Archive/File: orgs/french/foreign-office/yellow-book-documents.005 Last-Modified: 1997/10/19 PART FIVE The Danzig Question (May 15-August 19, 1939) I The Militarisation of the Free City (May 15-June 30) No. 126 M. LON NEL., French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, May 15, 1939. AT a time when Germany, by clever propaganda, is trying to persuade the world that the present risk of war is due solely to Poland's uncompromising attitude over the Danzig question, and to her stubborn refusal to permit the incorporation in the Reich of a city whose character is indisputably German, it will, perhaps, be useful to point out once more the causes which determine the Polish attitude. In refusing to allow the annexation of Danzig by the Reich, with its inevitable consequences-among the foremost of which would be the occupation of the Free City not only by the S.A., the S.S., and a large militarized police force, but also by troops with all the most up-to-date equipment in use in the Germany Army-Poland is not guided merely by the very legitimate fear, prompted by memories of the Czechoslovak experience, of being caught in the fatal mesh of continuous concessions and renunciations. Whatever promises and "guarantees" Herr Hitler might offer by way of compensation for the annexation of Danzig, it would remain none the less true that Germany, once master of the Free City, would not be far from having Poland completely at her mercy. It would be a simple matter for Germany to restrict the advantages of access to the sea, which Germany would in principle have recognized to Poland, and easier still to deprive her of the right of access altogether at the first convenient opportunity.  Sea-borne trade figures largely in Poland's foreign trade. Two thirds of it in value, and more than three quarters in bulk, pass through the two ports of Gdynia and Danzig. In 1938, in fact, of a total trade of 19,200,000 tons, 16,300,000 tons passed through them. The tonnage handled by Gdynia and Danzig, which, as we shall see, is far from adequate for Poland's total needs, is divided between these two ports as follows: 9,200,000 tons at Gdynia, and 7,100,000 at Danzig. The analysis of imports and exports is as follows: Imports Exports Gdynia....... 1,526,000 tons. 7,646,000 tons. Danzig....... 1,562,000 tons. 5,563,000 tons. One-third of the bulk, and 17 per cent of the value, of Polish foreign trade therefore passes through Danzig, while 46 per cent of the bulk and 48 per cent of the value passes through Gdynia. As the Polish Government has been at pains, for practical reasons and in order to avoid wasteful competition, to make the two ports in its Customs area specialize in particular trades, Danzig has become the principal port for the export of Polish cereals (in 1938, 407,000 tons of agricultural produce against only 112,000 via Gdynia) and Polish timber (813,000 tons against 402,000). The coal trade is shared between them. Coal from the Dombrowa basin is exported via Danzig that of Upper Silesia via Gdynia; the latter thus takes first place with 5,380,000 tons plus 1,000,000 tons of bunker coal against 3,500,000 tons via Danzig. If Poland wanted to dispense with Danzig and give Gdynia the handling of all her commerce, she could do so only after some time had elapsed, and at great expense. Gdynia could probably cope successfully with the coal exports, but this port is not adequately equipped for handling either cereals or wood. Not only would new accommodation (granaries, etc.) have to be provided, but even new quays and larger warehouses would have to be built. The construction at the back of the port of a canal 2 kilometres long, a project already contemplated, would also be necessary. From the point of view of communications, the importance to Poland of the Free City of Danzig is not confined to the use at present made of the harbour, or the fact that the mouth of the Vistula-the one important Polish river-is at Danzig. Though the Silesian-Baltic Railway, built and operated by the Franco-Polish Railway Company,  runs outside the territory of the Free City, the Warsaw- Gdynia line, on the other hand, crosses it and runs through Danzig itself. From the naval and military point of view, it is no exaggeration to say that the territory of Danzig commands Poland's access to the sea. The distance from Danzig to Hel is about 30 kilometres as the crow flies; from the nearest point on the coast in Danzig territory to Hel is about 25 kilometres. Ships passing near the Hel peninsula could, therefore, enter and leave the Bay of Gdynia remaining all the time out of range of the batteries on the Danzig coast. On the other hand, Gdynia is less than 10 kilometres from the nearest point of Danzig territory and would be within range of guns placed between Zoppot and the western limit of Danzig territory. Generally speaking, if Germany were able to construct fortifications in the south-west territory of the Free City, which forms a salient into the corridor, the defence of the latter would become still more difficult than it is now. For the militarisation of the Free City to have its full value, the Germans would, it is true, have to establish permanent means of communication between the two banks of the Vistula so as to link up the eastern portion with East Prussia. At present, no bridge spans the Vistula between Tczew (the last Polish town on the Vistula) and the sea, but Germany's vast technical resources would allow her to fill this gap quickly enough, and in any case make up for any deficiencies by emergency measures. The above indications show how well founded is the uneasiness with which Poland regards the intentions of Herr Hitler. Poland could not possibly exist without free access to the sea. Napoleon himself recognized this, adding that Danzig was essential to Poland "to enable her to dispose of her produce." The "Corridor" and Gdynia are not enough to ensure to Poland this "exit to the sea," which, in the words of Proudhon, is "vital to every large state." It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the events of last March have made this a still more vital necessity for Poland; she could, after her reconciliation with Lithuania, have utilized the "Port of Memel," but this is now out of the question; while, on the other hand, since the annexation by the Reich of Bohemia and Moravia, only at the cost of surrendering her independence to the Reich could she make sufficient use of the Czechoslovak railways to facilitate appreciably her foreign trade. Herr Hitler does not seem to have understood these points; by  choosing to claim Danzig precisely on the morrow of a series of aggressions, one result of which has been to make the maintenance of the existing status of Danzig more than ever indispensable to Poland, he has shown a complete lack of psychological insight. Before the partitions, the Poles called Danzig "the Admiral of Poland," thus symbolizing the importance they traditionally attached to this ancient port. The Poles of the twentieth century, with their passion for the sea, and their high ideals for their reborn state, and what it should become, are not prepared to allow themselves to be despoiled in Danzig of the rights they consider essential to them. They are unanimous on this point; they will not put up with any settlement which would not, in their opinion, appear likely to safeguard them. LON NEL. No. 127 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, May 22, 1939. FROM a reliable source I have received certain indications of Herr von Ribbentrop's present attitude to the International problems of the moment, which it appears to me advisable to pass on to your department. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it absolutely unbelievable that Poland should have rejected the Fhrer's proposals. These were Herr Hitler's personal suggestions. Herr von Ribbentrop himself would never have approved them. In his opinion, they were quite incomprehensible in "their clemency and their generosity." It was unthinkable that Herr Hitler should have revealed, at the same time such modesty in his demands, and such generosity in his offers. Furthermore, last January, M. Beck had accepted these advantageous proposals. It was because of the internal situation in Poland that he had been unable to keep his word. The Warsaw government had therefore missed a most unlooked-for chance of securing the continued existence of Poland for twenty-five years. But nothing would be lost by waiting. The possibility that Poland might accept the German point of view, and enter into her orbit, although it seemed highly remote at the moment, had not been altogether set aside by Herr von Ribbentrop. But what, in fact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich  thinks, is that the Polish State cannot last very long. Sooner or later it would be bound to disappear, once more partitioned between Germany and Russia. In Herr von Ribbentrop's mind the idea of such a partition was closely linked with that of a rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow. To him such a reconciliation seemed, in the long run, both indispensable and inevitable. It would be in accordance with reality, and with a tradition still very much alive in Germany and would be the only way of bringing about a permanent settlement of the German-Polish dispute, that is, according to the methods already applied in the case of Czechoslovakia, the deletion of Poland from the map. But above all it would give the rulers of the Reich the means of destroying the power of Great Britain. That was the chief objective which Herr von Ribbentrop had set himself, the ide fixe, which, with fanatical determination, he was unceasingly striving to achieve. The hope, that a Russo-German cooperation would one day give the Reich a chance of striking a mortal blow at the world power of the British Empire, had been strengthened latterly in Herr von Ribbentrop's mind by the difficulties which were met with in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. It was true that the Fhrer was still opposed to the political designs of the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to Soviet Russia. Herr Hitler considered that, for ideological reasons, it would be extremely difficult to bring about such a re-orientation of German policy. However, Herr von Ribbentrop had his backers, notably amongst the Higher Command and the more important industrialists. The Chancellor himself had, to a certain extent, already taken account of these tendencies of his Foreign Minister by making no attack against Soviet Russia in his speeches during the past few months, and by allowing the German Press for the time being to lower the tone of its anti-Bolshevik tirades. One of the immediate objects that the advocates of a reconciliation with the U.S.S.R. hoped to gain, appeared to be the possibility of persuading Russia to play the same role in an eventual dismemberment of Poland that the latter country had played with regard to Czechoslovakia. The ultimate object appeared to be to make use of the material resources and man-power of the U.S.S.R. as a means to destroy the British Empire. It is possible that up to the present the Fhrer has resisted these appeals or at any rate hesitated to commit himself to such a policy, for ideological reasons. But, even admitting that such is his present attitude, there is nothing to indicate that he will not change his mind.  In any case, the ease and rapidity with which rumours of a Russo-German reconciliation found credence in Germany at the time of M. Litvinov's resignation were enough to allay any fears that Herr Hitler might have had as to the effect on public opinion. One cannot eliminate the possibility that it was to enlighten the Chancellor on this point that the advocates of Russo-German reconciliation put about these rumours. At this moment, when the Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations seem to have entered upon a decisive phase, we should keep clearly conscious of this situation and bear in mind that the Reich would do its best to take advantage, to the detriment of France and Great Britain, of any failure, howsoever veiled, in the conversations now taking place with Moscow. COULONDRE. No. 128 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, May 25, 1939. WHILE maintaining an attitude of reserve, which contrasts with the activity and blunders of some of his collaborators, the German Ambassador has, since his return to Warsaw, had interviews with several of his colleagues. According to information I have gleaned he reproaches M. Beck with having abandoned the "only reasonable policy" under pressure from the Army and public opinion. As to the present situation, he declares that Germany wishes to avoid extreme measures towards Poland at the moment, and quotes in support of his statement the "composure" with which his countrymen have taken the recent incidents at Danzig, and the much more serious ones, according to him, at Tomaszow. But he does not attempt to hide the fact that this "patience" is only a question of passing tactics and he makes no mystery of the hopes of his Government: "in three months," he said emphatically in the course of conversations, "England, France and even Poland will be tired and will not think any more of fighting for the sake of Danzig. Then we shall settle the problem under favourable conditions." LON NEL.  No. 129 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, May 25, 1939. WITHIN the last few days there has been a series of incidents on the Danzig-Polish frontier. They were for the most part insignificant, but their frequency, the trouble stirred up about them by the Danzig authorities, and the use which these are obviously seeking to make of them give them exceptional importance. It will, therefore, be of interest to sum them up briefly here; 1. The Kalthof incident (Customs post on the frontier of East Prussia). A troop of the S.A. collected before a house occupied by the Polish Customs officials and threatened them. The officials withdrew. The assailants entered the house and ransacked it. Informed of the incident the Polish Commissioner- General made it known that he was sending his deputy, M. Perkowski to the spot, and informed the Danzig authorities who agreed to have him accompanied by the police. A few moments later, the same authorities telephoned to say that they had no police available. M. Perkowski therefore went alone by car to Kalthof. While he was visiting the ransacked building, a group of "unknown persons" attacked his car which was parked outside. The chauffeur, after firing two shots in the air, fired on his assailants. One of them was killed. The dead man turned out to be an S.A. from Marienburg in East Prussia, Grbnau by name. The crowd scattered immediately. M. Perkowski and his chauffeur joined the Customs officials, who had taken refuge in a neighbouring railway station, and had themselves conveyed on a railway engine to Tczew, in Polish territory. The German version separates the two portions of the incident. It explains Grbnau's death in the following manner: "A citizen was going through a deserted village in a taxi when he was killed by a Polish chauffeur who had first dazzled the taxi-driver with his headlights." As a sequel to the incident the Polish Commissioner- General transmitted to the Senate of Danzig a note in which: (1) He pointed out that the Polish Government could not admit that the work of the Polish Customs officials should be interfered with in any way.  (2) He demanded that an inquiry should be held. (3) He claimed compensation for damages. (4) He insisted upon a clear and precise declaration as to the guarantees that the Senate was disposed to give to ensure the security of the Polish minority in the Free City. The Senate, on its part, sent a protest on account the death of the S.A. Grbnau, demanding also compensation, sanctions and apologies. At this stage the Polish Customs officials returned to their post. To the note of the Polish Commissioner-General, the Senate has just replied with two notes. In the first it declared itself unable to accept the Polish version of the incident and refused to accede to the requests of the Polish Commissioner-General. In the second, the Senate requested the recall of M. Perkowski, the Commissioner-General's deputy, and of the Polish Inspector General of Customs and one of his collaborators. The Danzig note accused M. Perkowski of taking advantage of his diplomatic rights to flee into Polish territory taking with him the murderer thus enabling the latter to escape from the Danzig justice. Finally, yesterday, May 24, the funeral of the victim took place at Marienburg. Herr Hitler sent a wreath of flowers by special aeroplane. President Greiser and Gauleiter Forster took part in the ceremony. The speeches made dwelt chiefly upon the virtues of their lost comrade without making any allusion to Poland. But one of the S.A. took a solemn oath over the grave of Grbnau to avenge his death. 2. Incident at Pieklo (Picker) on the frontier of Danzig and East Prussia, opposite Elbing. On Sunday, May 14, there was a further hostile manifestation before the Polish Customs post. But this time, at the request of the Polish Commissioner-General, the police intervened and dispersed the demonstrators. 3. Incident on the Tczew bridge (Dirschau). On Tuesday, May 16, in the early hours of the morning a lorry coming from Elbing (East Prussia) going towards the Reich across the Corridor, drew up at the Polish frontier post near the Tczew bridge. At that moment a Polish Customs official fired a revolver shot in the air to prevent the chauffeur moving off. The Danzig version asserts that the Customs official attempted to kill the chauffeur. The Vorposten, the official organ of the Senate, devotes considerable space to  the incident, preceding the story with the huge headline: "Fresh attempt at murder by Poles on Danzig territory." 4. Incident at Kohling. Two Polish frontier guards crossed the frontier. Called upon to withdraw they left a bicycle in Danzig territory. The Senate speaks of a further violation of the frontier. Taking their stand upon the whole series of incidents, the Senate sent the Polish Commissioner General a note of protest which the Vorposten describes as extremely vigorous. But it does not publish the text. However, from information which has reached Warsaw it would seem that the Senate requested the Polish Government "to take the necessary measures to put a stop to the hysteria of the Polish officials before the trouble caused by it led to incalculable consequences." The Polish press, which had reacted violently after the Kalthof incident, does not seem, on the other hand, to attach much importance to the incidents which followed. It publishes brief reports under the heading "Minor frontier incidents." In the same way only a very fleeting allusion is made to yesterday's notes from the Danzig Senate. A telegram reproduced by the Gazeta Polska merely remarks "a peculiar feature of the Danzig requests is the recall of three Polish officials." The Pat Agency observes, in one of its bulletins, that the Senate's request for the recall of the Deputy Commissioner at Danzig cannot possibly be accepted, for the Polish Commissioner-General represents the Polish Government at Danzig and cannot be regarded as a normal diplomatic Representative. The same considerations, adds the semi- official agency, hold good for the officials under him. The same bulletin remarks that the Senate's notes are considered in Warsaw as tending, for purpose of propaganda, to aggravate the relations between Poland and Danzig; "the unhealthy publicity given by the Senate to minute incidents, and to the notes addressed to the Polish Government, cannot have any other object than that of further inflaming public opinion." LON NEL.  No. 130 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, May 30, 1939. I HAVE pointed out that in the near future we must expect Germany to begin, propos of Danzig, one of those large-scale campaigns, thanks to which she has been able to lay hands successively on Vienna, Sudetenland, and Prague. The threat of war, formulated in a more or less veiled or crude fashion, will still be, in all probability, the weapon to which the Reich will have recourse to vanquish if possible outside opposition. But before reaching this point, the Nazi leaders-who today can well measure their losses in the international field since March 1W will leave no stone unturned in order to try to persuade the world of the justice and purity of their intentions. It is necessary for us, therefore, to be ready to combat their propaganda and not to allow their arguments to pass without a reply. We have only to remember the case of Czechoslovakia to get an idea of the methods of agitation which the Heads of the Third Reich will most likely adopt once more. The German tactics will consist principally, it seems, in drawing the attention of the world to the fact-not disputed-that the majority of the population of Danzig is German in race and language. The Nazis will furthermore assert that the provocative attitude of the Poles, the dislike of the Danzig Germans for Poland, and the many incidents thus rendered inevitable, make the situation intolerable, and demand that a solution shall be found without delay. German blood spilt, women ill-treated, harmless peasants or peaceful city dwellers hunted from their homes by the hatred for Germany and obliged to seek refuge in the Reich-nothing will be lacking in the campaign launched by the German propaganda, nothing will be neglected so that the Fhrer may, when the time comes, make the very most of the role which he himself has assumed, that of the protector of all Germans. Despite the fact that world opinion is forewarned, we cannot exclude the possibility that certain elements who have learnt nothing from the Czech affair, will still allow themselves to be impressed. It is essential, therefore, in my opinion, that as the German Press campaign develops, our newspapers should take special pains to stress the weaknesses in the German arguments. I consider that the following points could be developed with advantage. Can Germany, which has just brutally incorporated 7,000,000  Czechs into the Reich, that is to say a whole people, more numerous than quite a number of other European nations, possibly advance ethnographic principles to support her claim for the return of 400,000 Germans to the Reich? Can Germany, while invoking the principle of Lebensraum as a justification for the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, possibly deny that Danzig and the Corridor are indispensable to the life of Poland? Can the leaders of the Reich who, having rejected historical principles last October, revived them in March to excuse their seizure of Prague, possibly refuse to recognize that Danzig and the Corridor have been considerably longer under Polish than under German rule? (From 968 to 1939, Pomerania was Polish for six hundred and ninety years and German for three hundred and sixty-three years only.) As for the dislike of the Germans in Danzig for the Poles and the intolerable nature of the situation which reigns in Danzig, how can such statements be reconciled with the oft repeated publicly stated affirmation of friendship for Poland given by the Fhrer himself since 1934 and, in particular, with his remark on February 20, 1938: "Danzig has ceased to be one of the danger spots of Europe"? COULONDRE. No. 131 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, May 31, 1939. A P.A.T. AGENCY bulletin has given a resum of the letter addressed by the Polish Commissioner-General at Danzig to the President of the Senate, Herr Greiser, in reply to the two notes addressed by the latter to the Polish Government after the Kalthof incident. According to this resum M. Chodacki states in his letter that responsibility for the events at Kalthof rests entirely with the authorities of Danzig, who, despite repeated representations from the Commissioner-General, had taken no steps "to prevent the criminal activities of the disturbers of the peace . . ." In reply to the Senate's demand for the recall of the Polish Deputy Commissioner, M. Perkowski, and of two Customs officials, the Commissioner-General confined himself to saying that he was unable to discover any lapse on the part of these officials and that, furthermore,  "he could not admit the right of the Senate to formulate any demands in the matter." The letter ended by declaring that, if the Senate was really prepared to put an end to the existing tension, the Polish Government was, for its part, prepared to undertake a joint examination "of the arrangements that could be made in order to ensure the possibility of normal activity for Polish officials in the territory of the Free City, and to improve the relations between these officials and the authorities of Danzig." No comments accompanied this P.A.T. communiqu, but one cannot help being struck by the conciliatory tone of M. Chodacki's letter. It does its utmost to avoid a continuation of the discussions started by the Senate on the prerogatives of the Polish Commissioner-General and his collaborators. At the same time the Polish Government implicitly renounces its claim for an indemnity for the damage done and refrains from speaking of the "new guarantees" for its officials, and for the Polish population of Danzig, which had been demanded in a previous letter immediately after the incident. LON NEL. No. 132 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 1, 1939. FROM a reliable intermediary, I have received the following indications, given by a senior official of the Wilhelmstrasse, on the manner in which the higher authorities envisage the settlement of the Danzig problem. I give as "reliable" the information which the official from whom it was obtained says he checked himself. "Three possibilities are at present contemplated: withdrawal on the part of Poland; war; and withdrawal on the part of Germany. "(1) The first solution is naturally preferred: it is one which is reckoned on and which is already being aimed at. That is the reason why a state of crisis is kept up in Poland, in order to oblige her to remain mobilized, and to exhaust progressively her nervous resistance and her financial resources. It is anticipated that the action undertaken will produce results in about two months. "Reliable-German diplomatic representatives abroad have been in-  structed to spread the report that France and England will not fight for the sake of Danzig. I have, myself, noted a revival of this campaign amongst the members of the diplomatic corps in Berlin. "Reliable-Herr Hitler has no illusions on this subject, for he has in his hands the reports of the competent Embassies in which it is declared that France and England will fight without any doubt in support of Poland. "(2) The higher authorities know, therefore, that if war broke out with Poland over the question of Danzig, a general war would result. "The Fhrer has asked General Keitel, chief of the General Staff, and General von Brauchitsch, C.-in-C. of the Army, whether in their opinion, under existing conditions, an armed conflict would turn in favour of Germany. Both replied that much depended on whether Russia remained neutral or not. In the first case General Keitel replied 'Yes' and General von Brauchitsch (whose opinion has greater value) replied 'probably.' Both declared that, if Germany had to fight against Russia, she would not have much chance of winning. Both generals attached considerable importance to the intervention of Turkey, their opinion being that Turkey was likely to act in favour of the Western Powers only if Russia herself join in. "The prevalent opinion at the Wilhelmstrasse is that, if Poland does not yield, Herr Hitler's decision will depend upon the signature of the Anglo-Russian pact. It is believed that he will risk war if he does not have to fight Russia, but that if, on the contrary, he knows that he will have to fight Russia as well, he will give way rather than expose his country, his party and himself to ruin and defeat. "Should the Anglo-Russian negotiations be protracted the possibility of a lightning seizure of Danzig within the next few weeks is not excluded. "(3) They are convinced at the Wilhelmstrasse that, in the mind of the Fhrer, Danzig is a means, but not an end. They stress the fact that, in his speech of April 28, Herr Hitler mentioned Alsace with a certain reticence." The above statements fit in as a whole with the information that I have already sent to Your Excellency. They underline at the same time the primary importance that is attached here to the Anglo-Russian talks and the extreme urgency of their being brought to a speedy conclusion. They indicate the middle of August as the culminating point of the crisis, but they also make clear the very great danger of the  period which will elapse before the present negotiations have been concluded. My British colleague, who considers as I do, that this information is very serious, informs me that he has communicated it to London urging that the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Russian pact be pushed forward as quickly as possible. I told him that for our part we would leave no stone unturned to bring about this result with the least possible delay. COULONDRE. No. 133 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 7, 1939. THE two notes which were handed by the Senate of Danzig on June 3 to the Polish Commissioner-General and, according to the Vorposten, constituted "Danzig's last word" on the Kalthof shooting, are worth particular study. They would seem, in fact, to give a clearer picture of the tactics which the Free City means to adopt towards Poland at any rate for the next few weeks. On the one hand, the idea seems to be to turn a deaf ear to any proposal for renewing collaboration, or even easing the existing tension, with Poland. On the other hand the Free City seems to be planning to profit by the circumstances in order to proclaim itself an independent German state; it must, therefore, abolish progressively all the Polish prerogatives. Thus it is taking advantage of the Kalthof incident, to quarrel with the Polish Representatives whom the Senate wishes to reduce to the level of ordinary diplomatic representatives and with the Polish Customs inspectors. If Poland should grow weary of the struggle, they would manage, in course of time, to obtain recognition by her of the Free City as an independent German state; and it will be remembered that it was towards such a solution that M. Beck seemed inclined to turn at the time when he was on good terms with Berlin. If Poland resists and conflicts arise, which from a distance appear to be of quite minor importance, Poland will be accused of adopting an uncompromising attitude and of wishing to undermine the essentially German character of Danzig. We know that, as a result of the Kalthof incident when the chauffeur of the Polish Deputy Commissioner, M. Perkowski, fired at a [172 ] Marienburg butcher and killed him, the Senate demanded the "recall" of this official, for abusing his diplomatic privileges in order to make good the escape of the murderer, as well as that of two other Customs officials. In its reply the Polish Government had refused to recognise the right of the Senate to make any demands, but at the same time declared itself willing to examine the arrangements that could be made in order to ensure the possibility of normal activity for Polish officials on the territory of the Free City "if the Senate was willing to put an end to the existing tension." The last two notes of the Senate had, as their object, to leave no doubt that it was not in the least prepared to end the existing tension and still less to assist in ensuring the possibility of normal activity for the Polish officials. The presentation of these notes is in itself eloquent. According to the official Danzig communiqu, they were addressed by "the Government of Danzig to the diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic" and the Polish Commissioner-General, M. Chodacki, found himself addressed as "Herr Minister." The first note warns the Polish Government that "if it maintained its refusal to recall the three officials mentioned, an order would be given to all Danzig officials, whether directly dependent on the Senate or not, to cease for the future all private and official dealings with them." The second note protests against the excessive number of Polish Customs inspectors, which was "contrary to treaty stipulations"; and notifies the Polish Representative that in future the Customs officials would be obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the authorities of the Free City. The Polish Press, which had received orders not to lay stress on the question, published only a brief report in which the reply of the Senate was reduced to the proportions of a purely local event upon which it was not necessary to dwell. The few newspapers which brought the matter up again, only did so in order to ridicule the Senate's claims. The I.K.C., for example, called Herr Greiser the "Burgomaster of the town of Gdansk." The Kurjer Warszawski was rather sarcastic about the senators who "in asking for a reduction in the number of Polish Customs officials revealed their ignorance of the statutes of their own city." The remarks made by Herr Forster on Sunday last, June 4, at the festival of the Danzig Labour Service, with the agreement of Reichsar-  beitsfhrer Hierl, seem to confirm the impression that the Free City is at present determined to carry on a policy of resistance and systematic sabotage of Polish rights. The Gauleiter compared the "unbridled fury" and the "hysteria" of the Poles with the calm of Danzig. "For us, Danzigers," he said, "we must not allow ourselves to lose our tempers-we leave that to our neighbours-we have only to wait, trusting in the Fhrer. We have held out for peace, we can hold out a little longer. The Fhrer wants a strong Danzig. Four hundred thousand people of Danzig are waiting, resolute, at the mouth of the Vistula, and look to no one but him." LON NEL. No. 134 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 11, 1939. THE force of 6,000 S.A. now circulating in Danzig, "with their packs on their backs, with entrenching tools and armed with carbines" which according to the Vorposten gives the town "almost the appearance of a mobilized city," have now been joined, the Nazi journal informs us, by "motor-cars and motor-cycles of the Reichswehr, manned by German soldiers." The newspaper which is supposed to reflect the views of the Senate affirms that there is nothing sensational in this and that it is only a question of a simple military tournament amongst the S.A., "in which units of the standing Army are taking part." It is stated, furthermore, in National-Socialist circles in the Free City, that these military motor-cars and motor-cycles have merely brought from East Prussia officers accompanied by their orderlies and chauffeurs, who have come to take part in the festivities. These army vehicles, as far as can be gathered, are about thirty in number and will take part in a rally to be held round the outer edge of the Free City. Neither the gathering of the S.A. nor the presence amongst them of the German regulars seems to disturb the Polish authorities who reckon that they will leave Danzig the way they came. The intention of the German leaders to "nibble" at the statute of Danzig is none the less evidenced anew by these facts. Such were the tactics formerly applied by Germany in the occupied Rhineland, but there they were confronted by a system of administra-  tion which it was easier to defend; all the circumstances (ceremonies, strikes, catastrophes) were utilized by the authorities of the Reich to try to introduce uniforms into the demilitarized zone. LON NEL. No. 135 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 13, 1939. A PERSON in close touch with this Embassy has just gathered together the following observations from someone in Herr von Ribbentrop's immediate entourage. Beneath the apparent calm which at the moment prevails in Berlin and astonishes some people and worries others, they are feverishly at work at the Wilhelmstrasse. Preparations are being made to face all manner of eventualities, but before directing his foreign policy into any one definite channel, Herr von Ribbentrop is awaiting the outcome of the talks between the Western Powers and Russia. The Danzig question is, in his eyes, only a detail which in itself does not interest him. For him it is the whole Polish question which is at stake. This problem could be settled: Either by an arrangement with England and France, as was the Czechoslovak problem, Or by an arrangement with Poland itself, Or by an arrangement with Russia. The first solution is ruled out by the attitude adopted by France and England since March 15. The second has met with the rigid resistance from Poland, backed by the British guarantee. There is now no longer much hope of its being realized, for the so-called negotiations in progress between Warsaw and Berlin only deal with technical details and do not touch on the conflict of principle. There remains, therefore, the third solution, namely the destruction of the Polish State by partition between the Reich and Russia. Herr von Ribbentrop has not given up this idea. He will not abandon it until the Anglo-Russian pact is signed. Until then he reserves all decisions, while continuing to show every consideration to the Soviets. The return of the "Condor" Legion should normally have been an  occasion for diatribes against Bolshevism. Herr von Ribbentrop saw to it that none of the speeches contained anything likely to offend Russia. The Fhrer himself, when addressing the "Condor" Legion never uttered the word "Bolshevism" or "Communism." It was against the "Democracies," the "warmongers and war profiteers," the promoters of "encirclement," that his thunderbolts were directed. The reserve that he observed with regard to Russia was evidently not due to chance. It was due to the influence of Herr von Ribbentrop who still has hopes of winning over the Russians, or at any rate of seeing them remain outside the bloc constituted under the aegis of France and England. These considerations, which bear out information I have already communicated to Your Excellency, seem clearly to reflect certain designs of Herr von Ribbentrop and the National-Socialist Government with regard to Poland and Russia. One could imagine perhaps that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich is himself the originator of these "confidences." Yet it is difficult to conceive how it would be to his interest to spread news which would incite the Western Powers to speed up the negotiations whose conclusion seems to be so much feared in Berlin. On the other hand, Your Excellency is aware that similar information reached me from Field Marshal Goering as well as from other sources. The manoeuvre which the advocates of collaboration with Moscow hope to bring off, evidently consists of a repetition to the detriment of Poland and with the aid of Russia, of the device already employed so successfully against Czechoslovakia. COULONDRE. No. 136 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, June 14, 1939. SINCE June 10, the date of the departure of the President of the Senate, who will be away about eight weeks, the situation has perceptibly deteriorated. An anti-Polish campaign of unheard-of violence and vulgarity is being carried on by the two daily papers, who charge the Polish Customs officials with the most unlikely offences. The reduction of their number, which is not limited by any agreement, is also de-  manded. It would seem that these officials exercise an effective control and have been taking steps to prevent the smuggling in of firearms, especially since the March crisis. The Press wishes perhaps to point out to the large numbers of visitors who have come from the Reich for the Cultural Congress and the exercises of the S.A., how intolerable life is for the German population of the Free City. A state of great excitement has been noted amongst the local militia. Business circles, however, seem to think that, as a result of Polish concessions, tension will diminish in the course of the next few weeks. LA TOURNELLE. No. 137 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, June 16, 1939. IN the Danzig-Polish dispute, the National-Socialist party is stressing the question of the Polish Customs inspectors, that is to say, they are giving indications as to just where the shoe pinches them. As I pointed out in a previous dispatch it is reported that a considerable number of firearms were being smuggled into the territory of the Free City in February and March. It appears that, since that time, this contraband has ceased and that the inspectors, doubtless backed up by their Government, have been showing more zeal in the performance of their duties. Although articles 200 and 201 of the Danzig-Polish treaty of October 24, 1921, which prescribe for their conditions of service, does not fix a limit to their number, the Senate, with a dogged perseverance, sends note after note protesting against their increase and denying them the right to exercise any authority outside the Customs offices, that is to say, for instance, to control the vehicles passing in front of the said offices. The local Press accuses them of being agents of the Frontier Guards service, carrying on espionage work, and not officials of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time it attempts to back up its attacks by transforming the slightest incidents into fantastic tales. For instance, two inspectors, who on May 25 took a look at the building of a landing-stage for the ferry boat over the Vistula, were abused most violently by the two dailies on June 7. On June 12, after a night spent in drinking together, an inspector and two S.A. came to blows; immediately the inspector was accused  of having tried to get the S.A. men drunk in order to kidnap them and get them into Poland. He was arrested, and brutally knocked about, and, up to date, permission has not been given for him to be visited in prison by subordinates of the Polish Commissioner-General. However, attacks and accusations have not weakened the Warsaw Government; on the contrary they have just increased the number of the inspectors, whose task is becoming more and more difficult, from 90 to 120. On the 10th the Polish Representative in the Free City handed a note to the Senate denying it the right to meddle with the questions of Customs and threatening a further increase in the numbers of the inspectors if their activity was further interfered with, or if the Danzig Customs officials were forced into taking the oath of allegiance to the National-Socialist party. The text of the note also hinted that, if need be, economic reprisals would be taken against the Free City. LA TOURNELLE. No. 138 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 20, 1939. ALTHOUGH the two speeches of Dr. Goebbels at Danzig have not introduced any new factor into the Polish-German problem, they were, if one can follow the intentions of the German propaganda, intended to mark a date, and an epoch in its evolution. After the warning shot of April 28, we have, as it were, the beginning of the heavy artillery preparation designed to intimidate the enemy and disorganize his countermeasures. The circumstances, the violence of their tone, the obvious wish to work up chauvinistic passions in the Free City to their maximum, all give added significance to the words of the Minister of Propaganda. From this point of view last Saturday's is the more interesting of the two speeches. The speaker, it is reported, spoke extempore. The warm welcome of the crowd seems to have made him improvise declarations thrilling with enthusiasm from the dress-circle in the theatre from which he had just watched a gala performance. But it is, in point of fact, sufficient to read the text of the speech to see that its terms had been most carefully weighed.  Without discussing the speech as a whole, four essential points may be singled out as essential: (1) Dr. Goebbels reasserted the German character of the Free City, which no one attempts to deny. The visit of the Fhrer's representative to Danzig is in itself proof that the population is perfectly at liberty to proclaim its attachment to the German "Volkstum." (2) With regard to the international aspects of the problem the speaker claimed that its present development could in no way be ascribed to the people of Danzig, who had only one desire, namely to belong to the Greater German Reich. This wish was "understandable, clear, definite and unshakable." "It is your misfortune," he added "that your lovely German city should be situated at the mouth of the Vistula. According to the theories of Warsaw, cities at the mouths of rivers always belong to the country through whose territory the rivers flow. Rotterdam, therefore, belongs to Germany since this port is at the mouth of the Rhine and the Rhine is a German river." (3) The Minister of Propaganda made a violent attack on Polish and British policies. "The Polish bullies," he said, "are now claiming East Prussia and German Silesia. According to them the west Polish frontier should be the Oder. Why not claim the Elbe or the Rhine? There they would meet their new allies the English, whose frontier, as we all know, is the Rhine." The Polish chauvinists are often speaking of a great battle that will take place outside Berlin. These boastings are the result of the fact that Polish policy is now passing through its "age of puberty." We must wait until this disorder disappears of itself. As to England, Dr. Goebbels cannot reconcile the statement made by Lord Halifax before the House of Lords that he wished to see a peaceful settlement of the Danzig question, and the fact that the British Government had "drawn a blank cheque in favour of Warsaw." Great Britain was endeavouring to encircle Germany and Italy and so "reviving her 1914 policy." But National-Socialist Germany was far from being the feeble bourgeois Germany of former times. "Therefore," said Dr. Goebbels, "we consider the oratory of Warsaw and London as so much bluster intended to hide under its volume of words, its deficiencies in strength and determination." (4) At the end of his speech the Head of the Nazi Propaganda let fall a more definite threat. Yet this threat was scarcely more open than that made by the Chancellor himself on April 28. "Our wish in the Reich," he cried out, "is as clear as your own,  wish; the Fhrer made this quite plain in his last speech to the Reichstag when he said 'Danzig is a German city and wishes once more to be part of Germany.' The world must have understood these words. It should realise too, from past experiences, that the Fhrer's words are not platonic. It will, in any case, be making a grave error if it imagines that Adolf Hitler withdraws before menaces, or gives in to blackmail. There can be no question of it." From the political point of view, Sunday's speech, which was almost entirely devoted to a eulogy of National- Socialist culture, was not so interesting. Dr. Goebbels was content with saying "political" frontiers were of limited duration, but that frontiers traced by language, race and blood were unchangeable and eternal. So this strange "cultural" week will have served to underline the will of the Reich to regain Danzig. The German Press proclaims it. The Montag writes that "the plebiscite has been held," Danzig has spoken. Danzig has made its choice. And the Volkischer Beobachter says that the word of the Fhrer, given two months ago, will be kept. "Today," it writes, "the people of Danzig know that, in no circumstances will they be left alone and that they will come into their own, come what may. Such is the historic significance of June 17, 1939. " Under what form and when will the Fhrer attempt to carry out his project? No one knows, and he himself is in all probability waiting for the opportune moment. But it would seem that, for the time being, the Nazi authorities do not contemplate immediate action. That is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the conclusion to be gathered from the words of Herr von Weizscker, which confirm those of his conversation with Herr Burckhardt. As far as one can gather, in Herr Hitler's eyes the affair is not yet ripe. He wishes to await, before acting, the development in one way or the other, of the Anglo-Franco- Russian negotiations (for in Berlin there is still the hope that these negotiations may break down). He also wants to await the evolution of the Anglo-Japanese conflict. During this respite that he has given himself and which will last, from what I can gather, for about two or three months, he will redouble his efforts in the sphere of propaganda supporting them probably with intimidatory measures of a military nature. It is apparently with the latter object in view that work is being intensified on the fortification of the German-Polish frontier in Slovakia, and on the Siegfried Line. It goes without saying that in this juncture the "bunkers" in the East will not play a purely defensive role.  One cannot fail to notice-and I have confirmation of the fact from various quarters-that the radical elements of the regime seem, for the moment, to have increased their influence on the mind of the Chancellor. The delay in the Moscow conversations, the Tientsin incident which confronts Great Britain with a formidable dilemma, perhaps certain statements made in London which have been interpreted as a sign of hesitation, have encouraged them and increased their confidence. Under their influence German policy is on the watch for any possible developments and is taking soundings in all directions, even as far off as Arabia and at the court of Ibn Saud. However, pending further information, nothing justifies the belief that the Fhrer will risk a general war for the sake of Danzig. Danzig has no doubt great strategic value for the development of the policy of the Third Reich. But the Nazi authorities will exhaust all means of turning the position before contemplating a frontal attack, that is to say starting a war with Poland, which would mean, in turn, a European war. I have been told that several of Herr Hitler's advisers keep on repeating that, even in the event of a general conflict, Germany will win. Herr Hitler is said to be not so sure, and quite apart from his horror of war which one can take as genuine, he has never up till now undertaken any move which was not certain of success. Things would be different if some particularly favourable circumstance presented itself. In Berlin in such a case prudence would be thrown to the wind in order to stake all on the last throw of the dice, "come what may," as the Volkischer Beobachter has put it. COULONDRE. No. 139 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 20, 1939. I HAD an interview on June 16 with the State Secretary at the very beginning of which he volunteered the opinion that, as far as he knew, all was quiet for the moment and that he saw no reason why the situation should become more strained in the near future. He repeated with special reference to Danzig, that, in his opinion, only acts of aggression on the part of the Poles could bring about a conflict. As I showed some skepticism he declared that, although the central Government of Warsaw exercised a moderating influence, a state of mind  existed among certain local authorities which made him seriously afraid of rash action on their part. Herr von Weizscker was none the less confident with regard to the immediate future and told me that he intended to take a holiday during the month of July. If the State Secretary had not obtained this information from a reliable source, it may be doubted whether, prudent and reserved man as he is, he would have offered it to me on his own initiative. From this declaration made to me, therefore, on the eve of the "Kulturtag" of Danzig, one may at least infer that no immediate action on the part of the Reich is likely to follow on Dr. Goebbels's speeches. Speaking generally, Herr von Weizscker considered that the opening of conversations likely to bring about an easing of the political tension would not be in any way aided by the conclusion of a Franco-Anglo-Russian pact. To threaten- the democracies should persuade themselves once and for all- was the worst possible way of dealing with the Fhrer. I pointed out that up till then only the reverse situation had been seen. Such methods had never been considered either in Paris or London, where it was fully realized that they had no effect on Herr Hitler. The cause of peace would have made great progress if Berlin became convinced that they had equally little chance of success with the Democracies. COULONDRE. No. 140 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 20, 1939. WHEN the moment arrives Chancellor Hitler will settle the Danzig question as he pleases and on his own responsibility, such is the view expressed and circulated by the German Ambassador in Warsaw and his collaborators. But they are also now enlarging the scope of their propaganda. They are speaking not only of Danzig, but now insist on every occasion on the impossibility of Germany allowing the Corridor to continue any longer in existence. The necessity for Germany to recover Upper Silesia is also mentioned by some of them. LON NEL.  No. 141 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 21, 1939. THE innumerable comments, to which the question of Danzig an the Corridor give rise, contain so many inaccuracies regarding Poland attitude, that I feel it necessary to define that attitude once more. (1) Poland has always shown herself willing, since the beginning of last winter, to give up the right to represent the Free City vis- -vis foreign powers, and at the same time to agree to the abolition of the office of High Commissioner of the League of Nations, and to complete independence of the Free City from Geneva. Poland would not, in principle, oppose certain modifications of the constitution of the City, which would be only of minor importance to Poland because they would not compromise vital Polish interests (Customs control transit facilities). Polish opposition is directed above all against a annexation by the Reich, which would, it is considered, invalidate a real guarantees relating to the utilization of the Vistula and the port of Danzig, and constitute such a menace to the Corridor that it would run the risk of being taken at any moment. (2) Poland is now, as previously, prepared to facilitate German rail and road communications between East Prussia and the rest the Reich by building, if necessary, at her own cost, a motor-road the use of which by Germans would involve neither Customs control, no a passport or pass. In this respect the intransigency of the Polish Government only applies to its absolute refusal to concede the principle of extra-territoriality for one or more roads across the Corridor. LON NEL. No. 142 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 22, 1939. THREE months have now elapsed since Germany made known her demands to Poland, and for that time Poland has not ceased to be in a state of alarm. At the beginning of this period, one could wonder whether, in the circumstances, Polish opinion would be able to retain its composure without losing its resolution.  The ordeal has shown the Poles in a very favourable light. Their determination to resist has not flinched, they remain ready to face anything. At the same time, even if one often hears the opinion expressed, especially amongst the masses and the Army that "they must put a stop to the present state of affairs and fight"; the nation has shown a remarkable sang-froid and obeys its authorities quite docilely when they advise it to show prudence and moderation. The Government is doing its utmost to prepare the defences of the country. Important results seem to have been obtained in the last three months. Without departing one whit from the attitude they have adopted towards Germany they are doing everything possible to gain time and postpone the conflict even though the majority do not believe that it can be avoided indefinitely. LON NEL. No. 143 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 22, 1939. THE situation is still confused in Berlin. If Dr. Goebbels's speeches have shown the stiffening attitude of the Reich on the Danzig question, they have not disclosed Herr Hitler's intentions; the question must be settled, but when and how? Probably no one knows except the Fhrer; it is not certain whether even he has made up his mind. Diplomatic circles are pessimistic. The events in the Far East and the difficulties of the negotiations with Moscow contribute to this feeling. It is considered, above all, that the manifestations of June 17 and 18 have given proof of the Fhrer's will to go ahead; that they have committed him before international opinion; and as, on the other hand, the Polish will to resist seems strong, it is not clear how any solution can be found to the crisis but war. Two points are more or less unanimously taken for granted here: (a) A crisis over Danzig is inevitable before the end of the year; (b) Danzig is not for Herr Hitler an end in itself. He has other objectives in Poland, namely the Corridor and Silesia. If any doubts may have existed on this subject, Dr. Goebbels took it upon himself to remove them last night, when he declared at the festival of the summer solstice that "Germany intends to take back all the territory which has belonged to her in the course of history."   This phrase did not appear in the German Press.  The majority of the diplomats accredited to Berlin are searching for a compromise solution, and growing uneasy at their inability to find one. They shut themselves up thus in a sort of contradiction, for, if one admits the limitless character of the German claims, and they do admit it, there is no hope for the moment of ending the situation by settling the Danzig question, and thus no advantage in compromising themselves over it. There are, on the other hand, some major disadvantages. Herr Hitler has definitely committed himself over the Danzig question, but he has not yet burnt his boats as he did with regard to Czechoslovakia. He will not burn them unless he definitely decides to go to the length of war, except in the event of his convincing himself that he can force the enemy position simply by means of threats and intimidation. That is why I am convinced that it is important today, even more than before, to abstain from taking the initiative, or adopting any attitude which could be interpreted here as a weakening of the Allied determination to oppose force by force. It seems to me nearly certain that we shall not be able to avoid a formidable increase of tension in the situation this autumn. Perhaps, however, if there is no giving way, on the part of the peace front, we shall see no repetition of the ultimatum of September 1938. What we must at any cost eliminate this time is the risk of war developing out of a threat of intimidation. According to my latest information this risk still exists. Is the information supplied by German agents abroad regarding the will to resist of the Allies less definite than it was before? I cannot say, but I have heard from a good source that Herr von Ribbentrop is once more convinced that at the present juncture Great Britain will not fight over Danzig. I know, on the other hand, that Field-Marshal Goering is very worried by the consequences of an uncompromising policy and would like to see the Fhrer play for time. It is impossible to foresee which of these two ideas will prevail, especially as the National-Socialist authorities, acting evidently upon "orders," are keeping a discreet silence in their dealings with the diplomats. The Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to be still very much in favour with Herr Hitler; on the other hand Field-Marshal Goering's credit with the Fhrer is reported to have gone up. COULONDRE.  NO. 144 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, June 23, 1939. THE publicity given abroad to Dr. Goebbels's speech made here on June 17 seems to have astonished the people of Danzig. In former years similar sarcasm and violence had been leveled at the heads of the German opposition parties, and the League of Nations, to which the latter could appeal, and then against the Jews; no one doubted that the Poles' time would come once the others had been eliminated. If, by his language, the Minister of Propaganda of the Reich gave the impression abroad that he was bringing a new element into the situation, his words have not surprised the population in the least; it had often heard similar phrases during the course of private meetings of the National-Socialist party. There are a great many who regret giving the impression that they had assented to a revision of the Danzig statute during the course of a demonstration, supposedly spontaneous, but in which the majority of the demonstrators were present by order. LA TOURNELLE. No. 145 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 27, 1939. As I have previously pointed out, diplomatic circles in Berlin are somewhat pessimistic about the development of the international situation from the month of August onwards. It is possible that the approach of the period when the crisis of 1938 broke out has something to do with this state of mind. It is also likely that most of the heads of the diplomatic missions have received information similar to that which has reached this Embassy. This may be classified under three headings: (1) Activity within the German Army. The number of reservists called up is estimated, by our Military Attach, very roughly at 600,000 and shows a tendency to increase. Maneuvers are in progress in the fortified zone of the West. (2) Military measures in Italy and Bulgaria. Large- scale maneuvers involving considerable bodies of troops are planned in Italy for the  month of August. The Bulgarian Army is expected to mobilize two classes at the same time. (3) Various indications: advice given by high German officials to foreign families not to remain in Germany during August; the general time-limit set for the validity of the passports of the male population; information to the effect that the Reichswehr has been instructed to hold itself in readiness for August 15. It is a noteworthy fact that, whereas a rather marked anxiety is beginning to arise among the middle classes, Germans in influential circles seem rather optimistic and are obviously trying to reassure foreigners whom they meet. One sentence struck me particularly in a statement made to one of my colleagues by one of the best-informed personages in the party. "In the event of Danzig proclaiming its return to the Reich," he said, "war would break out only if we were compelled to defend ourselves against aggression." This passage reminded me of certain words spoken by the State Secretary in the course of my last interview with him. After telling me that in his opinion no tension was to be foreseen in the near future, he added: "We have no intention of attacking Poland." When I pointed out to him that in this case no conflict was to be feared, since Poland was not going to attack Germany, he replied that serious incidents might occur, and quoted, as an example, the possible murder of a German consul. In the farewell audience which he granted to the Argentine Ambassador on June 26, Herr Hitler also told him more or less plainly that he had no intention of attacking Poland. Even if one admits that these various pointers express the real intentions of the German Government, one may ask how far they are reassuring. They may suggest that the Reich is prepared to temporize, but they may also be a preparation of the ground for an annexation of Danzig conducted from within the city. One may suppose that, among the various plans considered by the Nazi leaders for imposing their own solution of the problem of the Free City, the idea of stirring up a "spontaneous" movement and inducing the Danzig population itself to proclaim its return to the Reich, is particularly engaging their attention. In this event the plan of action would probably be as follows: At a moment chosen by the Fhrer, the National- Socialists of Danzig would proclaim the return of the city to the Reich. With their own resources, and without calling upon German troops, they would cut  off the little Polish garrison of the Westerplatte, together with the Polish Customs officials, and await Warsaw's reaction. The Polish Government would then have no other course than to occupy the city by force in order to re- establish the status quo, which would serve as a pretext for the launching of German military action. The object of such a maneuver is obvious. "If the Poles undertook the forcible suppression of a 'people's' movement," a notability of the regime recently said to one of my colleagues, "it would be they who would be the aggressors. They would be taking the initiative in violence. In such a case, would Great Britain and France be justified in attacking us?" It is thus calculated in Berlin that, when the right time comes, it would be possible for German propaganda to trouble the waters and create confusion, at least in the public opinion of neutral countries. Ever since the Austrian and Sudeten affairs for that matter, Nazi policy has shown itself a past-master in the art of fomenting internal crises and profiting by them. Such a conjecture makes it possible to reconcile the assurances given in various quarters that Germany "will not attack" with the indication of approaching tension gathered elsewhere. The latest information received from our consul in Danzig seems to show that this plan has already been set in motion, at least in its early phase. The Reich's preparations in the Free City are being rapidly intensified, and Herr Himmler is said to have arrived incognito in order to inspect their progress. Everything that is happening suggests that the Nazi Government wishes the armed forces in the city to be so strong that, when the appointed time arrives, the Fhrer may be able to take possession of it without any need either for a Putsch by the Party or for the dispatch of German troops. The Warsaw Government has doubtless taken such a possibility into account, and I know that it has been considered by the staff of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. German policy, therefore, cannot reasonably count upon taking the other side by surprise or confusing the question ad libitum by playing upon the word "aggressor." Moreover, the declaration read in the House of Commons by Mr. Chamberlain on March 31 on behalf of the British and French Governments, and the statement made by the President of the Council on April 13 are sufficiently explicit to convince the National-Socialist leaders that any act which infringed Poland's vital interests would entitle it to ask for the immediate support of France and Great Britain.  Nevertheless, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on this subject, one may ask whether it is not high time to speak plainly and frustrate this possible maneuver by dispelling any illusions which may still be held in Berlin. If Your Excellency agrees, it would be desirable to specify, for the benefit of the responsible leaders of German policy and within the framework of the Franco-British declaration, that any forcible action undertaken within the Free City contrary to the statute -i.e., action which, in view of the allegiance of the National-Socialists of Danzig to the Nazi party, could only be provoked and promoted by the Reich-and which Poland should feel bound to resist, would automatically lead to assistance being rendered by France and Great Britain. Such useful specific information might be given at the earliest opportunity by Paris and London. This would bring about the collapse of the elaborate presence which the German leaders seem to be so industriously building up. In any case, in the absence of further information it does not appear that any German action in this direction is imminent. At the Polish Embassy, where calm and resolution still prevail, it is considered that the alarmist rumours about German troop movements towards the Polish frontier (it was reported this morning that the Marshal Goering Regiment had left Berlin for Pillau, but this rumour is unconfirmed) might well come from German sources. According to this interpretation, National-Socialist agencies are seeking in this way to foster confusion by spreading false news in the hope of masking in advance any real military movements when they take place. In periods of fermentation, the policy of the Hitler Government usually surrounds itself with a smoke-screen. We can only stand to gain by making this maneuver ineffective through being on our guard against any surprise. COULONDRE. No. 146 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, June 27, 1939. IN his latest telegrams, M. de la Tournelle seems to me to present a very accurate idea of the situation in Danzig and its probable development. According to him, in order to reach his goal, Herr Hitler, after hav-  ing progressively destroyed the Danzig constitution and brought the population to heel, will have very little distance left to go. It certainly seems that, after failing in March to induce Poland to accept the annexation of Danzig by the Reich, he made up his mind to round off his work in this direction by militarizing the Free City. In order to complete its assimilation with "the rest of Germany," visits by soldiers, sailors and National-Socialist militia from the Reich follow one another in increasing numbers. Danzig's military forces may become strong enough to constitute, in themselves, a serious menace to the Polish Corridor, when the "Free Corps" which is now being talked about has been created. If Poland should one day feel bound to react against this menace and against these successive encroachments, German propaganda will not fail to represent its attitude as provocative and brand it as aggression. The German game is arousing great anxiety among the Poles, who see it for what it is. LON NEL. No. 147 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London. Paris, June 29, 1939. IN a telegram sent en clair by messenger, which I am communicating to you by air, M. Coulondre indicates that the latest news received from Danzig supports the view that the Reich is preparing the ground for a coup for the annexation of the Free City conducted from within, the Danzig Senate and population themselves proclaiming their return to the Reich. In this event the Polish Government would have no alternative but to occupy the city, by way of the harbour, in order to re-establish the status quo. Germany would represent itself as "attacked" and would exploit this equivocation by playing upon the word "aggression" in an attempt to confuse foreign public opinion and paralyze the reactions of the Governments of France and Great Britain. Our Ambassador informs me this morning that the Reich's military preparations in the Free City appear to be advancing more rapidly, and it seems to him to be essential, in order to frustrate this maneuver, to take steps beforehand and warn the Reich of the consequences which its attitude would inevitably entail.  I fully share the feeling expressed by M. Coulondre, and it seems to me most desirable that Lord Halifax, in the speech which he is to make this evening, should take the opportunity to give the rulers of the Reich a plain intimation of the common determination of the two Governments to fulfill the obligations of assistance which they have assumed towards Poland, no matter what devious means Germany might bring into play in order to create ambiguity about the real character of her action. You should approach the Principal Secretary of State with this object in view. GEORGES BONNET. No. 148 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, June 30, 1939. THE State Secretary was good enough to ask me to call upon him today, in order to convey to me an expression of regret on the part of Herr von Ribbentrop, whom I had asked for an interview and who is at the moment unwell, and his hope that he will be able to see me next week. When I drew Herr von Weizscker's attention to the pessimism of the Diplomatic Corps, he once more told me that he found it difficult to understand the reason for it. To be sure the negotiations of France and Great Britain with Russia, and the agreement with Turkey, gave no great pleasure to Berlin, and in his opinion did not make it any easier to reach peaceful solutions; without underrating the difficulties of the situation he could see no ground for being particularly anxious. I then spoke to him about Danzig and Poland, and emphasized the disquiet which I felt over information pointing to an increase of military activity in the Free City. "I recollect," I added, "that sometimes people still say in Germany that we are not going to fight for the sake of Danzig. I hope that your Government will be under no misapprehension in this respect. Danzig is a matter between Poland and you; but, whether it has to do with Danzig or not, we shall stand beside Poland if a conflict breaks out." The State Secretary's reply was, in substance, as follows: "The question whether such a conflict should break out in connection with Danzig is, I fully recognize, a secondary one. We have no doubts  about your alliance coming into play. France has long had alliances in the East. But we find it hard to understand that Great Britain should have delegated to a Continental country the responsibility of deciding whether she should go to war. It must have been the pressure of the Left-Wing Opposition which caused Mr. Chamberlain to give way. "So far as Danzig is concerned, plenty of fantastic rumours are in circulation. It is even said that the Fhrer is to be solemnly granted the freedom of the city on July 15. The police of the city, it is true, have recently been reinforced. The population are in the state of excitement that might be expected in the people of a town upon which the spotlights of the whole world are concentrated. Still, I do not see that any startling coup is to be feared. There is obviously a state of tension which could not continue over a period of years; but at present I still think that only incidents could provoke a conflict. They would need, for that matter, to be more serious than those about which we have so far had occasion to complain. The Polish provincial authorities continue to display frequent symptoms of great excitability. Recently, after Mass, a general made a speech in which he advocated an extension of Poland's sphere on the Baltic. But I am bound to recognise that the Central Government show more calm and greater moderation. I have even fancied that I could discern some indications of a desire on the part of M. Beck to seek a basis for a solution of our difficulties." I observed to Herr von Weizscker that I was much interested by this last remark of his, and asked him whether he would authorize me to make use of it. He replied in the affirmative, at the same time desiring me to emphasize the fact that as yet it was a question only of very slight indications, and that this was his personal opinion. Needless to say, I stressed the absolute solidarity between France and Great Britain in case of a conflict. It is nevertheless important to note that, in a more or less covert form, people here still attempt with regard to a Polish-German conflict, to draw a distinction between Great Britain's attitude and our own. COULONDRE.  PREFACE Germany's Word of Honour (July 11, 1936-September 26, 1938) I (July 11, 1936-March 12, 1938) No. 1 Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936 BEING convinced that they are making a valuable contribution towards the whole European development in the direction of maintaining peace, and in the belief that they are thereby best serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have resolved to return to relations of a normal and friendly character. In this connexion it is declared- (1) The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federate State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Fhrer and Chancellor of May 21, 1935. (2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National- Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal concern of that country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. (3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly follow in its policy in general, and in particular towards Germany, a line in conformity with leading principles corresponding to the fact that Austria By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934 and their additions of 1936, nor the relationship of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected. Considering that the dtente desired by both sides cannot become a reality unless certain preliminary  conditions are fulfilled by the Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal Government and the German Government will pass a number of special measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state of affairs. No. 2 M. PUAUX, French Minister in Vienna, to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, March 12, 1938. THIS morning German troops crossed the frontier at Bregenz, Innsbruck, Kufstein, Braunau and Salzburg. In the latter town the German authorities have put under guard the Prince-Bishop, the Governor, and several prominent Catholic personalities. Seventy aeroplanes have landed a battalion of the Wehrmacht at the Aspern aerodrome in Vienna. Officers of the Wehrmacht, the S.A. and the S.S. arrived in Vienna during the night. German air squadrons are maneuvering above the city. PUAUX. II (March 12_15, 1938) No. 3 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 12, 1938. FIELD MARSHAL GOERING, during a reception he gave last night, had a conversation with the Czechoslovak Minister. He gave assurances that Germany had no evil intentions whatever towards Czechoslovakia and that the latter State had therefore nothing to fear from the Reich, and he gave his word of honour to that effect. He then gave expression to the hope that Czechoslovakia would not mobilize. Returning to his legation, M. Mastny informed Prague by telephone of Field-Marshal Goering's communication. He then returned to the reception and informed the Minister- President that, after having established contact with his Government, he was in a position to assure him that Czechoslovakia would not mobilize. Field-Marshal Goering  then repeated what he had said before, adding that he was not only speaking for himself, but in the name of the Fhrer, who, having absented himself from Berlin for a time, had placed all powers in his hands. This morning, towards midday, Field-Marshal Goering called M. Mastny on the telephone. He informed him that the German troops had received orders to remain at 15 kilometres from the Czechoslovak frontier. M. Mastny replied that he took note of this, but that his Government felt it indispensable to take certain police measures on the frontiers of his country. Field-Marshal Goering replied that he had no objection to this. The Czechoslovak Minister was again summoned yesterday at 5.30 p.m., by Baron von Neurath. No doubt the conversation between M. Mastny and Field- Marshal Goering, which betrays Germany's anxiety lest her action should bring about the danger of a European war, has not been considered sufficient. FRANOIS-PONCET No. 4 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 12, 1938. BARON VON NEURATH merely repeated to the Czechoslovak Minister, on behalf of the Fhrer, the pacifying assurances already given by Field-Marshal Goering. The Czechoslovak Minister took the opportunity to declare that his country would remain perfectly calm, assured as it was of the loyalty of its Allies and of their support, should occasion arise. FRANOIS-PONCET No. 5 M. V. DELACROIX, French Minister in Prague, to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prague, March 12, 1938. GERMANY'S violent action against Austria is naturally considered by M. Krofta as an exceedingly serious menace to the future of Czechoslovakia. But he does not believe that the danger is immediate. He is of the opinion that the German Government is afraid that an action  against Czechoslovakia might lead to a general war, and the declarations made by Field-Marshal Goering to M. Mastny are a proof of this fear. The Field-Marshal is said to have declared yesterday, at 11 p.m. to the Czechoslovak Minister, that the Berlin Government considered what was happening in Austria as a family affair, but that its relations with Czechoslovakia were of an entirely different nature. Field-Marshal Goering gave his word of honour that that country would not be attacked by Germany. The Field-Marshal is said to have repeated this undertaking a little later during the night, adding that this time he was doing so Officially, as Herr Hitler, who was for the moment in retirement, had entrusted him with the direction of the State. Finally, this morning, Field-Marshal Goering is said to have telephoned to M. Mastny that, in order to prevent any incidents, he had forbidden the German troops to approach within 15 kilometres of the Czechoslovak frontier, on the understanding that Czechoslovakia, on her side, should abstain from any interference in Austro-German affairs. Yesterday, at 5 p.m., on an inquiry made by M. Eisenlohr, M. Krofta denied the rumour that the Prague Cabinet had ordered mobilization or was thinking of doing so. At the request of the German Minister, M. Krofta repeated this dmenti during the night, and the newspapers have published it this morning. The Minister has also described as ridiculous the rumour that a great number of Austrian refugees have crossed the frontier into Czechoslovakia. It appears, in fact, that there are in the country only between 90 and 100 refugees from Austria. M. Krofta does not know whether they have returned to Austria. The Press has been advised to exercise great caution and moderation in commenting on the events. LACROIX No. 6 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, March 12, 1938. THE Czechoslovak Minister has been received by Lord Halifax  and has pleaded the necessity of a positive demonstration in favour of his country. He made the following suggestion: Our Minister in Berlin, he said, has received the express assurance from Field-Marshal Goering that the Reich has no intention of encroaching upon the independence of Czechoslovakia. The German Minister in Prague has made the same declaration to M. Krofta. M. Masaryk asked whether his Government might not inform the Foreign Office officially of this double declaration. This step would allow you to take official notice of it and then to address a note to Berlin in which the British Government would place on record the assurance given to Czechoslovakia. Lord Halifax noted this suggestion and promised to put it before the Prime Minister. CORBIN. No. 7 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, March 13, 1938. M. MASARYK, the Czechoslovak Minister, acting on instructions from his Government, handed to the Foreign Office this morning a note in the following terms: "I have reported to my Government the interview which you were good enough to grant me to-day. "I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring to the official knowledge of His Majesty's Government the following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th March) Field-Marshal Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued earnest endeavour on the part of Germany to improve these mutual relations. "In the first statement the Field-Marshal used the expression: 'Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort.' "In the second statement Field-Marshal Goering asserted that, having given his own word previously, he was now able to give the word of the head of the State, who had authorized him to take over temporarily his official duties. He then repeated the above assurances.  "To-day (the 12th March) Field-Marshal Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, repeated yesterday's assurances and added that the German troops, marching into Austria, have strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the Czechoslovak frontier; at the same time he expressed the hope that no mobilization of the Czechoslovak army would take place. "M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject, and to-day spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925. "M. Mastny also saw to-day Herr von Mackensen, who assured him that the clarification of the Austrian situation will tend to improve German-Czechoslovak relations. "The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wish to assure His Majesty's Government that they are animated by the earnest and ardent desire to live in the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich. They cannot, however, fail to view with great apprehension the sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral agreement between Germany and Austria (July 11, 1936) and yesterday (March 11, 1938)." At the same time, M. Masaryk, speaking personally, expressed to Lord Halifax the hope that the British Government would inform Berlin, in any manner they might consider appropriate, but in an emphatic way, that they are aware of the assurances given by the Government of the Reich to Czechoslovakia. The document translated above should, until further notice, be regarded as confidential. CORBIN. No. 8 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, March 14, 1938. FOLLOWING on the letter addressed yesterday by the Czechoslovak Minister to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Berlin received instructions to call on Field- Marshal Goering without delay, and to inform him of the communication of the Czechoslovak Government, drawing his attention particularly to the importance attached in  London to the assurances mentioned therein, and to their full expectation that they would be respected. Sir Nevile Henderson was at the same time instructed to ask whether the British Government might publish the document, so as to mitigate to some extent the emotion caused among the public by the events in Austria. The Czechoslovak Minister has just heard that the declarations made to M. Mastny have been confirmed to the British Ambassador by Field-Marshal Goering, and that Field- Marshal Goering had raised no objection whatever to their publication. His only reservations were in connection with the arbitration treaties, which, he said, "concerned the Chancellor and Baron von Neurath," and the implications of which he professed not to be fully aware. CORBIN. No. 9 Extract from Mr. Neville Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on March 14,1938 "I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on March 11 gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin_an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler_that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular, on March 12, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October 1925." No. 10 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 15, 1938. MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, before referring publicly in his speech of yesterday to the assurances given by Field- Marshal Goering concerning Czechoslovakia, had instructed the British Ambassador in Berlin to ask the Field-Marshal whether he would authorize this Statement. The answer was in the affirmative.  Sir Nevile Henderson also received confirmation from Field-Marshal Goering and Baron von Neurath that Germany would, before the plebiscite of April 10, withdraw from Austria the troops which had been sent there. FRANOIS-PONCET. III (September 26, 1938) No. 11 Extract from Herr Hitler's speech at the Sports Palace in Berlin, September 26, 1938 "And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which shall be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.... "I have but few things to say. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I also told him that I cannot extend any further the limits of our patience. I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its problems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities, peacefully, without oppression, I shall no longer be interested in the Czech State. And this I guarantee. We don't want any Czechs at all."  II German Agitation Continued Warning to Germany: Letter from M. Georges Bonnet to Herr von Ribbentrop (July 1-30, 1939) No. 149 Note by M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his interview with Count von Welczeck, German Ambassador in Paris, July 1, 1939 I HAVE just received a visit from the German Ambassador, whom I had asked to see me this morning. It was all the more desirable to see him in that M. Coulondre had informed me that a rumour was current in Berlin to the effect that in the course of his recent stay in Berlin, Herr von Ribbentrop had instructed the Ambassador to inform me that Germany had decided to seize Danzig. I therefore began by listening attentively to Count von Welczeck, who spoke to me to the following effect: "It is only three days since I returned to Paris. In the course of my recent stay in Germany, I saw Herr von Ribbentrop in his country house, for he is unwell. We had a talk together about Polish intentions. Herr von Ribbentrop made serious complaints about the ill-treatment to which Germans are subjected in Poland. He considers that there are two parties in Poland. One, the more reasonable, realises that a war between Poland and Germany would very rapidly end in the defeat of Poland. To be sure, the Poles may entertain the hope that a subsequent victory of France and Great Britain, after the latter have come to their aid, would re- establish them in their rights; but meanwhile they would have suffered the devastation of war and they would have had enemy soldiers quartered among them for months or years, which is never very pleasant. Side by side with this reasonable party, however, there is the party of hot-heads, who are often in the pay of foreign agents. Above everything else they want, for ideological reasons, to overthrow the National-Socialist regime. They are ready for any rash action, they ill-treat the Germans, and they have war always in view." The Ambassador does not think, however, that things will take a  tragic turn. He proposes to stay in Paris for the next three months, and then go deer-stalking in Hungary. Nevertheless, Herr von Ribbentrop considers that incidents may lead to war between Poland and Germany at any momerit. Such a war would be extremely popular in Germany."We in Germany," he said, "have an unrequited love for France. On the other hand, the German people have no love for the Poles, and, in a war against Poland, the Fhrer would have the whole of his people behind him." Count von Welczeck added, on his own account, that it was regrettable that the question of Danzig had not been submitted to France and Great Britain before the Czechoslovak question; for, he said, this is really the last claim of the Reich, though nobody can believe it. Finally, the German Ambassador expressed regret over the refusal to understand that Germany was entitled to a zone of inlfluence in the East, which was perfectly legitimate owing to Germany's geographical situation. After listening to Count von Welczeck, I replied: "On the morrow of the Munich Agreement, while France contemplated large-scale economic collaboration with Germany, she also accepted the idea that certain countries of Central Europe, by reason of their geographical situation, might have more extensive economic relations with Germany than with France. But at no time could France have dreamed for a moment of giving Germany authority to violate the frontiers of all her neighbours and establish herself in Bucharest, Budapest or Warsaw." The Ambassador smiled and informed me that such a project had never been in the minds of the rulers of the Reich. I added that, in the course of the conversation which I had had with Herr von Ribbentrop, in Count von Welczeck's presence, I had made formal reservations respecting our relations with Poland and with the U.S.S.R., just as he himself had made reservations respecting his relations with Italy. I had even pointed out to him that we had an alliance with Poland, and Herr von Ribbentrop had said to me in reply that he was aware of the fact, and that it was a matter of indifference to him, since relations between Germany and Poland were excellent. Count von Welczeck recognised that this was accurate, and added that Germany's relations with Poland were, in fact, excellent at that time. The Poles had repeatedly come and asked the Germans to give them Teschen, Oderberg, part of Slovakia, and a common frontier  with Hungary. They had been granted all this. Count von Welczeck was convinced that if, at that time, the Government of the Reich had said to Colonel Beck: "Very well, we will give you all this, but we must come to terms over Danzig and the Corridor," the matter would have been instantly settled with the Poles. I then touched on the question of German-Polish relations, and insisted to Count von Welczeck that there was by no means any danger of war, provided that Germany was firmly resolved to maintain peace. The keys of peace or war were not in the hands of Poland, but in those of Germany. Count von Welczeck was wrong in believing that counsels of violence might be given to the Poles by the British Government. I could assure him that it was not so. But I was justifiably anxious about the situation which had been created in Danzig. What was the meaning of the arms which had been smuggled in there?-and of the S.S. men ? These did not suggest very peaceful intentions. Count von Welczeck replied that the Danzigers were entitled to consider their own defence, in view of the fact that they could see before their eyes a large number of mobilised Polish troops; but he repeated that there was no aggressive intention on Germany's part. I then told Count von Welczeck that he should entertain no illusions about what the French attitude would be in such an eventuality. France had definite commitments to Poland; these commitments had been still further increased as a result of recent events, and in consequence France would stand side by side with Poland immediately, I from the very moment Poland itself took up arms. I then read to Count von Welczeck the note which had been drafted by the Political Department, and which covered every case which might arise, including even the case, which had been considered as possible, of a kind of internal Putsch in Danzig. After reading this note, I told Count von Welczeck that I was I handing it to him, and that I requested him to reproduce it in extenso in the telegram which he would be dispatching to Herr von Ribbentrop. It was precisely because I had met Herr von Ribbentrop in Paris and because I had signed the Franco-German declaration that I did not want to leave room for the slightest misunderstanding between the French Government and the German Government with regard to France's attitude. If war should one day break out, I did not want the Government of the Reich to be in a position to say: "We were not warned. The explanations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs or of the  French Government were not clear. We did not know exactly what would be the reaction of the French Government." As it was, there could be no doubt. It was for this reason that I had made a point, as an exceptional measure, of putting my views into writing. In reply, Count von Welczeck told me that, in all his reports, he had not failed to inform his Government of the precise nature of the French attitude, and that he had repeatedly warned the Fhrer that France would stand side by side with Poland in the event of war. "But," he continued, "I find it difficult to convince him, for we cannot manage to understand how Great Britain and France should commit the mad act of embarking upon war over Danzig, when leading French statesmen, for the past fifteen years and even on the morrow of the Treaty of Versailles, have recognised that the statute of the Free City of Danzig could not last." A war, moreover, would be a world catastrophe, the Ambassador concluded, for the French could not break through the Siegfried Line any more than the Germans could break through the Maginot Line. Cities would be destroyed from the air, but the war would not be ended in that way. Nevertheless, we should be mistaken in believing that Germany could not stand a long war, for she has supplies which would enable her to do so. When the Ambassador once more repeated that the Danzig question was the last in which Germany was interested, I told him in reply that the Government of the Reich already had behind it the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement, and the declaration of a protectorate over Bohemia on March 15, and that therefore nobody could believe that this was really a final claim, for we should not fail to be presented with others. Finally, I told the Ambassador that he could observe the unanimity with which the French nation had rallied to the support of the Government. Elections would be suspended; public meetings would be stopped; attempts at foreign propaganda of whatever kind would be suppressed; and the Communists would be brought to book. The discipline and the spirit of sacrifice of the French people could not be called in question by anybody. Count von Welczeck informed me that, on this point, all his reports made mention of the present admirable attitude of the French people. He promised me that he would most faithfully repeat to his Government the conversation we had had together, the importance of which he fully realised.  No. 150 Note handed by M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Afiairs, to Count von Welczeck, German Ambassador, in the course of their conversation on July 1, 1939 I RECEIVED Herr von Ribbentrop in Paris a few months ago, and I signed with him the Franco-German declaration of December 6, 1938. The personal relations which I formed with him on that occasion make it a duty for me at the present moment to point out to him very definitely the position of the French Government, and to leave no doubt in his mind about the determination of France. In December last, I clearly specified to Herr von Ribbentrop that the Franco-German declaration-in conformity, for that matter, with the stipulation contained in Article 3- could not be considered as affecting the special relations of France with the countries of Eastern Europe. In so far as Poland, more particularly, is concerned, events since then have produced a strengthening of the French alliance. M. Daladier definitely indicated in his declaration of April 13 last the scope of the engagements by which the two countries are now linked. Today I make a point of recalling these commitments to Herr von Ribbentrop's very special attention, and stressing the unshakeable determination of France to fulfil them by exerting all her strength in support of her pledged word. At a moment when measures of all kinds are being taken in Danzig, whose scope and object it is difficult to appreciate, it is particularly essential to avoid any risk of misunderstanding about the extent of the obligations and about the attitude of the French Government: a misunderstanding whose consequences might be incalculable. I therefore regard it as my duty to state definitely that any action, whatever its form, which would tend to modify the status quo in Danzig, and so provoke armed resistance by Poland, would bring the Franco-Polish agreement into play and oblige France to give immediate assistance to Poland.  No. 151 M. GAUQUI, French Charg d'Affaires in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 3, 1939. LAST Friday a group of youths belonging to the "Hitler Jugend" crossed the frontier in Pomerania. They were at once arrested by Polish frontier guards and imprisoned. On being informed of this, the German Embassy intervened with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately gave orders for the young Germans to be set at liberty. The German Press has not breathed a word about this incident, nor, for that matter, has the Polish Press. It was M. Beck who reported the incident to my British colleague as a "significant fact." GAUQUI. No. 152 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, July 3, 1939. THE Polish Commissioner-General, who returned from Warsaw this morning, told me that, according to his information, the Polish Government has no intention at present of opposing the German military measures in progress in Danzig. The Government, in fact, feels that great prudence is enjoined on it by the responsibilities which it has assumed towards Paris and London, that the preparations in question are up to the present only defensive in character, and that it is to its advantage to gain time. "Our tolerance has limits," M. Chodacki said to me, "but they have not yet been reached, and our conduct should have great elasticity." I asked him whether he would inform the Senate as to these limits, and he replied in the negative. Finally, according to him, the German Government was still conforming to diplomatic usage in its official relations with the Polish Government on the subject of Danzig. Thus, for instance, Berlin had just notified Warsaw of the call which the cruiser Knigsberg is to make here on August 28. LA TOURNELLE.  No. 153 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 4, 1939. As I have reported to Your Excellency, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs asked me to call upon him last Friday, June 30. Since it may be supposed that he did not summon me solely in order to convey to me Herr von Ribbentrop's regrets that he was unable to receive me owing to his state of health, I wondered what might be the real reason which had led him to arrange this interview. In substance, Herr von Weizscker declared to me: (1) That, in his opinion, there was no ground for anticipating a coup in Danzig from the German side. (2) That he believed in our determination to support Poland, but was less convinced of the firmness of the British attitude. (3) That certain slight indications led him to think that M. Beck desired to seek a basis for a friendly solution. What is happening in Danzig which is arming in preparation for a siege, scarcely permits one to accept the reassuring statements made by the State Secretary at their face value. The Free City would have no more reason today than it had yesterday to put itself on a war footing to resist a Polish attack, if it were not preparing itself, on the orders of Berlin, for action likely to provoke intervention by Warsaw. The most favourable explanation of the remarks referred to under heading (1) above appears to me, therefore, to be that, while pursuing preparations for action in Danzig from within, Herr Hitler has not yet made up his mind, and is consequently assuming towards the Powers concerned a position which would enable him to procrastinate and possibly even to cover at least a provisional retreat. The fact that he decided not to make a speech at the launching of the cruiser Ltzow seems to lend support to this hypothesis. On his side, my British colleague, who is leaving today for London for a few weeks, tells me that the impression which he has formed from his conversations in Government circles is that the Fhrer has not yet made up his mind. The conversations I have had myself with various responsible persons in the Chancellor's entourage leave me with the impression that they do not know whether he would go so far as to risk a general war in order to settle the Polish affair. This may mean either that he has not  yet reached his decision, or that these persons are unaware what decision he has made. The reassurances which, according to all appearances, Herr von Weizscker was instructed to convey to me, may also have another object; to lull the vigilance of the Western Powers, in the hope that, when suddenly confronted with the fait accompli, they will confine themselves to verbal protests. The precedent of Bohemia is unfortunately quite recent. Sir Nevile Henderson received from Herr von Weizscker, on the eve of the occupation of Prague, an assurance that the Reich "would behave in a proper way." As for the indications referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) above, one may wonder whether they are not both alike intended to sap French resistance. I must at the same time remark that the opinion that Great Britain will not hold to her position is unfortunately still very general in German Government circles, and that moreover the indication that M. Beck was seeking the basis of a solution was reported in the same terms to one of my colleagues by the Italian Ambassador, which would seem to show that it is not without foundation. Furthermore, whatever may be the precise significance of Herr von Weizscker's declarations, they seem to me, in any case, to throw into relief the importance which the German Government attaches to the attitude of the Powers concerned in the determination of its line of conduct in the Danzig affair. In this respect, the communication made by Your Excellency to Count von Welczeck on July 1 should enable the Chancellor to measure the risks of a fresh adventure. COULONDRE. No. 154 M. COUL0NDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 4, 1939. MY Polish colleague, whom I questioned this morning about what he thinks of the situation, and about the way in which his Government proposes to meet it, was somewhat evasive. He regards as an undoubted fact the military activity proceeding in Danzig: the arrival of militiamen disguised as tourists, the importation of arms, the building of army huts, the increase in numbers of the police. He also feels that a time will come when the Polish Government will be bound to intervene; but he does not know, he told me, either when or how.  M. Lipski still remains convinced that the German Government is putting the strength of the Allies' resistance to the test, but that it will not embark upon a general war for the sake of Danzig. He seems not disinclined to think that the rumours which have recently been in circulation on the subject of an immediate Putsch in Danzig may well be of German origin and have been put about with a view to ascertaining the reactions of the Western Powers. I reported to him the indications which the State Secretary had given me regarding M. Beck's alleged desire to seek the basis of an amicable solution. In reply, he told me that he had no cognizance of any alteration in M. Beck's attitude. My Polish colleague showed himself somewhat anxious about the situation in Slovakia. Certain signs, notably the presence in Berlin of two members of the Bratislava Government, one of them being M. Tuka, lead him to fear that the German Government may be about to suppress what remains of the independence of that country. COULONDRE. No. 155 M. GARREAU, French Consul-General in Hamburg, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hamburg, July 4, 1939. THE German Press gives no information about the German- Soviet commercial negotiations at present in progress. Commercial circles in Hamburg, however, which are usually very well informed, are under the impression that, if some agreement is not shortly concluded between London, Paris and Moscow, the Soviet Government will be prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with the Reich for a period of five years. For some time past there has been anxiety in those circles about the rapid evolution of the National-Socialist system in the direction of autarchy and collectivisation. People do not disguise their fear of seeing this tendency still further strengthened by political cooperation between Berlin and Moscow. It is felt moreover that such cooperation would aggravate the risks of an early aggression by the Reich against Poland and thus precipitate a general conflagration. GARREAU.  No. 156 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 6, 1939. FROM a series of conversations which he has just had in military circles, General Musse has derived the impression that, in order to avoid figuring as an aggressor, Poland would proceed to great lengths in restraining its impatience in face of the progressive militarisation of Danzig. Our Military Attache thinks that the Polish Government will limit itself to platonic protests, unless a time comes when its essential interests are directly threatened in Danzig. It will react strongly only if its use of the harbour, the Vistula, or the railway is impeded. LON NEL. No. 157 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 6, 1939. M. BECK made his apologies for waiting until this morning to receive me. He wanted, he said, to inform me about the decisions that were reached yesterday evening in the course of a conference lasting four hours, under the chairmanship of M. Moscicki, at which the Marshal, the Prime Minister and himself were present In the course of this meeting the following decisions were reached: The Polish Government remains resolved that its conduct in Danzig shall correspond to whatever action may be taken by the Hitler Government. For the time being, progressive militarisation of the Free City does not appear to it to constitute, or as yet to be on the point of constituting, a reason sufficient to justify a counter-stroke which would run the risk of giving intervention by Poland the appearance of aggression. "Danzig," M. Beck said to me, "is under our guns. Accordingly, the presence in that city of the equivalent of a whole division and a few guns cannot, in itself, seriously disturb us." This attitude would change only if and when Poland's essential interests (the use of the railway, the Vistula, or the harbour) were directly affected. In this eventuality, moreover, the Polish Government would in the first place have recourse to measures of an economic nature in order  to defend its rights, reserving other forms of action to meet the most serious contingencies. I brought M. Beck to the point of specifying that, in any case, unless the march of events did not leave it the necessary time, the Polish Government would subordinate any action to previous consultation with the British and French Governments. LON NEL. No. 158 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 6, 1939. IN the course of our conversation, M. Beck said to me that it seemed to him preferable that the French and British newspapers, without abstaining from informing their readers about the Nazi intrigues in Danzig, should nevertheless avoid giving them too much importance or devoting too much space to them. The Polish Press has received general directions to this effect and is observing them scrupulously. M. Beck indeed feels, as I myself have already stated to Your Excellency, that, if it did not take care to present the affairs of Danzig as one of the elements in a problem which would continue to exist, even though there were no longer any Danzig question, the Press would be playing into the hands of German propaganda. This propaganda is, in fact, seeking to concentrate attention upon Danzig in order to throw the other aspects of the situation into the background and confuse public opinion in the Western countries. LON NEL. No. 159 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 9, 1939. TEN days ago, at the very moment when the rumour spread through Europe that the problem of Danzig was on the point of receiving a "German solution"; while Dr. Goebbels's staff seemed to be endeavouring to concentrate the attention of world opinion upon the Free City, as if to convince it that this problem constituted-incidentally, through the fault of Poland-the last obstacle to peace;  and while Count von Welczeck did not shrink from assuring Your Excellency that this was the Reich's last claim-at this very moment the Press service of the Danzig Senate was itself circulating a booklet entitled Danzig: What is at stake? which contained this passage: "We now return to the solution of the fundamental dispute between Poland and Germany, which has been put on one side since 1933. It is apposite to recall in this connection that, in so far as concerns Danzig the Corridor and the other territories arbitrarily detached from the Reich, it is a question of German soil, for whose possession Poland can put forward no claim, either moral, historical, civilising or cultural." It is, in fact, beyond any doubt no less than this that is in question at this moment in the eyes of the Germans as regards Poland. The language used by those Germans who live in Poland, or who come here on a visit, and even that which one may hear from the lips of certain close friends of Herr von Moltke, clearly confirm it; and while, of course, my German colleague personally shows himself much more prudent, nobody has ever heard him say that the annexation of Danzig was the last of the Nazi claims. The Poles are very well aware of the way in which the question of their relations with the Germans now presents itself, and they know the extent of the Teutonic appetite in their respect. It is this that explains why almost all of them regard war with the Reich as inevitable. Whether they share the latter view or not, the rulers of the country remain no less resolved-and the moderation which they display in their appreciation of the situation in Danzig definitely proves this-to do everything they can in order that a conflict, if it cannot be avoided, should at least be retarded as long as possible. LON NEL. No. 160 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 10, 1939. IN the course of a short stay in Danzig, the First Secretary of this Embassy, from information given him by our Consul and also from conversations with the High Commissioner for the League of Nations, the Polish Commissioner-General and certain Danzig authorities, has  gathered some interesting impressions, which may be summarised as follows: (1) The wave of unrest which has been apparent for some days in the Free City is appreciably on the ebb. But, in order to estimate the significance and the extent, which is entirely relative, of this regression, it is apposite to emphasize the fact that the effervescence which had been observed in the Free City was considerably exaggerated by interested propaganda and never presented the character of organised preparations for violent action. (2) In so far as can be ascertained, this appeasement has in no way slowed down the militarisation of the Free City, which is being methodically carried out. The strength of the police force has been raised to 3,000 men. The formation of the Free Corps is being continued. Its nucleus was created out of 300 S.S. men from East Prussia, who wear on the sleeves of their uniforms the words "Reichswehr Danzig." The barracks contain several thousands of young men who have come from the Reich, but are said to be of Danzig origin. Smuggling of arms (rifles, machine-guns, anti-aircraft batteries, light tanks, aircraft, etc.) continues. Entrance to the Schichau dockyard, where this material is disembarked, is strictly forbidden. All the tailors and even all the dressmakers of the Free City without exception have been requisitioned for making uniforms. It would be incorrect to say that these measures of rearmament are ostentatious, but they are known to the authorities. On the other hand, their rate, or even their importance, should not be exaggerated. In any case, this rearmament does not present the feverish character of such measures as would be taken with a view to an early coup de force. It is a question rather of a progressive preparation for the militarisation of the Free City, with a view to guarding against possibilities which perhaps do not as yet present themselves in a very definite way even to the National-Socialists themselves. The Danzig authorities declare that the Free City wants to be in such a state "as not to allow itself to be invaded without resistance" (like Prague!). They also say that Danzig must defend itself against possible aggression by the Poles. This argument, for that matter, is not pure propaganda. It corresponds to a real anxiety on the part of the population. Recently, while in Western Europe the possibility of an approaching Putsch in Danzig was kept in view, the Danzigers, for  their part, seem to have sincerely feared some such step on the part of Poland. (3) In considering the four elements-the Poles, the Danzig population, the Party and the Senate-which constitute the local elements of the problem, the following observations can be made: (a) Between the Poles and the Danzig authorities difficulties are endless. The Polish Commissioner-General, M. Chodacki, admits that every day he sees twenty or thirty fresh troubles arise. But both sides, for the time being, avoid turning them into incidents. The attitude assumed by the Polish Customs inspectors is significant in this respect. They shut their offices at night and appear not to notice the smuggling. In the course of his conversation with my colleague, M. Chodacki made a point of repeating that Poland remained ready to negotiate. He has, he said, "a plan for negotiation fully prepared" which M. Beck has approved. But for the time being it is impossible to think of making use of it. "We fall," he added, "between the rigid 'It is my will' of Herr Hitler, and the much more elastic Polish 'non possumus.'" It is impossible to see for the moment in what way the distance which separates them can be reduced. Meanwhile, the Poles continue to invest considerable sums in improvements in Danzig. They also point out that, during the first five months of the year, the traffic of the port (sailings of ships, tonnage) shows an increase of 33 per cent over 1938. (b) As far as the Danzig population is concerned, while, before the present crisis, the proportion of those who wanted the maintenance of the existing status could be estimated at 60 per cent, it is said at present to have risen to at least 80 per cent. Opposition is said to be especially strong among the Catholics, many of whom are of Polish origin but have lost consciousness of the fact, and form 40 per cent of the population. Everybody however is agreed in recognising that the feelings of the Danzig population are of no importance. It appears to be terrorized and is lavish with cries of "Heil Hitler!" (c) It is the Party, and, within the Party, the Gestapo, to whom all power belongs. But the Party simply means Berlin, and in practice, Gauleiter Forster, who is depicted as a kind of "butcher's assistant, and a jovial fellow," who has belonged to the Party since his early youth and has, apparently, the right of audience with Herr Hitler, who likes him; but he is, of course, merely the Chancellor's instrument. (d) Between the two is the Senate, which is flattered at figuring  as a Government and at bottom more or less shares the feelings of the population, but is, of course, obliged to speak and act as the Party decides. But the Senate is only a faade. In observing the state of things at present prevailing in Danzig, one cannot help making a comparison with the internal situation in Austria during the months which preceded the Anschluss; a population without enthusiasm, sometimes secretly hostile, but passive; a Government which certainly would like to maintain the status quo, but is without real power; finally, the Party, an active minority, in fact the only active element. (4) The comparison which one is led to make between Danzig and Austria is justified not only by the internal situation in the Free City, but also by the methods which German policy seems for the moment disposed to employ there. In order to attain her ends, Germany has hitherto had recourse to two systems: sometimes surprise, a sudden attack; sometimes slow preparation, patient waiting for favourable circumstances. The Reich tried the first method in Austria at the time of the assassination of Dollfuss; but it had to give way before Italy. It then sent Herr von Papen to Vienna and waited until the Western Powers' common front had dissolved. The success which attended the first method in Czechoslovakia undoubtedly for a time led the rulers in Berlin to desire to act in a similar way in Danzig. But resistance inside the City, and the resolute attitude of France and Great Britain, seem to have convinced them that, once again, they must have recourse to the second. There are many indications that they are already anxious to allay our watchfulness. The dmarche undertaken by Gauleiter Forster's principal colleague, Herr Zarske, Parliamentary Press Chief and editor of the Vorposten, as well as the proposals to the same effect put to High Commissioner Burckhardt by the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Herr Koch, although he is Herr Forster's sworn enemy, seem significant in this respect. Herr Zarske insistently repeats that "Danzig is really not worth a war." At the same time, Herr Zarske is anxious to a degree that is quite remarkable, to brush aside the memory of the Czechoslovak precedent. He has admitted that "this expedition was a mistake," and even added that "in Berlin they do not know how to get out of it and would be very glad to find a solution...." No doubt, the progressive movement in this direction, which everybody agrees is clearly taking place in Danzig, is as yet only in its  initial stage. Obviously many considerations or fortuitous incidents may change its course, particularly if Herr Hitler, who for the moment seems to want to trade on his credit in order to make the Danzigers wait for the fulfilment of his promises, should be led to think that this might be regarded as a sign of retreat. In any case, there is one fact about which foreign observers in Danzig are unanimous. It is that it is proper not to attach too much importance to the daily vicissitudes in the little provincial world of the Free City. They may indeed, these observers recognize, possess their value as pointers and serve as a barometer; but the final issue lies, and will continue to lie, between Berlin and Warsaw, and between Berlin, London and Paris. LON NEL. No. 161 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 11, 1939. A PERSON of high standing in National-Socialist circles has made the following declarations to one of my colleagues: "Herr von Ribbentrop no longer enjoys the Fhrer's absolute confidence. The Fhrer has given expression to a certain number of grievances against his Minister. In particular, he reproaches Herr von Ribbentrop with having wilfully concealed from him several items of information proving the high war-potential of Great Britain. Moreover, he accuses his Minister of having committed him, in connection with Danzig, to a difficult undertaking which runs the risk of compromising Germany's prestige if a satisfactory solution is not soon found. "It must be borne in mind that the raising of the Danzig question is Herr von Ribbentrop's personal doing. However, when he undertook the campaign for restoring this territory to the Reich, he did not realise that he would meet with firm resistance on the part of the Western Powers. "It seems that the Poles might still make proposals which our Government would agree to consider. Of course, Warsaw would have to make substantial concessions to us, but it is not yet too late to contemplate an agreement satisfactory to the two parties. "Moreover, the Poles would have everything to gain by deciding  to negotiate. For a conflict, whatever its issue might be, would in any case be fatal to them. "In fact either Poland would be defeated, and she would then fall entirely under our domination; or else (a highly improbable eventuality, for that matter), with the help of Russia, she would emerge victorious from the war. In this case, the Russians would never reconcile themselves to leaving the country, and that would be the end of Poland. "Have you not been struck recently by the somewhat changed tone of our Press towards Poland? You no longer find accounts of Polish-German incidents. Nevertheless, according to our information, the people of Poland continue, on the most trivial grounds, to molest our nationals living in the country. Our Minister wants to hold out a hand to the Warsaw Government for one last time. "The Government, and especially those in control at the Wilhelmstrasse, view the future with some anxiety. They realise that the feeling of hatred for Germany grows daily. Only yesterday, this hatred, this indignation, were peculiar to the rulers of certain States. Today, it looks as if the masses had been won over to these feelings. This development is especially noticeable in the case of Great Britain." The foregoing information must, of course, be accepted with reservations. It is, however, noteworthy, because of the standing of my informant, who certainly seems to be in the confidence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, it does as a whole tally closely enough with the impression which emerges from a study of the German newspapers, and also with information which I have gathered elsewhere. The Press campaign against Poland, which in any case never attained the violence of the attacks directed last year against Czechoslovakia, has recently become more circumspect. Aggressive headlines and polemical articles are reserved for Great Britain. Incidents between Germany and Poland are related without comment and are not given prominence. Several papers have declared that Danzig is not a casus belli, and the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung even seems to invite negotiation, when it writes that a reasonable solution is entirely within the bounds of possibility. A similar note is to be heard in Government circles, where it is given to be understood that there would be no refusal to negotiate if Poland were to put forward proposals. In fact, Berlin has been surprised by the firmness of Franco-Polish  resistance in the matter of Danzig, and some embarrassment is felt about it. While noting this result, one should at the same time guard against concluding from it that the Third Reich is ready to renounce Danzig. Not only is there no retreat on this point, but there is not even, properly speaking, any "marking time," since the militarisation of the Free City is being carried on, while in Germany reservists continue to be called to the colours in numbers which, by the end of the month of August, in the opinion of our Military Attache, will reach one million men. On the contrary, Germany pretends that all that is claimed is Danzig, which represents the Reich's very last demand. In order to know what to think about the sincerity of this assertion, one need only question Germans other than those whose business it is to present the official point of view. There is not one of them who does not smile at such a question. What Germany wants in Poland, obviously, is the restoration of the frontiers of 1914. But Danzig is the point of least resistance, and at this point Germany is trying to repeat the manauvre of infiltration which proved so successful with Sudetenland. It hopes, by taking Danzig, to secure possession of the key which will open for it the gate to Poland. It is for this reason, since intimidation no longer seems likely to work, that an attempt is made to add persuasion to it in order to shake the attitude of the Western Powers. With Danzig, Germany puts a full-stop to her demands; Europe can at last breathe. I should not be surprised if, in using the words reported above, Herr von Ribbentrop's associate had not been more or less wittingly a party to this manoeuvre. Accordingly, it seems to me essential that the Allied Governments, who see the trap, should strive to do everything in their power to open the eyes of public opinion in their respective countries. In order to avoid playing the German game, it is important not to deal with the problem of Danzig separately, but to keep in mind the Czechoslovak precedent and the Reich's real ambitions. Why give up Danzig, when we know that Germany wants infinitely more? And, even if there were a chance that the Reich would be satisfied with it, why run the risk of weakening Poland's morale, since it is quite obvious that, if the Reich does not want more, it will not undertake a universal war for so restricted an objective? Althongh well aware of the facts, French and British public opinion must realise that any pressure upon Warsaw in order to  bring it to yield to the German demands could only lead to the worst catastrophes, and that it rests with Poland, of its own free will, and confident of Franco-British support, to determine how far it can go to reach an agreed settlement without jeopardising its vital interests. Whether Germany proceeds by trickery or by threat, the means which it employs should not make us forget the fact that we are involved in a test of strength the issue of which may decide the fate of Europe; in this respect, the wavering attitude of the Reich as it takes the measure of our reaction can only cause us to persevere in a policy of firmness. COULONDRE. No. 162 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 13, 1939. BEING due to leave Berlin to-morrow evening, I went this morning to see the State Secretary, to whom I introduced M. de Saint-Hardouin. Herr von Weizscker once again told me that, without wishing to look too far into the future, he personally retained the belief that nothing would happen in Danzig which could cause serious complications. According to him, the danger of a conflict with Poland was still only to be found in the state of excitement of the population and of the Polish local authorities, which might give rise to fears that a serious incident might occur any day. At the same time I found the State Secretary less easy in manner than during our recent interviews. He mentioned with obvious displeasure the communication which Your Excellency had made to Count von Welczeck. "The German Government," he informed me, "is preparing a reply to it, and I may tell you that it will not lend itself to any ambiguity." I pointed out that the German Government could not have misinterpreted the spirit in which this step had been taken, since Your Excellency had been careful to show, with reference to the declaration of December 6, that you considered it an obligation of honesty to specify clearly the French Government's position in regard to the problem of Danzig. But Herr von Weizscker evaded discussion, declaring that he did not want to anticipate the reply which would  be made to us, and went on to talk about Mr. Chamberlain's latest statement in the House of Commons. "While it may be useful to define one's attitude clearly," he said, "there can be no justification for the endless repetition of public declarations indulged in by the British Government." I remarked that the Prime Minister's speech was very cool and very objective, and that to my knowledge this was the first time that he had defined the British Government's attitude concerning Danzig. But Herr von Weizscker did not agree with this. Such a speech, according to him, could only have the effect of diminishing the possibilities of a friendly understanding still further by hardening the present attitude of both parties. What hope was there that the Poles, thus encouraged, would be conciliatory? Moreover, the Reich could not be affected by any intimidation. After pointing out that the same applied to the Western Powers and that, moreover, I had found no wish to intimidate in Mr. Chamberlain's statements, I asked the State Secretary whether at the moment he saw any possibility of conversations with Warsaw. "If I may refer to the information about Warsaw's position to be found in the Polish Press," he replied, "I see none, for we are really worlds apart. I believe that for the time being there is nothing better to do than to wait and keep as quiet as possible." The State Secretary's tone unmistakably shows the impression produced upon the German Government by the clear and resolute attitude of the Western Powers in regard to Danzig. Mr. Chamberlain's declaration, in particular, unpleasantly surprised those who, like Herr von Ribbentrop, wished to cast doubts upon the possibility of armed intervention by Great Britain in the event of a German- Polish conflict. Now that our attitude is so clearly defined, and that it is known, moreover, to the German Government, I believe that it would be better to keep silent about Danzig, in so far as that depends on us. Anything which tends to foster polemics on this question could only make a waiting attitude or an eventual retreat more difficult for the Reich. Lastly, while it is impossible to foresee the decision which Herr Hitler may take, at least it is essential not to throw into the scales considerations of prestige, which weigh heavily in totalitarian States. COULONDRE.  No. 163 Personal letter addressed by Herr von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Georges Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs Fuschl, near Salzburg, July 13, 1939. MY DEAR M. BONNET, ON July 1 you handed to Count von Welczeck a note personally intended for me, which obliges me now to make known to you, clearly and in a manner free from any misunderstanding, the attitude of the German Government with regard to Franco-German relations in general, and the question of Danzig in particular. On December 6, 1938, the French and German Governments signed a declaration in accordance with which they solemnly recognised the existing frontiers between France and Germany as finally fixed, and according to which also they desired to use all their efforts for the establishment of peaceful and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. On the side of the Government of the Reich, this declaration was the logical sequel to the policy of understanding with France continually followed ever since that Government came into power; a policy which, in principle, it would still wish to maintain. As to your remark about the reservation recorded in Article 3 of the Franco-German declaration concerning the special relations France and of Germany with regard to third Powers, it is unquestionably not correct to say that this reservation implies a recognition of France's special relations with Poland. In the conversations which took place in Berlin and Paris at the time of the preliminary negotiations on the subject of the declaration, and on the occasion of the signature, it was on the contrary perfectly clear that the reservation referred to the special relations of friendship of France towards Great Britain and of Germany towards Italy. We were in agreement, in particular, at the time of our conversations in Paris on December 6, 1938, in considering that respect for vital reciprocal interests must be the prior condition and the principle of the future development of good Franco-German relations. On that occasion, I expressly pointed out that Eastern Europe constituted a sphere of German interests, and, contrary to what is stated in your note, you then stressed on your part, that, in France's  attitude with regard to the problems of Eastern Europe, a radical change had taken place since the Munich conference. In direct contradiction to this attitude established by us at the beginning of December stands the fact that France has taken advantage of the Fhrer's generous proposal to Poland for the settlement of the question of Danzig and of Poland's somewhat peculiar reaction, in order to contract with that country fresh commitments, strengthened and aimed at Germany. At the end of your note, these commitments are defined in such a way that any military intervention by Poland, on the occasion of any departure from the status quo in Danzig, would lead France to give immediate military assistance to Poland. With regard to this policy of the French Government, I have the following comments to make: (1) Germany, just as it has never interfered in France's vital interests, must reject, once for all and categorically, any interference by France in its spheres of vital interest. Germany's relations with its Eastern neighbours, whatever form they assume, in no way affect French interests; they are a matter which only concerns German policy. Accordingly the Government of the Reich does not find itself in a position to discuss with the French Government questions concerning German-Polish relations, or to recognise its right to exercise any influence upon questions dealing with the future settlement of the destiny of the German city of Danzig. (2) For your personal guidance, I beg to make the following statement about the German point of view in the Polish question: The Polish government has replied to the Fhrer's historic and unique offer, aiming at the settlement of the question of Danzig and at a definitive consolidation of German-Polish relations, by threats of war which can only be described as strange. At the present moment it is impossible to say whether the Polish Government will depart from this peculiar position and return to reason. But, as long as it maintains the unreasonable attitude which it has taken up one can only say that any violation of Danzig soil by Poland, or any Polish provocation incompatible with the prestige of the German Reich, would meet in reply with an immediate march by the Germans and the total destruction of the Polish army. (3) The statement already mentioned, which is contained in the final sentence of your note, would, if taken literally, mean that France recognises Poland's right to oppose by arms any departure in any respect from the status quo in Danzig, and that, if Germany declines  to tolerate that violence should thus be done to German interests, France will attack Germany. If such was in fact the purpose of French policy, I would beg you to consider that such threats could only further strengthen the Fhrer in his resolve to ensure the safeguarding of German interests by all the means at his disposal. The Fhrer has always desired Franco-German understanding and described as madness a fresh war between the two countries, which are no longer separated by any conflict of vital interests. But, if we have reached a point where the French Government wants war, it will find Germany ready at any moment. It would then be the French Government alone which would have to bear before its people and before the world the responsibility for such a war. Because of the pleasant personal relations which I was able to form with Your Excellency on the occasion of the signature of the declaration of December 6, 1938, I regret that your note constrains me to make this reply. I should not like to abandon the hope that in the end, reason will prevail and that the French people will recognise where its real interests are to be found. Since I have devoted myself for more than twenty years to Franco-German understanding, this would also represent to me personally the fulfilment of a deeply felt wish. Yours very sincerely, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP. No. 164 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 13, 1939. THIS Embassy has recently reported to the Ministry numerous signs of abnormal activity in the German army and of Germany's obvious preparations for the possibility of an impending war. The time seems to have come, by coordinating these reports, to attempt to take bearings in order to determine what measures remain to be taken by Germany to make it ready to go to war; what delay the execution of these measures may demand; and, especially, how and how long before an act of aggression we can ascertain that the executiOn of last minute measures has begun. In other words, in the present state of affairs, do we run the risk of finding ourselves sur-  prised by a war suddenly begun before we have been able to learn of the German Government's decision to take such a risk? The most significant information obtained by us so far bears upon the following points: (1) Units of the German Army are changing their stations constantly. Given the direction of these changes, apparently somewhat haphazard, it seems to be a question of manoeuvres rather than of a concentration leading to an imminent conflict. In any case, the military activity, the intensity of the instruction and training of units, and their bringing up to strength with reservists, are perfecting the instrument which may some day be used. On the other hand, the ceaseless coming and going of these units, the secrecy maintained about their movements, and the increasingly frequent summons to reservists, are of such a nature as to facilitate operations of concentration, which at the outset would not arouse attention because they would not present symptoms very different from those actually in existence today. It may, therefore, be asked whether this military activity and the precautions taken, as much to conceal the operations effected (the numbers of the regiments on the move have in most cases been taken off their uniforms) as to let it be known that such operations are in progress (some reservists are called up long in advance, and the Press keeps on referring to fortification works being effected in the East), are at least not partly intended to render it more difficult to recognise the transition from this state of semi-mobilisation to a state of war. (2) The departure of troops on manoeuvres leaves in the garrison towns the impression that it will be a long while before the regiments return to their quarters. In fact, it is reported that some units have set off after making arrangements like those taken before leaving for the front. For instance, identity discs have been issued to the men and they have been instructed to make a note of the addresses of their families in the individual bundles in which their personal effects are assembled. (3) The calling-up of the classes of reservists who would normally have been summoned in October has been advanced. The reservists who should have been discharged have been kept with the colours. One may anticipate that by the month of August the German Army, in addition to its normal effectives, will muster nearly a million mobilised reservists. (4) The gathering of the harvest has been accelerated. With this object in view, the Minister for Education has decided this year to fix  July 14, instead of August 1, as the end of the term in places of higher education and technical schools. The students who benefit by this earlier release must, until August 1, devote to harvest work the fortnight thus deducted from their studies. In addition, one may note the haste with which supplies are being accumulated. (5) This anxiety to be rapidly provided with every essential for war, often leads to the preference for what is quickly obtainable over something better. For instance, the aircraft factories are said to have received orders to carry on the building of planes, despite the fact that they will soon be out of date, rather than lose the time necessary; to adapt their workshops to the construction of the latest models. (6) With the accomplishment of the partial occupation of the Western fortifications, which, thanks incidentally to these ceaseless changes of garrison, could be progressively occupied without appreciably modifying the plan of the manccuvres now in progress, the construction of fortifications in the East is being pressed forward, especially in Silesia. Both military and civilian labour is employed upon it, and this task takes precedence of all other public works, which are being slowed down. These various facts allow one to conclude that all the measures preparatory to war are now being taken. The German General Staff is acting as though it had to be ready by a date which has been set out for it, and this date, according to all appearance, will fall in the course of the month of August, at which period the harvest will be gathered, the fortifications will be ready, and the reservists will be assembled in large numbers in the camps. But even were all the measures now in process of being carried out fully executed would it then be possible to launch an offensive, overnight? It seems, in the opinion of the officials of this Embassy, that there will remain certain measures preparatory to immediate action which can only be taken at the last moment. From the military point of view these measures will mainly consist in bringing into position the covering and shock units; from the naval point of view in the recall of ships now on the high seas; from the point of view of the air force in the putting into effect of the arrangements for air defence. In respect of operations on land, the rapidity of the final preparations and the greater or lesser facility with which we may become aware of them will depend first of all on the extent of the operations contemplated. It is certain that the existing camouflaging and the  fact that the population is accustomed to the sight of manoeuvres of which in any case they no longer dare to speak, since they know that any indiscretion will be severely punished, will make it possible to pass without very much difficulty, if the extent of the operations in view is limited, from the stage of manoeuvres to that of concentration. This, however, can only be the case if we assume that Germany will decide on a defensive war in the West and that any attack which might be launched at some other point will require only a small number of effectives. In respect of naval operations, the necessity of giving instructions to German ships to change their route sufficiently in advance will undoubtedly compel the competent authorities to acquaint the commanders of these units of the risk of war several days beforehand. By following carefully the movements of the German war and merchant ships, we may be able to obtain the most definite and probably the earliest possible indications of any final decision of the Chancellor. In respect of the air force plans, it seems certain that, particularly in view of the dread of air raids which exists here, the German Government will not risk entering on war without having protected its towns against retaliatory raids. The placing and making effective of the anti-aircraft defences and the instructions given to the civilian population for protective measures cannot pass unnoticed. Last September and last March it was possible to foresee several days in advance, through the preparations for anti- aircraft gunnery, that some action was imminent. The experience gained by the German authorities in that respect will undoubtedly enable them to devote less time to such preparations on the next occasion. In any case, however, it seems impossible that they should be postponed until the very last day. From these different considerations it follows that, though Germany is able to put her army on a war footing very rapidly, the circumstances are nevertheless not such as to expose us to a surprise attack, as far as operations of any real importance are concerned. Everything that has been done up to the present moment seems to have a twofold object: (1) To be prepared for any eventuality from August onwards. (2) Most likely also to impress international opinion by behaving as though the possibility of war were accepted. COULONDRE.  No. 165 M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 19, 1939. THE information, which appeared yesterday in the News Chronicle as coming from German circles representing moderate opinion to the effect that the Fhrer proposed to settle the Danzig question by having himself nominated as President of the Senate of the Free City, has caused a violent reaction in Polish Government circles. A communique from the Pat Agency was issued in the afternoon denying: (1) That political conversations between the two Governments had taken place on the settlement of the various points at issue between the two countries; (2) that the Polish Government could ever agree to a settlement of the question of Danzig which involved the abandonment of the four basic points in the attitude of Poland towards this problem; (3) that the Polish Government could accept without reacting in an appropriate manner any new action in respect of the Danzig situation of such character as to threaten their vital interests. The communique adds that the fact that the sources of the information are Rome and Berlin makes it possible to assess its true value. Putting together the report in the English newspaper and the rumours current yesterday in the western capitals, which provoked a strong reaction in the French Press, I asked the Director of the Western Section this morning whether in his opinion we were not faced with a new German manoeuvre, differing from previous manoeuvres in its field of action, but directed to the same end as thataimed at by the Hitler Government at the end of June. Count Potocki had not yet been able to form a general conclusion for lack of precise information concerning these rumours. He did not, however, dismiss the possibility of a new German feeler. SEGUIN.  No. 166 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, July 20, 1939. THE Gauleiter, who returned on Monday from Berchtesgaden, received a visit from the High Commissioner yesterday. According to Herr Forster, Herr Hitler was still determined to obtain authorisation for the construction of an extra-territorial motor road across the Corridor accompanied by the return of Danzig to the Reich, but he would not have recourse to war to secure these concessions; if Poland refrains from all provocation, measures of demobilisation will be taken some weeks hence in the Free City. A violent anti-Polish article by the Gauleiter would mark the end of the present campaign. LA TOURNELLE. No. 167 M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, July 20, 1939. MY British colleague has just informed me of the interview which he and General Ironside had yesterday with Marshal Rydz-Smigly and M. Beck. General Ironside started by giving the Marshal an assurance that Poland could rely absolutely on Great Britain. He then availed himself of this assurance to put to these gentlemen certain definite questions on the action contemplated by the Polish Government in the different eventualities which might occur at Danzig. The questions put and the answers given, sometimes by the Marshal and sometimes by M. Beck, when the Marshal referred the questions to him, were as follows: (1) What will Poland do if the Anschluss is purely and simply proclaimed without any such military demonstration as the entry of German troops, etc.? Reply: Poland considers that a protest should be lodged in Berlin by the three Powers. (2) What will Poland do if units of the Reichswehr openly occupy the territory of the Free City?  Reply: The Polish General Staff will send officers to the commandant of such units to demand an explanation of such an action. Such are the replies given from the Polish side to the questions put by the British General. They do little more than define the procedure which would be adopted in the circumstances suggested, without giving any indication of the Polish reaction if the Germans refused to take cognizance of protests against an accomplished fact. When General Ironside spoke of the possible consequences of an "incident," the Marshal replied that the Germans were indeed capable of adopting such means of provoking hostilities, but that, if they did so, they were bound to disclose their intentions in advance through the preliminary measures they must take before proceeding to action. General Ironside asked what the actual situation was from this point of view. The Marshal replied that the German military activities seemed to be directed towards attempts at intimidation, but that for the time being they did not seem to indicate arrangements for a possible conflict in the near future. SEGUIN. No. 168 Personal Letter from M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister Personal Paris, July 21, 1939. DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP, I am in receipt of the letter you wrote to me, marked "Personal," in reply to the communication I myself sent on July 1 to Count von Welczeck. There is one point which I am anxious to make absolutely clear. At no moment either before or after the declaration of December 6, has it been possible for the German Government to think that France had decided to disinterest herself in the East of Europe. At the time of the conversations of December 6, I reminded you that since 1921 we had had a treaty of alliance with Poland and since 1935 a pact with the U.S.S.R., both of which we are determined to maintain. I then gave definite assurances on this point to the Ambassadors of Poland and of the U.S.S.R. by communications, which were given the widest publicity in the Press. I remember, moreover, that  at the time when I reminded you of the treaties which bound us to Poland, you were good enough to reply that these treaties could not do any harm to Franco-German relations, since your own relations with Poland were at that time excellent. I was the less surprised at the assurance you gave me since, three months earlier, Herr Hitler had, in his speech at the Sports Palace in Berlin on September 26, referred to the German-Polish agreement as a model of its type: "Within barely one year we succeeded," he said, "in arriving at an understanding with him (Marshal Pilsudski) which by its very nature has removed the possibility of conflict, at all events for ten years. We are all of us convinced that this understanding will lead to a lasting peace. We appreciate that we have here two peoples who have to live side by side. A country with a population of thirtythree millions will always seek access to the sea; it was therefore necessary to find the way to an agreement. This has been found and is steadily being developed. The decisive factor should be a firm determination on the part of the two Governments, and all reasonable and level-headed men among the two peoples and in the two countries, to work for a constant improvement of their mutual relations." In addition to this, in the course of our conversation on December 6, one of the most pressing requests which I had to make to Your Excellency was in respect of our common guarantee to Czechoslovakia in fulfilment of the Munich Agreement. Such a request I could not have addressed to you, if France had no longer been interested in what was happening in Eastern Europe. Since I was unable to obtain a satisfactory reply on this matter, I sent you a note on February 8, 1939, recalling the agreement signed at Munich on September 29, in order once more to impress upon you the necessity of completing without delay the arrangements for our common guarantee to Czechoslovakia. To this note you replied on March 2, asking me to await the clearing up of internal developments in Czechoslovakia and the improvement of relations between that country and the neighbouring States, before considering a general arrangement between the Munich signatory Powers. Further, the actual statement which I made from the Tribune of the French Chamber on January 26, 1939, confirmed my attitude in a manner which admitted of no equivocation. This statement, which you may find in our "Journal Officiel" (p. 234), was reproduced in the Press throughout the world.  "France has also maintained her traditional friendly relations with Poland. At the time of the Franco-German declaration of December 6, I had, in conformity with the spirit of our agreement, advised the Polish Ambassador of our intentions. In thanking me for keeping them informed, the Polish Government expressed their appreciation of an action, the aim, the significance and the implication of which they fully realized. "Thus, Gentlemen, can we dispose of the legend that our policy had led to the cancellation of our obligations in the East of Europe with the U.S.S.R. or with Poland. "These obligations are still binding and must be honoured in the spirit in which they were entered into." Thus there is no equivocation whatsoever. You knew the treaty which united France and Poland. You never dreamed of asking me to denounce it on the occasion of the Franco- German declaration of December 6. At the time when we signed that declaration your relations with Poland were excellent, and there was nothing in the FrancoPolish understandings which were likely to arouse suceptibilities on your part. In the speech he made in the Reichstag on January 30, 1939, Hitler once again expressed his satisfaction at the understanding between Germany and Poland. "At this moment," he declared, "it would be difficult to discover any divergence of opinion amongst the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement" (the German;, Polish pact of non-aggression). These words were the more significant from our point of view because they were uttered some weeks after an important conversation at at Berchtesgaden between Herr Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister, Monsieur Beck. In the month of March relations between Germany and Poland became strained, and that fact brought about a new situation. France bears no responsibility for the development of these relations between Berlin and Warsaw. She has in fact always refrained-and will continue to refrain-from any interference in matters bearing upon the special relationships of the two neighbouring countries, and not affecting in any way the general international situation and the maintenance of peace. In conformity with the statements which I had the honour to make to Count von Welczeck, we earnestly hope that a bilateral arrangement between Germany and Poland may prove feasible. But there is one point that I am bound to bring to your notice, particularly in  view of the conversations which I had with you on December 6 and 7 in Paris, namely, that France is bound to Poland by a treaty of alliance, and will remain true to her bond, and scrupulously carry out all her promises. You are good enough, in reminding me of all the efforts which you yourself have made to bring about a rapprochement between France and Germany, to call my attention to the fact that Herr Hitler has always desired a Franco-German understanding and has stigmatized as "madness a new war between our two countries." Such an assurance is in accordance with our sincere wishes. I desire, as you do, the continued maintenance of friendly relations between France and Germany. It is for that reason that, in my communication of July 1, whose validity is maintained with all its implications, I made a point of reminding you, with the frankness called for by the circumstances, of the position of the French Government in respect of Poland, particularly in relation to the situation at Danzig. France is eagerly desirous of peace. No one can doubt that fact. Moreover, no one can doubt the determination of the French Government to fulfil its obligations. But I cannot permit it to be said that our country would be in any way responsible for war because it remained true to its pledged word. I beg you, my dear Herr von Ribbentrop, to accept the expression of my sincerest regards. GEORGES BONNET. No. 169 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 21, 1939. IT is said on very good authority that during the last week some change has taken place in the Chancellor's mind. It is reported that the Fhrer is now convinced that, contrary to what he has hitherto been assured by some of his advisers, France and England are resolved to fulfil their pledges to Poland and that consequently he will run the risk of starting a war if he goes too far in the matter of Danzig. SAINT-HARDOUIN.  No. 170 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 22, 1939. WITH regard to the statements made yesterday on the Danzig question by an official of the Ministry of Propaganda, a member of my staff gathered this morning from a very good source certain information which I think I ought to bring to your attention without delay. It was on the instruction of State-Secretary Dietrich, who had just come back from Berchtesgaden, where the Fhrer is staying at present, that Dr. Bmer, the Head of the Press Section at the Ministry of Propaganda, made to the correspondents of the foreign news agencies statements which the English Press reproduced in a sensational form and an accurate summary of which has been given by the Havas Agency. In essentials these statements may be summarized as follows: 1. The German Government still refuses to contemplate any other solution of the Danzig question than the return of the Free City to the Reich. 2. They wish to arrive at this solution by pacific methods and have no intention of provoking an armed conflict on this account. 3. This solution cannot be indefinitely postponed; at the same time, it is not a matter of immediate urgency; it might not take place till some months hence. 4. German political circles remain convinced that Poland cannot in the long run maintain her uncompromising attitude and that some intervention-presumably from the British side-will in time curb the obduracy of Warsaw. Learning of these statements after the event and of the use made of them by the British Press, Herr von Ribbentrop, who was still at Fuschl, near Salzburg, was extremely angry. He at once ordered the Press Service of the Wilhelmstrasse to elucidate and comment on the pronouncements of Dr. Bmer before the representatives of the foreign Press. Herr Braun von Stumm, entrusted with this task, was instructed to call attention to the fact that Dr. Bmer's pronouncements did not introduce any new element and to stress with particular emphasis the point that, though the Reich insisted on regarding the return of Danzig  to Germany as the only possible solution, it had never on the other hand, regarded the Free City as a problem to be settled by war. These explanations were further confirmed in some obviously inspired comments which appeared in this morning's papers. According to the reports collected by this member of my staff, this incident, like so many others, affords evidence of the rivalry between the Wihelmstrasse and the Ministry of Propaganda, or, more precisely, between Herr von Ribbentrop and Dr. Goebbels. Although both Ministers claim to be equally anxious for the most radical solutions, the eagerness of each of them to be regarded by the Fhrer as the foremost champion of this view has caused a dispute as to competence. Dr. Goebbels has never in fact given up the idea of indirectly influencing foreign policy by means of the Press. But on this occasion Herr von Ribbentrop's discontent is said to be due to the turn taken by the Danzig question, to the fact that recent events have shown his calculations to be wrong, and to the delicate situation in which he consequently finds himself with the Fhrer. In the face of the unexpected opposition met with in London and Paris, as well as in Warsaw, Herr von Ribbentrop thinks that for the time being his personal interest would be that as little as possible should be said about Danzig, and that the matter should be left in abeyance pending more favourable circumstances. He therefore regards the statements made yesterday by Dr. Bmer as most inopportune. As I see it, these indications, which I have every reason to believe genuine and accurate, make the following points clear: 1. From Dr. Bmer's statements, as also from their elucidation by Herr Braun von Stumm, there emerges a common element: the desire not to see the issue forced at this moment. This is undoubtedly a retreat, cloaked by the assurance of the pacific feelings which Germany is supposed never to have ceased to entertain. 2. In this respect the evidence set out above serves to confirm various indications gathered from other sources in the course of the last few days, namely, the change which is assumed to have taken place last week in the mind of the Fhrer following on direct information received from France and England and consequent on recent evidences of Britain's strength in the air; and, secondly, news received from Danzig to the effect that measures of demobilisation were about to be adopted by the Free City. 3. By insisting that the Danzig question is not of an urgent  nature and by hinting at the possibility of a British mediation, Dr. Bmer, whether he merely carried out or went beyond the orders given him at Berchtesgaden, has in any case disclosed the difficulty which seems to be embarrassing the Nazi leaders at the moment, as they are beginning to understand that the era of unilateral action and of victories without risk has come to an end. The tendency to retreat-or at least the wish to temporise-which can be inferred from the various items of evidence just enumerated (in particular from the declarations of the Minister of Propaganda and of the Wilhelmstrasse on the subject of Danzig) do not, however, detract in any way from the German Government's intention to recover the Free City. Although we can note them with satisfaction, it is essential that we should not attach too much importance to them. They are obviously a matter of tactics, and must necessarily prove ephemeral in nature. It is possible that their one object is to lead us to relax our vigilance, or to weaken our will to resist by holding out the false hope of possible negotiations. In any case, it must be kept in mind that in the meantime the German Army, so far as it is concerned, is carrying on with its preparations in order to reach an advanced state of mobilisation during the month of August. It is certain that if the Nazi leaders come to think that France and Britain are relaxing their military and diplomatic efforts-to which alone the present hesitations of the Reich are attributable-then the few faint signs now discernible of a dtente would quickly vanish. Furthermore, now that there appears to be some slight trace of at least a temporary withdrawal on the part of the rulers of the Third Reich, it is essential, as M. Coulondre has stressed, that our Press should refrain from premature jubilation over victory; they should take their cue from the organs of the Reich, whether these put the German-Polish struggle in the background, or ignore it altogether. SAINT- HARDOUIN. No. 171 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1939. THE impression prevails that August 1939 is bound to bring about a recrudescence of international tension, and, more especially, of  dangerous German initiatives in the Danzig question. The statement is repeatedly made that the end of the harvest- namely, the period August 15-20-will coincide with the beginning of a crisis so grave that European peace may not be able to survive it. It is estimated that this critical period will end towards the early days of October, when the autumn rains begin to make it difficult to handle large bodies of mechanised troops on the Polish plains. It is true that during the last few days it has been possible to notice among observers of the international situation a tendency to regard the future in a less gloomy light. There have even been a few who, prematurely and altogether ill-advisedly, have thought themselves justified in talking of a "German retreat." The truth is that arguments for both optimism and pessimism can be drawn from an examination of the situation as it exists in Germany today. Symptoms of two kinds may be observed: some of them appear to indicate that Germany is making her preparations with a view to war; others permit the belief that the Reich will not push the German-Polish struggle to the length of armed conflict. The purpose of the present report is to set down and compare the evidence that can be collected in either sense, in order to deduce from it, not conclusions that it is in present circumstances impossible to form, but at least a few indications of a practical kind. Broadly speaking, symptoms of a military character are disturbing whereas certain evidence of a more reassuring nature can be found in happenings in the political sphere. (1) EVIDENCE OF A MILITARY KIND Since the end of June we have witnessed in Germany preparations that, to a certain extent, recall those of last autumn. It should be noted that the beginning of this period of military activity was marked by an inspection tour by the Fhrer in the western fortified zone from May 14-20, 1939. Since that time Germany's military effort has taken the following forms: (1) Strengthening of the western fortification system, deemed to be inadequate or faulty; creation of a third line of defence, with the equipping of works calculated to make the anti-aircraft defences more efficient. (2) Hasty construction of a series of defensive works on the German-Polish frontiers.  (3) Progressive occupation, dating from June 20, of the western fortifed zone. (4) Masked mobilisation achieved in stages by means of: (a) The retention with the colours of men who have served their time. (b) The calling up of reservists. These reservists have been drafted from every military class (covering men between the ages of 22 and 55) and from every category coming under military law. They have been called up for periods, varying in length from a fortnight to three months-periods that are often extended on the date of expiry. It is, therefore, extremely hard to estimate, even approximately, the number of reservists at present with the colours. Judging by such outward signs as the appearance of the streets, stations, barracks, and the various calling-up notices, several hundred thousand reservists have now been ordered back to their units. The estimate, already reported, of our Military Attach (600,000 men up to date and a million by about August 15) appears to be a most probable one. On about August 15, then, Germany would have altogether about two million men under arms. (5) Numerous movements of men and materials in various and, so to speak, opposite directions. Because these movements are cleverly camouflaged-in particular, such precautions are taken as the removal of regimental numbers from shoulder-straps and of number-plates from cars-it is exceedingly difficult to follow them. It is equally hard to infer from them any general plan. The definite information so far collected makes it possible to assert, however, that troop movements of varying importance are taking place in the following directions: (a) Towards the western fortified zone, the occupation, or ganisation and equipment of which are all in progress. (b) Towards the southern frontier of Poland. According to information received from Prague on July 18, 25,000 men went through that city by rail and were reported to have been concentrated between Morawska-Ostrawa and the Tatra Mountains. On July 12 many troop trains (250 wagons in all) are said to have passed through Lundenburg station (Austria) going eastwards; at the same time the movement of large forces in the direction of Beuthen was observed in Silesia. (c) Towards the boundary between the Corridor and Pomerania, whither, it was reported, that three infantry regiments of the  20th mechanised division, normally stationed at Hamburg, had been sent. (d) Towards East Prussia (embarking of reservists was observed at Stettin). As opposed to this, no abnormal military activity had been observed, up to July 22, at any point upon the Hungarian and Jugoslav frontiers. (6) Militarisation of Danzig, by the organisation of a Volunteer Corps (of 20,000 men, recruited between the end of June and the beginning of July), the secret arrival of soldiers and men of Nazi militia organizations from the Reich, the smuggling in of large quantities of munitions and other war material, the reconditioning of existing and the construction of new defence works. (7) Speeding up of production in every branch of industry concerned with national defence. Combined with mobilisation, this intensified production (which in the case of Ruhr coal has reached record figures) has increased the shortage of German labour. On July 11 Field-Marshal Goering was forced to put severe restrictions upon the right to requisition labour for works of public utility. Various instances have been reported in which the army has been compelled to release young miners who had been mobilised. (8) Arrangements made to use female labour in order to replace in war-time factory operatives who might be mobilised. (9) Reguisitioning of motor vehicles (private cars and lorries), horses and motor fuels. In many districts the owners of motor vehicles or of horses have been invited to keep them at the disposal of the military authorities, in some instances from the first week in August, and, in others, on dates between August 15 and August 20. Highclass fuels like "aral" (benzine, benzol and motor spirit), which in times of crisis are always reserved for the army, have been requisitioned in Bohemia and Moravia. (10) Measures taken to organise the medical services for war-time needs. In Berlin premises have been requisitioned for the establishment of a hospital containing 600 beds. In the Dresden area doctors have received orders to place themselves at the disposal of the military authorities as from August 3 or August 5. (11) Restrictions placed upon the granting of leave and on travellers' facilities. It has been reported that in many military units leave had been cancelled as from July 15 or August 1. Again, in various factories holidays are reported to have been cancelled if they fell  due in the second week of August and onwards. At Dresden the police have stamped passports, valid for long periods, "valid until August 20." (12) Order given to aircraft factories to discontinue the adaptation of plant to the needs of the newest types of aircraft and to proceed with the production, at war-time speed, of aircraft of types already in use. (13) Placing at the disposal of the naval authorities of North Sea fishing-boats capable of being transformed into mine-layers. At Hamburg the majority of trawlers have already been equipped with mine-laying apparatus; and stocks of mines have been accumulated in the docks. This step had already been taken in September 1938. (14) Organisation in many areas of the Reich of civilian defence drill-an arrangement which had already been planned during last autumn, when the German-Czech crisis was entering upon its most acute phase. We can therefore consider that everything is proceeding as though the Reich were aiming at reaching an advanced state of mobilisation by the middle of August. Though, in many respects, the military activities at the moment being pursued in the Reich are similar to those which took place in Germany last summer, there are certain material differences: Last summer the preparations were made openly with the obvious design of making a display. This year the desire for concealment has outweighed the wish to make an impressive show of military measures. So far, the preparations and the movements of troops which have taken place give no evidence of a general plan, so much so that it has proved impossible to determine whether the German menace would be aimed at the east or the south-east. The German-Polish quarrel over Danzig and the Corridor broke out immediately after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops. In the development of this quarrel the following stages can be distinguished: On March 26 the Warsaw Government rejected the proposals made to it by Germany, and informed the Berlin Government that Poland would acquiesce neither in the return of Danzig to the Reich nor in the establishment of an extra- territorial passage across the Corridor. Since then the Polish Government has not changed its attitude.  In his speech on April 28 the Fhrer disclosed the proposal which had been made to the Warsaw Government, and laid stress on this offer as being "of unparalleled generosity" and never to be repeated. However, he declared himself ready to negotiate "provided that the matter was settled in an unequivocal manner"; he added that no one could possibly think that Danzig would ever be a Polish city, but he did not actually demand the return of Danzig to the Reich. Since then the Fhrer has never broached the question again. Some of his lieutenants, in particular Dr. Goebbels in his speech on June 17, appeared to have gone further than the Chancellor. Their tone was, in fact, more truculent. But fundamentally they did not go beyond the Fhrer's own declarations. "Danzig wants to be German," Dr. Goebbels reiterated. "Its population must be aware that the Reich is very amicably disposed towards them." But the Minister of Propaganda did not actually demand the return of Danzig to the Reich. On several occasions the Nazis in the Reich and in the Free City seem to have contemplated establishing a fait accompli in Danzig. But they refrained from doing so in the face of the resolute attitude of Poland and of its French and British allies, and also probably because they hoped for a weakening in the attitude of either Poland or the Western Powers. Similar information obtained from various sources during the last week seems to make it clear that the Fhrer himself, about the middle of this month, had arrived at the conclusion that on this occasion Germany was faced with extremely serious resistance, and that, if he attempted to ignore it, the Reich was running the risk of precipitating a general conflict. This reversal of opinion seems to be due to the reports which the Chancellor has received direct from agents sent to Britain and France. According to certain reports the recent visit to London early in July of Lieutenant-Colonel Gerhardt Schwerin, Chief of the British Section of the German General Staff, and the reports of the officers who were present in Paris at the review of July 14 have not been without influence in affecting such a change in the Chancellor's mind. But he seems to have been struck above all by the revival of the French Air Force, which in 1938 had completely disappeared as a factor in European politics, by the way in which the air power of Great Britain asserted itself, and by the active military cooperation between Britain, France and their allies. Thenceforward, being con-  vinced that the Western Powers were determined to honour their obligations to Poland, the Fhrer is said to have become uncertain as to the course to be pursued. The statements made by Dr. Bmer on July 21 to the correspondents of the foreign Press, the commentary on these statements given on the same day by a spokesman of the Wilhelmstrasse, the article published in the Danziger Vorposten of July 23, and the pronouncements which Herr Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig, has caused to appear in the German Press of today-all these seem to be inspired by the one motive: ways of retreat must be kept clear for the Reich Government, should they decide in the present circumstances not to press the matter of Danzig further. The spokesmen of the Minister of Propaganda and of the Wilhelmstrasse asserted that at no time had Germany contemplated war as a solution of the Danzig problem, and that it clung to the hope of reaching it by peaceful means. "To regain Danzig by peaceful methods is the political fact from which Germany will not depart," the Danziger Vorposten printed for its part. As to Herr Forster, he took up a defensive attitude: he protested that he had at no time planned a Putsch; he claimed that the military preparations made by the Free City were merely precautions taken against the possibilities of an attack by the Poles. In adopting this attitude the Danzig Government has made it possible for itself to demobilise without having to admit a retreat. Like Dr. Bmer, Herr Forster had moreover allowed it to be understood that there was no urgency about the problem of Danzig. Nevertheless, one fact cannot be overlooked: it remains the avowed aim of the Nazi parties both in Danzig and in Germany to secure the return of the Free City to the Reich. Upon this essential point there has been no question of the slightest compromise. The conflicting position between Warsaw and Berlin remains therefore unaltered. This fact, taken in conjunction with the military preparations now being made in Germany, demands the most vigilant attention. This is true, whatever reason for confidence may be derived from the developments which have taken place in France and Britain during the past months, and from the impression they have made upon the leaders of the Third Reich. From information received during the past few days from various high-placed Germans, it follows that the leaders of the Reich are at  present in a state of extreme embarrassment, that once again pressure in opposite directions is being brought to bear on the Fhrer by his advisers, and that he inclines first to one group and then to another. Moreover, he is said to be the more perplexed since, behind the Danzig question, there looms the more general problem of the relations between the Reich and the other European Powers, as the present state of tension cannot go on indefinitely. In no case, then, can we consider that the master of the Third Reich has given up for good the idea of a solution by force. Undoubtedly, the best means to deflect him from this is for the democracies to continue to show themselves resolute, strong and hardworking. In existing circumstances, any sign that Germany might interpret as an offer to begin conversations-premature so long as the Reich continues to ignore the Polish point of view-runs the risk of being regarded as a sign of physical weariness or of moral weakening. It would seem that it is by silently demonstrating their renewed forces and their energies that the Western Powers will most effectively contribute to prevent Nazi Germany from seeking a solution of her dispute with Poland by methods that might prove fatal to peace. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 172 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, July 25, 1939. IN the course of another conversation which he had with the Gauleiter yesterday, the latter confirmed to Herr Burckhardt that Herr Hitler was prepared to wait as long as might be necessary in order to bring about a solution of the Danzig question by peaceful means. Furthermore, deferring to the protest made to the Commissioner by the Gauleiter, the Warsaw Government will henceforth notify the Senate of any movements by rail of Polish troops upon the Free City's territories. LA TOURNELLE.  No. 173 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 1939. IN Berlin today everyone is more or less in agreement with th view that there is an apparent lull in the international situation, an that this pause in the development of the crisis is due to the impressio of strength and resolution given by France and Britain to Germany Nevertheless, among the members of the Diplomatic Corps as well as in German circles, opinions vary as to the importance to be attached to this lull, and as to the possible sequels to the deliberations now going on in the minds of the rulers of the Reich. The Germans had hoped to annex Danzig without having to face the possibility of a general war. It is now evident that the affair has been badly started and that, if there is a desire to carry it through to the end, the risk of war must be reckoned with. In a recent dispatch I noted the signs that lead one to believe that they do not recoil in the face of this contingency, and other and more hopeful signs that are averse to the idea of a war. It is likely, no doubt, that the Germans do not want to go war for the sake of Danzig; but is it, then, merely a question of Danzig? If this problem has been more clamorously advertised and was pressed in preference to any other, it is because its solution has been considered the easier, and that it involved less risk of war than I any other question in which Germany was equally concerned. Events have proved this estimate to be inaccurate and there are signs-or there thought to be signs-of hesitation at Berchtesgaden and Berlin. To what question do these hesitations relate? Is it wise to infer from them that the Chancellor, having ventured somewhat rashly in the matter, will show himself more reasonable? The facts seem to be that since Munich, and more especially since March 15, two currents of influence have attempted to sway the Chancellor's mind. On the one hand he has been told, and that is Herr von Ribbentrop's view, that Germany can still realise many of ambitions without risking an armed conflict, or at any rate without provoking a general war. On the other hand he was told-and this was Field-Marshal Goering's view-that in the present circumstances nothing more could be done without going to war.  The fact that Herr von Ribbentrop's information regarding Danzig proved to be inaccurate need not be regarded by the Chancellor as a proof that no other German requirement can be met without war. It may have been that Danzig was a bad choice. In the past the Memel question, although it had been very definitely raised, was kept in suspended activity, because circumstances seemed suddenly to favour a transfer of attention to other problems. On the other hand, the recognition that there was truth in what might be called the "Goering line of thought" does not mean that-on the assumption that there can be no conquests without war-war will not be preferred to the surrender of a dynamic policy. It does not appear that the Fhrer has made a decision. The keyboard is open before him: he can strike what note he will. Since all the military arrangements have been made he can, either in the case of Danzig or of any other question, decide to wait until the first propitious opportunity offers (and in the opinion of most Germans rifts will in time appear in the democratic fronts, of which it will be possible to take advantage). Alternatively, accepting the risk, he can concentrate upon the particular question of Danzig or upon the more general problem of German claims. While there is rather less talk of Danzig, a campaign against Poland as a maritime state is already taking shape. In this connection an article in this morning's Vlkischer Beobachter is significant. Voicing much the same view, the Lokal Anzeiger writes: "The Polish attempts to make of Poland a maritime state at all costs do not conform either with serious economic facts or with essential political or military interests." Thus the question of the Corridor, already mentioned in private conversation, now creeps into the Press together with that of Upper Silesia. A German manufacturer said to a Frenchman within the last few days: "When we possess Upper Silesia, we shall have in our hands the last industrial area of Central and Eastern Europe which was still outside our range. Then our economic power need have no more fear of competition in the markets of the Near East." It is necessary, therefore, to remain on the watch. What the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin describe as an easing of the strain is probably no more than a period of reflection, upon which the reactions of France and Great Britain will certainly exercise some influence. SAINT-HARDOUIN.  No. 174 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 30, 1939. FROM articles in the Press, as well as from conversations, it is becoming clear that the particular problem of Danzig is giving place to the problem of the Corridor and even to that of the structure of Poland itself. One wonders why the German Government, at a moment when it is giving unexpected prominence to the memory of the events of 1914, and when the twenty-fifth anniversary of Germany's entry into the war is about to be commemorated in the barracks as a national holiday, should be openly raising, on a larger scale and under a guise much more "vital" to Germany, the problem of the claims of the Reich. Again, in certain circles not unconnected with Herr von Ribbentrop's entourage, the conviction is being expressed that Poland, deprived of credits which it had hoped to secure from Great Britain, would not long be able to maintain the national effort it is making today. "We know that its economic situation is catastrophic; we are receiving evidence of the discontent to be found among the State officials. Poland will be unable to resist for long, and will be forced to negotiate. It follows that the Polish problem can be settled without war; for you are pledged to intervene only if Poland calls for your help." These are echoes of remarks made by Germans to foreigners during the past few days. SAINT-HARDOUIN. III The Polish Resistance and the German Press Campaign (August 1-19, 1939) No. 175 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 1, 1939. THE Senate having adopted a policy of silence in regard to the renewed protests made by the Polish Government on the subject of  Customs inspectors, that Government has just taken measures of economic reprisals which may have grave consequences. The Polish Commissioner General has indeed notified the authorities of the Free City that the inspection by Polish officials of the transformation of fats by the firm "Amada Unida" will cease as from August 1, and that the right given to Danzig to export them to Poland free of duty will no longer be recognized. At the same time a similar treatment is to be applied to the herrings caught by the Danzig fishing fleet. In both instances considerable interests are involved, and the parties concerned appear to be aggrieved. Certainly herrings figure prominently in the Polish diet; Dutch boats, sailing under the Danzig flag, used to supply 6 million zlotys' worth. On the other hand, Amada, an English firm run on Dutch capital, supplied margarine to inland Poland to the value of some 15 million zlotys, this being, according to its managing director, some 95 per cent of the country's import of the commodity; while, conversely, the firm handled 50 per cent of the country's export of colza. These unexpected reprisals caused surprise that found expression in the local Press of July 31. The two daily newspapers protested loudly against this linking of an economic question with one which they held to be political, namely that of the inspectors. They considered the whole matter a violation of the exchange agreement valid up to July 31, 1940, and on several occasions they described this attitude as being "direct action," a procedure which seemed to arouse in them great indignation. The official reaction was no less strong. On August 1 the Senate gave orders to its Customs officials to disregard for the future the Polish inspectors, who, they said, belonged to the corps of frontier guards and not to the Customs service. No rule was established for distinguishing between these two categories, and it will presumably be difficult to establish one, in view of the stream of abuse with which the whole body has been flooded for three months by the official propaganda. This step was heralded in the Press by a long article in which were set out all the delinquencies of which the agents of the neighbouring republic were said to have been guilty, consisting in equal proportions of cases of espionage and of gross indecency. It was recalled that the Treaty of Paris provided in Section 14 for an independent Customs service in the Free City with merely a general right of control by Poland. Poland had step by step transformed this privilege into a highly specialized system of inquisition, using such specious argu-  meets as the development of commercial activity or the growth and complication of the Customs service. The Danziger Neueste Nachrichten countered with the following figures: 1929 1938 Number of Polish Inspectors 27 100 Tonnage through the Port... 8.5 million tons, of 7.1 million tons, of a value of 1.5 mil- a value of 500 mil- liards of zlotys lion zlotys So far as numbers are concerned, in almost all the posts on the frontier of East Prussia the inspectors largely exceeded the Danzig officials of the same rank, for example at Kalthof by twelve to one. In general this inspired article did not maintain the same presence of dispassionate consideration. Its conclusion under the headline, "Poland wrecks the Customs Union," is most provocative. It insists that the Warsaw Government must give up its new claims, otherwise "the economic policy of Danzig must be directed not only to new outlets, but also to new sources of supply." The meaning of this threat is obvious; the reference is to rumours of an opening of the frontier with the Reich. LA TOURNELLE. No. 176 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1939. A FORTNIGHT ago various reliable reports reached the Embassy which seemed to show that about the middle of July an important change had taken place in the attitude of the Fhrer. He had become convinced that France and Great Britain were firmly resolved to honour their obligations to Poland, and that, this being so, the Reich ran the risk, if it pushed the matter of Danzig to extremes, of provoking general conflict. The impression had moreover been given that the leaders of the Reich were anxious to provide themselves with means of drawing back or of letting the matter rest for a time without relinquishing their aims or excluding the possibility of pursuing them actively, if and when more favourable circumstances presented themselves. The first phase of the Danzig affair, therefore, appear to have led to a set-back for Herr von Ribbentrop, whom his opponents, and  especially Field-Marshal Goering, accused, it was said, of having irresponsibly involved Germany in a most dangerous policy. At that moment, it might have been deduced that the cause of peace had scored an important point. Subsequently, certain signs led to the speculation whether a revulsion of feeling had not occurred in the mind of the all-powerful Lord of the Third Reich in the opposite direction. The German newspapers (as also the Nazi organ at Danzig), which towards August 22 stressed the desire of Germany to obtain satisfaction by peaceful methods, have in the last few days devoted themselves to showing that Germany has nothing to fear even from a general conflict, which, they declare, would find her in a much more favourable position than in 1914. This is particularly the theme of the majority of the articles devoted to the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry of Germany into the Great War. At the same time it became clear that the Press was enlarging the scope of the German-Polish quarrel. It was no longer a question solely of Danzig, but also of the Corridor and even of Poznania and Upper Silesia. This was a somewhat remarkable alteration of the tactics hitherto followed to minimize the quarrel between Berlin and Warsaw and to convey the impression that the German claims only affected a city which was indisputably German in character. Finally, the Nazi propaganda this very morning resumed the campaign against the Polish Customs officials, which it had abandoned from June onwards. Although for the last few weeks the inspectors of Polish Customs in order to avoid any clash, have allowed considerable supplies of arms and munitions to enter the territory of the Free City, they are declared by the German newspapers to have exceeded their rights and to have behaved as "regular bandits." This is a fresh application of the methods to which Germany resorted in the Sudeten affair. In the new attitude assumed by Germany in the last few days there is undoubtedly a considerable element of bluff. But it would, nevertheless, be unwise to remain satisfied with that explanation. Other factors have probably come into play. We may be faced with the resumption of an offensive attitude on the part of people like Herr von Ribbentrop, who have not given up hope of persuading the Fhrer that Great Britain will not in the end maintain her firm attitude and that, in order to avoid war, it would again agree to a solution similar to that of Munich.  The surprise visit of the Fhrer to Berlin on July 28, his interview at the Wilhelmstrasse with Herr von Ribbentrop, the fact that he proposes to conduct together with him a new inspection of the Western fortifications, clearly indicate that the Chancellor wishes to show that he has not in any way withdrawn his confidence from his Foreign Minister. Now it is known that, in respect of Danzig, Herr von Ribbentrop is one of the strongest supporters of a radical solution. It may also be asked whether, in view of the slow progress of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, the Nazi leaders do not feel tempted to return to the plan of lightning action, which would in a few weeks "liquidate" the Polish army and face the Western Powers with an accomplished fact. It is a plan which the German military authorities do not consider free from danger; on the other hand it may be assumed that they do not consider its execution impossible, provided that Russian neutrality is assured. The risk of seeing Germany rally to the support of such a solution cannot be entirely excluded, so long as the Russian riddle remains unanswered. However that may be, there certainly exist at this moment two opposite currents of opinion in Germany. The supporters of the one are yielding to the war psychosis and consider a catastrophe as inevitable. This point of view is very widespread, especially in the provinces, where it is supported by the calling up of reservists, the departure of soldiers for unspecified destinations, the antiaircraft preparations, the requisitions, the restrictions on food and on other commodities which are becoming more and more noticeable-the continual movements of troops and the calling-up of the last reserves of workers. The others-whose faith in the Fhrer remains unshaken are-convinced that the Chancellor will once more work a miracle and will succeed-without war-in restoring Danzig to the Reich. Some maintain that he has a scheme, the execution of which will astound the world. In circles that are usually well-informed they declare that they have no knowledge. The Fhrer himself, they say, does not know which policy he will adopt. It will depend entirely on the circumstances. In the same circles it is recognized that the only war that Germany can possibly risk is a very short one and that the chances of seeing the end of a war within a few months are extremely slender. The same people hold that the leaders of the Reich will have to come to their decision between now and the beginning of September, the date at which  the Nuremberg congress is to begin. The critical period would be the second half of August. The leaders of the Third Reich seem, then, to be still equally subject to doubts and to temptations. In so far as they become convinced that from now on Poland can count on the effective help of France and England and that a short war is a mere chimera, we may hope that logic will outweigh their leaning towards solutions based on trickery and boldness. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No . 177 M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 2, 1939. THIS morning I questioned M. Arciszewski concerning the retaliatory measures taken by the Polish Government against the Free City. He replied that the position was rather serious, that the Polish Government had had the matter under consideration yesterday evening and that, without knowing the result of its deliberations, he thought he could assure me that everything depended on the attitude taken by the Senate in regard to the difficulties encountered by the Polish Customs control. M. Arciszewski gave me to understand that, in accordance with its declared principles, the Polish Government would not refuse to replace by others those Customs inspectors whose relations with the local authorities had become strained as a result of certain incidents. When I asked him what might be the intentions of the Senate in regard to the opening of the Customs frontier with East Prussia, M. Arciszewski replied that the Polish Government had no special reason to fear such a possibility, but that it was bearing in mind all contingencies which might occur during the coming weeks. The view of the Polish Government was that as long as the Government of the Reich remained uncertain, what course of action Poland would adopt in the various contingencies which might arise, it would continue to feel its way. M. Arciszewski was naturally not very explicit concerning the tactics which his Government might adopt; but it is in all probability in order to keep the Germans in their present state of uncertainty that  the Polish Government has chosen not to remain consistently passive in face of the Nazi actions in the Free City. SEGUIN. No. 178 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 3, 1939. IT is with great surprise and considerable anxiety that we have learned in Danzig of the measures of economic reprisal taken by the Polish Government in reply to the difficulties experienced by the Customs inspectors in the performance of their duties. The smuggling of arms having been carried on for months without penalties and the Free City having been placed on a military footing without protest from Warsaw, so drastic a decision was no longer anticipated. Since August 1 the margarine of the Amada Company, an English company with Dutch capital, and the herrings caught by Dutch fishing boats flying the Danzig flag cannot be imported free of duty into Poland. The annual sales of these products amount to 15,000,000 and 5,000,000 zlotys respectively. The Amada Company imports 8,000 tons into Poland, which amounts to 95 per cent of the total quantity consumed in that country, and buys there 20,000 tons of colza, which amounts to 50 per cent of the total output. By way of reprisal the Senate has ordered its Customs officials only to work with the Polish inspectors if they are what they purport to be and not frontier guards in disguise; at the same time no means of ascertaining this difference has been indicated to them. In official circles there are hints of the possibility, if Poland persists in her "direct action," of the opening of the Customs frontier between the Reich and Danzig. But there is no concealing the fact that very serious consequences might result from such a step. LA TOURNELLE. No. 179 M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 3, 1939. THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has given the British Ambassador the following explanations on the subject of the recent decision of the  Danzig Senate: About three years ago the Polish Government added to the Polish Customs inspectors serving in the territory of the Free City some Customs officials, who were given the special duty of checking the smuggling which was then beginning to grow, and it was to free themselves from this unwelcome hindrance that the Senate wished to be able to distinguish the inspectors from the ordinary Customs officials. M. Beck added that the Polish Government would not object to a fusion of these two classes of officials and to giving them the same uniforms, provided that the Customs service could in future perform its duties in conditions that permitted of reasonable efficiency. SEGUIN. No. 180 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 3, 1939. IN the course of the last week a very definite change in the political atmosphere has been observed in Berlin. Whereas after the middle of July there appeared to be a certain dtente, towards the end of the month there were signs of a fresh stiffening of attitude. The period of embarrassment, hesitation, inclination to temporization or even to appeasement which had been observable among the Nazi leaders, has been succeeded by a new phase: today the actions of the leaders of the Third Reich and the language of their Press reveal two dominating purposes: To convince the German people that it is threatened, as in 1914, and that its very existence is imperiled. To convince public opinion at home and abroad that the Third Reich is invincible and that neither threats nor any human power can arrest it in the pursuit of its vital interests. Nothing is neglected which may give the German people such confidence in its own might as to allow it to await the future with calmness, to resist attacks of all kinds and to break through any obstacles which may impede its path. I will try to show elsewhere how this propaganda is conducted. It is not without interest to ask oneself what motives have inspired it. It is probable that the rulers of the Reich are endeavouring to allay the  fears which spread through the population when military preparations are, as at the present moment, greatly intensified. On every side I am informed of what amounts to a recrudescence of the war psychosis which had manifested itself last September. The anxiety to allay the general alarm is particularly shown by the persistence of the efforts to convince the people that there is no danger of air-raids. On the other hand, at a time when the German military preparations are being intensified and accelerated, when clashes between the Poles and the members of the German minority seem to multiply, when polemics regarding Danzig are being resumed, the Nazi leaders are doubtless anxious to impress foreign opinion with the conviction that Germany is now once again prepared to go to any lengths, if necessary, in order to obtain satisfaction and show that the Reich would not give way, even if faced by the coalition the crowning-piece of which would be a Franco-Anglo-Russian agreement. At the same time the possibility must not be ignored that the leaders of the Third Reich may have wished to stimulate the somewhat failing enthusiasm of their people and to convince them that, their existence being threatened, they must defend themselves and that it is not so much a question of the Germans "dying for Danzig" as of their fighting for the life of the German people itself. The military activity displayed by the Third Reich since June has all the time called for the greatest vigilance on our part. The tone now adopted by its Press must make us more vigilant still and as resolute as ever. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 181 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 6, 1939. THE clash which occurred on August 4 between the authorities of the Free City and the Polish Customs inspectors has been reported by M. de Seguin. But I consider it essential that I should touch on these Occurrences again in order to make clear certain details which remained obscure, and to deduce from them certain indications in view of the coming difficulties. On the afternoon of the 4th the Ministry of Foreign Affairs learnt  that at four of the Danzig Customs posts on the East Prussian frontier, the Polish Customs inspectors had been given notice by the heads of the Danzig posts that they could not continue to perform their duties after Sunday the 6th. The Polish Government took the step of addressing a note to the Senate, requesting it to give by the following evening a written assurance that the Customs officials would be allowed to continue to perform their duties, otherwise the Polish Government reserved to itself the right to take necessary steps to safeguard its rights. Toward 8 p.m. the French and British representatives were informed of the wish of M. Beck to communicate matters of importance to them in the evening. At about 10 p.m. the Private Secretary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned a secretary of the British Embassy and M. de Seguin, and informed them of the events of the afternoon and of the Polish Government's intentions. Count Lubienski added that M. Beck expected to be in a position to inform the French and British Governments next morning of the steps the Polish Government might be led to take in the event of the Senate of the Free City not giving a favourable reply. The Polish note was delivered during the night to the President of the Senate in person. At 830 a.m. the Polish Commissioner informed the League High Commissioner of the Polish dmarche. Shortly afterwards, M. Greiser telephoned to M. Chodacki that the Senate of the Free City would not put any difficulties in the way of the Polish officials performing the duties assumed by them, but that it would not "for technical reasons" reply in writing to the Polish note before Monday. The Polish Government decided to be satisfied for the time being by this reply, and at the end of the morning informed the two Embassies of the relaxation in the crisis. Such was the course of events. One point has not yet been cleared up: what exactly took place between German and Polish officials at the four frontier posts? In his conversation on Saturday morning with Sir Howard Kennard, M. Beck made it clear that the German notification was addressed only to Customs officials in the strict sense of the term (the Department is aware of the distinction which the Senate seeks to establish between Customs inspectors and the ordinary Customs officials whom it calls "Grenzer"). According to further information from official Polish circles, there had been no notification to the Polish officials, but a threat to remove them by force, if they did not give up their posts. Finally, according to the version reported by M. de la  Tournelle, M. Chodacki had taken his action because the President of the Diet had issued orders for the arrest of the "Grenzer" before 3 p.m. of that day. In itself the episode of August 4 seems to have been closed by Herr Greiser's answer to the Polish note, always supposing that the Senate's promised note arrives to confirm its terms. But this answer does not end the controversy on the subject of the distinction the Senate claims to draw between Customs inspectors and Customs officials. It neither provides, nor does it point towards, a final solution of the problem of the working of the system of Customs supervision. However, a new factor has appeared. Although Poland has taken no action against the remilitarization of the Free City, she has taken a stand against the threat of an attack aimed openly and publicly against her rights in the sphere of the Customs. Before August 4 the Reich might speculate as to how far it could go with its policy of "nibbling." This is now determined, and henceforth the Reich, before it frames its future policy, will have to take into its calculations the Polish will to resist. LON NEL. No. 182 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 7, 1939. IN a recent conversation, M. Beck informed the British Ambassador that military measures might have been taken, had the Senate rejected the Polish note. It is, therefore, of interest to refer to treaty articles applying either to the case of an attack on Danzig from outside, or to that of an attempt to alter by force the present status of the city. The Treaty of Versailles contains no provision in regard to these, nor does the Convention of 1920 specify either the circumstances or methods of possible action for the defence of the Free City. "In its sitting of November 17, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a report declaring that the Polish Government seemed particularly fitted to receive from the League of Nations in case of necessity the mandate to undertake the defence of the Free City, but adding that this mandate could at no time be given in a general form, but only after consideration by the Council of the circumstances peculiar to each case."  The Consultative Military Commission of the League of Nations, declared at this same date: "(1) The League of Nations can undertake the defence of Danzig only by mandate. "(2) A contingent mandate is of no military value; only a permanent mandate can be taken into account. "(3) The defence of the Free City cannot be separated from that of the province of Pomerania. "(4) Poland is the only Power in a position to organize the defence of the Free City. "(5) Poland must be allowed to build fortifications in the territory of the Free City and to garrison them with Polish troops. "(6) These fortifications would be built facing the sea and towards East Prussia. On the Pomeranian side Poland's western frontier constitutes Danzig's line of defence. "Following this statement, the Council of the League of Nations decided to consult General Sir Richard Haking, at that time High Commissioner in Danzig. On January 25, 1921, he declared that Danzig had no need of defences as the Free City could not be defended against a German attack, which was the only possible contingency." In June 1921, the Council adopted the following resolution: (1) The Polish Government is specially fitted to ensure, if circumstances require it, and in the following conditions, the defence of Danzig by land, as well as the maintenance of order on the territory of the Free City, in the event of the local police forces proving insufficient. With this object in view, the High Commissioner will, if occasion arises, request instructions from the Council of the League of Nations and will, if he thinks fit, submit proposals. (2) It will nevertheless be within the competence of the High Commissioner to anticipate the authorization of the Council and to address a direct invitation to the Polish Government to ensure the defence of Danzig, or "the maintenance of order," in the following cases: (a) In the event of the territory of the Free City being the object of aggression, threat or danger of aggression from a neighbouring country other than Poland, after the High Commissioner has assured himself of the urgency of the danger; (b) In the event of Poland being, for any reason whatever,  suddenly and effectively prevented from exercising the rights possessed by her under Article 28 of the Treaty of November 9th, 1920. In these two cases the High Commissioner should report to the Council the reasons for the action which he has taken. (3) As soon as the object in view has been achieved to the satisfaction of the High Commissioner, the Polish troops will be withdrawn. (4) In all cases where Poland has to ensure the defence of the Free City, the Council of the League of Nations may provide for the collaboration of one or more States Members of the League. (5) The High Commissioner, after consultation with the Polish Government, will present to the League of Nations a general report on the measures for which it may be necessary to provide in the above-mentioned cases. Theoretically, therefore, Poland could be called upon to provide for the defence of Danzig either if the League of Nations appealed to it directly, or in certain circumstances at the behest of the High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. But Poland does not hold a permanent mandate nor has she herself the right to intervene in the matter, but is required by the resolution of the Council in 1921 to take no action until asked to do so by the High Commissioner. At the end of last May, the Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of questions affecting Danzig reminded M. Burckhardt when the latter was passing through Warsaw of his rights in this respect, the High Commissioner replied that if a contingency occurred that would justify his intervention, he would straightway have recourse to the Committee of Three. LON NEL. No. 183 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 7, 1939. I HAVE received from M. Beck the following particulars with regard to the note that has today been handed to the Polish Commissioner by the Danzig Senate. The thesis already formulated verbally by Herr Greiser to M. Chodacki is repeated in this note: that the Polish Government, whose protest was based on mistaken information, had no cause to take  umbrage. Moreover, the Senate declares that it is ready to discuss the various points at issue in the matter of the Danzig Customs with the Commissioner. Although one may take it that the Senate's note is hardly diplomatic in expression, M. Beck is sufficiently pleased with it: he would seem to be right in interpreting this reply as a refusal on the part of the Nazi elements in Danzig. The latter, either at Berlin's instigation or possibly on their own initiative, provoked this incident to see how the land lay. The Polish Government considered that, after everything that has happened recently in Danzig from the military point of view, the time had come to call an immediate halt. "Although openly conducted," said M. Beck to me, "the smuggling of arms and men was not recognized by the Senate. This time, however, we had to make a stand, as here was an action being taken officially against our interests." The Foreign Minister added that the Polish Customs officers in the Free City had been ordered from the beginning of this incident to carry out their duties in uniform and armed, in case there should be an attempt made to arrest them. During the negotiations that are about to take place with the Senate, Poland will be very conciliatory as far as the details of the Customs control are concerned; with respect to the principle itself of that control it will, on the other hand, be very firm. In M. Beck's view the general situation is still serious; he tells me, however, that he considers the attitude which the Danzig Senate has just adopted, after consulting with Berlin, as a favourable sign which should encourage us all to persevere in our joint policy of firmness. Only by strict adherence to this policy could we overcome, without a war arising, a further crisis which Colonel Beck also expects at the end of August or early in September. LON NEL. No. 184 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 7, 1939. WHEN stressing the vital importance that Danzig has for Poland, the Polish Press does not fail to emphasize the fact that for Germany the fate of the Free City is not of any great significance but really  only a part of a very much wider problem which the Reich avoids mentioning at present for obvious tactical reasons. M. Smogorzewski, writing in the Gazeta Polska, observes with relation to this that many Germans, even in front of foreign journalists, have not troubled of late to conceal that a settlement of the Danzig question cannot be considered without a settlement of the problem of the Corridor, and that the access of eighty million Germans to East Prussia was more important than the access of twenty million Poles to the sea. The officials of the Wilhelmstrasse and of the German Propaganda Ministry are said to have received orders a few days ago not to make such remarks; but M. Smogorzewski quotes several examples to show that this is actually the theory held by the German leaders: Dr. Goebbels' speech at Cologne on May 19 last, in which the Corridor question was plainly stated; a special number published by the review Der Deutsche im Osten on the occasion of Dr. Goebbels' visit to Danzig, which stated that a final adjustment of German- Polish relations would involve the return to the Reich of Danzig, the Corridor and "other territories"; and an article appearing in the Schwarze Korps for July 20 which spoke of Poland's access to the sea as an absurd anomaly, etc. The Polish Press has hitherto done no more than briefly report Herr Forster's statements to the representatives of Paris Soir and the Daily Express. There is reason to believe, however, that it has taken careful note of them; Danzig's Bavarian Gauleiter incautiously provided it with a number of arguments when he declared that what the Germans want is "the restoration of Germany's pre-War frontiers and the certainty of not having hostile neighbours on her eastern border," adding: "Our claims seek only to redress the wrongs perpetrated by the Treaty of Versailles." In this connection I would point out to your Department that the pamphlet Danzig-de quoi s'agit-il? which is being circulated in France by the German Propaganda department, is in fact the translation of a booklet in German, copies of which were distributed some time ago by the Press service of the Danzig Senate. It too contains passages (pp. 16-17 of the French text) declaring in so many words that Germany demands the return not only of Danzig (her "last claim," according to Count Welczeck) but also "the Corridor and other territories arbitrarily torn from the Reich."  In my opinion such an avowal deserves to be noted and commented upon by our Press. LON NEL. No. 185 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 8, 1939. LAST week-end seems to have opened a new chapter in the development of the Danzig question: that of Polish resistance to the encroachments of the Senate and the Nazis of the Free City. This will to resist has assumed two forms: the ultimatum addressed to the Senate on August 5 on the subject of the Polish Customs officers, and Marshal Rydz- Smigly's speech at Cracow (August 6). The result has been a revival of anti-Polish agitation in the German and Danzig newspapers, but at any rate for the present this further outburst of ill-feeling seems chiefly designed to hide the setback suffered last Saturday in Danzig. The Nazi plan, as it appeared since the beginning of June, evidently consisted in the gradual eviction of Poland from Danzig by an unremitting series of infringements of the statute; when the remilitarization of the Free City had been completed, the next objective of the attack was the Customs barrier separating Danzig from East Prussia. Here too the Danzig Nazis proceeded by stages, and all things considered, with a great deal of caution. They differentiated among the Polish officials between Customs officers and frontier guards. The latter were singled out for a start, although of course there was every intention, if successful, to turn their attention towards breaking down entirely the Polish Customs control. The conflict arose over the Amada margarine factory. By way of a protest against the captiousness to which their agents were subjected, the Polish authorities on August 2 prohibited the importation of this firm's products into Polish territory. The Senate retorted by ordering the Danzig Customs officials to collaborate only with Polish Customs officers, and not with frontier guards disguised as Customs men. Next day, on August 4, Herr Forster demanded that reprisals should cease and threatened to do away with the Customs control. That same day, a high official of the Danzig Customs House ordered the arrest of Polish inspectors looked upon as "Grenzer" (frontier guards). On being informed of this order, the Warsaw Government  issued on the morning of the 5th an ultimatum expiring at six p.m., whereupon the Danzig Senate, startled by the reaction of the Poles, finished by giving way, after alleging that it knew nothing of the measure which had provoked the Polish ultimatum. Poland, which had for months tolerated countless infringements of the Danzig statute in order to avoid incidents, had scored the first point. Next day, August 6, in the speech which he delivered at Cracow before 150,000 legionaires, Marshal Rydz-Smigly announced that Poland was determined to meet "force with force" and to oppose any direct or indirect attempt to tamper with her interests and rights. He added that Danzig, bound to Poland for many centuries, formed the lung of her economic organization and that in this matter the Government of Warsaw had made its position completely and unequivocally clear. Thus the attempt at intimidation has been unsuccessful. From now on the nibbling process will meet with Polish resistance. That is what the past week-end has meant for Germany. In Berlin as in Danzig, it appears that the Nazis have been somewhat disconcerted by the firmness of the Warsaw Government. On Sunday morning the newspapers were silent about the events which had taken place in Danzig on Saturday. Not until Monday afternoon did a tendentious version find its way into the whole Press which strove to make things out as if the Senate had purely and simply rejected the "barefaced" demand which the Poles had made and "accompanied by threats." The Government in Warsaw was accused of having taken action as a result of false rumours and its attitude was announced as "a particularly dangerous provocation." Furthermore, the papers in Danzig and the Reich asserted that the Senate would seek to settle the question of the Danzig Customs officials' authority by negotiation and that it upheld the fundamental distinction between Customs inspectors and frontier guards. This was a thinly veiled retreat. The comments of the Czas on Marshal Rydz-Smigly's speech conveniently provided the Nazis with an opportunity to cover this retreat with a clamour of threats and imprecations. The Polish Conservative organ wrote that if the Danzig Nazis tried to create a fait accompli, "Polish guns would speak." "We are being threatened!" cried the entire German Press. "Poland has overstepped all limits in her insolence and irresponsibility. Poland, beware! It should be understood  in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and in London, that if Polish guns convert the German city of Danzig into a heap of ruins, German guns will not remain silent." After accepting the Polish ultimatum last Saturday, the Nazis had in their turn started to utter threats. Thus the balance tended to be established. From the fact that after a long series of concessions, the Poles last Saturday scored a point, one cannot draw any conclusions as to the ultimate outcome of the Danzig affair. Berlin and Warsaw still stand in complete opposition. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 186 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 8, 1939. IT is only after a lapse of two days that the German Press has seized on the happenings in Danzig to let fly at Poland, which it accuses of war-like provocation. Similarly the Czas article, which has supplied the campaign that was initiated yesterday with abundant material, was not immediately made use of by the German Press. Thus the Essener National Zeitung, although regarded as semi- official, abstained from commenting on the article in tonight's edition. One may therefore wonder whether these violent diatribes which are not spontaneous but seem in some respects to recall the process applied in September 1938 to Czechoslovakia, are intended as the time when the German army will be ready draws near, to pave the way for the test of strength which is generally expected at the end of this month, or whether it is not simply a question of the German leaders covering by this means the retreat which the Danzig Senate has been forced to make and preventing the Poles from glorying in their success or attempting to follow it up. Although there is a great deal of war talk among the people, because the papers encourage it, and military preparations are becoming more noticeable, still it should be stated that nothing abnormal has happened since Saturday, the day of the Polish ultimatum to the Danzig Senate. SAINT-HARDOUIN.  No. 187 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 8, 1939. THE latest Polish-Danzig incident and the manner in which it was settled are very typical of the attitudes of the contending parties. The Nazis continue to "nibble" in every possible way at what remains of the statute of the Free City and the relics of Poland's rights and interests in Danzig, no doubt hoping to enable Herr Hitler to declare some day that "by the will of the people of Danzig" nothing remains but the documents of the regime instituted by the Treaty of Versailles, and that it would be absurd to unleash a war for the sake of a scrap of paper. But at the same time Germany has been careful, hitherto at least, not to push things to extremes. The Poles, in their wish to gain time, had lately tolerated all that happened in Danzig, and the Nazis had taken the fullest possible advantage of the patience they displayed. This time, in face of a determination to resist, they have become conciliatory; according to information received by my English colleague, the Senate have officially communicated their draft memorandum to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, who is not accustomed to such courtesies, and they have drawn back with the evident intention of renewing their advance at the first opportunity. The margin of concessions which Poland is still prepared to make in her wish to temporize has become so narrow, however, that any incautious act might well have the most serious consequences. It would be well if Berlin were to understand this. LON NEL. No. 188 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 10, 1939. HERR FORSTER, in a conversation which he had at the end of the morning with the High Commissioner of the League, and the tenor of which the latter has communicated to the Polish Commissioner-General, said that the situation was regarded as extremely serious in Berlin and that certain articles in the Polish Press had incensed the  Chancellor; especially an article published three days ago by the Czas, which has led the Government of Warsaw once again to renew its counsels of moderation to the Press. "In order not to make things more complicated," Herr Hitler had enjoined him, Herr Forster continued, to avoid any new incident in Danzig. M. Beck, comparing this indication with the fact that the speech made by General von Brauchitsch this afternoon in Danzig was comparatively moderate, considers that to appreciate fully the real significance of the German move one should take this into account. LON NEL. No. 189 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 10, 1939. THE respite in the anti-Polish campaign which had followed the verbal acceptance by President Greiser last Saturday (August 5) of the Polish ultimatum in the affair of the Customs inspectors turned out to be only of short duration. The Nazis, both in Danzig and in the Reich, at first a little taken aback by the Polish resistance, did not take long to recover themselves. At the moment, the agitation against Poland is more violent than ever. The Germans in Danzig, as well as in the Reich, completely overlooking the origins of the present crisis, declare that they are threatened, so as to be able themselves to adopt a threatening attitude with a semblance of justification. Behind the question of the Free City, the deep-seated animosity between Germans and Poles, which was artificially masked by the 1934 agreement, is becoming more and more apparent with its full implications and with ever- increasing acuteness. (1) On August 5, in the course of the day, Herr Greiser, President of the Senate, taken aback by the Warsaw Government's sudden determination to resist had hastily parried this with verbal assurances which he had promised to confirm in writing by Monday, (August 7). It had seemed for a moment as though the Danzig authorities were going to seek a peaceful solution to the quarrel raised by the Free City in respect of the Polish Customs inspectors. The German Press itself, despite the biased character of its version of the discussion last Saturday between the Free City authorities and M. Chodacki, hinted that negotiations were about to begin between  Danzig and the Poles. The D.N.B. Agency's communiqu referred to them. In the note handed to M. Chodacki by the Senate on the 7th, there is, however, no longer any question of negotiation, according to our Consul in Danzig. In any case since August 9, no more mention of it has been made in the German Press, which merely proclaimed the need for a swift and thorough settlement of the dispute. That same day it was announced that at a mass meeting of Danzigers to be held on the evening of August 10, Herr Forster would speak "in protest against the Polish threats." It is difficult not to see in this decision the result of the interview which the Danzig Gauleiter had with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the 8th. The Czas article perhaps helped to suggest to the Chancellor the idea of a strong and solemn protest by the Free City against "Polish threats." Actually the moment had come for the Nazis to change their tactics. Their system had now come up against the Warsaw Government's determination to resist "nibbling." It was therefore necessary to come back to the method of intimidation, but this time making out that they were the victims of intolerable bullying and would be obliged to defend themselves by every means. That will doubtless be the tenor of the speech which Herr Forster is to deliver this evening in Danzig, a speech composed on Herr Hitler's instructions and which official German circles have already announced will be vehement in tone. In striving thus to create an unbearable tension between Danzig and Warsaw, and apparently seeking in this way to wreck all chances of a friendly agreement between the two States, the rulers of the Reich would seem, if we are to believe what we hear from well-informed quarters, to be pursuing a well-defined aim: to get the Senate to declare that it can no longer continue the talks with Poland on its own and must ask the Reich to safeguard the interests of the Free City within the scope of diplomatic action. The idea seems to be to prepare the diplomatic abdication of Danzig in favour of the Reich. In this way the differences between Danzig and Warsaw would be transformed into a direct conflict between Warsaw and Berlin. This would be a procedure similar to that followed in the Sudeten dispute, in which, at the decisive moment, the Reich took Herr Henlein's place. Meanwhile the campaign of incitement against Poland in the German Press has gone far beyond the legal quarrel raised over Danzig.  By making great play with certain articles in the Polish Press, such as that which appeared in Czas the day before yesterday, and then one in the Kurjer Polski today, the German papers have blazoned with sensational headlines the charge that Poland not only wishes to "conquer" Danzig and East Prussia and to reach the line of the Oder, but that she seeks the complete destruction of the Reich and the extermination of the German people, as formerly Rome desired the ruin of Carthage. Normally such threats-if in fact they are being uttered in Poland-should not in the least affect a nation as proud of its size and of its strength as the Greater German Reich. They should provoke nothing but ridicule. They are, however, being exploited to the full to fan the hatred against Poland and seem to reveal the intention to aggravate systematically the present crisis. The public pronouncements made in the last few days by eminent personalities of the Third Reich, more especially, Field-Marshal Goering and General von Brauchitsch, are also not of a kind to simplify a solution of this crisis. On the 25th anniversary of Germany's entry into the War, the Embassy pointed out the two main objects which the leaders of the Reich have in view: to persuade their people that Germany is threatened and that if the Reich made war it would be in self-defence; to convince public opinion that the war could have no end but a victory for the German arms, as the Reich was invulnerable and invincible. It is this two-fold intention that was revealed in the speech delivered by Field-Marshal Goering before the "Rheinmetall" workmen on Sunday, the interview which he gave to the Nachtausgabe (August 9), and the words spoken this very day by General von Brauchitsch to workmen of the armament factories. In the present circumstances these speeches might well seem to be the exhortation of a captain to his men before leading them to the attack against the Polish enemy and against the "encircling Powers." It is not certain, however, that such is the true meaning and the real aim of the anti-Polish campaign whose revival at the present time we have just noted. General von Brauchitsch stated that if the Fhrer demanded the last and supreme sacrifice from the German soldier, each would answer to his call; but he also asserted that the Chancellor would not lightly risk the life of one single German and that he would not decide to do so unless there were no alternative. As for Field-Marshal Goering, his chief concern was to cover up the  weak points in Germany's armour. He was at pains to make it clear that Germany did not want war, that the Reich was awaiting the peace it desired with calm and with confidence in the Fhrer, but that it would defend itself if it were refused this peace or if someone were to commit the folly of plunging Europe into war. Neither Field-Marshal Goering nor General von Brauchitsch touched on the problem of Danzig. It is a fact worth noting. The campaign of agitation now taking place in Germany may have several objects in view: Either to prepare the people's minds for a war, the prospect of which is very far from filling the great majority of Germans with enthusiasm; Or to prepare a way out for the German Government. Only recently a claimant, the Reich has abruptly become a defendant. To read the German newspapers, it would seem to be less a matter of annexing Danzig than of preventing Poland from taking it, an intention which the Warsaw Government has never held; Or, finally, to intimidate the Poles and bluff the Western Powers in the hope either of forcing Poland to come to terms or of isolating her. One cannot a priori reject any of these possibilities. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 190 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 12, 1939. IN view of the tone of the Press, of the continual calling-up of reserves, of the intense military activity which is all the time increasing, and of new food restrictions (there are queues outside the butchers' shops this morning), the nervousness of the public has grown suddenly sharper. The semi-official Press is busy creating the impression that important decisions are about to be taken today or to- morrow. According to current rumours the Reichstag will meet on Tuesday. September 2 is, in fact, the opening date of the Nuremberg Congress, which is to be the Congress of Peace (the medal symbolizing this celebration has just been struck) and the preparations for which  are being pushed forward with all speed. Between now and then, it is hinted, Germany will in fact have made "her Peace secure." That is the date which this Embassy always indicated as the one fixed for the Germany Army to be ready. Herr Hitler has begun his consultations. He would seem to be on the point of making a decision. It seems very difficult to believe, separated as we are by only three weeks from that Congress of Peace and with the troops not yet concentrated, that, despite the illusions which are held here about a "Blitzkrieg" which would not give France and England time to intervene, anyone could hope to obtain this peace, in so short a time, after having imposed the German solution by warlike means. What they are therefore counting on, is capitulation without war by the Western Democracies, alarmed by the Reich's display of military strength and by the self-confidence which it is going to show in the course of the next few days. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that the Reich in building up this bluff is becoming more deeply involved both in the political and in the military spheres, and that it runs the risk of reaching a point from which it would be difficult to draw back. In that case, however, it seems probable to judge from the information so far in our hands, that the Reich leaders will wait for the result of the spectacular gatherings at Tannenberg and Nuremberg, as the Danzig meeting did not produce the expected results. But if the Congress of Peace were postponed or if preparations for it were interrupted, the possibility of immediate action being taken should, to my mind, be at least more seriously considered. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 191 M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 12, 1939. GERMAN propaganda is now discoursing on the harsh treatment of Germans by the Poles in order to create an "atmosphere" which recalls the similar agitation made at the time of the Sudeten affair, hoping in this way to convince world-opinion and also to attempt for the last time to persuade France and Great Britain to abandon Poland to her fate. In order to avoid that, in the game now being played, Germany  should reach a point from which she could no longer draw back, one may wonder whether it would not be advisable to make it clear in some form or another that we are not deceived and to try, on our side, to prevent this "atmosphere" from being created. Undoubtedly it would be necessary to act with care so as not to exasperate the leaders of the Reich by reminding them of what they are supposed to know or by arguing with them. But in my view it would be useful to show that our attitude to the Danzig question remains unchanged and to explain objectively why we cannot allow our hearts to be softened by the fate of the German population in Poland (as the German Press invites us to do). I therefore advise that our wireless stations should broadcast, in an unprovocative manner, the following themes (they are not new, but their very repetition would not fail to have its effect): (1) To justify her claims on Danzig Germany puts forward the racial argument; why, then, is it occupying Prague? (2) From an historical point of view Germany maintains that Danzig is "Urdeutsch," that is to say within the homeland of the German people; even if we admitted this, it is still inconceivable that the Reich has finally renounced its claims on a land that was German at a far earlier date and accepts the expulsion of the indigenous population of the Upper Adige. (3) For its own purposes, the German Press makes daily mention of the incidents of which the German minority in Poland is supposed to be a victim; but it would be worth recalling those incidents of which the Polish minority in Germany has been victim; that minority is as large as Germany's minority in Poland (between 700,000 and a million souls); it is deprived of its essential liberties; recently several Polish schools have been closed. While the treatment undergone by Germans abroad distresses deeply the German Reich, it remains entirely silent about the regime which it imposes in the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia, whence it expels journalists and where it will allow no eye- witnesses. SAINT-HARDOUIN. No. 192 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 12, 1939. ATTENTION is drawn by Polish newspapers to the article published  in the Angriff by Dr. Goebbels on the occasion of Herr von Ribbentrop's conversations with Count Ciano. They point out that Germany makes no secret of her desire for a general revision of her eastern frontiers. Dr. Goebbels's remarks provide further proof of Germany's intentions of conquest, says the communiqu at the semi-official A.T.E. Agency, appearing in the Gazeta Polska. Danzig is only a pretext; Germany wants to establish her hegemony and seeks to use Danzig as a spring-board for action on a larger scale in Eastern Europe. LON NEL. No. 193 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 15, 1939. I HAVE the honour to send herewith to your Department a translation of the notes exchanged between the Commissioner- General of the Polish Republic in Danzig and the President of the Senate of the Free City, on August 4 and 7. Your department will also find enclosed the text of a communication addressed by the President of Customs Administration of the Free City to the Head Office of the Polish Customs on August 4. LON NEL. The COMMISSIONER-GENERAL of the Polish Republic, to the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. I HAVE learned that the local authorities of the Danzig Customs on duty at the posts situated on the frontier which separates the Free City from East Prussia have addressed to the Polish Customs inspectors a communication which is without precedent in the history of Polish-Danzig relations. This document states that the Danzig authorities intend, from 7 a.m. on August 6 to prevent a certain number of Polish Customs inspectors from carrying out their duties of control which form part of the recognized rights of the Polish Government on the Customs frontier. I am convinced that this infringement of the existing agreements, which has been committed by the local authorities, is the result of a misunderstanding or of a false interpretation of instructions given by the Senate of the Free City. You are, I am sure, aware that the Polish Government could not  permit the fundamental rights of Poland to be violated in this way. I expect to receive from you before 6 p.m. on August 5, 1939, a reply assuring me that you have countermanded the steps taken by your subordinates. Since the aforesaid incidents have occurred at several frontier posts, I am obliged to inform you that all Polish Customs inspectors have been ordered to carry out their duties, as from August 6, in uniform and armed, and this in all the frontier posts where they may consider it helpful to their duties. Any attempt to interfere with the execution of their duty, any attack or intervention by the police, will be considered an act of violence directed against Polish State officials in the discharge of their official functions. Should such abuses occur, the Polish Government would immediately initiate reprisals (retaliatory measures) against the Free City and the responsibility for these would fall entirely on the Senate. I hope to receive a satisfactory reply at the time stated. CHODACKI. His EXCELLENCY the Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic, M. M. CHODACKI, Minister Plenipotentiary in Danzig. EXCELLENCY, IN answer to your two notes of August 4, one of which was not delivered to me until the 5th, I must express my astonishment that you should take advantage of a completely baseless rumour to send to the Danzig Government on behalf of the Polish Government an ultimatum demanding a reply at short notice, and that acting in this way without reason you should court, at a time of great political unrest, dangers which might lead to incalculable disasters. The order which the Polish Government has abruptly given to all Polish Customs inspectors to carry out their duties in uniform and armed is contrary to all the stipulations of the Treaties in force and cannot be considered other than as a provocation likely to cause incidents and acts of violence of the most serious nature. In accordance with what I have since stated-and as I informed you immediately by telephone on the afternoon of Saturday, August 5-no official body, and in particular no section of the Customs Administration of the Free City of Danzig has ordered its officials from August 6, at 7 a.m., to prevent a certain number of Polish Customs inspectors from carrying out their duties. I refer you, moreover, to my note of June 3, 1939, in which I dealt at sufficient length with the  question of the relationship between the Polish and Danzig Customs officers on the frontier. The Danzig Government protests with the utmost energy against the reprisals with which it is threatened by the Polish Government. It considers this procedure entirely inadmissible and holds the Polish Government as entirely responsible for any consequences which might occur. I am, etc., GREISER. The PRESIDENT of the Customs Administration of the Free City of Danzig, to the Head Office of the Polish Customs. THE Senate of the Free City of Danzig has informed the Polish Diplomatic representative in Danzig, in its letter of July 29 of this year, that it has advised the Danzig Customs Administration that the "so-called" frontier guards shall no longer be treated as Polish Customs inspectors. I beg to refer you to this communication from the Senate. By Order, Dr. KUNST, Director of the Danzig Customs Administration, BEYLE. No. 194 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 15, 1939. I HAD this morning a conversation lasting one hour with the State Secretary with whom I thought it advisable to resume contact on my return to Berlin. Herr von Weizscker asked me what impression I brought back from Paris regarding the international situation. I gave him as exact a picture as possible of France at work, calm and peaceably inclined, but resolved to make all the sacrifices necessary for the defence of her honour and her position in the world. I made it clear that during my stay in Paris, I had been able to satisfy myself that the Government's foreign policy, which was supported almost unanimously by the country, had been and remained, exactly the same as the French Prime Minister and Your Excellency had clearly defined  it, particularly with reference to Poland and Danzig. It would be nothing short of dangerous to close our eyes to obvious facts. Our positions were taken up quite definitely. Between France, England, and Poland, undertakings for assistance had been entered into, which would operate automatically in case of aggression against any one of them. But the French Government was also still inspired by the most sincere wish to see an easing of the tension and an agreement reached between Germany and Poland, and I was able, in all sincerity and with a full knowledge of the facts, to state that my Government would always use its good offices to promote any settlement to which Poland, as a free and sovereign state, might think it possible to subscribe. I added that, on the other hand, I thought I had found in Berlin an atmosphere slightly different from that prevailing when I had left it in July. The Gauleiter of Danzig between two visits to Berchtesgaden, had made two violent speeches, one in the Free City, and one at Frth; in the Press, space devoted to Polish incidents was on some days assuming greater proportions, and the newspapers went so far as to speak of German honour in connection with these incidents. I was, therefore, very anxious to learn from the State Secretary exactly how matters stood. Herr von Weizscker replied that in actual fact he regretted that he could not tell me that the situation was still the same as when he had described it to me before my departure. In May, and June, he had expressed the opinion that time would do a great deal to improve matters, that the Poles would gradually come round to wiser and more conciliatory views. But the Poles were a changeable and excitable people, and the English and French guarantee, that "automatic" guarantee about which I had spoken, an offspring of the policy of encirclement, had inclined them to follow a course contrary to that which had been anticipated in Berlin; time had therefore worked in an adverse direction and they had now reached the point where an ultimatum from Warsaw to the Danzig Senate had been followed by an exchange of notes in which Poland went so far as to say that she would consider any fresh German intervention that was harmful to Polish rights and interests in Danzig as an act of aggression. The State Secretary then asked for these notes to be brought to him so that he could show them to me. I pointed out to him that I was not in a position to discuss the matter and would have to reserve my opinion. He did not insist, only mentioning that he had wished to give me  a striking example in support of his allegations, and he afterwards showed me a file of typewritten sheets: "There," he said, "is this morning's list of acts of persecution suffered by the German minority in Poland. I have as many every morning. "Fortunately it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good. This Polish policy must have the advantage of ultimately loosening the bonds between you and Warsaw; I refuse to believe that France intends always to screen these Polish pranks." In view of this direct hint and the insight which it afforded into what the Germans had at the back of their minds, it seemed to me necessary that I should be still more explicit in my reply than I had been at the beginning of the conversation. I first of all reminded Herr von Weizscker that if we had strengthened our bonds with Poland and if England had similarly bound herself, he was well aware that it was because of the events of last March, for which Germany was alone responsible. Without renouncing either our role in Europe, or our alliances, or our friendships, we had been willing, after December 6, to consider Germany's special position in central Europe. But the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia had brought about a positive reversal of French opinion. All, from the man in the street upwards, had realized that a danger, the most formidable of dangers to them, the loss of their liberty and of their independence, threatened them; and they have been practically unanimous in considering the restoration of a balance of power in Europe as indispensable for the preservation of these blessings; hence our policy, that was wholly devoid of any idea of encirclement. I indicated that this detailed explanation would no doubt enable the State Secretary to understand why there could be no question of our loosening our ties with Poland, and why the automatic operation of our guarantees about which I had spoken was "real." Herr von Weizscker then interrupted me in order to ask me whether this automatic action would come into play even if it were not a question of an "unprovoked" aggression. I advised him not to lose himself in subtleties; the fact was that if any of the three Allies, France, England, and Poland, were attacked, the other two would automatically be at her side. After all, everything I had seen while in Paris had convinced me of the moderation and even of the caution of the Polish Central Government. I had been able to observe that it turned a blind eye to the  importation of arms into Danzig, although the re- militarization of the City is prohibited by its Statute. "No doubt," retorted the State Secretary, "but the Statute could not foresee that the City would have to defend itself against its guardian! . . ." I quote this phrase because it is very typical of the state of mind of the Wilhelmstrasse. I added that if minor incidents occurred in regions with German minorities, the same was the case in Germany in regions with Polish minorities. Finally in order to leave no shadow of doubt in the mind of Herr von Weizscker, I added that even as he could rest assured that France was employing the language of wisdom in Warsaw (a language which was moreover perfectly well understood) and that she sincerely desired a German- Polish understanding, so the German Government must likewise take it as definite that France would not exert upon Poland, an integral part of our defensive front, a pressure capable of impairing the moral strength of that Power. In that respect we had had one experience which would not be repeated. Returning then to the attitude of the Reich, I asked the State Secretary whether he could give me an explicit statement of official intentions. We had to consider the claims of the Reich, and the Polish attitude. If I had understood rightly what had been said to me in June and July, the claims of the Reich could wait if the Polish attitude permitted. Had the situation changed? "It has changed," replied the State Secretary showing a certain embarrassment; "I can tell you no more for the moment; I only wish to add that I am pleased to see you back here at this time." I assured the State Secretary that I should devote the whole of my strength to the service of peace, which was particularly precious to my country. To those who know the covert way in which the State Secretary expresses himself, the language which he used to me is distinctly pessimistic. Ten days ago he still gave my English colleague a less gloomy view. There are, he told him, four possible risks of an armed conflict: (1) An English preventive war; (2) German refusal to believe that England would fight for Danzig; (3) Things might go so far that a retreat would no longer be possible; (4) A serious Polish incident. He eliminated Nos. 1 and 2 automatically. As regards No. 3 Herr Hitler, he said, would know how to stop in time. He only retained No. 4, the serious Polish incident, and this was what he had told me.  Today, Herr von Weizscker is no longer willing even to limit the risk of war to No. 4, and two or three times, I had the feeling that he wanted to give me to understand that events might move rapidly. Is his attitude a maneuver intended to impress the French Government? This is possible, and I hope in that case that my reactions showed him that it was labour lost. In any case, while I was making my statement he took numerous notes, which is contrary to his habit. Does his attitude on the contrary mean that, without having detailed information of what is his master's secret, he knows that important decisions have been made or discussed? That is also possible. Perhaps also he combined tactics and truthfulness. In life things are seldom entirely black or white. It is not unlikely that the same may also be true of Herr Hitler. The latter, in all probability, does not want a general war because he knows that he would have many chances of losing everything by it, and because he is convinced that he can hold out longer than the democracies in the present bloodless war. It may therefore be anticipated that he will strive to the last to achieve his plan without a general conflict. For none of my colleagues here doubts any more than I do, that he has a plan, and that as regards Poland, it comprises, in addition to Danzig, the reincorporation of the Corridor and Polish Silesia at the very least, that is to say the return to the old frontiers, and the German Press, moreover, does not hesitate to formulate such claims from time to time. But it is equally likely that the Fhrer, while he is anxious to avoid a general war, may become irritated and his anger gradually increasing against this neighbour who dares to defy him, in his desire to bring matters to a conclusion with Poland, he may be led to wage war against the latter, minimizing, more or less consciously, the risk of an extension of the conflict. To guard as far as possible against this danger which appears to me formidable and imminent I consider it essential: (1) To maintain absolute firmness, an entire and unbroken unity of front, as any weakening, or even any semblance of yielding will open the way to war; and to insist every time the opportunity occurs on the automatic operation of military assistance. (2) To maintain the military forces of the Allies, and in particular our own, on an equality with those of Germany, which are being continuously increased. It is essential that we should at the very least retain the previously existing ratio between our forces and those of the  Reich, that we should not give the erroneous impression that we are "giving ground." (3) To expedite to the very utmost the conclusion of the agreement with the Soviets. I can never repeat too often how important a psychological factor this is for the Reich. (4) To advise Warsaw to be more careful than ever and to intensify the measures taken to avoid local incidents, for example, by sending emissaries direct from the central authority to the danger zones. COULONDRE. No. 195 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 15, 1939. ON the morrow of the discussions between Count Ciano, Herr von Ribbentrop, and the Fhrer (August 11, 12, and 13) the situation, as seen from Berlin, is far from clear. It is not possible to discern with any degree of certainty either the immediate intentions of the leaders of the Reich, nor the manner in which they intend, at a given moment, to escape from the present deadlock nor to what extent they are really prepared to run the risk of a general conflict. There are, however, certain facts which control the situation: (1) The military preparations of the Reich are being speeded up and intensified, and it may be accepted that Germany has today reached an advanced stage of mobilization. These factors have increased the war psychosis which is becoming more and more prevalent among the German population; (2) In the Danzig problem, the Reich has become still more entangled, and over and above the question of the Free City, those of the German-Polish frontiers, and, in a more general way of the east of Europe, have been clearly put before German public opinion; (3) In spite of the categorical statements of the Reich Press, it is still impossible to gauge the degree of understanding and effective solidarity already achieved between Rome and Berlin; (4) In addition to symptoms which call for the utmost vigilance, others would seem to indicate that Berlin has not yet decided to precipitate matters, and that they have not given up all idea of temporizing.  (1) For several weeks past it has been evident that the Reich was taking all necessary measures to have considerable forces under arms from the middle of August (August 15 to 20), and by that date to have the country's military preparedness in all directions at an advanced stage. The measures observed at the present time can therefore hardly occasion surprise. On the other hand, they can no longer be explained only by the necessity-as officially pleaded-of training the troops (regulars or reserves). If compared with the military measures of last autumn, they are more and more clearly distinguished from the latter by the following features: Extreme care is taken to maintain secrecy, and secrecy is effectively maintained to a large extent thanks to methods of concealment developed almost to a fine art; Mobilization is effected on a much more extensive scale; the civilian population-in so far as it is not called up-is subject to requisitioning in much greater measure. This fact is particularly appreciable in the case of female labour; levies and requisitioning of all kinds (vehicles, petrol, livestock, sundry commodities) have attained a volume so great that the economic activity of the country is seriously disorganized, while stocks and their replenishment are hampered; The anxiety to put Germany in the best possible condition to sustain a war is such that, however great the part played by bluff, it is impossible to avoid the impression that more serious contingencies are not set aside. Such, moreover, is the feeling of the German population, among whom the fear of a war is universal; Up to the present, if we except the assembling of troops in many places in Upper Silesia and in East Prussia, no important concentrations constituting an immediate threat to Poland have yet been observed. Technical experts, however, are of opinion that in the present state of German mobilization such concentrations could be effected in a few days. (2) If, at the time of the Polish ultimatum of August 5, some surprise and some wavering was noticeable in the attitude of the Nazis in Danzig and in the Reich, Germany was, nevertheless, not slow in regaining her self possession. After the Senate climbed down in the matter of the Polish Customs officers, the leaders of the Reich, tried, as we had for several days been given to understand from the German side they would, to take over the diplomatic representation of the interests of Danzig. This was the meaning of the verbal note handed by the German Government  to Warsaw on August 9. The Polish reply of the 11th in which the Warsaw Government declared that it would consider any fresh German intervention in the differences between Danzig and Poland as an act of aggression, cut short this attempt. This reply appears to have profoundly irritated the Nazi leaders and the Fhrer himself. Meanwhile, the campaign in favour of the return of Danzig to the Reich was becoming more violent. On the evening of August 10, Gauleiter Forster, back from Berchtesgaden, made a speech in Danzig at a demonstration organized in order to testify to the will of the Danzig population to be reincorporated in the Reich. In this speech, drafted in accordance with instructions received in Obersalzberg, he expressed the conviction that the Fhrer would know how to realise the unanimous will of the people of Danzig to return to their German Fatherland. Two days later, back in Germany once more, he delivered, in his native town of Frth, a second speech in which some thought they recognized the Fhrer's style, and in the course of which he exclaimed: "Whatever happens, Danzig will certainly, in the long run, return one day to the Reich." The speeches of Herr Forster, and likewise the articles published at the same time in the Reich Press marked moreover a new phase in the anti-Polish campaign. Herr Forster not only explicitly stated the German claims with regard to Danzig; he called the Polish State itself to account just as the Czechoslovak State was called to account last year. He denied Poland the right of existence as an independent state. This argument was abundantly developed in semi-official newspapers such as the National Zeitung of Essen, which, in its issue of August 13, proclaimed that the existence of Poland was not in the least necessary to the European balance of power. The period of German claims to Pomerelia, Poznan, and Upper Silesia, was thus at once outstripped. The arguments now put forward are, moreover, strangely similar to those which were produced before against the Republic of M. Benes: total incapacity of the Government; heterogeneous character of a population of which one third is made up of minorities; and strategic weaknesses. Finally, accompanying the threats and ill-treatment alleged to be directed against the City of Danzig and the members of the German minority in Poland appeared the further argument, which had also been advanced at the time of the German-Czech crisis, namely that of German honour. Certain newspapers even went so far as to declare openly that the  Polish problem was in itself only one particular case, and that it was now time to settle the "Eastern problems." It must, nevertheless, be observed that, up to the present, no member of the Reich Government has taken up a position over the Danzig problem so definite as to make a final breach inevitable. The Fhrer has not referred to the subject since April 28. From what is known of his discussions with M. Burckhardt, at the time of the latter's visit to Berchtesgaden on August 12, it would seem that he has not altered his attitude since. Nor have any of his Lieutenants made any definite pronouncements. The newspapers themselves, while proclaiming their faith in the inevitable return of the Free City to the Reich, have not yet mentioned any date, nor declared that this return would have to be secured "in one way or another" (so oder so). (3) The German Press has not given any precise information concerning the conversations at Salzburg and Berchtesgaden. In so far as any items of information have been given, these have sometimes proved contradictory. To give one instance, certain newspapers have maintained that Germany and Italy had, of course, examined the question of the revision of the order of things established in Central and South-Eastern Europe by the treaties of 1919. Others have declared that neither Germany nor Italy had ever contemplated giving the Western Powers the pleasure of such a digression. From what it has been possible to observe in Berlin, the predominant impression left by the German-Italian conversations may be summed up as follows: Italy has endeavoured to exercise a moderating influence, to restrain the Reich. But the results of this attempt are still uncertain. (4) The situation created by the Salzburg and Berchtesgaden conversations is therefore precarious. Certain indications, it is true, permit the hope that the danger of war is not immediate. The crops have not yet been entirely gathered in; the harvest was very late and was partly damaged by the very abundant rains of the last few weeks. Work on the fortifications is not completed either on the Western Front, or on the German-Polish frontier. The preparations for the demonstrations at Tannenberg (August 27) and Nuremberg (September 2-10) are apparently being continued. The members of the Diplomatic Corps have just been invited to the Congress, which, as nearly a million Germans are expected to attend, will disorganize the railway service for several weeks.  Nevertheless, these indications, cannot be considered entirely conclusive. The principal dangers of war may, therefore, be reduced to these two: (a) Illusion as to the attitude of France and Great Britain. (b) The hope of being able to destroy the Polish Army before the Western Powers have been able to give effective assistance, and of having by this means created a "war map" which would set London and Paris thinking. (a) There is no doubt that certain of the Nazi leaders and, in particular, Herr von Ribbentrop, still hope to give some sort of satisfaction to the Western Powers by restricting the German claims to Danzig, setting aside, provisionally, the question of the Corridor and other claims against Poland. (b) The idea that the German Army could crush the Polish Army and take Warsaw in a few weeks, or even a few days, before France and England had time to intervene, or even to come to a decision, is fairly widespread among the public and in certain official circles. The Fhrer himself is said to consider the undertaking as not impossible. It is said that certain officers in his circle encourage him in that view. What is most likely at the present time, is that Germany, while endeavouring to carry through the first solution (a) is continuing to push on her preparations with a view to being able if necessary to attempt the second solution (b). The best means of counteracting this manoeuvre obviously aimed at gaining possession of Danzig in order to prepare the ruin of Poland, to demoralize the small States guaranteed by France and England, and to bring about the collapse of the entire system, built up to resist aggression is, it would seem, to invite the Germans, if they were to submit proposals to us to this effect, to address themselves to Warsaw. At the same time it is, however, essential, in view of the extent of the military measures adopted by the Reich, that we should not allow ourselves to be forestalled by the German mobilization. Moreover, it is by maintaining our military forces on a level with theirs that we shall most effectively help to persuade the Reich that we are fully resolved to keep our engagements with our Polish allies, and, if need be to intervene immediately in their favour. COULONDRE.  No. 196 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 16, 1939. M. BECK has confirmed to me that he will make every effort to reach a peaceful settlement of the Danzig dispute and that he would have recourse to the good offices of M. Burckhardt should the occasion arise. In the course of this morning, a conversation which seems to have been satisfactory took place between M. Chodacki and Herr Greiser. The latter notified the Polish Commissioner General that the Polish Customs officers arrested two days ago were to be released. Last night, it is true, a fresh incident occurred with regard to which M. Beck told me he had as yet no detailed information: a Polish soldier was killed on the Polish- Danzig frontier. In order to cooperate in the settlement of questions still outstanding, technical experts are going from Warsaw to Danzig. In this connection, I once more advised the Minister for Foreign Affairs to act in such a way that the population of Danzig, the majority of whom are hostile to the Nazi agitation, should have the feeling that its economic interests are being to the fullest possible extent safeguarded by Poland. M. Beck replied that, acting in this spirit, he would oppose any measure of retaliation the necessity of which did not arise. LON NEL. No. 197 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 17, 1939. FOR some days past, the German Press has entered upon a new chapter of its anti-Polish campaign. It claims that a sort of pogrom has been started by organized groups and certain local authorities against the Germans in Poland. This morning there were sensational headlines announcing that on the other side of the frontier a positive man-hunt was in progress against the "Volksdeutschen," that mass arrests were being made among them, that Polish officials were distributing arms to shady elements of the population and that an intoler-  able terror menaced the entire German minority. Lastly, refugees were said to be already flocking into German territory. Thus we meet again the tactics and methods by which Nazi propaganda, nearly a year ago, was able to induce the German people and part of foreign opinion to believe that there was serious disorder in Sudetenland, that bloody conflicts were occurring there daily, and that the Germans there were treated as outlaws. Acting on orders from Berlin, agents of Herr Henlein were trying to create a panic in Northern Bohemia, and compelling members of the minority to cross the frontier and seek refuge, without any reason, in refugee camps, organized with great publicity in the neighbourhood of Dresden or in Silesia. The object of this maneuver is clear; the intention is now, just as it was in September 1938, to inflame popular passions within the country and create externally, by artificial means, the impression, either that the opposing party was indulging in more and more intolerable provocations, or that its central authority, overwhelmed by irresponsible elements, is no longer in a position to maintain order. In both cases, the Reich can find a pretext for intervention, in the need either to avenge German honour, or to replace the irresolute authorities and themselves undertake the protection of their "brothers by race." It should be noted that as a result of this campaign, the Danzig question tends to recede into the background. The problem assumes wider proportions and by implication includes the question of the Corridor and that of the Polish Provinces with a German minority. In view of the results, direct and indirect, which National-Socialist policy proposes to secure by this propaganda, it is, in my view, important to counteract the latter as rapidly as possible, and demonstrate to the rulers of the Reich that foreign opinion, at least among the Western Powers is no longer taken in by maneuvers to which we now know what value to attach. This counteracting process should be comparatively easy if, as M. Lipski asserts, 95 per cent of the facts brought forward by the German Press in support of its campaign are exaggerated, distorted, or even merely fabricated. Thus the Polish Ambassador gave me the following example: In its issue of August 15, the Angriff reported on its front page, in sensational manner, the murder of a German engineer in Eastern Galicia. "Horrible Polish murder," the heading read, "German engineer murdered." This murder, had in actual fact, been committed as far back as  June 15. The murderer was arrested, and the case is at present before a Polish Court. It has been established that the crime in question, whose motive was passion, and devoid of any political bias, comes under common law. As a result of their consul's report on the murder of this Reich subject, the German authorities came to the same conclusion, and on July 3, the German Ambassador in Warsaw informed the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, in view of the character of the crime they would refrain from intervening. Nevertheless National-Socialist propaganda seized the occasion of the victim's funeral which took place on June 23, to write up the affair as though it had been a political assassination, and the Angriff now returns to the charge. This case is typical. It is not the only one; according to M. Lipski, many other examples might be quoted. In every case of this kind it would be desirable to set the facts in their true light as soon as possible, and, in this way, convict the German propaganda of mendacity and overstatement. These rectifications, would of course, be most valuable, in the first instance, to the competent Polish authorities. However, in so far as the Western Powers make common cause with the Poles the interests of their propaganda are obviously identical. Perhaps, if Your Excellency thought it advisable, our Embassy in Warsaw might, if required, draw the attention of the Polish administration to this matter. By setting the facts in a true light, in a dispassionate and objective manner, our Press and our broadcasting stations (particularly in their broadcasts in the German language) would very efficiently help in taking the edge off the German propaganda and enlighten readers and listeners, including those in the Reich, on the calculations and the ulterior motives of Nazi policy. COULONDRE. No. 198 M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg d'Affaires in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, August 18, 1939. THE British Ambassador had, on the date already mentioned, a conversation with Herr von Weizscker, which was very similar to the conversation reported by M. Coulondre, but which dealt exclusively with German-Polish relations and their international repercussions.  In the course of this conversation, the German State Secretary was particularly aggressive and even brutal towards Poland, on account of the notes sent by Warsaw both to the Senate and to the Wilhelmstrasse, and of the treatment meted out to the German-speaking population in Polish territory. Without referring to the possibility of England remaining outside the conflict, he declared that the last limit of German patience had now been reached. According to Sir Nevile Henderson's account, he replied with equal vigour and put forward the other side of all these questions. Not for one moment did he feel that he was even holding the interest of the person to whom he spoke. Lord Halifax has had this report sent to Colonel Beck for information. ROGER CAMBON. No. 199 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 18, 1939. DESPITE some indications of a local relaxation at Danzig, the situation becomes increasingly tense. It is difficult to say for the moment whether it will reach a climax before or after the Nuremberg Congress. There are indications favouring either view. Consequently, I shall venture to recall the chief suggestions made in my last telegrams: (1) It is of the utmost importance to keep abreast of Germany in all military matters. Germany is at the present time calling up large numbers of reserves and is forming them into divisions, and also carrying out considerable movements of troops and war material. (2) It is imperative to bring the Russian negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible. I learn from various sources that it is now the military authorities who are most active in pressing the Chancellor to go to war with Poland. The most powerful deterrent would be a pact with the Russians. (3) The most burning question today is perhaps less that of Danzig than that of the German minorities in Poland, and I wonder if Germany is not behaving thus in order to find points of attack less explicitly covered than Danzig by the Franco-British guarantees. It seems dear that the Reich is now trying to confuse the issue and to collect a dossier of such Polish acts of provocation as would permit her  to intervene against Poland in a military sense on other grounds than Danzig, in the hope that these alleged acts of Polish provocation would place the conflict outside the framework of the pact existing between Poland and the Western Powers. It would be useful to remember this when drawing up the agreements which are at present being prepared. (4) On the other hand, the treatment dealt out to the German minorities is one of the things to which Herr Hitler is most sensitive. Besides, this tendency has been reflected in the German Press for some days. (5) It is of course important to bring no pressure to bear on Poland which might injure her moral strength or vital interests, and to leave her free to decide the limit of the concessions she can make regarding Danzig, but at the same time it seems to me that we should let her know the value we attach to the safeguarding of peace, so that she should give no grounds for complaint nor justification for the German maneuver concerning the treatment of minorities, and should do all she can to avoid incidents with Germany, especially in the German-inhabited districts. (6) Given the extremely precise indications, which have reached me from a safe source, on the Chancellor's state of mind, I consider that the Government should make use of its powers and forbid the Press to make any attack which might be taken as a personal insult against the Head of the German State. COULONDRE. No. 200 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 18, 1939. As the German campaign against Poland develops, the analogies between it and that undertaken last autumn against Czechoslovakia are becoming more and more apparent. The methods used by the Reich on both occasions are so similar that we can try and ascertain what point the crisis has reached by a comparison with the events of 1938. (1) M. Burckhardt went back to Danzig on August 14. Last year, on about the same date, Lord Runciman arrived in Prague to reopen negotiations between Herr Henlein's Party and the Government in Prague. But from that time onwards it was seen that these conferences  and the agreements which might be reached between the Czech Government and the Sudeten Party were of secondary interest in the eyes of the German rulers. It is more or less the same today with the settlement of local questions affecting Danzig. Yet it should be noted that the Nazis of the Free City and of the Reich seem far more disposed to be conciliatory in the settlement of these questions than the German negotiators ever were with regard to the Czechs. (2) Ever since the month of May last year-on May 28 to be precise-the Fhrer had resolved not only to settle the Sudeten question, but also to have done with Czechoslovakia altogether. For a long time, the rulers of the Reich had made no secret of their desire to wipe Czechoslovakia-that "air-craft carrier for Soviet Russia"-off the map. For the moment, the Danzig question has fallen into a secondary place. The problem of the German minorities in Poland, and indirectly that of the German frontiers of 1914, have come into the foreground: but it cannot yet be affirmed that the Fhrer has decided to liquidate Poland. The existence of that State has so far been challenged in comparatively few newspaper articles. The destruction of Poland has not yet been presented to the German public as one of the essential aims of German policy. (3) From the end of August, 1938, it was clear that the Reich, in fomenting a revolt of the Sudeten Germans, was looking for a pretext for military intervention. Such is probably the aim of the agitation going on at present about the German minorities in Poland, but the manoeuvre has not yet reached such an advanced stage. Violent as it is, the campaign against the Poles is a long way from reaching the size and the violence assumed by the anti-Czech agitation towards the middle of August last year. It is true that for some days past the German Press has been describing ill treatment of every sort which is said to be inflicted on the Germans in Poland: it speaks of mass arrests, "man-hunts," the distribution of arms to doubtful elements, of tens of thousands of people compelled to seek refuge in Germany, of the violation of frontiers by military planes. But last year, tales such as these, considerably amplified and dramatized, were spread all over the German papers for whole weeks, while the crisis reached its peak only at the end of September. (4) In conclusion, therefore, we cannot say that the German-Polish crisis is any nearer its culmination now than was the German-Czech crisis at a corresponding period last year. This remark does not apply to symptoms of a military character.  In this sphere, the preparations would seem to be on a far vaster scale and in a much more advanced stage. This is a point to which we must attach the utmost importance. COULONDRE. No. 201 M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg d'Affaires in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 19, 1939. TAKEN in conjunction with the interview of the British Ambassador with Herr von Weizscker, the conversation held by the latter with M. Coulondre on August 10 would seem to have been a "friendly warning" of the imminence of a German- Polish conflict, given to France by the State Secretary by order of Herr von Ribbentrop, though less brutally than to Great Britain. ROGER CAMBON. No. 202 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 19, 1939. A Pat Agency telegram from Berlin, reproduced this morning in the Gazeta Polska, states that the persecutions of the Poles have now reached terrifying proportions. In the period from April 1 to June 30, it is stated that there have been 976 acts of violence, attacks on farms, destructions of property and forced evacuations from the frontier zone. Since July 1, the situation is said to have grown worse. LON NEL.  Part Six The International Crisis (August 20-September 3, 1939) I The German Will to Aggression (August 20-22, 1939) No. 203 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 20, 1939. (Received by air at 11 a.m.) FROM a very reliable source I learn that Wilhelmstrasse circles are gravely concerned by the turn of events and believe that Herr Hitler is determined to "settle the Danzig question" before the 1st September. LON NEL. No. 204 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 20, 1939. 12.25 p.m. (Received at 1.40 p.m.) ONE of my colleagues heard yesterday evening from high officials of the Wilhelmstrasse some very pessimistic views on the development of the international situation. In their opinion, German honour is at stake in Danzig and Germany cannot retreat: they saw no hope of avoiding war. As to a military intervention by Great Britain in favour of Poland, they did not believe in it. "Why should England intervene for Danzig, after allowing the Reich to seize Austria, the Sudeten territory, the Czech regions and Memel?" These German high officials, whose remarks also showed an ex-  treme animosity towards the British, behaved as if, while personally feeling deep anxiety and grave apprehension for the future, they were trying hard to impress on my colleague the imminence of a conflict on which Germany was resolved. COULONDRE. No. 205 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 21, 1939.1.50 a.m. (Received at 7 a.m.) A VERY important new fact in the military sphere, namely, the beginning of a concentration of German forces, is brought to light by the latest information collected, particularly after today's investigations. There are sure signs that the units of the Berlin armoured division are on a war footing and that they will probably move tonight. Many roads in the eastern direction are under military guard; others have been prepared for troop movements. Today, some tanks have been sent off by train. From Vienna comes news of an intense military activity since August 19. At Bremen, the 22nd Division is mobilized to war strength and ready to leave. Mobilization has already been carried out on a very large scale: but it is not possible to estimate even approximately the actual figures. I do not consider exaggerated the number given by a foreign source, according to which the land forces alone amount to 2,400,000 men. A very large proportion of reservists has also been called up for the Air Force. It may be that, by all these preparations, Germany only means to support the political maneuver which is being carried out by her at present. But it will become increasingly difficult for her to stop on the slope where Germany now finds herself. Considering as I do that nothing should be left undone which might prevent Germany from proceeding further, I feel it my duty to stress once more the urgent and imperative necessity of taking the necessary measures, both as to calling up reserves and the mobilization of industry, so that our preparations remain level with those of Germany. Even more than a military necessity, this is, in my opinion, a political necessity.  What constitutes one of the gravest dangers of war at the present time is the doubt which the Government of the Reich may still have concerning the intentions of France and Britain to lend Poland their support. If we prove by our military and other measures that we are actually getting ready to fulfill our obligations, we shall thereby make use of the best possible method to dissipate this doubt. On the other hand, the Third Reich would find dangerous encouragement in the thought that a disparity in its favour may exist between the German preparations and our own. COULONDRE. No. 206 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 21, 1939. 3.41 p.m. (Received at 535 p.m.) THE Pat Agency publishes a communiqu to the effect that it is authorized to give a categorical denial to the absolutely baseless inventions of the Reich's propaganda services as regards the "terror" of which the German minority in Poland is said to be the victim, the alleged "tortures" of arrested Germans and the "mass flights into Germany." On the other hand, the Polish newspapers announce that many Polish schools in the frontier zone have been requisitioned by the German authorities, that soldiers have been billeted in them, and that the classroom furniture has been thrown out into the street. They announce too that many people employed in Polish institutions or organizations in German Silesia have been sent to labour camps and that the Polish workers have been sent to the interior of Germany. LON NEL. No. 207 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 21, 1939. 5.29 p.m. (Received 7 p.m.) OWING to the large numbers of troops moving eastward during the whole of yesterday and the heavy traffic last night on the Magdeburg-  Berlin motor road, it is no longer possible to doubt that the concentration of forces is in progress. However, Germany has not officially mobilized, and is supposed to be using the army and calling up reserves for a period of training; the reserves are being called up by individual summons and not by proclamation. I think that for our part it would be best to avoid any ostentatious action while taking all necessary steps. The measures we adopt will be all the more effective for being discreet. The German Government will always get to know enough about them to realize what they mean It will be able neither to consider our attitude as a provocation, nor our preparations as a piece of bluff. COULONDRE. No. 208 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 21, 1939. 9.7 p.m. (Received on the 22nd at 12.10 a.m.) I HAVE just heard, from a source which is usually reliable, that the immediate intentions of Germany are as follows: (1) Orders have been given to all officer pilots of the Berlin region to join their posts at midnight to-morrow, with three days' provisions. Similar information reached me from another source this morning stating that the concentration of German forces was to be completed in two or three days' time. (2) An important decision is to be taken by the Reich in the night from Tuesday to Wednesday, in connection with the Danzig affair. This step on the precise nature of which no information has been given, would cause very serious international tension and would probably involve the closing of the German frontiers. (3) At the same time, Bohemia and Moravia would be granted an independence similar to that of Slovakia, an action calculated to have the appearance of generosity and meant to confuse French and English public opinion, to separate the Allies and to isolate Poland. (4) The Fhrer would merely have the Siegfried Line manned: he would not declare war on France or on Britain, and would remain on the defensive. Even should the Western Powers formally declare war on Germany, Herr Hitler would wait to be attacked and avoid taking  any initiative. He is said to hope that the French and British Governments will come to see the futility of any intervention and will then accept the situation created de facto on the eastern frontiers. I am not able to vouch for the accuracy of these indications; yet they come from a well-informed source and seem to me likely to be true, as a maneuver of this kind seems to correspond pretty well with Herr Hitler's mentality and methods. There must be no illusions concerning the independence that the Czech provinces might obtain: by making such a gesture while at the same time acting against Poland, the Third Reich would endeavour to create the impression that the establishment of a just peace was its sole concern, while actually carrying on its policy of conquest. COULONDRE. No. 209 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 21, 1939.9.55 p.m. (Received 11.30 p.m.) IN THE opinion of our Military Attach, the German forces will have completed their concentration in two or three days' time. The greater part of the German forces will be concentrated on the Polish frontier. COULONDRE. No. 210 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 21, 1939. 10.30 p.m. THE German Press and wireless are widely exploiting the alleged persecutions, of which the German minority in Poland is supposed to be the victim, just as they did last year over the Sudetens. The Polish Government would be well advised, in order to frustrate this manoeuvre: (1) To make the necessary rectifications through the same channels, and perhaps to provide the English and French wireless with all details in order that they may refute these allegations; (2) To take, locally, all such steps as may prevent incidents which might be exploited by the German propaganda.  Although I have no doubt that the Government in Warsaw is fully aware of all this, I leave it to your discretion to confirm this, in whatever way seems to you most expedient and with all due discretion. GEORGES BONNET. No. 211 M. GARREAU, French Consul-General in Hamburg, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hamburg, August 22, 1939. 4.10 p.m. (Received 6 p.m.) I LEARN on good authority that the German Government hopes, by a lightning attack, to dispose of Poland before the end of the month. The Reich seems to be convinced that Great Britain and France, equally disconcerted by the Russian attitude, will not move. The Reich believes that Moscow is preparing a great political upheaval which would tend to bring the ideologies of the two totalitarian regimes into harmony. The rumour that the offensive against Poland would be launched on August 22 has been circulating in Hamburg for several days. A great number of railway employees have been ordered to report in various Polish towns, notably in Warsaw, Ibrun and Poznan, on a date which would be notified towards the end of the month. From this it would seem that the occupation of these centres by the German Army was expected very soon. Many motor-cars have been requisitioned in Hamburg. They are at once given military numbers and repainted grey. The departure of the 20th Mechanized Division for the Polish frontier has taken place within the last 48 hours; these troops left Hamburg partly by train and partly in three motor convoys which set out respectively for Rostock, Ludwiglust and Lbeck. GARREAU. No. 212 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 22, 1939. 4.16 p.m. (Received 8.45 p.m.) HEARD that, in accordance with the request that I made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Government will daily from  to-morrow give the necessary corrective statements to the Havas Agency, to your Department through the Polish Embassy in Paris, and to me. I took this opportunity to have a conversation with one of M. Beck's private secretaries, in which I stressed the points desired by Your Excellency. He assured me that Poland, fully aware of the necessity for avoiding incidents, would redouble her vigilance in this matter. He told me that instructions had been given yesterday morning to the Government newspapers to refrain, for some days at least, from all attacks on the Reich and from giving prominence to any news items which might possibly irritate the Germans. LON NEL. No. 213 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 22, 1939. (Received by courier the 23rd at 12.30 p.m.) A RESERVE officer, who has just been called up in a Department of the German War Office, declared to a reliable intermediary that in the General Staff it is considered certain that action against Poland will be taken very shortly. It is not doubted that this action will produce decisive results in a very few days. They would seem, in fact, to be anticipating that, under the violence of the blows rained upon her, Poland will collapse internally. They appear to be counting a great deal upon upheavals among the racial minorities, chiefly the Ukrainians. The announcement of the non-aggression pact with Russia has contributed powerfully to the strengthening of the Army's confidence in the success of German arms. COULONDRE.  II Mr. Chamberlain's Message and Herr Hitler's Reply (August 23-26) No. 214 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 23, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.25 a.m.) THE British Ambassador, who is to be received by the German Chancellor today, has flown to Berchtesgaden. He is taking a message from Mr. Chamberlain to Herr Hitler. According to information sent to me by Sir Nevile Henderson, the purport of this document is known to Your Excellency. He emphasized that his mission is shrouded in absolute secrecy. COULONDRE. No. 215 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 23, 1939. 8.35 p.m. (Received at 11 p.m.) ANOTHER six Polish railwaymen were arrested yesterday; they are charged with being in possession of arms supplied to them by the Customs officials. Two of these arrests have been maintained. The body of the Polish soldier killed in Danzig territory is said to have been sent to the Polish Commissioner-General's office, after being filled with viscera taken from other dead bodies. Two Polish schools have just been requisitioned for military purposes, by order of the Senate of the Free City. LA TOURNELLE. No. 216 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET. Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 23, 1939. 11.50 p.m. (Received at 12 midnight.) I HAD an interview this evening with the State Under- Secretary who  had summoned me to hear the message sent by Mr. Chamberlain to Herr Hitler and the Chancellor's reply. Herr Woermann made no comment whatever upon this communication. COULONDRE. No. 217 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 24, 1939. (Received a 1 p.m. by telephone.) I SAW the British Ambassador at midday today. My colleague had two interviews with the Chancellor yesterday, one in the morning lasting about three-quarters of an hour, when he handed over the message from Mr. Chamberlain, the other in the afternoon lasting about half an hour. Sir Nevile made every effort to convince Herr Hitler that England would fight at Poland's side. He firmly believes, so he told me, that he had succeeded. For his part, the Chancellor spoke of almost nothing but the treatment of the German minorities in Poland. Should hostilities break out, the blame, he said, would be Britain's, and, recalling that he had made reasonable proposals last April, he alleged that the British guarantee had encouraged the Poles to ill-treat the German minorities and had stiffened the Warsaw Government in its uncompromising attitude; in his view, the limit had now been reached, and if, in Sir Nevile's own words, any fresh incidents were to take place against a German in Poland, "he would march." My colleague had asked Herr Hitler, should the latter have nothing further to say to him, to have his reply delivered to him at Salzburg. Herr Hitler had sent for him, and that was the only favourable sign that the British Ambassador had gathered from his visit. During the second interview, the Chancellor again emphasized strongly the necessity for putting an end to the ill-treatment which, according to him, was being meted out to the German minorities in Poland. Sir Nevile Henderson, while doubting whether there is still any hope of avoiding the worst, considers that the only chance of, at least, delaying matters lies in the immediate establishment of contact between Warsaw and Berlin.  He has, therefore, suggested to his Government that it should advise M. Beck to seek contact with the Chancellor without delay. My colleague thinks that Herr Hitler is waiting for the return of Herr von Ribbentrop to take his final decision, and that therefore only a few hours remains for this final attempt. Herr Hitler is adopting precisely the same attitude toward Poland as he did towards Czechoslovakia in the last days of September. COULONDRE. No. 218 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg d'Affaires in London. Paris, August 24, 1939. 1.25 p.m. THE French Government will make a most urgent dmarche to the Polish Government to the effect that the latter should abstain from military action should the Senate of the Free City proclaim the return of Danzig to the Reich. It is indeed important that Poland should not take up the position of an aggressor, which might impede the entry into force of some of our pacts and would furthermore place the Polish Army in Danzig in a very dangerous position. The Warsaw Government would in such a case reserve its freedom to defend its rights by diplomatic action. GEORGES BONNET. No. 219 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 6 p.m. (Received 10.30 p.m.) REFERRING to the conversation held yesterday between the Polish Ambassador and M. Daladier, M. Beck informed me today that in view of the scope of the Reich's military measures directed against Poland, the Polish Government decided last night to take additional precautionary measures. These measures are being carried out. They are on a much larger scale than those taken hitherto, and aim at bringing a great part of the Army up to war strength. The corresponding requisitions have been made at the same time. LON NEL.  No. 220 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 6.30 p.m. (Received 10.25 p.m.) ON the instructions of M. Beck the Polish Ambassador in Berlin has asked for an interview with the Reich State Secretary. Provided that Herr von Weizscker does not at once assume a provocative attitude, he will remind him that the Warsaw Government has always shown itself ready for discussion under normal conditions, and has not changed its attitude in this respect. LON NEL. No. 221 M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg d'Affaires in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 24, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.40 p.m.) THE British Embassy in Paris has been put in a position to report the essential points of the written communication handed by Herr Hitler to the British Ambassador in Berlin, in reply to Mr. Chamberlain's letter. The British Government has taken special precautions to keep this document a strict secret. The attention of the British Embassy in Paris has been specially drawn to this point. I, nevertheless, think I should communicate to the Department, for in case they may be useful, the following details of this reply: (1) For years Germany has tried in vain to win Britain's friendship, by going to the very limit of the Reich's interests. (2) Like other States, Germany has historical and economic interests which she cannot renounce. Among these interests are the German city of Danzig and the related problem of the Corridor. (3) Germany is ready to settle these questions with Poland on the basis of generous proposals. The British action has dissuaded the Poles from negotiating on this basis. (4) The unconditional guarantee given by Britain to Poland has encouraged the latter to terrorize the German minorities, which number a million and a half people. Such atrocities cannot be tolerated by a  great Power. Poland has likewise violated numerous legal obligations which she had assumed with regard to Danzig. She sent various ultimata and initiated the process of an economic strangulation of the Free City. (5) Germany recently made it clear to Poland that she was not prepared to acquiesce in the development of such a state of affairs. She would not tolerate any further ultimata or the persecution of minorities. She would not consent to the economic ruin of Danzig, nor consent to receive fresh Notes amounting to downright provocations to the Reich. Furthermore, the questions of Danzig and the Corridor must be settled. (6) Herr Hitler has taken note of the fact that the British Government will come to Poland's assistance in the case of intervention by the Reich. This is no way modifies the determination of Germany to protect the interests mentioned above. Herr Hitler shares the Prime Minister's view as to the probability of a long war, but he is ready to undergo any ordeal rather than sacrifice Germany's national interests or honour. (7) The German Government has received intelligence of the British and French Governments' alleged intention to take certain mobilization measures. Germany, on the other hand, has no wish to take other than purely defensive measures against France and Britain. A passage in Mr. Chamberlain's letter seems to confirm the foregoing intelligence and can be construed only as a threat to Germany. If the measures in question are taken, they will force Germany to order a general mobilization immediately. (8) A pacific solution of present difficulties does not depend upon Germany, but upon those Powers which, ever since the Treaty of Versailles, have opposed any peaceful revision. (9) No improvement in Anglo-German relations is possible until there is a change of mind among the Powers responsible. Herr Hitler has struggled throughout his life for the betterment of relations between his country and Britain. Up to the present, his efforts have been in vain. None more than he would welcome any change that might come about in this respect in the future. ROGER CAMBON.  No. 222 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 24, 1939. 6.40 p.m. You should see M. Beck at the earliest possible moment and tell him that in the new conditions resulting from the Russo-German Pact, the French Government is more anxious than ever that Poland should at all cost avoid laying herself open to the charge of being the aggressor-this being the whole purpose of the German manoeuvre-and thus playing into Germany's hands. The disadvantages arising from such a position would be as grave for Poland as for her allies, on account of the repercussions it might have on the obligations, virtual or actual, which bind the latter to other Powers. In the same way, the French Government urgently recommends that the Polish Government abstain from all military action in the event of the Danzig Senate proclaiming the City's return to the Reich. To any possible decision of this sort, it is important that Poland should reply only by an action of the same kind, that is to say, by making all reservations and stating her intention of having recourse to all legal remedies which may be afforded to her by diplomatic usage. The Warsaw Government will understand this counsel all the better since it corresponds to the intentions expressed by Marshal Rydz-Smigly to General Ironside on July 19. As for us, we have all the more grounds for clearly putting forward this advice as it is in harmony with our General Staff's view of the problem: for the Staff considers that, from the strategical point of view, a Polish Army, after advancing into the Free City territory, would be in an extremely delicate position. You should emphasize to M. Beck that, in our view, the question is one solely of expediency and that, by taking up such a position, the Polish Government would only be safeguarding the full effect of our assistance and would in no way be hampering its liberty of decision, in the event of a definite German military attack; nor would the validity of the French position with regard to Poland, as defined by agreements which it is necessary to recall, be thereby prejudiced. GEORGES BONNET.  No. 223 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 7 p.m. (Received 1155 p.m.) THE Polish Press today announces the following incidents: (1) Arrest at the Silesian frontier of a Polish diplomatic courier. He is said to have been imprisoned at Breslau and is being detained, in spite of intervention by the Consulate and by the Embassy. (2) Last night a three-engined German bomber flew over Bohumin. A Polish fighter went up after it and the bomber returned to German territory. (3) The body of the Polish soldier killed on Danzig territory some days ago has been returned in a mutilated condition to the Polish authorities. This has aroused great indignation. (4) The Polish Press publishes the following statements about the two German commercial aircraft which, according to the D.N.B., were shot at in the vicinity of Danzig: at eight o'clock in the morning, a German plane was seen flying over Polish territory, but no shot was fired. At four o'clock another plane flew over the forbidden zone of the Hel peninsula. After the Polish anti-aircraft batteries had fired three warning salvos the German plane turned back. LON NEL. No. 224 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 24, 1939. 750 p.m. (Received 11.30 p.m.) DEEMING the claims of the Senate to be unacceptable, the Polish Government has today broken off the Customs negotiations. The Danzig authorities, according to the local Press, deplore this breakdown. LA TOURNELLE.  No. 225 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 24, 1939. 7.51 p.m. (Received 10.15 p.m.) BY a decree of August 23, the Senate has approved the Gauleiter's appointment as Head of the State. I am informing our Ambassadors in Warsaw and Berlin. According to the Danziger Vorposten, this is the consecration of a state of things which has, in fact, existed ever since the Nazi Party seized power. LA TOURNELLE. No. 226 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 8.25 p.m. (Received August 25, 12.25 a.m.) IN view of the threatening situation in Danzig, I thought it my duty to approach M. Arciszewski again. I said that, things being as they are in the Free City, we relied upon the Polish Government not to take any initiative likely to bring about irreparable results without first consulting us. I requested him to inform M. Beck of my conversation without delay. LON NEL. No. 227 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 9 p.m. (Received 1030 p.m.) I HAVE once again drawn M. Beck's attention, in the course of an interview, to the urgent need of avoiding incidents and rash acts, and of doing all that is possible in this direction. M. Beck expressed his entire agreement. LON NEL.  No. 228 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, August 24, 1939. 9.50 p.m. (Received 11.20 p.m.) RECEIVED today at 3 o'clock by the King of Italy, the United States Ambassador delivered to him a message from President Roosevelt, calling attention to the dangers of the present situation and urging the King to do all he could to promote a peaceful solution. FRANOIS-PONCET. No. 229 M. DE SAINT-QUENTIN, French Ambassador in Washington, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Washington, August 24, 1939. 10.11 p.m. (Received August 25 at 6.50 a.m.) THE Under-Secretary of State has just informed me that President Roosevelt had today, 24th, sent a message to Herr Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic adjuring them to settle their differences by means of direct negotiation, by arbitration or by conciliation with the help of a citizen of a neutral country. The message emphasizes that such solutions would presuppose an undertaking by the parties concerned not to commit any act of aggression against each other during an agreed period, and to respect each other's independence and territorial integrity. Yet the substance of the two communications would seem not to be identical. Recalling the President's message of April 14 last, the appeal to Herr Hitler would appear to lay stress on the willingness of the American Government, in the event of a peaceful solution of the German-Polish dispute to contribute to the reconstruction of world economy. The text of these documents will be communicated to Your Excellency by Mr. Bullitt and published to-morrow in the Press. SAINT-QUENTIN.  No. 230 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 10.12 p.m. (Received August 25 at 2.50 a.m.) THE Polish Ambassador has not been able to see Herr von Weizscker, who is said to have left for Berchtesgaden. He was received at 5 p.m. on August 24 by Field-Marshal Goering. According to information which has been given me, the Field-Marshal was cordial, deplored the aggravation in German-Polish relations, but made no suggestion of any kind and in general avoided giving political significance to the interview. LON NEL. No. 231 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 24, 1939. 10.15 p.m. (Received August 25 at 2.50 a.m.) ACCORDING to information just given me by M. Beck, M. Chodacki has been instructed to deliver to the Senate of the Free City, either tonight or to-morrow, a letter, on the subject of the appointment of Herr Forster as Head of the Danzig State. The Government of Poland intends by this document to challenge the legality of the appointment and to declare that the responsibility for all possible results will fall upon the Senate, should this initiative result in Poland being faced with accomplished facts contrary to law. LON NEL. No. 232 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 24, 1939. (Received August 25 at 12.30 p.m.) NEWS has reached me that official circles in Berlin consider that, by the pact of August 23, Germany and Russia have agreed to settle between themselves, not only the matter of Poland, but all questions  concerning Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and this to the exclusion of all other Powers. From rumours circulating, it would seem that it is expected here that the first consequence of the German- Russian Pact will be the partition of Poland. According to a statement attributed to State Secretary Lammers, Berlin and Moscow have decided to establish a common frontier on the Vistula. Russia would receive free port facilities at Danzig. According to other rumours, Poland is to be reduced to the role of a buffer State; Lithuania would play the same part and would recover Wilna. The provinces of Bohemia and Moravia would receive a limited independence and would act, so to speak, as a bridge between the Slav and Germanic worlds. The Reich and Soviet Russia would also revise by mutual agreement the frontiers of the Baltic States and of Rumania. I pass on this information with reserve, while pointing out that it probably corresponds with certain cherished hopes on the German side. In this respect, the greatest importance is attributed by political circles in Berlin to Article 3, which provides for a permanent consultation between the two Governments. On the other hand, they seem to expect Poland to capitulate, and to attach great importance to Germany's not appearing to be the aggressor. COULONDRE. No. 233 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 3.15 a.m. (Received at 6 a.m.) I CALLED on M. Beck yesterday evening, as instructed by your telegram of August 24. According to what he told me: (1) The remark attributed by General Sir Edmund Ironside to Marshal Rydz-Smigly was actually made by M. Beck himself; the latter fully confirmed its substance. (2) Should the Anschluss be proclaimed by the "municipal authorities" of the Free City, the Warsaw Government would immediately  get in touch with their allies and would refrain from any military action until actually confronted by direct or indirect aggression on the part of the Reich. (3) Aware of the necessity of not allowing themselves to be maneuvered by Germany into a false position, the Polish Government, inspired by the same spirit as ourselves, will continue to maintain the greatest composure. Should Herr Forster proclaim the Anschluss, added M. Beck, this could only be at the instigation of the Chancellor, and action by Germany would probably follow with very little delay. LON NEL. No. 234 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 3.15 a.m. (Received at 5.10 a.m.) FROM the information given me yesterday by M. Beck, it appears that Herr Forster on the night of the 24th ordered the arrest of the chief officials of the Polish railways in Danzig. M. Beck instructed M. Chodacki to make immediate representations to the Senate, and to point out the gravity of this measure which, if upheld, would be liable seriously to impair one of the essential rights still remaining to Poland in Danzig territory. If these representations should have no result, the Polish Government reserved the right to consider the adoption of measures of retaliation. M. Beck stated definitely in reply to a question I put to him on this matter, that such methods could be only of an economic or administrative nature. LON NEL. No. 235 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 1 p.m. (Received August 26, at 4 a.m.) HAVAS dispatches transmitted to Paris announce a series of incidents provoked by Germans which occurred last night on the Polish frontier.  A refutation of certain groundless German allegations has likewise been published by the same Agency. A communiqu from the D.N.B. Agency, which appeared in the Press this morning under the title "Blood Bath at Bielsko," claims that Germans in this town have been subjected to threats. This is formally denied by the Polish authorities. The latter further announce that National-Socialist badges bearing the inscription "Frei Korps," as well as a large quantity of war material, have been seized by the Polish police in a search made in the house of a German named Maskoh, in Upper Silesia. LON NEL. No. 236 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 3.48 p.m. (Received at 6.10 p.m.) GENERAL FAURY, in full agreement with me, called on the Marshal this morning, to draw his attention to the incidents which, according to the Germans, were occurring on the Polish frontiers, and to urge him once again to give the strictest instructions to the Polish troops to observe the utmost self-restraint. LON NEL. No. 237 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 3.48 p.m. (Received at 6.47 p.m.) ACCORDING to the Polish Press, several acts of aggression were committed by Germans on Polish territory during the night of the 23rd-24th at midnight. About twenty Germans entered the station and Customs House of Makoszow, near Katowice, and fired several hundred shots. From 12.30 a.m. to 1.45 a.m. and from 2.30 a.m. to 2.50 a.m. fresh acts of aggression took place. A machine-gun attack was made on the Customs House near Rybnik. A protest has been handed to the German Government by the Polish Embassy. LON NEL  No. 238 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 6.5 p.m. (Received at 630 p.m.) FROM remarks made to General Faury by Marshal Rydz- Smigly it appears that the latter is fully aware that German maneuvers are aimed at inciting Poland to imprudent action; he declares that he clearly perceives the trap and will not fall into it. LON NEL. No. 239 M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, August 25, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.10 p.m.) TONIGHT'S Osservatore Romano announces that letters have just been exchanged between the King of the Belgians and the Pope. The King of the Belgians has personally informed Pope Pius XII of the declaration made by him on behalf of the Heads of States represented at the Brussels Conference. His Holiness has replied by thanking him for his communication and expressing his high appreciation of the initiative taken by the conference. He draws attention to the similarity of their declaration to his own message of yesterday, repeats the statement of principle set out in that message, recognizes the identity of purpose in favour of peace and the welfare of the nations, and finally expresses the hope that this common effort for peace may still attain its goal. CHARLES-ROUX. No. 240 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 25, 1939. 6.40 p.m. (Received August 26, at 9.30 am.) THE rate at which military preparations are being carried out here grows faster and faster. Young men are being brought in lorries from  East Prussia and at once equipped and sent to their battle positions, while more heavy anti-aircraft batteries are being placed along the shore. LA TOURNELLE. No. 241 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 25, 1939. 8.18 p.m. (Received August 26, at 3.10 a.m.) THE Danzig Senate has received a very serious note from the Polish Government, protesting against the appointment of the Gauleiter as Head of the State. This morning the Free City authorities decided upon the dismissal of fifteen Polish officials who were members of the Port Council and appointed Germans in their places. Three hours later the persons concerned were informed that there had been a misunderstanding and were able to resume their functions. In the course of a frontier incident, two Polish soldiers are said to have been killed 400 metres inside Polish territory. LA TOURNELLE. No. 242 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 25, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11 p.m.) THIS afternoon I had an interview with Herr Hitler, who had asked to see me at 5.30. This is the substance of what he told me: "In view of the gravity of the situation," he said, "I wish to make a statement which I would like you to forward to M. Daladier. As I have already told him, I bear no enmity whatever towards France. I have personally renounced all claims to Alsace-Lorraine and recognized the Franco-German frontier. I do not want war with your country; my one desire is to maintain good relations with it. I find indeed the idea that I might have to fight France on account of Poland a very painful one. The Polish provoca-  tion, however, has placed the Reich in a position which cannot be allowed to continue. "Several months ago I made extremely fair proposals to Poland, demanding the return of Danzig to the Reich and of a narrow strip of territory leading from this German city to East Prussia. But the guarantee given by the British Government has encouraged the Poles to be obstinate. Not only has the Warsaw Government rejected my proposals, but it has subjected the German minority, our blood-brothers, to the worst possible treatment, and has begun mobilization. "At first," pursued Herr Hitler, "I forbade the Press of the Reich to publish accounts of the cruelties suffered by the Germans in Poland. But the situation has now become intolerable. Are you aware," he asked me emphatically, "that there have been cases of castration? That already there are more than 70,000 refugees in our camps? Yesterday seven Germans were killed by the police in Bielitz, and thirty German reservists were machine-gunned at Lodz. Our aeroplanes can no longer fly between Germany and East Prussia without being shot at; their route had been changed, but they are now even attacked over the sea. Thus, the plane which was carrying State Secretary Stuckart was fired at by Polish warships, a fresh incident which I was not yet in a position to bring to the notice of Sir Nevile Henderson this morning." Raising his voice, Herr Hitler went on: "No nation worthy of the name can put up with such unbearable insults. France would not tolerate it any more than Germany. These things have gone on long enough, and I will reply by force to any further provocations. I want to state once again: I wish to avoid war with your country. I will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it through to the bitter end. As you are aware, I have just concluded a pact with Moscow that is not only theoretical, but, I may say, practical. I believe I shall win, and you believe you will win: what is certain is that above all French and German blood will flow, the blood of two equally courageous peoples. I say again, it is painful to me to think we might come to that. Please tell this to President Daladier on my behalf." With these words, Herr Hitler rose to show that the interview was over. Under the circumstances I could make only a brief reply. I told him, first of all, that I knew that all misunderstanding had now been removed; yet that, in a moment as grave as this, I emphatically gave him my word of honour as a soldier that I had no doubt whatever that in the event of Poland's being attacked, France would assist her with all the forces at her command. I was able however to give him  my word also that the Government of the Republic would still do all it could to preserve peace and would not spare its counsels of moderation to the Polish Government. The Chancellor replied: "I believe you; I even believe that men like M. Beck are moderate, but they are no longer in control of the situation." I added that if French and German blood were to flow, this blood-money, however costly, would not be the only payment to be made. The ravages of a war that would certainly be a long one would bring a succession of ghastly miseries in their train. Though I was, as he said, definitely certain of our victory, I feared, at the same time, that at the end of a war, the sole real victor would be M. Trotsky. The Chancellor, interrupting me, exclaimed: "Why, then, did you give Poland a blank cheque?" I replied by recalling the events of last March and the deep impression they had made on French minds, the feeling of insecurity to which they had given rise and which had led us to strengthen our alliances. I repeated that our most ardent desire was to maintain peace; that we continued to exert a moderating influence in Warsaw; and that I could not believe that it was impossible to bring the incidents complained of to an end. I had hinted earlier that the German Press seemed to me to have considerably exaggerated the number and importance of these incidents, and I had mentioned in particular the case reported by the Angriff on August 15 of the German engineer who was said to have been brutally murdered for political reasons, whereas, in actual fact, he had been on June 15 the victim of an ordinary quarrel whose motives were exclusively passionate. Herr Hitler replied that he had indeed been informed of our moderating influence in Warsaw; yet the incidents were increasing. As for the events of last March, he added, it was true that he had taken the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia under his protection, but he had preserved the liberties of the inhabitants, and anyone who touched a hair of their heads would pay dearly for it; this was a point of honour for the Reich. The Polish minority in these regions were not subjected to any kind of brutalities; in the Saar, too, not a single Frenchman had had any reason for complaint. "It is very painful for me," repeated the Chancellor once again, "to think I might have to fight your country; but the decision does not rest with me. Please tell this to M. Daladier."  I was unable to prolong the interview any further, and after these remarks I took my leave. COULONDRE. No. 243 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels. Paris, August 25, 1939, 11 p.m. I SEND you herewith the French Government's reply to the broadcast appeal by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, which you should communicate without delay to the Prime Minister. "The noble and magnanimous appeal made by His Majesty the King of the Belgians in the name of the representatives of the Oslo group of States meeting at Brussels has been welcomed by the French Government with keen and profound sympathy. "The contributions which France has made on every possible occasion to the service of peace, her constant anxiety that all differences between peoples should be settled by peaceful means, can leave no doubt as to the general attitude of the French Government; it remains always ready to cooperate in any initiative aimed at creating an atmosphere favourable to the easing of the international situation. "On the other hand, it is resolved not to accept any settlement imposed by violence, or under threat, and believes that this attitude contributes to the cause of peace, and, at the same time, to the creation in Europe and throughout the world, of conditions in which the independence of every state would be guaranteed and the respect of their most sacred rights assured." GEORGES BONNET. No. 244 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 25, 1939. 11.5 p.m. (Received August 26 at 136 a.m.) PRESIDENT MOSCICKI has just sent the King of the Belgians a telegram thanking him for his "noble" speech. "Poland," he adds, "is also convinced that a lasting peace cannot be founded on the crushing of the weak, and equally that the surest guarantee of peace lies in the  peaceful settlement of international affairs by means of direct negotiations conducted on the basis of mutual respect for each other's rights and interests." LON NEL. No. 245 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12.5 a.m.) IN the course of an interview with Sir Nevile Henderson today, Herr Hitler made the following statement to my colleague, the substance of which I report herewith as I had it from the latter. "I am prepared," said the Chancellor, "to make one more attempt to re-establish good relations between our countries and to preserve peace. I am willing to consider, within certain limits, a disarmament programme. I still want colonies, but I can wait, three, four or even five years; in any case, this will not be grounds for a war. Moreover, it need not be a question of the former German colonies. The important thing for me is to find fats and timber." My British colleague replied that to pass on these proposals with any hope of their being useful, he would have to be convinced that Germany would not attack Poland. Herr Hitler replied: "It is impossible for me to give any such undertaking; I prefer that you should not pass on my proposals." The British Ambassador has the impression, nevertheless, that hostilities will not break out during the 48 hours that his mission will take, for he is secretly leaving for London to-morrow morning by air. I asked my colleague if Herr Hitler had not referred to Poland. He answered that the Chancellor had repeated his claims of last April, namely, the return of Danzig, and access to the Free City across the Corridor. COULONDRE.  III M. Daladier's Letter and Herr Hitler's Reply (August 26-27) No. 246 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12.15 a.m.) YESTERDAY Herr Hitler informed my British colleague that he was determined to remedy the weakness of his eastern frontier, due to the presence there of alien minorities. Sir Nevile Henderson asked him if, as in the Tyrol, he proposed to carry out an exchange of populations, but the Fhrer gave no definite answer. My British colleague and I think that this is a most interesting idea and one which might make possible the reopening of conversations between Poland and Germany, and might even bring about an improvement in the relations between the two countries. We consider that this idea, which in principle at least harmonizes with the Fhrer's views, might be the object of an immediate proposal on the part of the Polish Government to the Government of the Reich. This opinion is shared by my Polish colleague. At my suggestion, he will recommend it by telegram to his Government, which has already been informed of his conversation with the British Ambassador. I have pointed out to him that, at the present juncture, gaining time may be the decisive factor. It is not impossible that moderates in the National-Socialist party may find in the Russian pact fresh arguments to dissuade the Fhrer from going to war, by calling his attention to the unlimited economic possibilities of the Reich's collaboration with the Soviet. Time presses, and a Polish approach should be made to Herr Hitler within 48 hours. I take the liberty of impressing on the Department the importance of their instructing our Ambassador in Warsaw to give the above suggestion emphatic support. COULONDRE.  No. 247 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 26, 1939. 12.55 a.m. (Received at 4.30 a.m.) COUNT SZEMBECK has confirmed both to my British colleague and myself, the reply given me by M. Beck in the course of our conversation about Danzig late last night; the Polish Government fully appreciates the motives and the excellent grounds for our recommendations and will do all in its power to avoid confronting us with a fait accompli; it will consult with Great Britain and with ourselves before making any important decision; it will not reply to attacks on its rights in customs and transport matters except by suitable retaliatory measures of a non-military character; only in the event of a situation arising, in circumstances at present impossible to predict, which would be so serious that any delay would appear dangerous, does the Polish Government reserve the right to act immediately, having informed us, but without undertaking to consult us beforehand. I replied to Count Szembeck that, in so far as this last part of his statement was concerned, I could only regard it as a reservation made with a view to some wholly unpredictable eventuality, and volunteered so to speak "to leave no doubts." LON NEL. No. 248 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 26, 1939. 1.40 a.m. (Received at 9.55 a.m.) MY British colleague, who has already transmitted by telegram the overtures made by Herr Hitler to Britain, has left for England to explain them verbally and recommend them for consideration. These proposals are in actual fact characterized by important new features (handing over of colonies other than those formerly German; transfer of populations to eliminate minority disputes; partial disarmament). In my opinion, it is important to avoid two dangers revealed by the Czech experiences. The first of these would be for us to be content, after a settlement  of the German demands on Poland, with vague undertakings and hypothetical promises in further matters. In this respect, it is enough to recall the collective guarantee to Czechoslovakia. The second would be to lend ourselves to a maneuver to break up the Allied Front. No pressure of a kind calculated to demoralize Poland should be contemplated. Danzig is only the point of least resistance by which the Reich is trying to penetrate into that country. As M. Lipski said to me yesterday: "What the Germans want is to be able to lay hands on Poland, and one day have the Polish Army at their disposal." Finally, no negotiation should be entered upon, and this is an essential preliminary condition, before all threat of force has been withdrawn. COULONDRE. No. 249 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 26, 1939. 2.20 a.m. As suggested by M. Coulondre and M. Lipski, you should give emphatic support to the proposals to the Polish Government made in the telegram from our Ambassador in Berlin, which I transmit herewith. GEORGES BONNET. No. 250 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 26, 1939. 11.4 a.m. (Received at 2.15 p.m.) OFFICIAL German circles take strong exception to the message of the President of the United States. They profess to be unable to understand the reasons which prompted Mr. Roosevelt to launch this appeal. They maintain that the Reich, by signing a whole series of non-aggression pacts, of which the Russo-German Pact is the latest, has already responded by deeds to the manifesto of April 14. It is to the democratic countries, which encourage Polish intransigence, and not to Germany that Mr. Roosevelt ought to address himself. The Reich will never entrust to international procedure the care of protecting Germans and of defending its vital interests.  The President's proposals are no longer even mentioned in this morning's Press. COULONDRE. No. 251 M. DE DAMPIERRE, French Minister in Ottawa, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ottawa, August 26, 1939. 12 a.m. (Received at 10 p.m.) THIS morning the Prime Minister addressed an appeal, through the German, Italian and Polish Consuls at Ottawa, to Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, as well as to the President of the Polish Republic. The messages intended for Warsaw and Berlin are couched in identical terms. The Havas Agency is telegraphing the full text of these documents. The Governor-General has told me that he approves of this initiative and that it would have a considerable repercussion upon Canadian public opinion. DAMPIERRE. No. 252 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 1 p.m.) I HAVE just seen M. Arciszewski and put before him the plan suggested by M. Coulondre, with a request to let Colonel Beck know of it immediately, as Colonel Beck could not see me before twelve. M. Arciszewski showed himself personally favourable to this suggestion, of which he understood the importance and advantages. Apart from the arguments set forth by M. Coulondre, I also stressed the following considerations: a Polish initiative in the sense indicated would bring the problem into the field of nationality questions, and consequently tend to safeguard the territorial status quo. The Chancellor could not reject it without serious drawbacks from his own point of view. Moreover, Italy, because of the precedent of the Tyrol, would probably take an interest in this solution. LON NEL.  No. 253 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin. Paris, August 26, 1939. 2.50 p.m. IN reply to the message which, at the end of your interview of the 25th August, Herr Hitler asked you to convey to M. Daladier, please deliver urgently to the Chancellor on behalf of the President of the Council of Ministers the personal letter which follows: Your Excellency, The French Ambassador in Berlin has sent me your personal message. Faced as we are, as you remind me, with the gravest responsibility that can ever be assumed by two heads of government, that of allowing the blood of two great peoples to be shed, when they desire nothing but peace and work, I owe it to you, I owe it to our two peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests solely in your hands. You cannot doubt my sentiments towards Germany, nor France's pacific dispositions towards your nation. No Frenchman has ever done more than I have to strengthen between our two peoples not merely peace, but a sincere cooperation in their own interest as well as in that of Europe and the whole world. Unless you attribute to the French people a conception of national honour less high than that which I myself recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt either that France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations, such as Poland, which, I am perfectly sure, wants also to live in peace with Germany. These two facts are easily reconciled. There is nothing today which need prevent any longer the pacific solution of the international crisis with honour and dignity for all peoples, if the will for peace exists equally on all sides. I can vouch not only for the good will of France, but also for that of all her allies. I can personally guarantee the readiness which Poland has always shown to have recourse to methods of free conciliation, such as may be envisaged between the Governments of two sovereign nations. In all sincerity I can assure you that there is not one of the grievances invoked by Germany against Poland in connection with the Danzig question which might not be submitted to decision by such methods with a view to a friendly and equitable settlement. I can also pledge my honour that there is nothing in the clear and  sincere solidarity of France with Poland and her allies which could modify in any manner whatsoever the peaceful inclinations of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from helping to maintain Poland in her pacific inclinations. In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no man endowed with human feelings could understand that a war of destruction should be allowed to break out without a last attempt at a pacific adjustment between Germany and Poland. Your will for peace may be exercised in all confidence in this direction without the slightest derogation from your sense of German honour. As for myself, the head of the Government of France, a country which, like yours, only desires harmony between the French people and the German people, and which, on the other hand, is united to Poland by bonds of friendship and by the pledged word, I am ready to make all the efforts that an honest man can make in order to ensure the success of this attempt. Like myself, you were a soldier in the last war. You realize, as I do, how a people's memory retains a horror for war and its disasters, whatever may be its result. My conception of your eminent rise as leader of the German people, to guide them along the paths of peace towards the full accomplishment of their mission in the common work of civilization, prompts me to ask you for a reply to this proposal. If the blood of France and that of Germany flow again, as they did twenty-five years ago, each of the two peoples will fight with confidence in its own victory, but the most certain victors will be the forces of destruction and barbarism. EDOUARD DALADIER. GEORGES BONNET. No. 254 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 26, 1939. 3.45 p.m. THE following instructions have been sent by the Foreign Office to your British colleague: During any conversations that may be opened between the German Government and the Polish Government upon the questions at issue between the two countries, and in order to prevent the Government of the Reich from seizing the pretext of alleged ill-treatment inflicted on the German minorities in Poland to break off such conversations,  it is suggested that the Government of Warsaw should provide for the appointment in those regions of neutral observers, offering every guarantee of impartiality. You should let the Polish Government know that you are in agreement with the dmarche that your English colleague is to make to this effect. GEORGES BONNET. No. 255 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 26, 1939. 4.45 p.m. (Received 7.20 p.m.) ACCORDING to a telegram from M. Lipski, the Chancellor yesterday reported to our Ambassador the murder of 24 Germans near Lodz and of eight others near Bielsko. M. Arciszewski informs me, and I have no reason for doubting his statement, that these two allegations are totally groundless. LON NEL. No. 256 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 4.45 p.m.) THIS afternoon's papers announce in huge headlines the "Polish attack in Danzig territory," in the course of which two Germans, a S.S. and a S.A. are supposed to have been killed. "A new and tragic violation of the frontier near Danzig" is the heavy-type headline spread across its whole front page by the Brsenzeitung, which alleges in its leading article that news is coming in hour by hour proving that troops are taking up position with a view to attack. "England is responsible" is another headline in this same journal, repeating the words of Herr Rudolf Hess, at the opening of the 7th Congress of Germans Abroad, yesterday evening. Apart from these fresh incidents alleged to have occurred in Danzig territory, the Press sums up and develops the accusations against Poland which were analyzed this morning. COULONDRE.  NO. 257 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 8.46 p m.) LORD HALIFAX, to whom I communicated the substance of the telegrams in which M. Coulondre described his interview with the Chancellor, observed that this conversation corresponded in the main with that between the British Ambassador and Herr Hitler on the same day. The latter reaffirmed his respect for the British Empire and his desire to establish permanent bonds of friendship with Great Britain. He added that he had no objection against the close relations uniting England and France, and that he had no quarrel with the latter over the western frontier. Herr Hitler, after specifying that the Polish question must be settled as a preliminary, mentioned the possibility of broaching the problem of disarmament if a general settlement could be arrived at. He also alluded to the colonial problem, but in terms devoid of a provocative character. In all references to the settlement of the difficulties of the Reich with Poland, he never stated clearly the manner in which he thinks that they could be solved. The language he used may mean either that he feels it to be simply a question of solving the problem of Danzig and the Corridor, or that he contemplates more far-reaching changes. Herr Hitler insisted that he did not wish to raise questions in too narrow or absolute a manner, nor would he ask the British Government to default on their pledges. What he wanted was that the British Government should make a gesture that would induce Poland to be amenable to reason. During the whole interview the Chancellor had, as usual, an appearance of complete sincerity and deep conviction. Taking note of these various indications, Sir Nevile Henderson interpreted Herr Hitler's advice to him to visit London as a sign of the latter's good will. He even believed that the postponement of the Tannenberg ceremony indicated that the Fhrer would allow a certain delay in the carrying out of his plans and would at least wait for the replies from Paris and from London. Lord Halifax, together with his colleagues of the inner Cabinet, listened to the Ambassador's account, and is now preparing a reply to  Herr Hitler. In its general lines, the document will first proclaim the British Government's faith in the possibility of continuing the negotiations with a view to avoiding a conflict. It will emphasize that the Chancellor's declarations do not, however, throw any light on the manner in which he envisages the settlement of his difficulties with Poland. The British Government would regard it as dishonourable to fail in its obligations. It could not, therefore, stand aside and take no interest in the solutions which might be contemplated for the present dispute. The importance of preventing any fresh violence at the expense of the German minority, in order to facilitate direct negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw, is fully recognized in London. The British Government would therefore be pleased to see this subject discussed. But they realize that these conversations will have no chance of success unless: (1) Herr Hitler shows a sincere intention to take into consideration the vital interests and the economic rights of Poland; (2) The settlement envisaged is made subject to certain international guarantees. The document containing the British Government's answer would add that a general discussion, if it should be opened, could not have a better preface than a pacific settlement of the German-Polish quarrel. In conclusion, Lord Halifax told me that this document, when drawn up and approved by the Cabinet, will be forwarded to the French Government. I took it upon myself to assure him that our reply would be likewise communicated to the British Government. CORBIN. NO. 258 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 26, 1939. 9.5 p.m. (Received 11.75 p.m.) COLONEL BECK has just informed me, through Count Szembeck, that the Polish Government were inclined to adopt our suggestion. However, for fear that Herr Hitler should misunderstand their intentions, they do not desire to take the initiative. M. Lipski is being asked to find an intermediary who might in-  troduce the question. Count Szembeck thinks that certain neutral colleagues, or even persons in Field-Marshal Goering's circle, would accept this mission. Generally speaking as soon as the initiative in this sense is taken by somebody, the Polish Government will reply in the affirmative. It would be advisable for M. Coulondre to get into touch on this matter with M. Lipski as soon as possible. LON NEL. No. 259 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 10 p.m.) ACCORDING to what Sir Nevile Henderson said this afternoon to a member of Lord Halifax's staff, the question of the exchange of populations had been the subject of only one very vague allusion in the course of yesterday's conversations with Herr Hitler, and it had arisen in the following way. During the interview the Fhrer spoke at one point of "Macedonian conditions" which complicated the racial problems on the German-Polish frontier. The British Ambassador then remarked that this situation is the more to be deplored as national sentiments were today so strong that one could understand the exchanges of population which certain countries had carried out. Moreover, this remark, which could not, properly speaking, be considered as a suggestion, was not taken up by the German Chancellor. CORBIN. No. 260 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 26, 1939. (Received by telephone at 10 p.m.) I INVITE reference to M. Coulondre's telegram, which was communicated to me this morning. In his telegraphic report of his conversation yesterday with Herr Hitler, the British Ambassador in Berlin did not mention the possibility  of the Fhrer reverting to the programme he had laid down last April, which was limited to the question of Danzig and to that of a motor road across the Corridor. Sir Nevile Henderson, in his communication to the Foreign Office, definitely said that no allusion to the proposals of last April was made yesterday by Herr Hitler in the course of their interview. CORBIN. No. 261 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 27, 1939. 12.15 a.m. (Received at 430 a.m.) I REGRET to have to report to Your Excellency that the proposal of Prime Minister Daladier has not been taken up by Chancellor Hitler. For forty minutes I commented upon the President's moving letter. I said everything that my heart as a man and a Frenchman could prompt to induce the Chancellor to agree to a supreme effort for a pacific settlement of the question of Danzig. I conjured him, in the name of history and for the sake of humanity, not to thrust aside this last chance. For the peace of his conscience, I begged him, who had built an empire without shedding blood, not to shed it now, not to shed the blood of soldiers nor that of women and children, without being absolutely certain that this could not be avoided. I confronted him with the terrible responsibilities that he would assume towards western civilization. I told him that his prestige is great enough outside Germany to remain undiminished even after a gesture of appeasement, the men who feared him would perhaps be astonished, but would admire him, mothers would bless him. Perhaps I moved him; but I did not prevail. His mind was made up. Herr Hitler, after reading the Prime Minister's letter and paying tribute to the noble thoughts it expressed, told me that ever since Poland had had the English guarantee, it had become vain to seek to lead her to a sound comprehension of the situation. Poland's mind was set in morbid resistance. Poland knew that she was committing suicide, but was doing so telling herself that, thanks to the support of France and England, she would rise once more. Besides, he added, things have now gone too far. No country having any regard for its honour could tolerate the Polish provocations. France,  in Germany's place, would have already gone to war. No doubt there were some reasonable men in Warsaw, but the soldiery of that barbarous country had now broken loose. The central Government no longer had the situation in hand. I laid stress on the importance of the French proposal: not only did M. Daladier undertake that Poland would agree to seek a solution by free conciliation, but he bound himself, with all the authority vested in his person, to work for the success of an attempt at pacific settlement. Herr Hitler replied that he did not doubt the sentiments of M. Daladier and his sincere desire to save peace, but he thought that the advice of the Prime Minister to Warsaw, however pressing it might be, would not be listened to, for Poland was deaf since she had the British guarantee. Moreover, if Poland showed any willingness to talk matters over, it would, doubtless, be in order to gain time for her mobilization. I returned many times to my point. I pointed out that Poland and Germany had not talked to one another for a long time, that in the course of the crisis the points of view might perhaps have drawn closer, that at any rate it was impossible to find this out unless conversations took place, and that both sides might refrain from taking any military measures while contacts were made. "It is useless," Herr Hitler replied to me. "Poland would not give up Danzig; and it is my will that Danzig, as one of the ports of the Reich, should return to Germany." In face of the impossibility of breaking down Herr Hitler's resistance, and after having invoked the arguments of sentiment reported at the beginning of this telegram, I thought I ought to leave the door ajar by expressing the hope that the Fhrer had not said his last word. As I was taking leave, Herr Hitler announced to me that he would reply in writing to M. Daladier's proposal. COULONDRE. No. 262 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 27, 1939. (Received by telephone at 9.35 a m.) HAVE arranged with Herr Hitler that no publicity should be  given until further notice to the letter from M. Daladier, and to the imminent reply from the Fhrer. I must beg that all the competent services should receive the strictest instructions to this effect. COULONDRE. No. 263 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 27, 1939. (Received by telephone at 1.20 p.m.) THE dmarche made by me yesterday had to be made. No doubt no immediate result can be expected from it, first because apparently we have not yet reached the climax of the trial of strength; then because Herr Hitler had to wait to learn the reception accorded by London to his overtures before taking up his position. It may nevertheless have had some psychological effect, at once, by confirming Herr Hitler in the belief that we are ready to fight, by making him face his responsibility and by showing him that we remain in favour of a solution honourable for both parties. It is not to be ruled out that this dmarche may bear fruit at the moment when Herr Hitler must make his choice between peace and war. We cannot, however, in my opinion, expect a happy result from it unless we are careful not to give the impression that we are on the watch for every possible compromise, whatever the cost may be. I know full well that this is not in the minds of the French and British Governments. I have simply emphasized the importance of making appearances correspond with the facts to the very end. COULONDRE. No. 264 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 27, 1939, 3.20 p.m. (Received at 5.31 p.m.) COLONEL BECK finds that, in spite of fresh incidents, the aggressiveness of the Germans on the Polish frontiers has rather diminished  during the last twenty-four hours. He told me that it was his impression that the Chancellor had not yet decided to make war. LON NEL. No. 265 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, august 27, 1939, 3.20 p.m. (Received at 5 p.m.) THE Polish Press report fresh German acts of aggression, pointing out that they are increasing in number on the most different points of the frontier. Two of these incidents on the frontier of Eastern Prussia led to casualties. In the district of Mlawa, two Polish frontier guards were killed by German soldiers firing from German territory. Not far from there, near Dzialdowo, a column of German artillery having entered Polish territory, one of the gunners was killed. Eight other less serious incidents are reported from Pomerania, in the district of Czestochowa and in Silesia. On the Slovak frontier an attack was made on a Polish post with machine-gun fire. According to the papers, German aeroplanes have again flown over Polish territory and the prohibited zone of Hel. LON NEL. No. 266 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 27, 1939. (Received by telephone at 530 p.m.) HERR VON RIBBENTROP communicated to me today a copy of Herr Hitler's reply to M. Daladier. This reply is of a negative character. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after having read this document, stated to me: "I must add to the Fhrer's letter that since yesterday the situation has become still more acute. The Polish Government is no longer master in its own country. This may perhaps be as well, as otherwise we should have to hold it responsible for the provocations directed against us. But I must warn you that we shall strike at the first incident." COULONDRE.  No. 267 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 27, 1939. HERR VON WEIZSCKER has handed me, and I have the honour to forward to you herewith the original of Chancellor Hitler's reply to the personal letter from M. Daladier. I attach two copies of the translation of that document. A duplicate copy of Herr Hitler's message must have been handed to you by the German Embassy in Paris. I dispatch the present communication by a special messenger. COULONDRE. Personal To His Excellency, M. DALADIER, President of the Council of Ministers of France, at Paris. MY DEAR PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, I can understand the thoughts that you have expressed. Nor have I, for my part, ever minimized the high duties devolving on those on whom the fate of peoples rests. As an ax-Serviceman I am as aware as you are of the frightfulness of war. Owing to this outlook and to this experience, I have likewise made sincere efforts to eliminate all cause of conflict between our two peoples. Some time ago I gave a public assurance to the French people that the return of the Saar territory was the preliminary condition of such an appeasement. As soon as this return had been effected I solemnly confirmed my renunciation of any other claim that might affect France. The German people has approved my attitude. As you were able to ascertain on the occasion of our last meeting, the German people, fully conscious of their own attitude, did not and do not harbour any kind of bitterness or of hatred towards their old and gallant opponent. Quite the contrary. The appeasement on our Western Frontier engendered a growing sympathy, at least on the part of the German people, a sympathy which on numerous occasions showed itself particularly demonstrative. The building of great fortifications in the West, which has absorbed and absorbs many millions of marks, amounts at the same time for Germany to an official act of acceptance and fixation of the final frontier of the Reich. The German people has consequently renounced the two provinces which  belonged in the past to the German Empire, and were conquered afresh with much blood and defended a last time with yet more blood. This renunciation does not represent, as your Excellency will certainly agree, any tactical attitude for external consumption, but a decision which was strictly confirmed by all the measures that we have taken. You could not, Mr. Prime Minister, mention one instance in which, either by a line or a speech, I have ever acted contrary to this final fixation of the Western frontier of the German Reich. By this renunciation and this attitude, I thought to have eliminated every conceivable element of conflict between our two peoples, which might lead to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918. But this voluntary limitation of the vital aspirations of Germany on the West cannot be considered as an acceptance, valid in all other spheres, of the Diktat of Versailles. I therefore year by year sought to obtain, by means of negotiation, the revision of at least the most incredible and most intolerable clauses of this Dikat. I found this impossible. That this revision ought to take place many far-seeing people in all countries considered to be obvious. Whatever reproaches might be leveled at my methods, however much you might feel obliged to oppose them, no one has the right to overlook or to deny that, thanks to them, it has been possible, in numerous cases, without fresh shedding of blood, not only to find a solution satisfactory for Germany, but also that, by such methods, the statesmen of other nations have been freed from the obligation (which it was often impossible for them to fulfill) of assuming before their own peoples the responsibility for this revision. For, in any case, it is a point upon which your Excellency will agree with me: the revision was inevitable. The Dikat of Versailles was intolerable. No Frenchman of honour, you least of all, M. Daladier, would have acted, in a similar situation, differently from me. I have, therefore, in this spirit, endeavoured to wipe out from the world the most unreasonable of the provisions of the Dikat of Versailles. I made to the Polish Government a proposal which alarmed the German people. No one but I myself could have attempted to bring such a proposal to the light of day. And therefore it could be made only once. I am now convinced, in my innermost conscience, that if England in particular, instead of launching a savage Press campaign against Germany, and of spreading rumours of German mobilization, had by one means or another induced Poland to show herself reasonable, Europe would be enjoying today and for twenty-five years the profoundest peace. But on the contrary, through the mendacious allegation of German aggression,  Polish public opinion was alarmed, it became more difficult for the Polish Government to take of their own accord the clear-cut decisions required, and above all their appreciation of the actual limits of what was possible was thereby obscured when we made our offer of a promise of guarantee. The Polish Government rejected my proposals. Polish public opinion, convinced that England and France would henceforth fight for Poland, then started to advance demands which could be treated as ludicrous follies if they were not infinitely dangerous as well. Then began an intolerable reign of terror, a physical and economic oppression of the million and a half Germans still to be numbered in the territories separated from the Reich. I do not want to speak here of the horrors that have been perpetrated. But Danzig itself, following the incessant encroachments of the Polish authorities, has become increasingly aware of being subjected, with no hope of redemption, to the arbitrary exactions of a force alien to the national character of the city and of its population. May I be allowed, M. Daladier, to inquire how you would act, as a Frenchman, if, as the unhappy result of a courageous struggle, one of your provinces was separated by a corridor occupied by a foreign Power; if a great city-let us say Marseilles-were forcibly prevented from proclaiming itself French, and if Frenchmen residing in this territory were at the present moment beset, beaten, maltreated, nay bestially done to death? You are a Frenchman, M. Daladier; I know therefore how you would act. I am a German. Have no doubt, M. Daladier, as to my feeling of honour and as to my conviction that it is my duty to act precisely thus. If you suffered what we are suffering, would you accept, M. Daladier, that Germany should want to intervene without any motive so that the corridor should continue to cut across France?-so as to prevent the return of the stolen territories to the mother country?-so as to prohibit the return of Marseilles to France? In any case, the idea would never occur to me, M. Daladier, that Germany should embark on a struggle with you for this reason. For I and all of us have renounced Alsace-Lorraine to avoid a fresh shedding of blood. And still less should we shed blood in order to maintain a state of affairs which would be intolerable for you and which would be of no value to us. All that you express in your letter, M. Daladier, I feel exactly as you do. Perhaps, just because we are ax-Servicemen, we are able to understand each other more easily in many spheres. But I beg of you, do understand this equally well; it is not possible for a nation of honour to give up nearly two millions  of human beings and to see them ill-treated on its frontiers. I have therefore formulated a precise demand; Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany. The Macedonian situation must be liquidated on our eastern frontier. I do not see the possibility of bringing to a pacific solution a Poland who now feels herself inviolable under the protection of her guarantees. But I should despair of an honourable future for my people if, under such circumstances, we had not decided to settle the question in one way or another. If, consequently, fate compels our two peoples to fight afresh, there would nevertheless be a difference between the motives of the one and the others. I, M. Daladier, should then be fighting with my people for the reparation of an injustice which was inflicted upon us, while the others would fight for maintenance of that injustice. This is the more tragic, since many of the most important personalities of your own nation have recognized the insanity of the solution of 1919, as well as the impossibility of its indefinite prolongation. I perfectly realize the heavy consequences which such a conflict would involve. But I believe that the heaviest would fall on Poland, for it is a fact that, whatever the issue of a war born of this question, the Polish State of today would be lost anyhow. That for this result our two peoples must engage in a new and bloody war of extermination, is a matter of the deepest sorrow not only for you, M. Daladier, but also for me. But, as already indicated, I fail to see any possibility for us to obtain any result from Poland by reasonable means so as to redress a situation which is intolerable for the German people and for the German nation. ADOLF HITLER. No. 268 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 27, 1939. 8.40 p.m. (Received at 10.25 p.m.) THE arrival at the Polish Frontiers of a new German division in the north-west and of a second division of reserves in Eastern Prussia is reported. The German troops in Slovakia are advancing westward and have reached Poprad. The latest information gathered by the Polish authorities confirms that the German mobilization appears to be general. LON NEL.  No. 269 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 27, 1939. 10 p.m. (Received August 28, at 1.15 a.m.) THE population of the districts adjoining the Polish frontier has been evacuated. Only military vehicles are circulating in Danzig, where life is that of an entrenched camp. Defence arrangements appear to be complete. All Polish stocks, notably 3,000 tons of wheat, 2,500 tons of petrol, and 1,000 tons of salt, have been confiscated by the Senate. LA TOURNELLE. No. 270 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels. Paris, August 27, 1939. 10.30 p.m. PLEASE request the King of the Belgians to grant you an audience, and hand him the following communication on behalf of the Government of the Republic: "The Government of the Republic have neglected nothing that might contribute to the maintenance of peace. If their efforts should fail, the French Government know that the Belgian Government would act in exact conformity with their international obligations. "In the event of Belgium adopting an attitude of neutrality, the French Government would, of course, as in 1914, fully respect this neutrality. Only in the event of Belgian neutrality not being respected by another Power might France be led to modify her attitude in order to secure her own defence. "The binding promises of assistance given by the French Government to Belgium, as expressly stated in their communication to the Belgian Government of August 24, 1937, as a matter of course, retain their full value." GEORGES BONNET.  No. 271 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors in London, Warsaw, Washington, Istanbul, and Bucharest. Paris, August 27, 1939. 11 p.m. ON the evening of August 26 the Chancellor of the Reich declared verbally to our Ambassador in Berlin that he could not accept M. Daladier's suggestion to agree to a supreme attempt at a pacific settlement with Poland. GEORGES BONNET. IV Herr Hitler Agrees to Hold Direct Conversations with Poland (August 28-30, 1939) No. 272 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 1.50 p.m. (Received at 430 a.m.) ACCORDING to what Colonel Beck has told me, the Polish Government feel compelled, on account of the intentions towards Poland expressed in the communication made by the German Chancellor to the British Ambassador, to complete their military measures by calling up fresh classes of reservists. This seems to mean putting on a war footing those of the first line divisions which have not yet been mobilized. LON NEL. No. 273 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 12 a.m. (Received at 1.35 p.m.) THE Polish troops have received orders from Marshal Rydz-Smigly not to reply to any German provocation. Their task is to drive back  any incursions into Polish territory but to take strict care not to cross the frontier. LON NEL. No. 274 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 3.30 p.m. (Received at 5.45 p.m.) THE Polish Press reports ten fresh cases of German aggression in Polish territory at widely separated points of the frontier. Either patrols have penetrated into Polish territory, or rifles and machineguns have been fired from German territory on the frontier guards stationed in Polish territory. Near Dzialdowo, (on the East Prussian frontier) a patrol of German cavalry was encountered 6 kilometres within the frontier line. A German cavalryman and his horse were killed. A skirmish took place near Nowy-Targ, on the Slovak frontier. From the official Polish version it transpires that in each case the German patrols only encountered frontier guards on the Polish side. LON NEL. No. 275 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 6 p.m. (Received at 8.40 p.m.) IN an interview which I had with the German Ambassador on July 15, the latter admitted that, while he had cause to complain of some administrative measures taken by the Polish authorities against Germans, he had not had to complain of acts of any other kind for some time past. I advised M. Arciszewski to take steps to cause an investigation to be made on the spot by some neutral in order to destroy the legend that the German Chancellor is trying to establish. LON NEL.  No. 276 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 6.5 p.m. (Received at 9.5 p.m.) THE ill-treatment, murders, etc., of which the Poles are accused by Chancellor Hitler are sheer calumnies. The denials issued by the national authorities cannot be doubted. It is impossible for Germans to be killed on the outskirts of Danzig or at Bielsko without the knowledge of the French who live in these districts. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Germans did not mention any definite facts, names or dates. No protest has been lodged with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador. LON NEL. No. 277 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 28, 1939. (Received by telephone 6.15 p.m.) THE Prime Minister has just communicated to me the final text of the British reply to the Chancellor's communication. A few verbal changes have been made by the inner Cabinet in the initial text, but the general tenor is not altered. I have the honour to transmit the following document to Your Excellency: The Secretary of State again insists that no indiscretion should take place with regard to the contents of the document in question. (1) His Majesty's Government have received the message conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care which it demands. They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany and the British Empire, and they fully share this desire. They believe with him that if a complete and lasting understanding between the two countries could be established it would bring untold blessings to both nations. (2) The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of questions:  those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connexion with these last, His Majesty's Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals are, of course, stated in a very general form and would require closer definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion, and they would be ready, if the differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach an agreement. (3) The condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress. The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which would put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee. (4) In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of April 28 last the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland. But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of August 22, His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee. In the view of His Majesty's Government, it follows that the next  step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely, the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee. They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope that the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course. If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion led to an agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire. (5) His Majesty's Government agree with the German Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German- Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace. It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly suppressed and that unverified reports should not be allowed to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without provocation on either side, for a full examination of the possibilities of a settlement. His Majesty's Government are confident that both the Governments concerned are fully alive to these considerations. (6) His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland. That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but also because of the wider considerations of which the German Chancellor has spoken with such conviction. (7) It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime Minister's letter to the Chancellor of  August 22, and His Majesty's Government do not doubt that they are as fully recognized by the Chancellor as by themselves. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the message, now under consideration to a limitation of armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected. (8) A just settlement of these questions between Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history. CORBIN. No. 278 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 28, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.15 p.m.) M. LIPSKI has received the instructions announced (my telegram of August 26) which authorize him to make indirect overtures with a view to settling the question of minorities by exchanges of population. The Polish ambassador intends to act on these instructions when an opportunity arises. COULONDRE. No. 279 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. HENRY CAMBON, French Minister in Luxemburg. Paris, August 28, 1939. 6.45 p.m. PLEASE transmit the following communication to M. Beck, on behalf of the French Government. "The Government of the Republic believes that, in the present circumstances, it can contribute to allay the preoccupations of the Government of Luxemburg by declaring its firm intention, should the need arise, to respect the inviolability of the Grand Duchy's terri- [33I] tory. It is only in the event of an infringement of that inviolability by another Power that the Government of the Republic might be compelled to change this attitude, in order to secure its own defence." GEORGES BONNET. No. 280 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 8.10 p.m. (Received at 10.40 p.m.) THE British Ambassador has just informed Colonel Beck of the substance of the reply which the British Government is giving to Herr Hitler. He requested him at the same time to confirm that Poland was still prepared to hold direct conversations with Germany under the conditions set out in the British document. Colonel Beck, who expressed great satisfaction at the English answer, replied in the affirmative to the British Ambassador's question. LON NEL No. 281 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 8.15 p.m. (Received at 11 p.m.) AMONG other contradictions of false allegations, the Press publishes the following news, supplied by the Pat Agency: 1. The Vice-Vovode of Silesia, M. Malhomme, accused by the German wireless stations of having ordered the maltreatment of women and children, has been seriously ill for a month and is under treatment at Warsaw; 2. Plundering by bands of insurgents in Silesia is a complete invention. Captain Blacha, who is alleged to be leading them, has been dead two years. LON NEL.  No. 282 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 28, 1939. 8.20 p.m. (Received at 9.50 p.m.) THE number of Germans residing in Poland is less than one million. It is therefore far from reaching the figure given by Herr Hitler. I may add that in a conversation with me on that question, in 1937, the German Ambassador recognized that the number of Poles in Germany and Germans in Poland was almost the same. LON NEL. No. 283 Note addressed to M. Bargeton, French Ambassador in Brussels, by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on August 28, 1939 (Transmitted at 8.38 p.m.) (Received at 10 p.m.) BY his note of August 28, 1939, the Ambassador of the French Republic was good enough to define, on the occasion of the present international crisis, the attitude that the French Government would observe towards Belgium in the event of a conflict in Europe becoming unavoidable. The King's Government has taken note of this communication, by which the Government of the Republic intimates that if Belgium in such a contingency maintains her neutrality, the French Government is firmly resolved, in conformity with its traditional policy, integrally to respect this neutrality. On its side, the King's Government, faithful to the policy of which France took cognizance in the declaration of April 24, 1937, intends to remain outside any conflict; consequently it will not tolerate any violation of this neutrality and will resist with all the forces at its disposal such violation if it should occur. If, contrary to its expectation, Belgium were the object of an aggression, she would not hesitate to appeal to France. She does not doubt that in this case she would receive the assistance requested, according to the assurances now renewed by the Government of the Republic.  The King's Government thanks the Government of the Republic for this fresh proof that it remains true to its traditional policy towards Belgium. No. 284 M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 28, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.30 p.m.) THE Prime Minster has just summoned me and requests me to inform you that the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians have agreed to offer their "good offices" in view of a settlement of the crisis. This offer is made to the Governments of France, of England, of Germany, of Italy, and of Poland. An identical communication is being made this evening by the Netherlands Government to the representatives of the said five Powers at the Hague. BARGETON. No. 285 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 29, 1939. (Received by telephone at 1.45 a.m.) THE British Ambassador, who is engaged in drafting his report to London, has this moment sent his first secretary in order to inform me of the substance of an interview lasting an hour and ten minutes which he had with Chancellor Hitler: "While showing himself very calm, the Chancellor refused to abate any of his claims against Poland. He demanded all the Corridor, without even mentioning Danzig, and territorial changes in Upper Silesia with the possibility of an exchange of populations. He declared, however, that the English communication would retain his most serious attention and that he would give his reply in writing to-morrow." COULONDRE.  No. 286 M. HENRY CAMBON, French Minister in Luxemburg, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 29, 1939. 11.8 a.m. (Received at 3.19 p.m.) THE declaration contained in your telegram of yesterday has been handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has charged me to express the thanks of the Grand Ducal Government to the French Government. CAMBON. No. 287 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 29, 1939. (Received by telephone at 1.20 p.m.) MY British colleague has acquainted me with his interview with Herr Hitler, the substance of which is as follows: "All through the interview the Fhrer returned again and again to his claims against Poland. In April he made a generous offer, which could not be repeated. What he wants today is Danzig, the Corridor, and territorial rectifications in Polish Silesia. Sir Nevile Henderson, who refused to be drawn into a discussion of this programme, said and repeated: England accepts the offer to conclude an agreement with Germany; but England stipulates as a preliminary condition that the Reich should reach an agreement with Poland, by free negotiations, conducted on a footing of complete equality, safeguarding essential Polish interests, under an international guarantee. The Ambassador added that Poland was willing to discuss on that basis. "At the end of the interview my colleague put two questions to Herr Hitler: "1. Are you willing to take part in direct conversations with Poland? "'I cannot answer you now,' replied the Fhrer, 'as I must first of all study with the most careful attention the communication of the British Government.' He added, turning towards Herr von Ribbentrop: 'This must be seen to immediately. Ask Field-Marshal Goering to work with you.'  "2. Would you be disposed to consider an exchange of populations for the settlement of the question of minorities? "'That is a formula which might be found favourable,' replied the Fhrer. "Herr Hitler informed the British Ambassador that he thought he would give his reply this very day. Sir Nevile replied to him: 'It took us two days to draw up our note. I am in no hurry.' "'But I am,' replied the Fhrer. "Herr Hitler declared that, contrary to certain insinuations made abroad, he was not bluffing. The British Ambassador answered the Chancellor that any act of force against Poland could not fail to bring about a war between England and the Reich." COULONDRE. No. 288 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 29, 1939. (Received by telephone at 3 p.m.) THE written reply of Chancellor Hitler was dispatched by an aeroplane which left Tempelhof towards noon. It is believed at the Foreign Office that it should therefore be received towards 4.30 p.m. The conversation which the British Ambassador had yesterday with Herr Hitler gave no indication of the latter's intentions. Sir Nevile Henderson definitely told Herr Hitler that it was for the Reich now to make its choice between British friendship and war, by the attitude which it would adopt towards Poland. Field-Marshal Goering was summoned in the morning by Herr Hitler, probably in order to discuss the situation. The German reply to M. Daladier has created a pessimistic impression at the Foreign Office. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me this morning that he did not see how the Chancellor, after having announced his aims in categorical terms, could beat a retreat without discrediting himself. CORBIN.  No. 289 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 29, 1939. 8.10 p.m. (Received at 9.55 p.m.) I AM told that the Senate has forbidden the Polish company Paged to dispose of its stocks of wood which are valued at 5 million zlotys. It is also reported to me that 200 Polish workers of the international shipyards have been dismissed, after their identity papers had been confiscated and without having their wages paid. An orderly of the military section of the General Commissioner's office is said also to have been arrested. LA TOURNELLE. No. 290 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 29, 1939. 10.3 p.m. (Received August 30, 1939, at 12.15 a.m.) HERE are some data concerning the German minorities in Poland: 1. At the Census of 1931 they numbered 741,000 persons, i.e. 2.13 per cent of the total population. Since then the coefficient of births being greater with the Poles than with the Germans, this percentage can only have diminished. 2. The German minority forms nowhere a compact group. It is spread all over the territory. One finds small German islands as far as the Russian frontier. 3. There is only a very feeble proportion of Germans in the Corridor. 4. There is no doubt that a great part of the German minority wishes to live on peaceful terms with the Poles. LON NEL.  No. 291 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 29, 1939. (Received by telephone at 10.15 p.m.) HERR HITLER has personally handed to Sir Nevile Henderson the German reply to the British communication. The British Ambassador is transmitting it at this moment by telephone to London. Here is what Sir Nevile Henderson told me of his conversation: "The interview was stormy; the Chancellor told me: 'Here is my reply to the two questions put by the British Government: "'A. Direct conversations. Although I am skeptical as to results, I accept. But on condition that a Polish plenipotentiary comes to Berlin to-morrow, August 30. "'B. International guarantee. I could only give a territorial guarantee in full agreement with the Government of the U.S.S.R.' "On Question A, I pointed out to the Chancellor that his proposal resembled an ultimatum. He replied this was not so because the present situation could not be prolonged. The mobilized Polish and German armies are facing each other; fresh incidents constantly occur; five more men were killed today, but England laughs at that. "I protested against such an allegation, and insisted that the prescribed period should be prolonged. Herr Hitler maintained the date of the 30th, pointing out that an aeroplane only took 90 minutes to come from Warsaw to Berlin. "I asked him whether the Polish plenipotentiary would be received with all the courtesy due to him, and if the negotiation would be conducted on a footing of equality. His reply was: 'Yes, of course.' "The Fhrer reminded me afresh of his demands: he wants Danzig and the Corridor. He wants also the suppression of all possibility of incidents with Poland, and to that effect he will have an economic plan drafted by to-morrow. "On Question B, I replied to the Chancellor that, in view of his agreement with the Soviets, his reservation did not seem to be likely to raise any difficulties. "In taking leave, I told Herr Hitler that I would transmit his reply to my Government. I recalled that if the Reich, failing an understanding, attacked Poland, it meant war with England." COULONDRE.  No. 292 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels, and to M. DE VITROLLES, French Minister in The Hague. Paris, August 29, 1939. 11 p.m. PLEASE inform immediately, in reply to the communication which you have received tonight: For Brussels: the Belgian Prime Minister. For the Hague: the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs. That the Government of the Republic welcomes with the greatest interest the offer which the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands have made of their good offices with a view to a settlement of the European crisis. The French Government, which earnestly desires that the noble initiative of the two Sovereigns should attain its realization, is ready, for its part, to further this endeavour with all its power. GEORGES BONNET. No. 293 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 29, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.55 p.m.) I HAVE obtained the following supplementary details regarding the conversation which took place yesterday evening between Herr Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson. After adding Silesia to his former claims, the Chancellor gave clearly to understand that what remained of Poland could not count upon an independent future. In resounding phrases, the German Chancellor emphasized the future vistas that would open out from an Anglo-German rapprochement. A golden age for humanity could not fail to result therefrom. Sir Nevile Henderson appears always to have led him back to the necessity of a previous settlement of the German-Polish difference. Herr Hitler, replying to a question from Sir Nevile Henderson, insisted that he could never return to his proposal of March 23 to the Polish Government. He let it be understood that he would negotiate  with Poland only if he were sure in advance that the Polish Government would accede to all his wishes. Mr. Chamberlain said a few words to me about the diplomatic situation. It is significant, according to the Prime Minister, that Chancellor Hitler has so far abstained, despite his menacing preparations, from starting any decisive action. As you told Sir Eric Phipps, each day which passes is in the Prime Minister's opinion, a day gained for the safeguarding of peace. The Fhrer cannot fail to realize the "disgust" which has been provoked in the whole civilized world by the conclusion by Germany of an agreement with a Power, which, on the very day before this agreement, was regarded by Germany as her worst enemy. The resolute firmness shown by the Western Powers cannot have failed to impress him. I said that Paris had welcomed the clear terms of the British reply brought by Sir Nevile Henderson to Herr Hitler, and notably the precision with which it was indicated that no enterprise of conciliation could be considered before the settlement of the German-Polish conflict. The Prime Minister replied that it was only Herr Hitler who could imagine that Great Britain, in order to be reconciled with Germany, would let herself be lured to a general conference, without regard for the country to which she had given her guarantee. Mr. Neville Chamberlain added that the facility with which the Moscow agreement had been concluded must have warped Herr Hitler's judgment. CORBIN. No. 294 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 30, 1939. 1 a.m. M. COULONDRE has given me a provisional account of the interview which Sir Nevile Henderson had this afternoon with Herr Hitler, in the course of which the German reply was delivered. I am communicating this document to you. However disagreeable may be the form in which the Chancellor expresses his thoughts, nevertheless, I notice that, for the first time, he accepts the principle of a direct conversation, to which he has hitherto been opposed. At first sight it is a point which seems worthy of attention. It appears to me that it would be difficult to meet it with a flat refusal.  As soon as the British Government is in possession of the text of the German reply as well as of the comments which accompany it, I propose to consult with the British Government with a view to defining our common attitude. GEORGES BONNET. No. 295 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 30, 1939.1 a.m. For London. I am sending the following telegram to Berlin and Warsaw: THERE is an increasing number of incidents between the German troops and the Polish troops, who are now in contact at many points. Should it be possible to open negotiations, I wonder whether it would not be feasible to envisage the withdrawal of these troops a few miles on either side of the Frontier. You should examine the possibility of making suggestions of this nature in Warsaw and in Berlin. GEORGES BONNET. No . 296 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 30, 1939. (Received by telephone at 2 a.m.) ACCORDING to what I have been told by my British colleague, his interview of yesterday has left him with a rather bad impression. He is less optimistic than he was yesterday. Nevertheless, he thinks that M. Beck should accept the invitation of the German Chancellor, for it would be to Poland's interest to show her good will before the eyes of the world. Sir Nevile Henderson is telegraphing to his Government in that sense. For my part I consider that the Polish Government should agree to appoint a plenipotentiary, since, after all, the German Chancellor  accedes to the suggestion made to him by Britain and France for direct contact between Berlin and Warsaw. Nevertheless, there would be serious objections to M. Beck's coming to Berlin in the present circumstances. The journey would inevitably recall the unhappy precedents of Dr. Schuschnigg and Dr. Hacha. It would be exploited by the Reich, with all the dramatic effects of which German propaganda is capable, as a moral victory and a sign of weakening. German demands would thereby be increased. If, therefore, the Ministers of the two countries were to meet, it seems to me that it should be in some town close to the frontier. If, on the other hand, the negotiations had to take place in Berlin, they should, in my opinion, be entrusted to M. Lipski. This solution would, moreover, have the advantage that the Polish Government would not appear to be yielding to a time limit which has every appearance of an ultimatum. Should the negotiations take a favourable turn, the subsequent visit of M. Beck would no longer present the same disadvantages. COULONDRE. No. 297 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 30, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.20 a.m.) GOING far beyond his demands of March 21, the German Chancellor today claims, besides Danzig, the Corridor, which is territory racially Polish, and also Gdynia, which is a Polish creation. Furthermore, by claiming an economic agreement and "the elimination of any possibility of incidents with Poland," he is opening the door to unspecified demands. The reservation which he makes with regard to the establishment of an international guarantee recalls the one to which last autumn he subordinated the guarantee to be given to the Czechoslovak State for its new frontier. According to all appearances, he expects a refusal from the Soviet. It is, moreover, impossible to imagine that such terms, which would mark the beginning of Poland's enslavement, would be accepted by that country. LON NEL.  No. 298 M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 30, 1939. 12.5 p.m. (Received at 1.55 p.m.) THE Prime Minister of Belgium, whom I approached early this morning according to your instructions, expressed his most cordial thanks. Our reply is the first he has received, but he has also received intimation of a favourable reply from Britain. He has up to the moment heard nothing from Rome or Berlin; Press reports lead him to suppose that one will be received from Poland. BARGETON. No. 299 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 30, 1939. (Received by telephone at 1.10 p.m.) I GIVE below the text of the reply sent by Herr Hitler to the British Government; the Foreign Office has on this occasion repeated its request for absolute secrecy already made in connection with the previous communication. "The British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in order: "1. To give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding, cooperation and friendship; "2. To leave no room for doubt as to the fact that such an under standing could not be bought at the price of a renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people. "The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of the British Government and from the oral explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British Government for their part are also prepared to improve the relationship between Germany and  England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion. "In this connexion, the British Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the realization of this hope. "Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, definitely to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of Customs policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community. "To this were added barbaric acts of ill-treatment which cry to Heaven, and other forms of persecution of the large German national group in Poland, which extended even to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of legitimate German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference. "The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory, which has always been recognized as being necessary, viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland. The German Government note with satisfaction that the British Govern-  ment also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the new situation which has arisen. "They further feel justified in assuming that the British Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remain days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents intervening, which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with. "While the British Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character which have led to the developments alluded to above. "The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees. "On this subject the German Government make the following declaration: "Though skeptical as to the prospectus of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador. "The German Government desire in this way to give the British Government and the British nation proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter on a lasting friendship with Great Britain. "The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.  "For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939. "The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator." CORBIN. No. 300 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 30, 1939. (Received by telephone at 130 p.m.) THE text of the German reply which was delivered yesterday to Sir Nevile Henderson has just been communicated to me by the British Embassy. It is brutal and reads more like a Diktat imposed upon a conquered country than an agreement to negotiate with a sovereign State. Even if the conversations should be broken off almost as soon as begun, I nevertheless consider that Poland should, at least, to start with, agree to open them through the intermediary of her Ambassador in Berlin. COULONDRE. No. 301 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 30, 1939. 3.20 p.m. (Received at 5.40 p.m.) THE Press announces the arrest of several members of the German minority, affiliated to terrorist organizations, who have been instructed to engage in conjunction with the military authorities of the Reich in "acts of diversion" and to impede the transport of troops. At Lodz 17 kilograms of dynamite and 4 kilograms of nitro-glycerine have been  found at the houses of two employees of a German bank. A similar organization has been discovered at Poznan. A member of the German minority belonging to a similar organization has been arrested at the frontier in a car belonging to the German Consulate at Katowice. The victims of the terrorist outrage at Tarnow number 18. LON NEL. No. 302 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 30, 1939. 5.40 p.m. (Received at 7.45 p.m.) THREE principal facts emerge from the German Press today: 1. The newspapers continue to reflect the irritation, noticed for the last two or three days. The campaign against Poland continues in the same strain. 2. The whole problem of the Polish-German frontier is kept well in the foreground. The racial principle is again invoked, as if the Reich, since March 15, still had the right to invoke it. 3. With the greatest insistence the newspapers underline the final character of the Berlin-Moscow Pact and its wide implications. One is given to understand that Russia and Germany are in perfect agreement, not only on the solution of the Polish problem, but also on the solution of other Eastern European problems. Similar insinuations, which are worthy of attention, should be compared with the declaration which the Chancellor made yesterday to Sir Nevile Henderson, according to which the Reich could not give Poland a territorial guarantee without the assent of Russia. However much intimidation and tactical maneuver may be behind this attitude, we cannot in my opinion watch too closely the development of Russo-German relations. Germany's object is to bring about between the two countries complete political and military cooperation in which the leadership will obviously be assumed by the Reich. In this connection there has even been talk in certain well-informed quarters in Berlin of a new surprise which might be in store for us very shortly. One of the reasons why the Reich has up till now deferred its action against Poland would appear to be the mysterious negotiations which are being conducted by Berlin and Moscow. COULONDRE.  No. 303 M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Danzig, August 30, 1939. 10.15 p.m. (Received at 1130 p.m.) As a reply to the seizure of trucks of goods carried out by the Danzig Customs Control, the Polish Government has reduced from yesterday the number of passenger trains. Tonight, the Senate protested on the subject to the Polish Commissioner-General. An agreement was reached this afternoon after a meeting of officials; the two Polish negotiators, who are railway officials, were however arrested by the Gestapo when leaving the meeting. LA TOURNELLE. No. 304 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, August 30, 1939. 11.20 p.m. THE British Government have submitted to the French Government the instructions sent to your British colleague by the Foreign Office. You should, in accordance with these instructions, support the steps taken by the British Ambassador. GEORGES BONNET. V Italy's Suggestion for a Conference and German Maneuvering to Bring About the Rupture of Negotiations (August 31) No. 305 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11 am.) British Ambassador saw M. Beck during the night. The Polish  Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed his representations and promised to give him the Polish Government's reply at noon. Upon receipt of your instructions I supported the steps taken by my colleague. LON NEL. No. 306 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 15 p.m.) CONFIRMATION of telephone message to M. Georges Bonnet at 12.50 p.m., August 31. Count Ciano summoned me at 12.35 p.m. to the Palazzo Chigi. He made the following verbal communication to me: Signor Mussolini offers, if France and England agree, to invite Germany to a conference which will take place on September 5 with the object of examining the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of the present trouble. The invitation to Germany will be sent to the latter only after France and Great Britain have given their assent. Count Ciano made the same communication to the British Ambassador. He requests an immediate reply for fear that hostilities may begin in the meantime. FRANOIS-PONCET. No. 307 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 150 p.m.) M. BECK has just telephoned to me so say that he is giving a favourable reply to the British Government and that he is willing to enter into direct negotiations with the Reich on the bases previously set forth by Lord Halifax. The Polish Government is ready, subject to reciprocity, to take the measures necessary to avoid any frontier incidents, and suggests that for the duration of the proposed negotiations a "simple" modus vivendi be applied to Danzig. Finally, the Polish  Government expresses a wish to know what form of international guarantee the British Government had in mind, and trusts that Poland can also count for the future upon the good offices of Great Britain to facilitate the application of any agreement reached. M. Beck informed me at the same time that, bearing in mind our suggestions, he is asking his ambassador to request an audience at the Wilhelmstrasse in order to resume contact. M. Lipski is instructed to state that the Polish Government gives a reply in the affirmative to the memorandum by which the British Government informed the Polish Government last night of the former's conversations with the Reich on the subject of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the dispute. M. Beck insists that the reply which he has just made to the British Government be kept secret both in Paris and in London. LON NEL. No. 308 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London. Paris, August 31, 1939. 2 p.m. You should inform the British Government that it appears to me of vital importance that, as soon as an affirmative reply, favouring in principle the conversations, is received from the Polish Government, the British Ambassador in Berlin should be instantly empowered to make it known to the Wilhelmstrasse. GEORGES BONNET. No. 309 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31, 1939. 2.10 p.m. (Received at 10.45 p.m.) INCIDENTS all along the frontiers continue to be reported. There were, however, no casualties yesterday. Within Poland, action against German espionage and terrorist organizations is increasing. At Novy-Sacz, members of the German minority have been arrested for preparing an attempt on a railway bridge. A German, whose arrest at Katowice I reported yesterday, has confessed that provocative outrages against certain German property  owners in Polish territory had been prepared about ten days ago in cooperation with the authorities of the National- Socialist Party of Silesia and upon instructions from the Gestapo. The Press reports at the same time a series of aggressive acts committed on the Slovak frontier by a party about 100 strong wearing swastika badges. LON NEL. No. 310 M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 2.15 p.m.) THE following message from His Holiness has just been transmitted to me by the Cardinal Secretary of State, with the request that it be forwarded immediately to Your Excellency: His Holiness is unwilling to abandon hope that the negotiations now proceeding may bring about the just and peaceful solution which the whole world has not ceased to pray for. "In the Name of God, His Holiness therefore begs the Polish and German Governments to do everything within their power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any measure likely to aggravate the existing tension. He begs the French, British and Italian Governments to give their support to his request." CHARLES-ROUX. No. 311 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31. 1939. (Received by telephone at 3.10 p.m.) I HAVE just received the text of the reply from the Polish Government to the British Government, which was announced in my previous telegram. After reading it I am in a position to give details on the following points: 1. The "simple" modus vivendi for Danzig, alluded to by M. Beck, would aim solely at ensuring provisionally tolerable conditions of existence for the Poles within the Free City. It would leave aside the question of the Statute.  2. The Polish Government declares that, as far as the international guarantee, in the relations between Poland and the Reich is concerned, it must reserve its opinion until the British Government has forwarded further explanations. 3. The Polish Government expresses the hope that, in the event of its entering into conversations with the Government of the Reich, it may continue to be assured of the good offices of the British Government. LON NEL. No. 312 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 31, 1939. 3.10 p.m. (Received at 5.10 p.m.) THE German Press is manifestly divided today between its care to keep the public on tenterhooks and its desire not to excite public opinion too much. The expectant attitude which has been maintained during the last few days by the newspapers is now visibly tinged with a certain embarrassment. This attitude confirms what I have already reported on the subject of the uncertainty and vacillation which would seem to prevail in Government circles. The impression that the Reich has not decided to go any further is beginning to spread among the population. The creation of a ministerial council for National Defence would appear to be intended to some extent to convey the impression that the Government is doing something, although many people notice that things are not progressing, despite the immense effort called for from the country. In semi-official circles they entertain, or pretend to entertain, a double hope. The first, which is steadily growing fainter, is to see the crisis move towards a compromise similar to that of Munich. The second, which becomes more and more definite, aims at securing from Russia active assistance, the very promise of which would make the strategic situation of Poland appear untenable. The Brsenzeitung this morning clearly threatens Poland and its allies with this Russo-German military collusion. On the German side, without doubt, no stone will be left unturned to achieve it, at least on  paper. It is probably one of the last trump cards kept in reserve by Herr von Ribbentrop. COULONDRE. No. 313 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.35 p.m.) THE following is the substance of the instructions which my Polish colleague has received from his Government: "The Polish Government have tonight received from the British Government a communication on the subject of the proposed direct conversations between the Polish and the German Governments. The Polish Government are favourably disposed towards this suggestion: they propose to communicate their answer immediately to the German Government." Having been instructed to advise Herr von Ribbentrop of this communication, M. Lipski asked at 1 p.m. for an interview. The State Secretary, Herr von Weizscker, telephoned to M. Lipski at 3 p.m. and asked him whether he was to deliver this message in his capacity as plenipotentiary or Ambassador. M. Lipski having replied that it was as Ambassador, the State Secretary told him that he would inform Herr von Ribbentrop accordingly, and asked whether he could get in touch with M. Lipski at his residence during the subsequent hours. The Polish Ambassador replied in the affirmative. He had received no reply from Herr von Ribbentrop up to the time at which I am sending this telegram (6.15 p.m.) COULONDRE. No. 314 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August, 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 8 p.m.) MY Polish colleague informs me that he has just been received by Herr von Ribbentrop and that he has handed him the communication prescribed. COULONDRE.  No. 315 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 31, 1939. (Received by courier on September 1, at 10 p.m.) AT five minutes past nine this morning my British colleague telephoned me. "I know from a reliable source," he said, "that if the Polish Government has not accepted before noon the proposal to send a plenipotentiary, the German Government will consider that Poland has given up any intention to seek a peaceful solution of the dispute, and it will give the German troops the order to attack." "First of all, we must get a clear idea of the situation," I replied, and I immediately went to see him. Sir Nevile had been informed that, once before, on the evening of the 25th, war had all but broken out and that once again there was a risk of its breaking out today. I knew that Sir Nevile's information about the 25th was accurate but it seemed to me that if the German Government had really decided in the absence of the Polish reply to attack at noon, it would have officially apprised the British Government, with which it was in contact. My British colleague told me then and there the sources, assuredly trustworthy, from which he had received his information. Sir Nevile Henderson added that the night before, at midnight, he had gone to Herr von Ribbentrop to take him a British communication, intimating that Herr Hitler's reply had been transmitted to Warsaw. The German Foreign Minister had rapidly read through the detailed plan of settlement given in the German reply, but had refused to deliver the text of it to Sir Nevile, on the grounds that the period stipulated for a Polish plenipotentiary to be sent to Berlin had expired. I decided to go immediately to the Polish Ambassador, who told me that he had been woken up at 2 a.m. by Sir Nevile, who had urged him strongly to go immediately to Herr von Ribbentrop to establish the required contact. M. Lipski had refused, because he was without instructions to that effect from his Government. He had, however, telephoned in the morning to Warsaw asking that some instructions be sent. After examining the position, it seemed to us desirable that Poland while being careful not to appear to yield to a German ultimatum, should not expose herself to the reproach of having sought to avoid a  direct conversation, which she had accepted both in her reply to President Roosevelt's message, and in her exchanges of views with Paris and London. M. Lipski accordingly decided to telephone once again to Warsaw, and I myself telephoned to Your Excellency the communication which I here repeat as a reminder: "The British Ambassador has just informed me that, according to information which is not official, but which he considers reliable, the German Government is seriously displeased at the non-arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary, and he considers that the present situation cannot be prolonged beyond the end of the morning without involving the most serious consequences. "I consider that this news should not induce us to depart from the dignified composure with which the exchange of views must be conducted. "But it seems to me that it would certainly be to the interest of the Polish Government to inform Berlin without delay that the Polish Government accepts the direct negotiations which, moreover, have been suggested by the French and British Governments, and that, while reserving judgment on the German note, it is preparing to send to M. Lipski the necessary instructions to meet the Germans in the capacity of plenipotentiary. "I would add that it would seem advisable for M. Lipski not to limit himself to receiving communication of the German claims, but himself to present a statement of the Polish point of view in order that the balance may be maintained. "It would probably be well if, in order to gain time, you would telephone to Warsaw immediately to this effect." At 12.10 p.m. Your Excellency was good enough to inform me by telephone that the Polish Government would in a few minutes give a reply which would be affirmative in principle. At 2 p.m. M. Lipski did, in fact, receive notice from his Government that it favoured the establishment of contact and that it was preparing a reply on the subject. He immediately requested an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop. At 3 p.m. the State Secretary, Herr von Weizscker, asked him whether he was requesting this audience as a plenipotentiary or as an Ambassador. M. Lipski replied that it was as an Ambassador. My Polish colleague has just informed me (7.45 p.m.) that he has just been received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that he in  formed the latter of the communication transmitted to him by his Government. COULONDRE. No. 316 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31, 1939. 9.55 p.m. (Received on September 1 at 1 a.m.) As a result of the events of the last few days in Danzig, the Poles find themselves temporarily stripped of all their prerogatives, except for their share in the administration of the port, which up to the moment has not been directly affected. They have lost control of the railways, Danzig Station has been occupied by the Nazis, and the rolling-stock has been requisitioned. The safety of Polish citizens is no longer assured. The Gestapo has arrested two officials who had come to negotiate with the representatives of the Senate regarding Danzig's food supply and the passenger train services. All these facts are reported by the Polish Press, which is cautious enough not to stress them. The Press has obviously received instructions to avoid focusing the attention of the public on the question. All these events appear under the general heading of German provocations with no more prominence than the frontier incidents and the acts of terrorism. LON NEL. No. 317 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.15 p.m.) I WAS summoned at 9.25 p.m. to the State Secretary, who gave me the following communication. "I am instructed by my Government to deliver to you for the information of the French Government the two documents herewith."   These documents contained the proposals which Herr von Ribbentrop read to Sir Nevile Henderson on the evening of August 30 (cf. No. 315) and which the German wireless broadcast at 9 p.m. on the 31st, stating that the Reich Government considered them as having been refused.  The first is a communiqu to the Press. The second is a German plan for the settlement of the question of Danzig and the Corridor and the German-Polish minorities problem." On receiving these documents, I noted that they were given to me for information and stated that it would be on that basis that I should transmit them to my Government. My British colleague had received the same communication at 9.15 p.m. COULONDRE. No. 318 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.30 p.m.) WE are faced with a new manoeuvre to make Poland appear as if she is trying to evade any attempt at a peaceful settlement. In order to frustrate this manoeuvre and to throw into relief the method used, it is enough to emphasize that, despite the tone of the German note, the conditions which it embodied and the ultimatum-like form in which it was couched, the Polish Government has not sought to avoid the conversation, but has on the contrary given its agreement in principle in the communication which M. Lipski made to Herr von Ribbentrop. COULONDRE. No. 319 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, August 31, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12.0 midnight) A BULLETIN on Polish-German relations has just been broadcast by Germany. In this connection M. Beck has sent me, by Count Lubienski, the following message intended for Your Excellency: At 1 p.m. today M. Lipski asked to be received by Herr von Ribbentrop. The conversation must have taken place at 6 p.m. M. Beck has no information about what had happened as communications between Berlin and Warsaw have been cut off. But the German radio bulletin is at pains to point out that negotiations have been broken off.  M. Beck is anxious to emphasize all the efforts which the Polish Government has made to facilitate the work of conciliation which had been undertaken. In addition he reserves judgment on the German communication and wonders whether we are faced with a last attempt at blackmail or an act preliminary to the opening of hostilities. I asked Count Lubienski to indicate to the Polish Foreign Minister that it was indeed important when confronted with a document the true character of which in any case requires to be made clear to reserve our final judgment on its significance. LON NEL. VI The Outbreak of Hostilities (September 1) No. 320 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 130 a.m.) THE account of the conversation between the British Ambassador in Warsaw and M. Beck reached the Foreign Office at 6.30 p.m. The delay to which telegrams in Central Europe are subjected is the cause of the late delivery of this text, which should have reached London much earlier and the end of which had to be sent by telephone. M. Beck stated that, in conformity with the British proposal, M. Lipski had been instructed to make contact with the German Government. In reply to a question from the British Ambassador, M. Beck explained that the Polish Ambassador would not be authorized, in the event of the text of the German proposals being presented to him, to accept such a document. The Polish Government, which has not forgotten the experiences of others or of similar ultimata, considers it indeed preferable not to receive a note delivered in such circumstances. M. Lipski's main duty would, therefore, be to establish contact and to discuss where and how negotiations could be opened. M. Beck mentioned that the situation in Danzig was becoming and more serious, that it seemed indispensable to set up without  delay a modus vivendi which would guarantee the release of the arrested Polish officials and the resumption of railway traffic. Perhaps the High Commissioner of the League of Nations would be able to act as intermediary in this connection. The Polish Foreign Minister added at the end of the interview that he had no intention of going personally to Berlin nor of being another President Hacha, and that in the event of negotiations being opened he was afraid that, during their course, he would be obliged to appeal to the British Government for its good offices. The written reply delivered to Sir Howard Kennard may be summarized as follows: 1. As already stated on several occasions, the Polish Government is prepared to agree to any exchange of views with the German Government on the basis of the British proposals; 2. The Polish Government is also prepared, subject to the desired conditions of reciprocity, to guarantee that the Polish troops will not commit any violation of the German frontier; 3. The immediate establishment of a modus vivendi in Danzig seems to the Polish Government essential; 4. The Polish Government deems it necessary to reserve its attitude towards the international guarantee mentioned by the British Government until a more definite idea can be reached of its exact implications; 5. The Polish Government hopes that it will always be able to call upon the good offices of Great Britain in the future. CORBIN. No. 321 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. 2.11 a.m. (Received 5.10 a.m.) THE fifteen points of the German claims broadcast tonight by wireless, call for the following comments: 1. Herr Hitler is trying by this broadcast to escape from the diplomatic negotiation in which, contrary to his methods, he got involved by Great Britain. It is thus important to make every effort if the Reich does not immediately attack Poland, to re-open the conversations between Berlin and London. 2. One is bound to conclude from the very text of this broadcast  that if the plenipotentiaries had come to Berlin they would have been compelled to accept these terms, without the possibility of discussion. 3. Ethnographical maps show that in 1914 the region referred to in the broadcast was inhabited by a Polish majority. LON NEL. No. 322 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 8 70 a.m.) THE Polish Army Headquarters report that German troops debouching from Danzig, crossed the Eastern frontier of the Corridor this morning from 4 o'clock onwards, in particular near Kartuzy and Gardeja. German aeroplanes have attacked the Polish town of Tczew to the south of Danzig. Aggression by German armed bands and also flights of aircraft have also been reported at various points of the Silesian frontier. LON NEL. No. 323 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 8.30 a.m.) ACCORDING to the latest information just received by the Polish Army Headquarters the German attack is general on all frontiers. In East Prussia, in South Poznania, in Silesia and on the Slovak frontier, there has been bombing without warning at numerous points. In addition, Danzig has proclaimed its Anschluss with the Reich. LON NEL. No. 324 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.30 a.m.) THE session of the Reichstag has just come to an end, having lasted one hour.  In his opening speech Field-Marshal Goering stated that it was only at 3 o'clock in the morning that the decision to summon the Reichstag had been taken. He added that more than one hundred delegates were absent because they were in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. The following is an analysis and a translation of the essential passages of the speech made by the Chancellor: "Since 1919 we have all been suffering the torments inflicted upon us by a problem created by the Diktat of Versailles, a problem which has become intolerable in its effects. "Danzig has always been, and is, a German city: the Corridor has always been, and is, German. Both these territories owe their cultural development to the German people. Danzig was separated from Germany, and the Corridor annexed. In other regions, Germans have been ill-treated in such a manner that more than a million of them have had to abandon their homes. "I have always tried to obtain an alteration of this position by peaceful methods. It is a lie to pretend that we have always had recourse to violence. In each case, not once but several times, I have tried to obtain indispensable modifications through the way of negotiation. My proposals for limitation of armaments, for the abolition of certain arms and for the elimination of certain methods of warfare, which I considered incompatible with the law of nations, were rejected. "I tried in vain to solve amicably the problems of Austria, the Sudeten, Bohemia and Moravia. It is impossible to claim that only peaceful revisions can be admitted, and at the same time continually persist in rejecting them. "For us, the Treaty of Versailles has never had the force of law!" Then, passing on to the situation existing in the Polish regions with German minorities, the Fhrer declared that no people with any feelings of honour would accept for long such a state of affairs. "I made, however, a final effort," the Fhrer added. "The British Government proposed that direct contact should be established between Poland and Germany. I accepted this proposal and I prepared bases for negotiation. For two whole days I waited without the Poles sending their plenipotentiaries. Last night the Polish Ambassador informed us that his Government was examining in what degree it would agree to the opening of negotiations. "If it could be thought that the German Reich and its Leader could be treated in that way, nothing would be left for Germany but to disappear from the political stage.  "I am wrongly judged.... My love for peace is not to be mistaken for cowardice. I accordingly decided to inform the British Government last night that I considered the negotiations to have failed. "As a first reply to my acceptance, Poland decreed general mobilization. There was a recrudescence of terrorism. I then decided to speak to Poland in her own language.... "If France and England consider that their essential interests are thus affected, that is an attitude which cannot make me hesitate to fulfill my duty. "I have already declared that I ask nothing and that I never will ask anything from the Western Powers. That is a declaration which has a final value. "I have always offered England my friendship, but love can never be unilateral. I have no interest in the West. Our Western frontier is final. Our western wall is for all time the frontier of the Reich. In that region we have no aims of any kind for the future. This attitude will not change. I thank Italy for having understood our attitude and for having backed us, but you will understand also that for the carrying on of this struggle I have no need of foreign aid. We shall carry out this task ourselves. I shall respect the neutrality of the neutral countries to the same extent that they respect it themselves. "You know that Russia and Germany are governed by two different doctrines. But between the two countries there was only one question that had to be cleared up. Germany has no intention of exporting her doctrine, nor Russia hers. Neither of the two countries has any reason to take up a position against the other. We have, therefore, resolved to conclude a pact which excludes for ever any use of violence between us, which imposes the obligation on us to consult together in certain European questions and makes possible for us economic cooperation. Never again can it happen that the powers of these two countries will be used against one another. Any attempt on the part of Western Powers to bring about any change in this will fail. This political decision means a tremendous departure for the future, and it is a final one. I believe that the whole German people will hail this political attitude with satisfaction. "In the World War Germany and Russia fought against one another, and in the end both of them were its victims. This will not happen a second time. "The pact of non-aggression and consultation has been ratified by Berlin and Moscow. In Moscow the pact has been greeted with as much  satisfaction as in Germany. I can only endorse word for word the speech made yesterday by M. Molotov. "And now. here is our goal I am determined to solve: "1. The Danzig question; "2. The question of the Corridor: "3. To see to it that a change is made in the relationship between Germany and Poland that shall ensure a peaceful collaboration of the peoples. "I am resolved to continue to fight until the Polish Government accepts this change, or until another Polish Government accepts it. I wish to remove from the German frontier in the East every element of discord and lasting danger. There must reign in the East a peace similar to that on our other frontiers. "The necessary measures will be taken so that the war is not directed against and does not affect women and children. But if the enemy thinks he can from that draw carte blanche on his side to act as he wills, he will receive a reply which will deprive him of hearing and sight. "This night Polish soldiers fired upon our territory. Since a quarter to six we have been returning the fire. From now on, bombs will be with bombs. And if gas-warfare is started, we shall reply with gas. Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare can only expect that we shall do the same. The struggle will be continued until the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured. "I have worked for six years and I have spent ninety milliards in building up our army. It is better-armed and much finer than the army of 1914. I have an unshakable confidence in it. If I ask of this army and of all Germans sacrifices, it is because I myself am prepared to make every personal sacrifice. I am prepared to accept any post whatever, however dangerous it may be. I have consecrated the whole of my life to the National-Socialist movement. I have had no other ambition than to be the first soldier of the Reich. I have taken this uniform and I shall not lay it aside until the victory is secured, or I will not survive the outcome. :"If anything should happen to me, my successor will be Goering. If anything should happen to Goering, Hess will be the successor. "I ask that they should be given an obedience as blind as is given to me. If anything should happen to Goering and to Hess, an electoral college appointed by me will choose the most worthy, that is, the most valiant."  The Fhrer then stated that a National-Socialist did not know the word capitulation, and that a second November 1918 could never be. "It matters little," he said, "that we individuals disappear, provided that our country lives on." The Chancellor exhorted the deputies to see that the morale of the people was maintained, and he concluded by saying that he counted upon the spirit of sacrifice and discipline of men, women and youth. COULONDRE. No. 325 Appeal of President Roosevelt to Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Poland September 1, 1939. "THE ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centres of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the earth in the past few years, which have resulted in the maiming and death of thousands of defenseless women and children, has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity. "If resort is had to this sort of inhuman barbarism during the period of tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings, who have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which have broken out, now will lose their lives. "I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every Government, which may be engaged in hostilities, publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon the understanding that the same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all their opponents. "I request an immediate reply." No. 326 M. WALTER STUCKI, Swiss Minister in Paris, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, September 1, 1939. THE Federal Government has instructed me, by telegram, to notify Your Excellency as follows: "The international situation, which makes it necessary for the Swiss  Confederation to take military measures, leads it to formulate, once again, its unshakable resolve to depart in no way from the principles of neutrality which have been the basis of its policy for many centuries and to which the Swiss people are deeply attached, in that these principles are consonant with their aspirations, their internal organization and their position in relation to other States. By virtue of the special mandate which has just been conferred upon it by the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council formally declares that the Swiss Confederation will preserve and defend, with all the means at its disposal, the inviolability of its territory and the neutrality which the treaties of 1815 and their complementary obligations have recognized as being in the true interests of the whole European political system. "The Confederation will make it a point of honour to facilitate, as it has during past wars, the impartial activity of humanitarian work which may help to relieve the sufferings arising from a conflict. Relying on the assurances which have been solemnly reiterated, the Federal Council is convinced that the present declaration will be considered as a faithful statement of the implications for the Swiss Confederation of the treaties and international obligations which concern it." No. 327 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome. Paris, September 1, 1939. (By telephone at 11.45 a.m.) YOUR telegram of August 31. You should inform Count Ciano as follows: "The French Government values highly the spirit in which the proposal of the Royal Government has been made, and reaffirms its willingness to seek all possible means, and to associate itself with any steps intended to facilitate and render possible an amicable settlement of the dispute which has arisen between Germany and Poland. "The French Government pays sincere tribute to the effort made to this end by the Italian Government, and thanks it for its communication regarding a plan to call a conference, which has been transmitted by the French Ambassador in Rome and to which a favourable reply has been given. "The French Government must nevertheless point out that in its opinion such a conference could not raise problems touching the inter  ests of powers not represented, and no arrangement could be made affecting the interests of any power unless that power were present. "The French Government considers that the activities of such a conference should not be restricted to an attempt to seek partial and temporary solutions of limited and immediate problems: it should, by raising all the problems of a general character which are at the root of any dispute, result in general appeasement such as will allow the peace of the world to be re-established and organized on solid foundations." GEORGES BONNET. No. 328 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12 noon.) As the telegram which I dispatched yesterday by special courier may arrive too late, I think it desirable to summarize it. On August 31, at 9.5 a.m., my British colleague telephoned me to say that he had learned from a trustworthy source that if at 12 noon Poland had not agreed to send a plenipotentiary, the German Government would order its troops to march. I went to see him immediately. He confirmed his news, which had come from Herr von Ribbentrop's entourage. He added that, during the night, he had taken the British reply to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter read to him the text of the German plan for a German-Polish settlement, but he read it so quickly that the Ambassador was only able to gather fragments of it. Sir Nevile Henderson asked for the text, but Herr von Ribbentrop refused to give it to him, on the grounds that the time allotted to Poland for sending a plenipotentiary had expired. I went immediately to M. Lipski and got him to urge Warsaw by telephone to let him have an immediate and affirmative reply from the Polish Government to the proposal for conversations. I myself telephoned Your Excellency suggesting an approach to Warsaw on the same lines. At 12.10 p.m. Your Excellency telephoned me that in a few minutes the Polish Government would give an affirmative reply in principle. I immediately informed my English and Polish colleagues. At 1 p.m. M. Lipski received the order to deliver the communication which I  telegraphed to you. After Herr von Weizscker had asked him at 3 p.m. whether he came as a plenipotentiary or as an Ambassador, he was received at 7.45 p.m. by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter took note of his communication but did not inform him of the German plan for settlement. At 9.15 p.m. and 9.25 p.m. my English colleague and I were successively summoned by Herr von Weizscker, who handed us, for the information of our respective Governments, the text of the German plan and a communiqu to the Press. At 9 p.m. as it appears, these documents were published. COULONDRE. No. 329 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12.15 p.m.) THE Polish Ambassador went to the Foreign Office this morning to inform the State Secretary of the information he had received, via Paris, regarding the acts of aggression which Germany had just committed against Poland. He stated that Polish territory had been attacked at four different points and that air raids had been made on various towns, causing, especially in Warsaw, victims among the civilian population, some of whom were women and children. Count Raczynski stated that events appeared to him to justify the application of the British guarantee. Giving his personal view, Lord Halifax replied that for him there was no shadow of doubt of this. CORBIN. No. 330 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 12.45 p.m.) REUTER'S AGENCY has just published an authorized bulletin, the essential passage of which I reproduce below: "It is pointed out in official circles in London that if Herr Hitler's proclamation to the German people, as it has been reported, is intended to signify, as it appears to do, that Germany has declared war on  Poland, it can be stated on the highest authority that Great Britain and France are inflexibly resolved to fulfill to the end their obligations towards the Polish Government. "The German version of the course of the negotiations is, of course, entirely mendacious. On August 29 the German Chancellor informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he would, on the following day, expect in Berlin a Polish plenipotentiary having full powers to negotiate a settlement. "He added that he hoped to draw up his proposals in the meantime. "In other words, he expected the Polish Government would submit to the same treatment as that which he had imposed on the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and would send to Berlin an emissary ready to accept terms the nature of which was completely unknown to the Polish Government. "As can readily be understood, the Polish Government did not consent to putting itself in this humiliating position. "Even when peace terms are imposed upon a conquered Power, it is not customary to forbid negotiators to refer to their Governments for instructions. "It is impossible in such a short while to comment on the mendacious statements of the German Government, but the attitude of His Majesty's Government may be briefly defined as follows: "If the German Government had been sincerely desirous of settling the dispute by negotiation, it would not have adopted a procedure which is in the nature of an ultimatum. It would, on the contrary, as is the normal practice of civilized Governments, have opened negotiations with the Polish Government with a view to fixing the place and time for the opening of the negotiations. "In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Polish Government was fully justified in refusing to submit to the treatment which the German Government endeavoured to impose on it. "As regards the terms which have now been published and have never, up to the moment, been communicated to the Polish Government, His Majesty's Government can only say that these terms should naturally have been submitted to the Polish Government, leaving the latter enough time to ascertain whether they interfered or not with the vital interests of Poland, which Germany, in her written communication to the British Government, had declared it was her intention to respect." CORBIN.  No. 331 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. 1.50 p.m. (Received at 5.58 p.m.) M. BECK has just telephoned to me to emphasize: 1. The aggressive nature of the action directed against the Polish frontier by the German troops. 2. The fact that yesterday, at 730 p.m. in the course of an interview which he had himself requested, M. Lipski confirmed to Herr von Ribbentrop that Poland was still prepared to negotiate. 3. That German aircraft have this morning bombed a great number of localities. M. Lipski has been instructed to ask for his passports. The Government is putting into force the legislation prepared for application in war. M. Beck also informed me that, in view of the circumstances, he left it to the French and British Governments to take proper account of the reply given yesterday by the Polish Government. LON NEL No. 332 M. FRANOIS-PONCET. French Ambassador in Rome, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, September 1, 1939. 2.30 p.m. (Received at 430 p.m.) THE French Government's reply to the Italian suggestion for the calling of a conference was delivered by me today at 12.45 p.m. to Count Ciano. The French Government's reply was manifestly gratifying to Count Ciano; he told me that he was very pleased with it and thanked me. He nevertheless added that he was not in a position to tell me whether the Italian proposal could still serve any purpose and whether it could be sent to Herr Hitler. FRANOIS-PONCET.  No. 333 The French Government's Reply to the Appeal of the President of the United States of America regarding Aerial Bombardment Paris, September 1, 1939. THE French Government hastens to reply to the appeal which the President of the United States of America has addressed to all the Governments which are liable to be involved in the conflict, requesting them to refrain from having recourse, in any event and circumstances, to aerial bombardment of civilian populations. The French Government highly appreciates the spirit which inspires the step taken by Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt and affirms its intention to conduct hostilities, if war should be imposed upon it as a result of German aggression, in strict conformity with the laws of warfare, and to do everything within its power to spare civilian populations the sufferings which modern warfare can involve. It is in this spirit of humanity, which has ever dictated in all circumstances the conduct of the French Government, that orders have already been given to the Commanders-in-Chief of all the French forces. These orders exclude in particular the bombardment of civil populations and restrict aerial bombardment to strictly military objectives. It is, of course, understood that the French Government reserves the right to have recourse to any action it may consider appropriate if its adversary should not observe the restrictions which the French Government has itself imposed upon the operations of its own Air Force. No. 334 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. WALTER STUCKI, Swiss Minister in Paris. Paris, September 1, 1939. I beg to acknowledge receipt of the Swiss Government's declaration of neutrality of which you have notified me today. I take due note of this communication. The French Government, so far as it is concerned, will not fail scrupulously to respect the neutrality of the Swiss Confederation and  the integrity of the territory of that Confederation, in accordance with the treaties of 1815 and their complementary obligations. I am, Sir, etc., GEORGES BONNET. No. 335 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 530 p.m.) MY recent telephonic communication with the Political Department: Sir Alexander Cadogan has just apprised me of the instructions which the British Government propose to send to Sir Nevile Henderson, and which he will be requested to carry out at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The text is as follows: "On the instructions received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to make the following communication: "Early this morning, the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which clearly indicated that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks on Polish towns are proceeding. "In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions (viz., an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. "I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that, unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland." Sir Alexander Cadogan has informed me that, in the view of the  British Government, the above communication should be embodied in an identical and joint note delivered by our Ambassador on behalf of our two Governments. CORBIN. VII Franco-British Dmarche in Berlin and the Entry into War (September 1-3) No. 336 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 535 p.m.) THE British Government, in a statement issued to the Press last night, was at pains to emphasize the fact that the German proposals to Poland, broadcast one hour previously, came as a surprise and that these had never been officially communicated to them. The proposals had been hurriedly read over once only to Sir Nevile Henderson on the previous night. It is a fact that when the British Ambassador asked Herr von Ribbentrop to let him have the text of what had just been read over to him, he met with a refusal. The German Secretary of State put the paper in question back into his pocket. I should like to draw the Government's attention to this action, in view of the fact that the German Government has endeavoured to compromise the British Government by affirming that it had definitely exercised a mediatory function. CORBIN. No. 337 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin. Paris, September 1, 1939. 5.55 p.m. THE following is in confirmation of my telephone call: The British Government have instructed your colleague to present  to the German Government an urgent communication of which Sir Nevile Henderson will himself inform you. You should associate yourself with this step. You should confine yourself, if a reply is given, to stating that you will refer the matter to your Government. GEORGES BONNET. No. 338 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw. Paris, September 1, 1939. 6.25 p.m. As I have already informed you by telephone, the Italian Government has offered to call an international conference in which France, Great Britain, Poland, Germany and Italy would take part. Please let me know (at your very earliest convenience) whether this proposal would find acceptance with the Warsaw Government. It should be understood that the object of such a conference would be, the settlement of all the questions involved in the construction of a lasting peace and would not apply merely to the current dispute. GEORGES BONNET. No. 339 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. 6.50 p.m. (Received on September 2 at 330 a m.) THE Reich's Charg d'Affaires has just asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his passports. LON NEL. No. 340 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives. Paris, September 1, 1939. 7 p.m. I AM now to give you the following details relative to the events of the last thirty-six hours, which reveal the responsibility of the Reich in the acts of aggression which have been committed against Poland.  The British Government having obtained the assent of the German Government to the opening of direct negotiations with Poland, the French and British Ambassadors in Warsaw called during the night of August 30-31 and in the morning of August 31 upon M. Beck, with a view to obtaining his consent to fall in with this procedure. At noon on September 31 M. Beck gave notice of his acceptance and indicated that he had instructed his Ambassador in Berlin to request an audience at the Wilhelmstrasse in order to state that the Polish Government gave a reply in the affirmative to the British Memorandum. At 2 p.m. M. Lipski asked to be received by Herr von Ribbentrop. At 3 p.m. Herr von Weizscker asked him by telephone whether it was in the capacity of a plenipotentiary or an Ambassador that he had a communication to make. M. Lipski explained that he was acting as Ambassador, and Herr von Weizscker informed him that he would report the matter to Herr von Ribbentrop. At 7.45 p.m., the Polish Ambassador delivered to the Foreign Minister of the Reich the communication with which his Government had entrusted him. Herr von Ribbentrop did not inform him of the German proposals. At 8.30 p.m. the German radio announced that an important communication would be made at 9 p.m. This broadcast dealt with the German proposals, of which the British Government was alleged to have been informed (this is untrue-see the official bulletin on the subject which appeared in the Press of September 1) and which the Reich Government regarded as having been refused by the Polish Government, the latter not having sent a plenipotentiary within the period fixed by the Reich. At about 10.30 p.m. the German radio announced a Polish raid on the broadcasting station at Gleiwitz. On September 1, at 4 a.m., it broadcast a proclamation by the Chancellor of the Reich, stating that Germany would henceforth meet force with force. Towards 7 a.m. it announced that the Anschluss of Danzig to the Reich had been proclaimed by Herr Forster. At 830 a.m. a communication from M. LON NEL informed this Department that the German troops had, at 5 a.m., attacked on all the Polish frontiers without ultimatum or previous warning. GEORGES BONNET.  No. 341 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 7.45 p m.) IT was noticed at this morning's session of the Reichstag that the Fhrer received the applause of the whole assembly only when he stated that he would fight like a soldier and that he would not wage war on women and children. Even then, enthusiasm was moderate. For the rest of the time, one half only of the deputies applauded the Fhrer. The praises bestowed upon M. Molotov found no echo. The atmosphere, generally speaking, was rather dull. Among the people, although they still wish to cherish the illusion that this is merely a German-Polish conflict, today's events have produced nothing short of consternation. It is to be noted, moreover, that the Fhrer has taken pains to represent the action of the German troops as a police operation rather than as the beginning of a campaign, and that he avoided the word "war." COULONDRE. No. 342 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. 9.29 p.m. (Received on September 2, at 1.10 p.m.) THIS afternoon M. Beck received the Slovak Minister, who authorized him to publish a letter in which M. Szathmary protests "in the name of the Slovak nation," now dominated by brute force and powerless, against the aggression directed by Germany against "Poland, a friendly nation." LON NEL.  No. 343 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 1, 1939. 9.31 p.m. (Received on September 2 at 3 p.m.) M. BECK has just made the following reply to Your Excellency's communication: "We are in the thick of war, as the result of unprovoked aggression. The question before us is not of a conference but that the common action which should be taken by the Allies to resist. I have heard nothing, moreover, from any quarter of the Italian plan." M. Beck added that the air attacks had been unrelenting since the morning. There have been considerable numbers of civilian victims at Poznan and Lwow. German aircraft have again flown over Warsaw. M. Beck has asked me to inform Your Excellency of these attacks in order to show the position in which Poland now finds herself. The people are indignant at the German aggression and its methods, but still remain calm and resolute. The atmosphere is no longer one for conciliation. LON NEL. No. 344 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 1, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11 p.m.) I TOOK the steps prescribed in Your Excellency's instructions in an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop at 10 p.m. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after remarking that my communication was identical with that which had just been handed to him by my British colleague, replied as follows: "There has not been, on the German side, any aggression against Poland. It is Poland that, for months, has resorted to continual provocation by stifling the economic life of Danzig, ill-treating minorities and incessantly violating the frontiers. "The Fhrer has endured this provocation with the greatest patience, in the hope that Poland would again revert to reason. But the  very opposite has been the case. Poland, which has been mobilizing for months, decreed general mobilization last night. The Poles have made three attacks on German territory. In such circumstances there can be no question of German aggression. "I am handing your communication to the Fhrer and will let you know his answer as soon as it reaches me." In accordance with Your Excellency's instructions by telephone, I confined myself to telling Herr von Ribbentrop that I would report his answer to my Government. My colleague and I had asked to be received together. Herr von Ribbentrop preferred to receive us separately. COULONDRE. No. 345 Text of the communication handed over on September 1, 1939, at 10 p.m. by M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin, to Herr von Ribbentrop Excellency, According to instructions from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to submit the following statement: Early this morning, the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German army which gave clear evidence that he was just about to attack Poland. Information which has reached the French Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom goes to show that troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks are now being made on Polish towns. This being so, it would seem to the French and British Governments that by its action, (that is to say, an act of force of an aggressive character against Poland, threatening that country's independence), the German Government has brought about those conditions which call for the carrying out by the Governments of France and of the United Kingdom of their undertaking to Poland to come to her help. As a consequence, I have to inform Your Excellency that, unless the German Government is prepared to give the French Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government has suspended all aggressive action against Poland and is ready promptly to withdraw its  forces from Polish territory, the French Government will unhesitatingly fulfill its obligations towards Poland. I am, Sir, etc. COULONDRE. No. 346 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See. Paris, September 1, 1939. 11.15 p.m. You should inform the Sovereign Pontiff that the French Government, deeply alive to the thought that has inspired him, thanks him for his moving message. The French Government have given their unreserved adherence to all the steps towards the maintenance of peace taken during these last days of August. It is their wish that these noble efforts may yet fulfill their purpose and allow a peace founded on justice and honour to prevail once more among all free nations. GEORGES BONNET. No. 347 Havas Note communicated to the Press during the night of September 1-2, 1939 THE French Government has been made cognizant, yesterday, as were several Governments, of an Italian move with the object of insuring the settlement of the European difficulties. After carefully considering the question the French Government has given a "positive" reply. No. 348 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 11.55 a.m.) THROUGH the Press and the wireless, Germany is still maintaining that it was Poland who rejected the peaceful settlement put forward by the Fhrer, and who thus made a conflict inevitable. German propaganda absolutely denies the statement that the Polish Government was  informed of the proposals which it is accused of having rejected. In support of its contentions it puts forward two facts: No. 1. Herr von Ribbentrop, in the night of August 30- 31, not only read to the British Ambassador the text of the German proposals, but it is further claimed that he commented at length on these proposals: No. 2. In the evening of Thursday, August 31, the Polish wireless, it is alleged, declared that the German proposals could not be accepted as a basis for discussion. That, so it is claimed, is a clear proof that the Warsaw Government had been informed of the German plan for a settlement. As to No. 1 of the above paragraphs, the matter has already been put in its true light. Herr von Ribbentrop read the German proposals at such a speed that Sir Nevile Henderson could not get any definite idea of them. Although the British Ambassador explicitly requested that the said document should be handed to him, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this plan had already been rendered obsolete, as the Polish plenipotentiary had not presented himself on August 30. Such was the pretext used by Herr von Ribbentrop for refusing to hand the text to Sir Nevile Henderson. As to No. 2 of the above paragraphs, there is clearly on the German side a manoeuvre to bring about a deliberate confusion between the plan read out by Herr von Ribbentrop at midnight on the 30th, and the note addressed on the 29th by the Reich Government to the British Government. In the latter note, drawn up in brutal terms, the German Government laid down most drastic conditions. In particular it referred "to what would be left of Poland after the alleged agreement had been reached." If the Polish wireless declared on the evening of the 31st that the German proposals were absolutely unacceptable, this assertion can apply only to the German note of the 29th sent to the British Government and not to the German plan comprising 16 points. Not only was the Warsaw Government kept uninformed of the German proposals, but furthermore the French and British Governments did not have in their hands the text of the German plan until after the German wireless had announced that Poland had rejected the proposals of the Reich and that negotiations were broken off. It was, in fact, at 9 p m. on the 31st that the German wireless gave out the communiqu announcing the breaking off of the negotiations and the text of the plan.  But it was only at 9.15 p.m. and at 9.25 p.m. that the British and the French Ambassadors had been respectively summoned by Herr von Ribbentrop in order to receive a copy of the communiqu and of the plan. From this it follows that there was never a time when Warsaw, or London, or Paris was in a position to examine the proposals, which were communicated to them by the German Government only after the latter had already declared them to be null and void. Moreover, the fact cannot be over-stressed that on August 31, as early as 1 p.m., the Polish Ambassador in Berlin requested Herr von Ribbentrop to receive him in order to inform him of the consent by Poland to conversations being opened. It was not till 7.45 p.m. that M. Lipski was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who confined himself to taking note of his communication, without informing him as to the contents of the German plan or even making mention of it in any way. COULONDRE. No. 349 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 2, 1939. 12 noon. (Received at 3 p.m.) IN contradiction to German assertions, the aggressor's aircraft have not confined themselves to striking at objectives of military importance. According to an official communiqu in the course of yesterday's raids and those of last night 130 persons were killed, among whom were only 12 belonging to the army. Of the civilian victims 50 per cent are women and children. A lunatic asylum for children was hit in Warsaw. Also, civilian refugees who were in a train coming from Poznan were bombed. The victims in both cases were very numerous. LON NEL  No. 350 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET. Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw. September 2. 1939. 12 noon. (Received at 2.50 p.m.) IN reply to President Roosevelt's initiative, the German Government has, through the good offices of the Netherlands, sent a note to the Polish Government, informing it that Herr Hitler had given orders to confine the bombing from the air to military objectives. The Polish Government, through the same channel, replied that it had given identical orders, that it was adhering to them in spite of cases of bombing which had made many victims among the Polish civilian population, but that it was reserving to itself the right to retaliate, if this happened again. No. 351 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 2, 1939. 1 p.m. (Received at 6 p.m.) FIERCE fighting is continuing, according to the latest news given out by the Polish General Staff, on all the Polish-German frontiers. The Germans seem to be exerting their main efforts in Silesia and in the north and the south of the industrial area. The great activity of the German air force still continues. LON NEL. No. 352 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, September 2, 1939. 1.10 p.m. (Received at 2.30 p.m.) COUNT CIANO had asked me yesterday, September 1, at 2.45 p.m., whether we had reason to think that Poland would still agree to the calling of a conference. I had replied at about 5 p.m. that the attitude of Poland was uncertain but that it was worth while all the same to give a trial to the course suggested by Signor Mussolini.  Count Ciano summoned me again last night, at 9 p.m., to the Palazzo Chigi. He declared to me that the Duce was in a state of great hesitation and that he feared lest Herr Hitler, faced by military operations in full course, should accuse him of trying to balk him of his victory. Signor Mussolini, however, did not give up the idea of intervening and was still on the watch to make use of the first favourable opening. FRANOIS-PONCET. No. 353 M. LON NEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Warsaw, September 2, 1939. 1.45 p.m. (Received at 6 p.m.) THE German air force keeps up its great activity. The civilian victims are numerous. LON NEL No. 354 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 2.30 p.m.) THE attitude the German Government is going to take up as a result of the communication, made yesterday evening in Berlin by the French and British Ambassadors, is exercising the minds of the British Government. It is asking itself whether Chancellor Hitler, in order to increase his hold on Polish territory, is not deliberately putting off his answer. Once the positions which he may judge to be necessary have been occupied, the Chancellor will turn to the other Powers and declare that he has no wish to go on with the war with Poland, that, having taken back Danzig and the Corridor and brought help to the German minorities, he is prepared to make a magnanimous peace based on the conditions he stated on August 31. Lord Halifax deems it impossible to allow the present situation to continue any longer. That was why, as early as last night, he had suggested that our representatives in Berlin should, without further delay, inform the Government of the Reich of the obligation under which both our  Governments would be to consider themselves in a state of war with Germany if satisfaction was not given, or if no answer had reached them within a few hours. Lord Halifax even contemplated a communication in which the Ambassadors would make a declaration that France and England consider themselves from now on as being in a state of war with the Reich. We must, however, foresee a case in which Chancellor Hitler, in order to gain time, might make a declaration of the kind specified above. The British Government, should this happen, would be inclined to reply that it was not possible to open negotiations before Polish territory had been evacuated by the German troops. Lord Halifax would highly appreciate an early intimation of your views on this subject. CORBIN No. 355 Message addressed by M. Albert Lebrun, President of the Republic, to the French Parliament. September 2, 1939  GENTLEMEN of the Senate, Gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies, You have been summoned at a critical time in our national life. War has broken out in Central Europe; men are killing one another; innocent victims are falling under machine-gun fire from the air. How has this come about? Two nations had differences to settle. They could do this by way of free and fair negotiations, as they had been advised from every side. At the moment when their plenipotentiaries were about to meet, Germany brutally attacked Poland, thus bringing about a state of war which nothing could justify. (Applause.) England and France, steadfastly devoted to a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation, did all that was humanly possible to avert this crisis. The voices of their Heads of Government, together with the voices of the highest moral and political authorities in the world, joined in adjuring the men who held war or peace in their hands, to give careful thought to their decisions before unleashing the dread scourge. That was of no avail. And, unless they should be, even at this  Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of Saturday, September 2, 1939 (Journal Officiel, of September 3, 1939).  hour, willing to listen to the appeal of universal conscience which is rising towards them, the worst must be expected. With great calmness, with cool resolve and in perfect order, France has taken the steps required by her own safety and her faithfulness to her obligations. (Loud applause on the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right.) For the last few days already, our young men have been keeping watch on the frontiers. Today general mobilization summons all the forces to the defence of our country. On behalf of the nation I send our land, sea and air forces an affectionate greeting and the expression of the unanimous confidence which the country has in them. (Loud applause everywhere.) The people within the country also are doing their whole duty. The union of all citizens, more sacred than ever, has once more come about spontaneously. Fortitude, discipline, hopefulness have one and all stirred their innermost souls. (Fresh applause.) They realise that over and above the fate of their own country the freedom of the world and the future of civilization are both at stake. They can be relied on to face the most portentous decisions unflinchingly. Let us remain united! Long live France! (The deputies rise. Prolonged applause.) No. 356 Declaration read out on September 2, 1939, to the Chamber of Deputies by M. Edouard Daladier, President of the Council of Ministers, and to the Senate by M. Camille Chautemps, Vice- President of the Council  GENTLEMEN, The Government yesterday decreed general mobilization. The whole nation is answering the call with serious and resolute calm. The young men have rejoined their regiments. They are now defending our frontiers. The example of dignified courage which they have just set to the world must provide inspiration for our debates. (Applause.) In a great impulse of national brotherliness they have forgotten everything which only yesterday could divide them. They  Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of Saturday, September 2, 1939 (Journal Officiel, of September 3, 1939).  no longer acknowledge any service but the service of France. As we send them the grateful greeting of the nation let us all pledge ourselves together to be worthy of them. (Loud and unanimous applause.) Thus has the Government put France into a position to act in accordance with our vital interests and with national honour. It has now the duty of setting forth before you the facts as they are, fully, frankly, and clearly. Peace had been endangered for several days. The demands of Germany on Poland were threatening to provoke a conflict. I shall show you in a moment how-perhaps for the first time in history-all the peaceful forces of the world, moral and material, were leagued together during those days and during those nights to save the world's peace. But just when it could still be hoped that all those repeated efforts were going to be crowned with success, Germany abruptly brought them to naught. During the day of August 31 the crisis reached its peak. When Germany had at last let Great Britain know that she agreed to hold direct negotiations with Poland, a course which she had, let it be said, refused to me, Poland, in spite of the terrible threat created by the sudden armed invasion of Slovakia by the German forces, at once endeavoured to resort to this peaceful method. (Loud applause on all the benches.) At one o'clock in the afternoon M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany, requested an audience from Herr von Ribbentrop. Peace seemed to be saved. But the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs would not receive M. Lipski till 7.45 p.m., seven hours later. While the latter was bringing the consent of his Government to direct conversations, the German Minister refused to communicate Germany's claims to the Polish Ambassador, on the pretext that the Ambassador had not full powers to accept or reject them on the spot. (Sensation.) At 9 p.m. the German wireless was communicating the nature and the full extent of these claims; it added that Poland had rejected them. That is a lie. (Long applause on the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right.) That is a lie, since Poland did not even know them. (Renewed applause.) And at dawn on September 1 the Fhrer gave his troops the order to attack. Never was aggression more unmistakable and less warranted; nor for its justification could more lies and cynicism have been brought into play. (Unanimous applause.) Thus was war unleashed at the time when the most noteworthy  forces, the authorities who were at the same time the most respected and the most impartial, had ranged themselves in the service of peace; at the time when the whole world had joined together to induce the two sides to come into direct contact so as to settle peacefully the conflict which divides them. The Head of Christianity had given voice to reason and feelings of brotherhood; President Roosevelt had sent moving messages and proposed a general conference to all countries; the neutral countries had been active in offering their impartial good offices. Need I say that to each of these appeals the French Government gave an immediate welcome and complete assent? (Applause.) I myself, Gentlemen, if I may be allowed a reference to my own person, thought it my duty as a Frenchman to approach Herr Hitler directly. The Head of the German Government had let me know on August 25, through M. Coulondre, our Ambassador in Berlin, that he deplored the fact that in case of an armed conflict between Germany and Poland, German blood and French blood might be shed. I immediately had a definite proposal put to the Fhrer, a proposal wholly inspired by the real concern to safeguard without any delay the peace of the world now imperiled. (Loud applause on the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right.) You were able to read, I think in fact that you must have read these texts. You know the answer I was given; I will not dwell on it. But we were not disheartened by the failure of this step, and once more we backed up the effort to which Mr. Chamberlain devoted himself with splendid stubbornness. (Loud and prolonged applause on the same benches.) The documents exchanged between London and Berlin have been published. On the one side impartial and persevering loyalty; on the other side, embarrassment, shifty and shirking behavior. I am also happy at this juncture to pay my tribute to the noble efforts made by the Italian Government. (Applause.) Even yesterday we strove to unite all men of goodwill so as at least to stave off hostilities, to prevent bloodshed and to ensure that the methods of conciliation and arbitration should be substituted for the use of violence. (Loud applause.) Gentlemen, these efforts towards peace, however powerless they were and still remain, will at least have shown where the responsibility lies. They insure for Poland, the victim, the effective cooperation and moral support of the nations and of free men of all lands. What we did before the beginning of this war, we are ready to do  once more. If renewed steps are taken towards conciliation, we are still ready to join in. (Loud and unanimous applause. On the extreme left, on the left, in the centre, and on the right the deputies rise and applaud again.) If the fighting were to stop, if the aggressor were to retreat within his own frontiers, if free negotiations could still be started, you may well believe, Gentlemen, the French Government would spare no effort to ensure, even today, if it were possible, the success of these negotiations, in the interests of the peace of the world. (Loud and prolonged applause.) But time is pressing; France and England cannot look on when a friendly nation is being destroyed (renewed applause), a foreboding of further onslaughts, eventually aimed at England and France. (Applause.) Indeed, are we only dealing with the German-Polish conflict? We are not, Gentlemen; what we have to deal with is a new stage in the advance of the Hitler dictatorship towards the domination of Europe and the world. (Loud and unanimous applause.) How, indeed, are we to forget that the German claim to the Polish territories had been long marked on the map of Greater Germany, and that it was only concealed for some years to facilitate other conquests? So long as the German-Polish Pact, which dates back only a few years, was profitable to Germany, Germany respected it; on the day when it became a hindrance to marching towards domination it was denounced unhesitatingly. (Applause.) Today we are told that, once the German claims against Poland were satisfied, Germany would pledge herself before the whole world for ten, for twenty, for twenty-five years, for all time, to restore or to respect peace. Unfortunately, we have heard such promises before! (Loud applause on a very great many benches.) On May 25, 1935, Chancellor Hitler pledged himself not to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria and not to unite Austria to the Reich; and on March 11, 1938, the German army entered Vienna; Chancellor Schuschnigg was imprisoned for daring to defend his country's independence, and no one today can say what is his real fate after so many physical and moral sufferings. (Loud applause.) Now we are to believe that it was Dr. Schuschnigg's acts of provocation that brought about the invasion and enslavement of his country! On September 12, 1938, Herr Hitler declared that the Sudeten problem was an internal matter which concerned only the German minority in Bohemia and the Czechoslovak Government. A few days  later he maintained that the violent persecutions carried on by the Czechs were compelling him to change his policy. On September 26 of the same year he declared that his claim on the Sudeten territory was the last territorial claim he had to make in Europe. On March 14, 1939, Herr Hacha was summoned to Berlin: ordered under the most stringent pressure to accept an ultimatum. A few hours later Prague was being occupied in contempt of the signed pledges given to other countries in Western Europe. In this case also Herr Hitler endeavoured to put on the victims the onus which in fact lies on the aggressor. (Unanimous applause.) Finally, on January 30, 1939, Herr Hitler spoke in loud praise of the non-aggression pact which he had signed five years previously with Poland. He paid a tribute to this agreement as a common act of liberation, and solemnly confirmed his intention to respect its clauses. But it is Herr Hitler's deeds that count, not his word. (Loud and repeated applause on all the benches.) What, then, is our duty? Poland is our ally. We entered into commitments with her in 1921 and 1925. These commitments were confirmed. I, myself, in the Chamber said, on May 11 last: "As a result of the journey of the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs to London and of the reciprocal pledges of guarantee given by Great Britain and Poland, by a common agreement with this noble and brave nation we took the measures required for the immediate and direct application of our treaty of alliance." Parliament approved this policy. Since then we have never failed both in diplomatic negotiations and in public utterances, to prove faithful to it. Our Ambassador in Berlin has several times reminded Herr Hitler that, if a German aggression were to take place against Poland, we should fulfill our pledges. And on July 1, in Paris, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said to the German Ambassador to France: "France has definite commitments to Poland. These engagements have been further strengthened as a result of the latest events, and consequently France will at once be at Poland's side as soon as Poland herself takes up arms." Poland has been the object of the most unjust and brutal aggression. The nations who have guaranteed her independence are bound to intervene in her defence. Great Britain and France are not Powers that can disown, or dream  of disowning, their signatures. (Loud and prolonged applause on the extreme left, on the left, in the centre, and on the right.) Already last night, on September 1, the French and British Ambassadors were making a joint overture to the German Government. They handed to Herr von Ribbentrop the following communication from the French Government and the British Government, which I will ask your leave to read out to you: "Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German army which clearly indicated that he was about to attack Poland. "Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops had crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. "In these circumstances, it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that, by their action, the German Government have created conditions (viz., an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. "I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that, unless the German Government are prepared to give the French Government and His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, the French Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland." And indeed, Gentlemen, it is not only the honour of our country: it is also the protection of its vital interests that is at stake. For a France which should allow this aggression to be carried out would very soon find itself a scorned, an isolated, a discredited France, without allies and without support, and, doubtless, would soon herself be exposed to a formidable attack. (Applause.) This is the question I lay before the French nation, and all nations. At the very moment of the aggression against Poland, what value has the guarantee, once more renewed, given for our eastern frontier, for our Alsace (loud applause), for our Lorraine (loud applause), after the repudiation of the guarantees given in turn to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland? More powerful through their conquests, gorged with the plunder of Europe, the masters of inexhaustible natural  wealth, the aggressors would soon turn against France with all their forces. (Fresh applause.) Thus, our honour is but the pledge of our own security. It is not that abstract and obsolete form of honour of which conquerors speak to justify their deeds of violence: it is the dignity of a peaceful people, which bears hatred towards no other people in the world (loud and prolonged applause on all benches) and which never embarks upon a war save only for the sake of its freedom and of its life. Forfeiting our honour would purchase nothing more than a precarious peace liable to rescission, and when, tomorrow, we should have to fight after losing the respect of our allies and the other nations, we should no longer be anything more than a wretched people doomed to defeat and bondage. (Loud and unanimous applause.) I feel confident that not a single Frenchman harbours such thoughts today. But I well know, too, Gentlemen, that it is hard for those who have devoted their whole lives to the cause of peace and who are still prompted by a peaceful ideal to reply, by force if needed, to deeds of violence. As head of the Government, I am not the man to make an apology for war in these tragic hours. I fought before like most of you. I can remember. I shall not utter a single one of those words that the genuine fighters look upon as blasphemous. (Applause.) But I desire to do my plain duty, and shall do it, as an honourable man. (Fresh applause.) Gentlemen, while we are in session, Frenchmen are rejoining their regiments. Not one of them feels any hatred in his heart against the German people. (Loud and unanimous applause.) Not one of them is giving way to the intoxicating call of violence and brutality; but they are ready, unanimously, to discharge their duty with the quiet courage which derives its inspiration from a clear conscience. (Fresh applause.) Gentlemen, you who know what those Frenchmen are thinking, you who even yesterday were among them in our provincial towns and in our countryside, you who have seen them go off-you will not contradict me if I evoke their feelings here. They are peace-loving men, but they have decided to make every sacrifice needed to defend the dignity and freedom of their country. If they have answered our call, as they have done, without a moment's hesitation, without a murmur, without flinching, that is because they feel, all of them, in the depths of their hearts that it is, in truth, whatever may be said,  the very existence of France that is at stake. (Loud and unanimous applause.) You know better than anyone else that no government, no man, would be able to mobilize France merely to launch her into an adventure. Never would the French rise to invade the territory of a foreign country. (Loud and prolonged applause on all the benches.) Theirs is the heroism for defence and not for conquest. When you see France spring to arms it is because she feels herself threatened. It is not France only that has arisen; it is that whole, far-flung empire under the sheltering folds of our tricolour. (Applause.) From every corner of the globe moving protestations of loyalty from all the protected or friendly races are reaching the mother country today. (Applause.) The union of all Frenchmen is thus echoed beyond the seas by the union of all peoples under our protection who in the hour of danger are proffering both their arms and their hearts. (Loud applause.) And I wish also to salute all the foreigners settled on our soil (loud applause) who on this very day in their thousands and thousands, as though they were the volunteers of imperiled freedom, are placing their courage and their lives at the service of France. (Renewed applause.) Our duty is to make an end of aggressive and violent undertakings; by means of peaceful settlement, if we can still do so, and this we shall strive our utmost to achieve (unanimous applause), by the wielding of our strength, if all sense of morality as well as all glimmering of reason has died within the aggressors. (Renewed applause.) If we were not to keep our pledges, if we were to allow Germany to crush Poland, within a few months, perhaps within a few weeks, what could we say to France, if we had to face aggressors once more? Then would those most determined soldiers ask us what we had done with our friends. They would feel themselves alone, under the most dreadful threat, and might lose, perhaps for all time, the confidence which now spurs them on. Gentlemen, in these hours when the fate of Europe is in the balance, France is speaking to us through the voice of her sons, through the voice of all those who have already accepted, if need be, the greatest sacrifice of all. Let us recapture, as they have done, that spirit which fired all the heroes of our history. France rises with such impetuous impulses only when she feels in her heart that she is fighting for her life and for her independence. Gentlemen, today France is in command. (Loud and repeated  applause on all the benches. The deputies sitting on the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right rise and applaud at great length.) No. 357 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 4.15 p.m.) THE sittings of both Houses of Parliament yesterday afternoon were marked by the same feeling of dignity and quiet determination. According to the information I have gathered from all sides, the Members, who on returning from the parliamentary recess had just renewed contact with their constituents, were struck by the firmness shown by all sections of the people regarding the foreign policy that should be followed. All Englishmen were absolutely resolved not to see a repetition of the events of last September and March. Convinced that sooner or later the British Empire would have to make a stand against German ambitions, the majority held that it was better to have done with it at once and not to continue the uncertainty about the morrow which was hindering any normal life. The aggression by the Reich against Poland once known, everyone understood that in any case the hour for action had now struck. No one dreamed for a moment that it was even possible to hesitate as to his duty in face of the open attack on a country to which Great Britain had given a formal guarantee, thus pledging her honour. The speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons was therefore in agreement with the unanimous feeling in Parliament and the country. He was listened to with the seriousness called for by the situation; but the Members none the less drowned in cheers the words with which Mr. Chamberlain, using a language new on his lips and obviously satisfied to be able to express at last what he thought of the leaders of the Reich, branded Herr Hitler's "senseless ambitions" and the "sickening technique" of the Nazi Government. Cheers also welcomed the Prime Minister's speech in which he declared that it was no longer a time for words but for deeds, that there was only one course left to Britain and that she was ready to face the situation, whatever it might be. The leaders of the two sections of the Opposition gave their support  to the Head of the Government, each in his own way, but both of them with the same determination; and the House unanimously voted a credit of 500,000,000 for war supplies and various extraordinary measures directed to the same purpose. The Press this morning announces that all the Ministers have proffered their resignations to Mr. Chamberlain, so as to allow him to form a National Government without delay. It is, however, uncertain whether the Labour Party will agree to join in. The Left newspapers, in fact, say that this party would rather for the moment stand aside, while supporting with all its power the Government's policy, in the country. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the attitude in political circles completely corresponds with the prevailing opinion in the country. The British people is united as it has perhaps never been throughout its history, by its will to resist any German attempt at domination and to safeguard the essential principles of international morality. It knows that it is entering upon an ordeal which undoubtedly will be a lengthy one and will call for the heaviest sacrifices; but it is resolved to carry out to the end what it deems to be both a duty and a mission not only in respect of its own country but also in respect of the civilized world. CORBIN. No. 358 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.40 p.m.) M. LIPSKI left the Polish Embassy early in the morning with his whole staff. The Polish mission has been sent by train to Denmark, whence it will go back to its own country. The house will be looked after by two lesser officials left in Berlin. I tried in vain during the day to telephone to my Polish colleague. COULONDRE.  No. 359 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 6.55 p.m.) HERR VON RIBBENTROP has not yet given an answer at 1.30 p.m. either to my British colleague or to me. Sir Nevile Henderson and I are awaiting our instructions. COULONDRE. No. 360 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome. to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, September 2, 1939. 7.25 p.m. (Received at 10 p.m.) THE British Ambassador and I were called today at 2 p.m. to the Palazzo Chigi. Count Ciano informed us there that he had finally resolved to inform the Fhrer and Herr von Ribbentrop, but without putting any pressure upon them, that France and Great Britain had agreed to the suggestion for a conference to which they had hope of bringing Poland. This conference could follow very closely upon an immediate armistice, leaving the adversaries in their respective positions. This suggestion had not been at once rejected from the German side, but Herr Hitler had pointed out that, being faced with a French note and a British note which the Ambassadors of the two countries had handed him on the evening of the 1st, he wished to know if these notes were in the nature of an ultimatum or not. If so, he would definitely reject them. If the contrary was true, he would ask for some time to think them over until noon to-morrow. Herr Hitler further requested that the answer to his two questions should be sent him through Rome. Count Ciano then telephoned directly to Your Excellency, who, after stating that the note handed yesterday by the French Ambassador was not in the nature of an ultimatum, gave approval in principle, in so far as the time limit was concerned, subject to the views of the President of the Council. Count Ciano then telephoned to Lord Halifax, who himself also  stated to him that the English note was not in the nature of an ultimatum and informed him that on the question of the time limit he (Lord Halifax) must consult his Government. He added that in his opinion to halt the troops on their positions would be insufficient; the occupied territories would have to be evacuated. Count Ciano replied that in his opinion there was little possibility of obtaining this from the Germans. So as to leave time for the necessary consultations to be held, and after I had pointed out that the consent of the Poles would be harder to get, we decided to part and to meet again in Count Ciano's room at 4 p.m. FRANOIS-PONCET. No. 361 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone at 7.30 p.m.) THE Polish Ambassador went this afternoon to Downing Street and was received during the Cabinet meeting, which was being held at the Prime Minister's house. Count Raczinski gave the information that, according to the news received from Warsaw, the German offensive had been violently resumed this morning along the whole Polish front, and that since the beginning of the afternoon there had been bombing from the air of unprecedented intensity on a great many towns. The Ambassador made a fresh and urgent appeal to Mr. Neville Chamberlain for the immediate putting into force of the British guarantee. Sir Alexander Cadogan requested Sir Eric Phipps by telephone to inform the French Government at once of this dmarche. CORBIN. No. 362 M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, September 2, 1939. (Received by telephone 9.45 p.m.) LORD HALIFAX has just made a declaration in the House of Lords  which was received with cheers. The Secretary of State pointed out that the British Ambassador was received last night at 9.30 by Herr von Ribbentrop, to whom he delivered the warning message that was read to the House yesterday. Herr von Ribbentrop replied that he must submit the communication to the German Chancellor Our Ambassador declared his readiness to receive the Chancellor's reply, but up to the present no reply has been received. "It may be," Lord Halifax pointed out, "that delay is caused to a proposal which, meanwhile, had been put forward by the Italian Government that hostilities should cease and that there should then immediately be a conference between the five Powers-Great Britain, France, Poland, Germany, and Italy. "While appreciating the efforts of the Italian Government, His Majesty's Government, for their part, would find it impossible to take part in a conference whilst Poland is being subjected to invasion. Her towns are under bombardment, and Danzig has been made the subject of a unilateral settlement by force." This last passage was interrupted by great cheering. Resuming, Lord Halifax recalled that the British Government, as stated yesterday, would be bound to take action unless the German forces were withdrawn from Polish territory. "The Government," he stated, "is in communication with the French Government as to the limit of time within which it would be necessary for the two Governments to know whether the German Government were prepared to effect such withdrawal. "If the German Government would agree to withdraw their forces then His Majesty's Government would be willing to regard the position as being the same as it was before the German forces crossed the Polish frontier. That is to say, the way would be open to discussion between the German and Polish Governments of the matters at issue between them, on the understanding that the settlement arrived at was one that safeguarded the vital interests of Poland and was secured by an international guarantee. "If the German and Polish Governments wished that other Powers should be associated with them in the discussion, His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree. "There is one other matter to which allusion should be made in order to make the present situation perfectly clear. Yesterday, Herr Forster, who on August 23 had, in contravention of the Danzig Con-  stitution, become the head of the State, decreed the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich and the dissolution of the Constitution. "Herr Hitler was asked to give effect to this decree by German law. At the meeting of the Reichstag, yesterday morning, a law was passed for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich. The international status of Danzig as a Free City is established by a treaty of which His Majesty's Government are a signatory, and the Free City was placed under the protection of the League of Nations. "The rights given to Poland in Danzig by treaty are defined and confirmed by agreements concluded between Danzig and Poland. The action taken by the Danzig authorities and the Reichstag yesterday is the final step in the unilateral repudiation of these international instruments which could only be modified by negotiation. "His Majesty's Government do not therefore recognize either the validity of the grounds on which the action of the Danzig authorities was based, the validity of this action itself, or of the effect given to it by the German Government." At the same time the Prime Minister made a declaration in identical terms in the House of Commons. In the course of this statement, which was greeted with warm cheering, he said, in substance: "The Government is in a somewhat difficult position. I suppose it always must be a difficulty for allies who have to communicate with one another by telephone to synchronize their thoughts and actions as quickly as those who are in the same room; but I should be horrified if the House thought for one moment that the statement that I have made to them betrayed the slightest weakening either of this Government or of the French Government in the attitude which we have taken up. "I am bound to say that I myself share the distrust which Mr. Greenwood expressed of maneuvers of this kind.... I should have to be convinced of the good faith of the other side ... before I could regard the proposition of a conference as a proposition having reasonable chances of a successful issue. "I should have been very glad had it been possible for me to say to the House now that the French Government and ourselves were agreed to make the shortest possible limit to the time when action should be taken by both of us. "It is very possible that the communication which we have had with the French Government will receive a reply from them in the course of the next few hours.  "I feel certain that I can make a statement to the House of a definite character to-morrow when the House meets again. I anticipate that there is only one answer. I hope that the issue will be brought to a close at the earliest possible moment so that we may know where we are." CORBIN. No. 363 M. FRANOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, September 2, 1939. 11.10 p.m. (Received September 3, at 3.10 a.m.) SIR PERCY LORAINE and I have returned to our respective Embassies, after waiting an hour in Count Ciano's room for the communications from London and Paris. It was agreed that, as soon as the telephone replies had reached him, Count Ciano would make them known to us. At 7.20 p.m. Count Ciano informed me that Lord Halifax accepted the Italian suggestion, but on condition that the German troops should withdraw to the frontiers of the Reich. Count Ciano told me that he did not think he was in a position to put forward such a request to Germany. This was likewise Signor Mussolini's opinion. The speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies by M. Daladier intimated that the position of the French Government was the same as that of the British Government. Consequently, it seemed that the Italian suggestion would have to be abandoned. Count Ciano informed me that he had therefore just telephoned to Signor Attolico that, in these circumstances, Signor Mussolini did not think he could follow up his suggestion. The above news has been conveyed to your department by a telephone call received by M. Hoppenot. FRANOIS-PONCET. No. 364 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin. Paris, September 2, 1939. 12 midnight. I WILL specify to you to-morrow morning the terms of a new dmarche which I would ask you to make on September 3, at noon, at the Wilhelmstrasse. GEORGES BONNET.  No. 365 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin. Paris, September 3, 1939. 10.20 a.m. LAST night, following a communication made to us by the British Government, and following the meeting of the French Chamber of Deputies, the French Government at a Cabinet meeting took the following decisions, which I have been charged to transmit to you. You should present yourself today, September 3, at noon, at the Wilhelmstrasse and ask for the German Government's reply to the communication which you handed in at 10 p. m. on September 1. If the reply to the questions contained in that communication is in the negative, you should recall the responsibility of Germany which you evoked during your last interview, and you should notify to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich or to his representative that the French Government find themselves, by reason of the German reply, compelled to fulfill as from today, September 3, at 5 p. m., the engagements which France entered into towards Poland, and which are known to the German Government. As from that moment you may ask for your passports. GEORGES BONNET. No. 366 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 3, 1939. (Received by telephone at 2 p.m.) MY communication by telephone at 1 p.m. with Your Excellency. At 12.40 p.m. today I made the communication prescribed by Your Excellency to Herr von Ribbentrop. The First Secretary of this Embassy is at this moment asking for my passports. COULONDRE.  No. 367 M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, September 3, 1939. (Received by telephone at 5.50 p.m.) I HAVE the honour to confirm as here below the communication which I made to Your Excellency by telephone at 1 p.m. Herr von Ribbentrop returned at noon. I was received at this hour by the State Secretary, but the latter informed me that he was not in a position to tell me whether a satisfactory reply had been made to my letter of September 1, nor even whether such a reply could be given thereto. He insisted that I should see Herr von Ribbentrop himself. In these circumstances I asked to be received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the earliest possible moment. I was received by Herr von Ribbentrop at 1230 p.m. I asked him whether he could give me a satisfactory reply to my letter which I had handed to him on September 1 at 10 p.m. He replied to me as follows: "After the delivery of your letter, the Italian Government notified the German Government of a proposed compromise, stating that the French Government was in agreement. Later, Signor Mussolini intimated to us that the contemplated compromise had failed owing to British intransigence. This morning the British Ambassador handed us an ultimatum, due to expire two hours later. We rejected it for the reason which is explained in the memorandum which I handed to the British Ambassador today and of which I give you a copy. "If the French Government feels bound by its commitments to Poland to enter into the conflict, I can only regret it, for we have no feeling of hostility towards France. It is only if France attacks us that we shall fight her, and this would be on her part a war of aggression. I then asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if I was to infer from his utterances that the reply of the Government of the Reich to my letter of September 1 was in the negative. "Yes," he replied. "In these circumstances I must, on behalf of my Government, remind you for the last time of the heavy responsibility assumed by the Government of the Reich by entering, without a declaration of war, into hostilities against Poland and in not acting upon the suggestion made by the Governments of the French Republic and of His Britannic  Majesty to suspend all aggressive action against Poland and to declare itself ready to withdraw its forces promptly from Polish territory. "I have the painful duty to notify you that as from today, September 3, at 5 p.m., the French Government will find itself obliged to fulfill the obligations that France has contracted towards Poland, and which are known to the German Government." "Well," Herr von Ribbentrop remarked, "it will be France who is the aggressor." I replied to him that history would judge of that. COULONDRE. No. 363 M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Paris. Paris, September 3, 1939. YOUR EXCELLENCY, In conformity with Article 2 of Convention III of The Hague, dated October 18, 1907, I have the honour to send you herewith the notification relative to the State of War existing between France and Germany. GEORGES BONNET. The aggression which the German Government, scorning the methods of peaceful settlement of differences to which it had bound itself to have recourse, and the appeals to free discussion or to mediation addressed to it by the most authoritative voices, committed against Poland on September 1, in violation of engagements most freely accepted both towards Poland herself as well as towards all the signatory States of the Pact of renunciation of war of August 27, 1928, has confronted the French Republic with its obligations to assist Poland, obligations resulting from public treaties and known to the Government of the Reich. The supreme effort, attempted by the Government of the French Republic and by the British Government with a view to maintain peace by the cessation of aggression, was frustrated by the refusal of the German Government. In consequence, as a result of the aggression aimed by Germany against Poland, a state of war exists between France and Germany as from September 3, 1939, at 5 p.m. The present notification is made in conformity with Article 2 of  Convention III of The Hague, dated October 18, 1907, relating to the outbreak of hostilities. No. 369 Joint Anglo-French Declaration THE Governments of the United Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly affirm their intention should a war be forced upon them to conduct hostilities with a firm desire to spare the civilian population and to preserve in every way possible these monuments of human achievement which are treasured in all civilized countries. In this spirit they have welcomed with deep satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of bombing from the air. Fully sympathizing with the humanitarian sentiments by which that appeal was inspired, they have replied to it in similar terms. They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions to the Commanders of their armed forces prohibiting the bombardment, whether from the air, or the sea, or by artillery on land, of any except strictly military objectives in the narrowest sense of the word. Bombardment by artillery on land will exclude objectives which have no strictly defined military importance, in particular large urban areas situated outside the battle zone. They will furthermore make every effort to avoid the destruction of localities or buildings which are of value to civilization. As regards the use of naval forces, including submarines, the two Governments will abide strictly by the rules laid down in the Submarine Protocol of 1936 which have been accepted by nearly all civilized nations. Further they will only employ their aircraft against merchant shipping at sea in conformity with the recognized rules applicable to the exercise of maritime belligerent rights by warships. Finally, the two allied Governments reaffirm their intention to abide by the terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. An inquiry will be addressed to the German Government as to whether they are prepared to give an assurance to the same effect. It will, of course, be understood that in the event of the enemy not observing any of the restrictions which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have thus imposed on the operations of their  forces these Governments reserve the right to take all such action as they may consider appropriate. No. 370 Appeal to the Nation by M. EDOUARD DALADIER, President of the Council of Ministers. Paris, September 3, 1939. Men and Women of France, Since daybreak on September 1, Poland has been the victim of the most brutal and most cynical of aggressions. Her frontiers have been violated. Her cities are being bombed. Her army is heroically resisting the invader. The responsibility for the blood that is being shed falls entirely upon the Hitler Government. The fate of peace was in Hitler's hands. He chose war. France and England have made countless efforts to safeguard peace. This very morning they made a further urgent intervention in Berlin in order to address to the German Government a last appeal to reason and request it to stop hostilities and to open peaceful negotiations. Germany met us with a refusal. She had already refused to reply to all the men of goodwill who recently raised their voices in favour of the peace of the world. She therefore desires the destruction of Poland, so as to be able to dominate Europe quickly and to enslave France. In rising against the most frightful of tyrannies, in honoring our word, we fight to defend our soil, our homes, our liberties. I am conscious of having worked unremittingly against the war until the last minute. I greet with emotion and affection our young soldiers, who now go forth to perform the sacred task which we ourselves did perform before them. They can have full confidence in their chiefs, who are worthy of those who have previously led France to victory. The cause of France is identical with that of Righteousness. It is the cause of all peaceful and free nations. It will be victorious. Men and women of France! We are waging war because it has been thrust on us. Every one of us is at his post, on the soil of France, on that land of liberty where  respect of human dignity finds one of its last refuges. You will all cooperate, with a profound feeling of union and brotherhood, for the salvation of the country. Viva la France!
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