Shofar FTP Archive File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.004
Archive/File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.004
Last-Modified: 1997/10/19
Page 110
IV. GERMAN-SOVIET CO-OPERATION, OCTOBER 2, 1939-MAY 29, 1940
*****
Frames 111659-111660, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, October 2, 1939.
No. 475
For the Ambassador.
Please inform Molotov at once that according to reports
I have received the Turkish Government would hesitate to
conclude an assistance pact with France and England, if the
Soviet Union emphatically opposed it. In my opinion, as
already stated several times, it would also be in the Russian
interest, on account of the question of the Straits, to
forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France. I was
therefore particularly anxious for the Russian Government to
proceed in that direction, in order to dissuade Turkey from
the final conclusion of assistance pacts with the Western
powers and to settle this at once in Moscow. No doubt, the
best solution at the moment would be the return of Turkey to
a policy of absolute neutrality while confirming existing
Russian-Turkish agreements.
Prompt and final diversion of Turkey from the projected
Anglo-French treaty, said to have been recently initialed,
would also clearly be in keeping with the peace offensive
agreed upon in Moscow, as thereby another country would
withdraw from the Anglo-French camp.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 111660, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Turkey
(Papen)
Telegram
BERLIN, October 2, 1939.
No. 352
Ambassador Schulenburg received the following
instructions: Insert text of [preceding telegram]. End of
instruction.
Page 111
I request that you, for your part, likewise do your best
to forestall the final conclusion of the assistance pact
between Turkey and the Western powers. In this matter you
also might point to the strong Russian aversion to a
unilateral commitment of Turkey and explain that the
conclusion of the assistance pact under present war
conditions would necessarily be viewed differently by Germany
than before the outbreak of the war.
*****
Frame 233367, serial 495
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
BERLIN, October 2, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 769
The Finnish Minister today requested me to clarify the
significance of the arrangement of spheres of influence
between Germany and Russia; he was particularly interested in
knowing what effect the Moscow agreements might have on
Finland.
I reminded the Minister that a short time ago Finland,
as is well known, had rejected our proposal to conclude a non-
aggression pact. Perhaps this was now regretted in Helsinki.
For the rest, now as then it is the wish of Germany to live
with Finland on the best and most friendly terms and,
particularly in the economic sphere, to effect as extensive
an exchange of goods as possible. If Herr Wuorimaa felt
uneasy about Finland because of the Estonian incident and
Herr Munters' [49] trip to Moscow, announced today, I would
have to tell him that I was not informed as to Moscow's
policies vis--vis Finland. But I felt that worries over
Finland at this time are not warranted.
The Minister then spoke of the Ciano visit. In this
connection I remarked that after the completion of the Polish
campaign we had undoubtedly arrived at an important juncture
in the war. The announced convocation of the Reichstag
pointed to a statement from the Government in which the idea
would surely be expressed that we regarded as senseless any
opening of real hostilities in the West. Of course, should
the Western powers fail to seize the opportunity for peace,
one would probably have to resign oneself to a bitter
struggle.
WEIZSCKER
[49] Latvian Foreign minister.
Page 112
*****
Frame 111663-111664, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 3, 1939-7:04 p. m.
Received October 3, 1939-11:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 463 of October 3
Molotov summoned me to his office at 2 p. m. today, in
order to communicate to me the following:
The Soviet Government would tell the Lithuanian Foreign
Minister, who arrives today, that, within the framework of an
amicable settlement of mutual relations (probably similar to
the one with Estonia), the Soviet Government was willing to
cede the city of Vilna and its environs to Lithuania, while
at the same time the Soviet Government would indicate to
Lithuania that it must cede the well-known portion of its
territory to Germany. Molotov inquired what formal procedure
we had in mind for carrying this out. His idea was the
simultaneous signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian protocol on Vilna
and a German-Lithuanian protocol on the Lithuanian area to be
ceded to us.
I replied that this suggestion did not appeal to me. It
seemed to me more logical that the Soviet Government should
exchange Vilna for the strip to be ceded to us and then hand
this strip over to us. Molotov did not seem quite in accord
with my proposal but was willing to let me ask for the
viewpoint of my Government and give him a reply by tomorrow
noon.
Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, as in the eyes
of the world it would make us appear as "robbers" of
Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet Government figures as
the donor. As I see it, only my suggestion enters into
consideration at all. However, I would ask you to consider
whether it might not be advisable for us, by a separate
secret German-Soviet protocol, to forego the cession of the
Lithuanian strip of territory until the Soviet Union actually
incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the
arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based.
SCHULENBURG
Page 113
*****
Frame 111666, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
URGENT
MOSCOW October 3, 1939-8:08 p. m.
Received October 3, 1939-11:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 464 of October 3
Reference your telegram of the 2d No. 475.
I informed Molotov in detail of the contents of your
instruction. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government shared
our trend of thought and was proceeding in that direction.
However, it appeared that Turkey had already become rather
closely involved with England and France. The Soviet
Government would continue to try to rectify or "neutralize"
matters in our sense.
The Afghan Ambassador, with whom I spoke today, claimed
to know that the Soviet Government demanded of Turkey
absolute neutrality and the closing of the Straits.
Molotov himself said that the negotiations were still
under way.
When I mentioned the rumors that England and France
intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to
set up a Balkan front, Molotov asserted spontaneously that
the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on
Bulgaria.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 11665, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
STRICTLY SECRET
BERLIN, October 4, 1939.
No. 488
Reference your telegram No. 463.
I, too, do not consider the method Molotov suggested for
the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory as suitable.
On the contrary, please ask Molotov not to discuss this
cession of territory with the Lithuanians at present, but
rather to have the Soviet Government assume the obligation
toward Germany to leave this strip of territory unoccupied in
the event of a posting of Soviet forces in Lithuania,
Page 114
which may possibly be contemplated, and furthermore to leave
it to Germany to determine the date on which the cession of
the territory should be formally effected. An understanding
to this effect should be set forth in a secret exchange of
letters between yourself and Molotov.
Reich Foreign Minister
[Notes:]
As directed by the Reich Foreign Minister, this telegram
is being dispatched at once with his signature. Gaus, October
4.
I telephoned the contents of the telegram in veiled
language at 11 a. m. to Count Schulenburg. He fully
understood the instruction. G[aus], October 4.
*****
Frames 254871-254872, serial 644
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, October 5, 1939-12:30 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 470 of October 4
Reference my telegram No. 463 of October 3.
Immediately after Under State Secretary Gaus' first
telephone call I transmitted to Molotov this morning the
request not to divulge to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister
anything regarding the German-Soviet understanding concerning
Lithuania. Molotov asked me to see him at 5 p. m. and told
me, that, unfortunately, he had been obliged yesterday to
inform the Lithuanian Foreign Minister of this understanding,
since he could not, out of loyalty to us, act otherwise. The
Lithuanian delegation had been extremely dismayed and sad;
they had declared that the loss of this area in particular
would be especially hard to bear, since many prominent
leaders of the Lithuanian people came from that part of
Lithuania. This morning at 8 a. m. the Lithuanian Foreign
Minister had flown back to Kowno, intending to return to
Moscow in one or two days.
I said that I would immediately notify my Government by
telephone, whereupon I called Herr Gaus. An hour later
Molotov informed me that Stalin personally requested the
German Government not to insist for the moment upon the
cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory.
SCHULENBURG
Page 115
*****
Frames 69687-69689, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union, (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, October 5, 1939-3:43 a. m.
Received Moscow, October 5, 1939-11:55 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 497 of October 4
Referring to today's telephonic communication from the
Ambassador.
Legation in Kowno is being instructed as follows:
1) Solely for your personal information, I am apprising
you of the following: At the time of the signing of the
German-Russian Non-aggression Pact on August 23, a strictly
secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in
Eastern Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith,
Lithuania was to belong to the German sphere of influence,
while in the territory of the former Polish state, the so-
called Four-River Line, Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San, was to
constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district
of Vilna go to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government
consented. At the negotiations concerning the Boundary and
Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended
to the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilna area, was
included in the Russian sphere of influence, for which in
turn, in the Polish area, the province of Lublin and large
portions of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket of
territory of Suwalki, fell within the German sphere of
influence. Since, by the inclusion of the Suwalki tract in
the German sphere of influence, a difficulty in drawing the
border line resulted, we agreed that in case the Soviets
should take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip of
territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on
the map, should fall to Germany.
2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports that Molotov,
contrary to our own intentions, notified the Lithuanian
Foreign Minister last night of the confidential arrangement.
Please now, on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government,
orally and in strict confidence, of the matter, as follows:
As early as at the signing of the German-Soviet Non-
aggression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications
in Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves
and the Soviet Government concerning the delimitation of
German and Soviet spheres of influence. In these
conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilna dis-
Page 116
trict to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government gave me
its consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and
Friendship Treaty of September 28, as is apparent from the
German-Soviet boundary demarcation which was published, the
pocket of territory of Suwalki jutting out between Germany
and Lithuania had fallen to Germany. As this created an
intricate and impractical boundary, I had reserved for
Germany a border correction in this area, whereby a small
strip of Lithuanian territory would fall to Germany. The
reward of Vilna to Lithuania was maintained in these
negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to
the Lithuanian Government that the Reich Government does not
consider the question of this border revision timely at this
moment. We make the proviso, however, that the Lithuanian
Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of
instruction for Kowno.
I request you to inform Herr Molotov of our
communication to the Lithuanian Government. Further, please
request of him, as already indicated in the preceding
telegram, that the border strip of Lithuanian territory
involved be left free in the event of a possible posting of
Soviet troops in Lithuania and also that it be left to
Germany to determine the date of the implementing of the
agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the territory
involved. Both of these points at issue should be set forth
in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 235040-235041, serial 506
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
SECRET
BERLIN, October 5, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 786
The Lithuanian Minister called on me this evening in
order, as was expected, to inquire about German claims to a
strip of land in southwestern Lithuania. Herr Skirpa,
however, even when he entered, had a friendlier appearance
than was to be expected. For Minister Zechlin [50] had in the
meantime delivered information in Kowno as instructed, so
that I did not need to go any further into the questions that
Herr Skirpa put. I restricted myself to a brief mention of
today's telegraphic instructions to Herr Zechlin. [51] Since
Herr Skirpa
[50] German Minister in Lithuania.
[51] see supra.
Page 117
expressed to me the satisfaction of his Government that we
had withdrawn our claim, I stressed that the announcement of
our need was "not at the moment pressing." (It is noteworthy
that Herr Skirpa knew and traced exactly on the map of Poland
that happened to be spread out before us the line agreed upon
by us in our secret protocol with the Russians.)
The Minister then gave the further information that the
Russians expected to get an assistance pact with Lithuania as
well as permission to station Russian garrisons, at the same
time agreeing in principle to the joining [Anschluss] of
Vilna and environs to Lithuania. Herr Skirpa asked me if I
had any ideas or suggestions to give in this regard. I stated
that I was not informed and added that in connection with our
negotiations in Moscow German interests had not been claimed
beyond the Russo-German line in the east known to Herr
Skirpa.
In conclusion the Minister asked to be given any
possible suggestions. Herr Urbsys [52] was still remaining in
Kowno today and tomorrow; he himself-Skirpa-was at the
disposal of the Reich Foreign Minister at any time.
WEIZSCKER
[62] Lithuanian Foreign Minister.
*****
Frames 111680-111681, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, October 7, 1939.
No. 518
I am receiving reliable reports from Istanbul to the
effect that Russo-Turkish negotiations might yet lead to the
signing of a mutual assistance pact. Hence I request you to
call on Herr Molotov immediately and to emphasize strongly
once more how much we would regret it if the Soviet
Government were unable to dissuade Turkey from concluding a
treaty with England and France or to induce her to adopt all
unequivocal neutrality. In the event that the Soviet
Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance
pact with Turkey, we would regard it as a foregone conclusion
that she would make a reservation in the pact whereby the
pact would not obligate the Soviet Government to any kind of
assistance aimed directly or indirectly against Germany.
Indeed, Stalin himself prom-
Page 118
ised this. Without such a reservation, the Soviet Government,
as has been previously stressed, would commit an outright
breach of the Non-aggression Pact concluded with Germany. It
would, moreover, not suffice to make this reservation only
tacitly or confidentially. On the contrary, we must insist
that it be formally stipulated in such a manner that the
public will notice it. Otherwise a very undesirable
impression would be created on the public, and such an act
would be apt to shake the confidence of the German public in
the effectiveness of the new German-Russian agreements.
Please take this opportunity to inform yourself on the
other details concerning the status of the Russo-Turkish
negotiations and to find out what is to be agreed upon
between the two Governments in regard to the question of the
Straits.
Report by wire.
Reich Foreign Minister
Note: I communicated the contents of this instruction to
Count Schulenburg this afternoon by telephone. The
transmission was very good. Count Schulenburg said he had
just come from Molotov, who had told him that he had not
talked with the Turkish delegation since Sunday. Hence our
warning certainly arrived in time. I replied that Count
Schulenburg should nevertheless lose no time, as it was a
matter of decisive importance, and the reports received here
pointed to a rather advanced stage in the negotiations.
Accordingly, Count Schulenburg is to call on Molotov again
tomorrow morning.
*****
Frame 0318, serial F 2
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the
Soviet Union (Molotov) to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
SECRET
Moscow, October 8, 1939.
MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor hereby to confirm that
in connection with the secret supplementary protocol,
concluded on September 29 [28], 1939, between the U.S.S.R.
and Germany, concerning Lithuania, the following
understanding exists between us:
1) The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the protocol
and marked on the map attached to the protocol shall not be
occupied in case forces of the Red Army should be stationed
[in Lithuania];
2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for
the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to
Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory.
Page 119
Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my
highest consideration.
W. MOLOTOW
*****
Frames 357061-357062, serial 1369
Foreign Office Memorandum
[October ?, 1939.]
OUTLINES FOR MY CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW
1) The credit and trade treaty of August 19 of this year
is not to be tampered with from either side. However, for our
benefit, we must attempt to obtain a more expeditious
delivery of raw materials (180 million Reichsmarks).
2) My principal task in the negotiations will be to find
out whether Russia, over and above the treaty of August 19,
1939, could and would compensate for the loss in imports by
sea and to what extent this might be done. The military and
civil agencies have handed me a schedule of requirements
totaling 70 million marks of immediate additional supplies.
(Enclosure 1. [53]) The requests which I shall present in
Moscow will go far beyond this schedule, as the German war
needs are several times as great as the proposal of the
Departments for the negotiations. (See enclosure 2. [53]) But
the relatively modest schedule of departmental requirements
shows how low the actual capacity of Russia for supplying raw
materials is estimated. The reasons are inadequacies of
transportation, of organization, of production methods, etc.
3) The plan to be proposed to the Russians would be as
follows:
Apart from the treaty of August 19, 1939, the Soviet
Union shall supply us X millions worth of raw materials, both
such as are produced in Russia and such as Russia buys for us
from other neutrals. The German quid pro quo for these raw
materials could not follow at once, but would have to take
the form of a supply and investment program, to extend over a
period of about five years. Within this time we would be
prepared, in order to meet our obligations arising from
Russian deliveries of raw material, to set up plants in
Russia in accordance with a large-scale program to be agreed
upon. (See enclosure 3. [53])
[53] Not printed.
Page 120
4) Within the framework of purely economic negotiations,
the difficulties actually existing in Russia cannot be
overcome, especially as we demand of the Russians performance
in advance. A positive achievement can really only be
expected, if an appropriate directive is issued by the
highest Russian authorities, in the spirit of the political
attitude toward us. In that respect these negotiations will
be a test of whether and how far Stalin is prepared to draw
practical conclusions from the new political course. The raw
materials deliveries requested by us can only be carried out,
in view of the unsatisfactory domestic supply situation of
Russia, at the expense of their own Russian consumption.
5) Depending on the result of my conversations, it will
be necessary that the raw materials program be taken up again
from the strictly political point of view by a qualified
personage.
6) In the Moscow negotiations it should furthermore be
ascertained to what extent our imports heretofore made from
Iran, Afghanistan, Manchuria, and Japan, can be transmitted
via Russia.
SCHNURRE
*****
Frame 111684, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, October 9, 1939-12:30 a. m.
Received October 9, 1939-3 a. m.
No. 493 of October 8
Reference your telegram of the 7th No. 518.
Molotov stated this evening at 9 p. m. that since
October 1 no meeting had [taken place] with the Turkish
Foreign Minister and that the outcome of the negotiations
cannot as yet be surmised. Molotov expressed the view that in
all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would not
be concluded. But under any circumstances the interests of
Germany and the special nature of German-Soviet relations
would be upheld. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government
was pursuing the aim of inducing Turkey to adopt full
neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in
maintaining peace in the Balkans.
SCHULENBURG
Page 121
*****
Frame 233368, serial 495
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 793
The Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the
Reich Foreign Minister. On the latter's instructions I
received Herr Wuorimaa this afternoon. He presented the
following facts:
By virtue of the developments in the Baltic States,
Russia had now penetrated so far into the Baltic that the
balance of power there had been upset, and predominance
threatened to pass to Russia. The lack of interest in this
matter on the part of Germany had attracted attention in
Finland, since there was reason there to assume that Russia
intended to make demands on Finland identical with those made
on the Baltic States.
The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorimaa that he
find out whether Germany remains indifferent to Russia's
forward thrust in this direction and, should that not prove
to be the case, to learn what stand Germany intends to take.
The Minister added that, on her part, Finland had tried
her best during the last few weeks to regulate her commercial
relations with Germany and maintain them on a normal basis
and to carry out the policy of neutrality desired by Germany
also.
I answered the Minister in the sense of the enclosed
instructions to Helsinki. [55] Wuorimaa asked me to call him
if we had anything further to add.
From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that
the Finnish Government was rather disturbed over the Russian
demands and would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and
Latvia.
As regards this attitude on the part of the Minister I
merely said that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle
matters with Russia in a peaceful manner.
WEIZSCKER
[55] Infra. ([54] not used? LWJ)
Page 122
*****
Frames 233369, serial 495
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizscker)
to the German Minister in Finland (Blcher)
Telegram
BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
No. [326]
In connection with telegraphic instruction No. 322. [56]
The Finnish Minister, who will call today at the Foreign
Office, is to receive the following information:
Our relationship to the three Baltic States rests on the
well-known non-aggression pacts; our relationship to Denmark
likewise. Norway and Sweden have declined non-aggression
pacts with us, since they do not feel endangered by us and
since they have hitherto not concluded any non-aggression
pacts at all. Finland, to be sure, has such a pact with
Russia, but declined our offer nevertheless. We regretted
this circumstance, but were and are of the opinion that our
traditionally good and friendly relations with Finland do not
require any special political agreements.
With this absence of problems in the German-Finnish
relations it is very easy to understand why in his utterances
of October 6th-concerned for the greater part with our
neighbors-the Fhrer did not mention Finland at all, just as
he did not mention many other greater and smaller states.
From this it only follows that between us there are no points
of difference. In Moscow, where in the negotiations of the
Reich Foreign Minister, German-Russian relations were
discussed in broad political outline and where a treaty of
friendship came into being, the well-known definitive line of
demarcation was fixed. West of this line lie the German
interests, east of it we have registered no interests. We are
therefore not informed as to what demands Russia intends to
make on Finland. We presume, however, that these demands
would not be too far-reaching. For this reason alone a German
stand on the question becomes superfluous. But after the
developments cited above we would hardly be in a position, in
any case, to intervene in the Russian-Finnish conversations.
WEIZSCKER
[56] Not printed.
Page 123
*****
Frame 235081, serial 506
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Nr. 795
BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
The Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that
a serious situation would arise in the Baltic region if
Russia were to make demands on Finland which threatened the
independence and autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished to
inform me of the preceding with reference to the close
relations between Sweden and Finland. It should not be
forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, strong and
vigorous forces were in power in Finland, who would not
submit to Russian oppression.
I replied to the Minister that nothing was known to me
about the probable Russian demands on Finland. To my
knowledge the word Finland had not been mentioned in
connection with the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to
Moscow. The situation was that we had not put forth any
claims to any interests east of the well-known line. I
should, however, assume that Russia would not set forth any
wishes that were too far-reaching as against Finland and
that, therefore, a peaceable solution could be found.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frame 214964, serial 407
The German Minister in Finland (Blcher) to the German
Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
HELSINKI, October 10, 1939-9:30 p. m.
Received October 10, 1939-12 midnight.
No. 287 of October 10
All indications are that if Russia will not confine its
demands to islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer
armed resistance. The consequences for our war economy would
be grave. Not only food and timber exports, but also
indispensable copper and molybdenum exports from Finland to
Germany would cease. For this reason I suggest you intercede
with Russian Government in the sense that it should not go
beyond a demand for the islands.
BLCHER
Page 124
*****
Frame 233342, serial 495
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
CONFIDENTIAL
BERLIN, October 12, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 800
The Bulgarian Minister, supplementing his recent
conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, informed me
today of the following:
The suggestions recently made by Molotov to the
Bulgarian Government concerning a Russian-Bulgarian agreement
were not clear at first. Later it became evident that Molotov
was thinking of a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in
the event of attack by a third power. This suggestion was
rejected in Sofia.
To my question why Bulgaria did not accept it, Draganoff
offered as his own conjecture the following: Up to now
Bulgaria had never concluded any treaty of alliance of this
kind, not even with Germany, to whom she has for long had
close ties. Probably his Government did not, for this reason,
wish to swerve from this principle nor, above all, conclude a
mutual assistance pact with Russia first.
Draganoff then went on to say that the Bulgarian
Government made the following counter proposal: Bulgaria was
ready to conclude a treaty of non-aggression or friendship
with Russia if Moscow would present concrete proposals of
this kind. A reply to this has not as yet reached Sofia.
I thanked the Ambassador for the information and
promised to transmit it to the Reich Foreign Minister.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frames 69672-69675, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, October 18, 1939-12:40 a. m.
Received Moscow, October 18, 1939-10:05 a. m.
No. 594 of October 17
For the Ambassador in person.
At an occasion soon to arise, I intend to speak in
public about the foreign political situation and shall then,
with reference to Chamberlain's last speech, deal with the
future aims of England and the British propaganda of lies. In
this connection I would also like to refute a lie
Page 125
recently circulated in quite specific form by the enemy
press, alleging that during my stay in Moscow I had asked the
Soviet Union for military assistance, but had met with an
outright refusal. I propose to say on this subject
approximately the following:
"In its grave disappointment at the recent development
in the international situation, which has been strongly
influenced by the establishment of friendly relations between
Germany and the Soviet Union, British propaganda has left
nothing untried to discredit and disturb this development and
German-Russian relations. In its well-known manner, it
stopped at nothing and has made use of the grossest and most
absurd lies. Thus, for instance, it has circulated the
statement that in the Moscow negotiations I had asked Herr
Stalin for military assistance against Poland, France, and
England. To this, Herr Stalin, however, is said to have given
only the tart reply: 'Not a single soldier.' But what in
reality was the course of these Moscow negotiations? Let me
reveal it to you:
"I came to Moscow on August 23 for the purpose of
negotiating and concluding in the name of the Fhrer, a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet Union. I commenced the
negotiations with Stalin and Molotov with the statement that
I had not come to Moscow, as the British and French delegates
had come at the time, to ask the Soviet Union for armed
assistance in case a war should be forced upon the German
Government by England. The German Government was not in need
of assistance for this contingency, but would, in this event,
have sufficient military strength to take up the struggle
alone against Poland and its Western foes and to carry it to
a victorious conclusion. To this, Stalin, with his
characteristic clarity and precision, replied spontaneously:
'Germany was taking a proud attitude by rejecting at the
outset any armed assistance from the Soviets. The Soviet
Union, however, was interested in having a strong Germany as
a neighbor and in the case of an armed showdown between
Germany and the Western democracies the interests of the
Soviet Union and of Germany would certainly run parallel to
each other. The Soviet Union would never stand for Germany's
getting into a difficult position.' I thereupon thanked
Stalin for his clear and precise statement and told him that
I would report to the Fhrer on this broad-minded attitude of
the Soviet Government. Thus the German-Russian negotiations
were opened and this exchange of views created from the
outset a broadminded and friendly climate, in which within 24
hours the Non-aggression Pact and, in the course of further
developments, at the end of September, the Boundary and
Friendship Treaty were concluded. Upon the political
foundation, it was likewise decided immediately to inaugurate
a comprehensive economic program, the implementation of which
is now being discussed at Moscow. Germany has need of the raw
materials of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union has need
of manufactured articles. There is no reason why the
flourishing trade of the past between the two nations should
not soon revive. On the
Page 126
contrary, I am firmly convinced that the former traditional
friendship between Germany and Russia has now been restored,
and that it will grow stronger and stronger and that the
exchange of goods, which is complementary by nature, will
result in an undreamed-of prosperity for both nations in the
future. Upon the same political foundation, the German-Soviet
declaration of September 28, 1939, has also been agreed upon,
to the effect that both Governments would work toward the
restoration of peace upon conclusion of the Polish campaign.
In case these efforts should fail-as they have-the
responsibility of England and France for the continuation of
the war would be established and at the same time provision
would be made for a consultation between the Government of
the Reich and the Soviet Government, in this contingency, on
the necessary measures to be taken. These consultations are
now under way and are proceeding in the same friendly spirit
as the Moscow negotiations, and on the firm basis of kindred
interests. In this connection, we expect an early visit of
Herr Molotov to Berlin. I believe that this brief account is
sufficient to sink once and for all the whole raft of lies of
the British Ministry of Lies and the other blundering
propaganda centers of our enemies, about the present German-
Russian negotiations and the future pattern of relations
between the two greatest countries of Europe."
Please inform Herr Stalin as promptly as possible of the
account of the Moscow negotiations as given above and wire me
his approval.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 69660, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, October 19, 1939.
No. 568 of October 19
Reference your telegram No. 594 of October 17.
Molotov today informed me that Stalin approved the
account of the negotiations in Moscow that the Reich Foreign
Minister contemplates making in his forthcoming speech. He
only asked that instead of the sentences quoted as the
statement of Stalin: "Germany was taking a proud attitude . .
. " up to " . . . getting into a difficult position," the
following version be adopted: "The attitude of Germany in
declining military aid commands respect. However, a strong
Germany is the absolute prerequisite for peace in Europe,
whence it follows that the Soviet Union is interested in the
existence of a strong Germany. Therefore the Soviet Union
cannot give its approval to
Page 127
the Western powers creating conditions which would weaken
Germany and place her in a difficult position. Therein lies
the community of interests between Germany and the Soviet
Union."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111764, serial 103
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Nr. 864
BERLIN, November 1, 1939.
Field Marshal Gring, Grand Admiral Raeder and Colonel
General Keitel, independently of each other, have told me
that the Russian delegation in Berlin expected too much in
the way of inspection and procurement of German materials of
war. Colonel General Keitel told me it was the Fhrer's
opinion that materials regularly issued to troops could be
shown to the Russians; what might be sold, we had to decide
ourselves. Things in the testing stage or otherwise secret
should not be shown to the Russians.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frame 111828, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizscker)
to
German Missions Abroad [57]
Telegram
BERLIN, December 2, 1939.
Pol. VI 2651
In your conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian
conflict please avoid any anti-Russian note.
According to whom you are addressing, the following
arguments are to be employed: The inescapable course of
events in the revision of the treaties following the last
Great War. The natural requirement of Russia for increased
security of Leningrad and the entrance to the Gulf of
Finland. The foreign policy pursued by the Finnish Government
has in the last few years stressed the idea of neutrality. It
has relied on the Scandinavian states and has treated German-
Russian opposition as axiomatic. As a result Finland has
avoided any rapprochement with Germany and has even rejected
the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany as
compromising, even though
[57] As indicated on an accompanying list; list not printed.
Page 128
Finland has a non-aggression pact with Russia. Also in the
League of Nations, Finland, in spite of the debt of gratitude
which she owed to Germany for the latter's help in 1918, has
never come out for German interests. Foreign Minister Holsti
is typical of this point of view and particularly hostile to
Germany. Extensive elements in Finland emphasize their
economic and ideological orientation in the direction of
democratic England. Correspondingly the attitude of most of
the organs of the press is out-spokenly unfriendly to us. The
platonic sympathy of England has confirmed Finland in her
previous attitude and has done the country no good.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frame 111834, serial 103
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Nr. 949
BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
Colonel General Keitel telephoned me today on the
following matter: Lately there have been repeated wrangles on
the boundary between Russia and the Government General, into
which the army, too, was drawn. The expulsion of Jews into
Russian territory, in particular, did not proceed as smoothly
as had apparently been expected. In practice, the procedure
was, for example, that at a quiet place in the woods, a
thousand Jews were expelled across the Russian border; 15
kilometers away, they came back, with the Russian commander
trying to force the German one to readmit the group. As it
was a case involving foreign policy, the O. K. W. was not
able to issue directives to the Governor General in the
matter. Naval Captain Brkner will get in touch with the desk
officer at the Foreign Office. Colonel General Keitel asked
me to arrange for a favorable outcome of this interview.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frame 111835, serial 103
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Nr. 950
BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
Colonel General Keitel called me on the telephone today
to say that the Russian schedule of requests for deliveries
of German products was growing more and more voluminous and
unreasonable. The negotia-
Page 129
tions with the Russians would necessarily, therefore, become
more and more difficult. The Russians, for example, wanted
machine tools for the manufacture of munitions, while the O.
K. W. could not spare such machine tools in the present state
of the war under any circumstances. The same was true in
respect to supplies of air and naval war materiel.
I confirmed to Colonel General Keitel that the Foreign
Office, too, intended to put a curb on Russian demands. We
had not yet quite made up our mind how to do it, whether in
Moscow or here through the Russian Ambassador. The Reich
Foreign Minister, too, had yet to be informed.
In conclusion, Colonel General Keitel said that he was
willing, either through General Thomas or by his own
participation, to bring about a meeting, if necessary.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frames 111836-111837, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizscker)
to the
German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 1003
BERLIN, December 6, 1939.
Supplement to Instruction Poll VI 2651, Item II.
Supplementing telegraphic instruction of December 2,
[59] the following additional instruction was issued today to
all the important missions:
In conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian conflict,
you are requested to make use of the following
considerations:
Only a few weeks ago Finland was about to come to an
understanding with Russia, which might have been achieved by
a prudent Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations
by the Finnish Government is the least suitable way of
solving the crisis.
There is no doubt that British influence on the Finnish
Government-partly operating through Scandinavian capitals-
induced the Finnish Government to reject Russian proposals
and thereby brought on the present conflict. England's guilt
in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be especially
emphasized.
[59] Ante, p. 127. ([58] not used? LWJ)
Page 130
Germany is not involved in these events. In
conversations, sympathy is to be expressed for the Russian
point of view. Please refrain from expressing any sympathy
for the Finnish position. End of telegraphic instruction.
WEIZSCKER
*****
Frames 395-393, serial F 18
Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister
RAM Nr. 60
BERLIN, December 11, 1939.
I. I asked the Russian Ambassador to see me today at 5
p.m.
At the beginning of our conversation, I indicated to
Herr Shkvartsev the inappropriateness of the report given out
by the Tass agency yesterday, dealing with alleged armament
supplies by Germany to Finland. I stressed the fact that this
report had been denied yesterday by German sources. All the
more did I regret that this report, apparently launched from
English sources via Sweden and only designed to create
discord between Germany and the Soviet Union, has been taken
up in so striking a fashion by the official Russian agency.
On the armaments business with Finland I made the
following suggestions to him:
1) Germany had before the commencement of hostilities
last summer contracted with Finland for the supply of certain
anti-aircraft guns in exchange for nickel shipments from
Finland. After the hostilities began, further shipments
ceased.
2) The Italian Government had inquired in October
whether Germany was willing to permit the transit of fifty
aircraft to Finland. At that time the threat of military
measures between Russia and Finland could not yet be
foreseen. Therefore, the German Government had, to be sure,
refused transit by air, but raised no objection to transit by
rail. The Italian Government, however, did not refer to this
matter again, and neither the Italians nor the Finns made
requests for a transit permit for the planes.
3) Some time ago an application was made to ship certain
war materials for Finland from Belgium through Germany. This
application, too, had been rejected.
I was now asking the Russian Ambassador to inform his
Government of the foregoing and to point out that with
publications such as the Tass report mentioned, only
England's game was being played. England was behind Finland
and according to intelligence received, England was also
responsible for the failure of the Russo-Finnish negotiations
last November. I should be grateful if the Russian Government
would cause the Tass agency, before releasing such reports in
the future, first to get in touch either with the German
Embassy in
Page 131
Moscow or with Berlin, in order that such unpleasant
incidents might be avoided.
The Russian Ambassador showed appreciation of my
viewpoint and promised to report to his Government
accordingly.
II. I then spoke to the Russian Ambassador about the
extensive demands for military supplies put forward by the
Russian trade delegation. I wanted to say beforehand, that I
had given instructions to comply with the Russian requests in
any conceivable way, within the limits of possibility. But it
should not be forgotten that Germany was at war and that
certain things were simply not possible. As I had since been
told, a new basis had been found in the meantime, upon which
the further negotiations can soon be concluded in Moscow,
between the newly arrived Russian delegation and our
negotiators. I asked the Russian Ambassador, however, to
point out in Moscow, that from the German side everything
humanly possible has been done and that beyond that one could
not go.
The Russian Ambassador promised to report to Moscow in
this sense and stressed the point that from the Russian side
any military information obtained here by the Russian
delegation would, of course, be kept secret.
I told the Russian Ambassador that we had complete
confidence in the Russian promises, but it should be
understood by the Russians that there was certain material
that we could not supply during the war.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 213-208, serial F 18
Foreign Office Memorandum
STATE SECRET
W 1027/40 g. Rs.
MEMORANDUM ON THE GERMAN-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT
SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 11, 1940
The Agreement is based on the correspondence-mentioned
in the preamble-between the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars, Molotov, dated September 28, 1939. [60] The
Agreement represents the first great step toward the economic
program envisaged by both sides and is to be followed by
others.
1. The Agreement covers a period of 27 months, i. e.,
the Soviet deliveries, which are to be made within 18 months,
will be compen-
[60] Ante, pp. 108-109.
Page 132
sated by German deliveries in turn within 27 months. The most
difficult point of the correspondence of September 28, 1939,
namely, that the Soviet raw material deliveries are to be
compensated by German industrial deliveries over a longer
period, is thereby settled in accordance with our wishes.
This was not possible without a hard fight. Only the personal
message of the Reich Foreign Minister to Stalin brought the
final settlement. The stipulation of 18 and 27 months
represents a compromise solution, since at stated intervals-
namely, every 6 months-the mutual deliveries of goods must be
balanced according to the fixed ratio. If this balance does
not exist, i. e., particularly if the German deliveries fall
behind the ratio of the Soviet deliveries fixed by the
Agreement, the other side is entitled to suspend its
deliveries temporarily until the fixed ratio is
reestablished. This stipulation is annoying, but could not be
eliminated by us, as Stalin himself had adopted it during the
final talks.
2. The Soviet deliveries. According to the Agreement,
the Soviet Union shall within the first 12 months deliver raw
materials in the amount of approximately 500 million
Reichsmarks.
In addition, the Soviets will deliver raw materials,
contemplated in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, for
the same period, in the amount of approximately 100 million
Reichsmarks.
The most important raw materials are the following:
1,000,000 tons of grain for cattle, and of legumes, in
the amount of 120 million Reichsmarks
900,000 tons of mineral oil in the amount of
approximately 115 million Reichsmarks
100,000 tons of cotton in the amount of approximately 90
million Reichsmarks
500,000 tons of phosphates
100,000 tons of chrome ores
500,000 tons of iron ore
300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron
2,400 kg. of platinum
Manganese ore, metals, lumber, and numerous other raw
materials.
To this must also be added the Soviet exports to the
Protectorate, which are not included in the Agreement, in the
amount of about 50 million Reichsmarks so that the net
deliveries of goods from the Soviet Union during the first
treaty year amount to a total of 650 million Reichsmarks.
In addition, there are other important benefits. On the
basis of the correspondence of September 28, 1939, the Soviet
Union had granted us the right of transit to and from
Rumania, Iran, and Afghanistan
Page 133
and the countries of the Far East, which is particularly
important in view of the German soybean purchases from
Manchukuo. The freight rates of the Trans-Siberian Railroad
were reduced by 50 percent for soybeans. The transit freight
charges are to be settled by a clearing system and amount to
approximately 100 million Reichsmarks.
Adding certain other items (clearing share in purchase
of raw materials by the Soviet Union in third countries), it
may be assumed that during the first 12 months Soviet
deliveries and services will amount to a total of about 800
million Reichsmarks.
3. Thus far, only part of the Soviet deliveries has been
fixed for the second treaty year. During the first 6 months
of the second treaty year the Soviet Union will deliver to
Germany 230 million Reichsmarks worth of raw materials of the
same kind as in the first treaty year. It is contemplated
that negotiations will be resumed before the expiration of
the first treaty year and the quantities for the exchange of
goods for the second treaty year fixed and even increased
beyond the volume of the first treaty year.
4. The German deliveries comprise industrial products,
industrial processes and installations as well as war
materiel. The Soviet deliveries of the first 12 months are to
be compensated by us within 15 months. The Soviet deliveries
of the first 6 months of the second treaty year (13th to 18th
month) are to be compensated by us within 12 months (from the
16th to the 27th month).
5. Among the Soviet deliveries within the first 18
months are 11,000 tons of copper, 3,000 tons of nickel, 950
tons of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, 500 tons of wolfram, 40
tons of cobalt. These deliveries of metals are intended for
the carrying out of the German deliveries to the Soviet
Union. Since these metals are not immediately available in
Germany and will not be delivered until the treaty is in
force, it will be necessary to bridge the initial period by
using metals from our own stocks for the German deliveries to
the Soviet Union and to replace them from the incoming Soviet
metal deliveries. Any different arrangement, such as the
advance delivery of metals which we demanded at first, could
not be achieved.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union declared her willingness
to act as buyer of metals and raw materials in third
countries. To what degree this promise can be realized in
view of the intensified English counter-measures cannot be
judged at the present time. Since Stalin himself has
repeatedly promised generous help in this respect it may be
expected that the Soviet Union will make every effort.
Page 134
6. The negotiations were difficult and lengthy. There
were material and psychological reasons for this.
Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union promised far more deliveries
than are defensible from a purely economic point of view, and
she must make the deliveries to Germany partly at the expense
of her own supply. On the other hand, it is understandable
that the Soviet Government is anxious to receive as
compensation those things which the Soviet Union lacks. Since
the Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods
whatsoever, their wishes concerned exclusively manufactured
goods and war materiel. Thus, in numerous cases, Soviet
bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine
tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition. It was not
easy to find a compromise between the interests of both
sides. Psychologically the ever-present distrust of the
Russians was of importance as well as the fear of any
responsibility. And People's Commissar Mikoyan had to refer
numerous questions to Stalin personally, since his authority
was not sufficient.
Despite all these difficulties, during the long
negotiations the desire of the Soviet Government to help
Germany and to consolidate firmly the political understanding
in economic matters, too, became more and more evident.
The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for us.
The raw material purchases from the Soviet Union and from the
countries bordering the Soviet Union can still be
considerably increased. But it is essential to meet the
German commitments to the extent required. In view of the
great volume this will require a special effort. If we
succeed in extending and expanding exports to the East in the
required volume, the effects of the English blockade will be
decisively weakened by the incoming raw materials.
BERLIN, February 26, 1940.
SCHNURRE
*****
Frames 242-240, serial F 18
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
STATE SECRET
BERLIN, March 28, 1940.
No. 543
For the Ambassador personally. Secret.
During my recent visit to Rome, where-as you know-I
worked on the improvement of Italian-Russian relations among
other things, I already contemplated carrying out the plan of
a visit by Herr Molotov
Page 135
to Berlin. Although I did not mention this idea to anyone,
the Anglo-French propaganda, correctly guessing my
intentions, spoke of it with the hope of interfering with the
plan and thereby with the further consolidation of our
relations with Russia. I could have denied the Anglo-French
report without any trouble, but refrained from doing so out
of consideration for Molotov. Then, the Russian press for its
part issued a denial.
Nevertheless, I have not given up the idea of a visit by
Molotov to Berlin. On the contrary, I should like to retain
it, and if it can be realized I should like to put it into
effect in the near future. It goes without saying that the
invitation is not to be confined to Herr Molotov; it would
suit our own needs better, as well as our really ever-closer
relations with Russia, if Herr Stalin himself came to Berlin.
The Fhrer would not only be particularly happy to welcome
Stalin in Berlin, but he would also see to it that he would
get a reception commensurate with his position and
importance, and he would extend to him all the honors that
the occasion demanded.
An invitation both to Herr Molotov and to Herr Stalin
has, as you know, already been issued orally by me in Moscow
and was accepted by both of them in principle. In what manner
the invitation should now be repeated, and its definite
acceptance and realization attained, you yourself can judge
best. During the conversation to be conducted you will have
to word the invitation to Herr Molotov more definitely,
whereas you will have to state the invitation to Herr Stalin
in the name of the Fhrer in less definite terms. We must, of
course, avoid receiving a clear-cut refusal from Stalin.
Before you take any action, I request that you comment
on the subject immediately, reporting to me by wire your
opinion as to the procedure to be followed by you and the
prospects for its success.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 0466-0467, serial F 5
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, March 30, 1940-11:40 p. m.
Received March 31, 1940-8:15 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 599 of March 30
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Reference your telegram of the 28th, No. 543.
Page 136
I. I personally believe firmly-as I reported on the
occasion of my inquiry of October 17, telegram No. 554 [61]-
that Molotov, conscious of his obligation, will visit Berlin
as soon as the time and circumstances appear propitious to
the Soviet Government. After careful examination of all
factors known to me I cannot, however, conceal the fact that
I consider the chances slight for the acceptance of an
invitation at the present time. My opinion is based on the
following considerations:
1. All our observations, particularly the speech of
Molotov on March 29, confirm that the Soviet Government is
determined to cling to neutrality in the present war and to
avoid as much as possible anything that might involve it in a
conflict with the Western powers. This must have been one of
the main reasons why the Soviet Government broke off the war
against Finland, abandoning the People's Government.
2. The Soviet Government having this attitude, it
probably fears that a demonstration of the relations between
the Soviet Union and Germany such as a visit by Molotov or by
Stalin himself to Berlin might, at present, involve the risk
of severance of diplomatic relations or even of warlike
developments with the Western powers.
3. Indicative of the situation is the Tass denial
mentioned by you which denies with rather striking plainness
and firmness all rumors about an allegedly impending; trip to
Germany by Molotov.
4. It is a known fact that Molotov, who has never been
abroad has strong inhibitions against appearing in strange
surroundings. This applies as much if not more to Stalin.
Therefore, only very favorable circumstances or
extremely important Soviet advantages could induce Molotov or
Stalin to make such a trip, in spite of disinclinations and
"wariness;" furthermore, Molotov, who never flies, will need
at least a week for the trip, and there is really no suitable
substitute for him here.
II. Although the prospects for success therefore appear
to be slight, I will, of course, do everything in my power in
order to try to realize the plan, in case it is to be pursued
any further. A suitable starting point for an informal
conversation on that subject can be found without much
trouble. The course of the conversation will reveal whether
and how far I can go into the subject. As regards the
invitation to Stalin, the possibility of a meeting in a
border town would have to be left open from the very
beginning.
SCHULENBURG
[61] Not printed.
Page 137
*****
Frame 0465, serial F 5
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
RAM Nr. 13 g. Rs.
BERLIN, April 3, 1940.
STATE SECRET
No. 570
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 599, of March 30.
The Reich Foreign Minister requests that nothing further
be initiated for the time being.
SCHMIDT
Minister
*****
Frames 203141-203142, serial 354
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
BERLIN, April 7, 1940.
Received MOSCOW, April 9, 1940.
You receive herewith two copies of a memorandum [62]
which will be presented by our envoys in Oslo and Copenhagen
on April 9, at 5:20 a. m., German summer time, to the
Governments concerned. Until the step which you are
instructed to take below has been carried out, the strictest
secrecy is to be maintained with regard to the memorandum and
this instruction, and no mention thereof is to be made even
to any other member of the Embassy.
On April 9, at 7 a. m., German summer time, you are
requested to ask for an interview with Herr Molotov, and,
during the course of the morning. to hand him a copy of the
memorandum.
You will kindly emphasize orally that we had absolutely
reliable reports regarding an imminent thrust of Anglo-French
military forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts and
therefore had to act without delay. As outlined in the
memorandum, it is a matter of security measures. Swedish and
Finnish territory will in no way be affected by our action.
The Reich Government is of the opinion that our actions
are also in the interest of the Soviet Union, for execution
of the Anglo-French
[62] Not printed here.
Page 138
plan which is known to us would have caused Scandinavia to
become a theater of war, and that, in all probability, would
have led to a reopening of the Finnish question.
Please report immediately by wire how your communication
is received.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 203133, serial 354
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 9, 1940.
SECRET
No. 653 of April 9
Reference your instruction of April 7 (delivered by
Counselor of Legation von Saucken) and our telegram No. 648
of April 9. [63]
For the Reich Foreign Minister in person.
Instruction carried out with Molotov today at 10:30 a.
m., European time. Molotov declared that the Soviet
Government understood the measures which were forced upon
Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far; they
had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In
conclusion, Molotov said literally: "We wish Germany complete
success in her defensive measures."
SCHULENBURG
[63] Latter not printed.
*****
Frames 210958-210960, serial 384
Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Schulenburg)
Tgb. Nr. A. 1833/40
Moscow, April 11, 1940.
MEMORANDUM
For some time we have observed in the Soviet Government
a distinct shift which was unfavorable to us. In all fields
we suddenly came up against obstacles which were, in many
cases, completely unnecessary; even in little things like
visas they started to create difficulties; the release of the
Volksdeutsche imprisoned by the Poles, which was promised by
treaty, could not be achieved; the deportation of the German
citizens long imprisoned in Soviet jails suddenly stopped;
the
Page 139
Soviet Government suddenly withdrew its promises already
given with regard to the "North Base" ["Basis Nord"] in which
our Navy is interested, etc. These obstacles, which were
apparent everywhere, reached their climax in the suspension
of petroleum and grain shipments to us. On the 5th of this
month I had a long talk with Herr Mikoyan, during which the
attitude of the People's Commissar was very negative. I had
to make the most strenuous efforts to get at least some
concessions from him.
We asked ourselves in vain what the reason might be for
the sudden change of attitude of the Soviet authorities.
After all, nothing at all had "happened"! I suspect that the
tremendous clamor of our enemies and their sharp attacks on
neutrals-particularly on the Soviet Union-and on neutrality
in general were not without effect upon the Soviet
Government, so that it feared being forced by the Entente
into a great war for which it is not prepared, and that for
this reason it wanted to avoid anything that might have
furnished a pretext to the English and French for reproaching
the Soviet Union with unneutral behavior or partisanship for
Germany. It appeared to me as though the sudden termination
of the Finnish war had come about from similar
considerations. Of course, these suspicions could not be
proved. However the situation had become so critical that I
decided to call on Herr Molotov in order to talk these
matters over with him, and after this discussion to notify
the Foreign Office. On the 8th of this month I therefore
asked for permission to see Herr Molotov-i. e., before the
Scandinavian events. Actually, the visit to Herr Molotov did
not take place until the morning of the 9th-i. e., after our
Scandinavian operations. During this talk it became apparent
that the Soviet Government had again made a complete about-
face. Suddenly the suspension of the petroleum and grain
shipments was termed "excessive zeal of subordinate agencies"
which would be immediately remedied. (Herr Mikoyan is
Assistant Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.
e., the highest Soviet personality after Herr Molotov!) Herr
Molotov was affability itself, willingly received all our
complaints and promised relief. Of his own accord he touched
upon a number of issues of interest to us and announced their
settlement in a positive sense. I must honestly say that I
was completely amazed at the change.
In my opinion there is only one explanation for this
about-face: our Scandinavian operations must have relieved
the Soviet Government enormously-removed a great burden of
anxiety, so to speak. What their apprehension consisted of,
can again not be determined with cer-
Page 140
tainty. I suspect the following: The Soviet Government is
always extraordinarily well informed. If the English and
French intended to occupy Norway and Sweden it may be assumed
with certainty that the Soviet Government knew of these plans
and was apparently terrified by them. The Soviet Government
saw the English and French appearing on the shores of the
Baltic Sea, and they saw the Finnish question reopened, as
Lord Halifax had announced; finally they dreaded most of all
the danger of becoming involved in a war with two Great
Powers. Apparently this fear was relieved by us. Only in this
way can the completely changed attitude of Herr Molotov be
understood. Today's long and conspicuous article in Izvestia
on our Scandinavian campaign (already sent to you by wire)
sounds like one big sigh of relief. But, at any rate-at least
at the moment-"everything is in order" again here, and our
affairs are going as they should.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 112110, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 13, 1940-10:31 p. m.
Received April 14, 1940-5:20 a. m.
SECRET
No. 687 of April 13
Molotov today asked me to see him and brought up the
following:
Persistent rumors were being circulated everywhere that
Germany would soon be forced to include Sweden in her
Scandinavian operations, particularly in order to ship more
troops to Norway. Molotov added that in his opinion Germany,
and definitely the Soviet Union, were vitally [lebhaft]
interested in preserving Swedish neutrality. He asked me how
much truth there was in these rumors.
First, I referred to my statement to him on April 9,
that our operations would not touch Sweden and Finland and
added that I was not aware of the slightest indication that
we had any designs on Swedish territory. Nevertheless, I
would pass his inquiry on to Berlin.
In conclusion, Molotov declared that the Soviet
Government was greatly interested in preserving Swedish
neutrality, that its violation was frowned upon by the Soviet
Government, and that it hoped the inclusion of Sweden in our
operations would not take place, if this could at all be
avoided. Request instructions by wire.
SCHULENBURG
Page 141
*****
Frame 112111, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
IMMEDIATE
BERLIN, April 15, 1940.
SECRET
No. 636
Reference your telegram No. 687.
I request that you explain to Herr Molotov our attitude
toward Sweden as follows:
We share completely the attitude of the Soviet
Government that preservation of Sweden's neutrality
corresponds both to German and to Soviet interests. As you
already told him on transmitting our memorandum on April 9
and repeated during the conversation of April 13, it is not
our intention to extend our military operations in the north
to Swedish territory. On the contrary, we are determined to
respect unconditionally the neutrality of Sweden, as long as
Sweden in turn also observes strict neutrality and does not
support the Western powers.
Reich Foreign Minister
*****
Frames 203979-203980, serial 357
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
BERLIN, May 7, 1940.
Received Moscow, May 10, 1940.
Enclosed you will find two copies of two memoranda [64]
which will be presented by our Legations in The Hague,
Brussels, and Luxemburg to the Governments there on the day
and hour to be indicated to you orally by the courier.
[Interlinear penciled notation: May 10, 1940, 5:45 a. m.,
German summer time.] Until the dmarche ordered below has
been accomplished, the memoranda and these instructions are
to be kept strictly secret and not mentioned even to any
member of the Embassy.
I request that after receipt of these instructions you
enter on the copies of the attached memoranda-on the last
page, beneath the text-the date of the day before that on
which you deliver the copies to the Government in Moscow,
preferably with typewriter, or else in ink.
[64] Not printed here.
Page 142
About 7 o'clock in the morning, German summer time, on
the day mentioned to you by the courier, I request that you
ask for an appointment with Molotov and then, in the course
of the morning at the earliest hour convenient to him, hand
him a copy of the memoranda. I request that you tell Herr
Molotov that the Reich Government, in view of our friendly
relations, is anxious to notify the Soviet Government of
these operations in the West, which were forced upon Germany
by the impending Anglo-French push on the Ruhr region by way
of Belgium and Holland.
For the rest, I request that you use the viewpoints and
arguments to be found in the memoranda themselves.
I request that you report by wire immediately concerning
the reception accorded your mission.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 203978, serial 357
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, May 10, 1940-6 p. m.
No. 874 of May 10
Reference instructions of May 7.
For the Reich Foreign Minister:
I called on Molotov; instruction carried out. Molotov
appreciated the news and added that he understood that
Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack.
He had no doubt of our success.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 210963-210964, serial 384
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, May 29, 1940-7:10 p. m.
Received May 29, 1940-10:10 p. m.
No. 1006 of May 29
Reference your telegram of the 28th No. 877. [65]
The reported agreement of the Soviet Government to the
sending of Cripps appears credible, since the Soviet
Government has always
[65] Not printed.
Page 143
taken the position that it was of interest to it to learn
what the British Government had to tell them, and that
economic agreements with England were in harmony with the
neutral position of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet
Union is interested in obtaining rubber and tin from England
in exchange for lumber.
There is no reason for apprehension concerning Cripps'
mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal attitude
of the Soviet Union toward us and since the unchanged
direction of Soviet policy toward England precludes damage to
Germany or vital German interests. There are no indications
of any kind here for belief that the latest German successes
caused alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government. All
the assertions of the foreign and especially enemy press to
the contrary are desperate attempts to sow distrust between
Germany and the Soviet Union, to start a diplomatic activity
against Germany at any cost in view of the precarious
situation of the Allies, and to exploit this as propaganda
for their own people.
The selection of Cripps as British plenipotentiary
appears unfortunate in view of the attitude in Moscow: the
Soviet Government prefers to negotiate important matters with
a prominent representative of the foreign government.
As I see it here a trip by Ritter [66] and (group
garbled) at the present time would have to avoid looking like
a race with Cripps. The advisability of the trip would also
have to be considered from the point of view of whether we
would (group missing) anything new to offer the Soviet
Government.
SCHULENBURG
[66] Ambassador Ritter of the German Foreign Office staff.
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