The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Shofar FTP Archive File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.003

Archive/File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.003
Last-Modified: 1997/10/19

Page 79



Frames 221102-221103, serial 439

 The Reich Finance Minister (Schwerin-Krosigk) to the Reich
                      Foreign Minister

ROME, August 23, 1939.

     MY  DEAR  HERR  VON RIBBENTROP: First,  my  cordial  and
sincere  congratulations on the great success  attained  with
the Russian pact.
     This  morning  at  10 o'clock I had a conversation  with
Count  Ciano and in accordance with our agreement I  herewith
report the contents.
     After   the  usual  words  of  salutation  Count   Ciano
immediately  talked  about foreign policy  and  stressed  the
importance of your trip to Russia. Nevertheless, in  case  of
Germany's  intervention in Poland, England and France  would,
in  his  opinion,  immediately participate in  the  war.  The
Ambassadors  of both powers had just confirmed  this  to  him
expressly  and  very seriously. This created a  very  serious
situation.  For  actually the Axis was not  yet  sufficiently
prepared,  above  all, economically. Only in  three  to  four
years-Count  Ciano  corrected himself and  said  with  strong
emphasis "in three years"-would it be ready for war. We would
certainly  have  initial military successes;  but  the  enemy
would  recover  and  would wage a war of  attrition  of  long
duration  along  economic lines. Upon my objection  that  the
Fhrer  was of a different opinion and did not believe  in  a
war  with England and France, Count Ciano replied that he was
aware  of that, but that he was afraid that the Fhrer  would
not  be  proved right this time. Upon my reply  that  it  was
completely  intolerable  for  a  great  nation  to  look   on
passively  any longer at the systematic [mis?]  treatment  of
Germans by Poles, and that therefore a solution of the Polish
problem  was  absolutely necessary and that the whole  German
people  was  of  one mind on that score, Count Ciano  replied
that  a great deal would depend upon the attitude of the Axis
peoples.  For  it  would be necessary to  fight  with  utmost
tenacity, since in case of a defeat we would have to count on
a  peace  which would practically mean the end  of  the  Axis
Powers.  Count  Ciano concluded the conversation  by  stating
that de-

Page 80

spite  the  great diplomatic success of the Russian  pact  he
considered the situation as very serious.
     My audience with the Duce will take place tomorrow at  7
p. m. On Friday morning I shall return to Berlin.
     Heil Hitler

Sincerely yours,

[In handwriting]

     MY  DEAR HERR von WEIZSŽCKER: In view of the absence  of
Herr von Ribbentrop, I am sending, you directly a copy of  my
letter addressed to him.


Frames 78822-78825, serial 147

      Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, August 25, 1939

     DUCE: For some time Germany and Russia have been engaged
in an exchange of views about a new attitude on both sides in
regard to their political relations.
     The  necessity of arriving at some conclusions  of  this
sort was increased by:

     (1)  The  general  situation of  world  politics  as  it
affected both of the Axis Powers.
     (2)  The  necessity  of securing a  clear  statement  of
position  from  the  Japanese Cabinet. Japan  would  probably
agree to an alliance against Russia, which would have only  a
secondary  interest, under the prevailing circumstances,  for
Germany,  and in my opinion, for Italy also. She  would  not,
however, undertake such definite obligations against England,
and  this, from the standpoint not only of Germany, but  also
of  Italy, was of decisive importance. The intention  of  the
military to force the Japanese Government in a short time  to
take  a similarly clear position with respect to England  had
been  stated  months  ago, but had  never  been  realized  in
     (3)  The relation of Germany to Poland, not through  the
blame  of  the  Reich, but as a result  of  the  activity  of
England,  has  become considerably more unsatisfactory  since
spring  and  in  the last few weeks the position  has  become
simply  unbearable. The reports about the persecution of  the
Germans  in  the border areas are not invented press  reports
but  represent  only  a fraction of the terrible  truth.  The
customs  policy  of  Poland, resulting in the  throttling  of
Danzig,  has brought about a complete standstill in  Danzig's
entire economic life for the past several weeks and would  if
it  were  continued for only a brief length of time,  destroy
the city.
     These  grounds  led me to hasten the conclusion  of  the
German-Russian conversations. I have not kept you informed in
detail, Duce,

Page 81

since  I did not have an idea of the possible extent of these
conversations, or any assurance of the possibility  of  their
     The readiness on the part of the Kremlin to arrive at  a
reorientation  of  its relations with Germany,  which  became
apparent  after  the departure of Litvinov, has  become  ever
stronger  in the last few weeks and has made it possible  for
me, after successful preparation, to send my Foreign Minister
to  Moscow for the conclusion of a treaty which is  the  most
extensive  non-aggression pact in existence  and  whose  text
will  be  made public. The pact is unconditional and includes
also  the  obligation  for consultation about  all  questions
affecting  Russia  and Germany. I may tell  you,  Duce,  that
through  these arrangements the favorable attitude of  Russia
in  case of any conflict is assured, and that the possibility
of  the  entry  of  Rumania into such a  conflict  no  longer
     Even  Turkey under these circumstances can only envisage
a  revision of her previous position. But I repeat once more,
that  Rumania is no longer in a situation to take part  in  a
conflict against the Axis! I believe I may say to you,  Duce,
that through the negotiations with Soviet Russia a completely
new  situation in world politics has been produced which must
be regarded as the greatest possible gain for the Axis.
     About the situation on the German-Polish frontier, I can
only inform Your Excellency that we have been for weeks in  a
state  of  alarm, that as a result of the Polish mobilization
German  preparations have naturally also been increased,  and
that  in  case of an intolerable Polish action,  I  will  act
immediately. The assertion of the Polish Government  that  it
is  not  responsible for these inhuman proceedings,  for  the
numerous border incidents (last night alone there were twenty-
one  Polish  border violations), and for the  firing  on  the
German airplanes, which had already received orders to travel
to  East  Prussia  over the sea in order to avoid  incidents,
shows  only  that  the Polish Government  has  its  excitable
soldiery   [Soldateska]  no  longer  under   control.   Since
yesterday  Danzig  has been blockaded  by  Polish  troops,  a
situation which is unendurable. Under these circumstances  no
one  can say what the next hour may bring. I can only  assure
you  there is a limit beyond which I will not be pushed under
any circumstances.
     In  conclusion I can assure you, Duce, that in a similar
situation  I would have complete understanding for Italy  and
that in any such case you can be sure of my attitude.


Page 82

Frames 78820-78821, serial 147

    Letter from Mussolini to Hitler, August 25, 1939 [35]

FšHRER: I am replying to your letter which has just been
delivered to me by Ambassador won Mackensen.
     (1)  Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve  of
that completely. His Excellency Marshal Goring will tell  you
that  in  the  discussion which I had with him last  April  I
stated  that a rapprochement between Germany and  Russia  was
necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.
     (2)  I consider it desirable to try to avoid a break  or
any  deterioration in relations with Japan, since that  would
result  in  Japan's  return  to  a  position  close  to   the
democratic  powers. With this in mind, I have telegraphed  to
Tokyo  and it appears that after the first surprise of public
opinion passed, a better psychological attitude prevails.
     (3)  The  Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can  alter
the  position of Turkey, which accepted the English loan, but
which  has  not  yet  signed the treaty of  alliance.  A  new
attitude  on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic
plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.
     (4)  As regards Poland I have complete understanding for
the  German  position  and for the fact  that  such  strained
relations cannot continue permanently.
     (5) As for the practical position of Italy, in case of a
military collision, my point of view is as follows:
     If  Germany  attacks  Poland and  the  conflict  remains
localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of  political
and economic assistance which is requested.
     If   Germany  attacks,  and  Poland's  allies   open   a
counterattack  against Germany, I want to  let  you  know  in
advance  that  it  would be better if  I  did  not  take  the
initiative  in  military activities in view  of  the  present
situation  of  Italian  war  preparations,  which   we   have
repeatedly previously explained to you, Fhrer, and  to  Herr
von Ribbentrop.
     Our  intervention can, therefore, take place at once  if
Germany delivers to us immediately the military supplies  and
the  raw materials to resist the attack which the French  and
English especially would direct against us.
     At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and
at  such time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in
the air according to the plans which had been arranged.

[35]  Translated from German Foreign Office's translation  of
Italian original.

Page 83

     I  am  also  of  the  opinion that the  purely  military
preparations  which  have  already been  undertaken  and  the
others  which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa  will
serve to immobilize important French and British forces.
     I  consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell
you the whole truth and inform you about the actual situation
in  advance.  Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences
for us all. This is my point of view and since within a short
time  I  must summon the highest governmental bodies  of  the
realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well.


Frames 24058-24061, serial 34

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

W IV 3296


     The German-Soviet Trade Agreement concluded on August 19
covers the following:
     1.  Germany grants the Soviet Union a merchandise credit
of  200 minion Reichsmarks. The financing will be done by the
German  Golddiskontbank. This method of financing includes  a
100  percent guarantee by the Reich. It is a credit based  on
bills of exchange. The bills of exchange are to be drawn  for
each individual transaction and have an average currency of 7
years.  The  interest  is 5 percent.  Under  a  secret  final
protocol, one-half percent of this is refunded to the Russian
special accounts in Berlin, whereby the actual interest  rate
is reduced to 4 1/2 percent.
     2.  The credit will be used to finance Soviet orders  in
Germany.  The Soviet Union will make use of it to  order  the
industrial  products listed in schedule A of  the  agreement.
They  consist  of  machinery  and  industrial  installations.
Machine  tools  up  to  the very largest  dimensions  form  a
considerable  part of the deliveries. And  armaments  in  the
broader sense (such as optical supplies, armor plate and  the
like)  will, subject to examination of every single item,  be
supplied in smaller proportion.
     3.   The  credit  will  be  liquidated  by  Soviet   raw
materials,  which will be selected by agreement  between  the
two  Governments. The annual interest will likewise  be  paid
from  the  proceeds of Soviet merchandise, that is, from  the
special accounts kept in Berlin.

Page 84

     4.  In  order that we might secure an immediate  benefit
from  the credit agreement, it was made a condition from  the
beginning  that the Soviet Union bind itself to the delivery,
starting  immediately, of certain raw  materials  as  current
business.  It  was possible so to arrange these  raw-material
commitments of the Russians that our wishes were largely met.
The  Russian  commitments of raw materials are  contained  in
schedule C. They amount to 180 million Reichsmarks:  half  to
be  delivered in each of the first and second years following
the  conclusion  of  the agreement.  It  is  a  question,  in
particular,  of  lumber,  cotton,  feed  grain,   oil   cake,
phosphate,  platinum, raw furs, petroleum,  and  other  goods
which for us have a more or less gold value.
     5.   Since  these  Soviet  deliveries  made  as  current
business  are to be compensated by German counter-deliveries,
certain  German promises of delivery had to be  made  to  the
Russians.  The German industrial products to be  supplied  in
current  business  as  counter-deliveries  for  Russian   raw
materials are listed in schedule B. This schedule totals  120
million  Reichsmarks  and comprises  substantially  the  same
categories of merchandise as schedule A.
     6.  From  the  welter of difficult questions  of  detail
which arose during the negotiations, the following might also
be  mentioned:  guaranteeing of the rate of exchange  of  the
Reichsmark. The complicated arrangement arrived at appears in
the  confidential protocol signed on August 26 of this  year.
In order not to jeopardize the conclusion of the agreement on
August  19  of  this year, the question was  laid  aside  and
settled afterwards. The questions of the liquidation  of  the
old credits, the shipping clause, an emergency clause for the
event   of   inability  to  deliver  of  either  party,   the
arbitration  procedure, the price clause, etc., were  settled
satisfactorily despite the pressure of time.
     7.  The  agreement,  which has  come  into  being  after
extraordinary difficulties, will undoubtedly give  a  decided
impetus to German-Russian trade. We must try to build anew on
this  foundation and, above all, try to settle  a  number  of
questions  which could not heretofore be settled, because  of
the  low  ebb which had been reached in our trade  relations.
The  framework  now  set up represents a minimum.  Since  the
political climate is favorable, it may well be expected  that
it  will be exceeded considerably in both directions, both in
imports and exports.

Page 85

     8.  Under the agreement, the following movement of goods
can be expected for the next few years:

   Exports to the U.S.S.R.        Imports from the U.S.S.R.
200 million Reichmarks credit     180 mill. RM. raw material
deliveries, schedule "A".          deliveries, schedule "C".
120 mill. RM. deliveries as       200 mill. RM. repayment of
current business, schedule         1935 credit.
                                approx. 100 mill. RM.
                                   capitalized interest from
                                   present and last credit.
X mill. RM. unspecified           X mill. RM. unspecified
deliveries on current              deliveries of Soviet goods
business.                          under German-Soviet Trade
                                   Agreement of Dec. 19,

     The  movement of goods envisaged by the agreement  might
therefore  reach  a total of more than 1 billion  Reichsmarks
for  the  next  few years, not including liquidation  of  the
present  200  minion  credit  by deliveries  of  Russian  raw
materials beginning in 1946.
     9.  Apart  from the economic import of the  treaty,  its
significance  lies  in  the fact that the  negotiations  also
served  to renew political contacts with Russia and that  the
credit  agreement was considered by both sides as  the  first
decisive step in the reshaping of political relations.


BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

Frame 111568, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 2, 1939-5:49 p. m.
Received September 2, 1939-6:10 p. m.

No. 254 of September 2

     With reference to your telegram No. 233 of the 30th  and
No. 241 of the 1st. [36]
     To  my  probing  as  to  whether  Istanbul  rumors  were
correct,   in  accordance  with  which  Turkey  was   already
negotiating with the

[36] Neither printed.

Page 86

Soviet Union, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government  was
actually  engaged in exchange of opinion and was  in  contact
with Turkey.
     After consultation with Stalin, Molotov informed me at a
second  conference at 3 p. m., that there  was  only  a  non-
aggression  pact  between the Soviet  Union  and  Turkey  and
relations  were  good in general; the Soviet  Government  was
prepared  to  work  for  permanent neutrality  of  Turkey  as
desired  by us. Our conception of the position of  Turkey  in
the present conflict was shared by the Soviet Government.
     Please make no use of the above statements of Molotov in
dealing with the Turks.



Frame 69855, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


No. 253 of September 3
BERLIN, September 3, 1939-6:50 p. m.
Received MOSCOW September 4, 1939-12:30 a. m.

     Very   Urgent!  Exclusively  for  Ambassador.   Strictly
secret!   For   Chief   of  Mission  or  his   representative
personally.  Top secret. To be decoded by himself.  Strictest
     We  definitely  expect to have beaten  the  Polish  Army
decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the  area  that
was  established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under
military   occupation.  We  would  naturally,  however,   for
military  reasons, also have to proceed further against  such
Polish  military forces as are at that time  located  in  the
Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.
     Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if  the
Soviet  Union  does  not  consider it desirable  for  Russian
forces  to  move at the proper time against Polish forces  in
the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy
this  territory. In our estimation this would be not  only  a
relief  for  us,  but  also,  in  the  sense  of  the  Moscow
agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.
     In  this  connection  please determine  whether  we  may
discuss  this matter with the officers who have just  arrived
here and what the Soviet Government intends their position to


Page 87


Frames 69848-69849, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 5, 1939-2:30 p. m.

No. 264 of September 5

Reference my telegram No. 261 of September 4. [37]

     Molotov  asked  me  to call on him today  at  12:30  and
transmitted  to  me  the  following  reply  of   the   Soviet

     "We  agree with you that at a suitable time it  will  be
absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We  are
of  the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is
possible  that  we  are mistaken, but it  seems  to  us  that
through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote
unity  among  our  opponents.  We  understand  that  as   the
operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties  might
be  forced  temporarily  to cross  the  line  of  demarcation
between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but  such
cases  must  not  prevent the strict execution  of  the  plan


Frame 111576, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


No. 266 of September 5
Moscow, September 5, 1939-5:02 p. m.
Received September 5, 1939-6 p. m.

Reference your telegram No. 262 of the 4th. [37]

     Today  at 12:30 p. m. I again asked Molotov to have  the
Soviet  Government continue to work on Turkey with a view  to
permanent neutrality. I mentioned that rumors were current to
the  effect  that England was putting pressure on Rumania  to
take  active part and was holding out a prospect of aid  from
British and French troops. Since this aid might come by  sea,
it  was  in the interests of the Soviet Government to prevail
upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely.

[37] Not printed.

Page 88

     Molotov   replied   that  the  Soviet   Government   had
considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it in the
sense  desired by us. Molotov added that there was  only  the
non-aggression  pact  between the Soviet  Union  and  Turkey;
conversations regarding the conclusion of a mutual assistance
pact  had,  it is true, been carried on at one time  but  had
borne no fruit.
     He  would have rumors about Rumania looked into  through
the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest.


Frames 211568-211569, serial 388

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Pol. V 8924
Moscow, September 6, 1939-5:46 p. m.
Received September 6, 1939-8:15 p. m.

No. 279 of September 6

Reference your telegram No. 267 of the 5th. [39]

     Since  anxiety over war, especially the fear of a German
attack,   has  strongly  influenced  the  attitude   of   the
population  here in the last few years, the conclusion  of  a
non-aggression pact with Germany has been generally  received
with  great  relief  and gratification. However,  the  sudden
alteration  in  the  policy of the Soviet  Government,  after
years   of  propaganda  directed  expressly  against   German
aggressors,  is  still  not  very  well  understood  by   the
population.  Especially the statements of official  agitators
to  the effect that Germany is no longer an aggressor run  up
against  considerable doubt. The Soviet Government  is  doing
everything  to  change the attitude of  the  population  here
toward   Germany.  The  press  is  as  though  it  had   been
transformed. Attacks on the conduct of Germany have not  only
ceased  completely, but the portrayal of events in the  field
of  foreign  politics  is based to an outstanding  degree  on
German  reports and anti-German literature has  been  removed
from the book trade, etc.
     The  beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has
powerfully affected public opinion here, and aroused new fear
in  extensive groups that the Soviet Union may be drawn  into
the war. Mistrust sown for years against Germany, in spite of
effective  counter-propaganda which is being  carried  on  in
party  and business gatherings, cannot be so quickly removed.
The fear is expressed by the population

[39] Not printed.  ([38] not used? LWJ)

Page 89

that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against
the  Soviet Union. The recollection of German strength in the
World War is everywhere still lively.
     In  a judgment of conditions here the realization is  of
importance  that the Soviet Government has always  previously
been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude  of
the population in the direction which it has desired, and  it
is  not  being  sparing  this time either  of  the  necessary

Frame 211562, serial 388

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union. (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-12:56 a. m.
Received September 9, 1939-5 a. m.

No. 300 of September 8

     I  have  just  received the following telephone  message
from Molotov:

     "I  have received your communication regarding the entry
of    German   troops   into   Warsaw.   Please   convey   my
congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government.



Frame 69816, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                    Soviet (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, September 9, 1939-12:50 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 9, 1939-12:10 p. m.

No. 300 of September 8

For the Ambassador personally.

Reference your telegram No. 261. [40]

     We  are  of  course in accord with the Soviet Government
that  the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is  not
affected  by  local extension of our military operations.  We
must  and  will defeat the Polish Army wherever we  meet  it.
Nothing  in  the  Moscow  arrangements  is  thereby  altered.
Military   operations  are  progressing   even   beyond   our
expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is

[40] Not printed.

Page 90

more   or  less  in  a  state  of  dissolution.  Under  these
circumstances,  I  consider it urgent  that  you  resume  the
conversation  with Molotov regarding the military  intentions
of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the
Russian  Military Attach‚ to Moscow indicates that  decisions
are  in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak
to  Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and
to wire result.


Frame 69815, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-4:10 p. m.

No. 308 of September 9

Reference your telegram No. 300 of September 8.

     Molotov  told  me  today at 3 p. m.  that  at  a  Soviet
military  action would take place within the next  few  days.
The  summoning of the Military Attach‚ to Moscow was in  fact
connected with it. Numerous reservists would also be called.


Frame 69814, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 9, 1939-8:40 p. m.

No. 310 of September 9

Supplementing my telegram No. 3 of September 9.

     The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General K”string
[41] that the Soviet Union will intervene. Moreover, external
evidence  is multiplying of imminent Soviet military  action:
calling  a large number of reservists up to 40 years of  age,
in    particular    technicians   and   physicians,    sudden
disappearance of important foods, preparation of  schoolrooms
as  hospitals, curtailment in issuance of gasoline,  and  the


[41] Military Attach‚ of the German Embassy in the Soviet

Page 91

Frames 69811-69813, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 10, 1939-9:40 p. m.

No. 317 of September 10

     Supplementing  my telegram No. 310 of  September  9  and
with  reference to telephone conversation of today  with  the
Reich Foreign Minister.
     In  today's  conference at 4 p. m. Molotov modified  his
statement  of yesterday by saying that the Soviet  Government
was  taken  completely by surprise by the unexpectedly  rapid
German  military  successes. In  accordance  with  our  first
communication,  the Red Army had counted  on  several  weeks,
which  had  now  shrunk to a few days.  The  Soviet  military
authorities  were therefore in a difficult situation,  since,
in  view  of conditions here, they required possibly  two  to
three  weeks  more for their preparations. Over three  minion
men were already mobilized.
     I  explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial  speedy
action of the Red Army was at this juncture.
     Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done
to  expedite  matters.  I  got the  impression  that  Molotov
promised more yesterday than the Red Army can live up to.
     Then  Molotov came to the political side of  the  matter
and  stated that the Soviet Government had intended  to  take
the  occasion  of  the further advance of  German  troops  to
declare  that  Poland  was falling  apart  and  that  it  was
necessary  for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to  come  to
the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened"
by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the
Soviet  Union  plausible to the masses and at the  same  time
avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor.
     This  course was blocked for the Soviet Government by  a
DNB report yesterday to the effect that, in accordance with a
statement by Colonel General Brauchitsch, military action was
no  longer necessary on the German eastern border. The report
created  the  impression that a German-Polish  armistice  was
imminent.  If,  however Germany concluded an  armistice,  the
Soviet Union could not start a "new war."
     I stated that I was unacquainted with this report, which
was  not in accordance with the facts. I would make inquiries
at once.


Page 92

Frame 69805, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, September 13, 1939-5:50 p. m.
Received Moscow, September 14, 1939-1:10 a. m.

No. 336 of September 13

For the Ambassador personally.

     As  soon  as  the exact outcome is known  in  the  great
battle in Poland, now approaching its end, we shall be  in  a
position  to give the Red Army the information it  asked  for
regarding the various parts of the Polish Army. But even now,
I  would  ask  you  to inform Herr Molotov  that  his  remark
regarding  Colonel General Brauchitsch's statement was  based
on  a  complete  misunderstanding.  This  statement  referred
exclusively  to the exercise of executive power  in  the  old
territory  of the Reich as regulated before the beginning  of
the German action against Poland, and had nothing whatever to
do  with  a limitation of our military operations toward  the
east on former Polish territory. There can be no question  of
imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland.


Frames 69806-69808, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 14, 1939-6 p. m.

No. 350 of September 14

Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.

     Molotov  summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and  stated  that
the  Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner  than
anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place  sooner
than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram
No.  317  of  September 10). For the political motivation  of
Soviet  action  (the  collapse of Poland  and  protection  of
Russian  "minorities") it was of the greatest importance  not
to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the

Page 93

city  of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that  he
be  informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture  of
Warsaw could be counted on.
     Please send instructions.
     I  would  direct  your attention to today's  article  in
Pravda,  carried by DNB, which will be followed by a  similar
article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare]
the  political  motivation mentioned by  Molotov  for  Soviet


Frames 69788-69790, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, September 15, 1939-8:20 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, September 16, 1939-7:15 a. m.

No. 360 of September 15

For the Ambassador personally.

     I  request  that you communicate the following  to  Herr
Molotov at once:
     1)  The  destruction  of  the  Polish  Army  is  rapidly
approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the
military  situation of September 14 which  has  already  been
communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw  in
the next few days.
     2)  We have already stated to the Soviet Government that
we  consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres  of
influence  agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from  purely
military  operations, and the same applies of course  to  the
future as well.
     3)  From  the  communication made to you by  Molotov  on
September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will  take
a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation
now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves  us
of  the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish
Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also  the
question  is  disposed of in case a Russian intervention  did
not  take place, of whether in the area lying to the east  of
the  German  zone of influence a political vacuum  might  not
occur.  Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking
any  political or administrative activities in  these  areas,
apart from what is made

Page 94

necessary   by   military   operations,   without   such   an
intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might
be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
     4)  For  the  political support of the  advance  of  the
Soviet  Army we propose the publication of a joint communiqu‚
of the following content:

     "In  view of the complete collapse of the previous  form
of  government  in  Poland,  the  Reich  Government  and  the
Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring  to
an  end  the  intolerable political and  economic  conditions
existing in these territories. They regard it as their  joint
duty  to  restore  peace and order in these areas  which  are
naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new  order
by  the  creation  of natural frontiers and  viable  economic

     5)  We  assume in proposing such a communiqu‚  that  the
Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by
Molotov  in  an earlier conversation with you, of taking  the
threat  to  the  Ukrainian and White Russian  populations  by
Germany  as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment  of  a
motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice.
It  would be directly contrary to the true German intentions,
which  are confined exclusively to the realization  of  well-
known  German  spheres  of interest.  It  would  also  be  in
contradiction  to  the  arrangements  made  in  Moscow   and,
finally,  would-in  opposition to  the  desire  for  friendly
relations  expressed  on both sides  expose  the  two  States
before the whole world as enemies.
     6)  Since  the military operations must be concluded  as
soon  as possible because of the advanced season of the year,
we  would be gratified if the Soviet Government would  set  a
day  and  hour on which their army would begin their advance,
so  that  we  on our part might govern ourselves accordingly.
For  the  purpose of the necessary coordination  of  military
operations  on  either  side, it is  also  necessary  that  a
representative  of  each Government, as well  as  German  and
Russian  officers  on  the spot in the  area  of  operations,
should  have a meeting in order to take the necessary  steps,
for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.
     I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in
text  agreed upon by Gaus with Hilger has already been  taken
care of.


Page 95

Frames 69777-69778, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 16, 1939.

No. 371 of September 16

Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.

     I  saw  Molotov  at  6  o'clock today  and  carried  out
instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention  by
the  Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow  or  the
day  after.  Stalin was at present in consultation  with  the
military  leaders  and  he  would this  very  night,  in  the
presence  of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the  Soviet
     Molotov added that he would present my communication  to
his Government but he believed that a joint communiqu‚ was no
longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its
procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed  and  no
longer  existed;  therefore  all  agreements  concluded  with
Poland  were  void; third powers might try to profit  by  the
chaos  which  had arisen; the Soviet Union considered  itself
obligated  to  intervene to protect its Ukrainian  and  White
Russian  brothers and make it possible for these  unfortunate
people to work in peace.
     The  Soviet Government intended to publicize  the  above
train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after
the  Red  Army had crossed the border, and at the  same  time
communicate  it in an official note to the Polish  Ambassador
here and to all the missions here.
     Molotov  conceded  that the projected  argument  of  the
Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German
sensibilities  but  asked  that  in  view  of  the  difficult
situation  of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle  like
this  stand  in  our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately
saw  no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet
Union  had thus far not concerned itself about the plight  of
its  minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in  some
way or other, its present intervention.

Page 96

     In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation
of  what  was  to  become  of Vilna.  The  Soviet  Government
absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and  would,
therefore,  like  to  know whether some  agreement  had  been
reached   with   Lithuania  regarding   the   Vilna   region,
particularly as to who was to occupy the city.


Frames 69772-69773, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, September 17, 1939.

No. 372 of September 17

Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.

     Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence
of  Molotov  and Voroshilov and declared that  the  Red  Army
would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along
the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
     In  order  to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested
that  we see to it that German planes as of today do not  fly
east  of  the  Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg  Line.  Soviet
planes  would  begin  today  to bomb  the  district  east  of
     I  promised  to do my best with regard to informing  the
German  Air Force but asked in view of the little  time  left
that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line  too
closely today.
     The  Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow
or day after tomorrow at the latest.
     Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish
Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in
the course of the day and then published. The note contains a
justification  for the Soviet action. The draft  read  to  me
contained  three points unacceptable to us. In answer  to  my
objections,  Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered  the
text  that  the  note now seems satisfactory for  us.  Stalin
stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqu‚  could
not be considered before two or three days.
     In  future all military matters that come up are  to  be
handled   by   Lieutenant  General  K”string  directly   with


Page 97

Frame 111596, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

Moscow, September 17, 1939-8:23 a. m.
Received September 17, 1939-8:45 a. m.

No. 374 of September 17

Reference your telegram of the 16th, No. 358. [42]

     On the occasion of my visit of today, Stalin informed me
that  the  Turkish  Government had  proposed  to  the  Soviet
Government the conclusion of an assistance pact that  was  to
apply  to the Straits and the Balkans. The Turkish Government
desires  a  pact with a restrictive clause whereby Turkey  in
rendering aid to the Soviet Union would be obligated only  to
such actions as are not directed against England and France.
     The  Soviet  Government is not greatly  edified  by  the
Turkish proposal and is considering proposing a clause to the
Turkish Government to the effect that the Soviet Union on its
part  would  not be obligated to any action directed  against
Germany. Stalin requested our reaction to this idea, but made
it  clearly evident that he considered the conclusion of  the
assistance pact in suitable form as very advantageous,  since
Turkey  would in that case surely remain neutral. Voroshilov,
who was present, added that such a pact would be a "hook"  by
which  Turkey  could  be  pulled away  from  France.  Request


Frame 111597, serial 103

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (Weizs„cker)

BERLIN, September 18, 1939.

     To  the  Office of the Reich Foreign Minister  with  the
request to transmit the following to the train for the  Reich
Foreign Minister:
     Reaction to telegram No. 374 from Moscow regarding Turko-
Russian assistance pact:
     The matter should be discussed openly with the Italians.
If  they  agree the Soviet Government could be told  that  we
concur in the basic idea, but parity would be preserved  only
if the Soviet Government were not obligated to action against
Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.


[42] Not printed.

Page 98

Frame 23373, serial 34

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

Moscow, September 18, 1939-3:59 p. m.
Received September 18, 1939-5:45 P. m.

No. 385 of September 18

     In  the  course  of the conversation which  I  had  this
evening with Stalin about the dispatch of a Soviet commission
to   Bialystok,  as  well  as  the  publication  of  a  joint
communiqu‚,  Stalin  said, somewhat  suddenly,  that  on  the
Soviet  side  there  were certain doubts as  to  whether  the
German  High Command at the appropriate time would  stand  by
the  Moscow agreement and would withdraw to the line that had
been  agreed  upon (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San). I replied  with
emphasis  that  of  course Germany was firmly  determined  to
fulfill the terms of the Moscow agreements precisely,  and  I
referred  to  point  2 of the communication  made  by  me  to
Molotov  on  September 16 in accordance with the instructions
of  the  Reich  Foreign Minister (see  telegram  No.  360  of
September  15  from  there).  I declared  that  it  would  be
suitable  for the High Command to withdraw to the line  which
had been agreed upon since, in this way, troops could be made
available for the western front. Stalin replied that  he  had
no  doubt  at all of the good faith of the German Government.
His  concern  was  based  on  the well-known  fact  that  all
military  men  are loath to give up occupied territories.  At
this  point  the  German  Military Attach‚  here,  Lieutenant
General  K”string, interjected that the German  armed  forces
would do just as the Fhrer ordered. In view of Stalin's well-
known  attitude of mistrust, I would be gratified if  I  were
authorized to make a further declaration of such a nature  as
to remove his last doubts.


Frames 69766-69770, serial 127

  Memorandum by Counselor of Legation Hilger of the German
                 Embassy in the Soviet Union

Re: Publication of joint Soviet-German communiqu‚.

     On September 17 at 3 p. m., the draft of a joint German-
Soviet   communiqu‚   was  transmitted  by   telephone   with
instructions  to obtain the consent of the Soviet  Government
to the publication of such a com-

Page 99

muniqu‚  on September 18. The text of this draft is  enclosed
(enclosure 1).
     On September 17 at 11:30 p. m., the Ambassador submitted
the  draft  to  Herr Molotov for approval. The latter  stated
that he would have to consult with Herr Stalin on the matter.
Herr Stalin, who was called on the telephone by Herr Molotov,
declared that in his opinion, too, a joint communiqu‚ had  to
be  issued, but that he could not entirely agree to the  text
proposed  by us since it presented the facts all too  frankly
[da  es  den Tatbestand mit allzu grosser Offenheit darlege].
Thereupon Herr Stalin wrote out a new draft in his  own  hand
and  asked  that  the  consent of the  German  Government  be
obtained to this new draft. (See enclosure 2.)
     On  September 18 at 12:30 a. m., I communicated to Under
State Secretary Gaus the text of the Soviet draft. Herr  Gaus
stated that he could not of his own accord declare himself on
the  matter  and had to ascertain the decision of  the  Reich
Foreign Minister.
     On  September  18 at 12 o'clock noon, the Chief  of  the
Office  of  the  Minister,  Herr  Kordt,  called  up  on  the
telephone and informed me as follows:

     "We  agree to Russian proposal concerning communiqu‚ and
shall  publish  the communiqu‚ in this form  Tuesday  in  the
morning papers. Ribbentrop."

     I  immediately  transmitted the above  communication  by
telephone to Herr Molotov's secretary.
     On  September  18  at 2:05 p. m., Herr Kordt  called  up
again  and informed Counselor of Embassy von Tippelskirch  as

     "The  communiqu‚ will be published by us in some of  the
evening papers. Please advise the offices concerned."

     I  immediately apprised Herr Molotov's secretary of  the
above-mentioned communication also.
     Two  hours later the text of the communiqu‚ appeared  on
the  teletype  and was also broadcast over the German  short-
wave radio.

Moscow, September 18, 1939.

Herewith most respectfully submitted
to the Ambassador
to the Counselor of Embassy


     On  September 18 at 7:15 p. m., Herr Gaus called up  and
asked whether the communiqu‚ would be published today in  the

Page 100

evening papers. If not, it should be broadcast today over the
Soviet  radio.  The Reich Foreign Minister was  very  anxious
that  this  be done. I told Herr Gaus that today, because  it
was  the Russian Sunday, no evening papers had appeared; that
I  would inform them further regarding the radio. At 8:00  p.
m. I was able to let Herr Gaus know that the Soviet radio had
broadcast the communiqu‚ several times since 4:00 p. m.


                        (Enclosure 1)

          Draft of a Joint German-Soviet Communiqu‚
     In  view of the internal incapacity of the Polish  State
and of the dissension of the populations living in its former
territory, the Reich Government and the Government of the  U.
S.  S.  R.  consider  it necessary to bring  to  an  end  the
intolerable  political  and economic conditions  existing  in
these  territories.  They regard it as their  joint  duty  to
restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of
interest  to  them  and to bring about a  new  order  by  the
creation   of   natural   frontiers   and   viable   economic
                     (Enclosure 2) [43]
     In   order  to  avoid  all  kinds  of  unfounded  rumors
concerning  the  respective aims of  the  German  and  Soviet
forces  which are operating in Poland, the Government of  the
German  Reich and the Government of the U. S. S.  R.  declare
that  the operations of these forces do not involve any  aims
which  are  contrary to the interests of Germany and  of  the
Soviet  Union,  or to the spirit or the letter  of  the  Non-
aggression Pact concluded between Germany and the U. S. S. R.
On  the contrary, the aim of these forces is to restore peace
and order in Poland, which had been destroyed by the collapse
of  the  Polish  State, and to help the Polish population  to
reconstruct the conditions of its political existence.
[43]  A  note  in  Schulenburg's hand reads:  "Stalin  draft.
September 18, '39."
Page 101
Frame 23374, serial 34

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                     Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, September 19, 1939.
(Sent from Special Train September 19-4:37 p. m.)
     For the Ambassador personally.
     Reference your telegram No. 385.
     I request that you tell Herr Stalin that you reported to
Berlin  about your conference with him, and that you are  now
expressly  directed by me to inform him that  the  agreements
which  I  made on the authorization of the Fhrer  at  Moscow
will, of course, be kept, and that they are regarded by us as
the  foundation  stone of the new friendly relations  between
Germany and the Soviet Union.
Frame 111608, serial 103
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office
Moscow, September 20, 1939-2:23 a. m.
Received September 20, 1939-4:55 a. m.

No. 395 of September 19
     Molotov  stated  to me today that the Soviet  Government
now  considered the time ripe for it, jointly with the German
Government,  to establish definitively the structure  of  the
Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original
inclination entertained by the Soviet Government  and  Stalin
personally  to permit the existence of a residual Poland  had
given  way  to the inclination to partition Po]and along  the
Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. The Soviet Government wishes to
commence negotiations on this matter at once, and to  conduct
them in Moscow, since such negotiations must be conducted  on
the  Soviet  side  by  persons in the  highest  positions  of
authority,  who  cannot  leave  the  Soviet  Union.   Request
telegraphic instructions.
Page 102

Frames 69721-69722, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN September 23, 1939-3:40 a. m.
Received Moscow September 23, 1939-11:05 a. m.

No. 417 of September 22
     Reference  your  telegram  No.  295  [395?].   For   the
Ambassador personally.
     We,  too,  consider the time now ripe  to  establish  by
treaty  jointly  with  the Soviet Government  the  definitive
structure  of the Polish area. The Russian idea of  a  border
line  along  the  well-known Four-Rivers  Line  coincides  in
general  with  the view of the Reich Government.  It  was  my
original intention to invite Herr Molotov to Germany in order
to  formulate  this treaty. In view of your report  that  the
leading  personages there cannot leave the Soviet  Union,  we
agree  to  negotiations in Moscow. Contrary  to  my  original
purpose  of  entrusting you with these negotiations,  I  have
decided to fly to Moscow myself. This particularly because-in
view of the full powers granted me by the Fhrer, thus making
it   possible  to  dispense  with  counter-inquiries,   etc.-
negotiations can be brought to a speedier conclusion. In view
of  the general situation, my sojourn in Moscow will have  to
be  limited  to one or two days at the most. Please  call  on
Herren Stalin and Molotov and wire me earliest proposed date.

Frame 111625, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

Moscow, September 25, 1939-10:58 p. m.
Received September 26, 1939-12:30 a. m.

No. 442 of September 25
     Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin at  8
p.  m.  today.  Stalin  stated the following:  In  the  final
settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future
might create friction be-
Page 103
tween Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this
point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent
Polish  rump  state.  He  proposed the  following:  From  the
territory  to  the  east  of the demarcation  line,  all  the
Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw
which  extends  to the Bug should be added to our  share.  In
return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania.
     Stalin  designated this suggestion as a subject for  the
forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister  and
added   that,  if  we  consented,  the  Soviet  Union   would
immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic
countries in accordance with the Protocol of August  23,  and
expected in this matter the unstinting support of the  German
Government.  Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia,  and
Lithuania, but did not mention Finland.
     I   replied  to  Stalin  that  I  would  report  to   my

Frame 111637, serial 103

The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet


BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 435
     For Reich Foreign Minister in person!
     Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of the 26th for Army  High
Command, Attach‚ Section:
     The  Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the  Russian
demand  for  an  alliance. He stated that  a  naval  base  at
Baltischport  and  an air base on the Estonian  islands  were
demanded  by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance
of  the  demands as German aid was most unlikely,  hence  the
situation  could only become worse. On September 25  and  26,
Russian  aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian
territory.  The  General Staff gave orders  not  to  fire  on
aircraft  in  order not to prejudice the situation.  R”ssing.
[44] Frohwein. [45]

[44] German Military Attach‚ in Estonia.
[45] German Minister in Estonia.

Page 104

Frames 111638, serial 103

The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet


BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
No. 436

     For Reich Foreign Minister in person.
     Telegram from Helsinki No. 245 of the 26th:
     The  Foreign  Minister notified me of  demands  made  by
Russia  on Estonia and observed that Finland was prepared  to
improve  her  relations with Russia, but would  never  accept
such demands and would rather let it come to the worst.
     I  pointed  to  the difference between the  position  of
Estonia  and that of Finland and advised the Foreign Minister
to  seek  the security of his country in good relations  with
Germany and Russia.
     The  Foreign  Minister  agreed and  emphasized  complete
elimination  of  English  influence  from  the  Baltic  area.
Blcher. [46]
[46] German Minister in Finland.

Frames 111639-111640, serial 103

The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet


BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 437
     For Reich Foreign Minister in person.
     Telegram from Reval No. 164 of the 26th:
     The  Foreign Minister conveyed a request to  inform  the
Reich  Foreign Minister of the following, if possible  before
his departure for Moscow:
     The  Estonian  Government, under the gravest  threat  of
imminent  attack, perforce is prepared to accept  a  military
alliance  with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter  with  staff
will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. Aim  of
negotiation:  Framing  of a treaty in such  manner  that  the
sovereignty   and  internal  security  of  the  country   are
preserved  and the Estonian non-aggression pact kept  intact.
Hence they intended to propose, in connection with the mutual
assistance obligation of the contracting parties,  to  except
the existing non-aggression pacts with third countries. It is
further  desired  that  naval and air bases  should  be  made
available  only  in  case of war, when assistance  obligation
comes  into  play;  in  peace time as far  as  possible  only
preparation  of the bases. The Russians first demanded  Reval
as  a  naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltischport
or  a  port on ™sel. The Estonians wish if possible to  grant
air bases only on island.
Page 105
     The  general tendency is to meet the demands only as far
as  necessary to prevent an attack and maintain existing good
relations with Germany. Frohwein.


Frame 281527, serial 838

    Timetable of Ribbentrop's Second Visit to Moscow [47]

September 27, 1939             
                               Arrival at airport 6 p. m.
                               First  meeting 10 p. m.  to  1
                               a. m.
September 28, 1930             
                               Meeting  resumed 3 to 6:30  p.
                               Dinner at Kremlin.
                               One   act   of  ballet   (Swan
                                 Lake);    Stalin   meanwhile
                                 negotiated     with      the
                               Meeting resumed at midnight.
                               Signing at 5 a. m.
                               Afterwards reception  for  the
                                 delegation  at  Ambassador's
                                 till about 6:30 a. m.
September 29, 1939             
                               Departure by air 12:40 p. m.

[47] Found in the papers of Under State Secretary Hencke.

Frames 0332-0331 [sic], serial F 2

        German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty
     The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the U.S.S.R. consider it as exclusively their task, after the
collapse  of  the former Polish state, to re-establish  peace
and  order in these territories and to assure to the  peoples
living  there a peaceful life in keeping with their  national
character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:
     The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the  U.S.S.R.  determine as the boundary of their  respective
national  interests  in the territory of  the  former  Polish
state  the  line marked on the attached map, which  shall  be
described in more detail in a supplementary protocol. [48]
[48] Not printed here.
Page 106
     Both  parties  recognize the boundary of the  respective
national interests established in article I as definitive and
shall  reject  any  interference  of  third  powers  in  this
     The  necessary  reorganization of public  administration
will  be effected in the areas west of the line specified  in
article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas
east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
     The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the  U.S.S.R. regard this settlement as a firm foundation for
a  progressive development of the friendly relations  between
their peoples.
     This  treaty  shall  be ratified and  the  ratifications
shall  be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty
becomes effective upon signature.
     Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.
     MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
     For the Government of the German Reich:
     By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
Frame 0319, serial F 2
                    Confidential Protocol
     The  Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles
in  the  way of Reich nationals and other persons  of  German
descent  residing in the territories under its  jurisdiction,
if  they  desire to migrate to Germany or to the  territories
under German jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall
be  carried out by agents of the Government of the  Reich  in
cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the
property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.
     A  corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government
of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or
White  Russian descent residing in the territories under  its
     MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
     For the Government of the German Reich:
     By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
Page 107
Frames 0326-0325 [sic], serial F 2
                Secret Supplementary Protocol
     The  undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement
of  the Government of the German Reich and the Government  of
the U.S.S.R. upon the following:
     The  Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August  23,
1939,  shall  be  amended in item 1 to the  effect  that  the
territory  of  the Lithuanian state falls to  the  sphere  of
influence  of  the U.S.S.R., while, on the  other  hand,  the
province  of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw  fall
to  the  sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached
to  the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon
as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures
on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present
German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of  a  natural  and
simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way
that  the  Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest  of
the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.
     Further it is declared that the economic agreements  now
in  force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected
by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.
     Moscow, September 28, 1939.
     For the Government of the German Reich:
     By authority of the
     of the U.S.S.R.:
Frame 0329, serial F 2
                Secret Supplementary Protocol
     The  undersigned  plenipotentiaries, on  concluding  the
German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have  declared
their agreement upon the following:
     Both  parties  will  tolerate in  their  territories  no
Polish  agitation which affects the territories of the  other
party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings
of  such  agitation and inform each other concerning suitable
measures for this purpose.
     MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
     For the Government of the German Reich:
     By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
Page 108
Frame 0330, serial F 2

  Declaration of the Government of the German Reich and the
      Government of the U.S.S.R. of September 28, 1939
     After  the  Government  of  the  German  Reich  and  the
Government  of  the  U.S.S.R. have, by means  of  the  treaty
signed today, definitively settled the problems arising  from
the  collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created  a
sure  foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe,  they
mutually  express their conviction that it  would  serve  the
true  interest of all peoples to put an end to the  state  of
war  existing at present between Germany on the one side  and
England  and  France  on  the other.  Both  Governments  will
therefore  direct  their common efforts, jointly  with  other
friendly  powers  if occasion arises, toward  attaining  this
goal as soon as possible.
     Should,  however,  the efforts of  the  two  Governments
remain  fruitless,  this  would  demonstrate  the  fact  that
England  and  France are responsible for the continuation  of
the  war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the  war,
the  Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall  engage
in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.
     Moscow, September 08, 1939.
     For the Government of the German Reich:
     By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
Frames 211596-211597, serial 388
The Reich Foreign Minister to the Chairman of the Council of
      People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Molotov)
Moscow, September 28, 1939.
     MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of
your  letter  of today, in which you communicate  to  me  the
     "With reference to our conversations I have the honor to
confirm  herewith  that the Government  of  the  U.S.S.R.  is
willing  on  the  basis  and  in the  sense  of  the  general
political  understanding reached by us,  to  promote  by  all
means  the trade relations and the exchange of goods  between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. To this end an economic program will
be  drawn  up  by both parties, under which the Soviet  Union
will  supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany,  in
turn, will make compensation through delivery of manufactured
goods over an
Page 109
extended  period.  Both  parties shall  frame  this  economic
program  in such a manner that the German-Soviet exchange  of
goods  will  again reach the highest volume attained  in  the
     Both  Governments  will  at  once  issue  the  necessary
directives  for the implementation of the measures  mentioned
and arrange that the negotiations are begun and brought to  a
conclusion as soon as possible."
     In  the  name and by authority of the Government of  the
German  Reich  I  am  in accord with this  communication  and
inform  you that the Government of the German Reich  in  turn
will take the necessary steps for this purpose.
     Accept,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my
highest consideration.
Frames 0322-0321 [sic], serial F 2

The Reich Foreign Minister to the Chairman of the Council of
     People's Commissars of the Soviet Union. (Molotov)


Moscow, September 28, 1939.
     MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of
your  letter  of  today, wherein you communicate  to  me  the
     "Implementing  my letter of today about the  formulation
of  a common economic program, the Government of the U.S.S.R.
will  see  to  it  that German transit traffic  to  and  from
Rumania  by way of the Upper Silesia-Lemberg-Kolomea railroad
line   shall  be  facilitated  in  every  respect.  The   two
Governments  will,  in the framework of  the  proposed  trade
negotiations,  make  arrangements  without  delay   for   the
operation of this transit traffic. The same will apply to the
German  transit  traffic  to  and  from  Iran,  to  and  from
Afghanistan as well as to and from the countries of  the  Far
     "Furthermore,  the  Government of the U.S.S.R.  declares
that  it  is  willing.  in addition to the  quantity  of  oil
previously  agreed  upon or to be agreed upon  hereafter,  to
supply a further quantity of oil commensurate with the annual
production  of  the oil district of Drohobycz  and  Boryslav,
with  the  proviso  that one half of this quantity  shall  be
supplied to Germany from the oil fields of the aforesaid  oil
district and the other half from other oil districts  of  the
U.S.S.R.  As  compensation for these  supplies  of  oil,  the
U.S.S.R. would accept German supplies of hard coal and  steel
     I  take note of this communication with satisfaction and
concur  in  it  in the name of the Government of  the  German
     Accept,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my
highest consideration.

Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor

© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and to combat hatred. Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.