Shofar FTP Archive File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.005
Archive/File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.005
Last-Modified: 1997/10/19
Page 144
V. FRICTION IN THE BALTIC AND THE BALKANS, JUNE 4-SEPTEMBER
21, 1940
*****
Frame 112206, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 4, 1940-12:25 a. m.
Received June 4, 1940-5:15 a. m.
No. 1063 of June 3
Molotov informed me today that Ambassador von Mackensen
had stated to the Soviet Charg‚ in Rome around May 25-in
connection with the apparently imminent Italian entrance into
the war-that all problems in the Balkans are to be solved
without war, i. e., by mutual cooperation among Germany, the
Soviet Union, and Italy.
Molotov requested information as to whether this
statement by Mackensen actually reflected the opinion of the
Reich Government and the Italian Government.
Telegraphic instruction is requested.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 112208, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 6, 1940-3:55 p. m.
Received June 6, 1940-6:30 p. m.
No. 1079 of June 6
Reference your telegram of June 5, No. 938. [67]
In the conference on June 3, Molotov only asked for
information without showing any intention of wanting to bind
the German or Italian Government on any point. On the other
hand, he showed clearly that the Soviet Government would be
very pleased if Herr von Mackensen's statement reflected not
only his personal opinion but actually the interpretation of
the German and Italian Governments. The question as to how
possible cooperation among the three in the Balkans would
work out practically was not broached by Herr Molotov.
SCHULENBURG
[67] Not printed.
Page 145
*****
Frames 334518-334519, serial 1228
The German Foreign Office to the Representative of the German
Foreign Office With the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia
IMMEDIATE
BERLIN, June 8, 1940.
CONFIDENTIAL (ALSO IN THE REICH)
Pol. V 1581g
Subject: Hetman Skoropadsky's contemplated visit with the
Reich Protector.
Reference your report of May 27, 1940-5769/D.Pol.5. [68]
In view of German-Soviet relations, it appears advisable
to avoid anything which would be likely to arouse the Soviet
Government's distrust in the Ukranian question. Accordingly,
the Foreign Office attaches importance to having the
Ukrainian organizations in Greater Germany carry on no
political activities. This also applies to former Hetman
Skoropadsky and his movement. The importance of the Hetman
Movement has declined lately, to be sure, in favor of the
Ukrainian National Organization (U. N. O.), which was
promoted by the competent German internal authorities, [69]
but even now the Hetman still has numerous adherents at his
disposition outside Germany, especially in the United States
and Canada, where several thousand Ukrainians have pledged
their oath of allegiance to him and recognize his family as
the hereditary dynasty.
The Foreign Office and the Gestapo are continuously in
contact with the Hetman, who has always maintained a loyal
attitude toward Germany. To assure him and his family an
income consistent with his position, a considerable allowance
is paid to him regularly by the Foreign Office in addition to
the monthly honorarium provided by the late Reich President
Field Marshal von Hindenburg in 1928. Unfortunately relations
with him have for some time been deteriorating, because the
73-year-old Hetman evidently considers it his main duty to
attack and cast suspicion on the other Ukrainian groups,
especially the above-mentioned U. N. 0. [69]
By order:
v. RINTELEN
[68] Not printed.
[69] The words underlined were stricken out in the draft of
the letter.
Page 146
*****
Frames 219495-219496, serial 432
Foreign Office Memorandum
BERLIN, June 11, 1940.
The Lithuanian Minister called on me today to inform me
of the further progress of the discussions with the Soviet
Union. After the Soviet Union had raised the question of the
safety of the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and had rejected
the suggestion for a mixed commission to investigate the
incidents, the Lithuanian Government had of its own accord
taken a series of measures which it thought would satisfy the
Soviet Union. It might perhaps be admitted that relations
between the Soviet garrisons and the Lithuanian population
had earlier been treated too casually. Restrictive and
control measures had now been taken, and many arrests and
house searches made, etc. It was known that no reply was
received to the Lithuanian suggestion of sending the Foreign
Minister to Moscow. It was, therefore, all the more
surprising that not the Foreign Minister but Minister
President Merkys was summoned to Moscow.
On June 7 Merkys had had his first conversation with
Molotov. The latter had reproached him severely regarding the
safety of the Soviet garrisons and in this connection
presented a great many detailed incidents. Molotov had in
particular maintained persistently that Butayeff, a member of
the Red Army, who according to Lithuanian reports had
committed suicide, had been shut by Lithuanians. He had
expressed his dissatisfaction very plainly and stressed that
the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior was not equal to its
task.
In a subsequent conversation on June 9, Molotov had
brought up questions of foreign policy, which had increased
Lithuanian fears regarding the course of the conversations.
Molotov had maintained that a military alliance existed
between the three Baltic States and as proof had referred to
the frequent meetings of the chiefs of staff of the three
countries and to other frequent conferences between Baltic
personalities. Merkys had replied that there existed neither
secret nor open agreements which could violate the letter or
the spirit of the Agreement of October 10, 1939. There was
the old political treaty between the Baltic States but no
military alliance. Merkys had then himself expressed the wish
to invite the Foreign Minister to the conversations. The
latter had arrived in Moscow yesterday afternoon. Herr Skirpa
had not yet received any more recent reports. From the
Page 147
standpoint of protocol, everything had taken place in very
polite form.
The Lithuanian Government still did not know what the
intentions of the Soviet Union might be. The Lithuanian
Government was prepared to do even more for the safety of the
garrisons than it had done so far. If the Soviet Union now
made broader political or military demands, the Lithuanian
Government could not take the responsibility for their
acceptance. Thus far, the subject of Lithuania's relations
with Germany had not been discussed during the foreign policy
conversations. However, it was no doubt to be expected that
the Soviet Union would raise questions in this respect, too.
Here I interjected that there was nothing in German-
Lithuanian relations which was not or should not be known by
the Soviet Union.
Herr Skirpa asked whether we had not instructed our
Ambassador in Moscow to make inquiries. I replied in the
negative and avoided further discussion of the matter with
the remark that our Ambassador would certainly make a report
of his own accord.
WOERMANN
*****
Frame 175538, serial 270
The State Secretary in the German Foreign office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, June 14, 1940-8:45 p. m.
Received Moscow June 14, 1940-11:30 p. m.
No. 1003 of June 13
For the Chief of Mission or his representative
personally. Strictly secret. To be deciphered personally. To
be treated as confidential.
From a strictly secret source with which you are
acquainted it has come to our knowledge that the Soviet
Minister in Stockholm, Frau Kollontay, recently stated to the
Belgian Minister there that it was to the common interest of
the European powers to place themselves in opposition to
German imperialism. It had become evident that the German
danger was far greater than had been believed.
The Reich Foreign Minister requests you, if opportunity
arises, and without revealing the source, to discuss
tactfully with Molotov the hostile attitude of Minister
Kollontay toward Germany.
WEIZSŽCKER
Page 148
*****
Frame 112211, serial 103
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 1007 of June 16, 1940
Reich Foreign Minister's Special Train
Reference your telegrams 1063 [71] and 1094. [72]
Please reply orally to Herr Molotov's question as
follows:
1. As Mackensen reported upon inquiry, he did not make
such a definite statement as was reported by the Soviet
Charg‚ in Rome to the Soviet Government. He had, instead,
stated during the conversation with the Charg‚ that in his
opinion Germany and Italy were agreed that the Balkans should
remain quiet and that a settlement of the unsolved Balkan
question could probably be brought about more easily and
without the use of force after the war.
2. The Reich Government was gratified that the war had
not spread to the Balkans. Germany was, in principle, not
interested there territorially but only commercially. Our
attitude toward the Soviet Union in this question was finally
and irrevocably established by the definite Moscow Agreement.
3. Italy's attitude toward the Balkans was also made
unequivocally clear by Mussolini's speech on June 10 to the
effect that Italy had no intention of drawing the Balkans
into a war.
RIBBENTROP
[71] Ante, p. 144. ([70] not used? LWJ)
[72] Not printed.
*****
Frames 214876-214877, serial 407
The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister
Teletype
No. . .
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
To Baumschule [73] for Sonnleitner.
With reference to the despatches from Kaunas No. 96 and
No. 97 of June 15 [74] forwarded by teletype.
The Lithuanian Minister called up at about 2 a. m. today
and said that, in accordance with a telephone report from
Eydtkuhnen, Presi-
[73] Code name for the field office of the Reich Foreign
Minister.
[74] Neither printed.
Page 149
dent Smetona, accompanied by an adjutant and members of his
family, as well as General Rastaikis (who was rejected by the
Soviets as Prime Minister) and his brother, Colonel
Rastaikis, with their wives, had arrived in Eydtkuhnen. The
Minister, moreover, reported that a number of other prominent
Lithuanian personalities were probably staying at the German-
Lithuanian border and that they desired to enter Germany.
Some of them would be in danger, should they fall into the
hands of the Russians. The Minister requested that the German
border authorities be instructed to let these personalities
enter Germany. The official on [night] duty replied that he
could not initiate anything independently in this matter and
suggested making the request again in the morning.
By order of Under State Secretary Woermann I request
instructions as to how to treat the application of the
Lithuanian Minister. The question arises in particular
whether former Interior Minister Skucas and the former
director of the State Security Department, Powelaitis, who
were to be tried in accordance with point 1 of the Soviet
ultimatum, can be allowed to enter. Powelaitis, regarding
whom inquiry has already been made there by teletype, has
loyally cooperated with German authorities in fighting Polish
intrigues.
Division for Political Affairs, Night Duty Officer
WELCK
*****
Frame 214887, serial 407
Foreign Office Memorandum
The High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] (Colonel von
Geldern) reports that it has received from the
Counterintelligence Office in K”nigsberg, the following
communication:
Tonight at 3 o'clock President Smetona with family and
entourage crossed the "green frontier." He had given orders
to the Lithuanian garrisons of Mariampol and Tauroggen to
cross the frontier into Germany fully equipped and armed.
The High Command of the Armed Forces requests
instructions as to what action to take if the Lithuanian
troops, which apparently have not yet arrived, should wish to
cross the border.
VON KESSEL
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
Page 150
*****
Frame 214873, serial 407
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
Baumschule No. 56 of June 16, 11:15 a. m.
1. I have already given orders through the Gestapo to
intern the Lithuanian President, Smetona, with family and
other functionaries who have crossed the "green frontier."
This will be done by the Gestapo.
2. If Lithuanian troop contingents ask permission to
cross the German border, this request may be granted. The
troops are to be disarmed and likewise to be interned.
3. It is reported that a Lithuanian Colonel offered to
have his regiment cross the border. It is requested that the
disarming and interning of any Lithuanian soldiers who might
cross the border be done by the Armed Forces in collaboration
with the Border Police. In agreement with the State Police
please take the measures necessary so that the border posts
concerned may be immediately informed.
It is again pointed out that border crossings are to be
permitted only upon request of the Lithuanians and that we,
for our part, must not do anything to encourage such
requests.
This communication is to be transmitted at once by the
fastest route, orally and in written form, to the High
Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] with the request for
further action.
RIBBENTROP
Minute
The transmittal to the High Command of the Armed Forces
[OKW] was made immediately in accordance with instructions.
At the same time, the High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]
was asked to see to it that in every case of a border
crossing of Lithuanian troop contingents a report be made
immediately to the Foreign Office.
v. d. HEYDEN RYNSCH
Page 151
*****
Frame 214886, serial 407
Foreign Office Memorandum
SECRET
BERLIN, June 16, 1940.
Pol. I M 8560g.
MEMORANDUM
High Command of the Armed Forces, Foreign Branch [OKW
Ausland], Major Krummacher, transmitted the following at
11:35 a.m.:
"Order of the Fhrer
1. If Lithuanian troops cross the East Prussian
border, they are to be disarmed. A further decision as
to what is to be done with them should be awaited.
2. At present some German units are returning to
their garrisons in East Prussia. They have received
instructions not to undertake any maneuvers and to avoid
anything which might look as if this return were in any
way connected with events in Lithuania.
This is for your information so that possible
Soviet Russian inquiries may immediately be answered in
this sense."
von GROTE
*****
Frame 214861, serial 407
The Reich Foreign Minister's Personal Staff to the German
Foreign Office
Telegram
Baumschule No. 57 of June 16.
Teletype to Herr v. Grundherr [75] via Minister's
Office.
The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to submit a
report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States
a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or
whether an attempt was made to form a bloc. Please transmit
your report by teletype.
SONNLEITNER
[75] Of the Political Division of the German Foreign Office,
in charge of Baltic affairs.
Page 152
*****
Frames 214862-214864, serial 407
The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister
Teletype
To Baumschule
BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
Reference telegram Baumschule No. 57 of June 16, 1940.
I. The cooperation between the Baltic States of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania is based on the Treaty of Mutual
Understanding and Cooperation concluded for ten years by
these three States on September 12, 1931. In addition, Latvia
and Estonia signed a mutual defense pact on November 1, 1923.
In practice, the political cooperation consisted mainly of
semiannual conferences of Foreign Ministers and joint press
conferences; on the other hand, there has often been an
abundance of discord and rivalry within the Baltic Entente.
Latvia and Estonia explicitly indicated their
disinterestedness in the Memel and Vilna questions, which
were important to Lithuania. The assertion, now made by
Russia, that Lithuania had joined the Estonian-Latvian
military pact, is, according to information available here,
without any foundation. Because of the very similar economic
structure of these countries, the economic cooperation
between the three States, in spite of much effort during the
last few years, made no appreciable progress. Since the
conclusion of the Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact with the
Baltic countries in September-October 1939 there has been no
closer cooperation in an anti-Russian sense among the Baltic
States. In view of the occupation of their countries by
Soviet Russian troops, the three Baltic Governments were
aware of the danger of such a policy.
II. For the same reason, there can be no question-during
the last few months-of dependence in foreign policy on
Germany by the Baltic States. The Lithuanian Government, to
be sure, has probably not been quite certain until the last
few days whether or not we were politically completely
disinterested in Lithuania, so that in many circles, as for
instance in the case of the Lithuanian Minister here, there
was perhaps some hope that Germany would, in case of further
Russian demands, put in a good word for Lithuania in Moscow,
although there was never, of course, any occasion given on
our part for such an assumption.
On the other hand, our economic relations with the
Baltic States have been strengthened very much since the
beginning of the war. Regarding the great importance of the
Baltic States to the war economy of the Reich, please see the
attached memorandum from Minister Schnurre.
GRUNDHERR
Page 153
(Annex)
Foreign Office Memorandum
The economic importance of the three Baltic States for
our supply of food and of raw materials essential for war has
become quite considerable as a result of the commercial
treaties concluded with these three States during the last
year. In the course of the last six months, we have
furthermore concluded secret agreements with all three States
whereby the entire export of these countries, except the
small part going to Russia and another small portion which
goes to neutral countries, will be sent to Germany. That
means for all three States about 70 percent of their total
exports. German imports from the three Baltic States will in
the current year amount to a total of approximately 200
million Reichsmarks-comprising grain, hogs, butter, eggs,
flax, lumber, seeds, and in the case of Estonia, petroleum.
The consolidation of Russian influence in these areas
will seriously endanger these necessary imports. For one
thing, the Russians will do their utmost to keep the raw
materials, and especially food, at home for their own use. On
the other hand, if part continues to go to Germany, they will
make quite different demands in regard to deliveries of
German products from those made in the past by the Baltic
States, so that in effect the previous exchange of goods will
break down. We were able to make the deliveries desired by
the Baltic States much more easily, and in many cases, under
the stress of circumstances, we were able to put these States
off till later.
In contrast, the economic interests of the Soviet Union
in the three Baltic States are of minor importance. The
Soviet Union was able to secure only about 10 percent of the
export trade of these countries for itself by means of the
treaties it recently concluded.
SCHNURRE.
BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
*****
Frame 214849, serial 407
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to all German Missions
Circular telegram
Pol. VI 1673
BERLIN, June 17, 1940.
For information and the orientation of your
conversation.
The unresisted reinforcement of Russian troops in
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the reorganization of the
Governments of the Baltic States, sought by the Russian
Government to bring about more
Page 154
reliable cooperation with the Soviet Union, are the concern
of Russia and the Baltic States. Therefore, in view of our
unaltered friendly relations with the Soviet Union, there is
no reason for nervousness on our part, which some of the
foreign press has tried to impute to us in only too
transparent a manner.
Please refrain from making any statement during
conversations which could be interpreted as partisan.
Please acknowledge receipt.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frame 112228, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 18, 1940-1:10 a. m.
Received June 18, 1940-4 a. m.
No. 1167 of June 17
Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and
expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet
Government on the splendid success of the German Armed
Forces. Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet action
against the Baltic States. He referred to the reasons
published in the press and added that it had become necessary
to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and
France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany
and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.
For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new
Governments the Soviet Government had, in addition to the
Soviet envoy accredited there, sent the following special
emissaries:
To Lithuania: Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Dekanosov; to Latvia: Vishinski, the representative of the
Council of Ministers; to Estonia: Regional Party Leader of
Leningrad Zhdanov.
In connection with the escape of Smetona and the
possible crossing of the frontier by Lithuanian army units,
Molotov stated that the Lithuanian border was evidently
inadequately guarded. The Soviet Government would, therefore,
if requested, assist the Lithuanian Government in guarding
its borders.
SCHULENBURG
Page 155
*****
Frames 112240-112241, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.
Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.
No. 1200 of June 23
Reference your telegram No. 1065 of the 22d and my
telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]
Molotov made the following statement to me today: The
solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further
delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a
peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should
the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The
Soviet claim likewise extended to Bucovina, which had a
Ukrainian population.
As justification Molotov declared that, although a long
time had elapsed since his declaration before the Supreme
Soviet, Rumania had done nothing to bring about a solution of
the Bessarabian problem. Therefore, something would have to
be done.
I stated to Molotov that this decision of the Soviet
Government had not been expected by me. I had been of the
opinion that the Soviet Government would maintain its claims
to Bessarabia-not contested by us-but would not itself take
the initiative toward their realization. I feared that
difficulties in the foreign relations of Rumania, which was
at present supplying us with very large amounts of essential
military and civilian raw materials, would lead to a serious
encroachment on German interests. I told Molotov that I would
report to my government at once, and I requested him not to
take any decisive steps before my Government had taken a
stand concerning the intentions of the Soviet Government.
Molotov promised to inform the Soviet Government of my
request but emphasized expressly that the matter was
extremely urgent. Molotov added that the Soviet Government
expected Germany not to hinder but to support the Soviets in
their action. The Soviet Government on its part would do
everything to safeguard German interests in Rumania.
[76] Neither printed.
Page 156
Accordingly, I request immediate instruction by wire. I
take the liberty of calling attention to the numerous
Volksdeutsche residing in Bessarabia and Bucovina for whom
provision of some sort will have to be made.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 112244-112245, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
Moscow, June 24, 1940-6:50 p. m.
Received June 25, 1940-1 a. m.
No. 1212 of June 24
The following information was published by Tass in the
Soviet press of June 23, and previously broadcast over the
radio on June 22:
"In connection with the entry of Soviet troops in the
Baltic countries, rumors have recently again been spread to
the effect that 100 to 150 divisions have been concentrated
at the Lithuanian-German border, that this concentration of
Soviet troops was due to the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction
with Germany's successes in the West, and that this revealed
a deterioration in Soviet-German relations, and is designed
to exert pressure on Germany. Lately, various versions of
these rumors are being repeated almost daily in the American,
Japanese, English, French, Turkish and Swedish press.
Tass is authorized to state that all these rumors, the
absurdity of which is obvious anyway, by no means correspond
to the truth. In the Baltic countries there are actually
neither 100 nor 150 divisions, but altogether no more than 18
to 20 divisions, and these divisions are not concentrated at
the Lithuanian-German border but in the various districts of
the three Baltic Republics, and their purpose is not to exert
'pressure' on Germany but to provide a guarantee for the
execution of the mutual assistance pacts between the U.S.S.R.
and these countries.
Responsible Soviet circles are of the opinion that the
spreading of these absurd rumors aims particularly at
clouding Soviet-German relations. These gentlemen, however,
pass off their secret wishes as reality. Apparently, they are
incapable of grasping the obvious fact that the good
neighborly relations, resulting from the conclusion of the
Non-aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, cannot
be shaken by any rumors or petty poisonous propaganda,
because these relations are not based on motives of
opportunism but on the fundamental interests of the U.S.S.R.
and Germany."
SCHULENBURG
Page 157
*****
Frame 112246, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
MOSCOW, June 24, 1940-6:49 p. m.
Received June 24, 1940-8:45 p. m.
No. 1213 of June 24
Reference my telegram No. 1212 of the 24th.
After the conclusion of our conversation of yesterday
concerning Bessarabia (cf. telegram No. 1212 [1205?] of June
23d) Molotov, with obvious complacency, brought up the Tass
communiqu‚ of June 22, whereupon I expressed my appreciation.
I infer from the wording of the communiqu‚ that Stalin
himself is the author. The refutation of numerous rumors now
circulating concerning differences between Germany and the
Soviet Union and concerning troop concentrations in
connection with Soviet operations in the Baltic region, and
the unequivocal clarification of German-Soviet relations
ought to be altogether to our advantage at this important
juncture. However, the further aim of the communiqu‚, to
emphasize German-Soviet solidarity as a preparation for the
solution of the Bessarabian problem. is just as plain.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 179-181, serial F 19
Memorandum. by the Reich Foreign Minister for Hitler
The Secret Supplementary Protocol of August 23, 1939,
reads as follows:
[Here follows the text of the Secret Supplementary
Protocol of August 23, 1939, printed on page 78.]
As far as I can remember the following took place at
that time:
At the time of the delimitation of the mutual spheres of
interest in Eastern Europe, the Soviets stressed their
interest in Bessarabia when the Southeast of Europe was
mentioned. On this occasion I stated orally our
disinterestedness in the Bessarabian question. However, in
order not to put down explicitly in written form the
recognition of the Russian claim to Bessarabia because of the
possibility of indiscretions, with which we had to count in
view of the then still very vague German-Russian
relationship, I chose a formulation of a general nature for
the Protocol. This was done in such a way that when the
Southeastern European problems were discussed I declared
Page 158
very generally that Germany was politically disinterested in
"these areas," i. e., in the Southeast of Europe. The
economic interest of Germany in these Southeastern European
territories was duly stressed by me. This was in accordance
with the general instructions given by the Fhrer for
Southeastern Europe and also, as I recall it, with a special
directive of the Fhrer which I received before my departure
for Moscow, in which the Fhrer authorized me to declare
German disinterestedness in the territories of Southeastern
Europe, even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the
Straits. However, the latter were not discussed.
R[IBBENTROP]
BAUMSCHULE, June 24, 1940.
*****
Frame 210475-210476, serial 380
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Transmitted by telephone on June 25, 1940-6 p. m.
No. 1074 of June 25
For the Ambassador personally.
Please call on Herr Molotov and state the following:
1. Germany is abiding by the Moscow agreements. She
takes, therefore, no interest in the Bessarabian question. In
this territory live approximately 100,000 Volksdeutsche.
Germany is naturally interested in the fate of these
Volksdeutsche and expects their future to be safeguarded. The
Reich Government reserves the right to make certain proposals
to the Soviet Government at the appropriate time concerning
the question of resettling these Volksdeutsche in the same
manner as the Volksdeutsche in Volhynia.
2. The claim of the Soviet Government to Bucovina is
something new. Bucovina was formerly an Austrian crown
province and is densely populated with Germans. Germany is
also particularly interested in the fate of these
Volksdeutsche.
3. In the rest of Rumania Germany has very important
[st„rkste] economic interests. These interests include oil
fields as well as agricultural land. Germany is, therefore,
as we have repeatedly informed the Soviet Government,
extremely interested in preventing these areas from becoming
a theater of war.
4. Although fully sympathetic toward the settling of the
Bessarabian problem, the Reich Government is, therefore, of
the opinion that . . . [77] of the Soviet Union . . . [77] of
the Moscow agreements, everything should be done in order to
reach a peaceful solution of the Bessarabian question with
the Rumanian Government. For its part the Reich Government
would be prepared, in the spirit of the Moscow agreements, to
advise Rumania, if necessary, to reach an amicable settlement
of the Bessarabian question satisfactory to Russia.
Please point out again clearly to Herr Molotov our great
interest in Rumania's not becoming a theater of war. As
matters stand, we are of the opinion that a peaceful
settlement in accordance with Russian views is altogether
possible, provided the problem is properly handled.
We should be grateful to the Soviet Government for a
communication concerning its ideas as to further treatment of
the matter.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 224890-224891, serial 459
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 26, 1940-12:59 a. m.
Received June 26, 1940-12:25 p. m.
No. 1233 of June 25
Reference your telegram No. 1074 of the 25th.
For the Reich Minister personally.
Instruction carried out at 9 o'clock this evening at
Molotov's office. Molotov expressed his thanks for the
understanding attitude of the German Government and its
readiness to support the Soviet Union in achieving its
claims. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government also
desired a peaceful solution, but repeatedly stressed the fact
that the question was particularly urgent and could brook no
further delay.
I pointed out to Molotov that Soviet renunciation of
Bucovina, which never belonged even to Tsarist Russia, would
substantially facilitate a peaceful solution. Molotov
countered by saying that Bucovina is the last missing part of
a unified Ukraine and that for this reason the Soviet
Government must attach importance to solving this question
simultaneously with the Bessarabian question. Nevertheless, I
gained the impression that Molotov did not entirely dismiss
the possibility of
[77] Omission indicated in the Moscow Embassy text of
message.
Page 160
renunciation of Bucovina in the course of the negotiations
with Rumania.
Molotov stated that our wishes concerning the
Volksdeutsche could certainly be met in a manner similar to
the arrangement in Poland.
Molotov promised to consider most favorably our economic
interests in Rumania.
In conclusion, Molotov stated that he would report the
German point of view to his Government and inform me of its
attitude as soon as possible. Molotov added that there had
been no discussion of the matter in Moscow or in Bucharest,
up to the present. He further mentioned that the Soviet
Government simply wished to pursue its own interests and had
no intention of encouraging other states (Hungary, Bulgaria)
to make demands on Rumania.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 224892-224893, serial 459
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, June 26, 1940-3:36 p. m.
Received June 26, 1940-10:35 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET
No. 1235 of June 26
Reference my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [78]
Following the conversation which the Italian Ambassador,
Rosso, had with Foreign Commissar Molotov on June 20, the
latter summoned Rosso yesterday afternoon. Molotov explained
that he had reported the Italian Government's views to his
Government, which had approved them. The Soviet Government
was of the opinion that Italian-Soviet relations should be re-
established quickly and definitely and should be put on the
same basis as those of Germany and the Soviet Government.
Molotov stated in this connection that the Soviet Government
and Germany were on excellent terms and that the relations
between Germany and the Soviet Government were working out
very well.
Molotov then declared that in his opinion the war would
last until next winter, that there were some political
questions, however, which had to be solved without delay, and
that he could briefly characterize the Soviet Government's
relations with various countries as follows: With Hungary the
Soviet Government was maintaining good rela-
[78] Not printed.
Page 161
tions. Certain Hungarian requests were considered reasonable
by the Soviet Government.
Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were good neighbors. The
Soviet-Bulgarian relations were strong and could be
strengthened even more. The Bulgarian demands for Dobruja and
for access to the Aegean Sea were considered justified by the
Soviet Government, which had recognized them and had no
objections to their realization.
The Soviet Union's attitude toward Rumania was known.
The Soviet Union would prefer to realize her claims to
Bessarabia (Bucovina was not mentioned) without war, but, if
that was impossible because of Rumanian intransigence, she
was determined to resort to force. Regarding other areas of
Rumania, the Soviet Government would communicate with
Germany. The Soviet Government regards Turkey with deep
suspicion. This was a result of Turkey's unfriendly attitude
toward Russia and other countries, by which Molotov obviously
meant Germany and Italy. Soviet suspicion of Turkey was
intensified by the Turkish attitude in regard to the Black
Sea, where Turkey desired to play a dominant role, and the
Straits, where Turkey wanted to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction. The Soviet Government was reducing a Turkish
threat to Batum, against which it would have to protect
itself toward the south and southeast, in which connection
the German and Italian interests would be considered.
In the Mediterranean, the Soviet Government would
recognize Italy's hegemony, provided that Italy would
recognize the Soviet Government's hegemony in the Black Sea.
Ambassador Rosso wired Molotov's statements to his
Government with the comment that he . . .* them very sensible
and recommended that they be acted upon as soon as possible.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 210457-210458, serial 380
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
[Moscow, June 26, 1940.]
No. 1236 of June 26
Reference my telegram No. 1233 of June 25.
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
*Group missing, apparently "considered". [Footnote in the
German text.]
Page 162
Molotov summoned me this afternoon and declared that the
Soviet Government, on the basis of his conversation with me
yesterday, had decided to limit its demands to the northern
part of Bucovina and the city of Czernowitz. According to
Soviet opinion the boundary line should run from the
southernmost point of the Soviet West Ukraine at Mt.
Kniatiasa, east along the Suczava and then northeast to
Hertza on the Pruth, whereby the Soviet Union would obtain
direct railway connection from Bessarabia via Czernowitz to
Lemberg. Molotov added that the Soviet Government expected
German support of this Soviet demand.
To my statement that a peaceful solution might more
easily be reached if the Soviet Government would return the
Rumanian National Bank's gold reserve, which had been
transferred for safekeeping to Moscow during World War I,
Molotov declared that this was absolutely out of the
question, since Rumania had exploited Bessarabia long enough.
Regarding further treatment of the matter Molotov has
the following idea: The Soviet Government will submit its
demand to the Rumanian Minister here within the next few days
and expects the German Reich Government at the same time
urgently to advise the Rumanian Government in Bucharest to
comply with the Soviet demands, since war would otherwise be
unavoidable. Molotov promised to inform me immediately as
soon as he had spoken to the Rumanian Minister.
Regarding the Rumanian Government's attitude toward the
new Soviet Minister, Molotov appeared to be annoyed and
pointed out that the Minister had not yet been given any
opportunity to present his credentials, although the
customary time had expired.
SCHULENBURG
N. B. General K”string has been informed.
Page 163
*****
Frame 224898, serial 459
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, June 27, 1940-1:10 a. m.
Received June 27, 1940-6:30 a. m.
No. 1241 of June 26
Reference my telegram No. 1236 of June 26.
Molotov just informed me by telephone that he had
summoned the Rumanian Minister at 10 o'clock this evening,
had informed him of the Soviet Government's demand regarding
the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina,
and had demanded a reply from the Rumanian Government not
later than tomorrow, i. e., on July [June] 27.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 224903, serial 459
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office
TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM SPECIAL TRAIN TO MINISTER SCHMIDT
SECRET
June 27, 1940-10:30 a. m.
The following instruction is to be transmitted
immediately by telephone in plain to Minister Fabricius in
Bucharest:
"You are requested to call immediately on the Foreign
Minister in Bucharest and inform him as follows:
"The Soviet Government has informed us that it has
demanded the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of
Bucovina from the Rumanian Government. In order to avoid war
between Rumania and the Soviet Union we can only advise the
Rumanian Government to yield to the Soviet Government's
demand. Please report by wire."
End of the instruction to Bucharest.
RIBBENTROP
(Telephoned to Counselor of Legation Stelzer at 11:00 a. m.)
Page 164
*****
Frames 112294-112297, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
Tgb. Nr. A/3192/40
Moscow, July 11, 1940.
The renewed diplomatic activity which the Soviet Union
has displayed during the last few weeks has naturally become
a main subject of discussion among the members of the
Diplomatic Corps here. Some things are not yet completely
clear, as for instance the question as to why the Soviet
Union just at this time proceeded or allegedly will yet
proceed against a number of countries. Most of my colleagues
are of the opinion that the Soviets, who are always very well
informed, know or at least assume the end of the war to be
imminent.
Regarding the action taken against Rumania, it has
aroused general surprise here that the Soviet Union has also
demanded the northern part of Bucovina. There had never been
any statement of Soviet claims to this region. As is known,
the Soviet Government has justified its claim by the fact
that Bucovina has a Ukrainian population. This only applies
to the northern part of the country, and the Soviet Union has
finally contented itself with this part. I cannot get rid of
the impression that it was Ukrainian circles in the Kremlin
who have advocated and put through the claim for cession of
Northern Bucovina. On several occasions, as for instance
during the negotiations regarding the German-Soviet border in
Poland, a very strong Ukrainian influence in the Kremlin was
evident. Herr Stalin told me personally at that time that he
was prepared to make concessions north of the boundary line
where it runs through White Russia, but this was impossible
in the south where Ukrainians live. Consequently, the cession
of the city of Sinyava, very much desired by us, was
cancelled by the Soviet Government after it had first agreed
to it. It has not yet been possible to determine where this
strong Ukrainian influence originates. There is no especially
influential Ukrainian known to be among the immediate
entourage of the leaders in the Kremlin. A clue might be
obtained from the fact that young Pavlov (now in the Soviet
Embassy in Berlin), who is the special pet of Herren Stalin
and Molotov, once was described to me by Stalin as "our
little Ukrainian."
Page 165
The entire political interest in Moscow is now focused
on events in the Baltic States and what will happen in
relation to Turkey and Iran.
Most people believe that the three Baltic States will be
changed into entities completely dependent on Moscow, i. e.,
will be incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Legations of
the three Baltic States here in Moscow expect to be
completely dissolved and to disappear in a very short time.
It is generally believed that the Soviet Government will
demand the withdrawal of all foreign missions in Kaunas,
Riga, and Reval. The excitement among Lithuanians, Latvians,
and Estonians here is extremely great. However, actual
developments will have to be awaited.
This, no doubt, applies likewise to Turkey and Iran.
Both Ambassadors here assert that neither in Moscow nor in
Ankara nor in Teheran have any demands been made up to the
present. However, it is certain that the situation is
serious. I may add that, at least in Iranian circles here,
there is much resentment against us, because of the
publication of the sixth White Book. They believe that the
White Book has induced the Soviet Government to take action
against Iran. However, the Iranian Ambassador here is too
clever not to see that the documents in the White Book were
only a pretext for the Soviet Government's conduct and that
Moscow would simply have found another pretext if this one
had not presented itself at the moment.
Finally an interesting detail:
The Turkish Ambassador here is telling his friends among
the diplomats that he received a plain telegram-which he even
produces-from Saracoglu on July 6, in which the latter denies
his conversation with Massigli [79] and refers in this
connection to telegraphic statements from him to that effect.
In the same breath, the Turkish Ambassador declares
significantly that it was very annoying that his conversation
with American Ambassador Steinhardt [80] thus had also been
revealed.
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
[79] French Ambassador in Turkey.
[80] American Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
Page 166
*****
Frame 112311, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, July 13, 1940-7:04 p. m.
Received July 13, 1940-9:10 p. m.
No. 1363 of July 13
Reference your telegram of the 8th, No. 1164, and my
telegram of the 12th, No. 1348. [81]
Molotov summoned me today and stated the following:
Stalin had carefully re-examined the situation with respect
to the strip of Lithuanian territory and has concluded that
our claim to this strip of territory and the Soviet
obligation to cede it are incontestable. Under the present
circumstances, however, the cession of this strip of
territory would be extremely inconvenient and difficult for
the Soviet Government. Therefore, Stalin and he himself
earnestly request the German Government to consider whether,
in conformity with the extraordinarily friendly relations
between Germany and the Soviet Union, a way cannot be found
which would leave this strip of territory permanently with
Lithuania. Molotov added that we could of course at any time
move the population of German origin out of Lithuania, as
well as out of this strip of territory. Molotov stressed
again and again the difficulties which would at present
result for the Soviet Union from the cession of this strip of
territory, and he made his and Stalin's request seem very
urgent by repeatedly expressing hope of a German concession.
Request instructions by wire. Perhaps, the Soviet request can
be used to put through our economic and financial demands
with respect to the Baltic States.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 112312-112313, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, July 13, 1940-9:17 p. m.
Received July 14, 1940-9:10 a. m.
SECRET
No. 1364 of July 13
Molotov informed me today that Cripps, the British
Ambassador here, had been received by Stalin a few days ago
upon request of the
[81] Neither printed.
Page 167
British Government. On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gave
me a memorandum of this conversation.
Cripps inquired regarding the attitude of the Soviet
Government toward the following questions:
1. The British Government was convinced that Germany was
striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all
European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as
well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a
common policy of self-protection against Germany and on the
re-establishment of the European balance of power.
2. Irrespective of this, England would like to trade
with the Soviet Union, provided that England's exports would
not be resold to Germany.
3. The British Government was of the opinion that
unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the
purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of
the Soviet Union. Under present circumstances this important
mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.
4. The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was
dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the Black
Sea. Cripps was of the opinion that the interests of the
Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded.
Stalin's answers are given as follows:
1. The Soviet Government was, of course, very much
interested in present events in Europe, but he (Stalin) did
not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in
Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be
engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany,
and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not
discovered any desire on their part to engulf European
countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military
successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations
with Germany. These relations were not based on transient
circumstances, but on the basic national interests of both
countries.
The so-called European balance of power had hitherto
oppressed not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union.
Therefore, the Soviet Union would take all measures to
prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in
Europe.
2. The Soviet Union did not object to trading with
England, but she contested the right of England or any other
country to interfere with German-Soviet commercial relations.
The Soviet Union would export to Germany, in accordance with
treaty provisions, part of the
Page 168
nonferrous metals she bought abroad, because Germany needed
these metals for the manufacture of the war materiel she
delivered to the Soviet Union. If England did not recognize
these conditions, trade between England and the Soviet Union
was impossible.
3. In Stalin's opinion no power had the right to an
exclusive role in the consolidation and leadership of the
Balkan countries. The Soviet Union did not claim such a
mission either, although she was interested in Balkan
affairs.
4. Regarding Turkey Stalin declared that the Soviet
Union was in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of
Turkey over the Straits and to Turkey's dictation of
conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware
of that.
*****
Frames 214783-214788, serial 407
Foreign Office Memorandum
BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
The Lithuanian Minister called on me today and stated
the following:
In view of the important events in his country he
considered it his duty not to let these events pass into
history without taking action. He had summarized his attitude
toward events in Lithuania in a letter to the Reich Foreign
Minister. The presentation of this letter amounted to a
unilateral act on his part, for which he alone assumed
responsibility. He himself did not wish to cause any
embarrassment to German policy by this act.
The matter arose in the following way: Some time ago, as
a precaution, Foreign Minister Urbsys instructed all
Lithuanian Ministers to take such a step in case of a
transfer of sovereignty to the Soviet Union. On the basis of
a communication between the Lithuanian Ministers he felt sure
that a corresponding note would be presented today in all
capitals in which Lithuania was represented. The Minister
then handed me the enclosed letter, which contains "a most
solemn and determined protest."
I told Herr Skirpa that for the time being I wanted to
keep the document myself, and I assumed from his statements
that he did not expect any comment on it. However, I could
not tell him whether as the German Government we would be
prepared to accept such a note at all, and we would therefore
have to reserve the right to return it to him.
Page 169
The Minister then stated that particularly in view of
the known attitude of Germany he had omitted one point in the
note, which the other Lithuanian Ministers would include in
their notes to the governments to which they were accredited,
namely, the request that the incorporation not be recognized.
The Minister asked whether he could not at least orally
present this request here. I rejected this, whereupon the
Minister stated that the request was to be considered as not
having been made. Finally, the Minister said that he intended
to make known his action by an announcement from the Berlin
office of the Elte Agency, since this appeared to him
necessary for the assertion of his personal attitude toward
events.
I requested the Minister to refrain from this, and he
promised to comply.
Transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister through the
State Secretary with the request for instructions whether the
note should be retained here. The Latvian and Estonian
Ministers may be expected to present similar notes here. The
Latvian Minister had already made an appointment with me for
5:30 p. m. today.
WOERMANN
[Enclosure]
The Lithuanian Minister in Germany (Skirpa) to the Reich
Foreign Minister
3991
BERLIN, July 21, 1940.
HERR REICH MINISTER: I have the honor, Excellency, to
bring the following to your attention:
As is already known, on June 14, 1940, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics presented an ultimatum to
Lithuania under flimsy and unjustified pretexts, in which it
was demanded:
1. that the constitutional government of Lithuania be
forced to resign immediately;
2. that the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of
the State Security Police be tried without preferring charges
based on law, and
3. that free and unlimited entry of Soviet military
forces into Lithuania be granted.
On the following day the Russian Red Army, after having
attacked the Lithuanian frontier guards, crossed the
Lithuanian border and occupied all of Lithuania. Furthermore,
a puppet government was forced upon us by a high Soviet
official sent from Moscow for this purpose, and the entire
administration was put under the control of the Government of
the Soviet Socialist Republics.
Page 170
In order to incorporate Lithuania fully into the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, elections to the Seim
(Parliament) were ordered on July 14, resulting in the
greatest falsification of the will of the Lithuanian
population.
In order to quell any expression of resistance, even
before the elections all Lithuanian clubs and organizations
were suppressed, the Lithuanian press was seized and its
editors removed by force, and the more or less influential
personalities in public life were arrested. People who
previously were considered open enemies of the Lithuanian
State were appointed to Government offices, particularly in
the State Security Police.
The Communist Party was the only political organization
which was allowed to function legally. And it then exerted
the decisive influence on the scheduled elections. Only one
list of candidates was permitted, namely, the one that was
agreeable to the Communist Party.
In order to force the necessary participation in the
elections anybody who did not wish to vote was threatened
with being declared an enemy of the people, and personal
attendance was strictly checked.
It was immediately obvious that the Seim, elected under
such circumstances, was only a blind tool in the hands of the
Communist Party and thereby of the Government of the Soviet
Socialist Republics. Today, on July 21, 1940, the Seim
adopted a resolution to establish the Soviet system within
the country and to incorporate Lithuania into the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia.
All these measures of the Government of the U.S.S.R.
amount to a flagrant violation of all treaties signed between
the Republic of Lithuania and the U.S.S.R., in particular
however:
1. of the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, by which the
U.S.S.R. as successor of the former Russian Tsarist Empire
recognized unconditionally the independence and autonomy of
Lithuania, and by which she renounced forever all rights of
sovereignty which Russia previously had over Lithuania (see
article 1);
2. of the Non-aggression Pact of September 29, 1926, and
of its renewals of May 6, 1931, and of April 4, 1934. In this
Pact the U.S.S.R. obligates herself to respect the
sovereignty of Lithuania as well as her territorial integrity
and inviolability under all circumstances (see article 2) and
to refrain from any use of force (article 3);
3. Of the Mutual Assistance Pact of October 10, 1939, in
which the Government of the U.S.S.R. repeats a solemn
assurance to Lithuania not to violate in any way the
sovereignty of the Lithuanian State, as well as its internal
order.
Page 171
In view of all these circumstances I feel compelled as
the Minister appointed by the constitutional agencies of the
Republic of Lithuania and accredited to the German Reich to
lodge the most solemn and determined protest against the
oppression of my country and the deprivation of sovereignty
and national independence of Lithuania by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and to declare that because the above-
mentioned resolution of the Seim was imposed by Russian
occupation authorities it amounts to nothing but the most
outrageous falsification of the expression of the will of the
Lithuanian people and that it is in the sharpest conflict
with the constitution and interests of the Lithuanian State'
as well as the free right of self-determination of nations,
and that, therefore, it cannot be recognized as valid in any
way.
I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
K. SKIRPA
*****
Frames 214780-214781, serial 104
Foreign Office Memorandum
BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
The Latvian Minister called on me today and gave me the
enclosed letter to the Reich Foreign Minister, in which he as
Minister of the "legitimate Government of Latvia" protests
against the incorporation of Latvia into the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. In this connection the Minister remarked
that he would not think of creating any difficulties for
Germany. None could, in his opinion, result from his entering
this protest here.
I told Herr Kreewinsch that I would keep his letter
personally for the time being. I would notify him later
whether the letter could remain here or not.
In connection with the memorandum of the conversation
with the Lithuanian Minister [82] there is transmitted
herewith this report to the Reich Foreign Minister through
the State Secretary, with the request for action.
WOERMANN
[82] Ante, p. 168
Page 172
[Enclosure]
The Latvian Minister in Germany (Kreewinsch) to the Reich
Foreign Minister
BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
HERR REICH MINISTER: I have the honor to inform Your
Excellency of the following:
The Parliament which convened on the 21st instant in
Riga has proclaimed Latvia a Soviet Republic, and it has
addressed to Moscow the request that Latvia be incorporated
into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This resolution
lacks any legal basis, since Parliament itself owes its
existence to elections which were held under the terror of
Russian occupation and which could not in any way be
considered a free expression of the popular will. Previous to
this, the invasion of Latvia by Soviet troops was already a
violation of all existing treaties between Latvia and the
Soviet Union.
As Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of
the legitimate Government of Latvia I consider it my duty
respectfully to inform Your Excellency of my protest against
the above-mentioned action.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
EDG. KREEWINSCH
*****
Frame 214771, serial 407
Foreign Office Memorandum
BERLIN, July 24, 1940.
I returned today in a friendly manner the notes
regarding the incorporation of their countries into the
Soviet Union to the Lithuanian and Latvian Ministers and
justified this by stating that we could accept from Ministers
only notes which they presented here in the name of their
Governments. At the same time, in accordance with
instructions, I did not indicate that they were returned by
order of the Reich Foreign Minister.
The Estonian Minister likewise wished to hand me a
similar note today. I requested him to refrain from doing so,
giving the appropriate reasons.
The Lithuanian Minister informed me that of his own
accord he had sent the Lithuanian Government a telegram of
protest against the
Page 173
resolution of incorporation into the Soviet Union, stating
among other things that he did not consider this resolution
binding on the Lithuanian people, the nation or himself. The
Lithuanian and Estonian Ambassadors told me that they had not
sent a similar telegram and did not contemplate doing so.
Furthermore, I told the three Ministers that they and
the other members of the Legation, including families, if
they so desired, could remain in Germany. The three Ministers
expressed their very great appreciation for this and also
requested me to thank the Reich Foreign Minister.
WOERMANN
*****
Frame 112343, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, July 29, 1940-7:10 p. m.
Received July 29, 1940-8:20 p. m.
No. 1500 of July 29
Reference my telegram of the 16th, No. 1472. [83]
Molotov summoned me today and stated that the Soviet
Government was very much interested in receiving information
about the subject of the recent discussions of Germany and
Italy with the Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Slovakian
statesmen. I replied that I did not have any information yet,
but would request it.
Speedy instructions by wire are requested, particularly
in view of the speech on foreign policy Molotov is expected
to make on August 1.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 112344, serial 104
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
URGENT
BERLIN, July 30, 1940.
No. 1307
Reference your telegrams No. 1472 [83] and 1500.
For the Ambassador personally.
Reich Foreign Minister requests that you inform Herr
Molotov
[83] Not printed.
Page 174
at the first opportunity of the latest state visits to
Germany, to the following effect:
The visit of the Rumanian Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister in Germany was occasioned by the fact that the King
of Rumania and the Rumanian Government lately had repeatedly
requested the Reich Government to express its attitude toward
the Hungarian and Bulgarian desires for [territorial]
revision. During the visit, the Rumanian statesmen were
advised by us to meet revisionist claims on a fair and
reasonable basis and to negotiate directly with the Hungarian
and Bulgarian Governments for this purpose. The Rumanian
statesmen now held out prospects of initiating such
negotiations. During the Bulgarian visit we notified
Bulgarian statesmen to that effect. End of the instructions
by the Reich Foreign Minister.
In accordance with instructions I shall similarly inform
Ambassador Shkvarzev.
A report by wire is requested.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frame 357760, serial 1379
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, August 2, 1940-4:24 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 2, 1940-8:45 p. m.
No. 1339 of August 2
Reference your telegram of July 13, No. 1363.
You are requested to inform Herr Molotov that the Reich
Government has taken cognizance of the wish of the Soviet
Government that Germany leave to the Soviet Union that part
of Lithuania allocated to Germany by the Moscow agreements.
This would represent a rather considerable change in the
Moscow Treaty to the disadvantage of Germany. Before the
Reich Government can consider the matter in detail,
therefore, I should be interested in hearing what quid pro
quo the Soviet Government would propose.
RIBBENTROP
Page 175
*****
Frame 211004, serial 384
Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister on the Reception of
the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, on August 6, 1940
RM 21/40
I received the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, today
and strongly remonstrated with him regarding the article,
published in Riga in the newspaper Jaunakas Zinas on the 5th
instant, entitled "German Communists Against Dictate at
Compiegne." I strongly emphasized that this was an outright
inflammatory article against Germany. The attacks on the
German Government contained in that article were not
calculated to further good German-Russian relations, which
after all were desired by both sides. The contents and
implications of this article did not correspond to the letter
or the spirit of the Moscow agreements. The article was also
in diametrical opposition to the desire, recently expressed
by the Fhrer and the day before yesterday by Molotov in
Moscow, of further strengthening friendly German-Russian
relations. I requested the Ambassador to inform his
Government immediately of this talk and to notify it that the
Reich Government considered it appropriate to suppress such
articles in the future.
Herr Shkvarzev did not make any comment on the article
itself, but promised to report the matter immediately to Herr
Molotov. As basis for his report a copy of the German News
Agency despatch of the 6th instant covering the article was
handed to him.
R[IBBENTROP] [85]
BERLIN, August 6, 1940.
*****
Frame 357784, serial 1379
The German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union and the German Legation in Lithuania
CONFIDENTIAL
BERLIN, August 9, 1940.
W XII 5228
For personal information only.
The incorporation of Lithuania into the territory of the
Soviet Union creates a completely new situation for the Memel
Free Port Zone. The Free Port Zone represented an
international obligation,
[85] Signature supplied from another copy of this memorandum.
Page 176
made to facilitate the return by little Lithuania of her most
important port to Germany. For Russia, which has expanded and
has at her disposal a great number of Baltic Sea ports, it
has lost its real significance; its continued existence would
lead to politically dangerous Russian privileges on German
territory. If Russia should demand the continuance of the
Free Port Zone in Memel, the position taken here will be that
the promises given in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of March
22, 1939, are no longer applicable to a Lithuania which has
been incorporated into the Soviet Union. The competent
offices wild initiate the necessary steps for terminating the
present state of affairs. The question of handling Russian
traffic via the German port of Memel will especially be kept
in mind.
By order:
SCHNURRE
*****
Frame 112386, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 13, 1940-12:25 a. m.
Received August 13, 1940-4:25 a. m.
SECRET
No. 1638 of August 12
Reference my telegram of the 7th, No. 1590. [86]
Concerning the Lithuanian strip of territory Molotov
today handed me a long memorandum stating that territorial
compensation was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, but
declaring readiness to pay 3,860,000 gold dollars within 2
years (i. e., half of the sum the U. S. A. paid to Russia for
the cession of Alaska), either in gold or goods, as Germany
may prefer, for the retention of the strip of territory by
the Soviet Union.
The text of the memorandum will be sent Wednesday via
courier by plane.
SCHULENBURG
[86] Not printed.
Page 177
*****
Frames 100-101, serial F 18
Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister
RM 22
Subject: Conversation with the Russian Ambassador.
The Russian Ambassador made an appointment with me today
in order to give me the answer of the Russian Government to
the complaint concerning the article in the Latvian newspaper
Janaukas Zinas. He said that he had instructions from his
Government to inform me that the appearance of the article
was due to a misunderstanding. His Government had given
instructions to Latvia, which now belonged to the Soviet
Union, that in the future such articles were to be
suppressed.
I answered the Russian that I took note of that. Such
articles were not advantageous for the development of the
good German-Russian relations which we desired. In the German
press in turn we would not tolerate articles against Russian
conditions either.
I then asked the Ambassador what truth there was to
press reports of a stiffening in Russo-Finnish relations;
whether they had reached a final understanding on the Aaland
problem or whether there were otherwise any reasons for this
stiffening. Herr Shkvarzev stated that he had no information
on that point.
The Ambassador and his interpreter made a somewhat
dejected impression during the talk.
R[IBBENTROP]
BERLIN, August 14, 1940.
*****
Frames 112436-112437, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, August 30, 1940-10:12 p. m.
Received August 31, 1940-12:10 a. m.
No. 1799 of August 30
Reference instruction W XII 5228 of August 9.
Last night Molotov asked me to see him and handed me a
note verbale, [87] in which the attention of the German
Government is called to activities of German authorities in
the Memel Free Port Zone which
[87] Not printed.
Page 178
violate rights and interests of the Lithuanian Soviet
Republic. Disregarding the rights fixed in the German-
Lithuanian Treaty of May 20 concerning the Memel Free Port
Zone (which are quoted in detail in the note verbale) German
authorities had ordered German troops to invade the territory
of the Free Zone, had discontinued the activities of the
Customs Office, and had declared that all Lithuanian goods in
this zone were to be removed. The German authorities had
thereby seriously affected the economic situation and
commercial possibilities of Lithuania, which now forms part
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was of the opinion
that the Lithuanian Soviet Republic was entitled to all the
rights and privileges granted by the German-Lithuanian Treaty
as well as by the letters exchanged between Schnurre and
Norkaitis on May 20, 1939, and that their validity could not
be terminated by a unilateral act.
Molotov added orally that just as the German Government
takes for granted the fulfillment of the commercial treaties
concluded between Germany and the Baltic countries, so also
must the Soviet Government demand the observance of the
German-Lithuanian Treaty with regard to the Memel Free Port
Zone which was likewise a commercial treaty.
Please enable me as soon as possible to answer the note
verbale, the text of which will follow by the next courier.
Minister Schnurre will give his opinion on this issue
separately.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 357804-357807, serial 1379
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 31, 1910-3:12 a. m.
Received Moscow August 31, 1940-10 a. m.
No. 1565 of August 30
Please call on Herr Molotov and inform him orally of the
Vienna conversations and the German-Italian award in the
Hungarian-Rumanian matter, approximately as follows:
As Molotov was previously informed, both the Rumanian
and the Hungarian Governments some time ago solicited the
advice of the Fhrer and the Duce on the solution of the
problem of territorial revision. The Fhrer and the Duce
urgently advised both parties, as well as the Bulgarian
Government, to come to an understanding as promptly as
possible by way of direct, bilateral negotiations.
Page 179
While the Bulgaro-Rumanian negotiations led relatively
soon to an agreement in principle, and we can now look
forward to the early conclusion of a formal agreement, it
recently became more and more obvious that the Hungarian-
Rumanian negotiations were running into very great
difficulties and that no progress was discernible in
reconciling the viewpoints of the two parties. Lately
relations between Hungary and Rumania deteriorated to such an
extent that the possibility of military complications had to
be seriously faced. In compliance with the repeated requests
of both the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments, the
Government of the Reich and the Italian Government found it
necessary in repeated personal consultations to influence
both parties toward effecting a speedier understanding. For
this purpose, the meeting in Vienna was agreed upon a few
days ago on very short notice. Since the attitude of the
Rumanians and of the Hungarians held out no prospect of an
agreement by direct negotiation, and since both parties
requested arbitration by Germany and Italy, the Government of
the Reich and the Italian Government withdrew their previous
objections to such arbitration and assumed the task of
settlement by arbitration.
The Government of the Reich decided upon this course in
agreement with the Italian Government, because it was evident
that there was no further prospect of reaching a peaceful
solution by any other means and because both Axis Powers have
a fundamental interest in the maintenance of peace and order
in those areas. This concern arises, as has always been
understood between ourselves and the Soviet Government,
primarily from the fact that Germany and Italy are very
closely involved [verkntpf] with the Rumanian economy. So,
for example, the extraction of Rumanian oil, its shipment to
Germany, the uninterrupted importation of Rumanian grain into
Germany, etc., are becoming of ever more vital significance
for the Axis Powers. Hence an armed conflict in those areas,
whatever its cause, could not have been tolerated by the
Axis. After the Soviet Government had peacefully settled her
controversy with Rumania, and the Rumanian-Bulgarian problem
likewise approached a settlement, it was imperative that the
last remaining territorial problem should not lead to an
armed conflict. Because of the very complicated geographical
and ethnological situation in Transylvania, the decision was
not an easy one. However, we finally found a way out of the
difficulties, which was based upon a just and impartial
consideration of all the interests concerned. By their award,
which was accepted by both parties without reservation,
Germany and Italy have now secured the peace that was
threatened in the
Page 180
Danube region. But in order to forestall once and for all a
repetition of differences which might easily arise in areas
of such territorial and ethnological complexity, the Axis
Powers have undertaken to guarantee the territory of Rumania,
which has now been definitively pacified. Since the award
necessarily involved the cession of a considerable portion of
Rumanian territory, it was a natural need for the Rumanians
henceforth to be able to regard their boundary with Hungary
and their territory in general as definitively secured. Since
the territorial demands made by the Soviet Government on
Rumania have been settled by the cession of Bessarabia, since
the Bulgarian demands are now in course of being met, and
since Rumania, through the award, has obtained her definitive
boundary with Hungary, there could remain from this
standpoint no further objection to the granting of such a
guarantee by the Axis Powers.
Please tell Herr Molotov on my behalf that in view of
the friendly relations between our countries, I attach great
importance to informing the Soviet Government of these
events.
We assume that, from the points of view set forth above,
the Soviet Government, too, will welcome the settlement
achieved by the Axis and regard it as a valuable contribution
toward securing the peace in the Danube region.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 112444, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram [88]
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 1, 1940-2:08 a.m.
Received September 1, 1940-4:40 a. m.
SECRET
No. 1815 of August 31
Reference your telegram of the 30th, No. 1565.
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
Instruction carried out. Molotov, who was reserved, in
contrast to his usual manner, expressed his thanks for the
information and stated as follows:
The Soviet Government was already informed regarding the
Vienna conversations by the press and the radio. He asked me
to call the attention of the German Government to the fact
that by its action it
[88] A marginal note reads: "Forwarded under No. 95 at 5:30
a. m., September 1, to the Special Train. Telegram Control
Office, September 1."
Page 181
had violated article 3 of the Non-aggression Pact, which
provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been
confronted with accomplished facts by the German Government;
this violated existing agreements and conflicted with
assurances the Soviet Government had received from Germany
regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The
present case involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors,
where she naturally had interests.
I told Molotov that I could not take a stand with regard
to his remarks and that I would immediately notify my
Government. Personally, I supposed that there had been no
time for consultation in the present case because of the
urgency of the matter.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 357818-357821, serial 1379
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, September 3, 1940-6:20 a. m.
Received Moscow September 3, 1940-1:50 p. m.
No. 1580 of September 3
Reference your telegram No. 1815.
Please call on Herr Molotov again and to his statement
that Germany, by her conduct in Vienna, had violated the
obligation to consult contained in article 3 of the Non-
aggression Pact, reply in accordance with the following
memorandum and afterwards hand him this memorandum as a
summary of your instructions. If there is anything you wish
to say regarding the instructions, please report to me before
you call on Molotov.
TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM:
In his last oral discussion with Ambassador Count von
der Schulenburg, when the latter acquainted him with the
conferences at Vienna, Chairman Molotov said that he had to
call Germany's attention to the fact that by her conduct in
Vienna she had violated article 3 of the German-Russian Non-
aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, which provided for
consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted by
Germany with accomplished facts, which violated existing
agreements and conflicted with assurances the Soviet
Government had received from Germany regarding questions of
common interest to the two countries. The present case
involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, in which she
naturally had interests.
Page 182
Conscious of her friendly relations with the Soviet
Union, which have developed in a manner satisfactory to both
parties. and have been intensified both in the economic and
in the political field since the conclusion of the treaties
of 1939, the Government of the Reich takes the following
position on the construction placed by the Soviet Government
on the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact:
In article 3 of the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact
an obligation was agreed upon for reciprocal information and
consultation on questions of interest to both parties.
Likewise at Moscow at the delimitation of the respective
spheres of influence, an interest in Bessarabia was stressed
on the part of Soviet Russia, while Germany declared herself
disinterested in these areas. But that Germany is intensely
concerned in the remaining Rumanian territories and the other
problems of the Danube region, and is even vitally concerned
there, in view of the close interpentration of the German
economy with Rumania, particularly in the questions of oil
and grain, is generally known and has, moreover, been
communicated to the Soviet Government on various occasions
and been recognized by it in its entirety. On the other hand,
after the settlement of the Bessarabian question a like
interest in the rest of Rumanian territory on the part of the
Soviet Union is not evident, and has not been expressed to
the Government of the Reich, either at the Moscow settlement
or later. The same is true of Hungary. Hence the existence of
mutual interests within the meaning of the Non-aggression
Pact of Moscow is out of the question here. Thus, even if
Rumania and Hungary are neighboring countries, Germany has
certainly not committed a violation of the obligation for
mutual consultation.
The Government of the Reich, moreover, believes itself
the more justified in this view, in that the Soviet
Government itself, on the occasion of various political moves
in the recent past, by no means considered the fact of
contiguity to Germany of the territories affected by her acts
as a reason for prior consultation with the Government of the
Reich. In this connection, the Government of the Reich refers
to Russian action in the Baltic States, especially Lithuania.
In the latter case, besides the fact that Lithuania is
adjacent to Germany, an obligation existed to surrender to
Germany a certain area in the southwest of Lithuania in the
event that the Soviet Union should take special measures on
Lithuanian territory for the safeguarding of her interests.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union effected a military occupation
of that area also, although as a result of the Russian
measures it should have been treated forthwith as German
territory. Only
Page 183
after representations by the Government of the Reich was this
question reopened.
Further, one might add that at the occupation of
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina the Government of the Reich
likewise received only very short notice from the Soviet
Government, although in view of the many Germans living
there, in this case also, Germany had a special interest, and
although the Government of the Reich had already pointed out
that for Germany it was a new issue [ein Novum].
Nevertheless, in view of its cordial relations with the
Soviet Union and in its desire to see the Danube region
remain at peace, the Government of the Reich took it upon
itself to give the Rumanian Government, which had made the
most importunate representations for assistance to the
Government of the Reich, the stern advice to settle this
question peacefully, which meant the cession of that
territory to the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, the Government of the Reich would like
further to observe with reference to the statement that
Germany had confronted the Soviet Union with accomplished
facts, that while the moves of the Soviet Union were planned
moves for the occupation of various territories in the
neighborhood of Germany and were not previously announced to
the Government of the Reich, the steps of the Reich
Government in the case of Rumania and Hungary served the
purpose of securing the peace in the Danube region, which was
gravely threatened by the tension between the two countries,
and this could only be accomplished by rapid diplomatic
intervention. Moreover, the Government of the Reich is
probably not mistaken in believing that by its campaign of
pacification in the Danube area it has rendered a substantial
service to all countries bordering on that area.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 357823-357824, serial 1379
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 4, 1940-5:30 p. m.
No. 1841 of September 4
Reference your telegram No. 1580 of September 3.
I would appreciate authorization to supplement the ideas
contained in the memorandum to be handed to Molotov in the
sense that the
Page 184
Soviet Government really set off the great complex of
questions by its settlement of the Bessarabian matter with
unexpected speed and that it had thereby forced us, in order
to avoid military complications in the Balkans, to take quick
decisions in the matter of the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute.
The beginning of the next to the last paragraph of the
memorandum might give the Soviet Government the chance to
protest that, before its action in Bessarabia, it had given
the German Government the opportunity to state its views and
had waited for the latter.
Further I would suggest deleting, in the third paragraph
of the memorandum, the words: " . . . and has not been
expressed to the Government of the Reich, either at the
Moscow settlement or later," because they could provide
Molotov with the opportunity again to revert to the talk
between Mackensen and the Soviet Charg‚ in Rome last May (see
our telegrams No. 1063 of June 3, No. 1079 of June 6, No.
1094 of June 7, [89] and the telegraphic instruction No. 1007
of June 15 [16]) and to state that the Soviet Government had
at the time repeatedly demonstrated its interest.
Furthermore, my interview with Molotov would be
substantially facilitated if I were enabled at the same time
to communicate to him the position of the German Government,
for which Molotov has in the meantime pressed several times,
in the matter of the strip of Lithuanian territory as well as
in the question of the Free Port Zone of Memel (see our
telegrams No. 1799 and 1800 of August 30). [90] The question
of the Free Port Zone of Memel was taken up with Schnurre on
September 2 by Mikoyan in a manner which leaves no doubt as
to the resentment felt by the Soviet Government, and makes
much more difficult the further pursuit of our interests in
the Baltic States. (See telegram No. 1829 of September 3).
[91]
Please wire instructions.
SCHULENBURG
[89] Telegram of June 7 not printed.
[90] Latter not printed.
[91] Not printed.
Page 185
*****
Frame 112457, serial 104
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
STATE SECRET
BERLIN, September 5, 1940.
No. 1604
The Navy intends to abandon the base on the Murman
Coast, as such are now available in Norway. Please inform the
Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Government of
the Reich, convey our thanks for valuable assistance. In
addition to the official note, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy intends also to express his gratitude in a personal
letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
Therefore please wire when notification has been made.
WOERMANN
*****
Frames 357827-357830, serial 1379
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 6, 1940-4:35 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 6, 1940-10 a. m.
No. 1609 of September 5
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 1841.
To your suggestions I state the following for your
information:
1) It is correct that the Hungarian and Bulgarian
revisionist demands on Rumania were set in motion by the
occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. However, we
cannot very well claim that it was the Russian action which
made our diplomatic intervention so urgent that for this
reason it was no longer possible for us to approach the
Soviet Union. Besides, the necessity for swift diplomatic
action is emphasized in the closing sentence of the
memorandum. You will please insert therefore, in the first
sentence of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum,
after the words "occupation of Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina," the qualifying clause: "which also gave the
impulse for the launching of revisionist demands on Rumania."
Page 186
2) That the Soviet Government, before the occupation of
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, formally gave us an
opportunity to express our views is not disputed in our
memorandum, but it is stressed that it gave us only a very
short period in which to do so. In this regard, therefore, a
change in the memorandum is not necessary.
3) The words in the third paragraph of the memorandum,
stating that a like interest in Rumania on the part of the
Soviet Union was not expressed to the Government of the
Reich, either at the Moscow settlement or later, please leave
unchanged. If Herr Molotov should object that the Soviet
Government had demonstrated its interest in Rumania during
discussion of the conversation between Mackensen and the
Soviet Charg‚ in Rome, the reply should be made that such an
interest could not be inferred from his inquiry at that time,
as he had then only inquired about the attitude of the Reich
Government toward an alleged statement of Mackensen, which in
fact he had not made in the sense imputed to him at all.
Besides, I might tell you for your personal information that
this passage in our memorandum is of particular importance
because we are anxious at this opportunity to demonstrate
once and for all to the Soviet Union that we have really
vital importance [Bedeutung] and predominant interests in
Rumania which led us to guarantee the Rumanian territory
within its present borders. Please bear this in mind in
connection with the orientation of your conversations now and
in the future as well. If necessary, you could point out
orally to Herr Molotov in this connection that after the
settlement of the Bessarbian question the purely geographical
contiguity of the Soviet Union to Rumania could not be
invested with a significance comparable to the German
interests in Rumania. The Soviet Union, in contrast to
Germany, certainly has sufficient oil wells and grain
production, so that her relationship to Rumania for this very
reason could decidedly not be placed on a level with ours.
But please do not of your own accord give occasion for a
discussion in such detail.
4) I leave it to you whether or not you think it
opportune to bring up on this occasion the question of the
strip of Lithuanian territory. If you think it advisable, you
may tell Herr Molotov that the Government of the Reich is
prepared in principle, against adequate compensation, to
forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which
was agreed upon in Moscow. The compensation which the Soviet
Union has offered is certainly not acceptable to us. At the
Page 187
moment we are engaged in drawing up a proposal for adequate
compensation and we shall soon approach the Soviet Government
with this proposal.
5) On the other hand, I request you not to broach the
question of the Free Port of Memel on this occasion. We must
persist in our view that we cannot grant the Soviet
Government a free port zone in Memel. But this question will
have to be discussed separately with the Soviet Government.
Please report by wire on the course of your interview
with Herr Molotov.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 112472, serial 104
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 10, 1940-12:55 a. m.
Received September 10, 1940-4:30 a. m.
No. 1884 of September 9
Reference your telegram No. 1609 of the 5th.
For the Reich Minister personally.
Instruction carried out. Handed memorandum to Molotov
this evening. Molotov read it through attentively and
declared that the matter was so important for the Soviet
Government that it would reply in writing. But he had to
state now, that the position taken by the German Government
could not alter the Soviet position. The Soviet Government
persisted in its view that the conduct of the German
Government in Vienna was not entirely in good faith [nicht
ganz loyal], as [the German Government] could not have been
in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania
and Hungary. The Soviet Government was, however, by no means
disputing the fact that Germany had special interests in
Rumania.
To justify his position, Molotov pointed out that the
entire world press assumed as a matter of course that in the
present case a consultation between Germany and the Soviet
Union had certainly taken place.
SCHULENBURG
Page 188
*****
Frame 214737, serial 407
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, September 10, 1940-5:58 p. m.
Received September 11, 1940-8 p. m.
No. 1900 of September 11
Reference your telegram No. 1649 of the 10th. [92]
Molotov displayed great interest in, and had me repeat
several times, the statement that "the Government of the
Reich is prepared in principle, against adequate
compensation, to forego the cession of the strip of
Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow." I had
the impression that Molotov was satisfied. The statement that
the compensation offered was certainly not acceptable to us
and that we were engaged in drawing up a counter-proposal,
Molotov noted with interest, without any further comment.
SCHULENBURG
[92] Not printed.
*****
Frames 0463-0464, serial F 5
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
RAM 37 g. Rs.
BERLIN, September 16, 1940.
No. . .
For the Ambassador personally.
Please call on Herr Molotov on the afternoon of
September 21, if by that time you are not otherwise
instructed, and communicate to him verbally and casually,
preferably while engaged on another errand, the following:
The continued penetration of English planes into Germany
and into the territories occupied by Germany makes it
necessary to strengthen the defenses at several points, and
particularly in northern Norway. Part of this reinforcement
is an antiaircraft artillery battalion, which, with its
equipment, is to be stationed in northern Norway.
Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for
this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the
least difficulty. This
Page 189
antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda
on September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail,
and the rest by road.
The Finnish Government, appreciating the special
circumstances, has granted the German request to permit this
transport to take place.
We are anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this
step in advance. Wire report that instruction has been
carried out.
We assume-and request express confirmation-that the
Soviet Government will keep this communication strictly
secret.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 0464-serial F 5
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Minister in Finland
(Blcher)
Telegram
No. . .
BERLIN, September 16, 1940.
For the Minister personally.
Arrangements have been made by German and Finnish
military authorities for the transport of an antiaircraft
artillery battalion through Finland. I wired the Moscow
Embassy in this matter as follows:
Insert [preceding document].
End of telegram to Moscow.
Please notify the Foreign Minister in Helsinki on the
afternoon of September 21 of the step which is being taken in
Moscow.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 112531-112538, serial 104
Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Schulenburg)
SEPTEMBER 21, 1940.
Subject: Interview with Molotov on Vienna conversations.
Before my departure for Berlin, Molotov received me at 5
p. m. on September 21, 1940. On this occasion he handed me an
exhaustive memorandum [93] in reply to the German memorandum
on the subject of
[93] For text, see enclosure to this document.
Page 190
the Vienna conversations, which I had transmitted to him on
September 9, 1940, on behalf of the Government of the Reich.
[94]
In the course of the interview, Molotov explained
verbally the contents of the memorandum, expressing
essentially the same ideas as on September 9. (See memorandum
of Hilger, Counselor of Embassy, of September 18, 1940.) [95]
When I pointed out that I could not recall that he-
Molotov-had ever spoken of German support for the claims of
the Soviet Government to Southern Bucovina and that I could
merely remember the casual little phrase that the Soviet
Government would "for the present" confine itself to Northern
Bucovina, Molotov replied that apparently he had made this
remark in an indefinite way at the time.
Then Molotov reverted-repeatedly-to the last paragraph
of the memorandum, in which he emphasized that an amendment
or annulment of article 3 of the Non-aggression Treaty might
be discussed, if this article inconvenienced us in any way or
had proved restrictive.
I replied that in my opinion the German Government had
no intentions at all along these lines.
Herr Molotov further stated that the German action at
Vienna had given the foreign press cause to speak of German-
Russian disagreements and to assert that the guarantee of the
Rumanian border was directed against the Soviet Union. It
would have been easy to forestall such rumors by asking the
Soviet Government in advance about its intentions. In this
case, the Soviet Government would have given the unequivocal
reply that it had no aggressive designs on Rumania.
In conclusion, Herr Molotov repeated his request that
during my stay in Berlin I do everything to clarify the
position of the Soviet Government on this question, which, of
course, I promised to do.
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
Moscow, September 21, 1940.
[Enclosure]
The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union to the German Embassy in the Soviet Union
In reply to German Ambassador Count von der
Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year, the
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to
state as follows:
[94] For text, see telegrams from the Reich Foreign Minister
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Nos. 1580 of
September 3 and 1609 of September 5, 1940, ante, pp. 181 and
185.
[95] Not printed. For the Ambassador's account of his
presentation of the German memorandum, see his telegram No.
1884 of September 9, 1940, ante, p. 187.
Page 191
1) In reply to the declaration of the People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, of August 31 of this
year, to the effect that the Government of the German Reich
had disregarded article 3 of the treaty of consultation, the
Government of the German Reich states that Germany did not
violate her obligation to consult. In justification of its
position, the Government of the German Reich states that,
after the solution of the Bessarabian question, the U.S.S.R.
and Germany, from the standpoint of the Moscow Non-aggression
Pact, no longer had any common interests with respect to
Rumania and Hungary.
The Soviet Government is of the opinion that such a
construction by the Government of the German Reich
contravenes article 3 of the Treaty of August 23, 1939, by
virtue of which the contracting parties obligate themselves
in the future to "maintain continual contact with one another
for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange
information on problems affecting their common interests."
There is no doubt that the decisions reached at Vienna
regarding the transfer of a considerable portion of
Transylvania to Hungary and regarding the guarantee of the
national territory of Rumania by Germany and Italy involve
the very questions that affect the common interests of our
countries and consequently make the consultation provided for
in article 3 of the Treaty of August 23, 1939 obligatory.
Definite information regarding the above-mentioned decisions
at Vienna was not given by the Government of the German Reich
to the Soviet Government until after the Vienna Award, which
confronted the Soviet Government with an accomplished fact.
The Soviet Government must also point to the fact that
the granting of the guarantee to Rumania in respect to her
national territory gave justification for the assertion that
this action of the Government of the German Reich was
directed against the U.S.S.R. As is known, assertions of this
kind actually received a wide circulation. If, however, the
Government of the German Reich had approached the Government
of the U.S.S.R. on this question in advance, every
justification for the circulation of such assertions would
have disappeared and the Government of the German Reich at
the same time would have fully convinced itself that the
U.S.S.R. does not intend to threaten the territorial
integrity of Rumania. From this is evident the extraordinary
importance of timely information and consultation on
questions affecting the common interests of the U.S.S.R. and
Germany.
Page 192
The Soviet Government regrets to have to state that the
view expressed in the reply of the Government of the German
Reich of September 9 of this year is also at variance with
the declaration made on June 23 of this year by Count von der
Schulenburg on behalf of the Government of the German Reich.
As is known, the Government of the German Reich in that case
replied-to a specific inquiry of the Soviet Government-that
the obligation to inform and consult arising from article 3
of the Treaty is applicable to the countries of southeastern
Europe and the Balkans. It appears from the foregoing that
the Government of the German Reich in June of this year
recognized the obligation to consult on questions concerning
such countries as Rumania and Hungary, particularly on such
important questions as those dealt with at Vienna, which
affect the interests of the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Government, for its part, considers it as its
duty to state that it reaffirms its declarations concerning
the recognition of the special economic interests of Germany
in Rumania, especially in the domain of oil and grain
supplies. At the same time, however, it is compelled to
declare that the inference which might be drawn from Count
von der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year
is incorrect: that after the solution of the Bessarabian
question the Soviet Government had recognized in its entirety
the exclusive interest of Germany in the Rumanian question
and also in other questions affecting the Danube basin. In
reality, the Soviet Government has neither orally nor in
writing recognized any such rights on the part of Germany.
2) To justify the omission of such a consultation with
the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the Vienna decisions, the
Government of the German Reich cites the fact that allegedly
the Government of the U.S.S.R. did not consult with the
Government of the German Reich, either, on its measures in
the Baltic States, especially in Lithuania, and gave only
short notice with regard to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina.
The Soviet Government must, in the first place, point
out that during the entire period of the validity of the
Treaty of August 23, 1939 the Government of the German Reich
did not once declare that the Soviet Government had violated
its treaty obligations or had failed to consult with the
Government of the German Reich on the above-mentioned
questions. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the
best way to establish mutual understanding and to secure the
complete and effective performance of the obligations imposed
by the Treaty is by a timely declaration of claims that may
arise, in case
Page 193
there actually are such claims. The Soviet Government must
point out that during the whole year that the Treaty of
August 23, 1939 has been in effect it kind not received any
such declarations or claims from the Government of the German
Reich.
To turn to the substance of the above-mentioned matter,
the Soviet Government believes it necessary to declare that
the said statement of the Government of the German Reich is
not in accord with the real situation. The Soviet Government
not only informed the Government of the German Reich in
advance regarding the measures it intended to take in the
Baltic States, especially in Lithuania, but even received
from the Government of the German Reich on June 17 of this
year a communication stating that the measures taken by the
Soviet Government in those countries were regarded by Germany
as measures which concerned solely the Soviet Union and those
countries. Such a declaration from the Government of the
German Reich was entirely comprehensible to the Soviet
Government, as Germany had as recently as August 1939
recognized the special interests of the Soviet Union in
respect to the Baltic States, and the measures which the
Soviet Union had taken regarding those states, especially
Lithuania, in no way went beyond the scope of the Soviet-
German Pact of August 23, 1939. In regard to a certain area
in the Southeast of Lithuania, however, the Soviet Government
in June of this year clearly confirmed the rights of Germany,
and reserved its new proposals concerning this Lithuanian
area for a special arrangement with the Government of the
German Reich.
The same holds true as regards the question of
Bessarabia and Bucovina, in regard to which the Soviet
Government held a consultation with the Government of the
German Reich, at which it met the viewpoint of the Government
of the German Reich by substantially paring down its
intentions with regard to Bucovina. At the same time it
voiced the hope that the Government of the German Reich would
give its support in the future, when the question of Southern
Bucovina was reopened. This declaration of the Soviet
Government met with no objection from the Government of the
German Reich.
Its attitude on questions pertaining to Rumania was,
moreover, communicated by the Soviet Government on June 25 of
this year to the Italian Government through the Italian
Ambassador, Herr Rosso, and it was convinced that the
Government of the German Reich would be duly informed of this
communication of the Soviet Government. In this
communication, the Soviet Government, while emphasizing that
it wished to obtain from Rumania merely what rightfully
belonged to it, declared: "Regarding other territories of
Rumania, the
Page 194
U.S.S.R. is mindful of the interests of Italy and Germany and
is prepared to come to an understanding with them on these
questions."
On the basis of the foregoing explanations, the Soviet
Government deems it necessary to declare that the measures it
took in regard to the Baltic States and in Bessarabia were
entirely in accord with the Soviet-German Treaty, while the
new and lesser problems which were not anticipated in this
Treaty are being solved and will be solved by the Soviet
Government in consultation with the Government of the German
Reich.
Hence the reference by the Government of the German
Reich to the measures carried out by the Soviet Union in the
Baltic region as an explanation of the failure to consult
with the Soviet Government regarding the Vienna decision is
not confirmed by the facts and therefore not justified.
3) In conclusion the Government of the German Reich
points to the circumstance that in the solution of the
Hungarian-Rumanian dispute on August 30 it had to proceed by
swift diplomatic intervention.
Here the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall
that this question had been considered as early as the
conferences in Salzburg between the Government of the German
Reich and the Governments of Hungary and Rumania and that,
consequently, the Government of the German Reich had
sufficient time at its disposal to consult with the Soviet
Government on this question.
The aforesaid circumstances, therefore, cannot serve as
justification for the failure of the Government of the German
Reich to comply with the obligation to consult, imposed by
the Non-aggression Treaty, in the Rumanian question and in
the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute.
The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the
precise and strict observance of this Treaty, particularly of
article 3 of the Treaty, is also one of the most important
conditions in the matter of the pacification of the Danube
region, to which reference is made in the memorandum of
September 9 of this year.
In conclusion, the Soviet Government deems it necessary
to add to the foregoing considerations that, if article 3 of
the Non-aggression Treaty involves certain inconveniences and
restrictions from the standpoint of the Government of the
German Reich, the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate
on the question of an amendment to or deletion of this
article of the Treaty. The Soviet Government considers it
desirable to have a special agreement to consider the time
and manner of dealing with this question.
Moscow, September 21, 1940.
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