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Page 50
II. AGREEMENT ACHIEVED, AUGUST 14-AUGUST 23, 1939
*****
Frames 69510-639513, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
MOST URGENT
BERLIN, August 14, 1939-10:53 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 15, 1939-4:40 a. m.
No. 175 of August 14
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and
communicate to him the following:
1) The ideological contradictions between National
Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the
sole reason why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood opposed to
each other in two separate and hostile camps. The
developments of the recent period seem to show that differing
world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship
between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of
a new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign
policy can be brought to an end once and for all and the way
lies open for a new sort of future for both countries.
2) There exist no real conflicts of interest between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of Germany and the
U.S.S.R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements
they do not conflict. Thus there is lacking all cause for an
aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the
other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the
U.S.S.R. The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is
no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which
cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both
countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea,
the Baltic area, Poland, Southeastern questions, etc. In such
matters political cooperation between the two countries can
have only a beneficial effect. The same applies to German and
Soviet economy, which can be expanded in any direction.
3) There is no doubt that German-Soviet policy today has
come to an historic turning point. The decisions with respect
to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and
Moscow will be of deci-
Page 51
sive importance for the aspect of relationships between the
German people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for
generations. On those decisions will depend whether the two
peoples will some day again and without any compelling reason
take up arms against each other or whether they pass again
into a friendly relationship. It has gone well with both
countries previously when they were friends and badly when
they were enemies.
4) It is true that Germany and the U.S.S.R., as a result
of years of hostility in their respective world outlooks,
today look at each other in a distrustful fashion. A great
deal of rubbish which has accumulated will have to be cleared
away. It must be said, however, that even during this period
the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians never
disappeared. The policy of both states can be built anew on
that basis.
5) The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must,
judging from all experience, count it as certain that the
capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving enemies
of both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R. They
are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military
alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into the war against Germany.
In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is
the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all
future time the destruction of Germany and of the U.S.S.R.,
which would profit only the Western democracies.
6) The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish
relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for
war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with
that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian
relations desirable. Otherwise these matters, without any
German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both
Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet
friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the
territorial questions of Eastern Europe. The leadership in
both countries should, therefore not allow the situation to
drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be
fatal if, through mutual lack of knowledge of views and
intentions our peoples should be finally driven asunder.
As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also has
the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations.
Since, however, according to previous experience this
clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual
diplomatic channels, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is
prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the
name of the Fhrer, to set forth the Fhrer's views to
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Herr Stalin. Only through such a direct discussion, in the
view of Herr von Ribbentrop, can a change be brought about,
and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the
foundations for a definite improvement in German-Russian
relations.
ANNEX: I request that you do not give Herr Molotov these
instructions in writing, but that you read them to him. I
consider it important that they reach Herr Stalin in as exact
a form as possible and I authorize you at the same time to
request from Herr Molotov on my behalf an audience with Herr
Stalin so that you may be able to make this important
communication directly to him also. In addition to a
conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin
would be a condition for my making the trip.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 254836-254837, serial 644
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 16, 1939-2:30 a. m.
SECRET
No. 175 of August 15
Reference your telegram No. 175 of August 14.
Molotov received with greatest interest the information
I had been authorized to convey, designated it as extremely
important, and declared that he would report it to his
Government at once and give me an answer shortly. He could
already state that the Soviet Government warmly welcomed
German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet
Union and in view of my communication of today now believed
in the sincerity of these intentions.
In the matter of the Reich Foreign Minister coming here,
he wanted to state tentatively, as his own opinion, that such
a trip required adequate preparation in order that the
exchange of opinions might lead to results.
In this connection, he was interested in the question of
how the German Government was disposed to the idea of
concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and
further, whether the German Government was prepared to
influence Japan for the purpose of improvement in Soviet-
Japanese relations and settlement of border conflicts and
whether a possible joint guarantee of the Baltic States was
contemplated by Germany.
Page 53
With regard to sought-for expansion of commercial
intercourse, M. admitted that negotiations were progressing
successfully in Berlin and approaching a favorable
conclusion.
M. repeated that if my communication of today included
the idea of a non-aggression pact or something similar, this
question must be discussed in concrete terms, in order that,
in the event the Reich Foreign Minister comes here, it will
not be a matter of an exchange of opinion but that concrete
decisions will be made.
M. recognized that speed was necessary in order not to
be confronted with accomplished facts, but stressed the fact
that adequate preparation of the problems mentioned by him
was indispensable.
A detailed memorandum [28] on the course of the
conversation will follow Thursday by special courier via
plane.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69503-69509, serial 127
Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Schulenburg)
SECRET
I began the interview with Molotov on August la about
8:00 p m. by stating that according to information which had
reached us the Soviet Government was interested in continuing
the political conversations, but that it preferred that they
be carried on in Moscow.
Molotov replied that this was correct.
Then I read to Herr Molotov the contents of the
instruction which had been sent to me and the German text was
immediately translated into Russian, paragraph by paragraph.
I also informed Molotov about the content of the annex to the
instruction which I had received. Molotov took under
consideration my communication that on the instructions of
the Reich Foreign Minister I was to ask for an audience with
Herr Stalin, as well as my statement that in addition to the
conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin
was a condition for the proposed visit of the Reich Foreign
Minister. With regard to the desire of the Reich Foreign
Minister that the content of the instruction should reach
Herr Stalin in as exact a form as possible, Molotov made a
gesture of assent.
Molotov listened to the reading of the instruction with
close [gespannter] attention, and he directed his secretary
to make as extensive and exact notes as possible.
[28] See the following document.
Page 54
Molotov then declared that in view of the importance of
my communication he could not give me an answer at once but
he must first render a report to his Government. He could
state at once, however, that the Soviet Government warmly
[lebhaft] welcomed the intention expressed on the German side
to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet
Union. Prior to the further communication which he would make
to me shortly, after securing instructions from his
Government, he wanted, at the moment, to express the
following views of his own with regard to the proposals of
the German Government.
A trip by the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow would
require extensive preparation if the intended exchange of
views was to produce any result. In this connection, he asked
me for information as to whether the following was in
accordance with the facts.
The Soviet Government at the end of June of this year
had received a telegraphic report from its Charg‚ in Rome
about a conference between the latter and the Italian Foreign
Minister, Ciano. In this conversation Ciano had said that
there was a German plan under way which had as its goal a
decisive improvement in German-Soviet relations. In that
connection Ciano had referred to the following items in the
plan:
1) Germany would not be disinclined to exercise
influence on Japan for the purpose of an improvement of her
relations with the Soviet Union and the elimination of the
boundary disputes.
2) Further, the possibility was envisaged of concluding
a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and making a
joint guarantee of the Baltic States.
3) Germany was prepared to make an economic treaty with
the Soviet Union on a broad basis.
The contents of the foregoing points had aroused great
interest on the part of the Soviet Government and he,
Molotov, would very much like to know how much of the plan
which Ciano had outlined in the form just mentioned to the
Soviet Charg‚ was true.
I replied that the statements of Ciano apparently rested
on a report of the Italian Ambassador here, Rosso, of which
we had already heard. The content of this report rested
principally on Rosso's deductions.
To a question interjected by Molotov as to whether Rosso
was inventing his information, I replied that that was only
partly correct. We wanted, as Molotov knew, an improvement in
German-Soviet relations and naturally had considered how such
an improvement could be brought about. The result of these
deliberations was contained in my communications which were
known to Molotov and in the state-
Page 55
ments of the Reich Foreign Minister and of Herr Schnurre to
Herr Astakhov.
Molotov replied that the question as to whether Rosso
had informed his Government correctly did not interest him
further. The Soviet Government at the present moment was
interested above all in knowing whether plans such as those
which were contained in Rosso's report, or something similar,
actually did exist and whether the German Government was
still following such a line of thought. He, Molotov, after
hearing of the report from Rome had seen nothing improbable
about it. The Soviet Government all through recent years had
been under the impression that the German Government had no
desire to bring about an improvement in relations with the
Soviet Union. Now the situation had changed. From the
conferences which had taken place in the last few weeks, the
Soviet Government had gotten the impression that the German
Government was really in earnest in its intentions to bring
about a change in relations with the Soviet Union. He
regarded the statement which had been made today as decisive
and as one in which this wish was especially completely and
clearly expressed. As regards the Soviet Government, it had
always had a favorable attitude with regard to the question
of good relations with Germany and was happy that this was
now the case on the German side also. Whether the details as
contained in Rosso's report were actually what the Germans
had in mind was not of such overwhelming importance. He,
Molotov, had the impression that there must be a great deal
of truth in them, since these ideas paralleled those advanced
from the German side for some months. In this connection he
stated with satisfaction that the economic discussions in
Berlin were continuing and apparently promised good results.
I remarked that the course of the economic negotiations
was satisfactory to us as well, and I asked how he envisaged
the further method of procedure in the political
conversations.
Molotov repeated that he was interested above everything
else in an answer to the question of whether on the German
side there was the desire to make more concrete the points
which had been outlined in Rosso's report. So, for example,
the Soviet Government would like to know whether Germany saw
any real possibility of influencing Japan in the direction of
a better relationship with the Soviet Union. "Also, how did
things stand with the idea of the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact? Was the German Government sympathetically
inclined to the idea or would the matter have to be gone into
more deeply?" were Molotov's exact words.
Page 56
I replied that, as regards the relationship to Japan,
the Reich Foreign Minister had already said to Herr Astakhov
that he had his own views on this matter. Thus it might be
assumed that the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to
interest himself in this matter also, since his influence
upon the Japanese Government was certainly not slight.
Molotov said that all this interested him very much and,
at this point, he interjected that Ciano had told the Soviet
Charg‚ that he would strongly support the ideas in the Rosso
report. He continued that it was very important for the
Soviet Government in connection with the intended trip of the
Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow to obtain an answer to the
question of whether the German Government was prepared to
conclude a non-aggression pact or something similar with the
Soviet Union. On an earlier occasion there had been mention
of the possibility of "a resurrection and revival of earlier
treaties."
I confirmed to Herr Molotov that we really were
considering a new order of things [eine Neuordnung der Dinge]
either in connection with what had gone before or perhaps on
an entirely new foundation. I then asked him whether I might
conclude that the questions which had been put by him would
constitute the substance of the conferences with the Reich
Foreign Minister in Moscow and that he had only communicated
them to me so that I might prepare the Reich Foreign Minister
for these questions.
Molotov replied that he would still have to make a
further reply to me with regard to the question of the visit
here by the Reich Foreign Minister. It seemed to him,
however, that for such a journey a previous clarification and
preparation of definite questions would be necessary, so that
it would not be just conversations which were carried on in
Moscow, but that decisions could be made as well. He heartily
subscribed to my statement that a prompt clarification was
desirable. He also had the opinion that haste was desirable,
so that the march of events would not confront us with
accomplished facts. He must, therefore, repeat that if the
German Government was favorably inclined to the idea of the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and if my statement of
today included this or a similar idea, more concrete
discussion of these questions should take place at once. He
requested me to inform my Government in this sense.
COUNT von der SCHULENBURG
Moscow, August 16, 1939.
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*****
Frames 178545-178547, serial 276
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
Moscow, August 16, 1939.
MY ESTEEMED STATE SECRETARY: With regard to my conversation
of yesterday with Herr Molotov, I should like in all haste to
stress especially the following:
Herr Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I
received the impression that the proposal of the visit of the
Reich Minister was very flattering personally to Herr Molotov
and that he considers it an actual proof of our good
intentions. (I recall that-according to newspaper dispatches-
Moscow requested that England and France send a Cabinet
Minister here, and that, instead, only Herr Strang came,
because London and Paris had been angry that Herr Voroshilov
had not been permitted to accept the invitation to the
British maneuvers, which is, in fact, quite another matter,
since high Soviet Russians have heretofore never traveled
abroad.)
In Herr Molotov's statements yesterday, the surprising
moderation in his demands on us also seems to be worthy of
note. He did not once use the words "Anti-Comintern Pact,"
and no longer demanded of us, as he did in the last
conversation, "suppression" of support of Japanese
aggression. He limited himself to the wish that we might
bring about a Soviet-Japanese settlement.
More significant is his quite clearly expressed wish to
conclude a non-aggression pact with us.
Despite all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining
entirely clearly what Herr Molotov desired in the matter of
the Baltic States. It appears that he mentioned the question
of a joint guarantee of the Baltic States as only one point
in Herr Rosso's report, but did not expressly make the demand
that we give such a guarantee. Such a joint guarantee seems
to me at variance with the behavior of the Soviet Government
in the British-French negotiations.
It actually looks at the moment as if we would achieve
the desired results in the negotiations here.
With cordial greetings and a Heil Hitler! I am, Herr
State Secretary,
Your ever devoted
COUNT von der SCHULENBURG
Page 58
*****
Frames 69501-69502, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
URGENT
BERLIN, August 16, 1939-4:15 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, August 17, 1939-1 a. m.
No. 179 of August 16
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you again call upon Herr Molotov with the
statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to
yesterday's message for Herr Stalin, a supplementary
instruction just received from Berlin, which relates to the
questions raised by Herr Molotov. Please then state to Herr
Molotov the following:
1) the points brought up by Herr Molotov are in
accordance with German desires. That is, Germany is read,
[bereit] to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet
Union and, if the Soviet Government so desires, one which
would be irrevocable [unkndbar] for a term of twenty-five
years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic
States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, it is
thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is
ready, to exercise influence for an improvement and
consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.
2) The Fhrer is of the opinion that, in view of the
present situation, and of the possibility of the occurrence
any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to
Herr Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish
provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of
German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of the
pressing questions are desirable. For these reasons the Reich
Foreign Minister declares that he is prepared to come by
plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal
on the basis of full powers from the Fhrer with the entire
complex of German-Russian questions and. if the occasion
arises [gegebenenfalls], to sign the appropriate treaties.
ANNEX: I request that you read these instructions to
Herr Molotov and ask for the reaction of the Russian
Government and Herr Stalin. Entirely confidentially, it is
added for your guidance that it would be of very special
interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the end
of this week or the beginning of next week.
RIBBENTROP
Page 59
*****
Frames 69496-69500, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 18, 1939-5:30 a. m.
SECRET
No. 189 of August 17
Reference your telegram 179 of August 16.
After I had read to Molotov the supplementary
instructions, Molotov declared, without going into their
content more closely, that he could give me today the answer
of the Soviet Government to my communication of August 15.
Stalin was following the conversations with great interest,
he was being informed about all their details, and he was in
complete agreement with Molotov.
Here Molotov read the answer of the Soviet Government,
which in the text given to me is as follows:
"The Soviet Government has taken cognizance of the
statement of the German Government transmitted by Count
Schulenburg on August 15 concerning its desire for a real
improvement in the political relations between Germany and
the U.S.S.R.
"In view of the official statements of individual
representatives of the German Government which have not
infrequently had an unfriendly and even hostile character
with reference to the U.S.S.R. the Soviet Government up till
very recently has had the impression that the German
Government was working for an excuse for a clash with the
U.S.S.R., was preparing itself for such a clash, and was
basing the necessity of its constantly increasing armament on
the inevitability of such a clash. Not to mention the fact
that the German Government by means of the so-called 'Anti-
Comintern Pact' was attempting to build up a unified front of
a group of states against the U.S.S.R., and was attempting
with especial persistence to draw Japan in.
"It is understandable that such a policy on the part of
the German Government compelled the U.S.S.R. to take serious
steps in the preparation of a defense against possible
aggression on the part of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and
also to participate in the organization of a defensive front
of a group of states against such an aggression.
"If, however, the German Government now undertakes a
change from the old policy in the direction of a sincere
improvement in political relations with the U.S.S.R., the
Soviet Government can look upon such a change only with
pleasure and is on its own part prepared to alter its policy
in the direction of an appreciable [ernsthaften] improvement
in relations with Germany.
Page 60
"If there be added to this the fact that the Soviet
Government has never had any sort of aggressive intentions
toward Germany and will not have such, and that now as
previously the Soviet Government considers a peaceful
solution of the questions at issue in the field of relations
between Germany and the U.S.S.R. as entirely possible, and
that the principle of a peaceful existence of various
political systems side by side represents a long established
principle of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., one comes to
the conclusion that for the establishment of new and improved
political relations between the two countries, there are now
at hand not only a real basis, but the actual prerequisites
for undertaking serious and practical steps in that
direction.
"The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that
the first step toward such an improvement in relations
between the U.S.S.R. and Germany could be the conclusion of a
trade and credit agreement.
"The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that
the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the reaffirmation of
the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion
of a special protocol which would define the interests of the
signatory parties in this or that question of foreign policy
and which would form an integral part of the pact."
Next Molotov supplied the following supplementary
information:
1) Economic agreements must be concluded first. What has
been begun must be carried through to the end.
2) Then there may follow after a short interval,
according to German choice, the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty
of 1926. In either case there must follow the conclusion of a
protocol in which, among other things, the German statements
of August 15 would be included.
3) With regard to the proposed trip of the Reich Foreign
Minister to Moscow, he declared that the Soviet Government
was very gratified by this proposal, since the dispatch of
such a distinguished public figure and statesman emphasized
the earnestness of the intentions of the German Government.
This stood in noteworthy contrast to England, who, in the
person of Strang, had sent only an official of the second
class to Moscow. A journey by the Reich Foreign Minister,
however, required thorough preparation. The Soviet Government
did not like the publicity that such a journey would cause.
They preferred that practical work be accomplished without so
much ceremony. To my remark that it was precisely by the
journey of the Reich Foreign Minister that the practical goal
could be speedily reached, Molotov countered that the Soviet
Government nevertheless preferred the other way in which the
first step had already been taken.
To my question as to how the Soviet Government reacted
to my communication of today, Molotov declared that today's
favorable German reply had not been known to the Soviet
Government when its answer
Page 61
was prepared and it would still have to be examined, but that
today's Soviet answer already contained all the essentials.
He suggested that on the German side we take up at once the
preparation of a draft for the non-aggression pact or for the
reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty, as the case might be,
as well as for the protocol; the same would be done on the
Soviet side.
I stated that I would report these proposals to my
Government. With regard to the protocol, it would be
desirable to have more exact information about the wishes of
the Soviet Government.
The conversation was concluded with Molotov's expressing
the desire to be supplied as soon as possible with our
drafts.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69492-69495, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 18, 1939-10:48 p. m.
Received Moscow, August l9, 1939-5:45 a. m.
No. 185 of August 18
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 182. [29]
Please arrange immediately another conversation with
Herr Molotov and do everything possible to see that this
conversation takes place without any delay. At this
conference, I would ask you to speak with Herr Molotov in the
following sense:
The Reich Government, to its great satisfaction, has
learned from his last statement the favorable attitude of the
Soviet Government with regard to the remolding of German-
Russian relations. We, too, under normal circumstances, would
naturally be ready to pursue a re-alignment of German-Russian
relations further through diplomatic channels and to carry it
out in the customary way. But the present unusual situation
made it necessary, in the opinion of the Fhrer, to employ a
different method which would lead to quick results. German-
Polish relations were becoming more acute from day to day. We
had to take into account that incidents might occur any day
that would make the outbreak of hostilities unavoidable. To
judge from the whole attitude of the Polish Government, the
developments in this
[29] supra.
Page 62
respect by no means rested with us. The Fhrer considers it
necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of
a German-Polish conflict while we are striving for a
clarification of German-Russian relations. He therefore
considers a previous clarification necessary, if only to be
able to consider Russian interests in case of such a
conflict, which would, of course, be difficult without such a
clarification.
The statement made by Herr Molotov refers to your first
communication of August 15th. My supplementary instruction
had gone beyond this and stated clearly that we were in
complete agreement with the idea of a non-aggression pact, a
guarantee of the Baltic States, and German pressure on Japan.
All factual elements for immediate commencement of direct
verbal negotiations and for a final accord were therefore
present.
Furthermore, you may mention that the first stage
mentioned by Herr Molotov, namely, the conclusion of
negotiations for a new German-Russian economic agreement, has
today been completed, so that we should now attack the second
stage. [30]
We were, therefore, now asking for an immediate reaction
to the proposal made in the supplementary instruction
regarding my immediate departure for Moscow. Please add in
this connection that I would come with full powers from the
Fhrer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the
total complex of problems.
As far as the non-aggression pact especially is
concerned, it seems to us so simple as to require no long
preparation. We have in mind here the following three points,
[31] which I would ask you to read to Herr M., but not to
hand to him.
ARTICLE 1. The German Reich and the U.S.S.R. will in no
event resort to war or to any other use of force with respect
to each other.
ARTICLE 2. this agreement shall enter into force
immediately upon signature and shall be valid and
undenounceable thereafter for a term of twenty-five years.
Please state in this connection that I am in a position,
with regard to this proposal, to arrange details in verbal
discussions at Moscow
[30] For a summary of the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of
August 19, 1939, see the memorandum by Schnurre of August 29,
1930, post, p 83.
[31] In a telegram of August 19, 1939, 1:44 p. m. (Moscow,
No. 180, not printed here) Ambassador Schulenburg called
attention to the fact that the following draft of a non-
aggression treaty contained only two articles.
Page 63
and, if occasion arises, to comply with Russian wishes. I am
also in a position to sign a special protocol regulating the
interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of
one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres
of interest in the Baltic area, the problem of the Baltic
States, etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems to us of
considerable importance, is only possible, however, at an
oral discussion.
Please emphasize in this connection, that German foreign
policy has today reached a historic turning point. This time
please conduct conversation, except for above articles of
agreement, not in the form of a reading of these
instructions, but by pressing emphatically, in the sense of
the foregoing statements, for a rapid realization of my trip
and by opposing appropriately any possible new Russian
objections. In this connection you must keep in mind the
decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish
conflict is probable and that we therefore have the greatest
interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 69490-69491, serial 127
The German Ambassador in The Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939-5:50 p. m.
No. 187 of August 19
Reference your telegram No. 185 of August 18.
The Soviet Government agrees to the Reich Foreign
Minister's coming to Moscow one week after proclamation of
the signing of the economic agreement. Molotov stated that if
the conclusion of the economic agreement is proclaimed
tomorrow, the Reich Foreign Minister might arrive in Moscow
on August 26 or 27.
Molotov delivered to me a draft of a non-aggression
pact.
A detailed account of the two conversations I had with
Molotov today, as well as the text of the Soviet draft,
follows by wire at once.
SCHULENBERG
Page 64
*****
Frames 69481-69483, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939.
SECRET
No. 189 of August 19
Supplementing my telegram No. 187 of August 19.
In my first conversation of today with Molotov-which
began at 2 o'clock and lasted an hour-after having made the
communications I had been charged with, I repeatedly tried to
convince M. of the fact that a visit of the Reich Foreign
Minister to Moscow was the only way of achieving the speed
that was urgently called for because of the political
situation. M. acknowledged the positive importance of the
proposed trip, stressed the fact that the Soviet Government
understood and esteemed the underlying purpose, but persisted
in his opinion that for the present it was not possible even
approximately to fix the time of the journey since it
required thorough preparation. This applied both to the non-
aggression pact and to the contents of the protocol to be
concluded simultaneously. The German draft of the non-
aggression pact was by no means exhaustive. The Soviet
Government desired that one of the many non-aggression pacts
that the Soviet Government had concluded with other countries
(for example with Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) should serve
as a model for the non-aggression pact with Germany. He left
it to the German Government to choose from among them the one
that seemed suitable. Further, the content of the protocol
was a very serious question and the Soviet Government
expected the German Government to state more specifically
what points were to be covered in the protocol. The attitude
of the Soviet Government toward treaties which it concludes
was a very serious one; it respected the obligations which it
undertook and expected the same of its treaty partners.
To the reasons I repeatedly and very emphatically
advanced for the need for haste, M. rejoined that so far not
even the first step-the closing of the economic agreements-
had been taken. First of all, the economic agreement had to
be signed and proclaimed and put into effect. Then would come
the turn of the non-aggression pact and protocol.
M. remained apparently unaffected by my protests, so
that the first conversation closed with a declaration on the
part of M. that he had
Page 65
imparted to me the views of the Soviet Government and had
nothing to add to them.
Hardly half an hour after the close of the conversation,
M. sent me word, asking me to call on him again at the
Kremlin at 4:30 p. m.
He apologized for putting me to the trouble and
explained that he had reported to the Soviet Government and
was authorized to hand me a draft of the non-aggression pact.
As far as the Reich Foreign Minister's trip was concerned,
the Soviet Government agreed to Herr von Ribbentrop's coming
to Moscow about a week after proclamation of the signing of
the economic agreement. Thus, if this proclamation takes
place tomorrow, Herr won Ribbentrop might arrive in Moscow on
August 26 or 27. M. did not give reasons for his sudden
change of mind. I assume that Stalin intervened. My effort to
get M. to accept an earlier date for the Reich Foreign
Minister's trip was, unfortunately, unsuccessful.
The text of the non-aggression pact draft will follow by
wire.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69479-69480, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939-11:30 p. m.
SECRET
No. 190 of August 19
Supplementing my telegram No. 189 of August 19.
The Soviet non-aggression pact draft reads as follows:
"The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German
Government, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace
among the nations and proceeding from the fundamental
provisions of the Neutrality Agreement that was concluded in
April 1926 between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, have reached the
following accord:
ARTICLE 1. Both High Contracting Parties obligate
themselves to desist reciprocally from any act of violence
and any aggressive action whatsoever toward each other, or
from an attack on each other either individually or jointly
with other powers.
ARTICLE 2. Should one of the High Contracting Parties
become the object of an act of violence or attack by a third
power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner
whatever give its support to such acts of that power.
ARTICLE 3. Should disputes or conflicts arise between
the High Contracting Parties with regard to questions of one
kind of another, both
Page 66
parties obligate themselves to settle these disputes and
conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through mutual
consultation or if necessary through the creation of suitable
arbitration commissions.
ARTICLE 4. The present Treaty shall be concluded for a
period of five years with the proviso that insofar as one of
the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year
before the expiration of the term the validity of the Treaty
shall automatically be extended for another five years.
ARTICLE 5. The present Treaty shall be ratified in as
short a time as possible, whereupon the Treaty shall enter
into force.
Postscript, The present Pact shall be valid only if a
special protocol is signed simultaneously covering the points
in which the High Contracting Parties are interested in the
field of foreign policy. The protocol shall be an integral
part of the Pact."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 254844-254846, serial 644
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 2O, 1939-4:35 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 91, 1939-12:45 a. m.
No. 189 of August 20
For the Ambassador personally.
The Fhrer authorizes you to present yourself to Molotov
at once and hand him the following telegram from the Fhrer
to Herr Stalin:
"Herr Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing
of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first
step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations.
2) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the
Soviet Union means to me the establishment of a long-range
German policy. Germany thereby resumes a political course
that was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries.
The Government of the Reich is therefore resolved in such
case to act entirely consistent with such a far-reaching
change.
3) I accept the draft of the non-aggression pact that
your Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, delivered but consider
it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with
it as soon as possible.
4) The supplementary protocol desired by the Government
of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be substantially
clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible
German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate.
Otherwise the Government of the
Page 67
Reich is not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could
be cleared up and settled in a short time.
5) the tension between Germany and Poland has become
intolerable. Polish demeanor toward a great power is such
that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined, at
any rate, in the face of this presumption, from now on to
look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at
its disposal.
6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the
intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation to
each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose
that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22,
but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign
Minister has full powers to draw up and sign the non-
aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the
Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most
is impossible in view of the international situation. I
should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler."
Please deliver to Herr Molotov the above telegram of the
Fhrer to
Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 260314, serial 695
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 191 of August 21
BERLIN, August 21, 1939-10:15 a. m.
Received Moscow, August 21, 1939-2:30 p. m.
For the Ambassador.
Please do your best to see that the journey
materializes. Date as in telegram.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 260312-260313, serial 695
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 21, 1939-5:30 p. m.
SECRET
Telegram No. 197 of August 21
Reference your telegrams No. 189 of August 20 and No. 191 of
August 21.
Page 68
Strongly stressing the extraordinary importance of, and
exceptional need for haste, I delivered to Herr Molotov at 3
p. m. the Fhrer's message to Stalin, with a translation. M.
read the document through and was evidently deeply impressed.
He stated that he would forward the message and advise me
immediately as soon as a decision was reached.
I tried with all the means at my disposal to make it
clear to M. that an immediate journey of the Reich Foreign
Minister was absolutely- necessary in the interest of both
countries. I closed with the request that, under any
circumstances, I be given an answer today.
I have just learned that M. wishes to see me again at 5
p. m.
SCHNURRE
*****
Frame 260307, serial 695
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, August 21, 1939.
SECRET
No. 199 of August 21
Supplementing my telegram No. 197 of August 21.
Molotov delivered to me at 5 p. m. Stalin's answer,
couched in very conciliatory form in reply to the Fhrer's
message. Stalin advises that the Soviet Government agrees to
the arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister on August 23.
Molotov declared that it was the desire of the Soviet
Government that tomorrow morning at the latest a short
factual communiqu‚ on the contemplated conclusion of a non-
aggression pact and "pending" arrival of the Reich Foreign
Minister be published in Moscow. Molotov requested German
assent to this by midnight. I advise consenting since the
Soviet Government places itself on record through
publication.
Text of Stalin's letter follows at once by wire.
SCHNURRE
Page 69
*****
Frame 260306, serial 695
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 21, 1939-7:30 p. m.
SECRET
No. 200 of August 21
Supplementing my telegram No. 199 of August 21.
Text of Stalin's reply:
"August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German Reich
A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-
Soviet non-aggression pact will mark a decided turn for the
better in the political relations between our countries.
The people of our countries need peaceful relations with
each other. The assent of the German Government to the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation
for eliminating the political tension and for the
establishment of peace and collaboration between our
countries.
The Soviet Government has authorized me to inform you
that it agrees to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on
August 23. J. Stalin."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 0032-0033, serial F 11
Full Powers
To the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop
I hereby grant full power to negotiate, in the name of
the German Reich, with authorized representatives of the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
regarding a non-aggression treaty, as well as all related
questions, and if occasion arises, to sign both the non-
aggression treaty and other agreements resulting from the
negotiations, with the proviso that this treaty and these
agreements shall enter into force as soon as they are signed.
ADOLF HITLER
RIBBENTROP
OBERSALZBERG, August 22, 1939.
Page 70
*****
Frames 130968-130970, serial 155
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
St. S. Nr. 614
BERLIN, August 22, 1939.
After the Reich Foreign Minister late yesterday evening
had briefly informed the Japanese Ambassador by telephone
from the Berghof about the latest turn between Berlin and
Moscow, I received Herr Oshima about midnight for a
conference which lasted about one hour. The Japanese
Ambassador as usual showed himself well disposed. At the same
time, I discerned in him a certain uneasiness, which
increased in the course of the conversation.
I first described to Oshima the natural course of events
which had led us to today's conclusion of a non-aggression
pact. When Oshima expressed his own concern, we finally came
to an agreement as to how Oshima might convince his
Government of the necessity and the advantage of the current
proceedings.
The ideas of Oshima were, as was to be expected, along
two lines:
1) If Russia were relieved of anxiety in Europe, she
would strengthen her East Asiatic front and put new life into
the Chinese war.
2) The jurists in Tokyo (and there were a great many of
them) would debate the consistency of our present proceedings
with certain earlier German-Japanese conversations.
Oshima added that there was no use in trying to
interfere with accomplished facts. He did, however, look for
a certain shock in Japan, and he would like to abate this by
making a telegraphic report tonight.
My discussion was along lines somewhat as follows:
1) We were doing nothing which would put in question our
friendly relationship with Japan. On the contrary, we would
continue to maintain that, and we esteemed the personalities,
like Oshima, who had acted and would act most vigorously to
that end.
2) The present proceedings were not a cause for surprise
inasmuch as the Reich Foreign Minister had informed the
Ambassador some months previously that a normalization of
German-Russian relations was worth attempting.
3) Such an arrangement would also put us in a position
to take steps to bring about a period of quiet in Japanese-
Russian relations and to insure its continuance for a
considerable period of time. That Japan was at the moment not
seeking a Japanese-Russian conflict was certain. I had even
received from the Russian side the impression that a Moscow-
Tokyo agreement would be welcomed there.
Page 71
4) Since the Anti-Comintern discussions (which had been
mentioned by Oshima) had been undertaken, the front of our
enemies had been dislocated both by Japan and by Germany. It
was clear as day that for Japan England had become Enemy No.
1, just as Germany also was threatened much less by Russian
than by English policy. The agreement which was being reached
with Moscow was serving the interests of both of us.
5) If Oshima referred to certain earlier German-Japanese
conversations, we would not argue the point with him that we
had sought tirelessly to improve German-Japanese relations.
We had waited for half a year to hear some echo from Japan.
The Japanese Government, therefore, had the priority and
Oshima had certainly had the merit of having always
recognized this, and of having urged that these negotiations
be speeded up.
6) Our economic, and also certain political, discussions
with Moscow had lasted for some time. The negotiations for a
non-aggression pact were, however, of very recent origin. It
was only in the last two or three days that the possibility
of this had appeared. Polish arrogance might force us into
war even in the course of this week. With only such a limited
amount of time available, we had been absolutely compelled to
act.
The Ambassador took note of these remarks and in
conclusion he assured me of his unaltered intention to work
further for German-Japanese friendship. Besides. he hoped to
be able to have a brief conference yet today with the Reich
Foreign Minister, if the latter passed through Berlin, in
order to give his report to Tokyo still more weight. If it
were necessary, Oshima would come to the airfield.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frame 254847, serial 644
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office
Telegram [32]
VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 2X, 1939-8:05 p. m.
No. 204 of August 23
Please advise the Fhrer at once that the first three-
hour conference with Stalin and Molotov has just ended. At
the discussion- which, moreover, proceeded affirmatively in
our sense-it transpired that the decisive point for the final
result is the demand of the Russians that we recognize the
ports of Libau and Windau as within their sphere of
influence. I would be grateful for confirmation before 8
o'clock German time that the Fhrer is in agreement, The
signing
[32] Other copies of this message and of the reply to it
indicate that the messages were transmitted by telephone
(frame 24017, serial 34 and frame 260299, serial 695).
Page 72
of a secret protocol on delimitation of mutual spheres of
influence in the whole eastern area is contemplated, for
which I declared myself ready in principle.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frame 24018, serial 34
The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister
Telegram [33]
No. 205
BERLIN, August 23, 1939.
Reference your telegram No. 204.
Answer is Yes. Agreed.
KORDT
*****
Frames 0019-0030, serial F 11
Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23d
to 24th, Between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the One
Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand
VERY SECRET!
STATE SECRET
The following problems were discussed:
1) Japan:
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that the German-
Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the
Soviet Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing to our
good relations with Japan, to make an effective contribution
to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union
and Japan. Should Herr Stalin and the Soviet Government
desire it, the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to work in
this direction. He would use his influence with the Japanese
Government accordingly and keep in touch with the Soviet
representative in Berlin in this matter.
HERR STALIN replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired
an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there
were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese
provocations. If Japan desired war, it could have it. The
Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If
Japan desired peace-so much the better! Herr Stalin
considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an
[33] Another copy of this message (frame 260299, serial 695)
indicates that it was transmitted by telephone and received
at Moscow at 11 p. m. on August 23.
Page 73
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he
did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the
initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet
Union.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER assented to this and stressed
the fact that his cooperation would mean merely the
continuation of talks that he had for months been holding
with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in the sense of an
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Accordingly, there
would be no new initiative on the German side in this matter.
2) Italy:
HERR STALIN inquired of the Reich Foreign Minister as to
Italian aims. Did not Italy have aspirations beyond the
annexation of Albania-perhaps for Greek territory? Small,
mountainous, and thinly populated Albania was, in his
estimation, of no particular use to Italy.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that Albania was
important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover, Mussolini
was a strong man who could not be intimidated.
This he had demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict, in
which Italy had asserted its aims by its own strength against
a hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a position
at that time to give Italy appreciable support.
Mussolini welcomed warmly the restoration of friendly
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. He had
expressed himself as gratified with the conclusion of the Non-
aggression Pact.
3) Turkey:
HERR STALIN asked the Reich Foreign Minister what
Germany thought about Turkey.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER expressed himself as follows
in this matter: he had months ago declared to the Turkish
Government that Germany desired friendly relations with
Turkey. The Reich Foreign Minister had himself done
everything to achieve this goal. The answer had been that
Turkey became one of the first countries to join the
encirclement pact against Germany and had not even considered
it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the fact.
HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV hereupon observed that the
Soviet Union had also had a similar experience with the
vacillating policy of the Turks.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER mentioned further that
England had spent five minion pounds in Turkey in order to
disseminate propaganda against Germany.
Page 74
HERR STALIN said that according to his information the
amount which England had spent in buying Turkish politicians
was considerably more than five million pounds.
4) England:
HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV commented adversely on the
British Military Mission in Moscow, which had never told the
Soviet Government what it really wanted.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated in this connection
that England had always been trying and was still trying to
disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and
the Soviet Union. England was weak and wanted to let others
fight for its presumptuous claim to world domination.
HERR STALIN eagerly concurred and observed as follows:
the British Army was weak; the British Navy no longer
deserved its previous reputation. England's air arm was being
increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots. If
England dominates the world in spite of this, this was due to
the stupidity of the other countries that always let
themselves be bluffed. It was ridiculous, for example, that a
few hundred British should dominate India.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and informed Herr
Stalin confidentially that England had recently put out a new
feeler which was connected with certain allusions to 1914. It
was a matter of a typically English, stupid maneuver. The
Reich Foreign Minister had proposed to the Fhrer to inform
the British that every hostile British act, in case of a
German-Polish conflict, would be answered by a bombing attack
on London.
HERR STALIN remarked that the feeler was evidently
Chamberlain's letter to the Fhrer, which Ambassador
Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg. Stalin
further expressed the opinion that England, despite its
weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly.
5) France:
HERR STALIN expressed the opinion that France,
nevertheless, had an army worthy of consideration.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, on his part, pointed out to
Herren Stalin and Molotov the numerical inferiority of
France. While Germany had available an annual class of more
than 300,000 soldiers, France could muster only 150,000
recruits annually. The West Wall was five times as strong as
the Maginot Line. If France attempted to wage war with
Germany, she would certainly be conquered.
Page 75
6) Anti-Comintern Pact:
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that the Anti-
Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the Soviet
Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was
able to infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the
Soviet Government fully recognized this fact.
HERR STALIN interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact had
in fact frightened principally the City of London and the
small British merchants.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and remarked
jokingly that Herr Stalin was surely less frightened by the
Anti-Comintern Pact than the City of London and the small
British merchants. What the German people thought of this
matter is evident from a joke which had originated with the
Berliners, well known for their wit and humor, and which had
been going the rounds for several months, namely, "Stalin
will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact."
7) Attitude of the German people to the German-Russian Non-
aggression Pact:
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that he had been able
to determine that all strata of the German people, and
especially the simple people, most warmly welcomed the
understanding with the Soviet Union. The people felt
instinctively that between Germany and the Soviet Union no
natural conflicts of interests existed, and that the
development of good relations had hitherto been disturbed
only by foreign intrigue, in particular on the part of
England.
HERR STALIN replied that he readily believed this. The
Germans desired peace and therefore welcomed friendly
relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER interrupted here to say that
it was certainly true that the German people desired peace,
but, on the other hand, indignation against Poland was so
great that every single man was ready to fight. The German
people would no longer put up with Polish provocation.
8) Toasts:
In the course of the conversation, HERR STALIN
spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fhrer, as follows:
"I know how much the German nation loves its Fhrer; I
should therefore like to drink to his health."
Page 76
HERR MOLOTOV drank to the health of the Reich Foreign
Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.
HERR MOLOTOV raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that
it had been Stalin who-through his speech of March of this
year, which had been well understood in Germany-had brought
about the reversal in political relations.
HERREN MOLOTOV and STALIN drank repeatedly to the Non-
aggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and
to the German nation.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER in turn proposed a toast to
Herr Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a
favorable development of relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union.
9) When they took their leave, HERR STALIN addressed to the
Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:
The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously.
He could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union
would not betray its partner.
HENCKE
Moscow, August 24, 1939.
*****
Frames 0048-0050, serial F 11
Treaty of Non-aggression Between Germany and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
August 23, 1939.
The Government of the German Reich and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between
Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental
provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April
1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the
following agreement:
ARTICLE I
Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to
desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and
any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with
other powers.
Page 77
ARTICLE II
Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the
object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High
Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this
third power.
ARTICLE III
The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties
shall in the future maintain continual contact with one
another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange
information on problems affecting their common interests.
ARTICLE IV
Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall
participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is
directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.
ARTICLE V
Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High
Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another,
both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts
exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if
necessary, through the establishment of arbitration
commissions.
ARTICLE VI
The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten
years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High
Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to
the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty
shall automatically be extended for another five years.
ARTICLE VII
The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest
possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in
Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is
signed.
Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.
Moscow, August 23, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP
With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV
Page 78
Frames 182-183, serial F 19
Secret Additional Protocol
On the occasion of the signature of the Non-aggression
Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of
the two parties discussed in strictly confidential
conversations the question of the boundary of their
respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These
conversations led to the following conclusions:
1. In the event of a territorial and political
rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States
(Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary
of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of
influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the
interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each
party.
2. In the event of a territorial and political
rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the
spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be
bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew,
Vistula, and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties
make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state
and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely
determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question
by means of a friendly agreement.
3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is
called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The
German side declares its complete political disinterestedness
in these areas. [34]
4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as
strictly secret.
Moscow, August 23, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV
[34] The German text of this article of the Protocol is as
follows: "Hinsichtlich des Sdostens Europas wird von
sowjetischer Seite das Interesse an Bessarabien betont. Von
deutscher Seite wird das v”llige politische Desinteressement
an diesen Gebieten erkl„rt."
For a statement by the Reich Foreign Minister concerning
the discussion of these subjects at the time of the
conclusion of the Non-aggression Pact, see Ribbentrop's
memorandum for Hitler of June 24, 1940, post, p. 157.
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to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
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