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[47]
PART THREE
The End of Czechoslovakia
(January 5-March 19, 1939)
NO. 36
M. DE MONTBAS, French Charg‚ d'Affairs in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
January 5, 1939.
AFTER the undeniable successes of the Third Reich's
foreign policy during the year 1938, it might have been
imagined that the Fhrer, gratified at having attained his
chief aims without striking a blow and shown the world the
superiority of Hitlerian methods, would have addressed
himself to the task of easing the internal tension, and
would himself have given an example of satisfied calm.
But, according to information received from trustworthy
sources, this is not the case. Herr Hitler is again said to
be going through a period of crisis. He is said to be
nervous, agitated, a prey to sudden and violent outbursts of
rage. It is said that he shuns his collaborators and lives
in sullen seclusion. In the presence of those happy few who
are received by him, he gives vent to angry complaints; he
declares that he receives nothing but disappointing reports;
that the carrying out of the Four Year Plan encounters new
difficulties every day; that in many regions of the Reich,
the spirit of the public is not what it should be; that in
Vienna, Brckel is struggling in the midst of scandals
caused by the corruption and extortions of the Austrian
Nazis; that Sudetenland is costing great sums of money; and
that he is assailed with requests for credits and subsidies
from every side.
From abroad, the Greater German Reich has not received
the flattering consecration or reaped the tribute of respect
and consideration that its victories had led it to hope for.
In spite of the Munich agreement, Anglo-German relations
have never been so strained. With Washington Berlin sees
itself engaged, willy-nilly, in vain and fruitless
[48]
polemics, at the very moment when, the bloc of a German or
German-controlled Mitteleuropa being as yet unorganized, the
National-Socialist economic system finds itself sorely in
need of safety-valves abroad. To the proposals for a German-
American armistice which the Propaganda service has
discreetly issued through certain press-agencies, the only
answer so far has been President Roosevelt's message in
which he raised the problem of a "reconsideration" of the
American policy of neutrality.
In the East and South-East the situation tends to
become more complicated: the collapse of Czechoslovakia has
suddenly revived national prejudices, hatreds and appetites;
German-Polish friendship, not so long ago a fine subject for
official toasts and the usual leitmotif of the Fhrer's
pacific speeches, has cooled down considerably. Deceived in
their hopes, the Hungarians have become recalcitrant and
restless. Far from taking refuge under the triumphant
Swastika, the small nations are sheltering behind a
neutrality which is not always a benevolent one.
The Franco-German declaration of December 6 is one of
the few clear patches in a cloudy sky. But the tension
between Rome and Paris is placing the Reich in a delicate
position towards France. Confronted with the Franco-Italian
differences, Nazi propaganda adopts for the time being a
watchful attitude, notwithstanding platonic protests
regarding the solidarity of the Axis.
It would be an obvious mistake to assume that the
Chancellor attaches much importance to these setbacks. Since
the events of last year, his faith in his own genius, in his
instinct, or as one might say, in his star, is boundless.
Those who surround him are the first to admit that he now
thinks himself infallible and invincible. That explains why
he can no longer bear either criticism or contradiction. To
contradict him is in his eyes a crime of lŠse-majest‚;
opposition to his plans, from whatever side it may come, is
a definite sacrilege, to which the only reply is an
immediate and striking display of his omnipotence.
The Chancellor chafes against all these disappointments
with indignant impatience. Far from conducing him to
moderation, these obstacles irritate him. He is aware of the
enormous blunder which the anti-Jewish persecutions of last
November have proved to be; yet, by a contradiction which is
part of the dictator's psychological make-up, he is said to
be preparing to enter upon a merciless struggle against the
Church and Catholicism. Perhaps he thus wishes to wipe out
the memory of past violence by fresh violence. It is in
Austria, henceforth
[49]
turned into an experimental station, that the signal for
anti-clerical measures might perhaps be given, doubtless
because the unity and the spirit of sacrifice among the
clergy is not so strong there as in the rest of the Reich,
where the memory of the Kulturkampf is still alive. Certain
articles in the Schwarze Korps already point to the
possibility of a far-reaching confiscation of Church
property in the so-called Ostmark.
Outside the Reich, German domination is weighing down
Czechoslovakia more and more heavily. The conclusion of a
customs and monetary union to the profit of the Reich might
prove at the same time a most advantageous operation and the
first stage on the road to the Ukraine.
Thus, at the beginning of the year 1939, the atmosphere
in the Third Reich can best be described as tense: tension
in all fields- political, economic, confessional and
psychological. As happens with an overheated engine, the
machinery of the Third Reich is strained to breaking point,
but the driver of Berchtesgaden does not appear to intend to
moderate the pressure.
MONTBAS
No. 37
M. LON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
January 12, 1939.
WHEN he received me today, after a couple of days'
rest, Colonel Beck began by telling me again that his
journey to Bavaria had been made on the initiative of the
German Chancellor, who had sent someone to see him in Monte
Carlo for that purpose. He added that he had not considered
it opportune, after recent events, to refuse the invitation
thus tendered to him.
According to Colonel Beck, this is what the
conversations between him and Herr Hitler and Herr von
Ribbentrop really amounted to.
The necessity was again stressed of maintaining the
good neighbourly relations created by the Polish-German
declaration of 1934, and it was stated that these relations
remained satisfactory in spite of certain difficulties.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had
found the Chancellor calm, talking a great deal as usual,
but weighing his words,
[50]
and not at all in the feverish state in which he had seen
him sometimes. "It does not appear," he said, "that at the
present time Herr Hitler is contemplating a vast project for
action in the near future, nor that his intention is to
bring about great events at short notice; he did not give me
the impression of a man who was preparing to start a crusade
against anybody."
Colonel Beck gave me the following information:
(1) Herr Hitler expressed his satisfaction that war had
been avoided in September 1938 and that the young people who
had already so many difficulties to contend with had been
spared this terrible ordeal.
(2) According to Colonel Beck, Herr Hitler referred
twice to France; first he congratulated himself on Herr von
Ribbentrop's journey to Paris, and gave an assurance of his
"good intentions" towards us. Later, the conversation having
strayed to architecture, he acknowledged the great debt
which civilization owes to our country.
(3) Against Moscow, against "Russia," and not merely
against Bolshevism, the Fhrer showed the same hostility as
in days gone by.
(4) From certain remarks made by the Chancellor,
Colonel Beck infers that the persecution of the Jews "will
not slow down in Germany." As to the fate of the Polish
Jews, the negotiations will be taken up again very soon,
after a temporary interruption.
(5) Colonel Beck was able to ascertain, on the occasion
of his visit to Berchtesgaden, that Herr von Ribbentrop
appeared rather ill-informed of the intentions of the
Chancellor, whom he had not seen for several weeks. This, in
his opinion, confirms what he had told me at the time of
Herr von Neurath's departure, concerning Herr Hitler's
intention to direct himself the future foreign policy of the
Reich, pondering over his decisions in the solitude of
Berchtesgaden.
(6) The Foreign Minister of Poland hopes that Herr von
Ribbentrop will come to Warsaw toward the end of January.
LON NOEL.
No. 38
M. LON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
January 27, 1939.
IN accordance with Your Excellency's instructions, I
paid a short visit to the German Minister for Foreign
Affairs just as he was leaving
[51]
for Berlin by train. Herr von Ribbentrop expressed his
deepest appreciation of this call.
As arranged, I informed the Minister that I had been
instructed to show him this mark of courtesy in order to
illustrate the spirit in which-a few weeks after his
official visit to Paris and the signing of the declaration
of December 6 to which we attach the importance stressed in
Your Excellency's declarations yesterday-we regarded his
visit to our Polish friends, and the good neighbourly
relations which the German Government declares itself
determined to maintain with them. Herr von Ribbentrop had
just been shown an incomplete and partially inaccurate
report of your speech, which made my d‚marche all the more
opportune. The passage relating to France's policy towards
Germany, and its reception by the Chamber had in fact been
left out. The report stressed before everything else the
parts of the speech bearing on the maintenance of the Franco-
Soviet engagements.
Thanks to the telegram of the Agence Havas and to the
conversation which I had last week with Your Excellency, I
was able to put matters in their true light, and to repeat
to the Minister the important portions of your speech
concerning the declaration of December 6.
LON NOEL.
NO. 39
M. LON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
January 27, 1939.
IN the course of our conversation, Herr von Ribbentrop
felt the need, in connection with Your Excellency's speech
and with our pact with Soviet Russia to refer to what he
calls "the policy of genes," and the events of last summer.
I interrupted these retrospective considerations by
observing that, at present, the best course was not to
discuss the past, but to look towards the future.
On the question of the Soviets, as he gave me to
understand that he always dreaded their influence on our
foreign policy, I replied that our Government's attitude as
well as the situation at home and the state of public
opinion in France, should be enough to prevent Germany's
interpreting our relations with Soviet Russia in a way that
would misrepresent their nature.
LON NOEL.
[52]
No. 40
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
January 27, 1939.
THE debate which has just taken place in the Chamber of
Deputies on our foreign policy gave several members an
opportunity to emphasize the importance of the Franco-German
declaration of December 6 for the development of the
relations between both countries. During the sitting of
January 26, Messrs. Oberkirch and Scapini laid special
stress on their wish to see the consultations provided for
in the agreement become more frequent.
You will receive under separate cover the text of the
passage of my speech dealing with Franco-German relations,
which the entire Chamber applauded.
I leave it to your discretion to make whatever use of
this information you may consider desirable.
GEORGES BONNET.
NO. 41
M. LEON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
January 30, 1939.
THE officially inspired Press publishes the text of
telegrams exchanged between Herr von Ribbentrop and Colonel
Beck, after the Foreign Minister of the Reich had left. Herr
von Ribbentrop thanks his Polish colleague for the
"exceptionally cordial hospitality extended to his wife and
to himself" and expresses the belief that the "friendly
relations between the two States will have been in a large
measure strengthened by the conversations of Warsaw."
"The spirit which Marshal Pilsudski and the Fhrer at
that time introduced into German-Polish relations, give the
guarantee," so he adds, "that the future will bring about a
constant development of our peaceful relations, and at the
same time draw still closer the ties of friendship now
existing between our two countries and so many neighbouring
States."
"I am convinced," Colonel Beck replied, "that the
conversations of Warsaw, carried on in an atmosphere of
sincerity and of mutual regard for the interests of the two
nations, will contribute to strengthen the
[53]
good neighbourly relations established by the agreement of
1934. These conversations will form a valuable addition to
what the Chancellor and Marshal Pilsudski had achieved
before, and will allow the relations between our two
countries to develop in the most friendly spirit."
LON NOEL.
No. 42
M. LON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
January 30, 1939.
WHEN he spoke to me this morning about his
conversations with Herr von Ribbentrop, Colonel Beck assured
me that they had been such as he had predicted to me before
the arrival of the Foreign Minister of the Reich. Nothing
new has been either signed or concluded between the two
Governments of Berlin and of Warsaw.
The Polish Foreign Minister then referred to the speech
and telegrams which he had exchanged with Herr von
Ribbentrop as well as to the text of the communiqu‚, and he
told me that he had found himself in complete agreement with
the German Minister on the necessity and the possibility of
settling, in the "spirit of neighbourliness," which is the
basis of the pact of 1934, present and future difficulties
between both countries.
When I asked him if there had been any new developments
on the subject of Danzig, Colonel Beck answered in the
negative and renewed his promise to inform us, eventually,
of what Poland and Germany, in the spirit of the pact, might
agree upon concerning the Free City of Danzig.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs was good enough to
inform me that his recent conversations had confirmed his
impressions that the Franco-Polish alliance was accepted by
the Reich as a fact, compatible both with the Polish-German
agreement of 1934 and with the Franco-German declaration of
December 6,1938.
LON NOEL.
No. 43
M. LEON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
February 4, 1939.
WITH reference to the question of transit through the
Corridor,
[54]
which has been examined during the Polish-German
conversations, I have just received the following additional
information:
Poland absolutely refuses to accept the establishment
of "a corridor through the Corridor"; neither will she hear
of the construction of a railway line which would be the
property of Germany or of a motor-road with extra-
territorial rights.
But as can be inferred from the inspired commentary
issued on the communiqu‚, measures are being planned, which,
according to the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
are meant to ease and "simplify" German transit through
Pomerania.
Negotiations on this matter are to take place between
the two Governments. They might possibly be carried on in
connection with conversations on the Danzig question.
LON NOEL.
No. 44
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
February 4, 1939.
LORD HALIFAX informed me in Geneva of Mr. Chamberlain's
conversation with Signor Mussolini, and of the plan of the
British Cabinet to sound the Government of the Reich on its
intentions.
Please make a parallel d‚marche at the Wilhelmstrasse
to that of your British colleague respecting the prospective
guarantee of the new frontiers of the Czechoslovak State.
You might indicate that the French Government, which
desires to give effect to the execution of all the clauses
of the Munich Agreement, would be glad to be informed as
soon as possible of the German Government's views on this
matter.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 45
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
February 7, 1939.
THIS morning I had a conversation with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on his journey to Berlin. First of all, M.
Chvalkovsky told me that, according to the desire expressed
by the German authorities, it had been agreed not to publish
anything on the conversations which
[55]
had taken place. Taking advantage of this official silence,
the Press published countless pieces of information, either
inaccurate or entirely invented. M. Chvalkovsky denied
especially that he had been ill-received in Berlin or that
he had been disappointed with the result of his journey. He
told me his visit was not meant to include any negotiation,
that he went to discuss current affairs concerning both
countries and in order to find out what was expected of
Czechoslovakia.
The position of his country in regard to Germany
supplied the atmosphere in which the Minister stated the
facts and expressed his views. He stressed the fact that he
was received by the Fhrer as an acquaintance and that the
interview he had with him took the form of a conversation
and not of the receipt of instructions.
The Foreign Minister summarized the indications he had
given me and linked them up with the question of the
guarantee of Czechoslovak frontiers. What appears to have
impressed him most was the importance which Herr Hitler and
Herr von Ribbentrop attach to the Jewish question-absolutely
out of proportion to the importance given to the other
questions dealt with. The Foreign Minister of the Reich, as
well as the Chancellor, are said to have stated emphatically
that it was not possible to given a German guarantee to a
State which does not eliminate the Jews:
"Do not imitate the sentimental and leisurely manner in
which we ourselves treated this problem," the two statesmen
are reported to have said. "Our kindness was nothing but
weakness, and we regret it. This vermin must be destroyed.
The Jews are our sworn enemies, and at the end of this year
there will not be a Jew left in Germany. Neither the French,
nor the Americans, nor the English are responsible for the
difficulties in our relations with Paris, London, or
Washington. Those responsible are the Jews. We will give
similar advice to Rumania, Hungary, etc.... Germany will
seek to form a bloc of anti-Semitic States, as she would not
be able to treat as friends the States in which the Jews,
either through their economic activity or through their high
positions, could exercise any kind of influence."
In connection with this part of M. Chvalkovsky's
conversations, I learnt that the Director of the Commercial
Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Herr
Friedmann, and the former Consul-General in Paris, Herr
Butter, at present attached to the Press Department at the
Czernin Palace, have been relieved of their posts.
The second point which the Reich Chancellor is said to
have emphasized during his talks with M. Chvalkovsky,
inasmuch as it con-
[56]
cerns the guarantee as well as the general relations between
Germany and Czechoslovakia, is the question of the rights to
be granted to the German minority within the Czechoslovak
State: the right to teach according to the National-
Socialist ideology in the German schools from which the
Jewish teachers must be expelled; the right to organize
themselves according to National-Socialist principles; the
right for the German minority to wear National-Socialist
badges. Then, M. Chvalkovsky mentioned that the Social-
Democrats of the German minority had merged into the
National-Socialist party, as had been the case in Germany.
Only a few hundred people, who have compromised themselves
too much to take the risk of returning to Germany, are
remaining faithful to their original convictions.
Finally, the German statesmen are said to have asked
for a reduction of the Czechoslovak army, in greater
proportion than the reduction in territory and population
already suffered. According to M. Chvalkovsky, who did not
express himself quite definitely, no demand was made. The
Reich seems to have mentioned that they would be prepared to
give their guarantee to a neutral State, taking for granted
that such a State would have no need for a strong army.
As the Foreign Minister reminded me, the Czechoslovak
Government was waiting for the Munich Powers to state
clearly the conditions upon which they were ready to give
the international guarantee mentioned as early as September
by France and Great Britain. According to M. Chvalkovsky,
the conditions stipulated in the Munich Agreement had been
fulfilled long ago.
In concluding, the Foreign Minister mentioned that
Czechoslovakia remained faithful to the treaties signed, and
to the alliances entered into by her Government.
LACROIX.
No. 46
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
February 7, 1939.
YESTERDAY afternoon I had an hour's conversation with
Herr von Ribbentrop, by whom I had asked to be received. In
its essentials the conversation was a long account by the
Minister of the Reich's foreign policy, a policy which, as
he stressed, was not his, but the Fhrer's, whose
instructions he merely followed.
[57]
As I reminded him of the general approval given, in the
Chamber of Deputies, to the declarations made by Your
Excellency on Franco-German relations, Herr von Ribbentrop
made substantially the following statement: "I will speak to
you with complete frankness. It is outrageous to maintain,
as is often done abroad, that we are pursuing war aims. I
myself in 1933 and 1934, offered an agreement in turn to
France and Great Britain. All my endeavours were of no
avail. The Berlin-Rome Axis was forged. Today that Axis is a
fact, and the London-Paris Axis is another. Moreover, the
Western Powers have shown themselves unable to understand
that our vital interests must be satisfied; the Press of
those countries has played its part, together with
irresponsible and mischievous elements, and the Czechoslovak
crisis arose. Later, Germany did what was in her power to
bridge the differences between the two Axes; hence the Anglo-
German declaration, and then the Franco-German declaration
to which, I insist, we attach the utmost importance. Is this
a policy of war or a policy of peace? Nevertheless, in spite
of the moderation of the German Press, a great number of
British and American newspapers, under the pressure of
Jewish and Bolshevising elements, do not stop attacking us;
on account of this, we have decided to give our newspapers
full liberty to answer back and you will soon see how they
do it.
"In foreign policy, our aim is twofold:
(1) To fight Bolshevism by every means, and especially
through the operation of the anti-Comintern pact.
(2) To regain our colonies.
"On the first point, believe me, the struggle we have
started is merciless. Towards the Soviets, we will remain
adamant. We never will come to an understanding with
Bolshevist Russia. During the Spanish war some among us had
advocated a policy of complete aloofness, hoping to weaken
France through the creation of a revolutionary focus on her
borders. This was not and is not the Fhrer's policy. This
is the reason why our 'volunteers' went to the help of
Franco.
"As to the Colonies, we cannot admit that the riches of
the world should be divided between Powers, great and even
small ones like Belgium or Holland, and that Germany should
be completely deprived of them. One day or another, this
colonial question will have to be settled. But, for the time
being, the Governments of the countries concerned are too
much under the pressure of the opposition parties to allow a
free discussion.
"It is just for this reason that we are not prepared,
generally speak-
[58]
ing, to start negotiations. And why should we, as long as in
the democracies the opposition parties are stirred up by the
mischievous action of Bolshevism and Jewry? But we are
confident that, in those countries, such influences will be
gradually reduced and finally suppressed; then it will be
possible to negotiate, and satisfactory solutions will
probably be found. But, for the time being, should a
conference be summoned, it would soon be seen that the only
possible course would be to call it off."
I had no opportunity to take up each of the points
mentioned by Herr von Ribbentrop during this monologue,
which I thought it advisable not to interrupt. I found it
expedient to do nothing more than point out to him that the
last speech delivered by Your Excellency would provide him
with definite information on the general position taken by
the French Government.
Then Herr von Ribbentrop took up the sentence in your
last speech relating to our agreements with Eastern European
countries. One might gather the impression, he remarked,
that France has not renounced the policy which brought about
the last crisis, and in any case such an interpretation
might be given to the declaration in certain countries;
recently we had to make certain representations to M.
Chvalkovsky. I answered him that France had no intention of
giving up either her friendships or her interests in any
part of the continent; as a great European Power she would
make her presence felt in Europe. Nothing, however, in her
attitude could give rise to suspicion on the part of the
Reich; but I had to repeat that if Berlin wished France to
show understanding of German vital interests, it was
necessary to admit and practice reciprocity; this mutual
understanding would be the best safeguarding for Franco-
German relations and for peace itself.
COULONDRE.
No. 47
Note Verbale concerning the arrangement of the
international guarantee to Czechoslovakia, transmitted by M.
Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin, to the Reich Foreign
Office on February 8, 1939
ACCORDING to annex No. 1 to the agreement signed in
Munich on September 29, 1938, the German and Italian
Governments declared themselves prepared to join in an
international guarantee of the new frontiers of the
Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression, as
[59]
soon as the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities
in Czechoslovakia had been settled.
Referring to this declaration, as well as to the
information recently given in Rome by Signor Mussolini to
the British Prime Minister, as to the preliminary conditions
under which the Italian Government as far as it was
concerned, would consider the granting of this guarantee,
the French Government, anxious to see all the clauses of the
Munich Agreement effectively carried out, would appreciate
information on the views of the Government of the Reich on
the question of the guarantee provided for in the said
agreement.
The French Embassy would be grateful to the Reich
Foreign Office if it would kindly enable it with all speed
to comply with the desire thus expressed by the French
Government.
No. 48
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
February 18, 1939.
THE conditions which the Reich lays down to the
Czechoslovak Government for an effective guarantee of the
Czechoslovak frontiers by Germany may be summed up in the
following ten points:
(1) Complete neutrality of Czechoslovakia.
(2) The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia must be
brought into line with that of the Reich; adhesion to the
Anti-Comintern Pact is deemed advisable.
(3) Czechoslovakia must immediately leave the League of
Nations
(4) Drastic reduction of military effectives.
(5) A part of the gold reserve of Czechoslovakia must
be ceded to Germany. A part of the Czechoslovak industries
having been ceded a part of the gold-reserve must
accordingly pass into the hands of Germany.
(6) The Czechoslovak currency from Sudetenland must be
exchanged for Czechoslovak raw materials.
(7) The Czechoslovak markets must be open to the German
industries of Sudetenland. No new industry may be created in
Czechoslovakia if it competes with an industry already
existing in Sudetenland.
(8) Promulgation of anti-Semitic laws analogous to
those of Nuremberg.
[60]
(9) Dismissal of all Czechoslovak Government employees
who may have given Germany any ground for complaint.
(10) The German population of Czechoslovakia must have
the right to carry Nazi badges and to fly the National-
Socialist flag.
LACROIX.
No. 49
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
February 22, 1939.
I SHOULD be glad if you would report as soon as
possible the result of the d‚marche which I have instructed
you to make at the Wilhelmstrasse, parallel to that of your
British colleague.
GEORGES BONNET
No. 50
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
February 24, 1939.
I HAVE received no answer whatsoever to the d‚marche
which I made in accordance with your instructions of
February 4.
COULONDRE.
No. 51
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 2, 1939.
THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent me his
answer to my note of February 8, concerning the guarantee to
be given to Czechoslovakia. The Department will find the
translation of that document attached. The same answer,
couched in identical terms, was given to the British
Embassy.
As I am unable, owing to the late hour when the
document reached me, to proceed to an exhaustive analysis
of the document, I will confine myself to a rapid survey of
the points which appear essential to me.
(1) In its comparatively veiled form, which does not
however exclude certain brutal or perfidious thrusts, the
German note, in substance, suggests that, in the opinion of
the Government of the Reich, the conditions foreseen in
annex 1 to the Munich Agreement for Ger-
[61]
many to adhere to an international guarantee of the new
frontiers of the Czechoslovak State have been in no way
fulfilled up to the present time.
The annex to the Munich Agreement stipulates in fine
that, after the question of the Polish and Hungarian
minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and
Italy, on their side, will also guarantee Czechoslovakia.
The German note endeavours to convey the impression
that the difficulties between Poland and Hungary on the one
hand, and Czechoslovakia on the other, are far from being
settled. Without hesitating to contradict the official
statements hitherto issued, it admits the failure of the
Vienna Award. The position thus taken allows the Government
of the Reich to refuse its guarantee, and consequently
leaves the door open for it eventually to reconsider the
entire question.
(2) The note from the German Foreign Office goes
further still. It unequivocally declares that an
intervention of the Western Powers in Central Europe, in the
shape of a guarantee in favour of the Czechoslovak State,
would do more harm than good. It would contribute to
aggravate the differences of Czechoslovakia with her
neighbours-other than the Reich-and perhaps even lead them
to degenerate into a conflict. Doubtless the note seems in
places to deal with a "premature" guarantee, but, for those
who understand, it is the whole conception of a guarantee of
the new Czechoslovakia by the Western Powers which it
rejects. "The German Government," it points out, "cannot in
any way see in an extension of this guarantee obligation to
the Western Powers a factor that might allay internal
quarrels in the said area, but rather an element liable to
increase unreasonable tendencies, as has already been the
case."
All that part of Europe henceforward is a preserve of
the Reich "The German Government," the note adds, "is
perfectly aware that, all things considered, the general
evolution of that part of Europe falls primarily into the
sphere of the Reich's most vital interests, and that not
only from the historical point of view, but also from the
geographical and, above all, the economic angle."
Translated into clear language, this phrase means that
the Western Powers have no longer any right to interest
themselves in Central European affairs.
This general theme is intermingled with perfidious
allusions to the question of Palestine (for the London
Government) to "more or less serious" military guarantees
given by her Western friends to Czecho-
[62]
slovakia (for Paris), and chiefly with thinly veiled threats
against the elements which, in Czechoslovakia, might
continue even today to oppose German domination.
At first sight this document is therefore anything but
reassuring as to the immediate intentions of Hitler's policy
towards Czechoslovakia.
COULONDRE.
Translation of a note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the French Embassy in Berlin
Berlin,
February 28, 1939.
IN its note verbale No. 78 of February 8, 1939, the
French Embassy raised the question of a guarantee for the
Czechoslovak State, a question dealt with in the annex to
the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. Referring to the
conversation which took place on this matter in Rome between
the Head of the Italian Government and the British Prime
Minister, the Embassy expressed the desire of its Government
to know the attitude of the German Government in this
matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to
reply to the Ambassador as follows:
In the course of the conversations which took place
during the Munich conference, the German Government, in
answer to the suggestions made to them, made it dear that
they could not consider granting a guarantee to the
Czechoslovak State, unless the other neighbours of that
State showed themselves equally disposed to enter into a
similar engagement. Even though the possibilities of a
conflict between Czechoslovakia enjoying a guarantee and the
German Reich are reduced to the minimum for the future, the
same cannot be said of the differences which might arise
between Czechoslovakia and her other neighbours. The
participation of Great Britain and France in such an
engagement to guarantee Czechoslovakia appears, in the
opinion of the German Government, as an inadequate safeguard
against such differences arising and multiplying and leading
to conflicts. The Government of the Reich rather apprehends,
on the basis of past experiences, that a declaration of a
guarantee in favour of Czechoslovakia by the Western Powers
might contribute to aggravate the differences of
Czechoslovakia with the neighbouring States. It will not,
for instance, have escaped the notice of the French
Government that a divergence of view persists between
Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia on
the other, as to the fairness of the delimitation of
[63]
their present frontiers. The Government of the Reich and the
Italian Government undertook that delimitation in the hope
of attaining, by an effort which they then thought to have
been successful, such a compromise as would meet with the
approval of all parties concerned. Since then events had
shown that, in this region where national groups are so
hopelessly intermingled, and where conditions of life cannot
be compared with those prevailing in the West, it was really
very difficult to arrive at a compromise which would be
satisfactory to all. The French Government perhaps might
better understand how uncertain the result of such attempts
remains, even when prompted by the best intentions, if it
will recall the alternative schemes of the British
Government for the solution of the question of Palestine. It
appears to be beyond doubt that the chief cause for the
critical development of the Czechoslovak problem is to be
found in the fact that, in the past, as a result of the more
or less serious military guarantees which they had received
from the Western Powers, the successive Czech governments
thought that they could simply ignore the imprescriptible
claims of the national minorities. Hence the state of
internal tension which finally led to the solution arrived
at in 1938.
It is not to be denied that even today the elements
responsible for past developments are continuing their
intrigues within Czechoslovakia, even though contrary to the
wish of the present Government. An undeniable danger exists
that prematurely given guarantees, far from bringing about a
reasonable solution of the Czechoslovak internal problems,
might rather contribute to consolidate existing opposition
and thus provoke further conflicts. In the belief that it
might pacify this region in which, by force of
circumstances, it happens to be the most interested party,
the Government of the Reich, in cooperation with the Italian
Government, made the Vienna Award, which, as time has shown,
met with only a qualified welcome from the interested
parties. They do not therefore consider themselves in a
position to provoke unnecessarily by another premature
intervention criticism against measures which they have
taken in countries with which they wish to live on terms of
peace and friendship. Consequently, and as already
indicated, they cannot consider an extension of this promise
of guarantee to the Western Powers as likely to allay
internal unrest in the area concerned, but rather as an
element liable to encourage unreasonable tendencies, as has
been the case before. The German Government are perfectly
aware that, all things considered, the general evolution
[64]
in that part of Europe falls primarily into the sphere of
the Reich's most vital interests, and that not only from the
historical point of view, but also from the geographical
and, above all, from the economic, angle.
They are also of opinion that it is necessary first of
all, before taking up a new position, to wait until
developments within Czechoslovakia have been clarified, as
well as for the improvement which cannot fail to be the
result in the relations between that country and the
neighbouring States.
No. 52
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 10, 1939.
THE negotiations that were taken up again yesterday in
Prague by the delegates of the Slovak Cabinet have
culminated tonight in a new crisis which led the Government
of Prague to dismiss President Tiso, as well as the
Ministers Durcansky, Cabusinsky and Vanco. At the same time,
the Czechoslovak Government entrusted the Government of the
province to M. Sivak, who until now was Minister for Public
Instruction.
According to the first information received, it seems
that the following interpretation can be placed on the
events leading to this decision which does not affect the
autonomous arrangements stipulated in November last.
It is said that the Czechs rejected the Slovak proposal
for the organization, not of a federal State, but a
Confederation of States. In their opinion such a system did
not afford them sufficient guarantees and involved serious
risks for the future. In the Bratislava Cabinet, with which
the Slovak negotiators were in constant communication by
telephone, the uncompromising elements are said to have
declared themselves for resistance.
In these circumstances the Government of Prague decided
to recall the Ministers who were under the influence of the
extremists, as well as the Prime Minister of Slovakia, who
had proved incapable of keeping them in check. The
Government also decided to take important police measures in
Slovakia, so as to be ready for any contingency.
LACROIX.
[65]
No. 53
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 10, 1939.
ACCORDING to information I have just received from
Bratislava, the Central Government until now seems to remain
in control of the situation in spite of intense agitation.
The military authorities, under the orders of the general
who is said to have been sent from Prague, have unlimited
control. It is reported that some units of the Hlinka guard
made a show of resistance, but that they were held in check
It was all confined to a few shots and some scuffling.
The Cabinet of Prague, according to M. Chvalkovsky's
communication this morning to my British colleague, is said
to be confident of complete success on the home front. As to
the attitude of Germany, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
had not yet noticed the least reaction from that side.
According to rumours which seem to be gaining strength,
concentrations of German troops are taking place near the
southern frontiers of Moravia and Slovakia. It should be
observed that such rumours, for the time being are
interpreted as a probable indication of Germany's desire, by
intimidatory action, to exploit the situation created by her
agents and to exercise pressure so as to extend her
domination over Czechoslovakia.
LACROIX.
No. 54
M. DE MONTBAS, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 11, 1939.
THE conflict which has arisen between the Czechs and
the Slovaks has suddenly taken an alarming turn, not only
following the proclamation of martial law in Bratislava and
the disbanding of the Slovak formations for self-protection
(this measure, since yesterday, is being commented on in the
German Press in a threatening tone), but also by the fact
that Mgr. Tiso is reported to have addressed (as confirmed
this morning by the D.N.B.) an appeal for help to the
Government of the Reich. In such circumstances we must
expect the latter to intervene very soon by ordering the
Government of Prague to reconsider
[66]
the measures just taken and to respect Slovak autonomy.
According to information received at the Embassy, this
intervention may, as soon as next week, take the form of an
"armed mediation."
Although up to the present moment the attitude of the
German Press is less aggressive than when the "liberation"
of Sudetenland was to the fore, it foreshadows that Germany
will not remain passive and that she is adopting the cause
of the nationalists revolting against the Government of
Prague.
MONTBAS.
No. 55
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 13, 1939.
WHILE at the Wilhelmstrasse, as late as in the evening
of March 12, they professed to be confident that M.
Chvalkovsky would find a satisfactory solution for the
crisis within Czechoslovakia, the Minister for Propaganda,
according to information obtained this morning by my Belgian
colleague, now declares that from the moment Germans are
molested, the Reich will have to intervene in a more direct
manner, but in what manner they decline to say.
The situation as I found it on my return to Berlin is,
therefore, an extremely serious one, and seems to be
developing rapidly.
Analyzed in its political and military factors, it
appears in the following light:
On March 11 and 12 military preparations were noticed
in certain German garrisons, and particularly in those near
Berlin. These preparations, which consisted for instance in
camouflaging the numbers on the cars and the men's
regimental badges, are an indication of impending troop
movements.
In the course of the same days, troop movements were
definitely observed in the provinces, on one side through
Saxony and Silesia in the direction of Gleiwitz, on the
other in Franconia in the direction of Austria.
In spite of camouflage it was possible to identify
light armoured units coming from Northern Germany, as well
as certain anti-aircraft units. On the other hand, on March
12 no preparations could be noticed in Austria north of
Vienna, or in Vienna itself. That region, however,
[67]
is well provided with mechanized units, the second Armoured
Division especially, which is now in line.
Everything suggests that Germany will very soon resort
to force against Czechoslovakia. Although no actual measures
of mobilization, even partial, have yet been noticed,
movements of troop units belonging to the standing army are
taking place with the object either of gripping the corridor
or Moravia in a vice, or of surrounding the entire Bohemian
Quadrilateral.
It appears from more recent information that, on the
one hand Staff officers are to leave Berlin to-morrow
morning, March 14, in order to take part in the operation,
and also that the Black Militia would be entrusted with
vanguard duties.
COULONDRE.
No. 56
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 13, 1939.
According to the declarations obtained by one of our
correspondents this evening from a German who occupies an
important post in one of the Ministries, the fate of Bohemia
and Moravia is now settled. What Germany wants is the
annexation of these provinces pure and simple. "It is not
for the sake of Mgr. Tiso," said the person in question,
"that our divisions are marching and that we are mobilizing
several major aircraft units. You should understand that we
intend to settle the question finally. Today an ultimatum
will be sent to the Prague Government. The answer we receive
is immaterial. It will be overtaken by events by the time it
reaches us."
This latter indication should, in my opinion, be
transmitted to Prague as a matter of the utmost urgency. It
would be desirable for the Czech Government to take the
necessary steps so as not to be overtaken by events as
happened in September.
COULONDRE.
No. 57
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 13, 1939.
ONE may well wonder what political designs are to be
realized by
[68]
the display of force which I have reported. Though the
secret appears to have been well kept, it seems,
nevertheless, that the attitude of the German Press is
sufficient to enlighten us.
As early as March 10 a D.N.B. dispatch made it known
that Mgr. Tiso had actually addressed a note to the German
Government. From that moment the newspapers of the Reich
have been maintaining that the only regular Slovak
Government for Germany was that of Mgr. Tiso. Yesterday, a
new element appeared: the violent attitude adopted by the
Czechs towards the German minority who made common cause
with the Slovak extremists. But today the quarrels between
Czechs and Slovaks are relegated to the background in the
Press, which is clamorously denouncing the regime of terror
which the Czechs are supposed to have unleashed, as in M.
Benes's time against the Slovak separatists as well as those
of Bohemia and Moravia. The evolution in the German attitude
towards the neighbouring country, which had become
noticeable in the last few months, is now taking definite
shape. It certainly looks as if the policy of reducing
Czechoslovakia to a vassal state was giving way to that of
separating of its component nationalities. It also appears
that the Reich, while favouring the independence of
Slovakia, is supporting the Polish and Hungarian claims on
Ruthenia, which, if it secedes from Czechoslovakia, must
inevitably fall into the hands of its neighbours. The future
will show what sort of bartering with Budapest and Warsaw
such a policy will involve. For the time being, in order
that this policy should succeed, there must be a pretext for
intervention. As in September last, the German Press
denounces the persecutions alleged to have been suffered by
German nationals, or by members of the German minority in
Czechoslovakia. As in September, the newspapers announce
that concentrations of Czech troops are taking place near
the German frontiers. The German population, from what I
hear, feels, as it did last autumn, a certain uneasiness
caused by military preparations and by current rumours. They
fear some rash adventure. But this factor appears to be even
less decisive than it was in September. The leaders of the
Reich, judging by news that reaches me from German sources,
are not reckoning with any resistance whatsoever from the
Czechs. The intended action, in their opinion, will not
overstep the bounds of a police operation, and it appears,
by the manner in which this operation is being prepared on
the military side, that such are actually the German
Government's anticipations.
In short, the situation appears to be serious enough
for us to have
[69]
to reckon with the possibility of a resort to force in one
form or another against Czechoslovakia, Germany alleging
that she is obliged to come to the rescue of her fellow-
countrymen. My British colleague has the same feeling. This
morning he asked for an interview with the State Secretary,
with a view to obtaining indications as to the German
Government's intentions. Until now he has not been able to
see him. In view of the contemplated d‚marche of Sir Nevile
Henderson, who, by the way, has been acting without
instructions from his Government, I thought it preferable
not to ask for an interview immediately so as not to create
the impression of a concerted intervention which might
recall those of last May.
If Your Excellency considers it suitable, I could, in
view of the rapid development of events, try to see the
State Secretary as soon as possible. I could point out to
him that the French Government would very well understand
that the Reich should help in bringing about some fair
settlement between Prague and Bratislava; but I would stress
that any violent solution, by destroying the foundations of
the agreement of September 29, would seriously endanger the
policy of mutual confidence and cooperation in the spirit of
Munich, which was also manifested in the declaration of
December 6. At the same time, I would remind the State
Secretary that a mutual consultation in case of
international difficulties was provided for by the
stipulations in paragraph 3 of that declaration.
Both my British colleague and myself hold that it is
essential that the necessary advice be given to Prague, so
that no pretext for intervention and no argument that might
be used for purposes of internal propaganda be supplied to
the Reich.
COULONDRE.
No. 58
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 14, 1939.
I HAVE just learnt that the Reich has presented an
ultimatum or an imperative demand. My informant, who was not
able to learn the object of this demand, was left with the
impression that the answer need not be given immediately.
According to certain rumours, the resignation of the Cabinet
is contemplated.
LACROIX.
[70]
No. 59
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 14, 1939.
THE reception given to Mgr. Tiso and M. Durcansky by
the German Chancellor, and the open intervention of the
Reich in the Czechoslovak conflict immediately broke the
energy shown by the Government of Prague towards the Slovak
extremists. The sitting of the Bratislava Diet now in
progress is probably taking place under the influence of
radical elements. The principal organ of the Czech national
bloc, the Venkov, seems to be preparing its readers for the
proclamation of Slovakia's complete independence.
LACROIX.
No. 60
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 14, 1939.
THE language used by the wireless station in Vienna on
the Czechoslovak crisis, being more forceful than
yesterday's broadcast, is creating intense anxiety here. The
speaker, making capital out of various incidents which
occurred last Sunday in the towns of Moravia, declared that
the Germans were again being subjected to ill-treatment,
that the Czech Government seemed inclined to return to the
methods of the Benes regime towards the German and Slovak
population, and that this would not be tolerated by the
Reich. According to the same station, a "Marxist plot was
actually being hatched in Prague."
The official agency and the daily Narodni Prace, which
is the organ of the national workers' party, gave an
emphatic denial to this assertion yesterday evening. The
threats and accusations of Germany are strikingly
reminiscent of the tactics employed by her at the beginning
of September, as well as on the eve of the Anschluss.
LACROIX.
No. 61
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague.
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 14, 1939.
As I had foretold, it seems to be confirmed that
Germany has de-
[71]
mended a reshuffle of the Prague Cabinet. She is said to
have made an imperative d‚marche yesterday evening to demand
the dismissal of several Ministers' whom she considers not
sufficiently docile, or suspect of sympathy with the
tendencies of the former regime in their home policy.
According to certain information it even appears that a
complete change in the ministry must be expected very soon.
German pressure has made the small fascist groups against
which measures were recently taken, increasingly bold. They
maintain that General Gajda will be the next President of
the Council.
LACROIX.
No. 62
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 14, 1939.
WITH regard to the visit which Mgr. Tiso, accompanied
by M. Durcansky, made to Berlin yesterday, I have gathered
the following information.
A telegram from Berlin inviting Mgr. Tiso to go to the
Fhrer without delay was received at Bratislava at about ten
o'clock yesterday morning. After conferring with the
principal leaders of the Slovak People's Party, Mgr. Tiso
decided to obey this summons. In the course of the interview
which he had with Herr Hitler towards the end of the
afternoon, the latter declared that he desired to see a
completely free Slovakia, and that in other respects it
rested with the Slovak people to choose their own destiny.
Mgr. Tiso and M. Durcansky conferred from nine p.m. until
three a.m. with Herr von Ribbentrop and various Nazi high
Officials and dignitaries, in particular with Herr Keppler,
who appears to have played an important part in the whole
affair.
They are said to have examined every aspect of the
situation and any further developments which might result
from it, and the conclusion arrived at through these
discussions appears to be that the salvation for the Slovaks
can only lie in complete separation from Prague.
It is announced that the Slovak Diet, whose sitting was
to take place today but had been postponed until the 28th,
will now sit this morning; it is anticipated that it will
vote in favour of complete independence for the country. The
Slovak Ministers are said to have
[72]
from the Nazi leaders an assurance that Germany's friendship
will be given to an independent Slovakia.
COULONDRE.
No. 63
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 14, 1939.
THE State Secretary, who this morning received my
British colleague, gave him in substance the following
information:
Germany holds the Tiso Government to be the only legal
Government. She considers the action taken against it by the
Prague Government contrary to the constitution.
The Reich desires the maintenance of order, proper
treatment for the German minority and the final elimination
of "the Benes spirit."
It has not yet been decided in Berlin what action will
be taken, and up to the present no ultimatum has been
addressed to the Prague Government. It is considered that
matters can be settled in a decent manner, especially if the
Czech Government respects the decision of the Slovak Diet.
Moreover, the line of policy to be observed in regard to
Czechoslovakia is a matter of divergent opinions and has not
yet been fixed.
The State Secretary has indicated to Sir Nevile
Henderson that the Reich Government had no contact with the
Czech Government, but that he personally did not consider
that there was any objection to such contact, provided that
it took place between Governments.
In giving his account of that conversation to the
Foreign Office my colleague said in conclusion that there is
still hesitation in Berlin over the line of conduct to be
adopted. This is certainly the impression which Herr von
Weizs„cker gives; but I am not certain that the declarations
of the State Secretary are still in accordance with the
actual facts.
I am inclined to believe that the National-Socialist
Government has from now on decided on a break-up of the
nationalities constituting Czechoslovakia, a break-up which
would be only the first step in a complete partition of the
country.
COULONDRE.
[73]
No. 64
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
March 14, 1939.
For London: I am sending the following telegram to our
ambassador in Berlin.
For both: Until now the Munich Agreement has been
presented even in Germany, as a vital element in the peace
of Central Europe and, in a more general way, as a decisive
step in the promotion of mutual confidence between the
principal European Powers interested in the maintenance of
that peace, among whom it should create both a formal basis
for understanding and at the same time an atmosphere of
cooperation which would prevent any future resort to force.
More particularly, as far as Czechoslovakia is
concerned, Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement, referring to
an international guarantee of the new frontiers of the
Czechoslovak State, established between the four
signatories, by means of definite stipulations, an
incontestable solidarity of purpose.
It was, moreover, the wider implication, attributed to
the Munich Agreement, which brought about the easing of
Franco-German relations, marked by the declaration of
December 6, with all that this implied in the political,
economic and cultural spheres.
It is therefore with the most concern that the French
Government is following the development of events in
Slovakia. The attitude to be adopted on this occasion by the
Reich Government cannot but provide a lesson which will
throw a light upon many essential questions for the future
relations of Germany with the rest of Europe.
Taking into account the foregoing considerations you
should inquire most urgently from Herr von Ribbentrop what
interpretation, in the opinion of the Reich authorities
themselves, is to be put on their action in Slovakia. You
should make this inquiry purely as a request for
information, the importance of which would justify, if
necessary, a reference on your part to the procedure of
mutual consultation provided for by the declaration of
December 6.
Inasmuch as the French Government intends to respond in
all sincerity to the new orientation resulting from the
Munich Agreement and the Franco-German Declaration, Berlin
cannot be surprised at
[74]
our present anxiety to obtain a clear means of judging the
degree of confidence which the German Government means to
establish as a justification of that policy.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 65
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 14, 1939.
IMMEDIATELY after the Vienna Award, while the German
Press was celebrating the "final" nature of the German-
Italian solution, a farsighted observer of affairs in
Central Europe stated in Berlin: "The old Czechoslovakia has
lasted twenty years, the new Czechoslovak State will not
last five." Events which are now taking place have proved
him right inasmuch as the Czechoslovakia of November 2,
1938, did not even last five months.
This evening, leading newspapers of the National-
Socialists are announcing as an accomplished fact the
disruption of the neighbouring State. The Diet of Bratislava
proclaimed this morning the independence of Slovakia,
Hungarian troops have crossed the frontier of Sub-Carpathian
Russia; and, in reprisal for incidents more or less
provoked, at Iglau, Brunn and elsewhere, the threat of a
"crushing" intervention of the Reichswehr hovers over
Bohemia and Moravia. According to rumours as yet
unconfirmed, German detachments have penetrated Czech
territory at several points.
It is striking to note once again the rapidity and
precision with which Hitler's political plans have been
accomplished, for it is beyond any question of doubt that
the present crisis is in accordance with a carefully
preconceived plan of which Berlin holds the principal
strings. This Embassy has recently collected various
information which leaves no uncertainty on this point. On
February 5 a National-Socialist of standing, whose duties
call for direct contact with the Fhrer's immediate circle,
told one of my collaborators to be prepared for developments
in which a "dislocation" (Aufl”sung) of Czechoslovakia would
be unavoidable. In this case, he added, Slovakia would
become independent, Hungary would annex Sub-Carpathian
Russia, and the Reich would, in one form or another, obtain
control of Bohemia and of Moravia. It is this process of
disruption, this dissection of Czechoslovakia, into three
pieces, which is being brought about today.
[75]
In explanation of this astonishing gift of prophecy,
one can admit that the controlling circles of the Third
Reich possessed at that time most precise information of the
attitude of the Slovak people. They could form a better
judgment of the developments in the situation since they
exercised a strong control over it. But there is a more
simple explanation: German policy had first decided upon its
aims in outline. After that all that remained was to find
means of inventing pretexts.
Now the partition of Czechoslovakia into three pieces
allowed Germany a revision, if not a complete change in her
policy towards that country. After Munich, the National-
Socialist leaders officially took upon themselves the task
of maintaining, in its then reduced limits, the integrity of
the new Czechoslovak State. They considered at that time
that a vassal Czechoslovakia, obedient to the will of the
Reich would afford the latter a starting-point for her
expansion towards the South-East, an expansion which had
only to follow the corridor of Sub-Carpathian Russia to
reach the oil-wells of Rumania and the wheat fields of the
Ukraine. Hence Germany's veto to the Hungarian-Polish
project of a common frontier, hence her stubborn
determination in Vienna on November 2 to safeguard the
existence of an independent Carpathian Ukraine within the
frame of the Czechoslovak State.
Today, Berlin does not hesitate to retract. The Nazi
leaders are renouncing the principle of Czechoslovakian
integrity. They are removing their opposition to the plan of
a Polish-Hungarian frontier on the Carpathians. It is
interesting to speculate when, how, and for what reasons
this change of mind has occurred.
During the whole of the month of November and a part of
the month of December 1938 the inspired Press of the Reich
never ceased to present the Belvedere arbitration as a fair
compromise bringing a definite solution to the Hungarian-
Czechoslovak difficulties. The Poles, having themselves
obtained complete satisfaction over their national claims in
the region of Teschen, the new Czechoslovakia was, according
to the German Press, a solid State which would prove to the
world the superiority of the political conceptions of the
Axis to the superficial structure built up immediately after
the Great War by the Peace Treaties. This assertion was
accompanied at times by calls to order addressed sometimes
to the Hungarians, sometimes to the Poles when they appeared
insufficiently convinced of the immutability of the
established state of things.
Towards the end of December, there was sudden silence
over the advantages of the Vienna Award. In January, there
was no longer
[76]
any mention of it, and in a speech delivered to the
Reichstag the Fhrer only touched lightly on the
Czechoslovak problem. It is, therefore, permissible to
conclude that it was towards the end of the year 1938, that
Chancellor Hitler decided for definite motives to fall back
on the lines which Italian political circles had continued
to recommend in respect of Sub-Carpathian Russia.
Indeed, on January 7, the Fhrer, when receiving
Colonel Beck at Berchtesgaden, declared to him that in his
opinion the Ukrainian question was not of "immediate
interest." It seems that with Count Czaky, at the time of
his official visit to Berlin (January 16 to 18), the ruling
elements of the Reich were still more explicit, and that the
Hungarian Minister was given to understand that the Reich
would not oppose, should occasion arise, the seizure of Sub-
Carpathian Russia by Budapest.
What reasons can have induced the Fhrer to modify his
attitude in this respect? On this point, as things at
present stand, one is naturally reduced to conjecture.
Possibly, as the correspondence from this Embassy has
already indicated, the Nazi leaders realized that they were
mistaken about the importance, for the purpose of a future
German advance towards the East, of a Sub-Carpathian Russia
that had been dismantled and deprived of its urban centres,
its main roads and its railways by the Belvedere arbitral
award. Then again, in order to keep in hand such an
uncertain trump card, could the Third Reich allow its
difficulties in Central Europe to increase, incur the
rancour of the Hungarians and the resentment of the Poles?
It was rumoured that the coming together of Warsaw and
Moscow and the vehement tone of a part of the Press and of
the Hungarian Opposition had aroused Adolf Hitler's concern.
In trying to avoid the material obstacle of the common
frontier was he not going to rouse against him the joint
hostility of Hungary and of Poland, just at a time when the
Western Powers were striving to reinforce their armaments?
By yielding to the Hungarian-Polish plans, the Reich would,
on the contrary, be assured of the gratitude of the Magyars
and of their eventual support against Rumania and, on the
day when he decided to resume his drive towards the East he
would have at his disposal the broad fairway of the
Hungarian plains instead of the narrow and difficult path of
the Carpathians. As far as Poland is concerned, Berlin has
possibly flattered itself that Polish neutrality in case of
a European conflict could be bought by freeing Poland from
the danger of having
[77]
at her Southern frontier an independent Ukrainian province
which would be the centre of propaganda and irredentist
unrest.
However, the decision once having been taken, German
policy definitely intended to press forward. The reply of
the Wilhelmstrasse to the Franco-British inquiry concerning
the guaranteeing of the new Czechoslovak frontier leaves no
doubt on this score. This note, dated February 28, is the
first official German document to admit, to Paris and
London, the failure of the Vienna Award. This position
permitted the Reich Government to refuse its guarantee and,
in consequence, left it the possibility to reconsider the
whole matter. In well-informed Berlin circles, no secret had
been made of the fact that in this respect the date of March
15 might be decisive.
It remained, then, only to find means of action and
pretexts. It is an established dogma of National-Socialist
policy to undermine from inside the States which are to be
destroyed. The Slovaks appear to have played this time the
part played by the Sudetens last year. By secretly
encouraging the uncompromising Slovak elements, notably the
partisans of the Radical movement "Rodebrana," and by
stirring up against Prague certain Slovak Ministers such as
M. Mach and M. Durcansky, Hitler's agents cunningly caused
this variance to degenerate into an acute crisis. If there
were, as has been stated, any project of a Putsch at
Bratislava there are good reasons for believing that the
German authorities were in the secret. It was not simply by
chance that M. Durcansky, as soon as he was able to escape,
took refuge in Vienna, where the radio was put at his
disposal to allow him to carry on his anti-Czech campaign.
Prague appears to have tried to forestall this measure,
but too late Perhaps, also, the policy of the Central
Government was not always perfectly clear or wise. If the
Czech leaders have expressed ample signs of goodwill towards
Berlin, it seems that they have believed that at the same
time they could continue inside their country a policy which
was purely Czech. In doing this, they have revived old
internal jealousies and needlessly aroused the suspicions of
the Reich. This movement, once started, developed according
to the prescription, tried out at the time of the Anschluss
and improved during last year's crisis. The Tiso note
recalls the Seyss-Inquart telegram. The incidents which took
place at Iglau, Brunn and other German-speaking centres were
used to transform at a given moment the Czechoslovak
conflict into a German-Czech conflict. One finds again in
the Berlin papers the same headlines as in August 1938, and
almost the same statements:
[78]
the pregnant woman struck down and trampled upon, the
"Deutschtum" in danger, because a student of the German
minority was ill-treated and in the headings of tonight's
papers the final motive of a "Blutbad" which must be
avenged. In the meantime Mgr. Tiso and M. Durcansky have
gone in a dramatic way to the Fhrer, as Herr Henlein had
previously done.
It is still too early to know to what extent the almost
desperate effort now being made in Berlin by the President
of the Czechoslovak Republic and his Prime Minister will
modify the German attitude and safeguard the federal unity
of the country. It is to be feared that the two statesmen
only came from Prague to ratify the Fhrer's decisions.
COULONDRE.
No. 66
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 14, 1939.
IN a previous letter I have set forth the origin and
growth of the crisis which must lead to the division and
perhaps to the partition of Czechoslovakia. I will therefore
confine myself now to summing up the political situation as
it appears in Berlin at the present moment. The most
important point is the proclamation in Bratislava this
morning of the independence of Slovakia, which has now
severed its ties with Prague and thus broken up the
framework of the Czechoslovak Federal State. One may wonder
whether the internal Czechoslovak crisis has not, by the
rapidity of its growth, surprised even the leaders of the
Reich, but one can hardly doubt that at the last moment the
proclamation of Slovak independence was the outcome of
pressure, if not of a direct order, from Berlin. It was, as
a matter of fact, during the course of the visit paid
yesterday by Mgr. Tiso to the capital of the Reich that the
decision was taken to convoke this morning the Slovak Diet
whose meeting, originally fixed for today, had been
postponed till the 28th.
From indications which I have been able to gather
concerning the interviews Mgr. Tiso had in Berlin, it would
seem that the Reich leaders and the Fhrer himself had shown
clearly their determination that a completely free Slovakia
should be created. It is only upon this condition that the
friendship and protection of the Nazi leaders, indis-
[79]
pensable to the new State, will be granted. Slovakia,
therefore, must be regarded as a vassal of the Reich.
Events in Slovakia have had an immediate repercussion
in Sub-Carpathian Russia; Mgr. Volosin has also proclaimed
the independence of his country, whose position now appears
most intricate. Indeed, as the result of dashes with the
Czech forces, Hungarian troops have already entered
Ruthenian territory, while the Government of Budapest has
addressed an ultimatum to Prague demanding the immediate
withdrawal of Czech troops from Sub-Carpathian Russia. Mgr.
Volosin, on his part, has asked by telegram for help and
protection from the Reich and from Italy. It is unlikely
that these two countries will accede to this request.
Now after the Slovak proclamation of independence which
has cut the Federal Republic into three sections, Sub-
Carpathian Russia, hitherto supported by subsidies from
Prague, can no longer survive. Its existence appears very
ephemeral. In all probability it will be absorbed by
Hungary. This at least is the point of view expressed in
those German newspapers which are mouthpieces of official
circles. Thus would be established the common frontier, so
ardently desired by Warsaw and Budapest, which since the
verdict of Vienna has been the subject of such bitter
controversy. Finally the future of what remains of the
Czechoslovak Republic, that is of Bohemia and Moravia, is
itself under discussion.
The Reich is again bringing great political pressure to
bear on the Prague Government accompanied by the threats of
military action.
Following upon the quarrels between Czechs and Slovaks
one can notice since last Sunday a sudden revival, in its
most virulent form, of the campaign which the German Press
launched last September against Czechoslovakia. The Czechs
are once more accused of using violence not only against the
Slovaks but also against others, and especially against
members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich.
The newspapers are proclaiming that the lives of these
Germans are in danger, that the situation is intolerable,
and that it is necessary to smother as quickly as possible
the focus of trouble which Prague has become in the heart of
Europe. They have even gone to the length of asserting that
the Czech Government is mobilizing.
This morning officials of the Reich press-service, in
discussing the subject with the representatives of foreign
news agencies, declared that the situation was "unbearable,"
and let it be understood that grave developments must be
expected.
[80]
In the meantime the German High Command has
concentrated around Bohemia and Moravia (that is to say, in
Silesia, in Saxony, in Bavaria and in Austria) considerable
numbers of troops, consisting for the most part of
mechanized units, which are now awaiting the order to cross
the frontier. The general impression is that this order will
be given some time to-morrow. It is even stated that Pilsen
will be occupied by German troops. They are said already to
have crossed the frontier in the region of Morawska-Ostrawa.
It seems that after a moment of confusion Prague has
pulled itself together and a last effort is being made to
avoid a rupture with the Reich. The President of the
Republic and the President of the Council of Ministers are
now on their way to Berlin.
Will they succeed in averting the military menace once
more hanging over their country? It seems very doubtful. The
German-Czech crisis has in a few days reached a stage as
acute as in the darkest days of September. The use of force
against Prague appears imminent. It would doubtless be
accompanied by parallel measures in Slovakia, whither the
Czechs have sent important reinforcements during the last
few days.
What are the designs of the Reich leaders with regard
to this State, which for some time they have been referring
to as "Czechia"?
Before and during the September crisis the Nazi leaders
made no secret of their clear determination to wipe
Czechoslovakia off the map. During last January the Fhrer
himself told one of my colleagues that if Czechoslovakia did
not "run straight," he would release a lightning attack
against it. Quite recently one of the Chancellor's intimates
spoke of this very dissolution of Czechoslovakia which the
Reich press is gloatingly proclaiming tonight.
If the fate of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia now
appears obvious it is more difficult to perceive the
Fhrer's intentions towards "Czechia."
According to my information, the Nazi extremists are
calling for nothing less than the annexation of Bohemia and
Moravia by the Reich, which would in return grant these
provinces some form of administrative and cultural autonomy.
Others advise the setting up in Prague of an authoritarian
Government whose head would be General Gajda, Dr. Benes's
relentless enemy. Such a Government in matters of both
internal and foreign policy would have to conform absolutely
to the views of Germany.
It is said that at present the Chancellor, having been
disappointed
[81]
over the results of the Munich Agreement, inclines towards
the extremist plan as he is seeking this time a radical
solution.
In any case the Reich Government would demand the
complete disarmament of "Czechia."
Such appears to be the situation at the present moment
when M. Hacha and M. Beran are about to arrive in Berlin,
where they will be received as representatives of the State
of Bohemia and Moravia.
COULONDRE.
No. 67
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 15, 1939.
THE German troops will occupy Prague at ten o'clock
this morning. Battalions of parachutists will descend near
the town.
M. Hacha, in the presence of M. Chvalkovsky, signed
during the course of interviews which he had last night with
the Fhrer, Field-Marshal Goering and Herr von Ribbentrop a
declaration placing the destinies of Bohemia and Moravia in
the hands of the Reich.
The German troops will occupy the whole of the two
provinces. Czech troops are from now onwards confined to
their barracks. Field-Marshal Goering has announced that if
there is the slightest attempt at resistance the Reich Air
Force, which is massed around Czechoslovakia, will give a
demonstration on Prague to show the Czechs what resistance
to Germany would cost them.
Bohemia and Moravia will be simply annexed, as was done
in the case of Austria. At the same time a certain measure
of political and cultural autonomy will be permitted to
them. The formula has not yet been drawn up. M. Hacha will
remain President of Bohemia and Moravia. The Czechs will not
become citizens of the Reich but will have a status somewhat
similar to that of the Jews.
Czechoslovakia will no longer be diplomatically
represented in foreign countries. The German Legation will
be provisionally maintained in Prague, but it is not certain
that the Czech Legation will be maintained in Berlin.
One cannot say that any negotiations have taken place
between the Czech and German Ministers. The Fhrer made it
known from the beginning that his decision had been taken,
and that anyone who opposed it would be crushed.
[82]
The Czech Ministers have been informed that the gold
reserves of the Czech Bank must be put at the disposal of
the Reich. The same applies to the whole of the gold and
foreign currency owned by individual Czech citizens.
COULONDRE.
No. 68
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 15, 1939.
FOLLOWING Your Excellency's instructions I have this
morning asked for an audience from Herr von Ribbentrop.
As the latter is, according to the reply I received,
away from Berhn, I will see Herr von Weizs„cker at midday
(German time). I have progressively kept you informed of the
course of events since yesterday, namely the entry of the
German troops into Morawska-Ostrawa, the conference between
the Chancellor and President Hacha, followed by the signing
of the agreement, the text of which has been communicated to
you, the Fhrer's proclamation and finally the Reich Army's
rapid occupation of Bohemian and Moravian territories. All
this has taken place within a few hours and events have thus
outrun the limits which your instructions had set to the
conversation I am due presently to have.
Owing to this speedy development of events I propose,
during my interview with Herr von Weizs„cker, to reserve in
the most formal manner both full liberty of appreciation and
the attitude which the French Government may adopt at a
later period in regard to the situation with which they are
confronted.
COULONDRE.
No. 69
COUNT VON WELCZECK, German Ambassador in Paris,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Paris,
March 15, 1939.
YOUR Excellency,
On behalf of my Government I have the honour to inform
Your Excellency as follows:
[83]
On the evening of March 14 the President of the Czech
State, Dr. Hacha, was received, according to his wish, by
the Fhrer and Chancellor of the Reich. In the course of the
discussions which followed an agreement was reached, the
text of which I have the honour to communicate to you
herewith. May I ask Your Excellency to bring to the notice
of the French Government the above facts and also the text
of the agreement here enclosed. Acting on the order of my
Government I have the following further communication to
make to Your Excellency:
In accordance with the enclosed agreement German troops
crossed the Czech frontier at six o'clock this morning and
will assume responsibility for the re-establishment of order
in Czech territory. Dr. Hacha, President of the Czech State,
and Dr. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs,
have given their assent to any measures necessary to prevent
resistance in any form, and to avoid bloodshed. The
competent Czech authorities, both military and civil, have
received instructions to this effect. In consequence, there
are grounds for assuming that the process of occupying and
pacifying the territories concerned will be carried out
calmly and in perfect order.
I
am, etc.,
WELCZECK.
AGREEMENT
The Fhrer and Chancellor of the Reich has today
received, at their own desire and in the presence of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, Herr von
Ribbentrop, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr.
Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Dr. Chvalkovsky. In the course of the meeting the serious
situation created by events which have occurred during these
last few weeks on what was until now Czechoslovak territory
was discussed with the utmost frankness. Both parties agreed
in expressing the conviction that the aim of all their
efforts ought to be to ensure tranquillity, order and peace
in this part of Central Europe. The President of the
Czechoslovak State has declared that to serve this purpose,
and with the object of securing a final appeasement, he
entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech
people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fhrer of
the German Reich. The Fhrer has accepted this declaration
and expressed his resolve to take the Czech people under the
protection of the German Reich, assuring it of an autono-
[84]
mous development suited to its own character. In testimony
whereof this document has been signed in two copies.
Berlin, March 15, 1939. ADOLF HITLER,
DR. HACHA,
DR. VON RIBBENTROP,
DR. CHVALKOVSKY.
No. 70
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 15, 1939.
IN accordance with your instructions I had an interview
with the State Secretary this morning. After reading the
text of your telephoned message I summed it up for Herr von
Weizs„cker. I pointed out to the State Secretary that he
should realize with what deep concern I had heard of the
entry of German troops into Moravia. This military
intervention was contrary to the Munich Agreement and to the
Declaration of December 6. Consequently I had to reserve
absolutely the judgment and attitude of my Government, and I
requested Herr von Weizs„cker to enlighten me as to the
precise intentions of the German Government.
The State Secretary replied as follows: "The present
state of affairs was brought about by the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia. Ruthenia, in which separatism has been
active, is now partly occupied by Hungarian troops. Slovakia
has proclaimed her independence; the action taken by the
Government of Prague against the Government of Slovakia also
hastened the movement which led to this proclamation.
"As far as Bohemia and Moravia are concerned,
hostilities have broken out there; German blood has been
shed and the German Government felt compelled immediately to
come to the rescue of the threatened German minority. The
agreement reached this morning between the leaders of the
German and Czech States in the presence of their Ministers
for Foreign Affairs definitely settles the question of
Bohemia and Moravia."
I did not fail to point out to Herr von Weizs„cker that
the entry of German troops into Moravia and the military
pressure brought to bear on Czechoslovakia threw a peculiar
light on the nature and conditions of this agreement. The
State Secretary answered that after two hours conversation
with the German Chancellor, the President of the
[85]
Republic was convinced that the Czech Government was
incapable of preventing the return to active politics of M.
Benes's adherents, and had signed the agreement and placed
the future of his country in the hands of the Fhrer.
I then told Herr von Weizs„cker that for the moment I
must urge him to enable me to furnish the French Government
with full information regarding the intentions of the Reich
towards Czechoslovakia, and especially with regard to an
eventual withdrawal of the German troops from Bohemia and
Moravia, and to the independence of the country.
Herr von Weizs„cker replied that as to Bohemia and
Moravia he could only ask me to refer again to the terms of
the agreement between Berlin and Prague. He had nothing
further to add. The Reich recognized the independence of
Slovakia. As for Ruthenia, its fate must be discussed with
Hungary. The explanations of the State Secretary show that
the German Government intends, under cover of this
agreement, to impose on the Czech plenipotentiaries the
annexation of Bohemia and Moravia-which can already be
considered as a fait accompli.
COULONDRE.
No. 71
M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 15, 1939.
MY British colleague has learnt that Herr Hitler and
Herr von Ribbentrop declared to the Czechoslovak Ministers
last night that if the German troops met with the slightest
resistance on their entry there would be terrible reprisals.
M. Hacha is said to have then put the Czechoslovak nation
under the protection of the German Chancellor. The Fhrer
appears to have replied that he would ensure the continued
development of a certain cultural autonomy. According to
what I learn at this very moment, the D.N.B. mentions this
last assurance.
LACROIX.
No. 72
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London.
Paris,
March 16, 1939.
THE urgent representations which our Ambassador in
Berlin was
[86]
instructed to make were based upon the same anxiety for
preliminary information which governed the attitude of Lord
Halifax.
This d‚marche has proved belated since the events of
today have given an answer. The development of the situation
which was at first limited to the separation of Slovakia has
ended this morning in the occupation of Prague and the de
facto annexation by the Reich of Bohemia and Moravia. The
agreements concluded at Munich have been flagrantly
violated.
As it is impossible for this violation to be accepted
without reaction from Governments who are concerned in
estimating its full importance, it is imperative to point
out without delay to the German authorities the deductions
which we are obliged to draw from events which jeopardize
the confidence that the agreements of September 29 were
designed to restore.
In calling the attention of the State Secretary to this
new situation you should emphasize that if we were to accept
without protest so explicit a violation of the Munich
Agreement it might lead to a doubt as to the good faith with
which Britain and France had embarked on September 29 on a
political settlement whose whole justification was, by
liberating the Sudeten, to safeguard at the very least the
independence and integrity of a more homogeneous
Czechoslovakia placed under an international guarantee. The
Governments, who gave their assent to a compromise intended
to assure the survival of Czechoslovakia, cannot today watch
in silence the dismemberment of the Czech people and the
annexation of their territory without being accused in
retrospect of complaisance and moral complicity. The
enforced submission of the Prague Government, brutally
imposed by German pressure, cannot be invoked to absolve
Great Britain and France from their moral obligation in the
eyes of their own people and of those of other States as
well as of the Czechoslovak nation. They owe it to
international opinion, as well as to themselves, to register
a formal protest against this act of force by which Germany,
in contempt of the rights of a nation, has destroyed the
contractual basis of the first attempt at an understanding
between the four great European Powers.
You should represent to Lord Halifax the full
importance of these considerations and satisfy yourself that
the British Government agree that the British and French
representatives should immediately take concerted action in
Berlin.
GEORGES BONNET.
[87]
No. 73
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 16, 1939.
LESS than six months after the conclusion of the Munich
Agreement and hardly four months after the Vienna Award,
Germany, treating her own and her partners' signatures as
negligible quantities has brought about the dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia, occupied with her army Bohemia and Moravia
and annexed both these provinces to the Reich. Since
yesterday, March 15, the swastika has been flying over the
Hradschin, while the Fhrer, protected by tanks and armoured
cars, entered the city among a staggered and thunder-struck
population. Slovakia has broken away. A so-called
independent state, she has in fact placed herself under the
protection of Germany. Sub-Carpathian Russia has been left
to Hungary, whose troops have already crossed the frontier.
Czechoslovakia, which at Munich agreed to such cruel
sacrifices for the sake of peace, no longer exists. The
dream of those Nazis who were most eager for her destruction
has been realized. Czechoslovakia has vanished from the map
of Europe.
The events, which have led up to this result with a
lightning speed are typical of the mentality and the methods
of the Nazi rulers. They carry with them certain lessons and
practical conclusions which all States anxious for their
independence and security should draw without delay, faced
as they are with a Germany intoxicated by success and which,
abandoning the line of racial claims, is plunging forward
into sheer imperialism.
The operation to which Czechoslovakia has just fallen a
victim bears to an even greater degree than former coups the
characteristic marks of Nazi action: cynicism and treachery
in conception, secrecy in preparation and brutality in
execution.
At Munich, the Nazi leaders and the Fhrer himself had
laid great stress on the impossibility for Germans and
Czechs to live together in the same State; they had urged
the implacable and age-long hatred of the Czechs for
everything German; they had asserted that the maintenance of
peace depended on a line being drawn strictly between the
two nationalities; they had managed to convince Lord
Runciman of this necessity whilst protesting on the other
hand that they had no wish to incorporate alien elements in
the Reich. It was in virtue
[88]
of these principles that the negotiators assembled in the
Bavarian capital had compelled the Prague Government to hand
over territories in which the German population was
predominant. In exchange, Czechoslovakia was to receive an
international guarantee of her new frontiers, a guarantee in
which Germany herself would take part.
Actually, it very soon appeared, during the work of the
International Commission at Berlin at the beginning of
October, that the German negotiators were guided far more by
strategical than by ethnographical considerations. The
numerous interventions of the Wehrmacht's Oberkommando
during the course of these negotiations showed that the
German leaders intended above all to draw a frontier which
would deprive Czechoslovakia of all her natural defences and
fortifications, and would reduce her to complete military
impotence. Indeed, the boundaries which the Prague
Government had to accept in October meant the inclusion of
850,000 Czechs within the Reich.
Today there is no further question of the separation of
Czechs from Germans, which was claimed to be so
indispensable to peace in the Danube basin and in Europe.
Completely reversing her tactics, Germany has again brought
into being that German-Czech amalgamation, the elements of
which she had declared last September to be incompatible.
Whereas a few months ago, she was saying that the co-
existence of these two racial groups was an impossibility,
she now claims to show that such a co-existence is entirely
natural, that it can be historically justified and that it
is the result of certain economic and geographical
necessities. There is no further question of the implacable
and age-long hatred between Germans and Czechs: on the
contrary, it is held that the two peoples can and must live
in harmony together inside one political community.
The Munich agreements, therefore, were for the Nazi
rulers nothing but a means of disarming Czechoslovakia
before annexing it. It would, perhaps, be going rather far
to assert that the Fhrer had conceived this project even at
Munich. What is beyond all doubt is that, by annexing under
threat of arms the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, the
Government of the Reich, a signatory to the September
agreements, is guilty of a breach of trust, of a real act of
treachery to the co-signatory States, particularly the Czech
Government which, trusting in the word of the Great Powers,
had resigned itself to handing over the Sudeten territories.
It was in the name of this ethnographical principle
that the Reich had obtained the return of three and a half
million Germans in
[89]
September. It is in contempt of this principle that it
annexes eight million Czechs today, left defenseless by the
handing over of the Sudeten territory.
It is the principle of the right of peoples to self-
determination that Germany now invokes in support of the
independence (in any case purely illusory) of Slovakia, but
this same right is refused to the Carpatho-Ukrainians
abandoned to Hungary, and to the Czechs who have been
forcibly incorporated in the Reich.
Germany has once again demonstrated her contempt for
all written pledges and her preference for methods of brute
force and the fait accompli. Without scruple she has torn up
the Munich Agreement as well as the Vienna Award, proving
yet again that her policy has only one guiding principle: to
watch for a suitable opportunity and to seize any booty
within reach. It is, more or less, the morality common to
the gangster and to the denizens of the jungle.
German cynicism has, moreover, been accompanied by
consummate skill. With a remarkable control of men and
events, the Government of the Reich has been at pains to
give an appearance of legality to the violence done to the
Czechs.
The official German thesis is that Czechoslovakia fell
to pieces of itself. Slovakia, it is declared, in breaking
with Prague, split the Federal Republic into three pieces.
As for Bohemia and Moravia, it was freely and of its
own volition that the Prague Government, unable to maintain
order and to protect the lives of the German minority,
placed the care of these provinces-so runs the argument in
the Fhrer's hands.
Such arguments can deceive no one.
There can be no doubt that Slovak separatism was the
work of German agents or of Slovaks controlled directly from
Berlin. M. Mach head of the propaganda department of the
Bratislava Government and a most ardent extremist, was well-
known for his entire devotion to the Reich. M. Durcansky,
Minister of Transport, who made frequent visits to Germany,
was also a mere tool in Nazi hands, particularly in those of
M. Karmasin, the "Fhrer" of the 120,000 Germans in
Slovakia. As for Mgr. Tiso, a man of little energy, although
as a priest he was worried by the growth of Nazi ideology in
his country he was incapable of opposing the separatist
tendencies encouraged by Germany. It was on account of this
weakness that the Prague Government dismissed him on March
10. This rigorous measure against Mgr.
[90]
Tiso and the latter's appeal for assistance to the Reich
Government supplied the German rulers with the excuse for
which they had been waiting to interfere in the quarrel
between the Czechs and the Slovaks.
On receipt of the note from the dismissed President,
German official circles let it be known that in their view
Mgr. Tiso's Government alone had a legal character, and
that, by appointing a new Prime Minister, Prague had
violated the Constitution. From this moment the Berlin
newspapers began to denounce the terror unleashed in
Bratislava by the Czechs against the Slovak autonomists and
their German comrades.
From the 12th onwards the tone of the Berlin Press
became more violent. Now it was not only a question of
clashes in Slovakia, but also in Bohemia and Moravia. Within
twenty-four hours the Berlin papers had relegated to the
background the sufferings of the Slovaks and denounced with
every sign of the keenest resentment the brutalities to
which Germans in Czechoslovakia were subjected, whether they
were members of the racial minority or citizens of the
Reich. To judge from the German papers, which used not only
the same language but exactly the same expressions as in
September last, the lives of the 500,000 Germans in
Czechoslovakia were in the most serious danger. The Czechs,
in whom the old Hussite spirit and the hatred of Germanism
was re-awakening, had once more organized man-hunts. The
situation was becoming intolerable.
Actually, with the exception of Bratislava, where
unrest had been fomented by the German Self-Protection
Service and by the Hlinka Guards, who had been armed by
Germany, public order had been disturbed neither in Slovakia
nor in Bohemia and Moravia. At Brunn, for example, where,
according to the German Press, German blood had been shed,
the British Consul was able to see and report to his
Minister in Prague that there was complete calm. The stories
published by the Berlin newspapers under inflammatory titles
were, furthermore, very thin in content, much like a few
grains of dust whirled along by some infernal bellows.
On the evening of the 13th the German leaders, who had
unremittingly counteracted the efforts of Prague to
establish a new Slovakian Government, summoned Mgr. Tiso to
Berlin. During the night of the 13th-14th, together with M.
Durcansky, he had a long interview with the Fhrer, who
expressed his determination to see the creation of "an
entirely free Slovakia." The proclamation of Slovak
independence should follow without delay. That same evening,
the 60
[91]
members of the Diet were summoned for the next day at
Bratislava, and Slovak independence, decided in Berlin, was
unanimously voted by them. From the afternoon of the 14th,
the German Press was in a position to declare that
Czechoslovakia had fallen to pieces, that she was in a state
of complete decay, that the Communists had reappeared and,
together with Czech chauvinists, were hunting and ill-
treating the Germans, notably at Brunn and Iglau. German
blood-so it was reported-was flowing in torrents. Germany-it
was said-could no longer tolerate such a state of affairs.
Meanwhile, 14 divisions, composed almost entirely of
mechanized units, had been concentrated on the frontiers of
Bohemia and Moravia. On the afternoon of the 14th, German
troops entered Czech territory and occupied Morawska-
Ostrawa.
Before giving the troops the order to march to the
invasion of Czech territory, it was necessary to find some
semblance of a justification. M. Hacha, President of the
Czechoslovak Republic and M. Chvalkovsky, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, arrived at Berlin where they were received
by the Fhrer in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop and
Field-Marshal Goering. Brutally, the Fhrer states that
there is no question of negotiation. The Czech statesmen are
asked to acquaint themselves with the decisions of Berlin
and to bow to them. Any sign of resistance will be crushed.
Any opposition to the German troops will be put down by
means of aerial bombardment. The Reich has decided to annex
Bohemia and Moravia. Prague will be occupied on the
following day at 10 o'clock. President Hacha, a man of great
age and in failing health, collapses and faints. Field-
Marshal Goering's own doctors intervene and bring him round
with injections. Then the old man signs the document
presented to him, by which the Czech Government places the
destiny of Bohemia and Moravia "with full confidence" in the
hands of the Fhrer.
The next day, the 15th, at nine o'clock in the morning,
the first mechanized troops reach Prague. During the
afternoon, the Fhrer enters the Imperial Castle of
Hradschin and immediately orders the swastika to be hoisted.
Czechoslovakia is no more.
The following day, the 16th, the Fhrer decrees the
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia within the Reich and
constitutes them a Protectorate with some sort of self-
administration, under the control of "Protector"
representing Germany and residing at Prague.
The same day, Mgr. Tiso, head of the new so-called
independent Slovak State, asks the Fhrer to take Slovakia
under his protection.
[92]
The Chancellor accepts at once. In fact, Slovak independence
is at an end. Mutilated by the Vienna Award, robbed of its
most fertile lands and reduced to a mountainous region, the
country cannot in any case hope for an independent
existence.
On March 12 Sub-Carpathian Russia too had proclaimed
its independence and solicited the protection of Germany.
But the Nazi leaders remained deaf to its appeal, although
that country, which for a while had played the role of
"Ukrainian Piedmont," had relied entirely upon them.
Sub-Carpathian Ukraine was invaded by Hungarian troops.
In despair, the Chust Government offered the country to
Rumania. M. Revay, Prime Minister, in a telegram to the
French Embassy in Berlin, sought to persuade the French
Government to approach the Government in Budapest in the
hope that the fate of the country might be decided by
diplomatic means and not by force of arms.
Everything seems to point to the conclusion that the
Reich has no interest in this State and is abandoning it to
Hungary.
One more feature deserves notice. It is the speed with
which the operation ending in the partition of
Czechoslovakia was decided upon and prepared.
Since the beginning of February, this Embassy had
certainly noted numerous indications of Germany's intentions
concerning Czechoslovakia. These convergent symptoms left no
doubt that the Nazis were only awaiting a favourable
opportunity to finish the work begun at Munich and to deal
the final blow to a State which, already mortally wounded,
was struggling with inextricable internal difficulties.
But it seems that the decision was not taken until
March 8 or 9, that is, after the departure of Field-Marshal
Goering for Italy, whence he was urgently recalled. Only on
March 11 and 12 came the first reports of troop movements.
On the 14th, about 200,000 men were massed on the frontiers
of Bohemia and Moravia. This concentration took place
without any disturbance of the normal life of the country.
Once more, bombers played a decisive role. They were the
unanswerable argument to which the Czech Ministers bowed,
anxious to spare their people the horrors and the
destruction of aerial bombardment.
In another letter I point out the repercussions likely
to occur in Europe as a result of the new changes brought
about in the map of the Continent under the pressure of Nazi
Germany.
[93]
In conclusion I will simply draw attention to what may
be learnt from this new coup committed by the Third Reich.
Nazi Germany has now thrown aside the mask. Until now,
she has denied the charge of imperialism. She asserted that
her only wish was to re-unite as far as possible all the
Germans of Central Europe in one family, to the exclusion of
aliens. Today, it is clear that the Fhrer's thirst for
domination knows no limit.
It is equally clear that all hopes of opposing to the
Fhrer any arguments other than those of force are in vain.
The Third Reich has the same contempt as the Empire of
Wilhelm II for treaties and pledges. Germany remains the
country of "scraps of paper."
National security as well as world peace demand from
the French people an immense effort of discipline and the
organization of the country's whole energy, which alone will
enable France, with the help of her friends, to assert
herself and defend her interests in the face of so
formidable an adversary as the Germany of Adolf Hitler,
plunging forward to the conquest of Europe.
COULONDRE.
No. 74
M. ARDIET, French Consul in Nuremberg,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Nuremberg,
March 16, 1939.
GAULEITER STRETCHER, at a great demonstration organized
yesterday evening in Nuremberg on the occasion of the German
troops' entry into Bohemia and Moravia, made the following
statement: "This is only a beginning: far greater events
will follow; the democracies can rise up and protest as much
as they like, they will surrender in the end."
Many squadrons flew over Nuremberg this morning on the
way to Bohemia.
ARDIET.
No. 75
M. LEON NOEL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
March 16, 1939.
Is the action recently taken in Europe by Germany the
prelude to further acts in the west or in the east?
[94]
In Warsaw, the second hypothesis seems quite plausible.
Germany's dissatisfaction with Poland is dear, since
the anti-German demonstrations made by the students.
Herr von Moltke does not conceal from his colleagues
his ill-humour, which does not spare M. Beck, and he
complains that the meeting of the German-Polish commission
in Berlin has had no useful result.
The development of sentiments hostile to Germany among
all classes of Polish people cannot escape any observer.
It is to be supposed that the reactions and the
calculations of the Chancellor will be influenced by this
situation.
I learn, too, that a Ukrainian deputy in the Polish
Diet, returning from Berlin, has announced that he received
there assurances of a new campaign by Germany in favour of
the Ukraine.
LEON NOEL.
No. 76
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
March 17, 1939.
You should seek an audience with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in order to hand him the note, the text of
which you will find herewith. (A similar d‚marche is being
made by your British colleague.)
"By a letter dated March 15, 1939, His Excellency the
German Ambassador, acting on instructions from his
Government, has handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the French Republic the text of an agreement reached
during the night of March 14-15 between the Fhrer-
Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich
on the one side and the President and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic on the other
side. In the same communication, it was announced that
German troops had crossed the Czech frontiers at 6 o'clock
in the morning and that all measures had been taken to avoid
resistance and bloodshed and to allow the occupation and
pacification of the territory to take place in a quiet and
orderly way.
"The French Ambassador has the honour to convey to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Reich the formal Protest
made by the Government of the Republic against the measure
referred to in Count von Welczeck's communication.
"The Government of the Republic considers itself,
through the ac-
[95]
tion taken against Czechoslovakia by the German Government,
confronted with a flagrant violation of both the letter and
the spirit of the Agreement signed in Munich on September
29, 1938.
"The circumstances in which the treaty of March 15 was
imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic could
not, in the view of the Government of the French Republic,
legalize the position laid down in this treaty.
"The French Ambassador has the honour to inform His
Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich
that the Government of the Republic cannot in the
circumstances recognize the legality of the new situation
brought about in Czechoslovakia by the action of the Reich."
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 77
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 17, 1939.
ON the subject of the circumstances in which M. Hacha
and M. Chvalkovsky were constrained to sign the treaty by
which the fate of Bohemia and Moravia passed into the
Fhrer's hands, I think I should report the following
account, which I heard from a reliable source.
During the afternoon of the 14th, the German Legation
in Prague made it known to the Czernin Palace that, in view
of the deterioration in the situation, it might be useful if
the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs would go
to Berlin.
Immediately on arrival, M. Hacha and his Minister, who
were received with military honours, were taken to the
Chancellery where Herr Hitler, Field-Marshal Goering, Herr
von Ribbentrop and Herr Keppler were waiting for them.
The document to be signed lay waiting on the table, in
its final form, as well as a memorandum relating to the
future Statute for the administration of Bohemia and
Moravia.
The Fhrer stated very briefly that the time was not
one for negotiation but that the Czech Ministers had been
summoned to be informed of Germany's decisions, that these
decisions were irrevocable, that Prague would be occupied on
the following day at 9 o'clock, Bohemia and Moravia
incorporated within the Reich and constituted a
Protectorate, and whoever tried to resist would be "trodden
underfoot"
[96]
(zertreten). With that, the Fhrer wrote his signature and
went out. It was about 12:30 a.m.
A tragic scene then took place between the Czech
Ministers and the three Germans.
For hours on end Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky protested
against the outrage done to them, declared that they could
not sign the document presented to them, pointed out that
were they to do so they would be for ever cursed by their
people. Dr. Hacha, with all the energy at his command,
fought against the Statute of Protectorate which it was
intended to impose on the Czechs, observing that no white
people was reduced to such a condition.
The German ministers were pitiless. They literally
hunted Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky round the table on which
the documents were lying, thrusting them continually before
them, pushing pens into their hands, incessantly repeating
that if they continued in their refusal, half Prague would
lie in ruins from aerial bombardment within two hours, and
that this would be only the beginning. Hundreds of bombers
were awaiting only the order to take off, and they would
receive that order at six in the morning if the signatures
were not forthcoming by them.
President Hacha was in such a state of exhaustion that
he more than once needed medical attention from the doctors,
who, by the way, had been there ready for service since the
beginning of the interview. The Czech Ministers having
stated they could not take such a decision without the
consent of their Government, they received the answer that a
direct telephonic line existed to the Cabinet of Ministers
then in session at Prague and that they could get in touch
immediately. It is a fact that such a line had been laid
down in Czech territory by members of the German minority,
without the knowledge of the authorities.
At 4:30 in the morning, Dr. Hacha, in a state of total
collapse, and kept going only by means of injections,
resigned himself with death in his soul to give his
signature. As he left the Chancellery, M. Chvalkovsky
declared: "Our people will curse us, and yet we have saved
their existence. We have preserved them from a horrible
massacre."
COULONDRE.
[97]
No. 78
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 18, 1939.
As the Minister for Foreign Affairs is not in Berlin, I
saw the State Secretary this morning and carried out the
instructions which had been given me.
Before acquainting himself with the contents of the
French Government's note, Herr von Weizs„cker asked me to
give him its tenor. When I had communicated the substance of
it to him, the State Secretary declared that he refused to
accept a protest from the French Government concerning
Czechoslovakia. He requested me to ask Your Excellency to
reconsider the question. I replied that the French
Government had carefully weighed its decision and that it
was utterly useless to ask them to change it. As Herr von
Weizs„cker still refused to accept the Note, I recalled
diplomatic usage and the right of my country to express its
opinion of recent events. The State Secretary's attitude
surprised me all the more because the object of discussion
was a solemn act, signed by the heads of the French
Government and the Government of the Reich. What had Germany
made of the Munich Agreement? Herr von Weizs„cker, without
making a direct answer, referred to verbal assurances
alleged to have been given to Herr von Ribbentrop by Your
Excellency in Paris after the signature of the declaration
of December 6, according to which Czechoslovakia was in
future not to be the subject of "an exchange of views." He
added that if the German Government had supposed that it
might be otherwise, they would not have signed the pact.
I replied to Herr von Weizs„cker that no trace could be
found of any such assurance, either in the declaration of
December 6 nor in the broadcast statements which had
accompanied it, and that the French authors of this
agreement could never have meant it to constitute a possible
recognition of the suppression of Czechoslovakia however
liberally its spirit were to be interpreted:
The declaration, on the contrary, provided that the two
Governments would consult each other on matters which
concerned them both and which in their development might
threaten to cause international difficulties.
Changing his ground, Herr von Weizs„cker then expressed
astonishment that the French Government could protest
against a state of
[98]
affairs resulting from a treaty between the heads of the
German and the Czech State.
I pointed out to him that he was now going to the root
of the matter and that I could answer that we had the
strongest reasons for thinking that the Czech negotiators
had not found themselves in a position to express their will
freely. Herr von Weizs„cker finally said he would take the
Note as if it had been sent to him by post, but that he
feared the French Government might regret this step.
I replied that one could never regret having done one's
duty, and with these words took leave of the State
Secretary.
The frown on Herr von Weizs„cker's face and the first
gesture he made on seeing the document which I gave him
warned me at the outset that he knew the purpose of my visit
and had been instructed to persuade me to withdraw the Note.
It was obviously impossible for me to yield to that wish.
COULONDRE.
No. 79
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 18, 1939.
ACCORDING to information that I have gathered from the
best sources, the development the Czechoslovak drama seems
to have been as follows:
The Nazi leaders, displeased at the resistance offered
by Czechoslovakia to her new position of tutelage last
December, worked out a scheme which, as the Germans put it,
would effectively prevent this State from ever again
becoming a menace to the Reich. But M. Chvalkovsky did not
succeed in persuading Prague to accept this plan, which must
already have almost amounted to a Protectorate. It was
decided in Berlin to break this too unmanageable tool. From
the month of February onwards, this Embassy drew attention
to certain characteristic signs in this respect.
It was in these circumstances that the leaders of
Austria, Seyss-Inquart and Brckel, were personally ordered
about three weeks ago to fan the agitation in Slovakia in
favour of its independence. The Vienna wireless station took
part in this. The Czech Government, frightened by the speed
with which the movement was growing, dismissed Mgr. Tiso,
who was considered to be too conciliatory. Herr
[99]
Hitler was waiting for this mistake. It is only then, that
is to say about March 9, that he seems to have taken the
decisions which led to the disappearance of Czechoslovakia.
Mgr. Tiso was summoned to Berlin. The Fhrer informed him of
the coming invasion of Bohemia and Moravia and charged him,
under threat of seeing Slovakia suffer the same fate, with
bringing about the immediate separation of that country from
Prague.
In order to prevent Germany's seizure of Slovakia the
Hungarians and Poles hastened to recognize the independence
of that country on the day of its proclamation, March 14;
Germany, the instigator of the whole thing, abstained from
so doing but sent troops to occupy Bratislava. Under
pressure, Mgr. Tiso telegraphed to the Fhrer asking for
protection, which was immediately granted. The German troops
continued their march into Slovakia, but, on representations
from Poland, Berlin decided to withdraw them to the line of
the Vaag.
COULONDRE.
No. 80
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 19, 1939.
ON the morrow of the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia
by the Reich, and the passing of Slovakia into German
tutelage, I should like, after the violent changes wrought
in the map of Europe, to try to determine in which
directions German dynamism may turn, to see if we may still
hold that it is aimed only at the east, and to draw certain
practical conclusions for our guidance.
A direct challenge to world opinion by the treachery,
the cynicism, and the brutality it shows, the "coup" by
which Germany has just wiped Czechoslovakia off the map
cannot simply be dismissed as a break in the general
political line taken by Germany since last autumn, nor even
as a deviation from this line. On the very morrow of the
Munich Agreement, it was clear that beyond the Rhine this
Agreement was taken to imply a free hand for Germany in
Central and Eastern Europe, and, as a corollary, relative
renunciation of their interests in these regions by the
Western Powers. Germany had understood, or pretended to have
understood, that at Munich France and England had wished
above all to prevent recourse to force, but that for the
rest they were resigned to Germany's will prevailing in
[100]
countries in which neither Paris nor London could
effectively intervene. The Munich Agreement, completed by
the Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations, meant in
Germany's eyes the right for the Reich to organize Central
and South-Eastern Europe as she wished, with the tacit
approval or at least the complaisance of the great Western
Powers. For months this version found daily expression in
the great German newspapers, officially inspired, as the
reports from the Embassy have often shown. I myself have
more than once noted the same state of mind in Herr von
Ribbentrop and Herr von Weizs„cker, both of whom have
expressed a certain astonishment whenever I have drawn their
attention to the fact that France, as a great European
Power, intends to be consulted in all that pertains to
Europe, and that on this point there must be no mistake or
misunderstanding. And yet, this misunderstanding did in fact
exist. The Nazi leaders did not fail to stress on every
occasion that, as the Fhrer said in his speech of January
30, "Central Europe was a region where the Western Powers
had no concern."
In this respect, the German seizure of Bohemia and
Moravia, with the subsequent inclusion of Slovakia within
the German orbit, is in line with the policy of eastern
expansion of which Germany has not only made no secret since
last autumn but which she has openly proclaimed.
During the last six months, the tendencies of German
foreign policy may be summed up as follows: a purely
defensive attitude in the West and the orientation towards
the East of Nazi aims and ambitions. The German attempt to
occupy the whole of Slovakia and even Sub-Carpathian Russia
shows even more clearly than the annexation of Bohemia and
Moravia in which direction lie German thoughts and the
German thrust.
Though we have no reason whatever to be surprised at
this new advance of German influence in the East, on the
other hand we have every right to condemn the unspeakable
methods used by the Reich to achieve it. It is these methods
which, properly speaking, constitute the break in the policy
of appeasement begun at Munich, and which found expression
in the declarations of September 30 and December 6. France
and Britain were entitled to expect that in the event of
fresh Central European difficulties they would be consulted
by the Reich; the German Government, moreover, could not be
unaware that the French and British Cabinets were ready for
such an exchange of views. France and Great Britain also had
the right to assume that Germany
[101]
would not reject the racial principle which at Munich had
guided the settlement of the German-Czech crisis, nor that,
having invoked the rights of nationalities, Germany would
violate them so wantonly. Paris and London could hope that
having renounced the use of force at Munich, Germany would
not again have recourse to threats of the wholesale massacre
of civil populations by her air force in particularly odious
circumstances. France and Britain were also entitled to
expect that the rulers of the Reich would not treat as
purely negligible the agreements reached at Munich and the
declarations which followed them, and that they would not
simply throw into the waste-paper basket documents on which
the signature of the head of the German State was hardly
dry.
But this is in fact what has happened. The Munich
agreements no longer exist. The psychological grounds on
which the potentialities of the declarations of September 30
and December 6 might have borne fruit have been destroyed.
Various German papers are already interpreting as a
denunciation of the Anglo-German and Franco-German
declarations the d‚marche by which Britain and France made
it known on March 18 that they could not recognize as legal
the position in Central Europe which had been brought about
by the Reich.
We find ourselves faced, therefore, with an entirely
new situation. Germany has not been content to consolidate
and extend her political influence over the nations living
in the Reich's orbit. She has revealed her desire to absorb
them, if not to annihilate them. From a policy of expansion
she has gone on to a policy of conquest, the claims of
common race giving way henceforth to military imperialism.
This brutal confession of a lust of conquest, which the
Third Reich had hitherto been at pains to conceal, could not
fail to arouse deep feeling throughout the world. Faced with
the wave of hostile criticism which it has provoked, and
after having absorbed in one year 18 million new subjects,
of whom eight millions are aliens, will Germany find it
necessary to mark time for a while? Or, taking advantage of
its acquired momentum and of the stupor of the Central
European States, will it continue its drive towards the
East? Or, again, will it be tempted to face about and put an
end to the opposition of the Western Powers which is
interfering with the Reich's liberty of action in the East?
In other words, will the Fhrer be tempted to return to the
idea expressed by the author of Mein Kampf, which, be it
said, is identical with the classic doctrine held by the
German General Staff, according
[102]
to which Germany cannot accomplish her high destiny in the
East until France has been crushed and, as a consequence,
Britain reduced to impotence on the Continent?
We must likewise examine whether there is still time to
erect in the East a wall capable of stemming to a certain
extent the German drive, and if to this end we should not
take advantage of the favourable circumstances offered to us
by the tension and anxiety which prevail in the Central
European capitals, especially in Warsaw.
The renewed changes which the European map has
undergone to Germany's advantage will mean from now on a
great increase in her potential, if not her actual, war
strength.
Germany, whose currency resources were completely
exhausted, has just seized the greater part of the gold and
currency reserves in the Czech National Bank. The sum so
taken, about 50,000,000 dollars, will be of no small
advantage to a nation almost completely without the means to
make international payments.
Still more important is the passing into German hands
of a large quantity of first-class war material, together
with the Skoda works. These world-famous works supplied not
only Czechoslovakia but Rumania and Jugoslavia, whose
military positions are thus seriously impaired. I will
mention only by way of reminder that the Skoda works are at
present manufacturing aeroplane engines for us. Possessing
both the Krupp and the Skoda works, the Reich is henceforth
beyond all doubt the most advantageously placed supplier of
war material for Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Germany
has, therefore, a means of bringing pressure to bear on
policy and of controlling armaments, which must not be
underestimated, as well as a possibility of obtaining
substantial amounts of foreign currency by sales abroad.
Further, the seizure of Bohemia and Moravia is the
first territorial operation, which, from the point of view
of food supplies, has not caused a loss to the Reich. On the
contrary it greatly improves the German food situation, not
only on account of the relative fertility of Bohemia and
Moravia but also and still more because the Reich now finds
itself at the very door of the Hungarian and Rumanian
granaries.
Again, the economic leaders of the Reich now have a
considerable reserve of labour at their disposal. Autarchy,
excessive re-armament, great public works require a labour
strength above that which the Reich itself could provide.
There was a shortage of a million and a
[103]
half labourers in industry and agriculture. In these
circumstances, it was hard to see how Germany could, in the
event of general mobilization, meet the increased labour
demands and fill the gaps left by the men called to the
colours. The Czechs, considered unworthy to bear arms, will
provide the 5,000,000 workers which Germany needed for such
an emergency.
Finally and above all, the strategical position of
Germany has vastly improved. In place of the winding
frontier, several hundred miles long, which separated
Germany from Czechoslovakia, is substituted the much shorter
and more easily defended line joining Austria to Silesia.
Germany thus saves the several divisions which would have
had to watch the Czech frontier in the event of war.
Further, the Bohemian and Moravian tableland provides an
excellent base of operations, particularly for aircraft,
whose effective range will henceforth cover the greater part
of the Balkans, to say nothing of Hungary and Poland.
The first act of the German military authorities after
the occupation of the Czech provinces was to make Vienna the
centre of a new air fleet, the Fourth [1] (South-East), made
up of units stationed in Austria, Sudetenland, Bohemia and
Moravia. "The creation of this fourth fleet," the German
papers have pointed out, "increases the power of our air
force beyond all our expectations."
Besides the increase of material forces, we must also
take into account the immense pride which, as a result of
the prodigious successes secured in one year, [2] could not
fail to swell the Nazi leaders' bosoms and inflame their
minds. Without striking a blow, without any annoyance beyond
a few gestures of protest, the Reich had swallowed 20
million men, turned the whole structure of Europe upside
down and forged a military machine of such power that Europe
was forced on more than one decisive occasion to bow to
German demands; there indeed is an achievement to turn the
most well-balanced head. But no operation had ever moved so
smoothly as that which culminated in the Fhrer's entering
the Castle of Hradschin. How can Herr Hitler do otherwise
than believe that nothing can stand against his will? How
could he fail to make capital out of the undoubted
superiority that Germany has won for itself in the air? It
is quite possible that tomorrow he will apply to Rumania or
Poland the same means that had
[1] The German Air Force had hitherto been divided into
three air
fleets.
[2] The conquest of Austria occurred on March 12, 1938, that
of Bohemia
and Moravia on March 15, 1939.
[104]
been so successful against Austria and Czechoslovakia and
place before them the alternatives of the massacre of civil
populations and the destruction of open towns, or the
acceptance of the German terms however onerous and
humiliating they may be. One must not, however, exclude the
possibility that the Reich, before carrying out its vast
programme to the East, will first turn against the Western
Powers.
There are three reasons for not ruling out at once such
possibility. From the reactions of London and Paris to the
annihilation of Czechoslovakia and the incorporation of the
Czechs in the Reich, Nazi Germany must see-as she pretended
not to see since Munich-that the Western Powers have not
completely given up the whole of Europe beyond the Rhine.
Then, confronted by the re-armament of France, England
and America, which is being watched here with more
irritation and anxiety than is admitted, the Nazi leaders
may be asking themselves how long they will enjoy the
mastery of the air, which they have exploited so cynically
for the past year, and if they too will not soon have to
reckon with enemy air forces capable of shattering reprisals
which would neutralize the threat of German air action, at
present hanging over Europe.
It is true that up to the present, there is no
indication that Germany has modified her line of policy and
that she intends at least temporarily to turn her eyes and
her ambitions away from the East with a view to a Western
war.
On the contrary, one fact seems to indicate that when
the Nazi leaders were planning the scheme against Bohemia
and Moravia, they were already intending to go still farther
eastward at a more or less early date. From information
hitherto received, it certainly seems that the German Army
tried to occupy the whole of Slovakia and even Sub-
Carpathian Russia. It was on account of Poland's attitude,
and the Hungarian decision to take no notice of German
representations, that the German troops were withdrawn to
the line of the Vaag. Now, an occupation of Slovakia and
Carpathian Ukraine, which would have brought the German Army
right up to the Russian frontier, could have had political
or military significance only if further operations were
contemplated against either Rumania or Poland. In well-
informed circles in Berlin it is regarded that these regions
are the more immediately threatened.
Yet it does not seem that the direction of the next
Nazi thrust
[105]
has been decided upon or that plans for further action have
been formulated.
An official of the Propaganda Ministry seems to have
summed up accurately the state of mind of the Nazi leaders
in a remark made to one of my compatriots: "We have before
us so many open doors, so many possibilities, that we no
longer know which way to turn or what direction to take."
We shall not go far wrong if we assume that the line of
conduct to be adopted by the Reich, which now forms a block
of 90 million inhabitants in the heart of Europe, will be
influenced by the balance of forces in Europe.
As things are, the Nazi leaders consider that the lead
they have established in armaments and the strategical
position they have won protect them from attack. Their weak
point is a shortage of stocks and a lack of raw materials
and foodstuffs which would make it impossible for them to
stand a long war. Given the material impossibility of
challenging Britain's mastery of the sea, the Nazi leaders
see two ways open to them.
Either to proceed without intermission to the
subjugation of east and south-east Europe and perhaps to
that of Scandinavia, thus securing for Germany in one way or
another the resources of these countries, and enabling it to
a certain extent to face a blockade.
Or to attack France and Britain, before these two
Powers have, with American help, caught up with German
armaments, and in particular, snatched from Germany the
mastery of the air.
This second possibility is not at present the more
probable. But we must reckon with the risk of seeing Germany
engaged in such an undertaking. This risk may even be
increased by the intensification and the speeding up of our
rearmament.
However, as we have no choice save either to bow one
day to Hitler's will or, by uniting our forces with those of
Britain, to build a military machine, and especially an air
force, strong enough to impress Germany, it is vital that we
should without delay:
(a) Rearm to the maximum of our capacity.
(b) As far as possible, avoid all publicity about this
intensive rearmament.
In any case, whatever new form German dynamism may take
after the conquest of Bohemia and Moravia, we are always
driven to the same conclusion: to the unavoidable necessity
for concentrating the nation's energies towards as vast and
as swift a development of
[106]
its military strength as possible, especially with regard to
its Air Force. In view of the impulsive character of the
Nazi leaders, the state of mental intoxication in which the
Fhrer must be at present and the irritation and alarm
caused in Germany by the rearmament of the democracies and
by the attitude of America, I consider that we must proceed
without delay to the industrial mobilization of the country,
as secretly and as intensively as possible.
COULONDRE.
No. 81
M. GE0RGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
March 19, 1939.
I Approve your action in replying as you did to the
extravagant statement of Herr von Weizs„cker according to
which, in my Paris conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, I
am alleged to have said that "Czechoslovakia would no longer
be the subject of an exchange of views." This conversation
took place without Herr von Weizs„cker, and in the presence
of M. Leger and Count von Welczeck only.
I emphasized during this interview-and Herr von
Ribbentrop took note of it-that our declaration in no way
affected the Franco-Polish and the Franco-Soviet pacts. I
then insisted at length that the guarantee promised to
Czechoslovakia by the Munich Agreement should also be given
by Germany. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich
replied that he was afraid Czechoslovakia was still
impregnated with the Benes spirit, and that the question was
not yet ripe. In spite of my insistence I failed to obtain
from him any assurance as to when this guarantee would be
given.
In the circumstances I asked you to see Herr von
Ribbentrop again during the months of January and February,
in order to get the German guarantee for Czechoslovakia. In
accordance with my instructions, you saw Herr von Weizs„cker
on December 21 and Herr von Ribbentrop on February 6. A
written Note was handed in by you on February 8. In reply to
this Note, the German Government handed you on March 2 a
written memorandum, designed to justify the delay of the
required guarantee. In that document it puts forward as a
reason the fact that the question of the Polish and
Hungarian minorities has not yet been settled and adds that,
in its opinion, any intervention in Cen-
[107]
tral Europe by the Western Powers in the form of a guarantee
would do more harm than good.
If, in the course of the Paris conversations, I had
declared that "Czechoslovakia would no longer be the subject
of an exchange of views," obviously the German Government
would not have accepted your d‚marches and would have
refused to be a party to the exchange of notes between the
two Governments. You should lose no opportunity to protest
against a statement which is one more proof of the German
Government's bad faith.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 82
M. PAYART, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Moscow,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Moscow,
March 19, 1939.
THE Soviet Government made a written protest yesterday
to the German Government, in reply to the notification made
by the German Ambassador, against the German Government's
decision to incorporate Czechia in the Reich and to modify
the Statute of Slovakia.
I am sending by post to your Department the translation
of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs' Note, which has not
yet been published in the Russian Press.
The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, after
taking exception to the German arguments, after contesting
the legality of President Hacha's assent to the Berlin
instrument, and after invoking the right of the self-
determination of peoples, ends his note in the following
manner:
"The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot recognise the
incorporation of Czechia in the Reich nor that of Slovakia
in one form or another, as legal or as in conformity with
the generally accepted rules of international law, or with
justice, or with the principle of self-determination. Not
only does the German Government's action not avert any of
the dangers threatening world peace but it actually tends to
multiply them, to disturb the political stability of Central
Europe, to increase the causes of anxiety already existing
in Europe, and, finally, to deal a new blow to the feeling
of security of nations."
PAYART.
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