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Page 261
VII. SOVIET RESISTANCE TO THE GERMAN ADVANCE IN THE BALKANS,
DECEMBER 18, 1940-MARCH 13, 1941
*****
Fhrer's Directive [7]
THE FšHRER AND COMMANDER IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I) Nr. 33 408/40 g K CHEFS.
MILITARY SECRET [Geheime Kommandosache]
TOP SECRET [Chef Sache]
BY OFFICER ONLY
FšHRER's HEADQUARTERS,
December 18, 1940
DIRECTIVE No. 21
OPERATION BARBAROSSA
The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet
Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before
the conclusion of the war against England.
For this purpose the Army will have to employ all
available units, with the reservation that the occupied
territories must be secured against surprise attacks.
For the Air Force it will be a matter of releasing such
strong forces for the eastern campaign in support of the Army
that a quick completion of the ground operations may be
expected and that damage to Eastern German territory by enemy
air attacks will be as slight as possible. This concentration
of the main effort in the East is limited by the requirement
that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must
remain adequately protected against enemy air attacks and
that the offensive operations against England, particularly
her supply lines, must not be permitted to break down.
The main effort of the Navy will remain unequivocally
directed against England even during an eastern campaign.
I shall order the concentration against Soviet Russia
possibly eight weeks before the intended beginning of
operations.
[7] This document is from the German Wehrmacht archives. It
is the only document in this collection derived from a source
other than the German Foreign Office archives.
Page 261
Preparations requiring more time to start are to be
started now-if this has not yet been done-and are to be
completed by May 15, 1941.
It is to be considered of decisive importance, however,
that the intention to attack is not discovered.
The preparations of the High Commands are to be made on
the following basis:
I. General Purpose:
The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be
destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep
armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat
into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.
In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which
the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German
Reich territory. The ultimate objective of the operation is
to establish a defense line against Asiatic Russia from a
line running approximately from the Volga River to Archangel.
Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to
Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea
Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be
able to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be
prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of the
operation.
II. Probable Allies and their Tasks:
1. On the flanks of our operation we can count on the
active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war
against Soviet Russia.
The High Command will in due time concert and determine
in what form the armed forces of the two countries will be
placed under German command at the time of their
intervention.
2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the
forces concentrating there, to pin down the enemy facing her
and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear
area.
3. Finland will cover the concentration of the
redeployed German North Group (parts of the XXI Group) coming
from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides,
Finland will be assigned the task of eliminating Hang”.
4. It may be expected that Swedish railroads and
highways will be available for the concentration of the
German North Group, from the start of operations at the
latest.
Page 262
III. Direction of Operations:
A. Army (hereby approving the plans presented to me):
In the zone of operations divided by the Pripet Marshes
into a southern and northern sector, the main effort will be
made north of this area. Two Army Groups will be provided
here.
The southern group of these two Army Groups-the center
of the entire front-will be given the task of annihilating
the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the
region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong
armored and motorized units. The possibility of switching
strong mobile units to the North must thereby be created in
order, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group operating
from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to
annihilate the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic. Only
after having accomplished this most important task, which
must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and
Kronstadt, are the offensive operations aimed at the
occupation of the important traffic and armament center of
Moscow to be pursued.
Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance
could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.
The most important assignment of the XXI Group, even
during the eastern operations, will still be the protection
of Norway. The additional forces available are to be employed
in the north (mountain corps), first to secure the Petsamo
Region and its ore mines as well as the Arctic Ocean route,
and then to advance jointly with Finnish forces against the
Murmansk railroad and stop the supply of the Murmansk region
by land.
Whether such an operation with rather strong German
forces (two or three divisions) can be conducted from the
area of and south of Rovaniemi depends upon Sweden's
willingness to make the railroads available for such a
concentration.
The main body of the Finnish Army will be assigned the
task, in coordination with the advance of the German northern
flank, of pinning down strong Russian forces by attacking
west of or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and of seizing Hang”.
The Army Group employed south of the Pripet Marshes is
to make its main effort in the area from Lublin in the
general direction of Kiev, in order to penetrate quickly with
strong armored units into the deep flank and rear of the
Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper
River
Page 263
The German-Rumanian groups on the right flank are
assigned the task of:
(a) protecting Rumanian territory and thereby the
southern flank of the entire operation.
(b) pinning down the opposing enemy forces while Army
Group South is attacking on its northern flank and, according
to the progressive development of the situation and in
conjunction with the Air Force, preventing their orderly
retreat across the Dniester during the pursuit,
[and,] in the North, of reaching Moscow quickly.
The capture of this city means a decisive success
politically and economically and, beyond that, the
elimination of the most important railway center.
B. Air Force:
Its task wild be to paralyze and to eliminate as far as
possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force as well as
to support the Army at its main points of effort,
particularly those of Army Group Center and, on the flank,
those of Army Group South. The Russian railroads, in the
order of their importance for the operations, will be cut or
the most important near-by objectives (river crossings)
seized by the bold employment of parachute and airborne
troops.
In order to concentrate all forces against the enemy Air
Force and to give immediate support to the Army the armament
industry will not be attacked during the main operations.
Only after the completion of the mobile operations may such
attacks be considered-primarily against the Ural Region.
C. Navy:
The Navy's role against Soviet Russia is, while
safeguarding our own coast, to prevent an escape of enemy
naval units from the Baltic Sea. As the Russian Baltic Sea
Fleet, once we have reached Leningrad, will be deprived of
its last base and will then be in a hopeless situation, any
larger naval operations are to be avoided before that time.
After the elimination of the Russian Fleet it will be a
question of protecting all the traffic in the Baltic Sea,
including the supply by sea of the northern flank of the Army
(mine clearance!).
IV. All orders to be issued by the commanders-in-chief
on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that
they are precautionary measures for the possibility that
Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The
number of officers to be assigned to the preparatory work at
an early date is to be kept as small as possible;
Page 264
additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible
and only to the extent required for the activity of each
individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our
preparations-the date of their execution has not even been
fixed-there is danger that most serious political and
military disadvantages may arise.
V. I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief
concerning their further plans based on this directive.
The contemplated preparations of all branches of the
Armed Forces, including their progress, are to be reported to
me through the High Command [OKW].
ADOLF HITLER [8]
[8] The document also bears four sets of initials, apparently
those of Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, and one unidentified.
*****
Frame 112785, serial 104
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
St. S. Nr. 925
DECEMBER 31, 1940.
The Finnish Minister, whom I saw today on the occasion
of the signing of a treaty, in connection with his New Year's
wishes expressed hope for his country. He stated that in his
homeland people were now reassured because they thought they
knew that in a future conflict with Russia they would not
stand alone.
In my reply I used the formula that the Russian
Government certainly realized that Germany did not desire any
new unrest in the North.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 112944-112945, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg), the German Ambassador in
Turkey (Papen), the German Minister in Yugoslavia
(Heeren), and the German Minister in Greece (Erbach-
Sch”nberg)
Telegrams
STATE SECRET
BERLIN, January 7, 1941.
Pol I 1650 gRs
No. 36 to Moscow
No. 12 to Ankara
No. 11 to Belgrade
No. 81 to Athens
Page 265
I. For confidential information of the Chief of the
Mission and the Military, Naval, and Air Attaches only.
Since early in January the movement of strong German
troop formations to Rumania has been going on via Hungary.
The movement of troops is being carried on with the full
concurrence of the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. For
the time being the troops will be quartered in the south of
Rumania.
The troop movements result from the fact that the
necessity must be seriously contemplated of ejecting the
English completely from all of Greece. German troops have
been provided in such strength that they can easily cope with
any military task in the Danubian Region and with any
eventualities from any side. The military measures being
carried out by us are aimed exclusively against British
forces getting a foothold in Greece, and not against any
Balkan country, including Turkey.
II. As for instructions for conversations, in general, a
reserved attitude is to be taken. In case of urgent official
inquiries, it is to be pointed out, depending on
circumstances, that such inquiries are to be made in Berlin.
In so far as conversation cannot be avoided, an opinion in
general terms is to be given. In so doing, our having
reliable reports regarding larger and larger reinforcements
of English troops of all kinds in Greece may be given as a
plausible reason, and the Salonika operation of the last
World War may be recalled. Concerning the strength of the
German troops, maintenance of the present vagueness is
desired for the time being. Later on we shall presumably be
interested in making known the full strength of the troops
and, beyond that, in stimulating exaggeration. The cue for
that will be given at the proper time.
This instruction also applies, by agreement with the
High Command, to the Military, Naval, and Air Attaches.
Strict reserve in answering inquiries is to be imposed upon
the other members of the mission.
III. Should occasion arise, please report by wire
concerning the attitude of the Government, the public and the
press, any inquiries by the Government there, and any
d‚marches of foreign missions with the Government there.
Reich Foreign Minister
Page 266
*****
Frame 112945, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Japan
(Ott)
Telegram
Pol. I 1650 g Rs
BERLIN, January 7, 1941.
No. 19. I request that the Japanese Foreign Minister be
personally and confidentially informed that at present rather
strong German troop contingents are being transferred to
Rumania. The movements are carried on with the full
concurrence of the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments.
These troop shipments are being carried out as a security
measure for an intervention that may become necessary in
Greece if English military forces gain a foothold and
necessitate such intervention there.
Reich Foreign Minister
*****
Frame 112942, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
STRICTLY SECRET
Moscow, January 8, 1941-4:45 p. m.
Received January 8, 1941-6 p. m.
No. 46 of January 8
Reference your telegram of the 7th No. 36.
Numerous rumors are already circulating here concerning
the sending of German troops to Rumania; the number of men in
the movement is even estimated at 200,000 (two hundred
thousand). Government circles here, the radio, and the Soviet
press have not yet taken up the matter. Nothing is known
concerning d‚marches by foreign missions with the Soviet
Government.
The Soviet Government will take the strongest interest
in these troop movements and will wish to know what purposes
these troop concentrations serve and particularly to what
degree Bulgaria and Turkey (Straits) might possibly be
affected by them.
Please give me appropriate instructions or perhaps
inform Herr Dekanosov there.
SCHULENBURG
Page 267
*****
Frame 112966, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
Teletype from Fuschl No. 12 of January 10, 11:45 p. m.
No. 1832
Reference your telegram No. 50 of January 8. [9]
I request you not to broach the question of increased
German troop shipments to Rumania with the Soviet Government.
Should you be approached regarding the matter by Herr Molotov
or some other influential person in the Soviet Government,
please say that according to your information the sending of
German troops was exclusively a matter of precautionary
military measures against England. The English already had
military contingents on Greek soil and it was to be expected
that they would further increase those contingents in the
immediate future. Germany would not under any circumstances
tolerate England's gaining a foothold on Greek soil. Please
do not go into greater detail until further notice.
RIBBENTROP
[9] Not printed
*****
Frames 333-334, serial F 15
Secret Protocol
The German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg,
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the German Reich, on the
one hand, and the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, Plenipotentiary of
the Government of the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, have
agreed upon the following:
1. The Government of the German Reich renounces its
claim to the strip of Lithuanian territory which is mentioned
in the Secret Supplementary Protocol of September 28, 1939
[10] and which has been marked on the map attached to this
Protocol;
2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the
German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this
Protocol by paying 7,500,000 gold dollars or 31,500,000
Reichsmarks to Germany.
The amount of 31.5 million Reichsmarks will be paid by
the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the following manner: one-
eighth, that is, 3,937,500 Reichsmarks, in non-ferrous metal
deliveries within three months after the signing of this
Protocol, the remaining seven-eighths,
[10] Ante, p, 107.
Page 268
or 27,562,500 Reichsmarks, in gold by deduction from the
German gold payments which Germany is to make by February 11,
1941 in accordance with the correspondence exchanged between
the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation, Dr. Schnurre,
and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.,
Herr A. I. Mikoyan, in connection with the "Agreement of
January 10, 1941 concerning reciprocal deliveries in the
second treaty period on the basis of the Economic Agreement
between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics of February 11 1940."
3. This Protocol has been executed in two originals in
the German language and two originals in the Russian language
and shall become effective immediately upon signature.
Moscow, January 10, 1941.
For the Government of the German Reich:
SCHULENBURG
(SEAL)
By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV
(SEAL)
*****
Frames 112984-112986, serial 104
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the
Reich Foreign Minister
SECRET
BERLIN; January 17, 1941.
St. S. Nr. 52
By Wire by fastest means to the Reich Foreign Minister
(teletype or telephone).
The Russian Ambassador called on me this afternoon. On
the basis of a memorandum which he handed me later on, he
stated the following:
"According to all reports, German troops in great
numbers are in Rumania and are now prepared to march into
Bulgaria, having as their goal the occupation of Bulgaria,
Greece and the Straits. There can be no doubt that England
will try to forestall the operations of German troops, to
occupy the Straits, to start military operations against
Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a
theater of operations. The Soviet Government has stated
repeatedly to the German Government that it considers the
territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as the security zone
of the U.S.S.R. and that it cannot be indifferent to events
which threaten the security interests of the U.S.S.R. In view
of all this the Soviet Government regards
Page 269
it as its duty to give warning that it will consider the
appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of
Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security
interests of the U.S.S.R."
End of the remarks of the Ambassador.
Without taking this statement too seriously before
Dekanosov, I replied that I should not like to answer him of
my own accord at once, but would prefer first to inform the
Reich Foreign Minister of his communication.
I then added that I should like to ask two more
questions in order to understand the contents of his
communication correctly, namely-
(a) From whom had the Soviet Government received the
report that German troops concentrated in Rumania were aiming
at the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits?
Dekanosov replied that his Government's sources were not
known to him. He referred to the fact that-as stated
previously-all reports are to this effect, to which I replied-
without intending to anticipate a later German statement-that
it was correct that under no circumstances would we allow
England to gain a foothold in Greece and that we were
observing this matter closely. Besides, this was certainly
nothing new for the Soviet Government, because this had
already been stated to Herr Molotov some time ago.
(b) Why did the Soviet Government take it for granted
that England, forestalling the operations of the German
troops, would attempt to occupy the Straits? In this matter,
too, Dekanosov referred only to his original communication.
His Government did not know that anything of the sort would
occur; however, it had no doubt regarding commensurate
English measures if the condition mentioned, namely, the
advance of German troops on Bulgaria, Greece, and the
Straits, should materialize.
In conclusion, I again reserved the right to a reply to
the d‚marche.
After I had made a few more remarks concerning German
air successes against the British fleet in the Mediterranean,
the Ambassador took his leave, hoping for an early reply.
WEIZSŽCKER
Page 270
*****
Frames 112981-112982, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, January 17, 1941-8:46 p. m.
Received January 17, 1941-11:40 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 122 of January 17
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
1. Molotov asked me to call on him this afternoon and
stated the following:
Since the most important economic questions in the
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union had been
settled by the recently concluded treaties, it would now be
in order to turn to purely political issues again. The Soviet
Government was surprised that it had not yet received from
Germany any answer to its statement of position of November
25 (cf. telegraphic report No. 2562 [2362] of November 25)
concerning the issues raised during the Berlin discussions,
and he would appreciate it if I would bring that fact to the
attention of the Government of the German Reich with the
remark that the Soviet Government was counting on an early
German reply.
I replied to Herr Molotov that there was not the
slightest cause for any surprise, since this was a matter of
issues which must first be thoroughly discussed with Italy
and Japan. As soon as these deliberations had been concluded
the Soviet Government would certainly be informed of our
position with regard to their reply.
2. Molotov then touched upon the Balkans and in that
connection stated word for word as follows:
According to all reports available here, German troops
in great numbers were concentrated in Rumania and ready to
march into Bulgaria with the aim of occupying Bulgaria,
Greece, and the Straits. There was no doubt that England
would try to forestall the operations of the German troops,
to occupy the Straits, to open military operations against
Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a
theater of war. The Soviet Government had repeatedly called
the attention of the Government of the German Reich to the
fact that it considered the territory of Bulgaria and the
Straits as a security zone of the U.S.S.R. and that it could
therefore not remain indifferent in the face of events which
menaced the security interests of the U.S.S.R. Consequently
the Soviet Government regarded it
Page 271
as its duty to call attention to the fact that it would
consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the
territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of
the security interests of the U.S.S.R.
Molotov added that he had instructed Dekanosov to make
an identical d‚marche in Berlin. In my reply I confined
myself to the statements prescribed by telegraphic
instructions No. 36 of January 7 and No. 57 of January 10.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 112994-112997, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the State Secretary in the
German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
Telegram
No. 38
FUSCHL, January 21, 1941-11:30 p. m.
Teletype through Office of Reich Foreign Minister to
State Secretary von Weizs„cker, No. 31.
1. I request that you ask the Russian Ambassador to call
on you Wednesday evening and that you give him in oral form
the following reply to the statement made to you on January
17. Thereupon the text of the reply is to be handed to him in
the form of a memorandum.
Text of the reply:
1. The Reich Government has not received any reports
that England contemplates occupying the Straits. Nor does the
Reich Government believe that Turkey will permit English
military forces to enter her territory. However, the Reich
Government is informed that England intends and is about to
gain a foothold on Greek territory.
2. The Fhrer pointed out repeatedly to Chairman Molotov
during his visit to Berlin in November that Germany would
prevent by all military means any attempt by England to gain
a foothold on Greek soil.
It is the inalterable intention of the Reich Government
not under any circumstances to permit English military forces
to establish themselves on Greek territory, which would mean
a threat to vital interests of Germany in the Balkans. It is
therefore carrying out certain troop concentrations in the
Balkans, which have the sole purpose of preventing the
British from gaining any foothold on Greek soil.
3. Germany does not intend to occupy the Straits. She
will respect the territory under Turkish sovereignty unless
Turkey on her part commits a hostile act against German
troops. On the other hand, however, the German Army will
march through Bulgarian territory
Page 272
should any military operations be carried out against Greece.
The Reich Government has, of course, no intention of
violating any Soviet Russian security interests nor would
this by any means be the case if German troops march through
Bulgaria.
4. For the action which may have to be undertaken
against England in Greece, Germany is carrying on a troop
concentration in the Balkans on such a scale that it will
enable her to checkmate any English attempt at building up a
front in those regions.
The Reich Government believes that in so doing it is
also serving Soviet interests, which would be opposed to
England's gaining a foothold in these regions.
5. The Reich Government-as it indicated on the occasion
of the Berlin visit of Chairman Molotov-has an understanding
of the Soviet interest in the Straits question and is
prepared to endorse a revision of the Montreux Convention at
the proper time. Germany on her part is politically not
interested in the Straits question and will withdraw her
troops from there after having carried out her operations in
the Balkans.
6. As to the stand requested by Chairman Molotov
concerning the question of continuing the political
discussion begun some time ago in Berlin, the following may
be stated:
The Reich Government still adheres to the ideas
explained to Chairman Molotov during his presence in Berlin.
The Soviet Government on the other hand made certain
counterproposals at the end of November. At the present time
the Reich Government is in touch with the Governments of its
allies, Italy and Japan, concerning all those issues, and it
hopes that after having further clarified the whole problem
it will be able to resume the political discussion with the
Soviet Government in the near future.
End of the reply.
2. Ambassador Schulenburg is receiving instructions from
here to take corresponding action with Herr Molotov on
Wednesday evening or Thursday morning. [11]
3. Furthermore, I request that, after the call of the
Russian Ambassador, you hand Ambassador Alfieri a copy of the
statement given to you by Herr Dekanosov on January 17, as
well as a copy of our reply, for the confidential information
of the Italian Government. The Duce and Count Ciano have
already been informed by me here.
RIBBENTROP
[11] By telegram No. 129 of January 22, 1941, not printed,
Ambassador Schulenburg was instructed to give an identical
reply to Molotov.
Page 273
*****
Frames 112998-112999, serial 101
Memorandum, by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
St. S. Nr. 59
BERLIN, January 22, 1941.
I received the Soviet Russian Ambassador late this
afternoon and informed him orally of the reply decided upon
in answer to his statement of January 17. I then handed him
the text of the reply in the form of a memorandum.
I also told Dekanosov that Count Schulenburg would hand
a corresponding communication to Herr Molotov either this
evening or tomorrow morning.
Dekanosov then inquired-for his own information, he said-
about the purport of certain expressions in the reply given
to him. He wanted to find out how soon German troops might be
expected to march through Bulgaria against Greece-as
mentioned therein-as well as whether this decision was to be
considered as definite.
I referred the Ambassador in this connection to the text
of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the memorandum.
Thereupon the Ambassador repeated from his communication
of the 17th instant that the Soviet Government considered the
appearance of any foreign military forces on Bulgarian
territory as a violation of its security interests. Our
statement at the end of paragraph 3 of the memorandum was not
in agreement with that view.
I replied that our view was made clear in paragraph 3
and paragraph 4 of the memorandum. we believed that our plans
would actually serve Soviet interests, which are opposed to
England's gaining a foothold in these regions. Moreover, I
asked the Ambassador to go over the memorandum again very
carefully at home. He would then surely reach the conclusion
that our answer removed his anxiety.
Submitted herewith to the
Reich Foreign Minister (by teletype).
WEIZSŽCKER
Page 274
*****
Frame 113003, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, January 23, 1941-9:21 p. m.
Received January 23 [24], 1941-12:25 a. m.
SECRET
No. 161 of January 23
Reference your telegram No. 129 of the 22nd. [12]
Instruction carried out today.
Molotov stated that Soviet Government would examine and
consider our communication, after which he would take a
stand, if necessary. He understood the communication of the
Government of the German Reich to mean that the transit of
German troops through Bulgaria was in itself a matter that
was definitely decided on, but only in the event that England
should expand her military operations on Greek soil beyond
their present scope.
For the rest, Molotov stated the well-known argument
according to which the Soviet Government considered Bulgaria
and the Straits as a security zone of the Soviet Union and
that it was opposed to any spread of the war, particularly in
the Black Sea, wherein it believed itself in agreement with
the Government of the German Reich.
SCHULENBURG
[12] Not printed. For contents see footnote 11, ante, p 272.
*****
Frame 218062, serial 426
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 353 of February 21
BERLIN, February 22, 1941-6:25 a. m.
Received Moscow, February 22, 1941-11 a. m.
Confidential material. For chief of mission or his
representative personally. State secret. To be decoded
personally. Extremely secret. Reply by courier or secret
code.
In Telegraphic Instruction No. 36 of January 7 the
statement was made that, for the time being, vagueness with
regard to the strength of the German forces was desirable and
that at a given time word would be given for publication of
the full strength of the troops. That time has now come.
Page 275
In Rumania there are 680,000 (six hundred eighty
thousand) German troops in readiness. Among these troops
there is an unusually high percentage of technical troops
with the most up-to-date military equipment, especially
armored units. Behind these troops there are inexhaustible
reserves in Germany, including the permanent units stationed
at the German-Yugoslav border.
I request the members of the mission and any available
trusted persons [Vertrauensleute] to start, in suitable ways,
to let this strength be known in an impressive manner-
indicating that it is more than sufficient to meet any
eventuality in the Balkans from any side whatsoever-and to do
so not only in Government circles there but also in the
foreign missions concerned. I leave it to your discretion not
always to mention the exact figure given above. On the
contrary, innuendo and circumlocution may also be used, as,
for example, "almost 700,000," and the like.
RITTER
*****
Frame 218061, serial 426
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
Multex No. 98 of February 22
BERLIN, February 23, 1941-3:10 a. m.
Received Moscow, February 23, 1941-9:50 a. m.
Confidential material. State Secret. Extremely secret.
To be decoded only by official in charge of state secret
documents. To be decoded personally. Extremely secret. Reply
by courier or secret code.
Recently there have been frequent Greek assurances,
intended for German ears, that, except for a number of
British planes, there are no British forces in Greece and
that the Greek Government has rejected and will reject
British offers to send strong British forces to Greece. These
assurances are apparently being made according to plan at the
direction of the Greek Government directly through Greek
diplomats and military attaches and indirectly through
foreign governments and military attaches.
Please do not accept such assurances without rejoinder.
The answer should be that the Government of the Reich had its
own information regarding the numerical strength of the
British troops in Greece and regarding the further intentions
of the British. British Prime
Page 276
Minister Churchill himself revealed the intentions of the
British when he declared in the House of Commons, in the
course of statements on the British military situation in
North Africa on December 19, 1940: "Marshal Sir Longmore
experienced the most critical moment in his preparations when
he saw how big a portion of his military forces was being
withdrawn in order to be sent to Greece." The Reich
Government attaches more importance to these and other
statements of Churchill than to the assurances of Greece,
whose purpose it is easy to see through.
Confirm receipt.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 113086-113087, serial 104
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Fuschl, February 27, 1941-9:50 p. m.
Received Berlin, February 27, 1941-10:30 p. m.
No. 144 of February 27
Transmitted to Moscow as No. 403, February 27-10:58 p. m.
For the Ambassador personally.
Please go to see Herr Molotov on Friday, February 28,
toward evening and communicate to him verbally the following:
1. As the Soviet Government knows, negotiations have for
some time been in progress between the Government of the
Reich and the Italian Government on the one hand and the
Bulgarian Government on the other, regarding the accession of
Bulgaria to the Three Power Pact. These negotiations have now
been concluded, and it has been agreed that Bulgaria will
accede to the Three Power Pact, and the Protocol regarding
this accession will be signed on March 1. The Government of
the Reich is anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this
in advance.
2. I would ask you to go to see Herr Molotov again on
March 1, toward evening, and to tell him the following:
Reports in our possession concerning British intentions
in Greece have forced the Government of the Reich to take
further security measures forthwith, making necessary the
shifting of German troops to Bulgarian soil. Referring to the
statement made to the Soviet Government on January 23d,
please add that this is a precautionary
Page 277
measure taken to prevent the British from gaining a firm
foothold in Greece. Should Herr Molotov go into the subject
in any further detail, we remind you-for your guidance-that,
in the first place, these security measures are taken
exclusively to prevent British entrenchment on Greek
territory; secondly, that the measures are not directed at
Turkey, and that we shall respect Turkish sovereignty unless
Turkey commits a hostile act against us; that, thirdly, these
German troop concentrations are war measures, and that the
elimination of the British danger in Greece will
automatically result in the withdrawal of the German troops.
Please inform me by wire how Herr Molotov receives your
communications.
For your personal information, you are further informed
that the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow will also make similar
communications from his Government on February 28th and on
March 1.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 113094, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, March 1, 1941-12:25 a. m.
Received March 1, 1941-2:10 a. m.
No. 444 of February 28
In reference to your telegram of the 27th, No. 403.
I called on Herr Molotov this evening and carried out
instruction (1).
Molotov received my communication with obvious concern
and stated that the German Reich Government had been informed
of the viewpoint of the Soviet Government on November 25,
1940 (see telegraphic report of November 25, No. 2562
[2362]). The position of the Soviet Government in the matter
was still determined by the communication of that date. Then,
the future position of Bulgaria was considered within the
framework of certain particular circumstances. In the
meantime, events had taken a different turn. The view of the
Soviet Government, on the other hand, that Bulgaria came
within the security zone of the Soviet Union, remained
unchanged.
Despite my objections that the accession of Bulgaria was
in no way prejudicial to the interests of the Soviet Union,
Molotov held to his view, stating that the accession of
Bulgaria was taking place
Page 278
under circumstances quite different than had been
anticipated, and that it was unfortunately not evident to him
that events were unfolding within the framework of the Soviet
Government's d‚marche of November 25.
SCHULENBURG
NOTE: Transmitted under No. 744, to special train.
Telegram Control Office March 1, 1941, 2:55 A. M.
*****
Frames 113100-113101, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, March 1, 1941-10:15 p. m.
Received March 2, 1941-2:20 a. m.
SECRET
No. 453 of March 1
Reference your telegram of the 27th, No. 403.
Instruction under (2) carried out at 6:30 p. m., Moscow
time, today.
Molotov, who received my communication with great
gravity, stated first of all that he was informed regarding
the German decision, since the Bulgarian Minister had today
already apprised Herr Vishinsky. Molotov thereupon expressed
his deep concern that the German Government had, in a matter
of such importance to the Soviet Government, made decisions
contrary to the Soviet Government's conception of the
security interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government
had repeatedly stressed its special interest in Bulgaria to
the German Government, both during the Berlin conferences and
later. Consequently it could not remain indifferent in the
face of Germany's last measures in Bulgaria and would have to
define its attitude with regard thereto. It hoped that the
German Reich Government would attach the proper significance
to this attitude. Molotov in my presence drafted in his own
hand a rough memorandum setting forth the position of the
Soviet Government, had it copied, and handed it to me. The
text of the note is as follows:
"1. It is to be regretted that despite the caution
contained in the d‚marche of November 25, 1940, on the part
of the Soviet Government, the German Reich Government has
deemed it possible to take a course that involves injury to
the security interests of the U.S.S.R. and has decided to
effect the military occupation of Bulgaria.
Page 279
"2. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government
maintains the same basic position as in its d‚marche of
November 25, the German Government must understand that it
cannot count on support from the U.S.S.R. for its acts in
Bulgaria."
In my reply, I confined myself to your instructions, and
stressed that there could be no question of an impairment of
Soviet security interests.
SCHULENBURG
NOTE: Transmitted to special train under No. 771.
Telegram Control Office March 2, 1941.
*****
Frame 24471, serial 34
Foreign Office Memorandum
STATE SECRET
Pol I M 653 g RS
General Warlimont and Naval Captain Brkner bring up the
point that for certain reasons a speedy termination of the
activities of the various Russian Commissions at work on
German territory in the east and their immediate despatch
home is necessary. Such commissions are still on German
territory in connection with the return of Lithuanian
emigrants from Germany to Lithuania. The German-Russian
boundary commission is also active, as well as several local
sub-commissions. Of these sub-commissions some are located on
Russian territory and others on German territory (and in fact
south of Suwalki?). The work of these sub-commissions was to
be completed by March 10th. For some reason, they have not
yet begun their work. The OKW requests that everything be
done to prevent this work from being begun.
The presence of Russians in this part of Germany can
only be permitted up to March 25. In the northern sector
strong elements of German troops are already being assembled.
From the 20th of March on an even heavier massing will take
place.
The question is raised in this connection as to whether
the Russian consulate in K”nigsberg is occupied.
RITTER
BERLIN, March 13, 1941
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