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Page 280
VIII. THE SOVIET TREATIES WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND JAPAN, MARCH 25-
APRIL 13, 1941
*****
Frames 113215-113216, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, March 25, 1941-3:05 a. m.
Received March 25, 1941-5:45 a. m.
SECRET
No. 680 of March 24
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
The Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who left Moscow
for Berlin this evening in accordance with his itinerary,
paid a visit to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov
this afternoon, accompanied by the Japanese Ambassador here.
In the ensuing conversation, which lasted two hours
altogether, I hear that Stalin later also took part at
Matsuoka's expressed desire. Matsuoka tells me he presented
to Molotov and Stalin the "fundamental problems" pending
between Japan and the Soviet Union with the thought of
eliminating existing differences. When Molotov and Stalin
wished to reply, he asked them to withhold comment at this
time, but instead to consider the subjects broached, and to
continue the conversation upon his return to Moscow. He had
gained a strong impression of the personality of Stalin. He
would communicate to the Reich Foreign Minister personally
all details of the conversation.
Since the conversation with Molotov and Stalin lasted
two hours altogether, the discussion would seem,
nevertheless, to have been a thorough one.
Matsuoka explained to me and the Italian Ambassador that
he had for thirty years been of the opinion that relations
between Japan and the Soviet Union should be good. His
further pursuit of this policy, therefore, was nothing new.
Matsuoka with the greatest willingness received the
chiefs of the missions here (among them also the American and
French Ambassadors, whom he knew from earlier days-but not
British Ambassador
Page 281
Cripps), as well as representatives of the press. In all his
talks, Matsuoka expressed himself very positively on Japan's
attitude to the Axis, in which connection he emphasized that
he had personally striven f or the consummation of the Three
Power Pact. With regard to his trip, he repeatedly stressed
the importance of a personal meeting with Germany's great
Fhrer, the Reich Foreign Minister, and Mussolini. In the
most emphatic manner he expressed the conviction that victory
was assured to Germany and Italy.
SCHULENBURG
NOTE Transmitted to special train under No. 1085.
Telegram Control Office March 25, 8 a. m.
*****
Frames 47400-47417, serial 67
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign
Minister and Japanese Foreign Minster Matsuoka in the
Presence of Ambassadors Ott and Oshima at Berlin on
March 27, 1941
STATE SECRET
Aufz. RAM 14/41
The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed Matsuoka cordially
as a man who had shown by word and deed that he took the same
attitude with regard to the problems of his country as the
Fhrer and his co-workers had been forced to take for Germany
and who, as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country,
had made possible the conclusion of the Pact with Japan. The
Three Power Pact was a very significant instrument for the
future of the three countries and represented the basis upon
which the future of the three nations could be secured in a
form such as the German and Japanese patriots had always
envisaged.
Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a summary of
the situation as seen from the German point of view.
With regard to the military situation he pointed out
that Germany today was in the final phase of its battle
against England. During the past winter the Fhrer had made
all necessary preparations, so that Germany stood completely
ready today to meet England everywhere. The Fhrer had at his
disposal at the moment perhaps the strongest military power
that had ever existed in the world. Germany had 240 combat
divisions, 186 of which were first-class assault divisions of
young soldiers. Of these 24 were Panzer divisions,
supplemented by other motorized brigades.
Page 282
The Luftwaffe had grown greatly and introduced new
models, so that it was a match in the future, as it had been
in the past, for competition of any kind; that is, Germany
was not only a match for England and America in this field,
but was definitely superior to them.
The German Navy, at the outbreak of the war, had had
only a relatively small number of battleships. Nevertheless,
the battleships under construction had been completed, so
that the last of them would shortly be put in service. In
contrast to the World War, the German Navy this time did not
stay in port, but from the first day of the war had been
employed against the foe. Matsuoka probably gathered from the
reports of the past few weeks that German large battle units
had interrupted the supply lines between England and America
with extraordinary success.
The number of submarines heretofore employed was very
small. There had been at most 8 or 9 boats in service against
the enemy at any one time. Nevertheless even these few U-
boats, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe, had sunk 750,000
tons per month in January and February, and Germany could
furnish accurate proof of this at any time. This number,
moreover, did not include the great additional losses that
England had sustained through floating and magnetic mines. At
the beginning of April the number of submarines would
increase eight to tenfold, so that 60 to 80 U-boats could
then be continuously employed against the enemy. The Fhrer
had pursued the tactics of at first employing only a few U-
boats and using the rest to train the personnel necessary for
a larger fleet, in order then to proceed to a knockout blow
against the enemy with a greater number of units. Therefore
the figure of tonnage sunk by the German U-boats could be
expected in the future greatly to exceed what had already
been accomplished. Under these circumstances, the U-boat
alone could be designated as absolutely deadly.
Passing on to the subject of the military situation on
the continent of Europe, the Reich Foreign Minister observed
that through the overthrow of the continental countries
Germany had practically no foe of any consequence other than
the small British forces that remained in Greece. Germany
would fight off-any attempt of England to land on the
Continent or entrench herself there. She would not,
therefore, tolerate England's staying in Greece. From the
military point of view, the Greek question was of secondary
importance. The only practical significance was the fact that
in the thrust toward Greece, which would probably be
necessary, dominant positions in the Eastern Mediterranean
would be won that would
Page 283
be of considerable significance for the development of
further operations in these areas.
In Africa the Italians had had bad luck in recent months
because the Italian troops there were not familiar with
modern tank warfare and were not prepared for antitank
defense, so that it was relatively easy for the British
armored divisions to capture the not very important Italian
positions. Any further advance of the British had been
definitively blocked. The Fhrer had dispatched one of the
most able of German officers, General Rommel, to Tripoli with
sufficient German forces. The hope that General Wavell would
attack had, unfortunately, not been realized. The British had
come upon the Germans in some skirmishes at an outpost and
had thereupon abandoned any further intention of attacking.
Should they by chance attempt another attack upon Tripoli,
they would court annihilating defeat. Here, too, the tables
would be turned some day, and the British would disappear
from North Africa, perhaps even more quickly than they had
come.
In the Mediterranean area, the German Luftwaffe had been
doing good work for two months and had inflicted heavy
shipping losses on the British, who were holding on
tenaciously. The Suez Canal had been blocked for a long time
and would be blocked again after the removal of the
obstacles. It was no longer any fun for the British to hold
out in the Mediterranean. He (the Reich Foreign Minister)
believed that even before the year's end the Mediterranean
would be sealed off so effectively that the English would
represent practically no further danger. Their fleet would
have to protect their position in Africa.
If, then, we summed up the military situation in Europe,
we would come to the conclusion that, practically, in the
military sphere the Axis was completely master of the
situation in the whole of continental Europe. A huge army,
which was practically idle, was at Germany's command and
could be employed at any time and at any place the Fhrer
considered necessary.
The political situation was characterized by the
adherence of almost the whole of the Balkans to the Three
Power Pact. This morning, to be sure, news of a putsch and
the formation of a new government had come from Belgrade, but
further details were lacking. The political situation in
Europe and in the whole world had also contributed to the
strengthening of the Three Powers of the Pact. Germany was
also still endeavoring to win over to the cause of the Three
Page 284
Powers one or another of the last countries which still
remained outside the Pact. Confidentially he (the Reich
Foreign Minister) could inform Matsuoka that Spain, in spirit
at least, was with the Three Power Pact. Of the two or three
countries yet remaining, Sweden and Turkey were of particular
interest. He could state confidentially to Matsuoka that
here, too, the attempt would be made to win these countries
over to the Three Power Pact.
Certain feelers had already been put out in the
direction of Turkey. Even if formally that country had an
alliance with England, it was nevertheless at least not
entirely impossible that Turkey would in the future move
closer and closer to the Three Power Pact.
With Russia, Germany had concluded the well-known
treaties. Ambassador Oshima knew how these treaties had come
about. Germany, at that time, had the desire to conclude an
alliance with Japan. In view of the situation in Japan, it
had not been possible to translate this desire into fact. On
the other hand, the war clouds in Europe had become more and
more threatening. At the Fhrer's instruction, the Reich
Foreign Minister had been prepared for the six months
preceding to sign the Italo-Japanese-German alliance. This
Ambassador Oshima knew. Since the alliance was unfortunately
not possible in that time, Germany, in view of the coming
war, had to resolve on the pact with Russia.
Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could
inform Matsuoka that present relations with Russia were
correct, to be sure, but not very friendly. After Molotov's
visit, during which accession to the Three Power Pact was
offered, Russia had made conditions that were unacceptable.
They involved the sacrifice of German interests in Finland,
the granting of bases on the Dardanelles and a strong
influence on conditions in the Balkans, particularly in
Bulgaria. The Fhrer had not concurred because he had been of
the opinion that Germany could not permanently subscribe to
such a Russian policy. Germany needed the Balkan Peninsula
above all for her own economy and had not been inclined to
let it come under Russian domination. For this reason she had
given Rumania a guarantee. It was this latter action,
particularly, that the Russians had taken amiss. Germany had
further been obliged to enter into a closer relationship with
Bulgaria in order to obtain a vantage point from which to
expel the British from Greece. Germany had had to decide on
this course because this campaign would otherwise not have
been possible. This, too, the Russians had not liked at all.
Page 285
Under these circumstances, relations with Russia were
externally normal and correct. The Russians, however, had for
some time demonstrated their unfriendliness to Germany
wherever they could. The declaration made to Turkey within
the last few days was an example of this. Germany felt
plainly that since Sir Stafford Cripps became Ambassador to
Moscow (he had recently met Eden at Ankara) ties between
Russia and England were being cultivated in secret and, at
times, even relatively openly. Germany was watching these
proceedings carefully. He (the Reich Foreign Minister), who
knew Stalin personally, did not assume that the latter was
inclined toward adventure, but it was impossible to be sure.
The German armies in the East were prepared at any time.
Should Russia some day take a stand that could be interpreted
as a threat to Germany, the Fhrer would crush Russia.
Germany was certain that a campaign against Russia would end
in the absolute victory of German arms and the total crushing
of the Russian Army and the Russian State. The Fhrer was
convinced that, in case of action against the Soviet Union,
there would in a few months be no more Great Power of Russia.
The Reich Foreign Minister stressed the fact, however, that
he did not believe that Stalin would pursue an unwise policy.
In any case, the Fhrer was not counting on the treaties with
Russia alone, but was relying, first of all, on his
Wehrmacht.
It must also not be overlooked that the Soviet Union, in
spite of all protestations to the contrary, was still
carrying on communistic propaganda abroad. It was attempting
not only in Germany, but also in the occupied areas of
France, Holland and Belgium, to continue its misleading
propagandist activity. For Germany, this propaganda naturally
constituted no danger. But what it had unfortunately led to
in other countries, Matsuoka well knew. As an example, the
Reich Foreign Minister cited the Baltic States, in which
today, one year after the occupation by the Russians, the
entire intelligentsia had been wiped out and really terrible
conditions prevailed. Germany was on guard, and would never
suffer the slightest danger to threaten Germany from Russia.
Further, there was the fact that Germany had to be
protected in the rear for her final battle against England.
She would, therefore, not put up with any threat from Russia
if such a threat should some day be considered serious.
Germany wanted to conquer England as rapidly as possible and
would not let anything deter her from doing so.
Page 286
In the further course of the conversation, the Reich
Foreign Minister spoke of the economic and food situation. It
was possible, to be sure, that certain foodstuffs were
temporarily in short supply; but he could state definitely
that no matter how long the war lasted, food supply
difficulties would not occur in Germany. Germany had space
enough to produce the necessary foods in her own territory
for the duration of the war.
With regard to raw materials, there were certain
bottlenecks, as evidenced, for example, by the rubber
negotiations with Japan. Here too, however, it might be
stated generally that a serious danger to the Reich was
entirely out of the question. The Fhrer had accumulated such
vast stockpiles of war materials that the German economy was
due for a conversion. The German munitions stores were so
great that for years to come not the slightest shortage would
be experienced. In the next few months, therefore, a great
process of conversion would take place in the economy, and
the effort of the German war potential would be utilized for
U-boat and airplane production. Since the German Army had
practically no opponents left on the Continent with the
possible exception of Russia, a high percentage of German
production capacity could be used for these two arms.
In summing up, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that
the war had already been definitely won for the Axis. It
could, in any case, no longer be lost. It was now only a
question of time until England would admit to having lost the
war. When this would take place, he could of course not
predict. This might be very soon, however, under certain
circumstances. It would depend upon events of the next three
or four months. It was highly probable, however, that England
would capitulate in the course of this year.
Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke of America.
There was no doubt that the British would long since have
abandoned the war if Roosevelt had not always given Churchill
new hope. Germany had clear and precise information from
England to this effect. What Roosevelt's intention was in the
long run, it was difficult to say. It was not clear whether
he wished to enter the war or not. It was only certain that
the aid promised England in the form of American munitions
could not be conjured up from the soil. It would be a long
time before this help would really be effective. But even
then the question of quality would be very problematical,
especially in the sphere of airplane deliveries. At the
present stage of development the various models became
obsolete very rapidly. From month to month, on the basis of
daily experience at the front, improvements were being under
Page 287
taken on German models, and it was doubtful whether a country
far from the war could turn out the highest quality aircraft.
What the German fliers had thus far encountered in the way of
American machines, they described, at any rate, as "junk." He
(the Reich Foreign Minister) therefore believed that quite a
considerable time would elapse before American aid to England
could make any difference. Germany was endeavoring, in any
case, to end the war as soon as possible, in the interest
also of its allies and friends.
The Three Power Pact had above all had the goal of
frightening America into abandoning the course it had chosen
and of keeping it out of the war. This goal was entirely
clear and desirable. The Three Power Pact was further to
serve the purpose of assuring the future collaboration of the
treaty partners in the New Order that Germany and Italy
wished to establish in Europe, and Japan in East Asia. The
principal enemy encountered in the establishment of the New
Order was England. The latter was as much the enemy of Japan
as of the Axis Powers. America had to be prevented by all
possible means from taking an active part in the war and from
making its aid to England too effective.
In examining the possibilities that existed for further
collaboration between Germany and Japan, the question had
repeatedly come up in the talks with the Fhrer as to
whether, in relation to the New Order-that is, the overthrow
of England, which was necessary to the establishment of this
New Order-active participation in the war on the part of
Japan might not be useful. The Fhrer had carefully
considered this question and believed that it would actually
be very advantageous if Japan would decide as soon as
possible to take an active part in the war upon England.
Germany believed, for instance, that a quick attack upon
Singapore would be a very decisive factor in the speedy
overthrow of England. He (the Reich Foreign Minister)
believed that from there it would be possible to work much
more closely with Japan in naval and other matters. It was
also certain that the capture of Singapore would be a very
serious blow to England. This was of great importance,
particularly in view of the rather bad morale already
prevailing in the British Isles. He also believed that the
capture of Singapore would perhaps be most likely to keep
America out of the war, because the United States could
scarcely risk sending its fleet into Japanese waters. If
today, in a war against England, Japan were to succeed with
one decisive stroke, such as the attack on Singapore,
Roosevelt would be in a very difficult position. It would be
Page 288
difficult for him to take any effective action against Japan.
If he did so, nevertheless, and declared war upon Japan, then
he must expect that the Philippine question, for example,
would be resolved in favor of Japan. This would mean a
serious loss of prestige for the President, so that he would
probably reflect for a long time before taking any action
against Japan.
On the other hand, Japan, through the conquest of
Singapore, would be in a position to operate quite
differently in East Asia than formerly, since it would then
command the absolutely dominant position in that part of East
Asia. Germany believed, therefore, that if Japan could decide
on such a move it would amount to cutting the Gordian knot in
East Asia.
Summing up, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that in
case Japan adopted such a course the war upon British tonnage
could be waged more intensively in East Asia; America would
probably be kept out of the war by Japan's bold step; and
Japan could secure those positions in East Asia which, in the
German view, she must eventually have for the New Order in
Greater East Asia. In this connection a number of other
questions would surely arise, for the discussion of which he
was available at all times.
In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that
the Three Power Pact could best accomplish its true purpose-
that is, to prevent the extension of the war, or, in other
words, the entry of the United States into the war-if at the
proper time the treaty partners made joint arrangements for
the final defeat of England, over and above what had already
been agreed upon. In this way the meaning of the Pact could
be most effectively demonstrated by all its adherents.
At this moment the Reich Foreign Minister was summoned
to the Reich Chancellery. Contrary to his original assumption
that this would mean only a short absence, the discussion
there lasted quite a while, so that the conversation with
Matsuoka could not be continued before lunch.
Thereupon the lunch which was on the program was held in
a very intimate circle, at first without the Reich Foreign
Minister, who did not appear until later.
SCHMIDT
BERLIN, March 31, 1941.
Page 289
*****
Frames 47418-47444, serial 67
Memorandum of the Interview Between the Fhrer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the Presence of
the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassadors Ott and
Oshima, March 27, 1941
F/Nr. 13/41
After some words of welcome the Fhrer inquired how
Matsuoka had found the long, tiresome journey from Japan to
Germany. Matsuoka replied that he had stood the trip very
well, since especially on the journey across Siberia he had
been completely cut off from the outer world and had only
been able to see from time to time a small Siberian
provincial newspaper, in which practically no reports on
current events appeared. It had been therefore much like
being away on a holiday trip.
Then the Fhrer gave a review of the general situation.
Germany had been forced into the war. She had not, however,
been surprised by the war; for she had had the chance to
observe for years the campaign of hate carried on by certain
English, French and American circles, and was accordingly
prepared for anything. In spite of this basic preparation the
outbreak of war had not been one of the goals of her policy.
Germany had had political claims; she had hoped, however, to
be able to satisfy them by reasonable methods. In the year
1939 the previously successful methods of securing a peaceful
revision of intolerable conditions had been interrupted by
the resistance of Poland and the consequences which arose
therefrom.
If a person considered the present situation carefully
and without illusions, he would have to concede that when the
war began in the year 1939, there were in existence on the
side of the opposition 60 Polish, 6 Norwegian, 18 Dutch, 22
Belgian, and 138 French divisions. In addition there were 12
or 13 British divisions on the Continent. Yet in scarcely a
year and a half 60 Polish divisions had been eliminated with
the occupation of Poland, 6 Norwegian divisions with the
occupation of Norway, 18 Dutch divisions with the occupation
of Holland, and 22 Belgian divisions with the occupation of
Belgium, and of the 138 French divisions there remained only
8 weak brigades. All of the English units had been routed and
driven out. These were losses which could not be recouped and
the position of England was no longer recoverable. Thus the
war had been decided, and the Axis Powers had become the
dominant combination. Resistance to their will had become
impossible.
Page 290
As Matsuoka knew, Germany had only at the beginning of
the war set out to construct a navy. Nevertheless all of the
military operations which had necessitated the use of water
routes, especially those in Norway, had been carried out
without successful opposition by the British. The German U-
boats, as well as the surface craft (auxiliary cruisers and
battleships), had, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, caused
England losses which amounted in tonnage almost to three-
quarters of the English and Allied losses during the World
War. At first Germany had produced few U-boats. By far the
greater number of them had therefore been used to train new
crews for the numerous units which were being constructed by
mass production. The real U-boat warfare was just beginning
in the present and coming months. England would be damaged to
an extent far surpassing her present rate of losses and would
no longer be able to threaten the German coasts and shipping
routes in any way. Besides, Germany was tying down an
increasing percentage of the English Fleet in the North Sea
and in the Atlantic. The same was being done by the Italian
Fleet and the German Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean.
In the air Germany had absolute supremacy, in spite of
all the claims of the English to success. Matsuoka could test
this assertion if he looked about in Berlin and compared
present-day Berlin with present-day London. The attacks of
the Luftwaffe in the coming months would actually grow much
stronger. England would suffer even more severe losses in
tonnage; and the effectiveness of the German blockade was
demonstrated by the fact that in England, rationing was much
more severe than in Germany. In the meantime the war would go
on in preparation for the final stroke against England.
The Fhrer then took up the situation in the
Mediterranean and declared that Italy had had bad luck in
North Africa because the necessary antitank guns had not been
available against the British armored forces. Now the danger
had been eliminated with the arrival of the first Panzer
division in Tripolitania, which would soon be followed by a
second division. A further British advance would be
impossible; on the contrary, the Axis would in a short time
pass over to a counterattack.
Unfavorable weather conditions had hindered Italian
operations in the Balkans. In the next few days, however, the
joint advance of Germany and Italy would eliminate all
difficulties there. There was no military problem since
Germany had at her disposal 240 "unemployed" divisions, of
which 186 were first-class combat divisions. The losses in
personnel and material which had been suffered in the years
Page 291
1939 and 1940 were very slight, so that in spite of the
campaigns just past, Germany was stronger in every respect
than in 1939.
The Fhrer then spoke of his conviction that England had
already lost the war. It was only a matter of having the
intelligence to admit it. Then would occur the collapse of
the individuals and of the government which had been
responsible for the insane policy of England.
In her present critical situation England was looking
for any straw to grasp. She was relying principally on two
hopes:
First, on American help. Germany, however, had taken
such help into her calculations in advance. It could appear
in tangible form only in the year 1942 at the earliest, but
even then the extent of such help would bear no relation to
the increased productive capacity of Germany.
The second hope of England was Russia. Both the British
Empire and the United States hoped that in spite of
everything they would be able to bring Russia in on the side
of England. They believed that they could attain this goal,
if not this year, perhaps next, and thus produce a new
balance of power in Europe.
In this connection it should be noted that Germany had
concluded well-known treaties with Russia, but much weightier
than this was the fact that Germany had at her disposal in
case of necessity some 160 to 180 divisions for defense
against Russia. She therefore did not fear such a possibility
in the slightest and would not hesitate a second to take the
necessary steps in case of danger. He (the Fhrer) believed,
however, that this danger would not arise.
Concerning the German war aims in Europe, the Fhrer
said that under any circumstances British hegemony would be
destroyed, British influence would be excluded from Europe,
and any attempt at American interference in Europe would be
beaten back. In addition, an indispensable element of the New
Order on the European Continent would be the limitation of
rights and duties to those who lived on the Continent, and
the exclusion of all countries who wished only to interfere
from the outside, especially England and America.
In the present conflict the Axis Powers were being
supported spiritually, morally and, in part, materially by
Japan. The Three Power Pact had through the cooperation of
Japan made possible, for example, the supplying of German
auxiliary cruisers in East Asia. Most important of all, it
had had the effect of making America hesitate to enter the
war officially. On the other hand, through her effort in the
conflict, Germany had brought her Japanese partner
appreciable assistance for Japan's own future.
Page 292
Few situations could be envisaged which offered greater
facilities for the realization of Japanese aims and larger
possibility of success. England was completely engaged at
sea, in the air, and on land. Increasingly powerful English
forces were being pinned down in the Mediterranean. Also on
the ocean more powerful units were being required for convoy
service. Cruisers and destroyers were often found to be no
longer sufficient, since these convoys were being attacked by
the Germans with battleships. For in contrast with the World
War, Germany possessed today on the long front from Narvik to
the Spanish-French frontier numerous bases from which she
could attack England and her approaches with naval forces.
Thus England was tied down in Europe; the objective was the
destruction of the British world empire.
America was confronted by three possibilities: she could
arm herself, she could assist England or she could wage war
on another front. If she helped England, she could not arm
herself. If she abandoned England, the latter would be
destroyed and America would then find herself confronting the
powers of the Three Power Pact alone. In no case, however,
could America wage war on another front.
Thus there could never in human imagination be a better
condition for a joint effort of the Three Power Pact
countries than the one which had now been produced. On the
other hand it was also clear to him that in any historic act
some risk had to be taken in the bargain. Seldom in history,
however, had a risk been smaller than at present: while war
was being fought in Europe and England was occupied there,
and while America was only in the initial stages of her own
armament, Japan was the strongest power in the East Asia area
and Russia could not intervene, since on her western border
stood one hundred and fifty German divisions. Such a moment
would never return. It was unique in history. The Fhrer
admitted that there was a certain amount of risk, but it was
extraordinarily slight at a moment in which Russia and
England were eliminated and America was not yet ready. If
this favorable moment passed by and the European conflict
ended in some fashion with a compromise, France and England
after a few years would recover. America would join them as a
third enemy of Japan and Japan sooner or later would be
confronted with the necessity of undertaking the defense of
her Lebensraum, in a struggle against these three powers.
Even from the military point of view there had probably
never in the memory of man been a situation so relatively
favorable as at
Page 293
present, even though the military difficulties presented by a
combined advance should not be underestimated.
It was especially favorable since between Japan and her
allies there were no conflicts of interest. Germany, who
would satisfy her own colonial claims in Africa, was as
little interested in East Asia as Japan was in Europe. This
was the best sort of preliminary condition for the
collaboration of a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian
Europe.
Collaboration with the Anglo-Saxons, on the contrary,
never represented actual cooperation, but only a playing off
of one against the other. Just as England never tolerated the
hegemony of one state in Europe, so in East Asia she played
off Japan, China and Russia against each other, to further
the interests of her own world empire. Just as had England,
so would the United States conduct herself, if she inherited
the world empire and set up American imperialism in place of
British imperialism.
Also on personal grounds a better situation for joint
action would scarcely occur again. He (the Fhrer) had
complete confidence in himself, and the German Nation stood
united behind him as it had been behind no one in its
previous history. He had the necessary power of decision in
critical situations, and, finally, Germany had had an
unparalleled series of successes such as occurred only once
in world history and was unlikely to occur again.
Next the Fhrer declared that his attitude toward Japan
had not been adopted in the year 1941. He had always been in
favor of collaboration with that country. Ambassador Oshima
knew that he (the Fhrer) had worked resolutely for many
years to that end. He was determined not to depart from that
line in the future. Especially favorable for collaboration,
as he had said, was the fact that there were no conflicts of
interest between Japan and Germany. For, in the long run,
interests were stronger than personalities and the will of a
leader and could always endanger anew the cooperation of
countries in case their interests were contradictory. In the
case of Germany and Japan, because of the non-existence of
such contradictions, one could make long-term plans. This had
been his firm conviction since his earliest youth. The
Japanese, German, and Italian peoples would achieve great
successes if they drew the necessary conclusions from the
present unique situation.
Matsuoka thanked the Fhrer for his frank presentation,
which seemed to him to put the whole situation in a clearer
light. He would
Page 294
think over once more most carefully the arguments which the
Fhrer had advanced, although he had already deliberated at
length on these subjects.
On the whole he agreed with the views expressed by the
Fhrer. He was especially of the opinion that any action
which was determined upon always carried with it a certain
risk. Matsuoka declared-after referring to the reports of
Ambassador Ott and the Reich Foreign Minister, through which
the Fhrer would certainly be informed about the current
situation in Japan-that he would personally set forth the
situation in the frankest fashion. There were in Japan, as in
other countries, certain intellectual circles which only a
powerful individual could hold firmly under control. He meant
by that the sort of person who would like to capture the
tiger cub, but who was not prepared to go into the den and
take it away from its mother. He had used this line of
thought in making the same point in the presence of two
princes of the Imperial Family in a conference at
headquarters. It was regrettable that Japan had not yet
eliminated those elements and that some of these people were
even occupying influential positions. Confidentially, he
could state that in the interview at headquarters, after an
earnest discussion, his point of view had prevailed. Japan
would take action, and in a decisive form, if she had the
feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which could
only occur once in a thousand years; and in fact Japan would
act without consideration of the state of her preparations,
since there were always some people who claimed that
preparations were insufficient. Matsuoka had also made this
point with the two princes. The hesitant politicians in Japan
would always delay and act partly from a pro-British or pro-
American attitude.
Matsuoka declared that he had come out for the alliance
long before the outbreak of the European war. He had been
very active at that time to this end, but unfortunately he
had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he
personally had held the opinion that Japan should first
attack Singapore and bring to an end the British influence in
that area and should then join the Three Power Pact, since he
did not favor the idea that Japan should join the alliance
without having made some contribution toward bringing about
the collapse of England. While Germany had been engaged in a
titanic struggle against England for a year, Japan, up to the
conclusion of the alliance, had contributed nothing. He had
therefore come out very strongly for the plan of an attack on
Singapore, but he had not
Page 295
prevailed and, under the force of events, had then reversed
his program and had come around to the entry into the
alliance first.
He had not the slightest doubt that the South Sea
problem could not be solved by Japan without the capture of
Singapore. They would have to press into the tiger's den and
drag out the young by force.
It was only a question of the time when Japan would
attack. According to his idea the attack should come as soon
as possible. Unfortunately he did not control Japan, but had
to bring those who were in control around to his point of
view. He would certainly be successful in this some day. But
at the present moment he could under these circumstances make
no pledge on behalf of the Japanese Empire that it would take
action.
He would, after his interviews with the Fhrer and the
Reich Foreign Minister, and after he had examined the
situation in Europe, give his closest attention to these
matters on his return. He could make no definite commitment,
but he would promise that he personally would do his utmost
for the ends that had been mentioned.
Matsuoka then requested urgently that the
representations which he had made be treated as strictly
confidential, since, if they became known in Japan, those
among his Cabinet colleagues who thought differently from him
would probably become alarmed and would seek to get him out
of office.
In connection with his efforts to bring about the treaty
of alliance he had maintained strict secrecy up to the last
minute and in order to deceive his opponents he had
oftentimes intentionally given the impression of having a pro-
American or pro-British attitude.
Shortly before the conclusion of the treaty of alliance
it had been reported to him that the British Ambassador was
conducting a strong propaganda campaign among the Japanese to
the effect that Japan was taking a very risky step in
adhering to the Three Power Pact. The American Ambassador
also had been active in the same direction. A few days after
the conclusion of the treaty of alliance he had asked the
American Ambassador whether the reports about these
propaganda activities were correct. The latter had admitted
everything and had stated as well that every Japanese whom he
had met, since the adherence to the treaty of alliance had
become known, had expressed the opinion that Germany would
win the war. In the opinion of the American Ambassador that
was false; Germany had no chance to win the war and therefore
in the Ambassador's opinion it actually was a very risky step
for Japan if the alliance had been concluded in the
expectation of a possible German victory.
Page 296
Matsuoka continued that he had answered the American
Ambassador that only the good God knew who would finally win
the war. He (Matsuoka) had, however, not concluded the
alliance on the basis of the victory of this or the other
power, but he had based his action on his vision of the New
Order. He had heard with interest the statements of the
Fhrer on the subject of the New Order and had been fully and
completely convinced by them. If, however, he assumed
entirely hypothetically that the fortune of war at some
period would turn against Germany, he must tell the American
Ambassador that in such a case Japan would come at once to
the assistance of her ally.
His vision of the New Order had been set forth in the
preamble to the Three Power Pact. There was at stake an
ideal, which had been handed down from one generation to
another from time immemorial. For him personally the
realization of this ideal was his life s aim, to which up to
the present day he had dedicated his fullest efforts, in
order to make on his own part a slight contribution toward
its realization. The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Three Power Pact was
also a contribution to such a realization. The consummation
of this idea, so Matsuoka went on, would be realized under
the slogan: "No conquest, no oppression, and no spoliation."
This would not be understood in all quarters in Japan. If,
however, Japan seemed likely to depart from this line he
would be the first to attempt to prevent it.
In this connection Matsuoka referred to still another
principle of the preamble to the Three Power Pact, according
to which every people must assume the place they deserved.
Although Japan, in the creation of the New Order, if it was
necessary, would proceed by force, and although she must
sometimes lead with a strong hand the peoples who would be
affected by this New Order, nevertheless she had always
before her the slogan which he had previously quoted: "No
conquest, no oppression, no spoliation."
In the further course of the conversation, Matsuoka
referred to his conference with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally
he owed an explanation on that subject to the Reich Foreign
Minister and he would have given it in the course of the
morning's conversation, if the Reich Foreign Minister had not
been called away early. Now he would give this information to
the Fhrer.
He had first only wanted to make a courtesy call on
Molotov on passing through Moscow. After some consideration,
however, he had decided to instruct the Japanese Ambassador
to make discreet inquiry of the Soviet Government whether the
latter would be interested in an interview between Stalin and
himself. However, before the
Page 297
Japanese Ambassador had been able to carry out his
instructions with the Soviet Government, a proposal was made
by the Russian Government itself for a meeting between
Stalin, Molotov and Matsuoka. He had spoken with Molotov for
about 30 minutes and with Stalin for an hour, so that, taking
into account the necessary translations, he had conversed
with Molotov for perhaps 10 minutes and with Stalin for 25
minutes.
He had told Stalin that the Japanese were moral
communists. This ideal had been handed down from father to
son from time immemorial. At the same time, however, he had
said that he did not believe in political and economic
communism, and he rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors
had much earlier given up any attempt in that direction and
had turned to moral communism.
In connection with what he called moral communism,
Matsuoka cited several examples from his own family. This
Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the
liberalism, individualism, and egoism introduced from the
West. At the moment the situation in Japan in this field was
extraordinarily confused. However, there was a minority which
was strong enough to fight successfully for the restoration
of the "Old Ego" ["alten Ichs"] of the Japanese. This
ideological struggle in Japan was extremely bitter. But those
who were fighting for the restoration of the old ideals were
convinced that they would be finally victorious. The Anglo-
Saxons were basically responsible for the entry of the new
philosophy which he had mentioned and, in order to restore
the old traditional Japanese ideals, Japan was compelled to
fight against the Anglo-Saxons, just as in China they were
not fighting against the Chinese but only against Great
Britain in China and capitalism in China.
Matsuoka then continued that he had discussed with
Stalin his ideas about the New Order and had stated that the
Anglo-Saxon represented the greatest hindrance to the
establishment of this order and that Japan therefore was
compelled to fight against them. He had told Stalin that the
Soviets on their part also were coming out for something new
and that he believed that after the collapse of the British
Empire the difficulties between Japan and Russia could be
eliminated. He had represented the Anglo-Saxons as the common
foe of Japan, Germany, and Soviet Russia.
Stalin had arranged to give him an answer when he passed
through Moscow again on his return journey to Japan; he had,
however, after some reflection stated that Soviet Russia had
never gotten along well with Great Britain and never would.
Page 298
Matsuoka in the further course of the conversation made
several remarks about the status of the Tenno. The Tenno was
the State, and the life and the property of every Japanese
belonged to the Tenno, that is to the State. That was, in a
way, the Japanese version of the idea of the totalitarian
state.
Further, Matsuoka expressed himself as marvelling over
the way in which the Fhrer with decisiveness and power was
leading the German people, who stood completely united behind
him through this great period of upheaval, a period without
parallel in previous history. A people found such a Fhrer
once in a thousand years. The Japanese people had not yet
found their Fhrer. He would, however, certainly appear in
time of need and with determination take over the leadership
of the people.
SCHMIDT
Minister
BERLIN, April 1, 1941.
*****
Frames 47376-47389, serial 67
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign
Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on March 28,
1941
Auf. RAM Nr. 18/41
The Reich Foreign Minister expressed his gratification
at being able to speak with Matsuoka a second time. The
Fhrer would have liked to define his attitude even more
fully with respect to the questions under consideration, but
his time had been very much taken up by developments in
Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The
essential thing was the question of the possibilities and
prospects of a closer cooperation between Japan and Germany,
that is, the transition from a passive to an active
collaboration of Japan in the common cause. It was with great
satisfaction that the Germans had heard of the spirit in
which Matsuoka was approaching these matters. It was a
question of the greatest opportunity that had ever existed
for the attainment of Japanese aims, and it would be well to
make use of this opportunity before it was lost. The
Tripartite Pact was a most important treaty and formed a
basis for relations between Japan and Germany for hundreds of
years. There existed no conflicts of interest.
The situation was such that a New Order could be
established only when Great Britain was completely defeated.
This applied with even greater force to Japan than to
Germany, who at present already dominated the European
Continent and by the end of this year would also
Page 299
bring the Mediterranean region and Africa, to the extent that
Germany was interested in them, under her domination.
Germany, then, had everything that she needed. She was not
striving for world domination, as Roosevelt falsely asserted.
The Fhrer wished to end the war as soon as possible in order
to devote himself again to his work of reconstruction. The
goal that he had set for himself-that is, to provide the
maximum security for the Reich-had, essentially, already been
attained.
On the other hand, the New Order in the Greater East
Asian sphere could be established only if Japan also
dominated the South. For this, however, the capture of
Singapore was necessary.
With reference to Russia the Reich Foreign Minister
stated that the Germans did not know how matters would
develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia would
set out upon the wrong road, although he did not really
expect this from Stalin. But one could not know. In any case
Germany would immediately strike if Russia should undertake
anything against Japan, and thereby keep Japan free in the
rear with respect to Russia. In this way one of the
misgivings of Japanese statesmen, but especially of the
Japanese Army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be
eliminated with the help of the German Army. The second
misgiving with reference to the English Home Fleet and the
English Mediterranean Fleet, which had been voiced
particularly by the Japanese Navy, he (the Reich Foreign
Minister) could answer by the fact that both of these English
fleets would be tied down by Germany in European and
Mediterranean waters. Finally, the Japanese had also
expressed concern on account of America. The United States,
however, would not risk its fleet against Japan and would not
send it beyond the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success
at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American
neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake
anything rash.
Although he (the Reich Foreign Minister) fully
understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had
illustrated by his story about the tiger and her cubs, he
nevertheless had to point out again that two of the strongest
countries in the world, which possessed a youthful, strong,
and fearless spirit, were now offered a chance by Providence
which probably occurred only once in a thousand years.
Germany's great opportunity was the Fhrer, whose co-workers
carried out his will only as his instruments. He (the Reich
Foreign Minister) had repeatedly declared to the Ambassadors
of England and France that
Page 300
they should not fall into the error of confusing present-day
Germany with that of 1919-1918. Even then the Reich had held
out for four years against a world of enemies; only because
of its disunity and its internal weakness had it lost the
war. Now, however, it was united and consequently had twice
the strength-which was again increased twofold by the genius
of Adolf Hitler's leadership, so that henceforth one would
have to reckon with a Germany which was four times as strong
as in the World War. The Ambassadors had disregarded these
warnings. The predictions had, however, come true, and
nothing in the world would prevent Germany and Italy from
dominating the European-African Hemisphere absolutely. When
under such circumstances an opportunity was offered Japan,
she ought to weigh matters very carefully and not let the
opportunity slip out of her hand.
When the present conflict would end, could not, of
course, be predicted with certainty; he (the Reich Foreign
Minister) had the feeling, however, that England might
perhaps collapse sooner than was generally expected. If the
English should suddenly ask for peace, it would be very
desirable if Germany and Japan could establish this peace
jointly.
The Reich Foreign Minister then spoke about his family
traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover, he
had had an important conversation with the Fhrer as early as
1934 on German-Japanese collaboration. The Fhrer's high
esteem for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese War. Now
the most important thing was not to lose the common
opportunity which presented itself in the year 1941.
Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. For
logical reasons, as well as from an inner feeling, he also
believed that 1941 would go down in history as a fateful
year. In it the greatest tragedy, the fall of the British
Empire, would be consummated. The German Nation in Europe and
the Japanese in the Far East were, he felt, acting almost
under a divine command to break up the British Empire and
establish a New Order.
Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would take
toward the United States if England should be brought to its
knees during the summer but America was not yet in the war.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that this would
depend on the attitude of the United States. The possibility
of an occupation of the British Isles required, to be sure, a
period of good weather, and the English would possibly try to
set up a new government in the United States. But in his
opinion this could not be done.
Page 301
Matsuoka then made his question specific as follows:
When England was crushed, the United States in his opinion
would not continue to support the British Empire. Canada
would simply be more or less annexed. Would Germany under
these circumstances leave the United States in peace? The
Reich Foreign Minister replied that Germany did not have the
slightest interest in a war against the United States.
Matsuoka noted this with satisfaction, remarking that one had
to reckon with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if it should not
be possible to convert America to our way of thinking, no New
Order could be established. The Reich Foreign Minister
replied that each would exercise dominion in its own sphere.
Germany, together with Italy, would do this in the European-
African sphere; the United States would have to limit itself
to the American Continent; and the Far East was reserved for
Japan. As far as Russia was concerned, it would be very
carefully watched and would in no case be permitted any kind
of subversive propaganda. In the future only the three
aforesaid spheres of interest would remain as great centers
of power. The British Empire would disappear.
Matsuoka replied that the only big problem still
remaining would then be Russia. Japan was prepared to permit
Russia an ice-free outlet to the sea by way of India or Iran,
but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast.
Matsuoka then asked whether the Fhrer had ever considered
the possibility of a Russian-Japanese-German alliance. The
Reich Foreign Minister denied this and said that a closer
collaboration with Russia was an absolute impossibility,
since the ideological bases of the army, as well as of the
rest of the nation, were completely incompatible. The Soviet
Union was still internationally minded while Japan and
Germany thought nationally. Russia was undermining the
family; Germany championed it. A union was just as impossible
here as between fire and water. Stalin was very clever and
had therefore concluded the pact with Germany under the
circumstances then prevailing. Russia would also have joined
the Tripartite Pact, but her conditions could not be met. The
whole matter was now being handled in a quite dilatory manner
by Germany, as he could now inform Matsuoka confidentially.
Moreover, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and-
this Matsuoka should realize clearly-she was prepared for any
eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia; but if the
policy of Stalin was not in harmony with what the Fhrer
considered to be right, he would crush Russia. Matsuoka
replied that Japan was now taking pains not to provoke
Russia. Japan was waiting for the completion of the German
victory in the
Page 302
Balkans. Without the good offices of Germany and without her
strength there was no chance for Japan to mend Russo-Japanese
relations completely.
Matsuoka also spoke of the long-term trade agreement
which would be concluded with Russia. He then asked the Reich
Foreign Minister whether on his return trip he should remain
in Moscow for a somewhat longer period in order to negotiate
with the Russians on the Non-aggression Pact or the Treaty of
Neutrality. He emphasized in this connection that direct
acceptance of Russia into the Tripartite Pact would not be
countenanced by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary
call forth a unanimous cry of indignation all over Japan. The
Reich Foreign Minister replied that such an adherence of
Russia to the Pact was out of the question and, moreover,
recommended that Matsuoka, if possible, should not bring up
the above-mentioned questions in Moscow, since this probably
would not altogether fit into the framework of the present
situation.
In reply to a further remark by Matsuoka that the
conclusion of a fishing and trade agreement would improve the
feeling between Russia and Japan, the Reich Foreign Minister
replied that there were no objections to the conclusion of
such purely commercial agreements. Matsuoka mentioned in this
connection that America was observing Japanese-Russian
relations closely and was trying on her part to conclude an
agreement with Russia against Japan.
Matsuoka then began to speak of Singapore again. The
Japanese were not worried on account of the British Navy. But
there were Japanese circles which viewed a conflict with
America with great misgivings, since they assumed that this
would involve a five-or ten-year war with the United States.
He would readily admit that America would not risk its fleet
in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these
Japanese circles were worried, because under these
circumstances the war would last for years. The Reich Foreign
Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would not let
it come to war since he was well aware of the impossibility
of any action against Japan. Japan, on the other hand, could
occupy the Philippines and in this way deal a severe blow to
Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan captured Singapore, the
greater part of the world would have come under the control
of the Tripartite Powers, and America would find itself in an
isolated position.
Matsuoka expressed himself as personally very strongly
in favor of the Reich Foreign Minister's line of reasoning.
If Japan did not assume the risk connected with the capture
of Singapore, he was of
Page 303
the opinion that it would thereby become a third-rate power.
The blow would therefore have to come some day in any event.
If he could succeed in keeping the United States quiet for
six months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation
which continued to hesitate in a matter of such fundamental
national importance thereby only showed that it lacked the
most important quality, power of decision.
Berlin, March 31, 1941.
*****
Frames 47357-47375, serial 67
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign
Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on
March 29, 1941
Auf. RAM 18/41
The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the earlier
discussion with Matsuoka concerning the latter's impending
conversations with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the
opinion that in view of the general situation it might be
best not to go into things too deeply with the Russians. He
did not know how the situation would develop. But one thing
was certain: if Russia should ever attack Japan, Germany
would strike immediately. He could give this firm assurance
to Matsuoka, so that Japan could push southward toward
Singapore without fear of any complications with Russia. As
it was, the greater part of the German Army was on the
eastern boundary of the Reich and was ready to attack at any
time. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed, however, that
Russia would not occasion any military action. But if Germany
should become involved in a conflict with Russia, the Soviet
Union would be finished within a few months. In that case,
Japan would, of course, not have anything at all to fear, if
she wanted to advance toward Singapore. So, in any case, she
need not be kept from that undertaking by any fears of
Russia.
Of course, we could not tell how matters would develop
with Russia. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
accentuate his present policy of unfriendliness toward
Germany. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) in any event wanted
to point out to Matsuoka that a conflict with Russia was
always within the realm of possibility. At any rate, Matsuoka
could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return,
that a conflict between Germany and Russia was inconceivable.
On the contrary, as matters stood, such a conflict, though
not probable, still would have to be designated as possible.
Page 304
With regard to Russian adherence to the Three Power
Pact, as had been offered to Molotov by Germany, the Reich
Foreign Minister remarked that there had been no question of
the direct admission of Russia into the Pact, but rather of a
different grouping. As already stated, however, the Russians
had set conditions for their adherence which Germany could
not accept, so that matters were now in suspense.
In reply to a question interpolated by Matsuoka, whether
that meant that Germany would perhaps again seek, after the
lapse of some time, to get Russia to adhere to the Three
Power Pact, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that an
attempt of that kind would probably not be made for some
time, since the conditions submitted by Russia were
irreconcilable with the German view, particularly those
concerning Finland and Turkey.
In reply to an inquiry by Matsuoka for further details
on the Russian conditions, the Reich Foreign Minister
responded that German resistance to the Soviet demands with
respect to Finland was based on economic considerations, and
also on sentiment. Germany had fought on the side of the
Finns in the World War. Matsuoka put in here that the Finns
apparently laid great stress on being considered as belonging
on the German side. The Japanese Minister in Helsinki, whom
he had recalled in connection with the recent shifting of
diplomats, told a newspaperman at Manchuli on the trip
homeward that Finland now appeared to have placed herself on
Russia's side. Some time later, the Finnish Minister in Tokyo
protested officially to Matsuoka against that statement and
declared that Finland would never place herself on Russia's
side.
The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that the Social-
Democratic governments in Finland had always been against the
Fhrer, so that there was no reason for Germany to help them
during the Russo-Finnish War. Besides, Germany had to assume
an absolutely neutral position, because in the conversations
with Molotov and Stalin, Finland had been designated as not
lying within the German sphere of interest. But when the
Finns defended themselves so valiantly against the Russians,
strong feeling for them sprang up in Germany, so that it was
now impossible to give up Finland, since an occupation by
Russia would lead to complete destruction of the country, as
was shown by the example of the Baltic States.
The second Russian condition dealt with the guarantee to
Bulgaria, together with occupation of the country by Russian
troops, concerning which he had already been informed in
detail in the earlier conversations.
Page 305
The third condition had as its subject the establishment
of bases on the Dardanelles. Matsuoka was already informed on
that point too. At any rate, Germany preferred the
Dardanelles to remain in the hands of the Turks. Besides, she
could not permit a penetration of the Russians into the
Balkans. However, Russia kept trying to push forward in that
direction. Thus, in connection with recent happenings in
Yugoslavia, activity was now increasing partly with the aid
of the Sokol organization or through direct Communist
influence. At any rate, the discussions with the Russians on
those conditions had not been taken up again. We had merely
told the Soviet Union that Germany could not allow any new
conflict in Finland or the Balkans. Since then all these
questions were, as stated, in suspense, and no favorable
development was to be expected.
During the further course of the conversation, the Reich
Foreign Minister imparted to the Japanese Foreign Minister,
in confidence, his view of the true Russian interest. The
Soviet Union wanted the war to last as long as possible. It
knew that it could not itself gain anything by military
attacks. Therefore the exceedingly rapid defeat of France did
not suit that sly politician Stalin very well. He wanted a
long war that would tire out the peoples and make them ripe
for Bolshevik influence. That was the true aim of Russian
policy, which should never be lost sight of.
Matsuoka agreed with these ideas and cited the situation
in China as an example. Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he was in
personal touch, who knew him and trusted him, was greatly
alarmed as to the further increase of the influence of the
Red Army in China.
The Reich Foreign Minister said that it was entirely
possible that the conditions previously described would lead
rather rapidly to a conflict between Germany and Russia. If
Germany should feel herself endangered, she would immediately
attack and put an end to Bolshevism.
To a suggestion by Matsuoka, not to allow the Anti-
Comintern Pact to expire, but to renew it, the Reich Foreign
Minister replied that he could not take a definitive position
on the matter yet, since the situation as it would appear in
the autumn, at the expiration of the Pact, could not be
foreseen at the present time. As a matter of principle,
however, Germany's stand was always in the sense of the Anti-
Comintern Pact.
When Matsuoka asked the Reich Foreign Minister to inform
him in good time, before the expiration of the Anti-Comintern
Pact, regard-
Page 306
ing the German stand with respect to a possible extension of
the Pact, the Reich Foreign Minister rejoined that by October
the situation would certainly have been clarified to such an
extent that a definite stand by Germany would be possible.
Thereupon the Reich Foreign Minister spoke once more of
the question of Singapore. In view of the fears expressed by
Japan of possible submarine attacks from the Philippines and
of the intervention of the British Mediterranean Fleet and
Home Fleet, he had discussed the situation once again with
Admiral Raeder. The latter had told him that the British
Fleet would be so fully occupied this year in British home
waters and in the Mediterranean that it could not send a
single ship to the Far East. The American submarines were
designated by Admiral Raeder as so poor that Japan need not
concern herself about them at all.
Matsuoka at once rejoined that the Japanese Navy
considered the danger from the English Navy as very slight,
and was also of the opinion that in case of a clash with the
American Navy it could destroy the latter without trouble. It
did fear, however, that the Americans would not give battle
with their fleet, and that in that way the conflict with the
United States would perhaps last for five years. They were
very uneasy over that in Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that America could
not do anything at all against Japan in case of the capture
of Singapore. For that very reason Roosevelt would perhaps
think twice before deciding actually to move against Japan.
For while he could not do anything against Japan, there was
the probability that the Philippines would be taken by Japan;
this would naturally entail great loss of prestige for the
American President, since, as a result of insufficient
American military preparation, he could not retaliate.
Matsuoka pointed out in this connection that he was
doing everything to soothe the British with regard to
Singapore. He was acting as if Japan had no designs
whatsoever on this key point of England in the East. It might
therefore be that in his words and acts he would assume a
friendly manner toward the English. But Germany should not be
misled by that. He was assuming that manner not only in order
to soothe the British, but to mislead the pro-British and pro-
American elements in Japan, until he should one day suddenly
attack Singapore.
With regard to this, the Reich Foreign Minister stated
that in his opinion the declaration of war by Japan against
England should follow from an attack on Singapore.
Page 307
Matsuoka remarked in this connection that his tactics
were based upon the safe assumption that the whole Japanese
Nation would be united at one stroke by the sudden attack on
Singapore. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the Reich
Foreign Minister interjected here) He (Matsuoka) was here
following the words of a famous Japanese statesman addressed
to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War: "Open fire, and the Nation will then be united." The
Japanese had to be shaken up to rouse them. Lastly, as an
Oriental he also believed in fate, which comes whether we
want it or not.
As the conversation went on, it turned to the question
of rubber shipments. The Reich Foreign Minister asked
Matsuoka to test the practicability of shipment to Lisbon or
France by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers.
Matsuoka agreed to this and said that immediately after
the step taken by Ambassador Ott with respect to the rubber
question, he had proposed having Japan provide certain
amounts for Germany from her own rubber stocks and later
filling up the resulting gaps with rubber from Indo-China.
In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed
out that traffic over the Siberian Railroad was not adequate
and that, besides, 18,000 tons of French rubber from Indo-
China would be delivered to Japan through the mediation of
Germany. In this connection also he inquired as to the size
of the auxiliary cruisers that might be available for the
rubber shipments. Matsuoka, who said that he was not
accurately informed, estimated the size at 10,000 tons.
In addition, referring to the discussion with Reich
Minister Funk, the Reich Foreign Minister turned the
conversation to future trade relations between Japan and
Germany. He explained that the trade between the great
economic areas of the future, that is, Europe and Africa on
the one side and the Far East on the other side, would have
to be developed on a relatively free basis, while the
American Hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States
was concerned, would remain more to itself, as it had
everything that it needed in its own territory and therefore
was not to be considered for interchange with other economic
areas. In South America, however, things were different.
Possibilities of exchange with other economic areas actually
presented themselves there.
Matsuoka replied that, for her own reconstruction and
for the development of China, Japan needed cooperation with
Germany. Some time before, he had given written instructions
to the Japanese missions in China to grant preferred
treatment to German and Italian
Page 308
economic interests, as had already been done in Manchukuo and
North China. Japan was not in a position to develop the
gigantic territories of China without the assistance of
German technical skill and German enterprise. Outwardly, of
course, Japan would declare the open-door policy, but in
reality would grant preferential treatment to Germany and
Italy.
Besides, he had to admit openly that Japanese business
circles were afraid of their German competitors, whom they
considered very clever, while they only smiled at British and
American competition. German business circles probably took a
similar stand with regard to the Japanese, and therefore
complaints came from both sides. He was of the opinion,
however, that the reciprocal interests could be brought into
harmony, and he told Japanese businessmen that they should
not be afraid of German competition, but should endeavor to
grapple with the problem with equal cleverness. At any rate
the Japanese Government would do everything to equalize the
interests of the two sides.
Then the Reich Foreign Minister went on to speak of
Matsuoka's possible trip to Vichy, which was being
considered. In this connection he said that of course he left
it entirely to Matsuoka to decide whether he wanted to go to
Vichy or not. If he considered this trip advisable, the
German Government would not have anything against it. It
would by no means stand in his way if, for instance, he
wanted to talk to the French about Indo-China.
Matsuoka replied that above all else the respect which
he felt for old Marshal Ptain had given him the idea of
going to Vichy. The Emperor, who as Crown Prince had once
been a guest of Ptain, was also among the admirers of the
Marshal. Besides, he (Matsuoka) would like to go to Paris,
and in that case a visit to Vichy would probably be
unavoidable. However, in view of the extraordinary tension
between Italy and France, he hesitated a great deal to
undertake this visit, and in any event he wanted to ask the
Duce and Count Ciano beforehand. He was certain that in her
position of power Germany would have nothing against such a
visit, but he did not know if he would hurt Italian feelings
by going.
Going on, Matsuoka again spoke of Japanese-Russian
relations. He pointed out that he had proposed a non-
aggression pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied
with the proposal of a neutrality agreement. During his stay
in Moscow he, as the one who had made the original non-
aggression proposal, would be forced to take a stand in some
way with respect to these matters. On that occasion
Page 309
he also intended to attempt to get the Russians to give up
the northern half of the Sakhalin Peninsula. There were
important oil deposits there, the exploitation of which was
hampered in every conceivable way by the Russians. In all,
Matsuoka calculated the maximum amount to be procured from
these oil deposits at 2 million tons. He would propose to the
Russians acquiring northern Sakhalin by purchase.
In reply to a question by the Reich Foreign Minister, as
to whether the Russians would be ready to sell these regions,
Matsuoka answered that it was extremely doubtful. At a hint
to the same effect, Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador
whether "that was meant for a joke." At any rate Japan was
ready in return to replace the treaties of Portsmouth and
Peking by other agreements and also to give up her fishing
rights. In any event he would have to take up these matters
and, in particular, the question of the non-aggression pact
during his stay in Moscow. He asked the Reich Foreign
Minister whether he should go very deeply into these
questions or treat them only superficially.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion
only a purely formal, superficial handling of these points
was advisable. The question mentioned by Matsuoka with regard
to Sakhalin could also be settled later. Further, if the
Russians should pursue a foolish policy and force Germany to
strike, he would-knowing the sentiments of the Japanese Army
in China-consider it proper if that army were prevented from
attacking Russia. Japan would best help the common cause if
she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the
attack on Singapore. With a common victory, the fulfillment
of the wishes named above would, so to speak, fall into
Japan's lap like ripe fruit.
Matsuoka went on to speak of German help in the blow
against Singapore, regarding which he had received repeated
assurances, and in that connection he mentioned the offer of
a written promise of German help.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had already
discussed these things with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked
him to supply maps of Singapore, so that the Fhrer, who
certainly must be considered the greatest expert of modern
times on military matters, could advise Japan as to the best
method for the attack on Singapore. German aviation experts
would also be available and, on the basis of experience
gained in Europe, could advise the Japanese regarding the
Page 310
use of dive bombers against the British Fleet in Singapore
from air bases nearby. The British Fleet would then be
compelled to disappear from Singapore at once.
Matsuoka interjected here that Japan was less concerned
about the British fleet than about the capture of the
fortifications.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that here too the
Fhrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on
strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and
Fort Eben Emael, which he could place at the disposal of the
Japanese.
Matsuoka replied, in this connection, that some junior
naval officers who were experts on such matters and who were
good friends of his were of the opinion that it would take
three months for the Japanese forces to capture Singapore. As
a cautious Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had doubled that
time. He believed that for six months they could ward off any
danger threatening from America. But if the capture of
Singapore should take still longer and were perhaps
protracted for as long as a year, an extremely critical
situation with America would develop, which he did not yet
know how to meet.
If it could somehow be avoided, he would not touch the
Dutch East Indies, as he feared that in case of a Japanese
attack on those regions the oil fields would be set on fire.
Then they could not be brought into production again for one
or two years.
The Reich Foreign Minister remarked on that point that
with the capture of Singapore, Japan would also gain control
of the Dutch East Indies at the same time.
Matsuoka then mentioned also that the desire for air
bases in French Indo-China and Thailand had been expressed
among Japanese officers. He had rejected this, however, since
he was by no means willing to undertake anything that might
betray Japanese intention with regard to Singapore.
In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister took up once
more the question of Germany's assistance to Japan. Something
could perhaps be done in that field also. Japan had to
understand, however, that in this war the heaviest burden was
resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting
against the island of Great Britain and was tying up the
British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was
fighting only on the periphery. Besides, the main Russian
forces were on the European side. The chivalrous Japanese
Nation would surely recognize this state of affairs.
Page 311
Matsuoka agreed to these ideas, in closing, and gave the
assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally, which
would devote its efforts fully and entirely to the common
cause and not merely in a half-hearted way.
BERLIN, March 31, 1941.
*****
Frames 47334-47347, serial 67
Memorandum of the Interview Between the Fhrer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the Presence of
the Reich Foreign Minister and Minister of State
Meissner at Berlin, April 4, 1941
Aufz. Fh 20/41
Matsuoka first thanked the Fhrer for the gifts which
had been presented to him in the Fhrer's name, which he said
he would treasure forever in an honored place as a perpetual
remembrance of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he
expressed his thanks for the friendly reception which he had
received in Germany from the Fhrer, the Reich Foreign
Minister, and the whole German people. As long as he lived he
would never forget the sympathy which had been displayed
toward him here on all sides. On his return to Japan he would
exert himself with all his power to convince the Japanese
people of the honored friendship and esteem in which they
were held by the German people.
Next Matsuoka reported concerning his conversations with
the Duce and the Pope.
With the Duce he had discussed the European situation in
general and the state of the war, as well as the relationship
of Italy to Germany and the future course of world
development. The Duce had informed him (Matsuoka) of his
views of the situation of the war in Greece, Yugoslavia, and
North Africa and of the part which Italy herself had in these
events. Finally the Chief of the Italian Government had
spoken of Soviet Russia and America. He had said that one
must have a clear notion of the importance of one's
opponents. The enemy No. 1 was America, and Soviet Russia
came only in second place. By these remarks the Duce had
given him to understand that America as enemy-No. 1 would
have to be very carefully observed, but should not be
provoked. On the other hand one must be thoroughly prepared
for all eventualities. Matsuoka had agreed in this line of
thought.
With regard to Soviet Russia the Duce had spoken only
briefly and to the same effect as had the Fhrer and the
Reich Foreign Minister. In that connection also Matsuoka had
agreed with him.
Page 312
As the deepest impression which he was bringing back
from his conversation with the Duce, Matsuoka mentioned the
sense of complete unity between Italy and Germany, whose
relations, in his opinion, could never be disturbed. Both
countries were at one and firmly determined not to let this
position be shaken. Matsuoka had felt this previously, but
his conviction after his conversation with the Duce was
stronger than ever. On his return to Japan he would try to
drive home this fact, especially with those Japanese who
continued to believe that Italy could be persuaded by Great
Britain, perhaps not to become detached from Germany
completely, but at least to cease to fight with her whole
heart for the common cause.
Count Ciano, with whom he was personally friendly, had
informed him that he did not always completely understand the
policy of the
Fhrer, but that nevertheless he had implicit confidence
in him and his decisions.
With the Pope he had had an open and friendly
conversation lasting for an hour and a quarter, which was
concerned in a more theoretical fashion with the present
situation and the future development of civilization. They
had not spoken of the war, so that it would be hardly useful
to describe the conversation any further to the Fhrer. At
his departure Matsuoka had asked the Pope whether or not the
latter perceived any opportunity or chance for bringing about
peace. After brief consideration the Pope had said "No," and
on his part asked Matsuoka whether or not he discerned any
possibilities of peace. Matsuoka had also replied in the
negative. The Pope had added only that nevertheless he prayed
daily for peace and he requested Matsuoka to do the same,
which the latter promised to do. In addition the Pope
declared that if Japan saw any possibility of peace he would
be glad to give his assistance.
Matsuoka further reported that he had told the Pope that
during the World War he had served in the Foreign Office in
Tokyo as private secretary to the then Prime Minister, and
that, in that capacity, he had sought to persuade the Prime
Minister and Field Marshal Yamagata to establish
communication with the Vatican for the purpose of bringing
about peace. Both had been favorable in principle but they
had not had the boldness to put the idea into actual
operation.
Matsuoka added that he had been led to undertake these
peace efforts principally in view of the personality of
Cardinal Gaspari.
Further, he had sought to convince the Pope that the
United States and especially the American President were
prolonging the war in Europe and in China. It was not a
matter of proving whether
Page 313
America and her President were right or wrong. They would
certainly have definite grounds for their policy. Entirely
apart from the question of right or wrong, the fact would
have to be recognized that they were prolonging the war in
Europe and in China. In connection with China he had sought
to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting against the
Chinese or China herself, but only against Bolshevism, which
was threatening to spread over China and the whole Far East.
It was regrettable that America and England stood on the side
of Bolshevism.
The Fhrer here interjected that both countries had
stood on the side of Bolshevism in Spain as well.
Matsuoka then advanced the request that the Fhrer
should instruct the appropriate authorities in Germany to
meet the desires of the Japanese Military Commission as fully
as possible. Especially in the field of U-boat warfare, Japan
required German help in the way of furnishing the latest
operational experience and the newest technical improvements
and discoveries. Japan would do everything in her power to
avoid a war with the United States. In case his country
determined on a stroke against Singapore, the Japanese Navy
must, of course, also make preparations against the United
States, for in such a case America might possibly come out on
the side of Great Britain. Personally he (Matsuoka) believed
that the entry of the United States into the war on the side
of Great Britain could be avoided. The army and navy must,
however, prepare for the worst, i. e., for a war against
America. They believed that such a war would last over five
years and would be fought out as a guerrilla war in the
Pacific Ocean and South Seas. For this reason the experience
derived by Germany in her guerrilla war would be most
important for Japan. It was a matter of how such a war could
best be carried on and how all the technical improvements of
the U-boats, down to individual parts, such as periscopes and
the like, could be made useful by Japan.
Summing up, Matsuoka asked the Fhrer to see to it that
the improvements and discoveries in the naval and military
fields should be made available to the Japanese by the
competent German authorities
The Fhrer agreed to this and added that Germany also
considered a war with the United States to be undesirable,
but that it had already been included in his calculations. In
Germany the viewpoint was that America's performance depended
upon her transport capabilities, which in turn would be
limited by the tonnage available. Germany's warfare against
shipping tonnage represented an appreciable weakening not
only of England but of America also. Germany had made
Page 314
her preparations so that no American could land in Europe.
She would wage a vigorous war against America with the U-
boats and the Luftwaffe, and with her greater experience,
which the United States had still to achieve, would be more
than a match for America, entirely apart from the fact that
the German soldiers were, obviously, far superior to the
Americans.
In the further course of the conversation the Fhrer
declared that if Japan got into a conflict with the United
States, Germany on her part would take the necessary steps at
once. It made no difference with whom the United States first
came into conflict, whether it was with Germany or with
Japan. They would always be intent upon disposing of one
country first, not with the idea of then coming to an
agreement with the other country, but with the idea of
disposing of it next. Therefore Germany would, as he had
said, promptly take part in case of a conflict between Japan
and America, for the strength of the allies in the Three
Power Pact lay in their acting in common. Their weakness
would be in allowing themselves to be defeated separately.
Matsuoka again repeated his request that the Fhrer
should give the necessary instructions, so that the competent
German authorities would make available to the Japanese the
latest inventions and improvements of interest to them, for
the Japanese Navy must make preparations at once for a
conflict with the United States.
With regard to Japanese-American relations Matsuoka
continued that in his own country he had always declared that
if Japan continued in the same fashion as at present, a war
with the United States sooner or later would be unavoidable.
In his view this conflict might better occur sooner than
later. Accordingly, so his argument had run, should not Japan
decide to act with determination at the proper moment and
take the risk of a war against America? Exactly by such means
the war might perhaps be postponed for generations,
especially if Japan secured domination in the South Seas. In
Japan, however, many people refused to follow this line of
thought. In those circles Matsuoka was considered to be a
dangerous man with dangerous ideas. He declared, however,
that if Japan proceeded further along the present course she
would some day have to fight and that this might happen under
more favorable circumstances then than at present.
The Fhrer replied that he had much sympathy for
Matsuoka's position, since he had found himself in similar
situations (the occupation of the Rhineland, and the
resumption of full military independence). He had also come
to the conclusion that in a period when
Page 315
he was still young and vigorous he should make use of
favorable circumstances and take upon himself the risk of a
war which was eventually unavoidable. That he had been right
in taking this position had been demonstrated by events.
Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply
at once to any extension of the war whether by Russia or by
America. Providence favored those who did not let perils
overtake them, but who confronted them courageously.
Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather the
statesmen who were in control there, had lately undertaken a
last maneuver with respect to Japan, in which they declared
that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the
South Pacific, on condition that Japan should permit
shipments of rubber and tin from these areas to proceed
unhindered to their points of destination in America. America
would, however, fight Japan the moment she felt that Japan
intended to enter the war with the intention of assisting in
the destruction of Great Britain. With the English-oriented
education which many Japanese had received, this sort of
argument naturally was not without effect on the Japanese.
The Fhrer declared in this connection that this
attitude of America meant no more than that, as long as the
British Empire remained, the United States would cherish the
hope of one day being able to proceed together with Great
Britain against Japan, while, with a collapse of the Empire
they would be completely isolated as against Japan and could
accomplish nothing against her.
The Reich Foreign Minister here interjected that the
Americans under any circumstances would seek to uphold the
English power position in East Asia; that, however, this
attitude showed how much they feared joint action on the part
of Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed important to him to
give the Fhrer the true story about the actual situation in
Japan. Therefore he must inform him of the regrettable
circumstances that he (Matsuoka), as Japanese Foreign
Minister, in Japan itself did not dare to say a word about
the plans which he had set forth to the Fhrer and the Reich
Foreign Minister. In political and financial circles it would
do him much harm. He had once, previously, before he had
become Japanese Foreign Minister, made the mistake of telling
a close friend something about his intentions. The latter had
apparently spread the matter about, so that every kind of
rumor arose, which, although he always otherwise spoke the
truth, as Foreign Minister he was bound energetically to
contradict. Also, under these circumstances, he could not
state how soon he would be able to hold a conference with the
Page 316
Japanese Prime Minister or with the Emperor about the
questions which had been discussed. He would first have to go
into developments in Japan closely and carefully, in order to
determine a favorable occasion on which to give Prince Konoye
and the Emperor the true picture about his real plans. The
decision would then have to follow in a few days, for
otherwise the problems would be talked to pieces. If he were
not able to put through his plans, it would be an indication
that he lacked sufficient influence, power of persuasion and
tactical ability. But if he could put them through, it would
show that he had attained great influence in Japan. He
personally believed that he would be able to put them
through.
On his return he would admit to the Emperor, the Prime
Minister, and the Navy and War Ministers, if they asked, that
the matter of Singapore had been discussed. He would,
however, declare that this had only been done in a
hypothetical way.
In addition Matsuoka expressly requested that nothing be
cabled on the subject of Singapore, since he feared that by
use of telegrams something might slip out. In case of
necessity, he would send a courier.
The Fhrer agreed and assured him that he could rely
fully and completely on German discretion.
Matsuoka replied that he had confidence in German
discretion, but he could not, unfortunately, say the same
thing for Japan.
After some personal farewell greetings the conversation
came to a close.
SCHMIDT
BERLIN, April 4, 1941.
*****
Frames 113240-113241, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 4, 1941-10:28 p. m.
Received April 5, 1941-12:55 a. m.
SECRET
No. 796 of April 4
For the Reich Minister personally.
Molotov just summoned me to the Kremlin to inform me of
the following, in accordance with the agreement to consult
existing between Germany and the Soviet Union:
Page 317
The Yugoslav Government had proposed to the Soviet
Government the negotiation of a treaty of friendship and non-
aggression, and the Soviet Government had accepted the
proposal. This agreement would be signed today or tomorrow.
In its decision to accede to the proposal of the Yugoslav
Government, the Soviet Government had been actuated solely by
the desire to preserve peace. It knew that in this desire it
was in harmony with the Reich Government, which was likewise
opposed to an extension of the war. The Soviet Government
therefore hoped that the German Government, too, in its
present relations to Yugoslavia, would do everything to
maintain peace. The agreement between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia was analogous to the Turco-Soviet Agreement of
1925, and relations of the Soviet Union to other countries
were not affected by the agreement with Yugoslavia. The
Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement was directed against no one and was
not aimed at any other state.
I replied to Molotov that in my estimation the moment
chosen by the Soviet Union for the negotiation of such a
treaty had been very unfortunate, and the very signing would
create an undesirable impression in the world. The policy of
the Yugoslav Government was entirely unclear, and its
attitude, as well as the behavior of the Yugoslav public
toward Germany, was challenging.
Molotov replied that Yugoslavia had concluded a treaty
with Germany regarding accession to the Three Power Pact, and
the Yugoslav Envoy here, who was at the same time a member of
the new Cabinet, had assured the Soviet Government that the
new Yugoslav Government was observing this treaty. Under
these circumstances, the Soviet Government had thought that
it could, for its part, conclude an agreement with Yugoslavia
that was not even as far-reaching as the German-Yugoslav
Treaty.
To my objection that, to my knowledge, we had thus far
received no statement from the Yugoslav Government regarding
the observance of its accession to the Three Power Pact and
had been given every reason to doubt its goodwill, Molotov
countered with the assertion that he was convinced of the
peaceful intentions of the Yugoslav Government. The latter
had restored peace and order to its country and strove to
create good relations with all its neighbors.
At my objection that the behavior of the new Yugoslav
Government actually revealed no striving toward good
relations with Germany-and despite all my efforts to obtain
from Molotov the promise that the Soviet Government might
reconsider the matter-Molotov repeatedly stated that the
Soviet Government had reached its decision
Page 318
after mature deliberation. It was convinced that the step it
had taken was a positive contribution to peace, which was
also desired by Germany. To this Molotov added the repeated
and urgent request that Germany also do all she could to
preserve peace in the Balkans.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 113249-113250, serial 104
Foreign Office Memorandum
MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOVIET DELIVERIES OF RAW
MATERIALS TO GERMANY
1) After the conclusion of the German-Soviet Commercial
Agreement of January 10, 1941, there could at first be
observed on the Soviet side a noticeable restraint with
regard to the practical carrying out of the Soviet
deliveries, which was probably attributable in part to the
cooling off of political relations with the Reich. The
conclusion of the individual commercial contracts also-as
usual-caused great difficulties. In consequence, imports of
raw materials from the U.S.S.R. remained relatively slight in
January and February (17 million RM and 11 million RM;
including, to be sure, as the largest and most important
item, 200,000 tons of Bessarabian grain).
2) A change took place in this respect in the month of
March. Deliveries in March rose by leaps and bounds,
especially in grains, petroleum, manganese ore, and the
nonferrous and precious metals. The grain contract, which we
had struggled so hard to get, was closed in the amount of 1.4
million tons of grain, at relatively favorable prices, for
delivery by September of this year. The Soviets have already
made available 110,000 tons of grain on this contract and
have promised firmly to deliver 170,000 to 200,000 tons of
grain in April.
3) The situation as regards the German counter-
deliveries is favorable in this quarter, since, in accordance
with the provisions of the contracts, we only have to deliver
in this quarter the balances due on the first year of the
contract. It will not be possible to adhere to the later
German delivery periods because of a shortage of labor and
priority of the military programs.
4) Transit traffic through Siberia is proceeding
favorably as usual. At our request, the Soviet Government
even put a special freight train for rubber at our disposal
at the Manchurian border. Negotiations are now in progress in
Moscow regarding the increase in Soviet tariff rates.
Page 319
To sum up, it may be said that after an initial lag
Russian deliveries at the moment are quite considerable, and
the Commercial Agreement of January 10th of this year is
being observed on the Russian side.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, April 5, 1941.
*****
Frames 365281-365282, serial 1448
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, April 6, 1941-4:30 a.m.
Received Moscow, April 6-9:35 a. m.
No. 703 of April 6
State Secret. Strictly secret. To be decoded only by the
officer in charge of state secret documents. To be submitted
at once to the Chief of the Mission personally. Reply by
courier or secret code.
For the Ambassador personally.
Please call on Herr Molotov early Sunday morning, April
6th, and tell him that the Government of the Reich had felt
itself compelled to proceed to military action in Greece and
Yugoslavia. The Government of the Reich had been forced to
take this step because of the arrival of British military
forces on the Greek mainland in ever increasing numbers, and
because of the fact that the Yugoslav Government which had
come to power illegally by the coup d'tat of March 27 had
made common cause with England and Greece. The Reich
Government had accurate information for several days to the
effect that the Yugoslav General Staff, in conjunction with
the Greek General Staff and the High Command of the British
Expeditionary Army that had landed in Greece, had prepared
for joint operations against Germany and Italy, which were on
the verge of being carried out. Moreover, the constantly
increasing number of reports on excesses against Germans in
Yugoslavia had made it impossible for the Government of the
Reich to remain inactive further in the face of such
developments. The new Yugoslav Government had taken this
course contrary to all law and reason, after Germany had for
years pursued a policy of friendship with this country, which
was to have reached its culmination in the recent accession
to the Three Power Pact. Moreover, I would ask you in this
connection to refer to the communications made
Page 320
to Herr Molotov on various occasions, which you had already
made to the Soviet Government, regarding the aims and
intentions of the German Government on the Balkan Peninsula:
that is, that German activity in this area is directed solely
to prevent England from gaining another foothold on the
Continent; that Germany has absolutely no political or
territorial interests in this area; and that German troops
would be withdrawn when their tasks in the Balkans are
finished. Please make these statements without any special
emphasis, in an objective and dispassionate manner.
Please do not on this occasion mention the communication
made to you by Molotov regarding the conclusion of a Soviet-
Yugoslav Friendship Pact. Should Molotov, on his part, speak
of it, then please confine yourself to the comment that you
have transmitted his communication to Berlin, but have not
yet received any reply.
Send telegraphic report on execution hereof.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 113266, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 6, 1941-7 p. m.
Received April 6, 1941-10:25 p. m.
No. 818 of April 6
Reference your telegram of the 5th [6th], No. 703.
For Reich Minister personally.
Since Molotov always spends Sunday out of town, I was
only able to speak with him this afternoon at 4 o'clock.
Molotov came to Moscow expressly for this purpose.
After I had made to Molotov the communications
prescribed, he repeated several times that it was extremely
deplorable that an extension of the war had thus proved
inevitable after all.
Molotov did not on this occasion mention the negotiation
of the Soviet-Yugoslav Pact. Therefore I, too, as instructed,
did not revert to this subject.
SCHULENBURG
Page 321
*****
Frames 84963-84964, serial 177
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 9, 1941-9:03 p. m.
Received April 9, 1941-11:05 p. m.
No. 843 of April 9
Reference my telegram No. 832 of the 7th. [13]
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka will have a further
conversation with Molotov this afternoon in the Kremlin.
After the dinner which Molotov arranged for him this evening,
Matsuoka will leave for Leningrad and spend Thursday there.
Matsuoka has delayed his departure till Sunday. I have had
several conversations with Matsuoka, but have not yet been
able to obtain any straightforward statement from him
regarding his conversations with Molotov and their concrete
results. In my opinion Matsuoka went very much into detail in
the conversations with Molotov, and it might well depend now
essentially on the Soviet Government whether there will be
any written agreements. Matsuoka promised to inform me before
his departure for Tokyo.
Matsuoka also related the following: At a breakfast
which Steinhardt, the American Ambassador here, gave for
Matsuoka by reason of his previous personal relations with
him, Steinhardt tried time and again to find out from him
whether a Japanese attack on America had been decided upon in
Berlin. Matsuoka added that he had the impression that
Steinhardt had been directly requested by Roosevelt to do
this. Naturally he had replied that this was entirely out of
the question.
SCHULENBURG
[13] Not printed.
*****
Frame 84967, serial 177
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 10, 1041-12:25 a. m.
Received April 10, 1941-5:20 a. m.
No. 851 of April 9
This evening, shortly before his dinner with Molotov,
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent Minister Nischi,
First Counselor of
Page 322
Embassy at the Japanese Embassy here, who was likewise
invited by Molotov, to give me the following information:
Today Matsuoka had again conferred for three hours with
Molotov. The result was: Matsuoka waived the original
Japanese demand for a non-aggression pact and the purchase by
Japan of North Sakhalin; at present it was a question of
concluding a neutrality pact, to include the following main
points:
1. Friendship
2. Respect for each other's territory
3. Neutrality in case of war
The Soviet Government was still insisting on the
abandonment of Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin as the
price of a neutrality pact, while the Japanese Government was
proposing that this point be settled later. Should the Soviet
Government persist in this viewpoint, Matsuoka would leave
here without accomplishing anything. If the Soviet Government
gave in, a neutrality pact would probably be concluded.
Matsuoka is leaving for Leningrad today; upon his return
Friday the decision may be made known.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 131706-131707, serial 165
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
[Moscow], April 13, 1941-6 p. m.
SECRET
No. 883 of April 13
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Matsuoka has just visited me in order to make his
farewell call. He stated to me that a Japanese-Soviet
Neutrality Pact had been arranged at the last moment and, in
all likelihood, would be signed this afternoon at 2 p. m.
local time. The Soviet Government had originally insisted
that Japan should at the same time give up her concession in
North Sakhalin, and that this be included in an annex to the
treaty. Matsuoka absolutely rejected this demand. Last
evening he had a conversation with Stalin, in which Stalin,
at the conclusion, had given up the demand for the
elimination of the Japanese concession. Stalin declared
characteristic-ally that Herr Matsuoka was "choking him"
Page 323
and he made the appropriate gesture. Herr Matsuoka promised
that he would do his best in Tokyo to bring the Japanese
Government and Japanese public opinion around to giving up
the concession. With regard to the episode, Herr Matsuoka
made the following remarks:
1) In Berlin he had told the Reich Foreign Minister that
in Moscow he probably would not be able to avoid discussing
the question, which had been pending for a long time, of a
Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression or Neutrality Pact. He would,
of course, show no eagerness in the matter, but he would be
compelled to do something in case the Russians were willing
to agree to Japanese wishes. The Reich Foreign Minister had
agreed in this point of view.
2) The forthcoming conclusion of the Pact, of course, in
no way affects the Three Power Pact. My inquiry as to whether
the Pact which was being concluded had any provision to this
effect in it, was answered by Matsuoka in the negative, and
he added that the Russians had not brought up this question,
and accordingly he had not gone into it either.
3) Matsuoka emphasized that the conclusion of the
Neutrality Pact was of very great importance for Japan. It
would make a powerful impression on Chiang Kai-shek and would
appreciably ease Japanese negotiations with him. Also it
would result in an appreciable strengthening of the position
of Japan as over against America and England. Matsuoka added
that the American and English journalists, who had reported
yesterday that his journey to Moscow had been a complete
failure, would be compelled today to acknowledge that the
Japanese policy had achieved a great success, which could not
fail to have its effect on England and America.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 131704-131705, serial 165
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 13, 1941-9 p. m.
SECRET
No. 884 of April 13
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Reference my telegram of today No. 883.
1. According to a statement of Matsuoka to the Italian
Ambassador at this capital, Matsuoka's assurance that he
would do his best
Page 324
to bring about the elimination of the Japanese concession in
North Sakhalin has been confirmed in writing by a letter of
Matsuoka to Molotov.
2. To a question from the Italian Ambassador to Matsuoka
as to whether at the conversation between Matsuoka and Stalin
the relations of the Soviet Union with the Axis had been
taken up, Matsuoka answered that Stalin had told him that he
was a convinced adherent of the Axis and an opponent [Gegner]
of England and America.
3. The departure of Matsuoka was delayed for an hour and
then took place with extraordinary ceremony. Apparently
completely unexpectedly for both the Japanese and the
Russians, both Stalin and Molotov appeared and greeted
Matsuoka and the Japanese who were present in a remarkably
friendly manner and wished them a pleasant journey. Then
Stalin publicly asked for me, and when he found me he came up
to me and threw his arm around my shoulders: "We must remain
friends and you must now do everything to that end!" Somewhat
later Stalin turned to the German Acting Military Attach,
Colonel Krebs, first made sure that he was a German, and then
said to him: "We will remain friends with you-in any event
[auf jeden Fall]!" Stalin doubtless brought about this
greeting of Colonel Krebs and myself intentionally, and
thereby he consciously attracted the general attention of the
numerous persons who were present.
SCHULENBURG
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