
delimitation of the Greater East Asian Sphere.
In view of a possible air raid alarm the talk was broken
off at this point and postponed until the following day, the
Fhrer promising Molotov that he would discuss with him in
detail the various issues which had come up during the
conversation.
SCHMIDT
BERLIN, November 16, 1940.
*****
Frames 154-190, serial F 18
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Fhrer and the
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov
in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the
Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor of Embassy Hilger and
Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters, in Berlin on
November 13, 1940
Fh. 33/40
The Fhrer referred to the remark of Molotov during
yesterday's conversation, according to which the German-
Russian agreement was fulfilled "with the exception of one
point: namely, of Finland."
Molotov explained that this remark referred not only to
the German-Russian agreement itself, but in particular to the
Secret Protocols too.
The Fhrer replied that, in the Secret Protocol, zones
of influence and spheres of interest had been designated and
distributed between Germany and Russia. In so far as it had
been a question of actually taking possession, Germany had
lived up to the agreements, which was not quite the case on
the Russian side. At any rate, Germany had not occupied any
territory that was within the Russian sphere of influence.
Lithuania had already been mentioned yesterday. There
could be no doubt that in this case the changes from the
original German-Russian agreement were essentially due to
Russian initiative. Whether the difficulties-to avoid which
the Russians had offered their suggestion-would actually have
resulted from the partition of Poland, could be left out of
the discussion. In any case, the Voivodeship of Lublin was no
compensation, economically, for Lithuania. However,
Page 235
the Germans had seen that in the course of events a situation
had resulted which necessitated revision of the original
agreement.
The same applied to Bucovina. Strictly speaking, in the
original agreement Germany had declared herself disinterested
only in Bessarabia. Nevertheless, she had realized, in this
case too, that revision of the agreement was in certain
respects advantageous for the other partner.
The situation regarding Finland was quite similar.
Germany had no political interest there. This was known to
the Russian Government. During the Russo-Finnish War Germany
had meticulously fulfilled all her obligations in regard to
absolutely benevolent neutrality.
Molotov interposed here that the Russian Government had
had no cause for criticism with regard to the attitude of
Germany during that conflict.
In this connection the Fhrer mentioned also that he had
even detained ships in Bergen which were transporting arms
and ammunition to Finland, for which Germany had actually had
no authority. Germany had incurred the serious opposition of
the rest of the world, and of Sweden in particular, by her
attitude during the Russo-Finnish War. As a result, during
the subsequent Norwegian campaign, itself involving
considerable risks, she had to employ a large number of
divisions for protection against Sweden, which she would not
have needed otherwise.
The real situation was as follows: In accordance with
the German-Russian agreements. Germany recognized that,
politically, Finland was of primary interest to Russia and
was in her zone of influence. However, Germany had to
consider the following two points:
1. For the duration of the war she was very greatly
interested in the deliveries of nickel and lumber from
Finland, and
2. She did not desire any new conflict in the Baltic Sea
which would further curtail her freedom of movement in one of
the few merchant shipping regions which still remained to
her. It was completely incorrect to assert that Finland was
occupied by German troops. To be sure, troops were being
transported to Kirkenes via Finland, of which fact Russia had
been officially informed by Germany. Because of the length of
the route, the trains had to stop two or three times in
Finnish territory. However, as soon as the transit of the
troop contingents to be transported had been completed, no
additional troops would be sent through Finland. He (the
Fhrer) pointed out that
Page 236
both Germany and Russia would naturally be interested in not
allowing the Baltic Sea to become a combat zone again. Since
the Russo-Finnish War, the possibilities for military
operations had shifted, because England had available long-
range bombers and long-range destroyers. The English thereby
had a chance to get a foothold on Finnish airports.
In addition, there was a purely psychological factor
which was extremely onerous. The Finns had defended
themselves bravely, and they had gained the sympathies of the
world-particularly of Scandinavia. In Germany too during the
Russo-Finnish War, the people were somewhat annoyed at the
position which, as a result of the agreements with Russia,
Germany had to take and actually did take. Germany did not
wish any new Finnish War because of the aforementioned
considerations. However, the legitimate claims of Russia were
not affected by that. Germany had proved this again and again
by her attitude on various issues, among others the issue of
the fortification of the Aaland Islands. For the duration of
the war, however, her economic interests in Finland were just
as important as in Rumania. Germany expected consideration of
these interests all the more, since she herself had also
shown understanding of the Russian wishes in the issues of
Lithuania and Bucovina at the time. At any rate, she had no
political interest of any kind in Finland, and she fully
accepted the fact that that country belonged to the Russian
zone of influence.
In his reply Molotov pointed out that the agreement of
1939 had referred to a certain stage of the development which
had been concluded by the end of the Polish War, while the
second stage was brought to an end by the defeat of France,
and that they were really in the third stage now. He recalled
that by the original agreement, with its Secret Protocol, the
common German-Russian boundary had been fixed and issues
concerning the adjacent Baltic countries and Rumania,
Finland, and Poland had been settled For the rest, he agreed
with the remarks of the Fhrer on the revisions made.
However, if he drew up a balance sheet of the situation that
resulted after the defeat of France, he would have to state
that the German-Russian agreement had not been without
influence upon the great German victories.
As to the question of the revision of the original
agreement with regard to Lithuania and the Voivodeship of
Lublin, Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Union would not
have insisted on that revision if Germany had not wanted it.
But he believed that the new solution had been in the
interest of both parties.
Page 237
At this point the Reich Foreign Minister interjected
that, to be sure, Russia had not made this revision an
absolute condition, but at any rate had urged it very
strongly.
Molotov insisted that the Soviet Government would not
have refused to leave matters as provided in the original
agreement. At any rate, however, Germany, for its concession
in Lithuania, had received compensation in Polish territory.
The Fhrer interjected here that in this exchange one
could not, from the point of view of economics, speak of
adequate compensation.
Molotov then mentioned the question of the strip of
Lithuanian territory and emphasized that the Soviet
Government had not received any clear answer yet from Germany
on this question. However, it awaited a decision.
Regarding Bucovina, he admitted that this involved an
additional territory, one not mentioned in the Secret
Protocol. Russia had at first confined her demands to
Northern Bucovina. Under the present circumstances, however,
Germany must understand the Russian interest in Southern
Bucovina. But Russia had not received an answer to her
question regarding this subject either. Instead, Germany had
guaranteed the entire territory of Rumania and completely
disregarded Russia's wishes with regard to Southern Bucovina.
The Fhrer replied that it would mean a considerable
concession on the part of Germany, if even part of Bucovina
were to be occupied by Russia. According to an oral
agreement, the former Austrian territories were to fall
within the German sphere of influence. Besides, the
territories belonging to the Russian zone had been mentioned
by name: Bessarabia, for example. There was, however, not a
word regarding Bucovina in the agreements. Finally, the exact
meaning of the expression "sphere of influence" was not
further defined. At any rate, Germany had not violated the
agreement in the least in this matter. To the objection of
Molotov that the revisions with regard to the strip of
Lithuanian territory and of Bucovina were not of very great
importance in comparison with the revision which Germany had
under taken elsewhere by military force, the Fhrer replied
that so-called "revision by force of arms" had not been the
subject of the agreement at all.
Molotov, however, persisted in the opinion previously
stated: that the revisions desired by Russia were
insignificant.
The Fhrer replied that if German-Russian collaboration
was to show positive results in the future, the Soviet
Government would have to understand that Germany was engaged
in a life and death struggle,
Page 238
which, at all events, she wanted to conclude successfully.
For that, a number of prerequisites depending upon economic
and military factors were required, which Germany wanted to
secure for herself by all means. If the Soviet Union were in
a similar position, Germany on her part would, and would have
to, demonstrate a similar understanding for Russian needs.
The conditions which Germany wanted to assure did not
conflict with the agreements with Russia. The German wish to
avoid a war with unforeseeable consequences in the Baltic Sea
did not mean any violation of the German-Russian agreements
according to which Finland belonged in the Russian sphere of
influence. The guarantee given upon the wish and request of
the Rumanian Government was no violation of the agreements
concerning Bessarabia. The Soviet Union had to realize that
in the framework of any broader collaboration of the two
countries advantages of quite different scope were to be
reached than the insignificant revisions which were now being
discussed. Much greater successes could then be achieved,
provided that Russia did not now seek successes in
territories in which Germany was interested for the duration
of the war. The future successes would be the greater, the
more Germany and Russia succeeded in fighting back to back
against the outside world, and would become the smaller, the
more the two countries faced each other breast to breast. In
the first case there was no power on earth which could oppose
the two countries.
In his reply Molotov voiced his agreement with the last
conclusions of the Fhrer. In this connection he stressed the
viewpoint of the Soviet leaders, and of Stalin in particular,
that it would be possible and expedient to strengthen and
activate the relations between the two countries. However, in
order to give those relations a permanent basis, issues would
also have to be clarified which were of secondary importance,
but which spoiled the atmosphere of German-Russian relations.
Finland belonged among these issues. If Russia and Germany
had a good understanding, this issue could be solved without
war, but there must be neither German troops in Finland nor
political demonstrations in that country against the Soviet-
Russian Government.
The Fhrer replied that the second point could not be a
matter for debate, since Germany had nothing whatsoever to do
with these things. Incidentally, demonstrations could easily
be staged, and it was very difficult to find out afterward
who had been the real instigator. However, regarding the
German troops, he could give the
Page 239
assurance that, if a general settlement were made, no German
troops would appear in Finland any longer.
Molotov replied that by demonstrations he also
understood the dispatch of Finnish delegations to Germany or
receptions of prominent Finns in Germany. Moreover, the
circumstance of the presence of German troops had led to an
ambiguous attitude on the part of Finland. Thus, for
instance, slogans were brought out that "nobody was a Finn
who approved of the last Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty", and the
like.
The Fhrer replied that Germany had always exerted only
a moderating influence and that she had advised Finland and
also Rumania, in particular, to accept the Russian demands.
Molotov replied that the Soviet Government considered it
as its duty definitively to settle and clarify the Finnish
question. No new agreements were needed for that. The old
German-Russian agreement assigned Finland to the Russian
sphere of influence.
In conclusion the Fhrer stated on this point that
Germany did not desire any war in the Baltic Sea and that she
urgently needed Finland as a supplier of nickel and lumber.
Politically, she was not interested and, in contrast to
Russia, had occupied no Finnish territory. Incidentally, the
transit of German troops would be finished within the next
few days. No further troop trains would then be sent. The
decisive question for Germany was whether Russia had the
intention of going to war against Finland.
Molotov answered this question somewhat evasively with
the statement that everything would be all right if the
Finnish Government would give up its ambiguous attitude
toward the U.S.S.R., and if the agitation against Russia
among the population (bringing out of slogans such as the
ones previously mentioned) would cease.
To the Fhrer's objection that he feared that Sweden
might intervene in a Russo-Finnish War the next time, Molotov
replied that he could not say anything about Sweden, but he
had to stress that Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, was
interested in the neutrality of Sweden. Of course, both
countries were also interested in peace in the Baltic. but
the Soviet Union was entirely able to assure peace in that
region.
The Fhrer replied that they would perhaps experience in
a different part of Europe how even the best military
intentions were greatly restricted by geographical factors.
He could, therefore, imagine that in the case of a new
conflict a sort of resistance cell would be formed
Page 240
in Sweden and Finland, which would furnish air bases to
England or even America. This would force Germany to
intervene. He (the Fhrer) would, however, do this only
reluctantly. He had already mentioned yesterday that the
necessity for intervention would perhaps also arise in
Salonika, and the case of Salonika was entirely sufficient
for him. He had no interest in being forced to become active
in the North too. He repeated that entirely different results
could be achieved in future collaboration between the two
countries and that Russia would after all, on the basis of
the peace, receive everything that in her opinion was due
her. It would perhaps be only a matter of six months or a
year's delay. Besides, the Finnish Government had just sent a
note in which it gave assurance of the closest and
friendliest cooperation with Russia.
Molotov replied that the deeds did not always correspond
with the words, and he persisted in the opinion which he had
previously expressed: that peace in the Baltic Sea region
could be absolutely insured, if perfect understanding were
attained between Germany and Russia in the Finnish matter.
Under those circumstances he did not understand why Russia
should postpone the realization of her wishes for six months
or a year. After all, the German-Russian agreement contained
no time limits, and the hands of none of the partners were
tied in their spheres of influence.
With a reference to the changes made in the agreement at
Russia's request, the Fhrer stated that there must not be
any war in the Baltic. A Baltic conflict would be a heavy
strain on German-Russian relations and on the great
collaboration of the future. In his opinion, however, future
collaboration was more important than the settlement of
secondary issues at this very moment.
Molotov replied that it was not a matter of war in the
Baltic, but of the question of Finland and its settlement
within the framework of the agreement of last year. In reply
to a question of the Fhrer he declared that he imagined this
settlement on the same scale as in Bessarabia and in the
adjacent countries, and he requested the Fhrer to give his
opinion on that.
When the Fhrer replied that he could only repeat that
there must be no war with Finland, because such a conflict
might have far-reaching repercussions, Molotov stated that a
new factor had been introduced into the discussion by this
position, which was not expressed in the treaty of last year.
The Fhrer replied that during the Russo-Finnish War,
despite the danger that in connection with it Allied bases
might be established
Page 241
in Scandinavia, Germany had meticulously kept her obligations
toward Russia and had always advised Finland to give in.
In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed
out that Germany had even gone so far as to deny to the
Finnish President the use of a German cable for a radio
address to America.
Then the Fhrer went on to explain that just as Russia
at the time had pointed out that a partition of Poland might
lead to a strain on German-Russian relations, he now declared
with the same frankness that a war in Finland would represent
such a strain on German-Russian relations, and he asked the
Russians to show exactly the same understanding in this
instance as he had shown a year ago in the issue of Poland.
Considering the genius of Russian diplomacy, ways and means
could certainly be found to avoid such a war.
Molotov replied that he could not understand the German
fear that a war might break out in the Baltic. Last year,
when the international situation was worse for Germany than
now, Germany had not raised this issue. Quite apart from the
fact that Germany had occupied Denmark. Norway, Holland, and
Belgium, she had completely defeated France and even believed
that she had already conquered England. He (Molotov) did not
see where under those circumstances the danger of war in the
Baltic Sea should come from. He would have to request that
Germany take the same stand as last year. If she did that
unconditionally, there would certainly be no complications in
connection with the Finnish issue. However, if she made
reservations, a new situation would arise which would then
have to be discussed.
In reply to the statements of Molotov regarding the
absence of military danger in the Finnish question, the
Fhrer stressed that he too had some understanding of
military matters, and he considered it entirely possible that
the United States would get a foothold in those regions in
case of participation by Sweden in a possible war. He (the
Fhrer) wanted to end the European War, and he could only
repeat that in view of the uncertain attitude of Sweden a new
war in the Baltic would mean a strain on German-Russian
relations with unforeseeable consequences. Would Russia
declare war on the United States, in case the latter should
intervene in connection with the Finnish conflict?
When Molotov replied that this question was not of
present interest, the Fhrer replied that it would be too
late for a decision when it became so. When Molotov then
declared that he did not see any indication of the outbreak
of war in the Baltic, the Fhrer replied that in that
Page 242
case everything would be in order anyway and the whole
discussion was really of a purely theoretical nature.
Summarizing, the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that
(1) the Fhrer had declared that Finland remained in the
sphere of influence of Russia and that Germany would not
maintain any troops there;
(2) Germany had nothing to do with demonstrations of
Finland against Russia, but was exerting her influence in the
opposite direction, and
(3) the collaboration of the two countries was the
decisive problem of long-range importance, which in the past
had already resulted in great advantages for Russia, but
which in the future would show advantages compared with which
the matters that had just been discussed would appear
entirely insignificant. There was actually no reason at all
for making an issue of the Finnish question. Perhaps it was a
misunderstanding only. Strategically, all of Russia's wishes
had been satisfied by her peace treaty with Finland.
Demonstrations in a conquered country were not at all
unnatural, and if perhaps the transit of German troops had
caused certain reactions in the Finnish population they would
disappear with the end of those troop transits. Hence, if one
considered matters realistically, there were no differences
between Germany and Russia.
The Fhrer pointed out that both sides agreed in
principle that Finland belonged to the Russian sphere of
influence. Instead, therefore, of continuing a purely
theoretical discussion, they should rather turn to more
important problems.
After the conquest of England the British Empire would
be apportioned as a gigantic world-wide estate in bankruptcy
of 40 million square kilometers. In this bankrupt estate
there would be for Russia access to the ice-free and really
open ocean. Thus far, a minority of 40 million Englishmen had
ruled 600 million inhabitants of the British Empire. He was
about to crush this minority. Even the United States was
actually doing nothing but picking out of this bankrupt
estate a few items particularly suitable to the United
States. Germany, of course, would like to avoid any conflict
which would divert her from her struggle against the heart of
the Empire, the British Isles. For that reason, he (the
Fhrer) did not like Italy's war against Greece, as it
diverted forces to the periphery instead of concentrating
them against England at one point. The same would occur
during a Baltic war. The conflict with England would be
fought to the last ditch, and he had no doubt that the defeat
of the British Isles would
Page 243
lead to the dissolution of the Empire. It was a chimera to
believe that the Empire could possibly be ruled and held
together from Canada. Under those circumstances there arose
world-wide perspectives. During the next few weeks they would
have to be settled in joint diplomatic negotiations with
Russia, and Russia's participation in the solution of these
problems would have to be arranged. All the countries which
could possibly be interested in the bankrupt estate would
have to stop all controversies among themselves and concern
themselves exclusively with the partition of the British
Empire. This applied to Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and
Japan.
Molotov replied that he had followed the arguments of
with interest and that he was in agreement with everything
that he had understood. However, he could comment thereon
less than the Fhrer, since the latter had surely thought
more about these problems and formed more concrete opinions
regarding them. The main thing was first to make up their
minds regarding German-Russian collaboration, in which Italy
and Japan could be included later on. In this connection
nothing should be changed that had been started rather, they
should only contemplate a continuation of what had been
begun.
The Fhrer mentioned here that the further efforts in
the sense of the opening up of great prospects would not be
easy and emphasized in this connection that Germany did not
want to annex France as the Russians appeared to assume. He
wanted to create a world coalition of interested powers which
would consist of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Soviet
Russia, and Japan and would to a certain degree represent a
coalition-extending from North Africa to Eastern Asia-of all
those who wanted to be satisfied out of the British bankrupt
estate. To this end all internal controversies between the
members of this coalition must be removed or at least
neutralized. For this purpose the settlement of a whole
series of questions was necessary. In the West, i. e. between
Spain, France, Italy, and Germany, he believed he had now
found a formula which satisfied everybody alike. It had not
been easy to reconcile the views of Spain and France for
instance, in regard to North Africa; however, recognizing the
greater future possibilities, both countries finally had
given in. After the West was thus settled, an agreement in
the East must now be reached. In this case it was not a
matter of relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey only,
but also of the Greater Asian Sphere. The latter consisted
not only of the Greater East Asian Sphere, but also of a
purely Asiatic area oriented toward the south, that Germany
even now recognized as Russia's sphere of influence. It was a
matter of
Page 244
determining in bold outlines the boundaries for the future
activity of peoples and of assigning to nations large areas
where they could find an ample field of activity for fifty to
a hundred years.
Molotov replied that the Fhrer had raised a number of
questions which concerned not only Europe but, beyond that,
other territories too. He wanted to discuss first a problem
closer to Europe, that of Turkey. As a Black Sea power, the
Soviet Union was tied up with a number of countries. In this
connection there was still an unsettled question that was
just now being discussed by the Danube Commission. Moreover,
the Soviet Union had expressed its dissatisfaction to Rumania
that the latter had accepted the guarantee of Germany and
Italy without consultation with Russia. The Soviet Government
had already explained its position twice, and it was of the
opinion that the guarantee was aimed against the interests of
Soviet Russia, "if one might express oneself so bluntly."
Therefore, the question had arisen of revoking this
guarantee. To this the Fhrer had declared that for a certain
time it was necessary and its removal therefore impossible.
This affected the interests of the Soviet Union as a Black
Sea power.
Molotov then came to speak of the Straits, which,
referring to the Crimean War and the events of the years 1918-
19, he called England's historic gateway for attack on the
Soviet Union. The situation was all the more menacing to
Russia, as the British had now gained a foothold in Greece.
For reasons of security the relations between Soviet Russia
and other Black Sea powers were of great importance. In this
connection Molotov asked the Fhrer what Germany would say if
Russia gave Bulgaria, that is, the independent country
located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under exactly the
same conditions as Germany and Italy had given one to
Rumania. Russia, however, intended to agree beforehand on
this matter with Germany and, if possible, with Italy too.
To a question by Molotov regarding the German position
on the question of the Straits, the Fhrer replied that the
Reich Foreign Minister had already considered this point and
that he had envisaged a revision of the Montreux Convention
in favor of the Soviet Union.
The Reich Foreign Minister confirmed this and stated
that the Italians also took a benevolent attitude on the
question of this revision.
Molotov again brought up the guarantee to Bulgaria and
gave the assurance that the Soviet Union did not intend to
interfere in the internal order of the country under any
circumstances. "Not a hairs-breadth" would they deviate from
this.
Page 245
Regarding Germany's and Italy's guarantee to Rumania,
the Fhrer stated that this guarantee had been the only
possibility of inducing Rumania to cede Bessarabia to Russia
without a fight. Besides, because of her oil wells, Rumania
represented an absolute German-Italian interest, and, lastly,
the Rumanian Government itself had asked that Germany assume
the air and ground protection of the oil region, since it did
not feel entirely secure from attacks by the English.
Referring to a threat of invasion by the English at Salonika,
the Fhrer repeated in this connection that Germany would not
tolerate such a landing, but he gave the assurance that at
the end of the war all German soldiers would be withdrawn
from Rumania.
In reply to Molotov's question regarding Germany's
opinion on a Russian guarantee to Bulgaria, the Fhrer
replied that if this guarantee was to be given under the same
conditions as the German-Italian guarantee to Rumania, the
question would first arise whether Bulgaria herself had asked
for a guarantee. He (the Fhrer) did not know of any request
by Bulgaria. Besides, he would, of course, have to inquire
about the position of Italy before he himself could make any
statement.
However, the decisive question was whether Russia saw a
chance to gain sufficient security for her Black Sea
interests through a revision of the Montreux Convention. He
did not expect an immediate answer to this question, since he
knew that Molotov would first have to discuss these matters
with Stalin.
Molotov replied that Russia had only one aim in this
respect. She wanted to be secure from an attack by way of the
Straits and would like to settle this question with Turkey; a
guarantee given to Bulgaria would alleviate the situation. As
a Black Sea power Russia was entitled to such security and
believed that she would be able to come to an understanding
with Turkey in regard thereto.
The Fhrer replied that this would conform approximately
with Germany's views, according to which only Russian
warships might pass freely through the Dardanelles, while the
Straits would be closed to all other warships.
Molotov added that Russia wanted to obtain a guarantee
against an attack on the Black Sea via the Straits not only
on paper but "in reality" and believed that she could reach
an agreement with Turkey in regard thereto. In this
connection he came back again to the question of the Russian
guarantee to Bulgaria and repeated that the internal regime
of the country would remain unaffected, whereas on the
Page 246
other hand Russia was prepared to guarantee Bulgaria an
outlet to the Aegean Sea. He was again addressing to the
Fhrer-as the one who was to decide on the entire German
policy-the question as to what position Germany would take
with regard to this Russian guarantee.
The Fhrer replied with a counter-question as to whether
the Bulgarians had actually asked for a guarantee, and he
again stated that he would have to ask the Duce for his
opinion.
Molotov stressed that he was not asking the Fhrer for a
final decision, but that he was asking only for a provisional
expression of opinion.
The Fhrer replied that he could not under any
circumstances take a position before he had talked with the
Duce, since Germany was interested in the matter only
secondarily. As a great Danubian power, she was interested
only in the Danube River, but not in the passage into the
Black Sea. For if she were perchance looking for sources of
friction with Russia, she would not need the Straits for
that.
The talk then turned again to the great plans for
collaboration between the powers interested in the British
Empire's bankrupt estate. The Fhrer pointed out that he was
not, of course, absolutely sure whether these plans could be
carried out. In case it was not possible, a great historical
opportunity would be missed, at any rate. All these questions
would perhaps have to be examined again in Moscow by the
Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy, and Japan together with
Herr Molotov, after they had been appropriately prepared
through diplomatic channels.
At this point in the conversation the Fhrer called
attention to the late hour and stated that in view of the
possibility of English air attacks it would be better to
break off the talk now, since the main issues had probably
been sufficiently discussed.
Summarizing, he stated that subsequently the
possibilities of safeguarding Russia's interests as a Black
Sea power would have to be examined further and that in
general Russia's further wishes with regard to her future
position in the world would have to be considered.
In a closing remark Molotov stated that a number of
important and new questions had been raised for Soviet
Russia. The Soviet Union, as a powerful country, could not
keep aloof from the great issues in Europe and Asia.
Finally he came to speak of Russo-Japanese relations,
which had recently improved. He anticipated that the
improvement would con-
Page 247
tinue at a still faster pace and thanked the Reich Government
for its efforts in this direction.
Concerning Sino-Japanese relations, it was certainly the
task of Russia and Germany to attend to their settlement. But
an honorable solution would have to be assured for China, all
the more since Japan now stood a chance of getting
"Indonesia."
SCHMIDT
BERLIN, November 15, 1940.
*****
Frames 136-153, serial F 18
Memorandum of the Final Conversation Between Reich Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop and the Chairman of the council
of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Herr Molotov, on November
13, 1940
SECRET
RM 42/40
Duration of conversation: 9:46 p. m. until 12 midnight.
Because of the air raid alert that had been ordered,
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop and Herr
Molotov went into the Reich Foreign Minister's air raid
shelter after the supper at the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at
9:40 p. m. on November 13, 1940, in order to conduct the
final conversation.
The Reich Foreign Minister opened the conversation with
the statement that he wanted to take the opportunity to
supplement and give more specific form to what had been
discussed thus far. He wanted to explain to Herr Molotov his
conception of the possibility of establishing a joint policy
of collaboration between Germany and the Soviet Union for the
future and to enumerate the points which he had in mind in
this connection. He had to stress explicitly however, that
this was merely a matter of ideas which were still rather
rough, but which might perhaps be realized at some time in
the future. By and large, it was a matter of achieving future
collaboration between the countries of the Tripartite Pact-
Germany, Italy, and Japan-and the Soviet Union, and he
believed that first a way must be found to define in bold
outlines the spheres of influence of these four countries and
to reach an understanding on the problem of Turkey. From the
very beginning it was clear in this connection that the
problem of the delimitation of the spheres of influence
concerned all
Page 248
four countries, whereas only the Soviet Union, Turkey, Italy,
and Germany were interested in the settlement of the Straits
question. He conceived the future developments as follows:
Herr Molotov would discuss with Herr Stalin the issues raised
in Berlin; then, by means of further conversations, an
agreement could be reached between the Soviet Union and
Germany; thereupon the Reich Foreign Minister would approach
Italy and Japan in order to find out how their interests with
respect to the delimitation of spheres of influence could be
reduced to a common formula. He had already approached Italy
as to Turkey. The further modus procedendi between Italy, the
Soviet Union, and Germany would be to exert influence upon
Turkey in the spirit of the wishes of the three countries. If
they succeeded in reducing the interests of the four
countries concerned to a common denominator-which, given good
will, was entirely possible-it would undoubtedly work to the
advantage of all concerned. The next step would consist in
attempting to record both sets of issues in confidential
documents. If the Soviet Union entertained a similar view,
that is, would be willing to work against the extension, and
for the early termination of the war (the Reich Foreign
Minister believed that Herr Molotov had indicated his
willingness in the previous discussions), he had in mind as
the ultimate objective an agreement for collaboration between
the countries of the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union. He
had drafted the contents of this agreement in outline form
and he would like to inform Herr Molotov of them today,
stressing in advance that he had not discussed these issues
so concretely either with Japan or with Italy. He considered
it necessary that Germany and the Soviet Union settle the
issues first. This was not by any means a matter of a German
proposal, but-as already mentioned-one of still rather rough
ideas, which would have to be deliberated by both parties and
discussed between Molotov and Stalin. It would be advisable
to pursue the matter further, particularly in diplomatic
negotiations with Italy and Japan, only if the question had
been settled as between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Then the Reich Foreign Minister informed Herr Molotov of
the contents of the agreement outlined by him in the
following words:
The Governments of the states of the Three Power Pact
Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one side, and the Government
of the U. S. S. R. on the other side, motivated by the desire
to establish in their natural boundaries an order serving the
welfare of all peoples concerned and to create a firm and
enduring foundation for their common labors toward this goal,
have agreed upon the following:
Page 249
Article 1
In the Three Power Pact of September 27, 1940, Germany,
Italy, and Japan agreed to oppose the extension of the war
into a world conflict with all possible means and to
collaborate toward an early restoration of world peace. They
expressed their willingness to extend their collaboration to
nations in other parts of the world which are inclined to
direct their efforts along the same course as theirs. The
Soviet Union declares that it concurs in these aims and is on
its part determined to cooperate politically in this course
with the Three Powers.
ARTICLE 2
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to
respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far
as these spheres of influence come into contact with each
other, they will constantly consult each other in an amicable
way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.
ARTICLE 3
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to
join no combination of powers and to support no combination
of powers which is directed against one of the Four Powers.
The Four Powers will assist each other in economic
matters in every way and will supplement and extend the
agreements existing among themselves.
The Reich Foreign Minister added that this agreement was
intended for a period of ten years, with the provision that
the Governments of the Four Powers, before the expiration of
this term were to reach an understanding regarding the matter
of an extension of the agreement.
The agreement itself would be announced to the public.
Beyond that, with reference to the above-mentioned agreement,
a confidential (secret) agreement could be concluded-in a
form still to be determined-establishing the focal points in
the territorial aspirations of the Four Countries.
As to Germany, apart from the territorial revisions to
be made in Europe at the conclusion of the peace, her
territorial aspirations centered in the Central African
region.
The territorial aspirations of Italy, apart from the
European territorial revisions to be made at the conclusion
of the peace, centered in North and Northeast Africa.
The aspirations of Japan would still have to be
clarified through diplomatic channels. Here too, a
delimitation could easily be found, possibly by fixing a line
which would run south of the Japanese home islands and
Manchukuo.
Page 250
The focal points in the territorial aspirations of the
Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the
territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian
Ocean.
Such a confidential agreement could be supplemented by
the statement that the Four Powers concerned, except for the
settlement of individual issues, would respect each other's
territorial aspirations and would not oppose their
realization.
The above-mentioned agreements could be supplemented by
a second secret protocol, to be concluded between Germany,
Italy, and the Soviet Union. This second secret protocol
could perhaps read that Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union,
on the occasion of the signing of the agreement between
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were agreed that
it was in their common interest to release Turkey from her
previous ties and win her progressively to a political
collaboration with them.
They declare that they would pursue this aim in close
contact with each other, in accordance with a procedure to be
established.
Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union would jointly exert
their influence to the end that the Straits Convention of
Montreux, presently in force, would be replaced by another
convention which would accord to the Soviet Union the
unrestricted right of passage through the Straits for her
warships at any time, whereas all other powers except the
other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy,
would renounce in principle the right of passage through the
Straits for their warships. Transit through the Straits for
merchant ships would, of course, have to remain free in
principle.
In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister stated as
follows:
The German Government would welcome it if the Soviet
Union were prepared for such collaboration with Italy, Japan,
and Germany. This matter was to be clarified in the near
future by the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der
Schulenburg, and the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. In
conformity with the statement contained in Herr Stalin's
letter, that he was not adverse to a fundamental examination
of the question, which had been confirmed by Herr Molotov
during his stay in Berlin, a conference of the Foreign
Ministers of Germany, Italy, and Japan for the purpose of
signing such an agreement might be envisaged as the ultimate
goal. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, was of course aware
that such questions required careful examination; he did not,
therefore, expect any answer from Herr Molotov today, but he
was happy to have had the opportunity to inform Herr Molotov
in this slightly
Page 251
more concrete form of the thoughts that had recently been
motivating Germany. Furthermore, he wished to tell Herr
Molotov the following:
As Herr Molotov knew, he (the Reich Foreign Minister)
had always shown a particular interest in the relations
between Japan and the Soviet Union. He would appreciate it if
Herr Molotov could say what the state of these relations was
at the present time. As far as the German Government was
informed, Japan was anxious to conclude a non-aggression
treaty. It was not his intention to interfere in matters
which did not directly concern him, but he believed that it
would be useful if this question were also discussed between
him and Molotov. If a mediating influence on the part of
Germany were desired, he would be glad to undertake this
office. To be sure, he still clearly recalled Herr Stalin's
remark, when Herr Stalin said that he knew the Asiatics
better than Herr von Ribbentrop did. Nevertheless, he wished
to mention that the willingness of the Japanese Government to
come to a broad understanding with the Soviet Union was known
to him. He also had the impression that if the non-aggression
pact materialized the Japanese would be prepared to settle
all other issues in a generous manner. He wished to stress
explicitly that Japan had not asked the German Government to
mediate. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, was, however,
informed of the state of affairs, and he knew that, in case
of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, Japan would be
willing to recognize the Russian spheres of influence in
Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, provided an understanding with
China were reached. An agreement could also be reached on
possible Soviet aspirations in the direction of British
India, if an understanding were reached between the Soviet
Union and the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government was
disposed to meet the Soviet wishes half-way in regard to the
oil and coal concessions on Sakhalin Island, but it would
first have to overcome resistance at home. This would be
easier for the Japanese Government if a non-aggression pact
were first concluded with the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the
possibility would undoubtedly arise for an understanding on
all other points also.
The Reich Foreign Minister concluded by requesting Herr
Molotov to inform him of his views on the issues presented by
him.
Herr Molotov replied that, concerning Japan, he had the
hope and conviction that they would now make more progress on
the road to understanding than had previously been the case.
Relations with Japan had always been fraught with
difficulties and reverses. Never-
Page 252
theless, there now seemed to be prospects of an
understanding. The Japanese Government had suggested the
conclusion of a non-aggression treaty to the Soviet
Government-in fact, even before the change of government in
Japan-in which connection the Soviet Government had put a
number of questions to the Japanese Government. At present,
the answer to these questions had not yet been received. Only
when it arrived could negotiations be entered into-
negotiations which could not be separated from the remaining
complex of questions. The solution of the problem would
therefore require some time.
As for Turkey, the Soviet Union assumed that they would
have to reach an understanding with Turkey on the Straits
question first of all. Germany and the Soviet Union were
agreed that the Convention of Montreux was worthless. For the
Soviet Union, as the most important Black Sea power, it was a
matter of obtaining effective guarantees of her security. In
the course of her history, Russia had often been attacked by
way of the Straits. Consequently paper agreements would not
suffice for the Soviet Union; rather, she would have to
insist on effective guarantees of her security. Therefore,
this question had to be examined and discussed more
concretely. The questions which interested the Soviet Union
in the Near East, concerned not only Turkey, but Bulgaria,
for instance, about which he, Molotov, had spoken in detail
in his previous conversation with the Fhrer. But the fate of
Rumania and Hungary was also of interest to the Soviet Union
and could not be immaterial to her under any circumstances.
It would further interest the Soviet Government to learn what
the Axis contemplated with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece,
and, likewise, what Germany intended with regard to Poland.
He recalled the fact that, regarding the future form of
Poland, a Protocol existed between the Soviet Union and
Germany for the implementation of which an exchange of
opinion was necessary. He asked whether from the German view-
point this Protocol was still in force. The Soviet Government
was also interested in the question of Swedish neutrality,
and he wanted to know whether the German Government still
took the stand that the preservation of Swedish neutrality
was in the interest of the Soviet Union and Germany. Besides,
there existed the question of the passages out of the Baltic
Sea (Store Belt, Lille Belt, Oeresund, Kattegat, Skagerrak).
The Soviet Government believed that discussions must be held
regarding this question similar to those now being conducted
concerning the Danube Commissions. As to the Finnish
question, it was sufficiently clarified
Page 253
during his previous conversations with the Fhrer. He would
appreciate it if the Reich Foreign Minister would comment on
the foregoing questions, because this would facilitate the
clarification of all other questions which Herr von
Ribbentrop had previously raised.
In his answer the Reich Foreign Minister stated that he
had no comment to make on the Bulgarian question, other than
what the Fhrer had already told Herr Molotov; that, first,
it would have to be determined whether Bulgaria desired a
guarantee at all from the Soviet Union, and that, moreover,
the German Government could not take a stand on this question
without previously consulting Italy. On all other questions
he felt he had been "queried too closely" ["berfragt"], by
Herr Molotov. As to the preservation of Sweden's neutrality,
we were just as much interested in it as the Soviet Union. As
to the passages out of the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea was at
present an inland sea, where we were interested in the
maintenance of the free movement of shipping. Outside of the
Baltic Sea, however, there was war. The time was not yet ripe
for discussing the new order of things in Poland. The Balkan
issue had already been discussed extensively in the
conversations. In the Balkans we had solely an economic
interest, and we did not want England to disturb us there.
The granting of the German guarantee to Rumania had
apparently been misconstrued by Moscow. He wanted to repeat
again, therefore, that at that time it was a matter of
averting a clash between Hungary and Rumania through quick
action. If he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had not intervened
at that time, Hungary would have marched against Rumania. On
the other hand, Rumania could not have been induced to cede
so much territory, if the Rumanian Government had not been
strengthened by the territorial guarantee. In all its
decisions, the German Government was guided solely by the
endeavor to preserve peace in the Balkans and to prevent
England from gaining a foothold there and from interfering
with supplies to Germany. Thus our action in the Balkans was
motivated exclusively by the circumstances of our war against
England. As soon as England conceded her defeat and asked for
peace, German interests in the Balkans would be confined
exclusively to the economic field, and German troops would be
withdrawn from Rumania. Germany had-as the Fhrer had
repeatedly declared-no territorial interests in the Balkans.
He could only repeat again and again that the decisive
question was whether the Soviet Union was prepared and in a
position to cooperate with us in the great liquidation of the
British Empire. On
Page 254
all other questions we would easily reach an understanding if
we could succeed in extending our relations and in defining
the spheres of influence. Where the spheres of influence lay
had been stated repeatedly. It was therefore-as the Fhrer
had so clearly put it-a matter of the interests of the Soviet
Union and Germany requiring that the partners stand not
breast to breast but back to back, in order to support each
other in the achievement of their aspirations. He would
appreciate it if Herr Molotov would comment on this matter.
Compared to the great basic issues, all others were
completely insignificant and would be settled automatically
as soon as an over-all understanding was reached. In
conclusion, he wished to remind Herr Molotov that the latter
owed him an answer to the question of whether the Soviet
Union was in principle sympathetic to the idea of obtaining
an outlet to the Indian Ocean.
In his reply Molotov stated that the Germans were
assuming that the war against England had already actually
been won. If, therefore, as had been said in another
connection, Germany was waging a life and death struggle
against England, he could only construe this as meaning that
Germany was fighting "for life" and England "for death." As
to the question of collaboration, he quite approved of it,
but he added that they had to come to a thorough
understanding. This idea had also been expressed in Stalin's
letter. A delimitation of the spheres of influence must also
be sought. On this point, however, he (Molotov) could not
take a definitive stand at this time. since he did not know
the opinion of Stalin and of his other friends in Moscow in
the matter. However, he had to state that all these great
issues of tomorrow could not be separated from the issues of
today and the fulfillment of existing agreements. The things
that were started must first be completed before they
proceeded to new tasks. The conversations which he-Molotov-
had had in Berlin had undoubtedly been very useful, and he
considered it appropriate that the questions raised should
now be further dealt with through diplomatic channels by way
of the ambassadors on either side.
Thereupon Herr Molotov cordially bade farewell to the
Reich Foreign Minister, stressing that he did not regret the
air raid alarm, because he owed to it such an exhaustive
conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.
HILGER
Moscow, November 18, 1940.
Page 255
*****
Frames 177500-177501, serial 273
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to All German Diplomatic Missions and the Offices in Paris
and Brussels
[Circular telegram]
Multex 425
BERLIN, November 15, 1940.
The conversations between the German and the Soviet-
Russian Governments on the occasion of the presence of
Molotov in Berlin were conducted on the basis of the treaties
concluded last year and resulted in complete agreement
regarding the firm determination of both countries to
continue in the future the policy inaugurated by these
treaties. Beyond that, they served the purpose of
coordinating the policy of the Soviet Union with the policy
of the Tripartite Pact. As already expressed in the final
communiqu‚ regarding the visit of Molotov, this exchange of
views took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and
resulted in agreement by both sides on all important
questions of interest to Germany and the Soviet Union. This
result clearly proves that all conjectures regarding alleged
German-Russian conflicts are in the realm of fantasy and that
all speculations of the foe as to a disturbance in the German-
Russian relationship of trust and friendship are based on
self-deception.
This is particularly stressed by the friendly visit of
Molotov in Berlin. [This sentence added in Ribbentrop's
handwriting.]
Same text to all missions.
Please acknowledge receipt.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 183883-183889, serial 292
Draft [3]
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE THREE POWER PACT,
GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN, ON THE ONE SIDE, AND THE
SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER SIDE
The Governments of the states of the Three Power Pact,
Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one side,
and
the Government of the U. S. S. R. on the other side,
motivated by the desire to establish in their natural spheres
of influ-
[3] This draft was found in the secret files of the German
Embassy in Moscow. It bears no date, apparently it formed the
basis for Schulenburg's conversation with Molotov reported on
November 26, 1940.
Page 256
ence in Europe, Asia, and Africa a new order serving the
welfare of all peoples concerned and to create a firm and
enduring foundation for their common labors toward this goal,
have agreed upon the following:
ARTICLE I
In the Three Power Pact of Berlin, of September 27,
1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to oppose the
extension of the war into a world conflict with all possible
means and to collaborate toward an early restoration of world
peace. They expressed their willingness to extend their
collaboration to nations in other parts of the world which
are inclined to direct their efforts along the same course as
theirs. The Soviet Union declares that it concurs in these
aims of the Three Power Pact and is on its part determined to
cooperate politically in this course with the Three Powers.
ARTICLE II
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to
respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far
as these spheres of interest come into contact with each
other, they will constantly consult each other in an amicable
way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.
Germany, Italy, and Japan declare on their part that
they recognize the present extent of the possessions of the
Soviet Union and will respect it.
ARTICLE III
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to
join no combination of powers and to support no combination
of powers which is directed against one of the Four Powers.
The Four Powers will assist each other in economic
matters in every way and will supplement and extend the
agreements existing among themselves.
ARTICLE IV
This agreement shall take effect upon signature and
shall continue for a period of ten years. The Governments of
the Four Powers shall consult each other in due time, before
the expiration of that period, regarding the extension of the
agreement.
Done in four originals, in the German, Italian,
Japanese, and Russian languages.
Moscow, 1940.
Page 257
Draft
SECRET PROTOCOL No. 1
Upon the signing today of the Agreement concluded among
them, the Representatives of Germany, Italy, Japan and the
Soviet Union declare as follows:
1) Germany declares that, apart from the territorial
revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of
peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories
of Central Africa.
2) Italy declares that, apart from the territorial
revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of
peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories
of Northern and Northeastern Africa.
3) Japan declares that her territorial aspirations
center in the area of Eastern Asia to the south of the Island
Empire of Japan.
4) The Soviet Union declares that its territorial
aspirations center south of the national territory of the
Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.
The Four Powers declare that, reserving the settlement
of specific questions, they will mutually respect these
territorial aspirations and will not oppose their
achievement.
Moscow, on ....
Draft
SECRET PROTOCOL No. 2 TO BE CONCLUDED AMONG GERMANY, ITALY,
AND THE SOVIET UNION
On the occasion of the signing today of the Agreement
among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the
Representatives of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union
declare as follows:
1) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree in the
view that it is in their common interest to detach Turkey
from her existing international commitments and progressively
to win her over to political collaboration with themselves.
They declare that they will pursue this aim in close
consultation, in accordance with a common line of action
which is still to be determined.
2) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union declare their
agreement to conclude, at a given time, a joint agreement
with Turkey, wherein the Three Powers would recognize the
extent of Turkey's possessions.
3) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union will work in
common toward the replacement of the Montreux Straits
Convention now in
Page 258
force by another convention. By this convention the Soviet
Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of
its navy through the Straits at any time, whereas all other
Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including
Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the right of
passage through the Straits for their naval vessels. The
passage of commercial vessels through the Straits would, of
course, have to remain free in principle.
Moscow, 1940.
*****
Frames 112669-112670, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, November 26, 1940-5:34 a. m.
Received November 26, 1940-8:50 a. m.
VERY SECRET
No. 2362 of November 20
For the Reich Minister in person.
Molotov asked me to call on him this evening and in the
presence of Dekanosov stated the following:
The Soviet Government has studied the contents of the
statements of the Reich Foreign Minister in the concluding
conversation on November 13 and takes the following stand:
"The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft
of the Four Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister
outlined in the conversation of November 13, regarding
political collaboration and reciprocal economic [support [4]]
subject to the following conditions:
1) Provided that the German troops are immediately
withdrawn from Finland. which, under the compact of
1939, belongs to the Soviet Union's sphere of
influence. At the same time the Soviet Union
undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with
Finland and to protect German economic interests in
Finland (export of lumber and nickel).
"2) Provided that within the next few months the
security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is
assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance
pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which
geographically is situated inside the security zone
of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union,
and by the establishment of a base for land and
naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-
term lease.
[4] "Untersttzung" in Moscow Embassy draft; garbled in text
as received in Berlin.
Page 259
"3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in
the general direction of the Persian Gulf is
recognized as the center of the aspirations of the
Soviet Union.
"4) Provided that Japan [renounces [5]] her rights to
concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.
"In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the
protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of
influence as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister would
have to be amended so as to stipulate the focal point of the
aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in
the general direction of the Persian Gulf.
"Likewise, the draft of the protocol or agreement
between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to
Turkey should be amended so as to guarantee a base for light
naval and land forces of the U.S.S.R. On [am] the Bosporus
and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including-
in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four
Power Pact-a guarantee of the independence and of the
territory of Turkey by the three countries named.
"This protocol should provide that in case Turkey
refuses to join the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the
Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the
required military and diplomatic measures, and a separate
agreement to this effect should be concluded.
"Furthermore there should be agreement upon:
"a) a third secret protocol between Germany and the
Soviet Union concerning Finland (see Point 1
above).
"b) a fourth secret protocol between Japan and the
Soviet Union concerning the renunciation by Japan
of the oil and coal concession in Northern Sakhalin
(in return for an adequate compensation).
"c) a fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet
Union, and Italy, recognizing that Bulgaria is
geographically located inside the security zone of
the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union and
that it is therefore a political necessity that a
mutual assistance pact be concluded between the
Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which in no way shall
affect the internal regime of Bulgaria, her
sovereignty or independence."
In conclusion Molotov stated that the Soviet proposal
provided five protocols instead of the two envisaged by the
Reich Foreign Minister. He would appreciate a statement of
the German view. [6]
SCHULENBURG
[5] "Verzichtet" in Moscow Embassy draft; omitted in text as
received in Berlin.
[6] The next account of a discussion of the proposed treaty
found in the German Foreign Office files appears in
Ambassador Schulenburg's telegram to the Foreign Office No.
122 of January 17, 1941, post, p. 270.
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