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Last-Modified: 1997/10/19
Page 79
III. THE PACT EXECUTED AND AMENDED, AUGUST 23-SEPTEMBER 28,
1939
*****
Frames 221102-221103, serial 439
The Reich Finance Minister (Schwerin-Krosigk) to the Reich
Foreign Minister
ROME, August 23, 1939.
MY DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: First, my cordial and
sincere congratulations on the great success attained with
the Russian pact.
This morning at 10 o'clock I had a conversation with
Count Ciano and in accordance with our agreement I herewith
report the contents.
After the usual words of salutation Count Ciano
immediately talked about foreign policy and stressed the
importance of your trip to Russia. Nevertheless, in case of
Germany's intervention in Poland, England and France would,
in his opinion, immediately participate in the war. The
Ambassadors of both powers had just confirmed this to him
expressly and very seriously. This created a very serious
situation. For actually the Axis was not yet sufficiently
prepared, above all, economically. Only in three to four
years-Count Ciano corrected himself and said with strong
emphasis "in three years"-would it be ready for war. We would
certainly have initial military successes; but the enemy
would recover and would wage a war of attrition of long
duration along economic lines. Upon my objection that the
Fhrer was of a different opinion and did not believe in a
war with England and France, Count Ciano replied that he was
aware of that, but that he was afraid that the Fhrer would
not be proved right this time. Upon my reply that it was
completely intolerable for a great nation to look on
passively any longer at the systematic [mis?] treatment of
Germans by Poles, and that therefore a solution of the Polish
problem was absolutely necessary and that the whole German
people was of one mind on that score, Count Ciano replied
that a great deal would depend upon the attitude of the Axis
peoples. For it would be necessary to fight with utmost
tenacity, since in case of a defeat we would have to count on
a peace which would practically mean the end of the Axis
Powers. Count Ciano concluded the conversation by stating
that de-
Page 80
spite the great diplomatic success of the Russian pact he
considered the situation as very serious.
My audience with the Duce will take place tomorrow at 7
p. m. On Friday morning I shall return to Berlin.
Heil Hitler
Sincerely yours,
COUNT SCHWERIN-KROSIGK
[In handwriting]
MY DEAR HERR von WEIZSŽCKER: In view of the absence of
Herr von Ribbentrop, I am sending, you directly a copy of my
letter addressed to him.
SCHWERIN-KROSIGK
*****
Frames 78822-78825, serial 147
Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, August 25, 1939
DUCE: For some time Germany and Russia have been engaged
in an exchange of views about a new attitude on both sides in
regard to their political relations.
The necessity of arriving at some conclusions of this
sort was increased by:
(1) The general situation of world politics as it
affected both of the Axis Powers.
(2) The necessity of securing a clear statement of
position from the Japanese Cabinet. Japan would probably
agree to an alliance against Russia, which would have only a
secondary interest, under the prevailing circumstances, for
Germany, and in my opinion, for Italy also. She would not,
however, undertake such definite obligations against England,
and this, from the standpoint not only of Germany, but also
of Italy, was of decisive importance. The intention of the
military to force the Japanese Government in a short time to
take a similarly clear position with respect to England had
been stated months ago, but had never been realized in
practice.
(3) The relation of Germany to Poland, not through the
blame of the Reich, but as a result of the activity of
England, has become considerably more unsatisfactory since
spring and in the last few weeks the position has become
simply unbearable. The reports about the persecution of the
Germans in the border areas are not invented press reports
but represent only a fraction of the terrible truth. The
customs policy of Poland, resulting in the throttling of
Danzig, has brought about a complete standstill in Danzig's
entire economic life for the past several weeks and would if
it were continued for only a brief length of time, destroy
the city.
These grounds led me to hasten the conclusion of the
German-Russian conversations. I have not kept you informed in
detail, Duce,
Page 81
since I did not have an idea of the possible extent of these
conversations, or any assurance of the possibility of their
success.
The readiness on the part of the Kremlin to arrive at a
reorientation of its relations with Germany, which became
apparent after the departure of Litvinov, has become ever
stronger in the last few weeks and has made it possible for
me, after successful preparation, to send my Foreign Minister
to Moscow for the conclusion of a treaty which is the most
extensive non-aggression pact in existence and whose text
will be made public. The pact is unconditional and includes
also the obligation for consultation about all questions
affecting Russia and Germany. I may tell you, Duce, that
through these arrangements the favorable attitude of Russia
in case of any conflict is assured, and that the possibility
of the entry of Rumania into such a conflict no longer
exists!
Even Turkey under these circumstances can only envisage
a revision of her previous position. But I repeat once more,
that Rumania is no longer in a situation to take part in a
conflict against the Axis! I believe I may say to you, Duce,
that through the negotiations with Soviet Russia a completely
new situation in world politics has been produced which must
be regarded as the greatest possible gain for the Axis.
About the situation on the German-Polish frontier, I can
only inform Your Excellency that we have been for weeks in a
state of alarm, that as a result of the Polish mobilization
German preparations have naturally also been increased, and
that in case of an intolerable Polish action, I will act
immediately. The assertion of the Polish Government that it
is not responsible for these inhuman proceedings, for the
numerous border incidents (last night alone there were twenty-
one Polish border violations), and for the firing on the
German airplanes, which had already received orders to travel
to East Prussia over the sea in order to avoid incidents,
shows only that the Polish Government has its excitable
soldiery [Soldateska] no longer under control. Since
yesterday Danzig has been blockaded by Polish troops, a
situation which is unendurable. Under these circumstances no
one can say what the next hour may bring. I can only assure
you there is a limit beyond which I will not be pushed under
any circumstances.
In conclusion I can assure you, Duce, that in a similar
situation I would have complete understanding for Italy and
that in any such case you can be sure of my attitude.
ADOLF HITLER
Page 82
*****
Frames 78820-78821, serial 147
Letter from Mussolini to Hitler, August 25, 1939 [35]
FšHRER: I am replying to your letter which has just been
delivered to me by Ambassador won Mackensen.
(1) Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of
that completely. His Excellency Marshal Goring will tell you
that in the discussion which I had with him last April I
stated that a rapprochement between Germany and Russia was
necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.
(2) I consider it desirable to try to avoid a break or
any deterioration in relations with Japan, since that would
result in Japan's return to a position close to the
democratic powers. With this in mind, I have telegraphed to
Tokyo and it appears that after the first surprise of public
opinion passed, a better psychological attitude prevails.
(3) The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can alter
the position of Turkey, which accepted the English loan, but
which has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new
attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic
plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.
(4) As regards Poland I have complete understanding for
the German position and for the fact that such strained
relations cannot continue permanently.
(5) As for the practical position of Italy, in case of a
military collision, my point of view is as follows:
If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict remains
localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of political
and economic assistance which is requested.
If Germany attacks, and Poland's allies open a
counterattack against Germany, I want to let you know in
advance that it would be better if I did not take the
initiative in military activities in view of the present
situation of Italian war preparations, which we have
repeatedly previously explained to you, Fhrer, and to Herr
von Ribbentrop.
Our intervention can, therefore, take place at once if
Germany delivers to us immediately the military supplies and
the raw materials to resist the attack which the French and
English especially would direct against us.
At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and
at such time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in
the air according to the plans which had been arranged.
[35] Translated from German Foreign Office's translation of
Italian original.
Page 83
I am also of the opinion that the purely military
preparations which have already been undertaken and the
others which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa will
serve to immobilize important French and British forces.
I consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell
you the whole truth and inform you about the actual situation
in advance. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences
for us all. This is my point of view and since within a short
time I must summon the highest governmental bodies of the
realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well.
MUSSOLINI
*****
Frames 24058-24061, serial 34
Foreign Office Memorandum
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
W IV 3296
MEMORANDUM
The German-Soviet Trade Agreement concluded on August 19
covers the following:
1. Germany grants the Soviet Union a merchandise credit
of 200 minion Reichsmarks. The financing will be done by the
German Golddiskontbank. This method of financing includes a
100 percent guarantee by the Reich. It is a credit based on
bills of exchange. The bills of exchange are to be drawn for
each individual transaction and have an average currency of 7
years. The interest is 5 percent. Under a secret final
protocol, one-half percent of this is refunded to the Russian
special accounts in Berlin, whereby the actual interest rate
is reduced to 4 1/2 percent.
2. The credit will be used to finance Soviet orders in
Germany. The Soviet Union will make use of it to order the
industrial products listed in schedule A of the agreement.
They consist of machinery and industrial installations.
Machine tools up to the very largest dimensions form a
considerable part of the deliveries. And armaments in the
broader sense (such as optical supplies, armor plate and the
like) will, subject to examination of every single item, be
supplied in smaller proportion.
3. The credit will be liquidated by Soviet raw
materials, which will be selected by agreement between the
two Governments. The annual interest will likewise be paid
from the proceeds of Soviet merchandise, that is, from the
special accounts kept in Berlin.
Page 84
4. In order that we might secure an immediate benefit
from the credit agreement, it was made a condition from the
beginning that the Soviet Union bind itself to the delivery,
starting immediately, of certain raw materials as current
business. It was possible so to arrange these raw-material
commitments of the Russians that our wishes were largely met.
The Russian commitments of raw materials are contained in
schedule C. They amount to 180 million Reichsmarks: half to
be delivered in each of the first and second years following
the conclusion of the agreement. It is a question, in
particular, of lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake,
phosphate, platinum, raw furs, petroleum, and other goods
which for us have a more or less gold value.
5. Since these Soviet deliveries made as current
business are to be compensated by German counter-deliveries,
certain German promises of delivery had to be made to the
Russians. The German industrial products to be supplied in
current business as counter-deliveries for Russian raw
materials are listed in schedule B. This schedule totals 120
million Reichsmarks and comprises substantially the same
categories of merchandise as schedule A.
6. From the welter of difficult questions of detail
which arose during the negotiations, the following might also
be mentioned: guaranteeing of the rate of exchange of the
Reichsmark. The complicated arrangement arrived at appears in
the confidential protocol signed on August 26 of this year.
In order not to jeopardize the conclusion of the agreement on
August 19 of this year, the question was laid aside and
settled afterwards. The questions of the liquidation of the
old credits, the shipping clause, an emergency clause for the
event of inability to deliver of either party, the
arbitration procedure, the price clause, etc., were settled
satisfactorily despite the pressure of time.
7. The agreement, which has come into being after
extraordinary difficulties, will undoubtedly give a decided
impetus to German-Russian trade. We must try to build anew on
this foundation and, above all, try to settle a number of
questions which could not heretofore be settled, because of
the low ebb which had been reached in our trade relations.
The framework now set up represents a minimum. Since the
political climate is favorable, it may well be expected that
it will be exceeded considerably in both directions, both in
imports and exports.
Page 85
8. Under the agreement, the following movement of goods
can be expected for the next few years:
Exports to the U.S.S.R. Imports from the U.S.S.R.
200 million Reichmarks credit 180 mill. RM. raw material
deliveries, schedule "A". deliveries, schedule "C".
120 mill. RM. deliveries as 200 mill. RM. repayment of
current business, schedule 1935 credit.
"B".
approx. 100 mill. RM.
capitalized interest from
present and last credit.
X mill. RM. unspecified X mill. RM. unspecified
deliveries on current deliveries of Soviet goods
business. under German-Soviet Trade
Agreement of Dec. 19,
1938.
The movement of goods envisaged by the agreement might
therefore reach a total of more than 1 billion Reichsmarks
for the next few years, not including liquidation of the
present 200 minion credit by deliveries of Russian raw
materials beginning in 1946.
9. Apart from the economic import of the treaty, its
significance lies in the fact that the negotiations also
served to renew political contacts with Russia and that the
credit agreement was considered by both sides as the first
decisive step in the reshaping of political relations.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, August 29, 1939.
*****
Frame 111568, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 2, 1939-5:49 p. m.
Received September 2, 1939-6:10 p. m.
No. 254 of September 2
With reference to your telegram No. 233 of the 30th and
No. 241 of the 1st. [36]
To my probing as to whether Istanbul rumors were
correct, in accordance with which Turkey was already
negotiating with the
[36] Neither printed.
Page 86
Soviet Union, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government was
actually engaged in exchange of opinion and was in contact
with Turkey.
After consultation with Stalin, Molotov informed me at a
second conference at 3 p. m., that there was only a non-
aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey and
relations were good in general; the Soviet Government was
prepared to work for permanent neutrality of Turkey as
desired by us. Our conception of the position of Turkey in
the present conflict was shared by the Soviet Government.
Please make no use of the above statements of Molotov in
dealing with the Turks.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 69855, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 253 of September 3
BERLIN, September 3, 1939-6:50 p. m.
Received MOSCOW September 4, 1939-12:30 a. m.
Very Urgent! Exclusively for Ambassador. Strictly
secret! For Chief of Mission or his representative
personally. Top secret. To be decoded by himself. Strictest
secrecy!
We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army
decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the area that
was established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under
military occupation. We would naturally, however, for
military reasons, also have to proceed further against such
Polish military forces as are at that time located in the
Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.
Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the
Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian
forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in
the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy
this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a
relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow
agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.
In this connection please determine whether we may
discuss this matter with the officers who have just arrived
here and what the Soviet Government intends their position to
be.
RIBBENTROP
Page 87
*****
Frames 69848-69849, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 5, 1939-2:30 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 264 of September 5
Reference my telegram No. 261 of September 4. [37]
Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12:30 and
transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet
Government:
"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be
absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are
of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is
possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that
through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote
unity among our opponents. We understand that as the
operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might
be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation
between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such
cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan
adopted."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111576, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
No. 266 of September 5
Moscow, September 5, 1939-5:02 p. m.
Received September 5, 1939-6 p. m.
Reference your telegram No. 262 of the 4th. [37]
Today at 12:30 p. m. I again asked Molotov to have the
Soviet Government continue to work on Turkey with a view to
permanent neutrality. I mentioned that rumors were current to
the effect that England was putting pressure on Rumania to
take active part and was holding out a prospect of aid from
British and French troops. Since this aid might come by sea,
it was in the interests of the Soviet Government to prevail
upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely.
[37] Not printed.
Page 88
Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had
considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it in the
sense desired by us. Molotov added that there was only the
non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey;
conversations regarding the conclusion of a mutual assistance
pact had, it is true, been carried on at one time but had
borne no fruit.
He would have rumors about Rumania looked into through
the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 211568-211569, serial 388
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
Pol. V 8924
Moscow, September 6, 1939-5:46 p. m.
Received September 6, 1939-8:15 p. m.
No. 279 of September 6
Reference your telegram No. 267 of the 5th. [39]
Since anxiety over war, especially the fear of a German
attack, has strongly influenced the attitude of the
population here in the last few years, the conclusion of a
non-aggression pact with Germany has been generally received
with great relief and gratification. However, the sudden
alteration in the policy of the Soviet Government, after
years of propaganda directed expressly against German
aggressors, is still not very well understood by the
population. Especially the statements of official agitators
to the effect that Germany is no longer an aggressor run up
against considerable doubt. The Soviet Government is doing
everything to change the attitude of the population here
toward Germany. The press is as though it had been
transformed. Attacks on the conduct of Germany have not only
ceased completely, but the portrayal of events in the field
of foreign politics is based to an outstanding degree on
German reports and anti-German literature has been removed
from the book trade, etc.
The beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has
powerfully affected public opinion here, and aroused new fear
in extensive groups that the Soviet Union may be drawn into
the war. Mistrust sown for years against Germany, in spite of
effective counter-propaganda which is being carried on in
party and business gatherings, cannot be so quickly removed.
The fear is expressed by the population
[39] Not printed. ([38] not used? LWJ)
Page 89
that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against
the Soviet Union. The recollection of German strength in the
World War is everywhere still lively.
In a judgment of conditions here the realization is of
importance that the Soviet Government has always previously
been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude of
the population in the direction which it has desired, and it
is not being sparing this time either of the necessary
propaganda.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 211562, serial 388
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union. (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-12:56 a. m.
Received September 9, 1939-5 a. m.
No. 300 of September 8
I have just received the following telephone message
from Molotov:
"I have received your communication regarding the entry
of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my
congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government.
Molotov."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 69816, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet (Schulenburg)
Telegram
URGENT
BERLIN, September 9, 1939-12:50 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 9, 1939-12:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 300 of September 8
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 261. [40]
We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government
that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not
affected by local extension of our military operations. We
must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it.
Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered.
Military operations are progressing even beyond our
expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is
[40] Not printed.
Page 90
more or less in a state of dissolution. Under these
circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the
conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions
of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the
Russian Military Attach‚ to Moscow indicates that decisions
are in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak
to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and
to wire result.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 69815, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-4:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 308 of September 9
Reference your telegram No. 300 of September 8.
Molotov told me today at 3 p. m. that at a Soviet
military action would take place within the next few days.
The summoning of the Military Attach‚ to Moscow was in fact
connected with it. Numerous reservists would also be called.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 69814, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 9, 1939-8:40 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 310 of September 9
Supplementing my telegram No. 3 of September 9.
The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General K”string
[41] that the Soviet Union will intervene. Moreover, external
evidence is multiplying of imminent Soviet military action:
calling a large number of reservists up to 40 years of age,
in particular technicians and physicians, sudden
disappearance of important foods, preparation of schoolrooms
as hospitals, curtailment in issuance of gasoline, and the
like.
SCHULENBURG
[41] Military Attach‚ of the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union.
Page 91
******
Frames 69811-69813, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 10, 1939-9:40 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 317 of September 10
Supplementing my telegram No. 310 of September 9 and
with reference to telephone conversation of today with the
Reich Foreign Minister.
In today's conference at 4 p. m. Molotov modified his
statement of yesterday by saying that the Soviet Government
was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid
German military successes. In accordance with our first
communication, the Red Army had counted on several weeks,
which had now shrunk to a few days. The Soviet military
authorities were therefore in a difficult situation, since,
in view of conditions here, they required possibly two to
three weeks more for their preparations. Over three minion
men were already mobilized.
I explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial speedy
action of the Red Army was at this juncture.
Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done
to expedite matters. I got the impression that Molotov
promised more yesterday than the Red Army can live up to.
Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter
and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take
the occasion of the further advance of German troops to
declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was
necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to
the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened"
by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the
Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time
avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor.
This course was blocked for the Soviet Government by a
DNB report yesterday to the effect that, in accordance with a
statement by Colonel General Brauchitsch, military action was
no longer necessary on the German eastern border. The report
created the impression that a German-Polish armistice was
imminent. If, however Germany concluded an armistice, the
Soviet Union could not start a "new war."
I stated that I was unacquainted with this report, which
was not in accordance with the facts. I would make inquiries
at once.
SCHULENBURG
Page 92
*****
Frame 69805, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
URGENT
BERLIN, September 13, 1939-5:50 p. m.
Received Moscow, September 14, 1939-1:10 a. m.
No. 336 of September 13
For the Ambassador personally.
As soon as the exact outcome is known in the great
battle in Poland, now approaching its end, we shall be in a
position to give the Red Army the information it asked for
regarding the various parts of the Polish Army. But even now,
I would ask you to inform Herr Molotov that his remark
regarding Colonel General Brauchitsch's statement was based
on a complete misunderstanding. This statement referred
exclusively to the exercise of executive power in the old
territory of the Reich as regulated before the beginning of
the German action against Poland, and had nothing whatever to
do with a limitation of our military operations toward the
east on former Polish territory. There can be no question of
imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 69806-69808, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 14, 1939-6 p. m.
SECRET
No. 350 of September 14
Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.
Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that
the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than
anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner
than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram
No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of
Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of
Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not
to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the
Page 93
city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he
be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of
Warsaw could be counted on.
Please send instructions.
I would direct your attention to today's article in
Pravda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar
article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare]
the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for Soviet
intervention.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69788-69790, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 15, 1939-8:20 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, September 16, 1939-7:15 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 360 of September 15
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you communicate the following to Herr
Molotov at once:
1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly
approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the
military situation of September 14 which has already been
communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in
the next few days.
2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that
we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of
influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely
military operations, and the same applies of course to the
future as well.
3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on
September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take
a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation
now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us
of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish
Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the
question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did
not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of
the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not
occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking
any political or administrative activities in these areas,
apart from what is made
Page 94
necessary by military operations, without such an
intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might
be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
4) For the political support of the advance of the
Soviet Army we propose the publication of a joint communiqu‚
of the following content:
"In view of the complete collapse of the previous form
of government in Poland, the Reich Government and the
Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring to
an end the intolerable political and economic conditions
existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint
duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are
naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order
by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic
organizations."
5) We assume in proposing such a communiqu‚ that the
Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by
Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the
threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by
Germany as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a
motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice.
It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions,
which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-
known German spheres of interest. It would also be in
contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and,
finally, would-in opposition to the desire for friendly
relations expressed on both sides expose the two States
before the whole world as enemies.
6) Since the military operations must be concluded as
soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year,
we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would set a
day and hour on which their army would begin their advance,
so that we on our part might govern ourselves accordingly.
For the purpose of the necessary coordination of military
operations on either side, it is also necessary that a
representative of each Government, as well as German and
Russian officers on the spot in the area of operations,
should have a meeting in order to take the necessary steps,
for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.
I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in
text agreed upon by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken
care of.
RIBBENTROP
Page 95
*****
Frames 69777-69778, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 16, 1939.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 371 of September 16
Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.
I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out
instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by
the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the
day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the
military leaders and he would this very night, in the
presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet
advance.
Molotov added that he would present my communication to
his Government but he believed that a joint communiqu‚ was no
longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its
procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no
longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with
Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the
chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself
obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White
Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate
people to work in peace.
The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above
train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after
the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time
communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador
here and to all the missions here.
Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the
Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German
sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult
situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like
this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately
saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet
Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of
its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some
way or other, its present intervention.
Page 96
In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation
of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government
absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would,
therefore, like to know whether some agreement had been
reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region,
particularly as to who was to occupy the city.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69772-69773, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939.
SECRET
No. 372 of September 17
Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence
of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army
would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along
the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested
that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly
east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet
planes would begin today to bomb the district east of
Lemberg.
I promised to do my best with regard to informing the
German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left
that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too
closely today.
The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow
or day after tomorrow at the latest.
Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish
Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in
the course of the day and then published. The note contains a
justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me
contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my
objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the
text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin
stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqu‚ could
not be considered before two or three days.
In future all military matters that come up are to be
handled by Lieutenant General K”string directly with
Voroshilov.
SCHULENBURG
Page 97
*****
Frame 111596, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939-8:23 a. m.
Received September 17, 1939-8:45 a. m.
No. 374 of September 17
Reference your telegram of the 16th, No. 358. [42]
On the occasion of my visit of today, Stalin informed me
that the Turkish Government had proposed to the Soviet
Government the conclusion of an assistance pact that was to
apply to the Straits and the Balkans. The Turkish Government
desires a pact with a restrictive clause whereby Turkey in
rendering aid to the Soviet Union would be obligated only to
such actions as are not directed against England and France.
The Soviet Government is not greatly edified by the
Turkish proposal and is considering proposing a clause to the
Turkish Government to the effect that the Soviet Union on its
part would not be obligated to any action directed against
Germany. Stalin requested our reaction to this idea, but made
it clearly evident that he considered the conclusion of the
assistance pact in suitable form as very advantageous, since
Turkey would in that case surely remain neutral. Voroshilov,
who was present, added that such a pact would be a "hook" by
which Turkey could be pulled away from France. Request
instructions.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111597, serial 103
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
BERLIN, September 18, 1939.
To the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister with the
request to transmit the following to the train for the Reich
Foreign Minister:
Reaction to telegram No. 374 from Moscow regarding Turko-
Russian assistance pact:
The matter should be discussed openly with the Italians.
If they agree the Soviet Government could be told that we
concur in the basic idea, but parity would be preserved only
if the Soviet Government were not obligated to action against
Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.
WEIZSŽCKER
[42] Not printed.
Page 98
*****
Frame 23373, serial 34
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 18, 1939-3:59 p. m.
Received September 18, 1939-5:45 P. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 385 of September 18
In the course of the conversation which I had this
evening with Stalin about the dispatch of a Soviet commission
to Bialystok, as well as the publication of a joint
communiqu‚, Stalin said, somewhat suddenly, that on the
Soviet side there were certain doubts as to whether the
German High Command at the appropriate time would stand by
the Moscow agreement and would withdraw to the line that had
been agreed upon (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San). I replied with
emphasis that of course Germany was firmly determined to
fulfill the terms of the Moscow agreements precisely, and I
referred to point 2 of the communication made by me to
Molotov on September 16 in accordance with the instructions
of the Reich Foreign Minister (see telegram No. 360 of
September 15 from there). I declared that it would be
suitable for the High Command to withdraw to the line which
had been agreed upon since, in this way, troops could be made
available for the western front. Stalin replied that he had
no doubt at all of the good faith of the German Government.
His concern was based on the well-known fact that all
military men are loath to give up occupied territories. At
this point the German Military Attach‚ here, Lieutenant
General K”string, interjected that the German armed forces
would do just as the Fhrer ordered. In view of Stalin's well-
known attitude of mistrust, I would be gratified if I were
authorized to make a further declaration of such a nature as
to remove his last doubts.
SCHULENBERG
*****
Frames 69766-69770, serial 127
Memorandum by Counselor of Legation Hilger of the German
Embassy in the Soviet Union
Re: Publication of joint Soviet-German communiqu‚.
On September 17 at 3 p. m., the draft of a joint German-
Soviet communiqu‚ was transmitted by telephone with
instructions to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government
to the publication of such a com-
Page 99
muniqu‚ on September 18. The text of this draft is enclosed
(enclosure 1).
On September 17 at 11:30 p. m., the Ambassador submitted
the draft to Herr Molotov for approval. The latter stated
that he would have to consult with Herr Stalin on the matter.
Herr Stalin, who was called on the telephone by Herr Molotov,
declared that in his opinion, too, a joint communiqu‚ had to
be issued, but that he could not entirely agree to the text
proposed by us since it presented the facts all too frankly
[da es den Tatbestand mit allzu grosser Offenheit darlege].
Thereupon Herr Stalin wrote out a new draft in his own hand
and asked that the consent of the German Government be
obtained to this new draft. (See enclosure 2.)
On September 18 at 12:30 a. m., I communicated to Under
State Secretary Gaus the text of the Soviet draft. Herr Gaus
stated that he could not of his own accord declare himself on
the matter and had to ascertain the decision of the Reich
Foreign Minister.
On September 18 at 12 o'clock noon, the Chief of the
Office of the Minister, Herr Kordt, called up on the
telephone and informed me as follows:
"We agree to Russian proposal concerning communiqu‚ and
shall publish the communiqu‚ in this form Tuesday in the
morning papers. Ribbentrop."
I immediately transmitted the above communication by
telephone to Herr Molotov's secretary.
On September 18 at 2:05 p. m., Herr Kordt called up
again and informed Counselor of Embassy von Tippelskirch as
follows:
"The communiqu‚ will be published by us in some of the
evening papers. Please advise the offices concerned."
I immediately apprised Herr Molotov's secretary of the
above-mentioned communication also.
Two hours later the text of the communiqu‚ appeared on
the teletype and was also broadcast over the German short-
wave radio.
Moscow, September 18, 1939.
Herewith most respectfully submitted
to the Ambassador
to the Counselor of Embassy
HILGER
On September 18 at 7:15 p. m., Herr Gaus called up and
asked whether the communiqu‚ would be published today in the
Russian
Page 100
evening papers. If not, it should be broadcast today over the
Soviet radio. The Reich Foreign Minister was very anxious
that this be done. I told Herr Gaus that today, because it
was the Russian Sunday, no evening papers had appeared; that
I would inform them further regarding the radio. At 8:00 p.
m. I was able to let Herr Gaus know that the Soviet radio had
broadcast the communiqu‚ several times since 4:00 p. m.
HI[LGER]
SEPTEMBER 18.
(Enclosure 1)
Draft of a Joint German-Soviet Communiqu‚
In view of the internal incapacity of the Polish State
and of the dissension of the populations living in its former
territory, the Reich Government and the Government of the U.
S. S. R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the
intolerable political and economic conditions existing in
these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to
restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of
interest to them and to bring about a new order by the
creation of natural frontiers and viable economic
organizations.
(Enclosure 2) [43]
In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumors
concerning the respective aims of the German and Soviet
forces which are operating in Poland, the Government of the
German Reich and the Government of the U. S. S. R. declare
that the operations of these forces do not involve any aims
which are contrary to the interests of Germany and of the
Soviet Union, or to the spirit or the letter of the Non-
aggression Pact concluded between Germany and the U. S. S. R.
On the contrary, the aim of these forces is to restore peace
and order in Poland, which had been destroyed by the collapse
of the Polish State, and to help the Polish population to
reconstruct the conditions of its political existence.
[43] A note in Schulenburg's hand reads: "Stalin draft.
September 18, '39."
Page 101
*****
Frame 23374, serial 34
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet
Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, September 19, 1939.
(Sent from Special Train September 19-4:37 p. m.)
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 385.
I request that you tell Herr Stalin that you reported to
Berlin about your conference with him, and that you are now
expressly directed by me to inform him that the agreements
which I made on the authorization of the Fhrer at Moscow
will, of course, be kept, and that they are regarded by us as
the foundation stone of the new friendly relations between
Germany and the Soviet Union.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 111608, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
STRICTLY SECRET
Moscow, September 20, 1939-2:23 a. m.
Received September 20, 1939-4:55 a. m.
No. 395 of September 19
Molotov stated to me today that the Soviet Government
now considered the time ripe for it, jointly with the German
Government, to establish definitively the structure of the
Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original
inclination entertained by the Soviet Government and Stalin
personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had
given way to the inclination to partition Po]and along the
Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. The Soviet Government wishes to
commence negotiations on this matter at once, and to conduct
them in Moscow, since such negotiations must be conducted on
the Soviet side by persons in the highest positions of
authority, who cannot leave the Soviet Union. Request
telegraphic instructions.
SCHULENBURG
Page 102
*****
Frames 69721-69722, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
STRICTLY SECRET
BERLIN September 23, 1939-3:40 a. m.
Received Moscow September 23, 1939-11:05 a. m.
No. 417 of September 22
Reference your telegram No. 295 [395?]. For the
Ambassador personally.
We, too, consider the time now ripe to establish by
treaty jointly with the Soviet Government the definitive
structure of the Polish area. The Russian idea of a border
line along the well-known Four-Rivers Line coincides in
general with the view of the Reich Government. It was my
original intention to invite Herr Molotov to Germany in order
to formulate this treaty. In view of your report that the
leading personages there cannot leave the Soviet Union, we
agree to negotiations in Moscow. Contrary to my original
purpose of entrusting you with these negotiations, I have
decided to fly to Moscow myself. This particularly because-in
view of the full powers granted me by the Fhrer, thus making
it possible to dispense with counter-inquiries, etc.-
negotiations can be brought to a speedier conclusion. In view
of the general situation, my sojourn in Moscow will have to
be limited to one or two days at the most. Please call on
Herren Stalin and Molotov and wire me earliest proposed date.
*****
Frame 111625, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 25, 1939-10:58 p. m.
Received September 26, 1939-12:30 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 442 of September 25
Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin at 8
p. m. today. Stalin stated the following: In the final
settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future
might create friction be-
Page 103
tween Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this
point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent
Polish rump state. He proposed the following: From the
territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the
Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw
which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In
return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania.
Stalin designated this suggestion as a subject for the
forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and
added that, if we consented, the Soviet Union would
immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic
countries in accordance with the Protocol of August 23, and
expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German
Government. Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, but did not mention Finland.
I replied to Stalin that I would report to my
Government.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111637, serial 103
The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
No. 435
For Reich Foreign Minister in person!
Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of the 26th for Army High
Command, Attach‚ Section:
The Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the Russian
demand for an alliance. He stated that a naval base at
Baltischport and an air base on the Estonian islands were
demanded by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance
of the demands as German aid was most unlikely, hence the
situation could only become worse. On September 25 and 26,
Russian aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian
territory. The General Staff gave orders not to fire on
aircraft in order not to prejudice the situation. R”ssing.
[44] Frohwein. [45]
BRšCKLMEIER
[44] German Military Attach‚ in Estonia.
[45] German Minister in Estonia.
Page 104
*****
Frames 111638, serial 103
The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
No. 436
For Reich Foreign Minister in person.
Telegram from Helsinki No. 245 of the 26th:
The Foreign Minister notified me of demands made by
Russia on Estonia and observed that Finland was prepared to
improve her relations with Russia, but would never accept
such demands and would rather let it come to the worst.
I pointed to the difference between the position of
Estonia and that of Finland and advised the Foreign Minister
to seek the security of his country in good relations with
Germany and Russia.
The Foreign Minister agreed and emphasized complete
elimination of English influence from the Baltic area.
Blcher. [46]
[46] German Minister in Finland.
BRšCKLMEIER
*****
Frames 111639-111640, serial 103
The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 27, 1939.
No. 437
For Reich Foreign Minister in person.
Telegram from Reval No. 164 of the 26th:
The Foreign Minister conveyed a request to inform the
Reich Foreign Minister of the following, if possible before
his departure for Moscow:
The Estonian Government, under the gravest threat of
imminent attack, perforce is prepared to accept a military
alliance with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter with staff
will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. Aim of
negotiation: Framing of a treaty in such manner that the
sovereignty and internal security of the country are
preserved and the Estonian non-aggression pact kept intact.
Hence they intended to propose, in connection with the mutual
assistance obligation of the contracting parties, to except
the existing non-aggression pacts with third countries. It is
further desired that naval and air bases should be made
available only in case of war, when assistance obligation
comes into play; in peace time as far as possible only
preparation of the bases. The Russians first demanded Reval
as a naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltischport
or a port on ™sel. The Estonians wish if possible to grant
air bases only on island.
Page 105
The general tendency is to meet the demands only as far
as necessary to prevent an attack and maintain existing good
relations with Germany. Frohwein.
BRšCKLMEIER
*****
Frame 281527, serial 838
Timetable of Ribbentrop's Second Visit to Moscow [47]
September 27, 1939
Arrival at airport 6 p. m.
First meeting 10 p. m. to 1
a. m.
September 28, 1930
Meeting resumed 3 to 6:30 p.
m.
Dinner at Kremlin.
One act of ballet (Swan
Lake); Stalin meanwhile
negotiated with the
Latvians.
Meeting resumed at midnight.
Signing at 5 a. m.
Afterwards reception for the
delegation at Ambassador's
till about 6:30 a. m.
September 29, 1939
Departure by air 12:40 p. m.
[47] Found in the papers of Under State Secretary Hencke.
*****
Frames 0332-0331 [sic], serial F 2
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the U.S.S.R. consider it as exclusively their task, after the
collapse of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace
and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples
living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national
character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:
ARTICLE I.
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the U.S.S.R. determine as the boundary of their respective
national interests in the territory of the former Polish
state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be
described in more detail in a supplementary protocol. [48]
[48] Not printed here.
Page 106
ARTICLE II.
Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective
national interests established in article I as definitive and
shall reject any interference of third powers in this
settlement.
ARTICLE III.
The necessary reorganization of public administration
will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in
article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas
east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
ARTICLE IV.
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the U.S.S.R. regard this settlement as a firm foundation for
a progressive development of the friendly relations between
their peoples.
ARTICLE V.
This treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications
shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty
becomes effective upon signature.
Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.
MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP
By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
W. MOLOTOW
*****
Frame 0319, serial F 2
Confidential Protocol
The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles
in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German
descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction,
if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories
under German jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall
be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in
cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the
property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.
A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government
of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or
White Russian descent residing in the territories under its
jurisdiction.
MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP
By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
W. MOLOTOW
Page 107
*****
Frames 0326-0325 [sic], serial F 2
Secret Supplementary Protocol
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement
of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of
the U.S.S.R. upon the following:
The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23,
1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the
territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of
influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the
province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall
to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached
to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon
as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures
on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present
German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and
simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way
that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of
the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.
Further it is declared that the economic agreements now
in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected
by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.
Moscow, September 28, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP
By authority of the
of the U.S.S.R.:
W. MOLOTOW
*****
Frame 0329, serial F 2
Secret Supplementary Protocol
The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the
German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared
their agreement upon the following:
Both parties will tolerate in their territories no
Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other
party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings
of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable
measures for this purpose.
MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP
By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
W. MOLOTOW
Page 108
*****
Frame 0330, serial F 2
Declaration of the Government of the German Reich and the
Government of the U.S.S.R. of September 28, 1939
After the Government of the German Reich and the
Government of the U.S.S.R. have, by means of the treaty
signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from
the collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created a
sure foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they
mutually express their conviction that it would serve the
true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of
war existing at present between Germany on the one side and
England and France on the other. Both Governments will
therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other
friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this
goal as soon as possible.
Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments
remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that
England and France are responsible for the continuation of
the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war,
the Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage
in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.
Moscow, September 08, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP
By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
W. MOLOTOW
*****
Frames 211596-211597, serial 388
The Reich Foreign Minister to the Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Molotov)
Moscow, September 28, 1939.
MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of
your letter of today, in which you communicate to me the
following:
"With reference to our conversations I have the honor to
confirm herewith that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is
willing on the basis and in the sense of the general
political understanding reached by us, to promote by all
means the trade relations and the exchange of goods between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. To this end an economic program will
be drawn up by both parties, under which the Soviet Union
will supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany, in
turn, will make compensation through delivery of manufactured
goods over an
Page 109
extended period. Both parties shall frame this economic
program in such a manner that the German-Soviet exchange of
goods will again reach the highest volume attained in the
past.
Both Governments will at once issue the necessary
directives for the implementation of the measures mentioned
and arrange that the negotiations are begun and brought to a
conclusion as soon as possible."
In the name and by authority of the Government of the
German Reich I am in accord with this communication and
inform you that the Government of the German Reich in turn
will take the necessary steps for this purpose.
Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
VON RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 0322-0321 [sic], serial F 2
The Reich Foreign Minister to the Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars of the Soviet Union. (Molotov)
CONFIDENTIAL
Moscow, September 28, 1939.
MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of
your letter of today, wherein you communicate to me the
following:
"Implementing my letter of today about the formulation
of a common economic program, the Government of the U.S.S.R.
will see to it that German transit traffic to and from
Rumania by way of the Upper Silesia-Lemberg-Kolomea railroad
line shall be facilitated in every respect. The two
Governments will, in the framework of the proposed trade
negotiations, make arrangements without delay for the
operation of this transit traffic. The same will apply to the
German transit traffic to and from Iran, to and from
Afghanistan as well as to and from the countries of the Far
East.
"Furthermore, the Government of the U.S.S.R. declares
that it is willing. in addition to the quantity of oil
previously agreed upon or to be agreed upon hereafter, to
supply a further quantity of oil commensurate with the annual
production of the oil district of Drohobycz and Boryslav,
with the proviso that one half of this quantity shall be
supplied to Germany from the oil fields of the aforesaid oil
district and the other half from other oil districts of the
U.S.S.R. As compensation for these supplies of oil, the
U.S.S.R. would accept German supplies of hard coal and steel
piping."
I take note of this communication with satisfaction and
concur in it in the name of the Government of the German
Reich.
Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
VON RIBBENTROP
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