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PART FIVE
The Danzig Question
(May 15-August 19, 1939)
I
The Militarisation of the Free City
(May 15-June 30)
No. 126
M. LON N™EL., French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
15, 1939.
AT a time when Germany, by clever propaganda, is trying
to persuade the world that the present risk of war is due
solely to Poland's uncompromising attitude over the Danzig
question, and to her stubborn refusal to permit the
incorporation in the Reich of a city whose character is
indisputably German, it will, perhaps, be useful to point
out once more the causes which determine the Polish
attitude.
In refusing to allow the annexation of Danzig by the
Reich, with its inevitable consequences-among the foremost
of which would be the occupation of the Free City not only
by the S.A., the S.S., and a large militarized police force,
but also by troops with all the most up-to-date equipment in
use in the Germany Army-Poland is not guided merely by the
very legitimate fear, prompted by memories of the
Czechoslovak experience, of being caught in the fatal mesh
of continuous concessions and renunciations. Whatever
promises and "guarantees" Herr Hitler might offer by way of
compensation for the annexation of Danzig, it would remain
none the less true that Germany, once master of the Free
City, would not be far from having Poland completely at her
mercy. It would be a simple matter for Germany to restrict
the advantages of access to the sea, which Germany would in
principle have recognized to Poland, and easier still to
deprive her of the right of access altogether at the first
convenient opportunity.
[159]
Sea-borne trade figures largely in Poland's foreign
trade. Two thirds of it in value, and more than three
quarters in bulk, pass through the two ports of Gdynia and
Danzig. In 1938, in fact, of a total trade of 19,200,000
tons, 16,300,000 tons passed through them.
The tonnage handled by Gdynia and Danzig, which, as we
shall see, is far from adequate for Poland's total needs, is
divided between these two ports as follows: 9,200,000 tons
at Gdynia, and 7,100,000 at Danzig. The analysis of imports
and exports is as follows:
Imports Exports
Gdynia....... 1,526,000 tons. 7,646,000 tons.
Danzig....... 1,562,000 tons. 5,563,000 tons.
One-third of the bulk, and 17 per cent of the value, of
Polish foreign trade therefore passes through Danzig, while
46 per cent of the bulk and 48 per cent of the value passes
through Gdynia.
As the Polish Government has been at pains, for
practical reasons and in order to avoid wasteful
competition, to make the two ports in its Customs area
specialize in particular trades, Danzig has become the
principal port for the export of Polish cereals (in 1938,
407,000 tons of agricultural produce against only 112,000
via Gdynia) and Polish timber (813,000 tons against
402,000). The coal trade is shared between them. Coal from
the Dombrowa basin is exported via Danzig that of Upper
Silesia via Gdynia; the latter thus takes first place with
5,380,000 tons plus 1,000,000 tons of bunker coal against
3,500,000 tons via Danzig.
If Poland wanted to dispense with Danzig and give
Gdynia the handling of all her commerce, she could do so
only after some time had elapsed, and at great expense.
Gdynia could probably cope successfully with the coal
exports, but this port is not adequately equipped for
handling either cereals or wood. Not only would new
accommodation (granaries, etc.) have to be provided, but
even new quays and larger warehouses would have to be built.
The construction at the back of the port of a canal 2
kilometres long, a project already contemplated, would also
be necessary.
From the point of view of communications, the
importance to Poland of the Free City of Danzig is not
confined to the use at present made of the harbour, or the
fact that the mouth of the Vistula-the one important Polish
river-is at Danzig. Though the Silesian-Baltic Railway,
built and operated by the Franco-Polish Railway Company,
[160]
runs outside the territory of the Free City, the Warsaw-
Gdynia line, on the other hand, crosses it and runs through
Danzig itself.
From the naval and military point of view, it is no
exaggeration to say that the territory of Danzig commands
Poland's access to the sea.
The distance from Danzig to Hel is about 30 kilometres
as the crow flies; from the nearest point on the coast in
Danzig territory to Hel is about 25 kilometres. Ships
passing near the Hel peninsula could, therefore, enter and
leave the Bay of Gdynia remaining all the time out of range
of the batteries on the Danzig coast.
On the other hand, Gdynia is less than 10 kilometres
from the nearest point of Danzig territory and would be
within range of guns placed between Zoppot and the western
limit of Danzig territory.
Generally speaking, if Germany were able to construct
fortifications in the south-west territory of the Free City,
which forms a salient into the corridor, the defence of the
latter would become still more difficult than it is now.
For the militarisation of the Free City to have its
full value, the Germans would, it is true, have to establish
permanent means of communication between the two banks of
the Vistula so as to link up the eastern portion with East
Prussia. At present, no bridge spans the Vistula between
Tczew (the last Polish town on the Vistula) and the sea, but
Germany's vast technical resources would allow her to fill
this gap quickly enough, and in any case make up for any
deficiencies by emergency measures.
The above indications show how well founded is the
uneasiness with which Poland regards the intentions of Herr
Hitler.
Poland could not possibly exist without free access to
the sea. Napoleon himself recognized this, adding that
Danzig was essential to Poland "to enable her to dispose of
her produce." The "Corridor" and Gdynia are not enough to
ensure to Poland this "exit to the sea," which, in the words
of Proudhon, is "vital to every large state." It should not
be forgotten, moreover, that the events of last March have
made this a still more vital necessity for Poland; she
could, after her reconciliation with Lithuania, have
utilized the "Port of Memel," but this is now out of the
question; while, on the other hand, since the annexation by
the Reich of Bohemia and Moravia, only at the cost of
surrendering her independence to the Reich could she make
sufficient use of the Czechoslovak railways to facilitate
appreciably her foreign trade.
Herr Hitler does not seem to have understood these
points; by
[161]
choosing to claim Danzig precisely on the morrow of a series
of aggressions, one result of which has been to make the
maintenance of the existing status of Danzig more than ever
indispensable to Poland, he has shown a complete lack of
psychological insight.
Before the partitions, the Poles called Danzig "the
Admiral of Poland," thus symbolizing the importance they
traditionally attached to this ancient port. The Poles of
the twentieth century, with their passion for the sea, and
their high ideals for their reborn state, and what it should
become, are not prepared to allow themselves to be despoiled
in Danzig of the rights they consider essential to them.
They are unanimous on this point; they will not put up with
any settlement which would not, in their opinion, appear
likely to safeguard them.
LON N™EL.
No. 127
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
22, 1939.
FROM a reliable source I have received certain
indications of Herr von Ribbentrop's present attitude to the
International problems of the moment, which it appears to me
advisable to pass on to your department.
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it
absolutely unbelievable that Poland should have rejected the
Fhrer's proposals. These were Herr Hitler's personal
suggestions. Herr von Ribbentrop himself would never have
approved them. In his opinion, they were quite
incomprehensible in "their clemency and their generosity."
It was unthinkable that Herr Hitler should have revealed, at
the same time such modesty in his demands, and such
generosity in his offers. Furthermore, last January, M. Beck
had accepted these advantageous proposals. It was because of
the internal situation in Poland that he had been unable to
keep his word. The Warsaw government had therefore missed a
most unlooked-for chance of securing the continued existence
of Poland for twenty-five years. But nothing would be lost
by waiting.
The possibility that Poland might accept the German
point of view, and enter into her orbit, although it seemed
highly remote at the moment, had not been altogether set
aside by Herr von Ribbentrop.
But what, in fact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Reich
[162]
thinks, is that the Polish State cannot last very long.
Sooner or later it would be bound to disappear, once more
partitioned between Germany and Russia. In Herr von
Ribbentrop's mind the idea of such a partition was closely
linked with that of a rapprochement between Berlin and
Moscow. To him such a reconciliation seemed, in the long
run, both indispensable and inevitable. It would be in
accordance with reality, and with a tradition still very
much alive in Germany and would be the only way of bringing
about a permanent settlement of the German-Polish dispute,
that is, according to the methods already applied in the
case of Czechoslovakia, the deletion of Poland from the map.
But above all it would give the rulers of the Reich the
means of destroying the power of Great Britain. That was the
chief objective which Herr von Ribbentrop had set himself,
the id‚e fixe, which, with fanatical determination, he was
unceasingly striving to achieve.
The hope, that a Russo-German cooperation would one day
give the Reich a chance of striking a mortal blow at the
world power of the British Empire, had been strengthened
latterly in Herr von Ribbentrop's mind by the difficulties
which were met with in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. It was
true that the Fhrer was still opposed to the political
designs of the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to
Soviet Russia. Herr Hitler considered that, for ideological
reasons, it would be extremely difficult to bring about such
a re-orientation of German policy. However, Herr von
Ribbentrop had his backers, notably amongst the Higher
Command and the more important industrialists. The
Chancellor himself had, to a certain extent, already taken
account of these tendencies of his Foreign Minister by
making no attack against Soviet Russia in his speeches
during the past few months, and by allowing the German Press
for the time being to lower the tone of its anti-Bolshevik
tirades.
One of the immediate objects that the advocates of a
reconciliation with the U.S.S.R. hoped to gain, appeared to
be the possibility of persuading Russia to play the same
role in an eventual dismemberment of Poland that the latter
country had played with regard to Czechoslovakia. The
ultimate object appeared to be to make use of the material
resources and man-power of the U.S.S.R. as a means to
destroy the British Empire.
It is possible that up to the present the Fhrer has
resisted these appeals or at any rate hesitated to commit
himself to such a policy, for ideological reasons. But, even
admitting that such is his present attitude, there is
nothing to indicate that he will not change his mind.
[163]
In any case, the ease and rapidity with which rumours
of a Russo-German reconciliation found credence in Germany
at the time of M. Litvinov's resignation were enough to
allay any fears that Herr Hitler might have had as to the
effect on public opinion. One cannot eliminate the
possibility that it was to enlighten the Chancellor on this
point that the advocates of Russo-German reconciliation put
about these rumours.
At this moment, when the Anglo-Franco-Russian
negotiations seem to have entered upon a decisive phase, we
should keep clearly conscious of this situation and bear in
mind that the Reich would do its best to take advantage, to
the detriment of France and Great Britain, of any failure,
howsoever veiled, in the conversations now taking place with
Moscow.
COULONDRE.
No. 128
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
25, 1939.
WHILE maintaining an attitude of reserve, which
contrasts with the activity and blunders of some of his
collaborators, the German Ambassador has, since his return
to Warsaw, had interviews with several of his colleagues.
According to information I have gleaned he reproaches
M. Beck with having abandoned the "only reasonable policy"
under pressure from the Army and public opinion.
As to the present situation, he declares that Germany
wishes to avoid extreme measures towards Poland at the
moment, and quotes in support of his statement the
"composure" with which his countrymen have taken the recent
incidents at Danzig, and the much more serious ones,
according to him, at Tomaszow.
But he does not attempt to hide the fact that this
"patience" is only a question of passing tactics and he
makes no mystery of the hopes of his Government: "in three
months," he said emphatically in the course of
conversations, "England, France and even Poland will be
tired and will not think any more of fighting for the sake
of Danzig. Then we shall settle the problem under favourable
conditions."
LON N™EL.
[164]
No. 129
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
25, 1939.
WITHIN the last few days there has been a series of
incidents on the Danzig-Polish frontier. They were for the
most part insignificant, but their frequency, the trouble
stirred up about them by the Danzig authorities, and the use
which these are obviously seeking to make of them give them
exceptional importance.
It will, therefore, be of interest to sum them up
briefly here;
1. The Kalthof incident (Customs post on the frontier of
East Prussia).
A troop of the S.A. collected before a house occupied
by the Polish Customs officials and threatened them. The
officials withdrew. The assailants entered the house and
ransacked it.
Informed of the incident the Polish Commissioner-
General made it known that he was sending his deputy, M.
Perkowski to the spot, and informed the Danzig authorities
who agreed to have him accompanied by the police. A few
moments later, the same authorities telephoned to say that
they had no police available. M. Perkowski therefore went
alone by car to Kalthof.
While he was visiting the ransacked building, a group
of "unknown persons" attacked his car which was parked
outside. The chauffeur, after firing two shots in the air,
fired on his assailants. One of them was killed. The dead
man turned out to be an S.A. from Marienburg in East
Prussia, Grbnau by name.
The crowd scattered immediately. M. Perkowski and his
chauffeur joined the Customs officials, who had taken refuge
in a neighbouring railway station, and had themselves
conveyed on a railway engine to Tczew, in Polish territory.
The German version separates the two portions of the
incident. It explains Grbnau's death in the following
manner: "A citizen was going through a deserted village in a
taxi when he was killed by a Polish chauffeur who had first
dazzled the taxi-driver with his headlights."
As a sequel to the incident the Polish Commissioner-
General transmitted to the Senate of Danzig a note in which:
(1) He pointed out that the Polish Government could not
admit that the work of the Polish Customs officials should
be interfered with in any way.
[165]
(2) He demanded that an inquiry should be held.
(3) He claimed compensation for damages.
(4) He insisted upon a clear and precise declaration as
to the guarantees that the Senate was disposed to give to
ensure the security of the Polish minority in the Free City.
The Senate, on its part, sent a protest on account the
death of the S.A. Grbnau, demanding also compensation,
sanctions and apologies.
At this stage the Polish Customs officials returned to
their post.
To the note of the Polish Commissioner-General, the
Senate has just replied with two notes. In the first it
declared itself unable to accept the Polish version of the
incident and refused to accede to the requests of the Polish
Commissioner-General. In the second, the Senate requested
the recall of M. Perkowski, the Commissioner-General's
deputy, and of the Polish Inspector General of Customs and
one of his collaborators. The Danzig note accused M.
Perkowski of taking advantage of his diplomatic rights to
flee into Polish territory taking with him the murderer thus
enabling the latter to escape from the Danzig justice.
Finally, yesterday, May 24, the funeral of the victim
took place at Marienburg. Herr Hitler sent a wreath of
flowers by special aeroplane. President Greiser and
Gauleiter Forster took part in the ceremony. The speeches
made dwelt chiefly upon the virtues of their lost comrade
without making any allusion to Poland. But one of the S.A.
took a solemn oath over the grave of Grbnau to avenge his
death.
2. Incident at Pieklo (Picker) on the frontier of Danzig and
East Prussia, opposite Elbing.
On Sunday, May 14, there was a further hostile
manifestation before the Polish Customs post. But this time,
at the request of the Polish Commissioner-General, the
police intervened and dispersed the demonstrators.
3. Incident on the Tczew bridge (Dirschau).
On Tuesday, May 16, in the early hours of the morning a
lorry coming from Elbing (East Prussia) going towards the
Reich across the Corridor, drew up at the Polish frontier
post near the Tczew bridge. At that moment a Polish Customs
official fired a revolver shot in the air to prevent the
chauffeur moving off. The Danzig version asserts that the
Customs official attempted to kill the chauffeur. The
Vorposten, the official organ of the Senate, devotes
considerable space to
[166]
the incident, preceding the story with the huge headline:
"Fresh attempt at murder by Poles on Danzig territory."
4. Incident at Kohling.
Two Polish frontier guards crossed the frontier. Called
upon to withdraw they left a bicycle in Danzig territory.
The Senate speaks of a further violation of the frontier.
Taking their stand upon the whole series of incidents,
the Senate sent the Polish Commissioner General a note of
protest which the Vorposten describes as extremely vigorous.
But it does not publish the text.
However, from information which has reached Warsaw it
would seem that the Senate requested the Polish Government
"to take the necessary measures to put a stop to the
hysteria of the Polish officials before the trouble caused
by it led to incalculable consequences."
The Polish press, which had reacted violently after the
Kalthof incident, does not seem, on the other hand, to
attach much importance to the incidents which followed. It
publishes brief reports under the heading "Minor frontier
incidents."
In the same way only a very fleeting allusion is made
to yesterday's notes from the Danzig Senate. A telegram
reproduced by the Gazeta Polska merely remarks "a peculiar
feature of the Danzig requests is the recall of three Polish
officials."
The Pat Agency observes, in one of its bulletins, that
the Senate's request for the recall of the Deputy
Commissioner at Danzig cannot possibly be accepted, for the
Polish Commissioner-General represents the Polish Government
at Danzig and cannot be regarded as a normal diplomatic
Representative. The same considerations, adds the semi-
official agency, hold good for the officials under him.
The same bulletin remarks that the Senate's notes are
considered in Warsaw as tending, for purpose of propaganda,
to aggravate the relations between Poland and Danzig; "the
unhealthy publicity given by the Senate to minute incidents,
and to the notes addressed to the Polish Government, cannot
have any other object than that of further inflaming public
opinion."
LON N™EL.
[167]
No. 130
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
30, 1939.
I HAVE pointed out that in the near future we must
expect Germany to begin, … propos of Danzig, one of those
large-scale campaigns, thanks to which she has been able to
lay hands successively on Vienna, Sudetenland, and Prague.
The threat of war, formulated in a more or less veiled or
crude fashion, will still be, in all probability, the weapon
to which the Reich will have recourse to vanquish if
possible outside opposition. But before reaching this point,
the Nazi leaders-who today can well measure their losses in
the international field since March 1W will leave no stone
unturned in order to try to persuade the world of the
justice and purity of their intentions. It is necessary for
us, therefore, to be ready to combat their propaganda and
not to allow their arguments to pass without a reply. We
have only to remember the case of Czechoslovakia to get an
idea of the methods of agitation which the Heads of the
Third Reich will most likely adopt once more.
The German tactics will consist principally, it seems,
in drawing the attention of the world to the fact-not
disputed-that the majority of the population of Danzig is
German in race and language. The Nazis will furthermore
assert that the provocative attitude of the Poles, the
dislike of the Danzig Germans for Poland, and the many
incidents thus rendered inevitable, make the situation
intolerable, and demand that a solution shall be found
without delay. German blood spilt, women ill-treated,
harmless peasants or peaceful city dwellers hunted from
their homes by the hatred for Germany and obliged to seek
refuge in the Reich-nothing will be lacking in the campaign
launched by the German propaganda, nothing will be neglected
so that the Fhrer may, when the time comes, make the very
most of the role which he himself has assumed, that of the
protector of all Germans.
Despite the fact that world opinion is forewarned, we
cannot exclude the possibility that certain elements who
have learnt nothing from the Czech affair, will still allow
themselves to be impressed.
It is essential, therefore, in my opinion, that as the
German Press campaign develops, our newspapers should take
special pains to stress the weaknesses in the German
arguments. I consider that the following points could be
developed with advantage.
Can Germany, which has just brutally incorporated
7,000,000
[168]
Czechs into the Reich, that is to say a whole people, more
numerous than quite a number of other European nations,
possibly advance ethnographic principles to support her
claim for the return of 400,000 Germans to the Reich?
Can Germany, while invoking the principle of Lebensraum
as a justification for the annexation of Bohemia and
Moravia, possibly deny that Danzig and the Corridor are
indispensable to the life of Poland?
Can the leaders of the Reich who, having rejected
historical principles last October, revived them in March to
excuse their seizure of Prague, possibly refuse to recognize
that Danzig and the Corridor have been considerably longer
under Polish than under German rule? (From 968 to 1939,
Pomerania was Polish for six hundred and ninety years and
German for three hundred and sixty-three years only.)
As for the dislike of the Germans in Danzig for the
Poles and the intolerable nature of the situation which
reigns in Danzig, how can such statements be reconciled with
the oft repeated publicly stated affirmation of friendship
for Poland given by the Fhrer himself since 1934 and, in
particular, with his remark on February 20, 1938: "Danzig
has ceased to be one of the danger spots of Europe"?
COULONDRE.
No. 131
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
31, 1939.
A P.A.T. AGENCY bulletin has given a resum‚ of the
letter addressed by the Polish Commissioner-General at
Danzig to the President of the Senate, Herr Greiser, in
reply to the two notes addressed by the latter to the Polish
Government after the Kalthof incident.
According to this resum‚ M. Chodacki states in his
letter that responsibility for the events at Kalthof rests
entirely with the authorities of Danzig, who, despite
repeated representations from the Commissioner-General, had
taken no steps "to prevent the criminal activities of the
disturbers of the peace . . ."
In reply to the Senate's demand for the recall of the
Polish Deputy Commissioner, M. Perkowski, and of two Customs
officials, the Commissioner-General confined himself to
saying that he was unable to discover any lapse on the part
of these officials and that, furthermore,
[169]
"he could not admit the right of the Senate to formulate any
demands in the matter."
The letter ended by declaring that, if the Senate was
really prepared to put an end to the existing tension, the
Polish Government was, for its part, prepared to undertake a
joint examination "of the arrangements that could be made in
order to ensure the possibility of normal activity for
Polish officials in the territory of the Free City, and to
improve the relations between these officials and the
authorities of Danzig."
No comments accompanied this P.A.T. communiqu‚, but one
cannot help being struck by the conciliatory tone of M.
Chodacki's letter. It does its utmost to avoid a
continuation of the discussions started by the Senate on the
prerogatives of the Polish Commissioner-General and his
collaborators. At the same time the Polish Government
implicitly renounces its claim for an indemnity for the
damage done and refrains from speaking of the "new
guarantees" for its officials, and for the Polish population
of Danzig, which had been demanded in a previous letter
immediately after the incident.
LON N™EL.
No. 132
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 1, 1939.
FROM a reliable intermediary, I have received the
following indications, given by a senior official of the
Wilhelmstrasse, on the manner in which the higher
authorities envisage the settlement of the Danzig problem.
I give as "reliable" the information which the official
from whom it was obtained says he checked himself.
"Three possibilities are at present contemplated:
withdrawal on the part of Poland; war; and withdrawal on the
part of Germany.
"(1) The first solution is naturally preferred: it is
one which is reckoned on and which is already being aimed
at. That is the reason why a state of crisis is kept up in
Poland, in order to oblige her to remain mobilized, and to
exhaust progressively her nervous resistance and her
financial resources. It is anticipated that the action
undertaken will produce results in about two months.
"Reliable-German diplomatic representatives abroad have
been in-
[170]
structed to spread the report that France and England will
not fight for the sake of Danzig. I have, myself, noted a
revival of this campaign amongst the members of the
diplomatic corps in Berlin.
"Reliable-Herr Hitler has no illusions on this subject,
for he has in his hands the reports of the competent
Embassies in which it is declared that France and England
will fight without any doubt in support of Poland.
"(2) The higher authorities know, therefore, that if
war broke out with Poland over the question of Danzig, a
general war would result.
"The Fhrer has asked General Keitel, chief of the
General Staff, and General von Brauchitsch, C.-in-C. of the
Army, whether in their opinion, under existing conditions,
an armed conflict would turn in favour of Germany. Both
replied that much depended on whether Russia remained
neutral or not. In the first case General Keitel replied
'Yes' and General von Brauchitsch (whose opinion has greater
value) replied 'probably.' Both declared that, if Germany
had to fight against Russia, she would not have much chance
of winning. Both generals attached considerable importance
to the intervention of Turkey, their opinion being that
Turkey was likely to act in favour of the Western Powers
only if Russia herself join in.
"The prevalent opinion at the Wilhelmstrasse is that,
if Poland does not yield, Herr Hitler's decision will depend
upon the signature of the Anglo-Russian pact. It is believed
that he will risk war if he does not have to fight Russia,
but that if, on the contrary, he knows that he will have to
fight Russia as well, he will give way rather than expose
his country, his party and himself to ruin and defeat.
"Should the Anglo-Russian negotiations be protracted
the possibility of a lightning seizure of Danzig within the
next few weeks is not excluded.
"(3) They are convinced at the Wilhelmstrasse that, in
the mind of the Fhrer, Danzig is a means, but not an end.
They stress the fact that, in his speech of April 28, Herr
Hitler mentioned Alsace with a certain reticence."
The above statements fit in as a whole with the
information that I have already sent to Your Excellency.
They underline at the same time the primary importance that
is attached here to the Anglo-Russian talks and the extreme
urgency of their being brought to a speedy conclusion. They
indicate the middle of August as the culminating point of
the crisis, but they also make clear the very great danger
of the
[171]
period which will elapse before the present negotiations
have been concluded.
My British colleague, who considers as I do, that this
information is very serious, informs me that he has
communicated it to London urging that the conclusion of an
Anglo-Franco-Russian pact be pushed forward as quickly as
possible. I told him that for our part we would leave no
stone unturned to bring about this result with the least
possible delay.
COULONDRE.
No. 133
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 7, 1939.
THE two notes which were handed by the Senate of Danzig
on June 3 to the Polish Commissioner-General and, according
to the Vorposten, constituted "Danzig's last word" on the
Kalthof shooting, are worth particular study. They would
seem, in fact, to give a clearer picture of the tactics
which the Free City means to adopt towards Poland at any
rate for the next few weeks. On the one hand, the idea seems
to be to turn a deaf ear to any proposal for renewing
collaboration, or even easing the existing tension, with
Poland. On the other hand the Free City seems to be planning
to profit by the circumstances in order to proclaim itself
an independent German state; it must, therefore, abolish
progressively all the Polish prerogatives. Thus it is taking
advantage of the Kalthof incident, to quarrel with the
Polish Representatives whom the Senate wishes to reduce to
the level of ordinary diplomatic representatives and with
the Polish Customs inspectors. If Poland should grow weary
of the struggle, they would manage, in course of time, to
obtain recognition by her of the Free City as an independent
German state; and it will be remembered that it was towards
such a solution that M. Beck seemed inclined to turn at the
time when he was on good terms with Berlin. If Poland
resists and conflicts arise, which from a distance appear to
be of quite minor importance, Poland will be accused of
adopting an uncompromising attitude and of wishing to
undermine the essentially German character of Danzig.
We know that, as a result of the Kalthof incident when
the chauffeur of the Polish Deputy Commissioner, M.
Perkowski, fired at a
[172 ]
Marienburg butcher and killed him, the Senate demanded the
"recall" of this official, for abusing his diplomatic
privileges in order to make good the escape of the murderer,
as well as that of two other Customs officials.
In its reply the Polish Government had refused to
recognise the right of the Senate to make any demands, but
at the same time declared itself willing to examine the
arrangements that could be made in order to ensure the
possibility of normal activity for Polish officials on the
territory of the Free City "if the Senate was willing to put
an end to the existing tension."
The last two notes of the Senate had, as their object,
to leave no doubt that it was not in the least prepared to
end the existing tension and still less to assist in
ensuring the possibility of normal activity for the Polish
officials.
The presentation of these notes is in itself eloquent.
According to the official Danzig communiqu‚, they were
addressed by "the Government of Danzig to the diplomatic
Representative of the Polish Republic" and the Polish
Commissioner-General, M. Chodacki, found himself addressed
as "Herr Minister." The first note warns the Polish
Government that "if it maintained its refusal to recall the
three officials mentioned, an order would be given to all
Danzig officials, whether directly dependent on the Senate
or not, to cease for the future all private and official
dealings with them."
The second note protests against the excessive number
of Polish Customs inspectors, which was "contrary to treaty
stipulations"; and notifies the Polish Representative that
in future the Customs officials would be obliged to take an
oath of allegiance to the authorities of the Free City.
The Polish Press, which had received orders not to lay
stress on the question, published only a brief report in
which the reply of the Senate was reduced to the proportions
of a purely local event upon which it was not necessary to
dwell. The few newspapers which brought the matter up again,
only did so in order to ridicule the Senate's claims. The
I.K.C., for example, called Herr Greiser the "Burgomaster of
the town of Gdansk." The Kurjer Warszawski was rather
sarcastic about the senators who "in asking for a reduction
in the number of Polish Customs officials revealed their
ignorance of the statutes of their own city."
The remarks made by Herr Forster on Sunday last, June
4, at the festival of the Danzig Labour Service, with the
agreement of Reichsar-
[173]
beitsfhrer Hierl, seem to confirm the impression that the
Free City is at present determined to carry on a policy of
resistance and systematic sabotage of Polish rights. The
Gauleiter compared the "unbridled fury" and the "hysteria"
of the Poles with the calm of Danzig. "For us, Danzigers,"
he said, "we must not allow ourselves to lose our tempers-we
leave that to our neighbours-we have only to wait, trusting
in the Fhrer. We have held out for peace, we can hold out a
little longer. The Fhrer wants a strong Danzig. Four
hundred thousand people of Danzig are waiting, resolute, at
the mouth of the Vistula, and look to no one but him."
LON N™EL.
No. 134
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 11, 1939.
THE force of 6,000 S.A. now circulating in Danzig,
"with their packs on their backs, with entrenching tools and
armed with carbines" which according to the Vorposten gives
the town "almost the appearance of a mobilized city," have
now been joined, the Nazi journal informs us, by "motor-cars
and motor-cycles of the Reichswehr, manned by German
soldiers." The newspaper which is supposed to reflect the
views of the Senate affirms that there is nothing
sensational in this and that it is only a question of a
simple military tournament amongst the S.A., "in which units
of the standing Army are taking part."
It is stated, furthermore, in National-Socialist
circles in the Free City, that these military motor-cars and
motor-cycles have merely brought from East Prussia officers
accompanied by their orderlies and chauffeurs, who have come
to take part in the festivities.
These army vehicles, as far as can be gathered, are
about thirty in number and will take part in a rally to be
held round the outer edge of the Free City.
Neither the gathering of the S.A. nor the presence
amongst them of the German regulars seems to disturb the
Polish authorities who reckon that they will leave Danzig
the way they came.
The intention of the German leaders to "nibble" at the
statute of Danzig is none the less evidenced anew by these
facts.
Such were the tactics formerly applied by Germany in
the occupied Rhineland, but there they were confronted by a
system of administra-
[174]
tion which it was easier to defend; all the circumstances
(ceremonies, strikes, catastrophes) were utilized by the
authorities of the Reich to try to introduce uniforms into
the demilitarized zone.
LON N™EL.
No. 135
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 13, 1939.
A PERSON in close touch with this Embassy has just
gathered together the following observations from someone in
Herr von Ribbentrop's immediate entourage.
Beneath the apparent calm which at the moment prevails
in Berlin and astonishes some people and worries others,
they are feverishly at work at the Wilhelmstrasse.
Preparations are being made to face all manner of
eventualities, but before directing his foreign policy into
any one definite channel, Herr von Ribbentrop is awaiting
the outcome of the talks between the Western Powers and
Russia. The Danzig question is, in his eyes, only a detail
which in itself does not interest him. For him it is the
whole Polish question which is at stake. This problem could
be settled:
Either by an arrangement with England and France, as
was the Czechoslovak problem,
Or by an arrangement with Poland itself,
Or by an arrangement with Russia.
The first solution is ruled out by the attitude adopted
by France and England since March 15.
The second has met with the rigid resistance from
Poland, backed by the British guarantee. There is now no
longer much hope of its being realized, for the so-called
negotiations in progress between Warsaw and Berlin only deal
with technical details and do not touch on the conflict of
principle.
There remains, therefore, the third solution, namely
the destruction of the Polish State by partition between the
Reich and Russia.
Herr von Ribbentrop has not given up this idea. He will
not abandon it until the Anglo-Russian pact is signed. Until
then he reserves all decisions, while continuing to show
every consideration to the Soviets.
The return of the "Condor" Legion should normally have
been an
[175]
occasion for diatribes against Bolshevism. Herr von
Ribbentrop saw to it that none of the speeches contained
anything likely to offend Russia. The Fhrer himself, when
addressing the "Condor" Legion never uttered the word
"Bolshevism" or "Communism." It was against the
"Democracies," the "warmongers and war profiteers," the
promoters of "encirclement," that his thunderbolts were
directed. The reserve that he observed with regard to Russia
was evidently not due to chance. It was due to the influence
of Herr von Ribbentrop who still has hopes of winning over
the Russians, or at any rate of seeing them remain outside
the bloc constituted under the aegis of France and England.
These considerations, which bear out information I have
already communicated to Your Excellency, seem clearly to
reflect certain designs of Herr von Ribbentrop and the
National-Socialist Government with regard to Poland and
Russia. One could imagine perhaps that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich is himself the originator of
these "confidences." Yet it is difficult to conceive how it
would be to his interest to spread news which would incite
the Western Powers to speed up the negotiations whose
conclusion seems to be so much feared in Berlin. On the
other hand, Your Excellency is aware that similar
information reached me from Field Marshal Goering as well as
from other sources.
The manoeuvre which the advocates of collaboration with
Moscow hope to bring off, evidently consists of a repetition
to the detriment of Poland and with the aid of Russia, of
the device already employed so successfully against
Czechoslovakia.
COULONDRE.
No. 136
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
June 14, 1939.
SINCE June 10, the date of the departure of the
President of the Senate, who will be away about eight weeks,
the situation has perceptibly deteriorated.
An anti-Polish campaign of unheard-of violence and
vulgarity is being carried on by the two daily papers, who
charge the Polish Customs officials with the most unlikely
offences. The reduction of their number, which is not
limited by any agreement, is also de-
[176]
manded. It would seem that these officials exercise an
effective control and have been taking steps to prevent the
smuggling in of firearms, especially since the March crisis.
The Press wishes perhaps to point out to the large numbers
of visitors who have come from the Reich for the Cultural
Congress and the exercises of the S.A., how intolerable life
is for the German population of the Free City. A state of
great excitement has been noted amongst the local militia.
Business circles, however, seem to think that, as a
result of Polish concessions, tension will diminish in the
course of the next few weeks.
LA
TOURNELLE.
No. 137
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
June 16, 1939.
IN the Danzig-Polish dispute, the National-Socialist
party is stressing the question of the Polish Customs
inspectors, that is to say, they are giving indications as
to just where the shoe pinches them. As I pointed out in a
previous dispatch it is reported that a considerable number
of firearms were being smuggled into the territory of the
Free City in February and March. It appears that, since that
time, this contraband has ceased and that the inspectors,
doubtless backed up by their Government, have been showing
more zeal in the performance of their duties. Although
articles 200 and 201 of the Danzig-Polish treaty of October
24, 1921, which prescribe for their conditions of service,
does not fix a limit to their number, the Senate, with a
dogged perseverance, sends note after note protesting
against their increase and denying them the right to
exercise any authority outside the Customs offices, that is
to say, for instance, to control the vehicles passing in
front of the said offices.
The local Press accuses them of being agents of the
Frontier Guards service, carrying on espionage work, and not
officials of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time it
attempts to back up its attacks by transforming the
slightest incidents into fantastic tales. For instance, two
inspectors, who on May 25 took a look at the building of a
landing-stage for the ferry boat over the Vistula, were
abused most violently by the two dailies on June 7.
On June 12, after a night spent in drinking together,
an inspector and two S.A. came to blows; immediately the
inspector was accused
[177]
of having tried to get the S.A. men drunk in order to kidnap
them and get them into Poland. He was arrested, and brutally
knocked about, and, up to date, permission has not been
given for him to be visited in prison by subordinates of the
Polish Commissioner-General.
However, attacks and accusations have not weakened the
Warsaw Government; on the contrary they have just increased
the number of the inspectors, whose task is becoming more
and more difficult, from 90 to 120. On the 10th the Polish
Representative in the Free City handed a note to the Senate
denying it the right to meddle with the questions of Customs
and threatening a further increase in the numbers of the
inspectors if their activity was further interfered with, or
if the Danzig Customs officials were forced into taking the
oath of allegiance to the National-Socialist party. The text
of the note also hinted that, if need be, economic reprisals
would be taken against the Free City.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 138
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 20, 1939.
ALTHOUGH the two speeches of Dr. Goebbels at Danzig
have not introduced any new factor into the Polish-German
problem, they were, if one can follow the intentions of the
German propaganda, intended to mark a date, and an epoch in
its evolution. After the warning shot of April 28, we have,
as it were, the beginning of the heavy artillery preparation
designed to intimidate the enemy and disorganize his
countermeasures. The circumstances, the violence of their
tone, the obvious wish to work up chauvinistic passions in
the Free City to their maximum, all give added significance
to the words of the Minister of Propaganda.
From this point of view last Saturday's is the more
interesting of the two speeches. The speaker, it is
reported, spoke extempore. The warm welcome of the crowd
seems to have made him improvise declarations thrilling with
enthusiasm from the dress-circle in the theatre from which
he had just watched a gala performance. But it is, in point
of fact, sufficient to read the text of the speech to see
that its terms had been most carefully weighed.
[178]
Without discussing the speech as a whole, four
essential points may be singled out as essential:
(1) Dr. Goebbels reasserted the German character of the
Free City, which no one attempts to deny. The visit of the
Fhrer's representative to Danzig is in itself proof that
the population is perfectly at liberty to proclaim its
attachment to the German "Volkstum."
(2) With regard to the international aspects of the
problem the speaker claimed that its present development
could in no way be ascribed to the people of Danzig, who had
only one desire, namely to belong to the Greater German
Reich. This wish was "understandable, clear, definite and
unshakable." "It is your misfortune," he added "that your
lovely German city should be situated at the mouth of the
Vistula. According to the theories of Warsaw, cities at the
mouths of rivers always belong to the country through whose
territory the rivers flow. Rotterdam, therefore, belongs to
Germany since this port is at the mouth of the Rhine and the
Rhine is a German river."
(3) The Minister of Propaganda made a violent attack on
Polish and British policies.
"The Polish bullies," he said, "are now claiming East
Prussia and German Silesia. According to them the west
Polish frontier should be the Oder. Why not claim the Elbe
or the Rhine? There they would meet their new allies the
English, whose frontier, as we all know, is the Rhine." The
Polish chauvinists are often speaking of a great battle that
will take place outside Berlin. These boastings are the
result of the fact that Polish policy is now passing through
its "age of puberty." We must wait until this disorder
disappears of itself.
As to England, Dr. Goebbels cannot reconcile the
statement made by Lord Halifax before the House of Lords
that he wished to see a peaceful settlement of the Danzig
question, and the fact that the British Government had
"drawn a blank cheque in favour of Warsaw." Great Britain
was endeavouring to encircle Germany and Italy and so
"reviving her 1914 policy." But National-Socialist Germany
was far from being the feeble bourgeois Germany of former
times.
"Therefore," said Dr. Goebbels, "we consider the
oratory of Warsaw and London as so much bluster intended to
hide under its volume of words, its deficiencies in strength
and determination."
(4) At the end of his speech the Head of the Nazi
Propaganda let fall a more definite threat. Yet this threat
was scarcely more open than that made by the Chancellor
himself on April 28.
"Our wish in the Reich," he cried out, "is as clear as
your own,
[179]
wish; the Fhrer made this quite plain in his last speech to
the Reichstag when he said 'Danzig is a German city and
wishes once more to be part of Germany.' The world must have
understood these words. It should realise too, from past
experiences, that the Fhrer's words are not platonic. It
will, in any case, be making a grave error if it imagines
that Adolf Hitler withdraws before menaces, or gives in to
blackmail. There can be no question of it."
From the political point of view, Sunday's speech,
which was almost entirely devoted to a eulogy of National-
Socialist culture, was not so interesting. Dr. Goebbels was
content with saying "political" frontiers were of limited
duration, but that frontiers traced by language, race and
blood were unchangeable and eternal.
So this strange "cultural" week will have served to
underline the will of the Reich to regain Danzig. The German
Press proclaims it. The Montag writes that "the plebiscite
has been held," Danzig has spoken. Danzig has made its
choice. And the Volkischer Beobachter says that the word of
the Fhrer, given two months ago, will be kept. "Today," it
writes, "the people of Danzig know that, in no circumstances
will they be left alone and that they will come into their
own, come what may. Such is the historic significance of
June 17, 1939.
"
Under what form and when will the Fhrer attempt to
carry out his project? No one knows, and he himself is in
all probability waiting for the opportune moment. But it
would seem that, for the time being, the Nazi authorities do
not contemplate immediate action. That is, as I have pointed
out elsewhere, the conclusion to be gathered from the words
of Herr von Weizs„cker, which confirm those of his
conversation with Herr Burckhardt.
As far as one can gather, in Herr Hitler's eyes the
affair is not yet ripe. He wishes to await, before acting,
the development in one way or the other, of the Anglo-Franco-
Russian negotiations (for in Berlin there is still the hope
that these negotiations may break down). He also wants to
await the evolution of the Anglo-Japanese conflict. During
this respite that he has given himself and which will last,
from what I can gather, for about two or three months, he
will redouble his efforts in the sphere of propaganda
supporting them probably with intimidatory measures of a
military nature. It is apparently with the latter object in
view that work is being intensified on the fortification of
the German-Polish frontier in Slovakia, and on the Siegfried
Line. It goes without saying that in this juncture the
"bunkers" in the East will not play a purely defensive role.
[180]
One cannot fail to notice-and I have confirmation of
the fact from various quarters-that the radical elements of
the regime seem, for the moment, to have increased their
influence on the mind of the Chancellor. The delay in the
Moscow conversations, the Tientsin incident which confronts
Great Britain with a formidable dilemma, perhaps certain
statements made in London which have been interpreted as a
sign of hesitation, have encouraged them and increased their
confidence. Under their influence German policy is on the
watch for any possible developments and is taking soundings
in all directions, even as far off as Arabia and at the
court of Ibn Saud.
However, pending further information, nothing justifies
the belief that the Fhrer will risk a general war for the
sake of Danzig. Danzig has no doubt great strategic value
for the development of the policy of the Third Reich. But
the Nazi authorities will exhaust all means of turning the
position before contemplating a frontal attack, that is to
say starting a war with Poland, which would mean, in turn, a
European war. I have been told that several of Herr Hitler's
advisers keep on repeating that, even in the event of a
general conflict, Germany will win. Herr Hitler is said to
be not so sure, and quite apart from his horror of war which
one can take as genuine, he has never up till now undertaken
any move which was not certain of success.
Things would be different if some particularly
favourable circumstance presented itself. In Berlin in such
a case prudence would be thrown to the wind in order to
stake all on the last throw of the dice, "come what may," as
the Volkischer Beobachter has put it.
COULONDRE.
No. 139
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 20, 1939.
I HAD an interview on June 16 with the State Secretary
at the very beginning of which he volunteered the opinion
that, as far as he knew, all was quiet for the moment and
that he saw no reason why the situation should become more
strained in the near future. He repeated with special
reference to Danzig, that, in his opinion, only acts of
aggression on the part of the Poles could bring about a
conflict. As I showed some skepticism he declared that,
although the central Government of Warsaw exercised a
moderating influence, a state of mind
[181]
existed among certain local authorities which made him
seriously afraid of rash action on their part. Herr von
Weizs„cker was none the less confident with regard to the
immediate future and told me that he intended to take a
holiday during the month of July.
If the State Secretary had not obtained this
information from a reliable source, it may be doubted
whether, prudent and reserved man as he is, he would have
offered it to me on his own initiative. From this
declaration made to me, therefore, on the eve of the
"Kulturtag" of Danzig, one may at least infer that no
immediate action on the part of the Reich is likely to
follow on Dr. Goebbels's speeches.
Speaking generally, Herr von Weizs„cker considered that
the opening of conversations likely to bring about an easing
of the political tension would not be in any way aided by
the conclusion of a Franco-Anglo-Russian pact. To threaten-
the democracies should persuade themselves once and for all-
was the worst possible way of dealing with the Fhrer. I
pointed out that up till then only the reverse situation had
been seen. Such methods had never been considered either in
Paris or London, where it was fully realized that they had
no effect on Herr Hitler. The cause of peace would have made
great progress if Berlin became convinced that they had
equally little chance of success with the Democracies.
COULONDRE.
No. 140
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 20, 1939.
WHEN the moment arrives Chancellor Hitler will settle
the Danzig question as he pleases and on his own
responsibility, such is the view expressed and circulated by
the German Ambassador in Warsaw and his collaborators.
But they are also now enlarging the scope of their
propaganda. They are speaking not only of Danzig, but now
insist on every occasion on the impossibility of Germany
allowing the Corridor to continue any longer in existence.
The necessity for Germany to recover Upper Silesia is
also mentioned by some of them.
LON N™EL.
[182]
No. 141
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 21, 1939.
THE innumerable comments, to which the question of
Danzig an the Corridor give rise, contain so many
inaccuracies regarding Poland attitude, that I feel it
necessary to define that attitude once more.
(1) Poland has always shown herself willing, since the
beginning of last winter, to give up the right to represent
the Free City vis-…-vis foreign powers, and at the same time
to agree to the abolition of the office of High Commissioner
of the League of Nations, and to complete independence of
the Free City from Geneva. Poland would not, in principle,
oppose certain modifications of the constitution of the
City, which would be only of minor importance to Poland
because they would not compromise vital Polish interests
(Customs control transit facilities). Polish opposition is
directed above all against a annexation by the Reich, which
would, it is considered, invalidate a real guarantees
relating to the utilization of the Vistula and the port of
Danzig, and constitute such a menace to the Corridor that it
would run the risk of being taken at any moment.
(2) Poland is now, as previously, prepared to
facilitate German rail and road communications between East
Prussia and the rest the Reich by building, if necessary, at
her own cost, a motor-road the use of which by Germans would
involve neither Customs control, no a passport or pass. In
this respect the intransigency of the Polish Government only
applies to its absolute refusal to concede the principle of
extra-territoriality for one or more roads across the
Corridor.
LON N™EL.
No. 142
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 22, 1939.
THREE months have now elapsed since Germany made known
her demands to Poland, and for that time Poland has not
ceased to be in a state of alarm. At the beginning of this
period, one could wonder whether, in the circumstances,
Polish opinion would be able to retain its composure without
losing its resolution.
[183]
The ordeal has shown the Poles in a very favourable
light. Their determination to resist has not flinched, they
remain ready to face anything. At the same time, even if one
often hears the opinion expressed, especially amongst the
masses and the Army that "they must put a stop to the
present state of affairs and fight"; the nation has shown a
remarkable sang-froid and obeys its authorities quite
docilely when they advise it to show prudence and
moderation.
The Government is doing its utmost to prepare the
defences of the country. Important results seem to have been
obtained in the last three months. Without departing one
whit from the attitude they have adopted towards Germany
they are doing everything possible to gain time and postpone
the conflict even though the majority do not believe that it
can be avoided indefinitely.
LON N™EL.
No. 143
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 22, 1939.
THE situation is still confused in Berlin. If Dr.
Goebbels's speeches have shown the stiffening attitude of
the Reich on the Danzig question, they have not disclosed
Herr Hitler's intentions; the question must be settled, but
when and how? Probably no one knows except the Fhrer; it is
not certain whether even he has made up his mind.
Diplomatic circles are pessimistic. The events in the
Far East and the difficulties of the negotiations with
Moscow contribute to this feeling. It is considered, above
all, that the manifestations of June 17 and 18 have given
proof of the Fhrer's will to go ahead; that they have
committed him before international opinion; and as, on the
other hand, the Polish will to resist seems strong, it is
not clear how any solution can be found to the crisis but
war.
Two points are more or less unanimously taken for
granted here: (a) A crisis over Danzig is inevitable before
the end of the year; (b) Danzig is not for Herr Hitler an
end in itself. He has other objectives in Poland, namely the
Corridor and Silesia. If any doubts may have existed on this
subject, Dr. Goebbels took it upon himself to remove them
last night, when he declared at the festival of the summer
solstice that "Germany intends to take back all the
territory which has belonged to her in the course of
history." [1]
[1] This phrase did not appear in the German Press.
[184]
The majority of the diplomats accredited to Berlin are
searching for a compromise solution, and growing uneasy at
their inability to find one. They shut themselves up thus in
a sort of contradiction, for, if one admits the limitless
character of the German claims, and they do admit it, there
is no hope for the moment of ending the situation by
settling the Danzig question, and thus no advantage in
compromising themselves over it. There are, on the other
hand, some major disadvantages.
Herr Hitler has definitely committed himself over the
Danzig question, but he has not yet burnt his boats as he
did with regard to Czechoslovakia. He will not burn them
unless he definitely decides to go to the length of war,
except in the event of his convincing himself that he can
force the enemy position simply by means of threats and
intimidation. That is why I am convinced that it is
important today, even more than before, to abstain from
taking the initiative, or adopting any attitude which could
be interpreted here as a weakening of the Allied
determination to oppose force by force. It seems to me
nearly certain that we shall not be able to avoid a
formidable increase of tension in the situation this autumn.
Perhaps, however, if there is no giving way, on the part of
the peace front, we shall see no repetition of the ultimatum
of September 1938. What we must at any cost eliminate this
time is the risk of war developing out of a threat of
intimidation.
According to my latest information this risk still
exists. Is the information supplied by German agents abroad
regarding the will to resist of the Allies less definite
than it was before? I cannot say, but I have heard from a
good source that Herr von Ribbentrop is once more convinced
that at the present juncture Great Britain will not fight
over Danzig. I know, on the other hand, that Field-Marshal
Goering is very worried by the consequences of an
uncompromising policy and would like to see the Fhrer play
for time. It is impossible to foresee which of these two
ideas will prevail, especially as the National-Socialist
authorities, acting evidently upon "orders," are keeping a
discreet silence in their dealings with the diplomats. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to be still very much in
favour with Herr Hitler; on the other hand Field-Marshal
Goering's credit with the Fhrer is reported to have gone
up.
COULONDRE.
[185]
NO. 144
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
June 23, 1939.
THE publicity given abroad to Dr. Goebbels's speech
made here on June 17 seems to have astonished the people of
Danzig.
In former years similar sarcasm and violence had been
leveled at the heads of the German opposition parties, and
the League of Nations, to which the latter could appeal, and
then against the Jews; no one doubted that the Poles' time
would come once the others had been eliminated. If, by his
language, the Minister of Propaganda of the Reich gave the
impression abroad that he was bringing a new element into
the situation, his words have not surprised the population
in the least; it had often heard similar phrases during the
course of private meetings of the National-Socialist party.
There are a great many who regret giving the impression that
they had assented to a revision of the Danzig statute during
the course of a demonstration, supposedly spontaneous, but
in which the majority of the demonstrators were present by
order.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 145
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 27, 1939.
As I have previously pointed out, diplomatic circles in
Berlin are somewhat pessimistic about the development of the
international situation from the month of August onwards.
It is possible that the approach of the period when the
crisis of 1938 broke out has something to do with this state
of mind. It is also likely that most of the heads of the
diplomatic missions have received information similar to
that which has reached this Embassy. This may be classified
under three headings:
(1) Activity within the German Army. The number of
reservists called up is estimated, by our Military Attach‚,
very roughly at 600,000 and shows a tendency to increase.
Maneuvers are in progress in the fortified zone of the West.
(2) Military measures in Italy and Bulgaria. Large-
scale maneuvers involving considerable bodies of troops are
planned in Italy for the
[186]
month of August. The Bulgarian Army is expected to mobilize
two classes at the same time.
(3) Various indications: advice given by high German
officials to foreign families not to remain in Germany
during August; the general time-limit set for the validity
of the passports of the male population; information to the
effect that the Reichswehr has been instructed to hold
itself in readiness for August 15.
It is a noteworthy fact that, whereas a rather marked
anxiety is beginning to arise among the middle classes,
Germans in influential circles seem rather optimistic and
are obviously trying to reassure foreigners whom they meet.
One sentence struck me particularly in a statement made
to one of my colleagues by one of the best-informed
personages in the party. "In the event of Danzig proclaiming
its return to the Reich," he said, "war would break out only
if we were compelled to defend ourselves against
aggression." This passage reminded me of certain words
spoken by the State Secretary in the course of my last
interview with him. After telling me that in his opinion no
tension was to be foreseen in the near future, he added: "We
have no intention of attacking Poland." When I pointed out
to him that in this case no conflict was to be feared, since
Poland was not going to attack Germany, he replied that
serious incidents might occur, and quoted, as an example,
the possible murder of a German consul. In the farewell
audience which he granted to the Argentine Ambassador on
June 26, Herr Hitler also told him more or less plainly that
he had no intention of attacking Poland.
Even if one admits that these various pointers express
the real intentions of the German Government, one may ask
how far they are reassuring. They may suggest that the Reich
is prepared to temporize, but they may also be a preparation
of the ground for an annexation of Danzig conducted from
within the city.
One may suppose that, among the various plans
considered by the Nazi leaders for imposing their own
solution of the problem of the Free City, the idea of
stirring up a "spontaneous" movement and inducing the Danzig
population itself to proclaim its return to the Reich, is
particularly engaging their attention.
In this event the plan of action would probably be as
follows: At a moment chosen by the Fhrer, the National-
Socialists of Danzig would proclaim the return of the city
to the Reich. With their own resources, and without calling
upon German troops, they would cut
[187]
off the little Polish garrison of the Westerplatte, together
with the Polish Customs officials, and await Warsaw's
reaction. The Polish Government would then have no other
course than to occupy the city by force in order to re-
establish the status quo, which would serve as a pretext for
the launching of German military action.
The object of such a maneuver is obvious. "If the Poles
undertook the forcible suppression of a 'people's'
movement," a notability of the regime recently said to one
of my colleagues, "it would be they who would be the
aggressors. They would be taking the initiative in violence.
In such a case, would Great Britain and France be justified
in attacking us?"
It is thus calculated in Berlin that, when the right
time comes, it would be possible for German propaganda to
trouble the waters and create confusion, at least in the
public opinion of neutral countries. Ever since the Austrian
and Sudeten affairs for that matter, Nazi policy has shown
itself a past-master in the art of fomenting internal crises
and profiting by them.
Such a conjecture makes it possible to reconcile the
assurances given in various quarters that Germany "will not
attack" with the indication of approaching tension gathered
elsewhere. The latest information received from our consul
in Danzig seems to show that this plan has already been set
in motion, at least in its early phase. The Reich's
preparations in the Free City are being rapidly intensified,
and Herr Himmler is said to have arrived incognito in order
to inspect their progress. Everything that is happening
suggests that the Nazi Government wishes the armed forces in
the city to be so strong that, when the appointed time
arrives, the Fhrer may be able to take possession of it
without any need either for a Putsch by the Party or for the
dispatch of German troops.
The Warsaw Government has doubtless taken such a
possibility into account, and I know that it has been
considered by the staff of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
German policy, therefore, cannot reasonably count upon
taking the other side by surprise or confusing the question
ad libitum by playing upon the word "aggressor." Moreover,
the declaration read in the House of Commons by Mr.
Chamberlain on March 31 on behalf of the British and French
Governments, and the statement made by the President of the
Council on April 13 are sufficiently explicit to convince
the National-Socialist leaders that any act which infringed
Poland's vital interests would entitle it to ask for the
immediate support of France and Great Britain.
[188]
Nevertheless, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on
this subject, one may ask whether it is not high time to
speak plainly and frustrate this possible maneuver by
dispelling any illusions which may still be held in Berlin.
If Your Excellency agrees, it would be desirable to specify,
for the benefit of the responsible leaders of German policy
and within the framework of the Franco-British declaration,
that any forcible action undertaken within the Free City
contrary to the statute -i.e., action which, in view of the
allegiance of the National-Socialists of Danzig to the Nazi
party, could only be provoked and promoted by the Reich-and
which Poland should feel bound to resist, would
automatically lead to assistance being rendered by France
and Great Britain. Such useful specific information might be
given at the earliest opportunity by Paris and London. This
would bring about the collapse of the elaborate presence
which the German leaders seem to be so industriously
building up.
In any case, in the absence of further information it
does not appear that any German action in this direction is
imminent. At the Polish Embassy, where calm and resolution
still prevail, it is considered that the alarmist rumours
about German troop movements towards the Polish frontier (it
was reported this morning that the Marshal Goering Regiment
had left Berlin for Pillau, but this rumour is unconfirmed)
might well come from German sources. According to this
interpretation, National-Socialist agencies are seeking in
this way to foster confusion by spreading false news in the
hope of masking in advance any real military movements when
they take place.
In periods of fermentation, the policy of the Hitler
Government usually surrounds itself with a smoke-screen. We
can only stand to gain by making this maneuver ineffective
through being on our guard against any surprise.
COULONDRE.
No. 146
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
June 27, 1939.
IN his latest telegrams, M. de la Tournelle seems to me
to present a very accurate idea of the situation in Danzig
and its probable development.
According to him, in order to reach his goal, Herr
Hitler, after hav-
[189]
ing progressively destroyed the Danzig constitution and
brought the population to heel, will have very little
distance left to go.
It certainly seems that, after failing in March to
induce Poland to accept the annexation of Danzig by the
Reich, he made up his mind to round off his work in this
direction by militarizing the Free City. In order to
complete its assimilation with "the rest of Germany," visits
by soldiers, sailors and National-Socialist militia from the
Reich follow one another in increasing numbers. Danzig's
military forces may become strong enough to constitute, in
themselves, a serious menace to the Polish Corridor, when
the "Free Corps" which is now being talked about has been
created. If Poland should one day feel bound to react
against this menace and against these successive
encroachments, German propaganda will not fail to represent
its attitude as provocative and brand it as aggression.
The German game is arousing great anxiety among the
Poles, who see it for what it is.
LON N™EL.
No. 147
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London.
Paris, June
29, 1939.
IN a telegram sent en clair by messenger, which I am
communicating to you by air, M. Coulondre indicates that the
latest news received from Danzig supports the view that the
Reich is preparing the ground for a coup for the annexation
of the Free City conducted from within, the Danzig Senate
and population themselves proclaiming their return to the
Reich. In this event the Polish Government would have no
alternative but to occupy the city, by way of the harbour,
in order to re-establish the status quo. Germany would
represent itself as "attacked" and would exploit this
equivocation by playing upon the word "aggression" in an
attempt to confuse foreign public opinion and paralyze the
reactions of the Governments of France and Great Britain.
Our Ambassador informs me this morning that the Reich's
military preparations in the Free City appear to be
advancing more rapidly, and it seems to him to be essential,
in order to frustrate this maneuver, to take steps
beforehand and warn the Reich of the consequences which its
attitude would inevitably entail.
[190]
I fully share the feeling expressed by M. Coulondre,
and it seems to me most desirable that Lord Halifax, in the
speech which he is to make this evening, should take the
opportunity to give the rulers of the Reich a plain
intimation of the common determination of the two
Governments to fulfill the obligations of assistance which
they have assumed towards Poland, no matter what devious
means Germany might bring into play in order to create
ambiguity about the real character of her action. You should
approach the Principal Secretary of State with this object
in view.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 148
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
June 30, 1939.
THE State Secretary was good enough to ask me to call
upon him today, in order to convey to me an expression of
regret on the part of Herr von Ribbentrop, whom I had asked
for an interview and who is at the moment unwell, and his
hope that he will be able to see me next week.
When I drew Herr von Weizs„cker's attention to the
pessimism of the Diplomatic Corps, he once more told me that
he found it difficult to understand the reason for it. To be
sure the negotiations of France and Great Britain with
Russia, and the agreement with Turkey, gave no great
pleasure to Berlin, and in his opinion did not make it any
easier to reach peaceful solutions; without underrating the
difficulties of the situation he could see no ground for
being particularly anxious.
I then spoke to him about Danzig and Poland, and
emphasized the disquiet which I felt over information
pointing to an increase of military activity in the Free
City. "I recollect," I added, "that sometimes people still
say in Germany that we are not going to fight for the sake
of Danzig. I hope that your Government will be under no
misapprehension in this respect. Danzig is a matter between
Poland and you; but, whether it has to do with Danzig or
not, we shall stand beside Poland if a conflict breaks out."
The State Secretary's reply was, in substance, as
follows: "The question whether such a conflict should break
out in connection with Danzig is, I fully recognize, a
secondary one. We have no doubts
[191]
about your alliance coming into play. France has long had
alliances in the East. But we find it hard to understand
that Great Britain should have delegated to a Continental
country the responsibility of deciding whether she should go
to war. It must have been the pressure of the Left-Wing
Opposition which caused Mr. Chamberlain to give way.
"So far as Danzig is concerned, plenty of fantastic
rumours are in circulation. It is even said that the Fhrer
is to be solemnly granted the freedom of the city on July
15. The police of the city, it is true, have recently been
reinforced. The population are in the state of excitement
that might be expected in the people of a town upon which
the spotlights of the whole world are concentrated. Still, I
do not see that any startling coup is to be feared. There is
obviously a state of tension which could not continue over a
period of years; but at present I still think that only
incidents could provoke a conflict. They would need, for
that matter, to be more serious than those about which we
have so far had occasion to complain. The Polish provincial
authorities continue to display frequent symptoms of great
excitability. Recently, after Mass, a general made a speech
in which he advocated an extension of Poland's sphere on the
Baltic. But I am bound to recognise that the Central
Government show more calm and greater moderation. I have
even fancied that I could discern some indications of a
desire on the part of M. Beck to seek a basis for a solution
of our difficulties."
I observed to Herr von Weizs„cker that I was much
interested by this last remark of his, and asked him whether
he would authorize me to make use of it. He replied in the
affirmative, at the same time desiring me to emphasize the
fact that as yet it was a question only of very slight
indications, and that this was his personal opinion.
Needless to say, I stressed the absolute solidarity
between France and Great Britain in case of a conflict. It
is nevertheless important to note that, in a more or less
covert form, people here still attempt with regard to a
Polish-German conflict, to draw a distinction between Great
Britain's attitude and our own.
COULONDRE.
[192]
PREFACE
Germany's Word of Honour
(July 11, 1936-September 26, 1938)
I
(July 11, 1936-March 12, 1938)
No. 1
Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936
BEING convinced that they are making a valuable
contribution towards the whole European development in the
direction of maintaining peace, and in the belief that they
are thereby best serving the manifold mutual interests of
both German States, the Governments of the Federal State of
Austria and of Germany have resolved to return to relations
of a normal and friendly character. In this connexion it is
declared-
(1) The German Government recognizes the full
sovereignty of the Federate State of Austria in the spirit
of the pronouncements of the German Fhrer and Chancellor of
May 21, 1935.
(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner
political order (including the question of Austrian National-
Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal
concern of that country, upon which it will exercise neither
direct nor indirect influence.
(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly
follow in its policy in general, and in particular towards
Germany, a line in conformity with leading principles
corresponding to the fact that Austria
By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934
and their additions of 1936, nor the relationship of Austria
to Italy and Hungary as partners in these protocols, are
affected. Considering that the d‚tente desired by both sides
cannot become a reality unless certain preliminary
[1]
conditions are fulfilled by the Governments of both
countries, the Austrian Federal Government and the German
Government will pass a number of special measures to bring
about the requisite preliminary state of affairs.
No. 2
M. PUAUX, French Minister in Vienna,
to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Vienna,
March 12, 1938.
THIS morning German troops crossed the frontier at
Bregenz, Innsbruck, Kufstein, Braunau and Salzburg. In the
latter town the German authorities have put under guard the
Prince-Bishop, the Governor, and several prominent Catholic
personalities.
Seventy aeroplanes have landed a battalion of the
Wehrmacht at the Aspern aerodrome in Vienna.
Officers of the Wehrmacht, the S.A. and the S.S.
arrived in Vienna during the night. German air squadrons are
maneuvering above the city.
PUAUX.
II
(March 12_15, 1938)
No. 3
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 12, 1938.
FIELD MARSHAL GOERING, during a reception he gave last
night, had a conversation with the Czechoslovak Minister. He
gave assurances that Germany had no evil intentions whatever
towards Czechoslovakia and that the latter State had
therefore nothing to fear from the Reich, and he gave his
word of honour to that effect. He then gave expression to
the hope that Czechoslovakia would not mobilize.
Returning to his legation, M. Mastny informed Prague by
telephone of Field-Marshal Goering's communication. He then
returned to the reception and informed the Minister-
President that, after having established contact with his
Government, he was in a position to assure him that
Czechoslovakia would not mobilize. Field-Marshal Goering
[2]
then repeated what he had said before, adding that he was
not only speaking for himself, but in the name of the
Fhrer, who, having absented himself from Berlin for a time,
had placed all powers in his hands.
This morning, towards midday, Field-Marshal Goering
called M. Mastny on the telephone. He informed him that the
German troops had received orders to remain at 15 kilometres
from the Czechoslovak frontier. M. Mastny replied that he
took note of this, but that his Government felt it
indispensable to take certain police measures on the
frontiers of his country. Field-Marshal Goering replied that
he had no objection to this.
The Czechoslovak Minister was again summoned yesterday
at 5.30 p.m., by Baron von Neurath.
No doubt the conversation between M. Mastny and Field-
Marshal Goering, which betrays Germany's anxiety lest her
action should bring about the danger of a European war, has
not been considered sufficient.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET
No. 4
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 12, 1938.
BARON VON NEURATH merely repeated to the Czechoslovak
Minister, on behalf of the Fhrer, the pacifying assurances
already given by Field-Marshal Goering.
The Czechoslovak Minister took the opportunity to
declare that his country would remain perfectly calm,
assured as it was of the loyalty of its Allies and of their
support, should occasion arise.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET
No. 5
M. V. DELACROIX, French Minister in Prague,
to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Prague,
March 12, 1938.
GERMANY'S violent action against Austria is naturally
considered by M. Krofta as an exceedingly serious menace to
the future of Czechoslovakia. But he does not believe that
the danger is immediate. He is of the opinion that the
German Government is afraid that an action
[3]
against Czechoslovakia might lead to a general war, and the
declarations made by Field-Marshal Goering to M. Mastny are
a proof of this fear.
The Field-Marshal is said to have declared yesterday,
at 11 p.m. to the Czechoslovak Minister, that the Berlin
Government considered what was happening in Austria as a
family affair, but that its relations with Czechoslovakia
were of an entirely different nature. Field-Marshal Goering
gave his word of honour that that country would not be
attacked by Germany.
The Field-Marshal is said to have repeated this
undertaking a little later during the night, adding that
this time he was doing so Officially, as Herr Hitler, who
was for the moment in retirement, had entrusted him with the
direction of the State.
Finally, this morning, Field-Marshal Goering is said to
have telephoned to M. Mastny that, in order to prevent any
incidents, he had forbidden the German troops to approach
within 15 kilometres of the Czechoslovak frontier, on the
understanding that Czechoslovakia, on her side, should
abstain from any interference in Austro-German affairs.
Yesterday, at 5 p.m., on an inquiry made by M.
Eisenlohr, M. Krofta denied the rumour that the Prague
Cabinet had ordered mobilization or was thinking of doing
so. At the request of the German Minister, M. Krofta
repeated this d‚menti during the night, and the newspapers
have published it this morning. The Minister has also
described as ridiculous the rumour that a great number of
Austrian refugees have crossed the frontier into
Czechoslovakia. It appears, in fact, that there are in the
country only between 90 and 100 refugees from Austria.
M. Krofta does not know whether they have returned to
Austria. The Press has been advised to exercise great
caution and moderation in commenting on the events.
LACROIX
No. 6
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. YVON DELBOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
March 12, 1938.
THE Czechoslovak Minister has been received by Lord
Halifax
[4]
and has pleaded the necessity of a positive demonstration in
favour of his country. He made the following suggestion:
Our Minister in Berlin, he said, has received the
express assurance from Field-Marshal Goering that the Reich
has no intention of encroaching upon the independence of
Czechoslovakia. The German Minister in Prague has made the
same declaration to M. Krofta.
M. Masaryk asked whether his Government might not
inform the Foreign Office officially of this double
declaration. This step would allow you to take official
notice of it and then to address a note to Berlin in which
the British Government would place on record the assurance
given to Czechoslovakia.
Lord Halifax noted this suggestion and promised to put
it before the Prime Minister.
CORBIN.
No. 7
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
March 13, 1938.
M. MASARYK, the Czechoslovak Minister, acting on
instructions from his Government, handed to the Foreign
Office this morning a note in the following terms:
"I have reported to my Government the interview which
you were good enough to grant me to-day.
"I have in consequence been instructed by my Government
to bring to the official knowledge of His Majesty's
Government the following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th
March) Field-Marshal Goering made two separate statements to
M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him
that the developments in Austria will in no way have any
detrimental influence on the relations between the German
Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued
earnest endeavour on the part of Germany to improve these
mutual relations.
"In the first statement the Field-Marshal used the
expression: 'Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort.'
"In the second statement Field-Marshal Goering asserted
that, having given his own word previously, he was now able
to give the word of the head of the State, who had
authorized him to take over temporarily his official duties.
He then repeated the above assurances.
[5]
"To-day (the 12th March) Field-Marshal Goering asked M.
Mastny to call on him, repeated yesterday's assurances and
added that the German troops, marching into Austria, have
strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the
Czechoslovak frontier; at the same time he expressed the
hope that no mobilization of the Czechoslovak army would
take place.
"M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and
binding assurances on this subject, and to-day spoke with
Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on
behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself
bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention
concluded at Locarno in October 1925.
"M. Mastny also saw to-day Herr von Mackensen, who
assured him that the clarification of the Austrian situation
will tend to improve German-Czechoslovak relations.
"The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wish to
assure His Majesty's Government that they are animated by
the earnest and ardent desire to live in the best possible
neighbourly relations with the German Reich. They cannot,
however, fail to view with great apprehension the sequel of
events in Austria between the date of the bilateral
agreement between Germany and Austria (July 11, 1936) and
yesterday (March 11, 1938)."
At the same time, M. Masaryk, speaking personally,
expressed to Lord Halifax the hope that the British
Government would inform Berlin, in any manner they might
consider appropriate, but in an emphatic way, that they are
aware of the assurances given by the Government of the Reich
to Czechoslovakia.
The document translated above should, until further
notice, be regarded as confidential.
CORBIN.
No. 8
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
March 14, 1938.
FOLLOWING on the letter addressed yesterday by the
Czechoslovak Minister to Lord Halifax, the British
Ambassador in Berlin received instructions to call on Field-
Marshal Goering without delay, and to inform him of the
communication of the Czechoslovak Government, drawing his
attention particularly to the importance attached in
[6]
London to the assurances mentioned therein, and to their
full expectation that they would be respected. Sir Nevile
Henderson was at the same time instructed to ask whether the
British Government might publish the document, so as to
mitigate to some extent the emotion caused among the public
by the events in Austria.
The Czechoslovak Minister has just heard that the
declarations made to M. Mastny have been confirmed to the
British Ambassador by Field-Marshal Goering, and that Field-
Marshal Goering had raised no objection whatever to their
publication. His only reservations were in connection with
the arbitration treaties, which, he said, "concerned the
Chancellor and Baron von Neurath," and the implications of
which he professed not to be fully aware.
CORBIN.
No. 9
Extract from Mr. Neville Chamberlain's speech in the
House of Commons on March 14,1938
"I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on March 11
gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin_an
assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr
Hitler_that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German
Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular,
on March 12, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech
Minister that German troops marching into Austria had
received the strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres
from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak
Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that
Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak
Arbitration Convention of October 1925."
No. 10
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 15, 1938.
MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, before referring publicly in
his speech of yesterday to the assurances given by Field-
Marshal Goering concerning Czechoslovakia, had instructed
the British Ambassador in Berlin to ask the Field-Marshal
whether he would authorize this Statement. The answer was in
the affirmative.
[7]
Sir Nevile Henderson also received confirmation from
Field-Marshal Goering and Baron von Neurath that Germany
would, before the plebiscite of April 10, withdraw from
Austria the troops which had been sent there.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
III
(September 26, 1938)
No. 11
Extract from Herr Hitler's speech at the Sports
Palace in Berlin, September 26, 1938
"And now we are confronted with the last problem which
must be solved and which shall be solved. It is the last
territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is
a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will
satisfy, God willing....
"I have but few things to say. I am grateful to Mr.
Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I assured him that the
German people want nothing but peace; but I also told him
that I cannot extend any further the limits of our patience.
I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when
this problem is solved, there will be no more territorial
problems for Germany in Europe; and I further assured him
that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its
problems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an
arrangement with their other minorities, peacefully, without
oppression, I shall no longer be interested in the Czech
State. And this I guarantee. We don't want any Czechs at
all."
[8]
II
German Agitation Continued
Warning to Germany:
Letter from M. Georges Bonnet to Herr von
Ribbentrop
(July 1-30, 1939)
No. 149
Note by M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, on his interview with Count von Welczeck, German
Ambassador in Paris, July 1, 1939
I HAVE just received a visit from the German
Ambassador, whom I had asked to see me this morning.
It was all the more desirable to see him in that M.
Coulondre had informed me that a rumour was current in
Berlin to the effect that in the course of his recent stay
in Berlin, Herr von Ribbentrop had instructed the Ambassador
to inform me that Germany had decided to seize Danzig.
I therefore began by listening attentively to Count von
Welczeck, who spoke to me to the following effect:
"It is only three days since I returned to Paris. In
the course of my recent stay in Germany, I saw Herr von
Ribbentrop in his country house, for he is unwell. We had a
talk together about Polish intentions. Herr von Ribbentrop
made serious complaints about the ill-treatment to which
Germans are subjected in Poland. He considers that there are
two parties in Poland. One, the more reasonable, realises
that a war between Poland and Germany would very rapidly end
in the defeat of Poland. To be sure, the Poles may entertain
the hope that a subsequent victory of France and Great
Britain, after the latter have come to their aid, would re-
establish them in their rights; but meanwhile they would
have suffered the devastation of war and they would have had
enemy soldiers quartered among them for months or years,
which is never very pleasant. Side by side with this
reasonable party, however, there is the party of hot-heads,
who are often in the pay of foreign agents. Above everything
else they want, for ideological reasons, to overthrow the
National-Socialist regime. They are ready for any rash
action, they ill-treat the Germans, and they have war always
in view."
The Ambassador does not think, however, that things
will take a
[193]
tragic turn. He proposes to stay in Paris for the next three
months, and then go deer-stalking in Hungary. Nevertheless,
Herr von Ribbentrop considers that incidents may lead to war
between Poland and Germany at any momerit. Such a war would
be extremely popular in Germany."We in Germany," he said,
"have an unrequited love for France. On the other hand, the
German people have no love for the Poles, and, in a war
against Poland, the Fhrer would have the whole of his
people behind him."
Count von Welczeck added, on his own account, that it
was regrettable that the question of Danzig had not been
submitted to France and Great Britain before the
Czechoslovak question; for, he said, this is really the last
claim of the Reich, though nobody can believe it.
Finally, the German Ambassador expressed regret over
the refusal to understand that Germany was entitled to a
zone of inlfluence in the East, which was perfectly
legitimate owing to Germany's geographical situation.
After listening to Count von Welczeck, I replied:
"On the morrow of the Munich Agreement, while France
contemplated large-scale economic collaboration with
Germany, she also accepted the idea that certain countries
of Central Europe, by reason of their geographical
situation, might have more extensive economic relations with
Germany than with France. But at no time could France have
dreamed for a moment of giving Germany authority to violate
the frontiers of all her neighbours and establish herself in
Bucharest, Budapest or Warsaw."
The Ambassador smiled and informed me that such a
project had never been in the minds of the rulers of the
Reich.
I added that, in the course of the conversation which I
had had with Herr von Ribbentrop, in Count von Welczeck's
presence, I had made formal reservations respecting our
relations with Poland and with the U.S.S.R., just as he
himself had made reservations respecting his relations with
Italy. I had even pointed out to him that we had an alliance
with Poland, and Herr von Ribbentrop had said to me in reply
that he was aware of the fact, and that it was a matter of
indifference to him, since relations between Germany and
Poland were excellent.
Count von Welczeck recognised that this was accurate,
and added that Germany's relations with Poland were, in
fact, excellent at that time. The Poles had repeatedly come
and asked the Germans to give them Teschen, Oderberg, part
of Slovakia, and a common frontier
[194]
with Hungary. They had been granted all this. Count von
Welczeck was convinced that if, at that time, the Government
of the Reich had said to Colonel Beck: "Very well, we will
give you all this, but we must come to terms over Danzig and
the Corridor," the matter would have been instantly settled
with the Poles.
I then touched on the question of German-Polish
relations, and insisted to Count von Welczeck that there was
by no means any danger of war, provided that Germany was
firmly resolved to maintain peace. The keys of peace or war
were not in the hands of Poland, but in those of Germany.
Count von Welczeck was wrong in believing that counsels of
violence might be given to the Poles by the British
Government. I could assure him that it was not so. But I was
justifiably anxious about the situation which had been
created in Danzig. What was the meaning of the arms which
had been smuggled in there?-and of the S.S. men ? These did
not suggest very peaceful intentions.
Count von Welczeck replied that the Danzigers were
entitled to consider their own defence, in view of the fact
that they could see before their eyes a large number of
mobilised Polish troops; but he repeated that there was no
aggressive intention on Germany's part.
I then told Count von Welczeck that he should entertain
no illusions about what the French attitude would be in such
an eventuality. France had definite commitments to Poland;
these commitments had been still further increased as a
result of recent events, and in consequence France would
stand side by side with Poland immediately, I from the very
moment Poland itself took up arms.
I then read to Count von Welczeck the note which had
been drafted by the Political Department, and which covered
every case which might arise, including even the case, which
had been considered as possible, of a kind of internal
Putsch in Danzig.
After reading this note, I told Count von Welczeck that
I was I handing it to him, and that I requested him to
reproduce it in extenso in the telegram which he would be
dispatching to Herr von Ribbentrop. It was precisely because
I had met Herr von Ribbentrop in Paris and because I had
signed the Franco-German declaration that I did not want to
leave room for the slightest misunderstanding between the
French Government and the German Government with regard to
France's attitude. If war should one day break out, I did
not want the Government of the Reich to be in a position to
say: "We were not warned. The explanations of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs or of the
[195]
French Government were not clear. We did not know exactly
what would be the reaction of the French Government." As it
was, there could be no doubt. It was for this reason that I
had made a point, as an exceptional measure, of putting my
views into writing.
In reply, Count von Welczeck told me that, in all his
reports, he had not failed to inform his Government of the
precise nature of the French attitude, and that he had
repeatedly warned the Fhrer that France would stand side by
side with Poland in the event of war. "But," he continued,
"I find it difficult to convince him, for we cannot manage
to understand how Great Britain and France should commit the
mad act of embarking upon war over Danzig, when leading
French statesmen, for the past fifteen years and even on the
morrow of the Treaty of Versailles, have recognised that the
statute of the Free City of Danzig could not last." A war,
moreover, would be a world catastrophe, the Ambassador
concluded, for the French could not break through the
Siegfried Line any more than the Germans could break through
the Maginot Line. Cities would be destroyed from the air,
but the war would not be ended in that way. Nevertheless, we
should be mistaken in believing that Germany could not stand
a long war, for she has supplies which would enable her to
do so.
When the Ambassador once more repeated that the Danzig
question was the last in which Germany was interested, I
told him in reply that the Government of the Reich already
had behind it the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement, and the
declaration of a protectorate over Bohemia on March 15, and
that therefore nobody could believe that this was really a
final claim, for we should not fail to be presented with
others.
Finally, I told the Ambassador that he could observe
the unanimity with which the French nation had rallied to
the support of the Government. Elections would be suspended;
public meetings would be stopped; attempts at foreign
propaganda of whatever kind would be suppressed; and the
Communists would be brought to book. The discipline and the
spirit of sacrifice of the French people could not be called
in question by anybody.
Count von Welczeck informed me that, on this point, all
his reports made mention of the present admirable attitude
of the French people. He promised me that he would most
faithfully repeat to his Government the conversation we had
had together, the importance of which he fully realised.
[196]
No. 150
Note handed by M. Georges Bonnet, Minister
for Foreign Afiairs, to Count von Welczeck, German
Ambassador, in the course of their conversation on July 1,
1939
I RECEIVED Herr von Ribbentrop in Paris a few months
ago, and I signed with him the Franco-German declaration of
December 6, 1938.
The personal relations which I formed with him on that
occasion make it a duty for me at the present moment to
point out to him very definitely the position of the French
Government, and to leave no doubt in his mind about the
determination of France.
In December last, I clearly specified to Herr von
Ribbentrop that the Franco-German declaration-in conformity,
for that matter, with the stipulation contained in Article 3-
could not be considered as affecting the special relations
of France with the countries of Eastern Europe.
In so far as Poland, more particularly, is concerned,
events since then have produced a strengthening of the
French alliance. M. Daladier definitely indicated in his
declaration of April 13 last the scope of the engagements by
which the two countries are now linked.
Today I make a point of recalling these commitments to
Herr von Ribbentrop's very special attention, and stressing
the unshakeable determination of France to fulfil them by
exerting all her strength in support of her pledged word. At
a moment when measures of all kinds are being taken in
Danzig, whose scope and object it is difficult to
appreciate, it is particularly essential to avoid any risk
of misunderstanding about the extent of the obligations and
about the attitude of the French Government: a
misunderstanding whose consequences might be incalculable. I
therefore regard it as my duty to state definitely that any
action, whatever its form, which would tend to modify the
status quo in Danzig, and so provoke armed resistance by
Poland, would bring the Franco-Polish agreement into play
and oblige France to give immediate assistance to Poland.
[197]
No. 151
M. GAUQUI, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 3, 1939.
LAST Friday a group of youths belonging to the "Hitler
Jugend" crossed the frontier in Pomerania. They were at once
arrested by Polish frontier guards and imprisoned. On being
informed of this, the German Embassy intervened with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately gave orders
for the young Germans to be set at liberty.
The German Press has not breathed a word about this
incident, nor, for that matter, has the Polish Press.
It was M. Beck who reported the incident to my British
colleague as a "significant fact."
GAUQUI.
No. 152
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
July 3, 1939.
THE Polish Commissioner-General, who returned from
Warsaw this morning, told me that, according to his
information, the Polish Government has no intention at
present of opposing the German military measures in progress
in Danzig. The Government, in fact, feels that great
prudence is enjoined on it by the responsibilities which it
has assumed towards Paris and London, that the preparations
in question are up to the present only defensive in
character, and that it is to its advantage to gain time.
"Our tolerance has limits," M. Chodacki said to me, "but
they have not yet been reached, and our conduct should have
great elasticity."
I asked him whether he would inform the Senate as to
these limits, and he replied in the negative.
Finally, according to him, the German Government was
still conforming to diplomatic usage in its official
relations with the Polish Government on the subject of
Danzig. Thus, for instance, Berlin had just notified Warsaw
of the call which the cruiser K”nigsberg is to make here on
August 28.
LA TOURNELLE.
[198]
No. 153
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 4, 1939.
As I have reported to Your Excellency, the State
Secretary for Foreign Affairs asked me to call upon him last
Friday, June 30. Since it may be supposed that he did not
summon me solely in order to convey to me Herr von
Ribbentrop's regrets that he was unable to receive me owing
to his state of health, I wondered what might be the real
reason which had led him to arrange this interview.
In substance, Herr von Weizs„cker declared to me:
(1) That, in his opinion, there was no ground for
anticipating a coup in Danzig from the German side.
(2) That he believed in our determination to support
Poland, but was less convinced of the firmness of the
British attitude.
(3) That certain slight indications led him to think
that M. Beck desired to seek a basis for a friendly
solution.
What is happening in Danzig which is arming in
preparation for a siege, scarcely permits one to accept the
reassuring statements made by the State Secretary at their
face value. The Free City would have no more reason today
than it had yesterday to put itself on a war footing to
resist a Polish attack, if it were not preparing itself, on
the orders of Berlin, for action likely to provoke
intervention by Warsaw.
The most favourable explanation of the remarks referred
to under heading (1) above appears to me, therefore, to be
that, while pursuing preparations for action in Danzig from
within, Herr Hitler has not yet made up his mind, and is
consequently assuming towards the Powers concerned a
position which would enable him to procrastinate and
possibly even to cover at least a provisional retreat. The
fact that he decided not to make a speech at the launching
of the cruiser Ltzow seems to lend support to this
hypothesis. On his side, my British colleague, who is
leaving today for London for a few weeks, tells me that the
impression which he has formed from his conversations in
Government circles is that the Fhrer has not yet made up
his mind. The conversations I have had myself with various
responsible persons in the Chancellor's entourage leave me
with the impression that they do not know whether he would
go so far as to risk a general war in order to settle the
Polish affair. This may mean either that he has not
[199]
yet reached his decision, or that these persons are unaware
what decision he has made.
The reassurances which, according to all appearances,
Herr von Weizs„cker was instructed to convey to me, may also
have another object; to lull the vigilance of the Western
Powers, in the hope that, when suddenly confronted with the
fait accompli, they will confine themselves to verbal
protests. The precedent of Bohemia is unfortunately quite
recent. Sir Nevile Henderson received from Herr von
Weizs„cker, on the eve of the occupation of Prague, an
assurance that the Reich "would behave in a proper way."
As for the indications referred to in paragraphs (2)
and (3) above, one may wonder whether they are not both
alike intended to sap French resistance. I must at the same
time remark that the opinion that Great Britain will not
hold to her position is unfortunately still very general in
German Government circles, and that moreover the indication
that M. Beck was seeking the basis of a solution was
reported in the same terms to one of my colleagues by the
Italian Ambassador, which would seem to show that it is not
without foundation.
Furthermore, whatever may be the precise significance
of Herr von Weizs„cker's declarations, they seem to me, in
any case, to throw into relief the importance which the
German Government attaches to the attitude of the Powers
concerned in the determination of its line of conduct in the
Danzig affair. In this respect, the communication made by
Your Excellency to Count von Welczeck on July 1 should
enable the Chancellor to measure the risks of a fresh
adventure.
COULONDRE.
No. 154
M. COUL0NDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 4, 1939.
MY Polish colleague, whom I questioned this morning
about what he thinks of the situation, and about the way in
which his Government proposes to meet it, was somewhat
evasive. He regards as an undoubted fact the military
activity proceeding in Danzig: the arrival of militiamen
disguised as tourists, the importation of arms, the building
of army huts, the increase in numbers of the police. He also
feels that a time will come when the Polish Government will
be bound to intervene; but he does not know, he told me,
either when or how.
[200]
M. Lipski still remains convinced that the German
Government is putting the strength of the Allies' resistance
to the test, but that it will not embark upon a general war
for the sake of Danzig. He seems not disinclined to think
that the rumours which have recently been in circulation on
the subject of an immediate Putsch in Danzig may well be of
German origin and have been put about with a view to
ascertaining the reactions of the Western Powers.
I reported to him the indications which the State
Secretary had given me regarding M. Beck's alleged desire to
seek the basis of an amicable solution. In reply, he told me
that he had no cognizance of any alteration in M. Beck's
attitude.
My Polish colleague showed himself somewhat anxious
about the situation in Slovakia. Certain signs, notably the
presence in Berlin of two members of the Bratislava
Government, one of them being M. Tuka, lead him to fear that
the German Government may be about to suppress what remains
of the independence of that country.
COULONDRE.
No. 155
M. GARREAU, French Consul-General in Hamburg,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Hamburg,
July 4, 1939.
THE German Press gives no information about the German-
Soviet commercial negotiations at present in progress.
Commercial circles in Hamburg, however, which are usually
very well informed, are under the impression that, if some
agreement is not shortly concluded between London, Paris and
Moscow, the Soviet Government will be prepared to sign a
pact of non-aggression with the Reich for a period of five
years.
For some time past there has been anxiety in those
circles about the rapid evolution of the National-Socialist
system in the direction of autarchy and collectivisation.
People do not disguise their fear of seeing this tendency
still further strengthened by political cooperation between
Berlin and Moscow. It is felt moreover that such cooperation
would aggravate the risks of an early aggression by the
Reich against Poland and thus precipitate a general
conflagration.
GARREAU.
[201]
No. 156
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 6, 1939.
FROM a series of conversations which he has just had in
military circles, General Musse has derived the impression
that, in order to avoid figuring as an aggressor, Poland
would proceed to great lengths in restraining its impatience
in face of the progressive militarisation of Danzig.
Our Military Attache thinks that the Polish Government
will limit itself to platonic protests, unless a time comes
when its essential interests are directly threatened in
Danzig. It will react strongly only if its use of the
harbour, the Vistula, or the railway is impeded.
LON N™EL.
No. 157
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 6, 1939.
M. BECK made his apologies for waiting until this
morning to receive me. He wanted, he said, to inform me
about the decisions that were reached yesterday evening in
the course of a conference lasting four hours, under the
chairmanship of M. Moscicki, at which the Marshal, the Prime
Minister and himself were present
In the course of this meeting the following decisions
were reached:
The Polish Government remains resolved that its conduct
in Danzig shall correspond to whatever action may be taken
by the Hitler Government. For the time being, progressive
militarisation of the Free City does not appear to it to
constitute, or as yet to be on the point of constituting, a
reason sufficient to justify a counter-stroke which would
run the risk of giving intervention by Poland the appearance
of aggression. "Danzig," M. Beck said to me, "is under our
guns. Accordingly, the presence in that city of the
equivalent of a whole division and a few guns cannot, in
itself, seriously disturb us." This attitude would change
only if and when Poland's essential interests (the use of
the railway, the Vistula, or the harbour) were directly
affected.
In this eventuality, moreover, the Polish Government
would in the first place have recourse to measures of an
economic nature in order
[202]
to defend its rights, reserving other forms of action to
meet the most serious contingencies.
I brought M. Beck to the point of specifying that, in
any case, unless the march of events did not leave it the
necessary time, the Polish Government would subordinate any
action to previous consultation with the British and French
Governments.
LON N™EL.
No. 158
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 6, 1939.
IN the course of our conversation, M. Beck said to me
that it seemed to him preferable that the French and British
newspapers, without abstaining from informing their readers
about the Nazi intrigues in Danzig, should nevertheless
avoid giving them too much importance or devoting too much
space to them. The Polish Press has received general
directions to this effect and is observing them
scrupulously.
M. Beck indeed feels, as I myself have already stated
to Your Excellency, that, if it did not take care to present
the affairs of Danzig as one of the elements in a problem
which would continue to exist, even though there were no
longer any Danzig question, the Press would be playing into
the hands of German propaganda. This propaganda is, in fact,
seeking to concentrate attention upon Danzig in order to
throw the other aspects of the situation into the background
and confuse public opinion in the Western countries.
LON N™EL.
No. 159
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 9, 1939.
TEN days ago, at the very moment when the rumour spread
through Europe that the problem of Danzig was on the point
of receiving a "German solution"; while Dr. Goebbels's staff
seemed to be endeavouring to concentrate the attention of
world opinion upon the Free City, as if to convince it that
this problem constituted-incidentally, through the fault of
Poland-the last obstacle to peace;
[203]
and while Count von Welczeck did not shrink from assuring
Your Excellency that this was the Reich's last claim-at this
very moment the Press service of the Danzig Senate was
itself circulating a booklet entitled Danzig: What is at
stake? which contained this passage:
"We now return to the solution of the fundamental
dispute between Poland and Germany, which has been put on
one side since 1933. It is apposite to recall in this
connection that, in so far as concerns Danzig the Corridor
and the other territories arbitrarily detached from the
Reich, it is a question of German soil, for whose possession
Poland can put forward no claim, either moral, historical,
civilising or cultural."
It is, in fact, beyond any doubt no less than this that
is in question at this moment in the eyes of the Germans as
regards Poland. The language used by those Germans who live
in Poland, or who come here on a visit, and even that which
one may hear from the lips of certain close friends of Herr
von Moltke, clearly confirm it; and while, of course, my
German colleague personally shows himself much more prudent,
nobody has ever heard him say that the annexation of Danzig
was the last of the Nazi claims.
The Poles are very well aware of the way in which the
question of their relations with the Germans now presents
itself, and they know the extent of the Teutonic appetite in
their respect. It is this that explains why almost all of
them regard war with the Reich as inevitable.
Whether they share the latter view or not, the rulers
of the country remain no less resolved-and the moderation
which they display in their appreciation of the situation in
Danzig definitely proves this-to do everything they can in
order that a conflict, if it cannot be avoided, should at
least be retarded as long as possible.
LON N™EL.
No. 160
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 10, 1939.
IN the course of a short stay in Danzig, the First
Secretary of this Embassy, from information given him by our
Consul and also from conversations with the High
Commissioner for the League of Nations, the Polish
Commissioner-General and certain Danzig authorities, has
[204]
gathered some interesting impressions, which may be
summarised as follows:
(1) The wave of unrest which has been apparent for some
days in the Free City is appreciably on the ebb. But, in
order to estimate the significance and the extent, which is
entirely relative, of this regression, it is apposite to
emphasize the fact that the effervescence which had been
observed in the Free City was considerably exaggerated by
interested propaganda and never presented the character of
organised preparations for violent action.
(2) In so far as can be ascertained, this appeasement
has in no way slowed down the militarisation of the Free
City, which is being methodically carried out.
The strength of the police force has been raised to
3,000 men. The formation of the Free Corps is being
continued. Its nucleus was created out of 300 S.S. men from
East Prussia, who wear on the sleeves of their uniforms the
words "Reichswehr Danzig." The barracks contain several
thousands of young men who have come from the Reich, but are
said to be of Danzig origin. Smuggling of arms (rifles,
machine-guns, anti-aircraft batteries, light tanks,
aircraft, etc.) continues. Entrance to the Schichau
dockyard, where this material is disembarked, is strictly
forbidden. All the tailors and even all the dressmakers of
the Free City without exception have been requisitioned for
making uniforms.
It would be incorrect to say that these measures of
rearmament are ostentatious, but they are known to the
authorities. On the other hand, their rate, or even their
importance, should not be exaggerated. In any case, this
rearmament does not present the feverish character of such
measures as would be taken with a view to an early coup de
force. It is a question rather of a progressive preparation
for the militarisation of the Free City, with a view to
guarding against possibilities which perhaps do not as yet
present themselves in a very definite way even to the
National-Socialists themselves.
The Danzig authorities declare that the Free City wants
to be in such a state "as not to allow itself to be invaded
without resistance" (like Prague!). They also say that
Danzig must defend itself against possible aggression by the
Poles. This argument, for that matter, is not pure
propaganda. It corresponds to a real anxiety on the part of
the population. Recently, while in Western Europe the
possibility of an approaching Putsch in Danzig was kept in
view, the Danzigers, for
[205]
their part, seem to have sincerely feared some such step on
the part of Poland.
(3) In considering the four elements-the Poles, the
Danzig population, the Party and the Senate-which constitute
the local elements of the problem, the following
observations can be made:
(a) Between the Poles and the Danzig authorities
difficulties are endless. The Polish Commissioner-General,
M. Chodacki, admits that every day he sees twenty or thirty
fresh troubles arise. But both sides, for the time being,
avoid turning them into incidents. The attitude assumed by
the Polish Customs inspectors is significant in this
respect. They shut their offices at night and appear not to
notice the smuggling.
In the course of his conversation with my colleague, M.
Chodacki made a point of repeating that Poland remained
ready to negotiate. He has, he said, "a plan for negotiation
fully prepared" which M. Beck has approved. But for the time
being it is impossible to think of making use of it. "We
fall," he added, "between the rigid 'It is my will' of Herr
Hitler, and the much more elastic Polish 'non possumus.'" It
is impossible to see for the moment in what way the distance
which separates them can be reduced.
Meanwhile, the Poles continue to invest considerable
sums in improvements in Danzig. They also point out that,
during the first five months of the year, the traffic of the
port (sailings of ships, tonnage) shows an increase of 33
per cent over 1938.
(b) As far as the Danzig population is concerned,
while, before the present crisis, the proportion of those
who wanted the maintenance of the existing status could be
estimated at 60 per cent, it is said at present to have
risen to at least 80 per cent. Opposition is said to be
especially strong among the Catholics, many of whom are of
Polish origin but have lost consciousness of the fact, and
form 40 per cent of the population.
Everybody however is agreed in recognising that the
feelings of the Danzig population are of no importance. It
appears to be terrorized and is lavish with cries of "Heil
Hitler!"
(c) It is the Party, and, within the Party, the
Gestapo, to whom all power belongs. But the Party simply
means Berlin, and in practice, Gauleiter Forster, who is
depicted as a kind of "butcher's assistant, and a jovial
fellow," who has belonged to the Party since his early youth
and has, apparently, the right of audience with Herr Hitler,
who likes him; but he is, of course, merely the Chancellor's
instrument.
(d) Between the two is the Senate, which is flattered
at figuring
[206]
as a Government and at bottom more or less shares the
feelings of the population, but is, of course, obliged to
speak and act as the Party decides.
But the Senate is only a fa‡ade.
In observing the state of things at present prevailing
in Danzig, one cannot help making a comparison with the
internal situation in Austria during the months which
preceded the Anschluss; a population without enthusiasm,
sometimes secretly hostile, but passive; a Government which
certainly would like to maintain the status quo, but is
without real power; finally, the Party, an active minority,
in fact the only active element.
(4) The comparison which one is led to make between
Danzig and Austria is justified not only by the internal
situation in the Free City, but also by the methods which
German policy seems for the moment disposed to employ there.
In order to attain her ends, Germany has hitherto had
recourse to two systems: sometimes surprise, a sudden
attack; sometimes slow preparation, patient waiting for
favourable circumstances. The Reich tried the first method
in Austria at the time of the assassination of Dollfuss; but
it had to give way before Italy. It then sent Herr von Papen
to Vienna and waited until the Western Powers' common front
had dissolved. The success which attended the first method
in Czechoslovakia undoubtedly for a time led the rulers in
Berlin to desire to act in a similar way in Danzig. But
resistance inside the City, and the resolute attitude of
France and Great Britain, seem to have convinced them that,
once again, they must have recourse to the second.
There are many indications that they are already
anxious to allay our watchfulness. The d‚marche undertaken
by Gauleiter Forster's principal colleague, Herr Zarske,
Parliamentary Press Chief and editor of the Vorposten, as
well as the proposals to the same effect put to High
Commissioner Burckhardt by the Gauleiter of East Prussia,
Herr Koch, although he is Herr Forster's sworn enemy, seem
significant in this respect. Herr Zarske insistently repeats
that "Danzig is really not worth a war." At the same time,
Herr Zarske is anxious to a degree that is quite remarkable,
to brush aside the memory of the Czechoslovak precedent. He
has admitted that "this expedition was a mistake," and even
added that "in Berlin they do not know how to get out of it
and would be very glad to find a solution...."
No doubt, the progressive movement in this direction,
which everybody agrees is clearly taking place in Danzig, is
as yet only in its
[207]
initial stage. Obviously many considerations or fortuitous
incidents may change its course, particularly if Herr
Hitler, who for the moment seems to want to trade on his
credit in order to make the Danzigers wait for the
fulfilment of his promises, should be led to think that this
might be regarded as a sign of retreat.
In any case, there is one fact about which foreign
observers in Danzig are unanimous. It is that it is proper
not to attach too much importance to the daily vicissitudes
in the little provincial world of the Free City. They may
indeed, these observers recognize, possess their value as
pointers and serve as a barometer; but the final issue lies,
and will continue to lie, between Berlin and Warsaw, and
between Berlin, London and Paris.
LON N™EL.
No. 161
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 11, 1939.
A PERSON of high standing in National-Socialist circles
has made the following declarations to one of my colleagues:
"Herr von Ribbentrop no longer enjoys the Fhrer's
absolute confidence. The Fhrer has given expression to a
certain number of grievances against his Minister. In
particular, he reproaches Herr von Ribbentrop with having
wilfully concealed from him several items of information
proving the high war-potential of Great Britain. Moreover,
he accuses his Minister of having committed him, in
connection with Danzig, to a difficult undertaking which
runs the risk of compromising Germany's prestige if a
satisfactory solution is not soon found.
"It must be borne in mind that the raising of the
Danzig question is Herr von Ribbentrop's personal doing.
However, when he undertook the campaign for restoring this
territory to the Reich, he did not realise that he would
meet with firm resistance on the part of the Western Powers.
"It seems that the Poles might still make proposals
which our Government would agree to consider. Of course,
Warsaw would have to make substantial concessions to us, but
it is not yet too late to contemplate an agreement
satisfactory to the two parties.
"Moreover, the Poles would have everything to gain by
deciding
[208]
to negotiate. For a conflict, whatever its issue might be,
would in any case be fatal to them.
"In fact either Poland would be defeated, and she would
then fall entirely under our domination; or else (a highly
improbable eventuality, for that matter), with the help of
Russia, she would emerge victorious from the war. In this
case, the Russians would never reconcile themselves to
leaving the country, and that would be the end of Poland.
"Have you not been struck recently by the somewhat
changed tone of our Press towards Poland? You no longer find
accounts of Polish-German incidents. Nevertheless, according
to our information, the people of Poland continue, on the
most trivial grounds, to molest our nationals living in the
country. Our Minister wants to hold out a hand to the Warsaw
Government for one last time.
"The Government, and especially those in control at the
Wilhelmstrasse, view the future with some anxiety. They
realise that the feeling of hatred for Germany grows daily.
Only yesterday, this hatred, this indignation, were peculiar
to the rulers of certain States. Today, it looks as if the
masses had been won over to these feelings. This development
is especially noticeable in the case of Great Britain."
The foregoing information must, of course, be accepted
with reservations. It is, however, noteworthy, because of
the standing of my informant, who certainly seems to be in
the confidence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Moreover, it does as a whole tally closely enough with
the impression which emerges from a study of the German
newspapers, and also with information which I have gathered
elsewhere.
The Press campaign against Poland, which in any case
never attained the violence of the attacks directed last
year against Czechoslovakia, has recently become more
circumspect. Aggressive headlines and polemical articles are
reserved for Great Britain. Incidents between Germany and
Poland are related without comment and are not given
prominence. Several papers have declared that Danzig is not
a casus belli, and the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung even
seems to invite negotiation, when it writes that a
reasonable solution is entirely within the bounds of
possibility. A similar note is to be heard in Government
circles, where it is given to be understood that there would
be no refusal to negotiate if Poland were to put forward
proposals.
In fact, Berlin has been surprised by the firmness of
Franco-Polish
[209]
resistance in the matter of Danzig, and some embarrassment
is felt about it.
While noting this result, one should at the same time
guard against concluding from it that the Third Reich is
ready to renounce Danzig. Not only is there no retreat on
this point, but there is not even, properly speaking, any
"marking time," since the militarisation of the Free City is
being carried on, while in Germany reservists continue to be
called to the colours in numbers which, by the end of the
month of August, in the opinion of our Military Attache,
will reach one million men.
On the contrary, Germany pretends that all that is
claimed is Danzig, which represents the Reich's very last
demand. In order to know what to think about the sincerity
of this assertion, one need only question Germans other than
those whose business it is to present the official point of
view. There is not one of them who does not smile at such a
question. What Germany wants in Poland, obviously, is the
restoration of the frontiers of 1914. But Danzig is the
point of least resistance, and at this point Germany is
trying to repeat the manauvre of infiltration which proved
so successful with Sudetenland. It hopes, by taking Danzig,
to secure possession of the key which will open for it the
gate to Poland.
It is for this reason, since intimidation no longer
seems likely to work, that an attempt is made to add
persuasion to it in order to shake the attitude of the
Western Powers. With Danzig, Germany puts a full-stop to her
demands; Europe can at last breathe. I should not be
surprised if, in using the words reported above, Herr von
Ribbentrop's associate had not been more or less wittingly a
party to this manoeuvre.
Accordingly, it seems to me essential that the Allied
Governments, who see the trap, should strive to do
everything in their power to open the eyes of public opinion
in their respective countries. In order to avoid playing the
German game, it is important not to deal with the problem of
Danzig separately, but to keep in mind the Czechoslovak
precedent and the Reich's real ambitions. Why give up
Danzig, when we know that Germany wants infinitely more?
And, even if there were a chance that the Reich would be
satisfied with it, why run the risk of weakening Poland's
morale, since it is quite obvious that, if the Reich does
not want more, it will not undertake a universal war for so
restricted an objective?
Althongh well aware of the facts, French and British
public opinion must realise that any pressure upon Warsaw in
order to
[210]
bring it to yield to the German demands could only lead to
the worst catastrophes, and that it rests with Poland, of
its own free will, and confident of Franco-British support,
to determine how far it can go to reach an agreed settlement
without jeopardising its vital interests. Whether Germany
proceeds by trickery or by threat, the means which it
employs should not make us forget the fact that we are
involved in a test of strength the issue of which may decide
the fate of Europe; in this respect, the wavering attitude
of the Reich as it takes the measure of our reaction can
only cause us to persevere in a policy of firmness.
COULONDRE.
No. 162
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 13, 1939.
BEING due to leave Berlin to-morrow evening, I went
this morning to see the State Secretary, to whom I
introduced M. de Saint-Hardouin.
Herr von Weizs„cker once again told me that, without
wishing to look too far into the future, he personally
retained the belief that nothing would happen in Danzig
which could cause serious complications. According to him,
the danger of a conflict with Poland was still only to be
found in the state of excitement of the population and of
the Polish local authorities, which might give rise to fears
that a serious incident might occur any day.
At the same time I found the State Secretary less easy
in manner than during our recent interviews. He mentioned
with obvious displeasure the communication which Your
Excellency had made to Count von Welczeck. "The German
Government," he informed me, "is preparing a reply to it,
and I may tell you that it will not lend itself to any
ambiguity."
I pointed out that the German Government could not have
misinterpreted the spirit in which this step had been taken,
since Your Excellency had been careful to show, with
reference to the declaration of December 6, that you
considered it an obligation of honesty to specify clearly
the French Government's position in regard to the problem of
Danzig. But Herr von Weizs„cker evaded discussion, declaring
that he did not want to anticipate the reply which would
[211]
be made to us, and went on to talk about Mr. Chamberlain's
latest statement in the House of Commons. "While it may be
useful to define one's attitude clearly," he said, "there
can be no justification for the endless repetition of public
declarations indulged in by the British Government."
I remarked that the Prime Minister's speech was very
cool and very objective, and that to my knowledge this was
the first time that he had defined the British Government's
attitude concerning Danzig.
But Herr von Weizs„cker did not agree with this. Such a
speech, according to him, could only have the effect of
diminishing the possibilities of a friendly understanding
still further by hardening the present attitude of both
parties. What hope was there that the Poles, thus
encouraged, would be conciliatory? Moreover, the Reich could
not be affected by any intimidation.
After pointing out that the same applied to the Western
Powers and that, moreover, I had found no wish to intimidate
in Mr. Chamberlain's statements, I asked the State Secretary
whether at the moment he saw any possibility of
conversations with Warsaw.
"If I may refer to the information about Warsaw's
position to be found in the Polish Press," he replied, "I
see none, for we are really worlds apart. I believe that for
the time being there is nothing better to do than to wait
and keep as quiet as possible."
The State Secretary's tone unmistakably shows the
impression produced upon the German Government by the clear
and resolute attitude of the Western Powers in regard to
Danzig.
Mr. Chamberlain's declaration, in particular,
unpleasantly surprised those who, like Herr von Ribbentrop,
wished to cast doubts upon the possibility of armed
intervention by Great Britain in the event of a German-
Polish conflict.
Now that our attitude is so clearly defined, and that
it is known, moreover, to the German Government, I believe
that it would be better to keep silent about Danzig, in so
far as that depends on us. Anything which tends to foster
polemics on this question could only make a waiting attitude
or an eventual retreat more difficult for the Reich.
Lastly, while it is impossible to foresee the decision
which Herr Hitler may take, at least it is essential not to
throw into the scales considerations of prestige, which
weigh heavily in totalitarian States.
COULONDRE.
[212]
No. 163
Personal letter addressed by Herr von Ribbentrop,
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Georges Bonnet,
French Minister for Foreign Affairs
Fuschl, near Salzburg,
July 13, 1939.
MY DEAR M. BONNET,
ON July 1 you handed to Count von Welczeck a note
personally intended for me, which obliges me now to make
known to you, clearly and in a manner free from any
misunderstanding, the attitude of the German Government with
regard to Franco-German relations in general, and the
question of Danzig in particular.
On December 6, 1938, the French and German Governments
signed a declaration in accordance with which they solemnly
recognised the existing frontiers between France and Germany
as finally fixed, and according to which also they desired
to use all their efforts for the establishment of peaceful
and good neighbourly relations between the two countries.
On the side of the Government of the Reich, this
declaration was the logical sequel to the policy of
understanding with France continually followed ever since
that Government came into power; a policy which, in
principle, it would still wish to maintain.
As to your remark about the reservation recorded in
Article 3 of the Franco-German declaration concerning the
special relations France and of Germany with regard to third
Powers, it is unquestionably not correct to say that this
reservation implies a recognition of France's special
relations with Poland. In the conversations which took place
in Berlin and Paris at the time of the preliminary
negotiations on the subject of the declaration, and on the
occasion of the signature, it was on the contrary perfectly
clear that the reservation referred to the special relations
of friendship of France towards Great Britain and of Germany
towards Italy. We were in agreement, in particular, at the
time of our conversations in Paris on December 6, 1938, in
considering that respect for vital reciprocal interests must
be the prior condition and the principle of the future
development of good Franco-German relations.
On that occasion, I expressly pointed out that Eastern
Europe constituted a sphere of German interests, and,
contrary to what is stated in your note, you then stressed
on your part, that, in France's
[213]
attitude with regard to the problems of Eastern Europe, a
radical change had taken place since the Munich conference.
In direct contradiction to this attitude established by
us at the beginning of December stands the fact that France
has taken advantage of the Fhrer's generous proposal to
Poland for the settlement of the question of Danzig and of
Poland's somewhat peculiar reaction, in order to contract
with that country fresh commitments, strengthened and aimed
at Germany. At the end of your note, these commitments are
defined in such a way that any military intervention by
Poland, on the occasion of any departure from the status quo
in Danzig, would lead France to give immediate military
assistance to Poland.
With regard to this policy of the French Government, I
have the following comments to make:
(1) Germany, just as it has never interfered in
France's vital interests, must reject, once for all and
categorically, any interference by France in its spheres of
vital interest. Germany's relations with its Eastern
neighbours, whatever form they assume, in no way affect
French interests; they are a matter which only concerns
German policy. Accordingly the Government of the Reich does
not find itself in a position to discuss with the French
Government questions concerning German-Polish relations, or
to recognise its right to exercise any influence upon
questions dealing with the future settlement of the destiny
of the German city of Danzig.
(2) For your personal guidance, I beg to make the
following statement about the German point of view in the
Polish question:
The Polish government has replied to the Fhrer's
historic and unique offer, aiming at the settlement of the
question of Danzig and at a definitive consolidation of
German-Polish relations, by threats of war which can only be
described as strange. At the present moment it is impossible
to say whether the Polish Government will depart from this
peculiar position and return to reason. But, as long as it
maintains the unreasonable attitude which it has taken up
one can only say that any violation of Danzig soil by
Poland, or any Polish provocation incompatible with the
prestige of the German Reich, would meet in reply with an
immediate march by the Germans and the total destruction of
the Polish army.
(3) The statement already mentioned, which is contained
in the final sentence of your note, would, if taken
literally, mean that France recognises Poland's right to
oppose by arms any departure in any respect from the status
quo in Danzig, and that, if Germany declines
[214]
to tolerate that violence should thus be done to German
interests, France will attack Germany. If such was in fact
the purpose of French policy, I would beg you to consider
that such threats could only further strengthen the Fhrer
in his resolve to ensure the safeguarding of German
interests by all the means at his disposal. The Fhrer has
always desired Franco-German understanding and described as
madness a fresh war between the two countries, which are no
longer separated by any conflict of vital interests. But, if
we have reached a point where the French Government wants
war, it will find Germany ready at any moment. It would then
be the French Government alone which would have to bear
before its people and before the world the responsibility
for such a war.
Because of the pleasant personal relations which I was
able to form with Your Excellency on the occasion of the
signature of the declaration of December 6, 1938, I regret
that your note constrains me to make this reply. I should
not like to abandon the hope that in the end, reason will
prevail and that the French people will recognise where its
real interests are to be found. Since I have devoted myself
for more than twenty years to Franco-German understanding,
this would also represent to me personally the fulfilment of
a deeply felt wish.
Yours
very sincerely,
JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP.
No. 164
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 13, 1939.
THIS Embassy has recently reported to the Ministry
numerous signs of abnormal activity in the German army and
of Germany's obvious preparations for the possibility of an
impending war.
The time seems to have come, by coordinating these
reports, to attempt to take bearings in order to determine
what measures remain to be taken by Germany to make it ready
to go to war; what delay the execution of these measures may
demand; and, especially, how and how long before an act of
aggression we can ascertain that the executiOn of last
minute measures has begun. In other words, in the present
state of affairs, do we run the risk of finding ourselves
sur-
[215]
prised by a war suddenly begun before we have been able to
learn of the German Government's decision to take such a
risk?
The most significant information obtained by us so far
bears upon the following points:
(1) Units of the German Army are changing their
stations constantly. Given the direction of these changes,
apparently somewhat haphazard, it seems to be a question of
manoeuvres rather than of a concentration leading to an
imminent conflict. In any case, the military activity, the
intensity of the instruction and training of units, and
their bringing up to strength with reservists, are
perfecting the instrument which may some day be used. On the
other hand, the ceaseless coming and going of these units,
the secrecy maintained about their movements, and the
increasingly frequent summons to reservists, are of such a
nature as to facilitate operations of concentration, which
at the outset would not arouse attention because they would
not present symptoms very different from those actually in
existence today.
It may, therefore, be asked whether this military
activity and the precautions taken, as much to conceal the
operations effected (the numbers of the regiments on the
move have in most cases been taken off their uniforms) as to
let it be known that such operations are in progress (some
reservists are called up long in advance, and the Press
keeps on referring to fortification works being effected in
the East), are at least not partly intended to render it
more difficult to recognise the transition from this state
of semi-mobilisation to a state of war.
(2) The departure of troops on manoeuvres leaves in the
garrison towns the impression that it will be a long while
before the regiments return to their quarters. In fact, it
is reported that some units have set off after making
arrangements like those taken before leaving for the front.
For instance, identity discs have been issued to the men and
they have been instructed to make a note of the addresses of
their families in the individual bundles in which their
personal effects are assembled.
(3) The calling-up of the classes of reservists who
would normally have been summoned in October has been
advanced. The reservists who should have been discharged
have been kept with the colours. One may anticipate that by
the month of August the German Army, in addition to its
normal effectives, will muster nearly a million mobilised
reservists.
(4) The gathering of the harvest has been accelerated.
With this object in view, the Minister for Education has
decided this year to fix
[216]
July 14, instead of August 1, as the end of the term in
places of higher education and technical schools. The
students who benefit by this earlier release must, until
August 1, devote to harvest work the fortnight thus deducted
from their studies.
In addition, one may note the haste with which supplies
are being accumulated.
(5) This anxiety to be rapidly provided with every
essential for war, often leads to the preference for what is
quickly obtainable over something better. For instance, the
aircraft factories are said to have received orders to carry
on the building of planes, despite the fact that they will
soon be out of date, rather than lose the time necessary; to
adapt their workshops to the construction of the latest
models.
(6) With the accomplishment of the partial occupation
of the Western fortifications, which, thanks incidentally to
these ceaseless changes of garrison, could be progressively
occupied without appreciably modifying the plan of the
manccuvres now in progress, the construction of
fortifications in the East is being pressed forward,
especially in Silesia. Both military and civilian labour is
employed upon it, and this task takes precedence of all
other public works, which are being slowed down.
These various facts allow one to conclude that all the
measures preparatory to war are now being taken. The German
General Staff is acting as though it had to be ready by a
date which has been set out for it, and this date, according
to all appearance, will fall in the course of the month of
August, at which period the harvest will be gathered, the
fortifications will be ready, and the reservists will be
assembled in large numbers in the camps.
But even were all the measures now in process of being
carried out fully executed would it then be possible to
launch an offensive, overnight? It seems, in the opinion of
the officials of this Embassy, that there will remain
certain measures preparatory to immediate action which can
only be taken at the last moment. From the military point of
view these measures will mainly consist in bringing into
position the covering and shock units; from the naval point
of view in the recall of ships now on the high seas; from
the point of view of the air force in the putting into
effect of the arrangements for air defence.
In respect of operations on land, the rapidity of the
final preparations and the greater or lesser facility with
which we may become aware of them will depend first of all
on the extent of the operations contemplated. It is certain
that the existing camouflaging and the
[217]
fact that the population is accustomed to the sight of
manoeuvres of which in any case they no longer dare to
speak, since they know that any indiscretion will be
severely punished, will make it possible to pass without
very much difficulty, if the extent of the operations in
view is limited, from the stage of manoeuvres to that of
concentration. This, however, can only be the case if we
assume that Germany will decide on a defensive war in the
West and that any attack which might be launched at some
other point will require only a small number of effectives.
In respect of naval operations, the necessity of giving
instructions to German ships to change their route
sufficiently in advance will undoubtedly compel the
competent authorities to acquaint the commanders of these
units of the risk of war several days beforehand. By
following carefully the movements of the German war and
merchant ships, we may be able to obtain the most definite
and probably the earliest possible indications of any final
decision of the Chancellor.
In respect of the air force plans, it seems certain
that, particularly in view of the dread of air raids which
exists here, the German Government will not risk entering on
war without having protected its towns against retaliatory
raids. The placing and making effective of the anti-aircraft
defences and the instructions given to the civilian
population for protective measures cannot pass unnoticed.
Last September and last March it was possible to foresee
several days in advance, through the preparations for anti-
aircraft gunnery, that some action was imminent. The
experience gained by the German authorities in that respect
will undoubtedly enable them to devote less time to such
preparations on the next occasion. In any case, however, it
seems impossible that they should be postponed until the
very last day.
From these different considerations it follows that,
though Germany is able to put her army on a war footing very
rapidly, the circumstances are nevertheless not such as to
expose us to a surprise attack, as far as operations of any
real importance are concerned.
Everything that has been done up to the present moment
seems to have a twofold object:
(1) To be prepared for any eventuality from August
onwards.
(2) Most likely also to impress international opinion
by behaving as though the possibility of war were accepted.
COULONDRE.
[218]
No. 165
M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 19, 1939.
THE information, which appeared yesterday in the News
Chronicle as coming from German circles representing
moderate opinion to the effect that the Fhrer proposed to
settle the Danzig question by having himself nominated as
President of the Senate of the Free City, has caused a
violent reaction in Polish Government circles.
A communique from the Pat Agency was issued in the
afternoon denying:
(1) That political conversations between the two
Governments had taken place on the settlement of the various
points at issue between the two countries;
(2) that the Polish Government could ever agree to a
settlement of the question of Danzig which involved the
abandonment of the four basic points in the attitude of
Poland towards this problem;
(3) that the Polish Government could accept without
reacting in an appropriate manner any new action in respect
of the Danzig situation of such character as to threaten
their vital interests.
The communique adds that the fact that the sources of
the information are Rome and Berlin makes it possible to
assess its true value.
Putting together the report in the English newspaper
and the rumours current yesterday in the western capitals,
which provoked a strong reaction in the French Press, I
asked the Director of the Western Section this morning
whether in his opinion we were not faced with a new German
manoeuvre, differing from previous manoeuvres in its field
of action, but directed to the same end as thataimed at by
the Hitler Government at the end of June. Count Potocki had
not yet been able to form a general conclusion for lack of
precise information concerning these rumours. He did not,
however, dismiss the possibility of a new German feeler.
SEGUIN.
[219]
No. 166
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
July 20, 1939.
THE Gauleiter, who returned on Monday from
Berchtesgaden, received a visit from the High Commissioner
yesterday.
According to Herr Forster, Herr Hitler was still
determined to obtain authorisation for the construction of
an extra-territorial motor road across the Corridor
accompanied by the return of Danzig to the Reich, but he
would not have recourse to war to secure these concessions;
if Poland refrains from all provocation, measures of
demobilisation will be taken some weeks hence in the Free
City. A violent anti-Polish article by the Gauleiter would
mark the end of the present campaign.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 167
M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
July 20, 1939.
MY British colleague has just informed me of the
interview which he and General Ironside had yesterday with
Marshal Rydz-Smigly and M. Beck.
General Ironside started by giving the Marshal an
assurance that Poland could rely absolutely on Great
Britain. He then availed himself of this assurance to put to
these gentlemen certain definite questions on the action
contemplated by the Polish Government in the different
eventualities which might occur at Danzig. The questions put
and the answers given, sometimes by the Marshal and
sometimes by M. Beck, when the Marshal referred the
questions to him, were as follows:
(1) What will Poland do if the Anschluss is purely and
simply proclaimed without any such military demonstration as
the entry of German troops, etc.?
Reply: Poland considers that a protest should be lodged
in Berlin by the three Powers.
(2) What will Poland do if units of the Reichswehr
openly occupy the territory of the Free City?
[220]
Reply: The Polish General Staff will send officers to
the commandant of such units to demand an explanation of
such an action.
Such are the replies given from the Polish side to the
questions put by the British General. They do little more
than define the procedure which would be adopted in the
circumstances suggested, without giving any indication of
the Polish reaction if the Germans refused to take
cognizance of protests against an accomplished fact.
When General Ironside spoke of the possible
consequences of an "incident," the Marshal replied that the
Germans were indeed capable of adopting such means of
provoking hostilities, but that, if they did so, they were
bound to disclose their intentions in advance through the
preliminary measures they must take before proceeding to
action. General Ironside asked what the actual situation was
from this point of view. The Marshal replied that the German
military activities seemed to be directed towards attempts
at intimidation, but that for the time being they did not
seem to indicate arrangements for a possible conflict in the
near future.
SEGUIN.
No. 168
Personal Letter from
M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister
Personal
Paris,
July 21, 1939.
DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP,
I am in receipt of the letter you wrote to me, marked
"Personal," in reply to the communication I myself sent on
July 1 to Count von Welczeck.
There is one point which I am anxious to make
absolutely clear. At no moment either before or after the
declaration of December 6, has it been possible for the
German Government to think that France had decided to
disinterest herself in the East of Europe.
At the time of the conversations of December 6, I
reminded you that since 1921 we had had a treaty of alliance
with Poland and since 1935 a pact with the U.S.S.R., both of
which we are determined to maintain. I then gave definite
assurances on this point to the Ambassadors of Poland and of
the U.S.S.R. by communications, which were given the widest
publicity in the Press. I remember, moreover, that
[221]
at the time when I reminded you of the treaties which bound
us to Poland, you were good enough to reply that these
treaties could not do any harm to Franco-German relations,
since your own relations with Poland were at that time
excellent.
I was the less surprised at the assurance you gave me
since, three months earlier, Herr Hitler had, in his speech
at the Sports Palace in Berlin on September 26, referred to
the German-Polish agreement as a model of its type:
"Within barely one year we succeeded," he said, "in
arriving at an understanding with him (Marshal Pilsudski)
which by its very nature has removed the possibility of
conflict, at all events for ten years. We are all of us
convinced that this understanding will lead to a lasting
peace. We appreciate that we have here two peoples who have
to live side by side. A country with a population of
thirtythree millions will always seek access to the sea; it
was therefore necessary to find the way to an agreement.
This has been found and is steadily being developed. The
decisive factor should be a firm determination on the part
of the two Governments, and all reasonable and level-headed
men among the two peoples and in the two countries, to work
for a constant improvement of their mutual relations."
In addition to this, in the course of our conversation
on December 6, one of the most pressing requests which I had
to make to Your Excellency was in respect of our common
guarantee to Czechoslovakia in fulfilment of the Munich
Agreement. Such a request I could not have addressed to you,
if France had no longer been interested in what was
happening in Eastern Europe.
Since I was unable to obtain a satisfactory reply on
this matter, I sent you a note on February 8, 1939,
recalling the agreement signed at Munich on September 29, in
order once more to impress upon you the necessity of
completing without delay the arrangements for our common
guarantee to Czechoslovakia. To this note you replied on
March 2, asking me to await the clearing up of internal
developments in Czechoslovakia and the improvement of
relations between that country and the neighbouring States,
before considering a general arrangement between the Munich
signatory Powers.
Further, the actual statement which I made from the
Tribune of the French Chamber on January 26, 1939, confirmed
my attitude in a manner which admitted of no equivocation.
This statement, which you may find in our "Journal Officiel"
(p. 234), was reproduced in the Press throughout the world.
[222]
"France has also maintained her traditional friendly
relations with Poland. At the time of the Franco-German
declaration of December 6, I had, in conformity with the
spirit of our agreement, advised the Polish Ambassador of
our intentions. In thanking me for keeping them informed,
the Polish Government expressed their appreciation of an
action, the aim, the significance and the implication of
which they fully realized.
"Thus, Gentlemen, can we dispose of the legend that our
policy had led to the cancellation of our obligations in the
East of Europe with the U.S.S.R. or with Poland.
"These obligations are still binding and must be
honoured in the spirit in which they were entered into."
Thus there is no equivocation whatsoever. You knew the
treaty which united France and Poland. You never dreamed of
asking me to denounce it on the occasion of the Franco-
German declaration of December 6. At the time when we signed
that declaration your relations with Poland were excellent,
and there was nothing in the FrancoPolish understandings
which were likely to arouse suceptibilities on your part.
In the speech he made in the Reichstag on January 30,
1939, Hitler once again expressed his satisfaction at the
understanding between Germany and Poland. "At this moment,"
he declared, "it would be difficult to discover any
divergence of opinion amongst the true friends of peace as
to the value of this agreement" (the German;, Polish pact of
non-aggression). These words were the more significant from
our point of view because they were uttered some weeks after
an important conversation at at Berchtesgaden between Herr
Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister, Monsieur Beck.
In the month of March relations between Germany and
Poland became strained, and that fact brought about a new
situation.
France bears no responsibility for the development of
these relations between Berlin and Warsaw. She has in fact
always refrained-and will continue to refrain-from any
interference in matters bearing upon the special
relationships of the two neighbouring countries, and not
affecting in any way the general international situation and
the maintenance of peace.
In conformity with the statements which I had the
honour to make to Count von Welczeck, we earnestly hope that
a bilateral arrangement between Germany and Poland may prove
feasible. But there is one point that I am bound to bring to
your notice, particularly in
[223]
view of the conversations which I had with you on December 6
and 7 in Paris, namely, that France is bound to Poland by a
treaty of alliance, and will remain true to her bond, and
scrupulously carry out all her promises.
You are good enough, in reminding me of all the efforts
which you yourself have made to bring about a rapprochement
between France and Germany, to call my attention to the fact
that Herr Hitler has always desired a Franco-German
understanding and has stigmatized as "madness a new war
between our two countries."
Such an assurance is in accordance with our sincere
wishes. I desire, as you do, the continued maintenance of
friendly relations between France and Germany. It is for
that reason that, in my communication of July 1, whose
validity is maintained with all its implications, I made a
point of reminding you, with the frankness called for by the
circumstances, of the position of the French Government in
respect of Poland, particularly in relation to the situation
at Danzig.
France is eagerly desirous of peace. No one can doubt
that fact. Moreover, no one can doubt the determination of
the French Government to fulfil its obligations. But I
cannot permit it to be said that our country would be in any
way responsible for war because it remained true to its
pledged word.
I beg you, my dear Herr von Ribbentrop, to accept the
expression of my sincerest regards.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 169
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 21, 1939.
IT is said on very good authority that during the last
week some change has taken place in the Chancellor's mind.
It is reported that the Fhrer is now convinced that,
contrary to what he has hitherto been assured by some of his
advisers, France and England are resolved to fulfil their
pledges to Poland and that consequently he will run the risk
of starting a war if he goes too far in the matter of
Danzig.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
[224]
No. 170
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 22, 1939.
WITH regard to the statements made yesterday on the
Danzig question by an official of the Ministry of
Propaganda, a member of my staff gathered this morning from
a very good source certain information which I think I ought
to bring to your attention without delay. It was on the
instruction of State-Secretary Dietrich, who had just come
back from Berchtesgaden, where the Fhrer is staying at
present, that Dr. B”mer, the Head of the Press Section at
the Ministry of Propaganda, made to the correspondents of
the foreign news agencies statements which the English Press
reproduced in a sensational form and an accurate summary of
which has been given by the Havas Agency.
In essentials these statements may be summarized as
follows:
1. The German Government still refuses to contemplate
any other
solution of the Danzig question than the return of the
Free City
to the Reich.
2. They wish to arrive at this solution by pacific
methods and
have no intention of provoking an armed conflict on
this account.
3. This solution cannot be indefinitely postponed; at
the same
time, it is not a matter of immediate urgency; it
might not take
place till some months hence.
4. German political circles remain convinced that
Poland cannot in
the long run maintain her uncompromising attitude and
that some
intervention-presumably from the British side-will in
time curb
the obduracy of Warsaw.
Learning of these statements after the event and of the
use made of them by the British Press, Herr von Ribbentrop,
who was still at Fuschl, near Salzburg, was extremely angry.
He at once ordered the Press Service of the Wilhelmstrasse
to elucidate and comment on the pronouncements of Dr. B”mer
before the representatives of the foreign Press. Herr Braun
von Stumm, entrusted with this task, was instructed to call
attention to the fact that Dr. B”mer's pronouncements did
not introduce any new element and to stress with particular
emphasis the point that, though the Reich insisted on
regarding the return of Danzig
[225]
to Germany as the only possible solution, it had never on
the other hand, regarded the Free City as a problem to be
settled by war.
These explanations were further confirmed in some
obviously inspired comments which appeared in this morning's
papers.
According to the reports collected by this member of my
staff, this incident, like so many others, affords evidence
of the rivalry between the Wihelmstrasse and the Ministry of
Propaganda, or, more precisely, between Herr von Ribbentrop
and Dr. Goebbels. Although both Ministers claim to be
equally anxious for the most radical solutions, the
eagerness of each of them to be regarded by the Fhrer as
the foremost champion of this view has caused a dispute as
to competence. Dr. Goebbels has never in fact given up the
idea of indirectly influencing foreign policy by means of
the Press. But on this occasion Herr von Ribbentrop's
discontent is said to be due to the turn taken by the Danzig
question, to the fact that recent events have shown his
calculations to be wrong, and to the delicate situation in
which he consequently finds himself with the Fhrer. In the
face of the unexpected opposition met with in London and
Paris, as well as in Warsaw, Herr von Ribbentrop thinks that
for the time being his personal interest would be that as
little as possible should be said about Danzig, and that the
matter should be left in abeyance pending more favourable
circumstances. He therefore regards the statements made
yesterday by Dr. B”mer as most inopportune.
As I see it, these indications, which I have every
reason to believe genuine and accurate, make the following
points clear:
1. From Dr. B”mer's statements, as also from their
elucidation by
Herr Braun von Stumm, there emerges a common element:
the desire
not to see the issue forced at this moment. This is
undoubtedly a
retreat, cloaked by the assurance of the pacific
feelings which
Germany is supposed never to have ceased to entertain.
2. In this respect the evidence set out above serves to
confirm
various indications gathered from other sources in the
course of
the last few days, namely, the change which is assumed
to have
taken place last week in the mind of the Fhrer
following on direct
information received from France and England and
consequent on
recent evidences of Britain's strength in the air; and,
secondly,
news received from Danzig to the effect that measures
of
demobilisation were about to be adopted by the Free
City.
3. By insisting that the Danzig question is not of an
urgent
[226]
nature and by hinting at the possibility of a British
mediation,
Dr. B”mer, whether he merely carried out or went beyond
the
orders given him at Berchtesgaden, has in any case
disclosed the
difficulty which seems to be embarrassing the Nazi
leaders at the
moment, as they are beginning to understand that the
era of
unilateral action and of victories without risk has
come to an end.
The tendency to retreat-or at least the wish to
temporise-which can be inferred from the various items of
evidence just enumerated (in particular from the
declarations of the Minister of Propaganda and of the
Wilhelmstrasse on the subject of Danzig) do not, however,
detract in any way from the German Government's intention to
recover the Free City. Although we can note them with
satisfaction, it is essential that we should not attach too
much importance to them. They are obviously a matter of
tactics, and must necessarily prove ephemeral in nature. It
is possible that their one object is to lead us to relax our
vigilance, or to weaken our will to resist by holding out
the false hope of possible negotiations.
In any case, it must be kept in mind that in the
meantime the German Army, so far as it is concerned, is
carrying on with its preparations in order to reach an
advanced state of mobilisation during the month of August.
It is certain that if the Nazi leaders come to think that
France and Britain are relaxing their military and
diplomatic efforts-to which alone the present hesitations of
the Reich are attributable-then the few faint signs now
discernible of a d‚tente would quickly vanish.
Furthermore, now that there appears to be some slight
trace of at least a temporary withdrawal on the part of the
rulers of the Third Reich, it is essential, as M. Coulondre
has stressed, that our Press should refrain from premature
jubilation over victory; they should take their cue from the
organs of the Reich, whether these put the German-Polish
struggle in the background, or ignore it altogether.
SAINT-
HARDOUIN.
No. 171
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 25, 1939.
THE impression prevails that August 1939 is bound to
bring about a recrudescence of international tension, and,
more especially, of
[227]
dangerous German initiatives in the Danzig question. The
statement is repeatedly made that the end of the harvest-
namely, the period August 15-20-will coincide with the
beginning of a crisis so grave that European peace may not
be able to survive it. It is estimated that this critical
period will end towards the early days of October, when the
autumn rains begin to make it difficult to handle large
bodies of mechanised troops on the Polish plains.
It is true that during the last few days it has been
possible to notice among observers of the international
situation a tendency to regard the future in a less gloomy
light. There have even been a few who, prematurely and
altogether ill-advisedly, have thought themselves justified
in talking of a "German retreat."
The truth is that arguments for both optimism and
pessimism can be drawn from an examination of the situation
as it exists in Germany today. Symptoms of two kinds may be
observed: some of them appear to indicate that Germany is
making her preparations with a view to war; others permit
the belief that the Reich will not push the German-Polish
struggle to the length of armed conflict.
The purpose of the present report is to set down and
compare the evidence that can be collected in either sense,
in order to deduce from it, not conclusions that it is in
present circumstances impossible to form, but at least a few
indications of a practical kind.
Broadly speaking, symptoms of a military character are
disturbing whereas certain evidence of a more reassuring
nature can be found in happenings in the political sphere.
(1) EVIDENCE OF A MILITARY KIND
Since the end of June we have witnessed in Germany
preparations that, to a certain extent, recall those of last
autumn.
It should be noted that the beginning of this period of
military activity was marked by an inspection tour by the
Fhrer in the western fortified zone from May 14-20, 1939.
Since that time Germany's military effort has taken the
following forms:
(1) Strengthening of the western fortification system,
deemed to be inadequate or faulty; creation of a third line
of defence, with the equipping of works calculated to make
the anti-aircraft defences more efficient.
(2) Hasty construction of a series of defensive works
on the German-Polish frontiers.
[228]
(3) Progressive occupation, dating from June 20, of the
western fortifed zone.
(4) Masked mobilisation achieved in stages by means of:
(a) The retention with the colours of men who have
served their time.
(b) The calling up of reservists.
These reservists have been drafted from every military
class (covering men between the ages of 22 and 55) and from
every category coming under military law. They have been
called up for periods, varying in length from a fortnight to
three months-periods that are often extended on the date of
expiry. It is, therefore, extremely hard to estimate, even
approximately, the number of reservists at present with the
colours. Judging by such outward signs as the appearance of
the streets, stations, barracks, and the various calling-up
notices, several hundred thousand reservists have now been
ordered back to their units. The estimate, already reported,
of our Military Attach‚ (600,000 men up to date and a
million by about August 15) appears to be a most probable
one. On about August 15, then, Germany would have altogether
about two million men under arms.
(5) Numerous movements of men and materials in various
and, so to speak, opposite directions. Because these
movements are cleverly camouflaged-in particular, such
precautions are taken as the removal of regimental numbers
from shoulder-straps and of number-plates from cars-it is
exceedingly difficult to follow them. It is equally hard to
infer from them any general plan. The definite information
so far collected makes it possible to assert, however, that
troop movements of varying importance are taking place in
the following directions:
(a) Towards the western fortified zone, the occupation,
or ganisation and equipment of which are all in progress.
(b) Towards the southern frontier of Poland. According
to information received from Prague on July 18, 25,000 men
went through that city by rail and were reported to have
been concentrated between Morawska-Ostrawa and the Tatra
Mountains. On July 12 many troop trains (250 wagons in all)
are said to have passed through Lundenburg station (Austria)
going eastwards; at the same time the movement of large
forces in the direction of Beuthen was observed in Silesia.
(c) Towards the boundary between the Corridor and
Pomerania, whither, it was reported, that three infantry
regiments of the
[229]
20th mechanised division, normally stationed at Hamburg, had
been sent.
(d) Towards East Prussia (embarking of reservists was
observed at Stettin).
As opposed to this, no abnormal military activity had
been observed, up to July 22, at any point upon the
Hungarian and Jugoslav frontiers.
(6) Militarisation of Danzig, by the organisation of a
Volunteer Corps (of 20,000 men, recruited between the end of
June and the beginning of July), the secret arrival of
soldiers and men of Nazi militia organizations from the
Reich, the smuggling in of large quantities of munitions and
other war material, the reconditioning of existing and the
construction of new defence works.
(7) Speeding up of production in every branch of
industry concerned with national defence. Combined with
mobilisation, this intensified production (which in the case
of Ruhr coal has reached record figures) has increased the
shortage of German labour. On July 11 Field-Marshal Goering
was forced to put severe restrictions upon the right to
requisition labour for works of public utility. Various
instances have been reported in which the army has been
compelled to release young miners who had been mobilised.
(8) Arrangements made to use female labour in order to
replace in war-time factory operatives who might be
mobilised.
(9) Reguisitioning of motor vehicles (private cars and
lorries), horses and motor fuels. In many districts the
owners of motor vehicles or of horses have been invited to
keep them at the disposal of the military authorities, in
some instances from the first week in August, and, in
others, on dates between August 15 and August 20. Highclass
fuels like "aral" (benzine, benzol and motor spirit), which
in times of crisis are always reserved for the army, have
been requisitioned in Bohemia and Moravia.
(10) Measures taken to organise the medical services
for war-time needs. In Berlin premises have been
requisitioned for the establishment of a hospital containing
600 beds. In the Dresden area doctors have received orders
to place themselves at the disposal of the military
authorities as from August 3 or August 5.
(11) Restrictions placed upon the granting of leave and
on travellers' facilities. It has been reported that in many
military units leave had been cancelled as from July 15 or
August 1. Again, in various factories holidays are reported
to have been cancelled if they fell
[230]
due in the second week of August and onwards. At Dresden the
police have stamped passports, valid for long periods,
"valid until August 20."
(12) Order given to aircraft factories to discontinue
the adaptation of plant to the needs of the newest types of
aircraft and to proceed with the production, at war-time
speed, of aircraft of types already in use.
(13) Placing at the disposal of the naval authorities
of North Sea fishing-boats capable of being transformed into
mine-layers.
At Hamburg the majority of trawlers have already been
equipped with mine-laying apparatus; and stocks of mines
have been accumulated in the docks. This step had already
been taken in September 1938.
(14) Organisation in many areas of the Reich of
civilian defence drill-an arrangement which had already been
planned during last autumn, when the German-Czech crisis was
entering upon its most acute phase.
We can therefore consider that everything is proceeding
as though the Reich were aiming at reaching an advanced
state of mobilisation by the middle of August.
Though, in many respects, the military activities at
the moment being pursued in the Reich are similar to those
which took place in Germany last summer, there are certain
material differences:
Last summer the preparations were made openly with the
obvious design of making a display.
This year the desire for concealment has outweighed the
wish to make an impressive show of military measures.
So far, the preparations and the movements of troops
which have taken place give no evidence of a general plan,
so much so that it has proved impossible to determine
whether the German menace would be aimed at the east or the
south-east.
The German-Polish quarrel over Danzig and the Corridor
broke out immediately after the occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia by German troops. In the development of this quarrel
the following stages can be distinguished:
On March 26 the Warsaw Government rejected the
proposals made to it by Germany, and informed the Berlin
Government that Poland would acquiesce neither in the return
of Danzig to the Reich nor in the establishment of an extra-
territorial passage across the Corridor.
Since then the Polish Government has not changed its
attitude.
[231]
In his speech on April 28 the Fhrer disclosed the
proposal which had been made to the Warsaw Government, and
laid stress on this offer as being "of unparalleled
generosity" and never to be repeated. However, he declared
himself ready to negotiate "provided that the matter was
settled in an unequivocal manner"; he added that no one
could possibly think that Danzig would ever be a Polish
city, but he did not actually demand the return of Danzig to
the Reich. Since then the Fhrer has never broached the
question again.
Some of his lieutenants, in particular Dr. Goebbels in
his speech on June 17, appeared to have gone further than
the Chancellor. Their tone was, in fact, more truculent. But
fundamentally they did not go beyond the Fhrer's own
declarations. "Danzig wants to be German," Dr. Goebbels
reiterated. "Its population must be aware that the Reich is
very amicably disposed towards them." But the Minister of
Propaganda did not actually demand the return of Danzig to
the Reich.
On several occasions the Nazis in the Reich and in the
Free City seem to have contemplated establishing a fait
accompli in Danzig. But they refrained from doing so in the
face of the resolute attitude of Poland and of its French
and British allies, and also probably because they hoped for
a weakening in the attitude of either Poland or the Western
Powers.
Similar information obtained from various sources
during the last week seems to make it clear that the Fhrer
himself, about the middle of this month, had arrived at the
conclusion that on this occasion Germany was faced with
extremely serious resistance, and that, if he attempted to
ignore it, the Reich was running the risk of precipitating a
general conflict. This reversal of opinion seems to be due
to the reports which the Chancellor has received direct from
agents sent to Britain and France.
According to certain reports the recent visit to London
early in July of Lieutenant-Colonel Gerhardt Schwerin, Chief
of the British Section of the German General Staff, and the
reports of the officers who were present in Paris at the
review of July 14 have not been without influence in
affecting such a change in the Chancellor's mind. But he
seems to have been struck above all by the revival of the
French Air Force, which in 1938 had completely disappeared
as a factor in European politics, by the way in which the
air power of Great Britain asserted itself, and by the
active military cooperation between Britain, France and
their allies. Thenceforward, being con-
[232]
vinced that the Western Powers were determined to honour
their obligations to Poland, the Fhrer is said to have
become uncertain as to the course to be pursued.
The statements made by Dr. B”mer on July 21 to the
correspondents of the foreign Press, the commentary on these
statements given on the same day by a spokesman of the
Wilhelmstrasse, the article published in the Danziger
Vorposten of July 23, and the pronouncements which Herr
Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig, has caused to appear in
the German Press of today-all these seem to be inspired by
the one motive: ways of retreat must be kept clear for the
Reich Government, should they decide in the present
circumstances not to press the matter of Danzig further.
The spokesmen of the Minister of Propaganda and of the
Wilhelmstrasse asserted that at no time had Germany
contemplated war as a solution of the Danzig problem, and
that it clung to the hope of reaching it by peaceful means.
"To regain Danzig by peaceful methods is the political fact
from which Germany will not depart," the Danziger Vorposten
printed for its part. As to Herr Forster, he took up a
defensive attitude: he protested that he had at no time
planned a Putsch; he claimed that the military preparations
made by the Free City were merely precautions taken against
the possibilities of an attack by the Poles.
In adopting this attitude the Danzig Government has
made it possible for itself to demobilise without having to
admit a retreat. Like Dr. B”mer, Herr Forster had moreover
allowed it to be understood that there was no urgency about
the problem of Danzig.
Nevertheless, one fact cannot be overlooked: it remains
the avowed aim of the Nazi parties both in Danzig and in
Germany to secure the return of the Free City to the Reich.
Upon this essential point there has been no question of the
slightest compromise. The conflicting position between
Warsaw and Berlin remains therefore unaltered. This fact,
taken in conjunction with the military preparations now
being made in Germany, demands the most vigilant attention.
This is true, whatever reason for confidence may be derived
from the developments which have taken place in France and
Britain during the past months, and from the impression they
have made upon the leaders of the Third Reich.
From information received during the past few days from
various high-placed Germans, it follows that the leaders of
the Reich are at
[233]
present in a state of extreme embarrassment, that once again
pressure in opposite directions is being brought to bear on
the Fhrer by his advisers, and that he inclines first to
one group and then to another. Moreover, he is said to be
the more perplexed since, behind the Danzig question, there
looms the more general problem of the relations between the
Reich and the other European Powers, as the present state of
tension cannot go on indefinitely.
In no case, then, can we consider that the master of
the Third Reich has given up for good the idea of a solution
by force. Undoubtedly, the best means to deflect him from
this is for the democracies to continue to show themselves
resolute, strong and hardworking. In existing circumstances,
any sign that Germany might interpret as an offer to begin
conversations-premature so long as the Reich continues to
ignore the Polish point of view-runs the risk of being
regarded as a sign of physical weariness or of moral
weakening.
It would seem that it is by silently demonstrating
their renewed forces and their energies that the Western
Powers will most effectively contribute to prevent Nazi
Germany from seeking a solution of her dispute with Poland
by methods that might prove fatal to peace.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 172
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
July 25, 1939.
IN the course of another conversation which he had
with the Gauleiter yesterday, the latter confirmed to Herr
Burckhardt that Herr Hitler was prepared to wait as long as
might be necessary in order to bring about a solution of the
Danzig question by peaceful means.
Furthermore, deferring to the protest made to the
Commissioner by the Gauleiter, the Warsaw Government will
henceforth notify the Senate of any movements by rail of
Polish troops upon the Free City's territories.
LA TOURNELLE.
[234]
No. 173
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 27, 1939.
IN Berlin today everyone is more or less in agreement
with th view that there is an apparent lull in the
international situation, an that this pause in the
development of the crisis is due to the impressio of
strength and resolution given by France and Britain to
Germany Nevertheless, among the members of the Diplomatic
Corps as well as in German circles, opinions vary as to the
importance to be attached to this lull, and as to the
possible sequels to the deliberations now going on in the
minds of the rulers of the Reich.
The Germans had hoped to annex Danzig without having to
face the possibility of a general war. It is now evident
that the affair has been badly started and that, if there is
a desire to carry it through to the end, the risk of war
must be reckoned with. In a recent dispatch I noted the
signs that lead one to believe that they do not recoil in
the face of this contingency, and other and more hopeful
signs that are averse to the idea of a war.
It is likely, no doubt, that the Germans do not want to
go war for the sake of Danzig; but is it, then, merely a
question of Danzig? If this problem has been more
clamorously advertised and was pressed in preference to any
other, it is because its solution has been considered the
easier, and that it involved less risk of war than I any
other question in which Germany was equally concerned.
Events have proved this estimate to be inaccurate and there
are signs-or there thought to be signs-of hesitation at
Berchtesgaden and Berlin. To what question do these
hesitations relate? Is it wise to infer from them that the
Chancellor, having ventured somewhat rashly in the matter,
will show himself more reasonable?
The facts seem to be that since Munich, and more
especially since March 15, two currents of influence have
attempted to sway the Chancellor's mind. On the one hand he
has been told, and that is Herr von Ribbentrop's view, that
Germany can still realise many of ambitions without risking
an armed conflict, or at any rate without provoking a
general war. On the other hand he was told-and this was
Field-Marshal Goering's view-that in the present
circumstances nothing more could be done without going to
war.
[235]
The fact that Herr von Ribbentrop's information
regarding Danzig proved to be inaccurate need not be
regarded by the Chancellor as a proof that no other German
requirement can be met without war. It may have been that
Danzig was a bad choice. In the past the Memel question,
although it had been very definitely raised, was kept in
suspended activity, because circumstances seemed suddenly to
favour a transfer of attention to other problems. On the
other hand, the recognition that there was truth in what
might be called the "Goering line of thought" does not mean
that-on the assumption that there can be no conquests
without war-war will not be preferred to the surrender of a
dynamic policy.
It does not appear that the Fhrer has made a decision.
The keyboard is open before him: he can strike what note he
will. Since all the military arrangements have been made he
can, either in the case of Danzig or of any other question,
decide to wait until the first propitious opportunity offers
(and in the opinion of most Germans rifts will in time
appear in the democratic fronts, of which it will be
possible to take advantage). Alternatively, accepting the
risk, he can concentrate upon the particular question of
Danzig or upon the more general problem of German claims.
While there is rather less talk of Danzig, a campaign
against Poland as a maritime state is already taking shape.
In this connection an article in this morning's V”lkischer
Beobachter is significant. Voicing much the same view, the
Lokal Anzeiger writes: "The Polish attempts to make of
Poland a maritime state at all costs do not conform either
with serious economic facts or with essential political or
military interests."
Thus the question of the Corridor, already mentioned in
private conversation, now creeps into the Press together
with that of Upper Silesia. A German manufacturer said to a
Frenchman within the last few days: "When we possess Upper
Silesia, we shall have in our hands the last industrial area
of Central and Eastern Europe which was still outside our
range. Then our economic power need have no more fear of
competition in the markets of the Near East."
It is necessary, therefore, to remain on the watch.
What the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin describe
as an easing of the strain is probably no more than a period
of reflection, upon which the reactions of France and Great
Britain will certainly exercise some influence.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
[236]
No. 174
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
July 30, 1939.
FROM articles in the Press, as well as from
conversations, it is becoming clear that the particular
problem of Danzig is giving place to the problem of the
Corridor and even to that of the structure of Poland itself.
One wonders why the German Government, at a moment when
it is giving unexpected prominence to the memory of the
events of 1914, and when the twenty-fifth anniversary of
Germany's entry into the war is about to be commemorated in
the barracks as a national holiday, should be openly
raising, on a larger scale and under a guise much more
"vital" to Germany, the problem of the claims of the Reich.
Again, in certain circles not unconnected with Herr von
Ribbentrop's entourage, the conviction is being expressed
that Poland, deprived of credits which it had hoped to
secure from Great Britain, would not long be able to
maintain the national effort it is making today.
"We know that its economic situation is catastrophic;
we are receiving evidence of the discontent to be found
among the State officials. Poland will be unable to resist
for long, and will be forced to negotiate. It follows that
the Polish problem can be settled without war; for you are
pledged to intervene only if Poland calls for your help."
These are echoes of remarks made by Germans to
foreigners during the past few days.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
III
The Polish Resistance and the German Press Campaign
(August 1-19, 1939)
No. 175
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
August 1, 1939.
THE Senate having adopted a policy of silence in regard
to the renewed protests made by the Polish Government on the
subject of
[237]
Customs inspectors, that Government has just taken measures
of economic reprisals which may have grave consequences.
The Polish Commissioner General has indeed notified the
authorities of the Free City that the inspection by Polish
officials of the transformation of fats by the firm "Amada
Unida" will cease as from August 1, and that the right given
to Danzig to export them to Poland free of duty will no
longer be recognized. At the same time a similar treatment
is to be applied to the herrings caught by the Danzig
fishing fleet. In both instances considerable interests are
involved, and the parties concerned appear to be aggrieved.
Certainly herrings figure prominently in the Polish
diet; Dutch boats, sailing under the Danzig flag, used to
supply 6 million zlotys' worth. On the other hand, Amada, an
English firm run on Dutch capital, supplied margarine to
inland Poland to the value of some 15 million zlotys, this
being, according to its managing director, some 95 per cent
of the country's import of the commodity; while, conversely,
the firm handled 50 per cent of the country's export of
colza.
These unexpected reprisals caused surprise that found
expression in the local Press of July 31. The two daily
newspapers protested loudly against this linking of an
economic question with one which they held to be political,
namely that of the inspectors. They considered the whole
matter a violation of the exchange agreement valid up to
July 31, 1940, and on several occasions they described this
attitude as being "direct action," a procedure which seemed
to arouse in them great indignation.
The official reaction was no less strong. On August 1
the Senate gave orders to its Customs officials to disregard
for the future the Polish inspectors, who, they said,
belonged to the corps of frontier guards and not to the
Customs service. No rule was established for distinguishing
between these two categories, and it will presumably be
difficult to establish one, in view of the stream of abuse
with which the whole body has been flooded for three months
by the official propaganda.
This step was heralded in the Press by a long article
in which were set out all the delinquencies of which the
agents of the neighbouring republic were said to have been
guilty, consisting in equal proportions of cases of
espionage and of gross indecency. It was recalled that the
Treaty of Paris provided in Section 14 for an independent
Customs service in the Free City with merely a general right
of control by Poland. Poland had step by step transformed
this privilege into a highly specialized system of
inquisition, using such specious argu-
[238]
meets as the development of commercial activity or the
growth and complication of the Customs service. The Danziger
Neueste Nachrichten countered with the following figures:
1929
1938
Number of Polish Inspectors 27
100
Tonnage through the Port... 8.5 million tons, of 7.1
million tons, of
a value of 1.5 mil- a value
of 500 mil-
liards of zlotys lion
zlotys
So far as numbers are concerned, in almost all the
posts on the frontier of East Prussia the inspectors largely
exceeded the Danzig officials of the same rank, for example
at Kalthof by twelve to one.
In general this inspired article did not maintain the
same presence of dispassionate consideration. Its conclusion
under the headline, "Poland wrecks the Customs Union," is
most provocative. It insists that the Warsaw Government must
give up its new claims, otherwise "the economic policy of
Danzig must be directed not only to new outlets, but also to
new sources of supply." The meaning of this threat is
obvious; the reference is to rumours of an opening of the
frontier with the Reich.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 176
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 1, 1939.
A FORTNIGHT ago various reliable reports reached the
Embassy which seemed to show that about the middle of July
an important change had taken place in the attitude of the
Fhrer. He had become convinced that France and Great
Britain were firmly resolved to honour their obligations to
Poland, and that, this being so, the Reich ran the risk, if
it pushed the matter of Danzig to extremes, of provoking
general conflict. The impression had moreover been given
that the leaders of the Reich were anxious to provide
themselves with means of drawing back or of letting the
matter rest for a time without relinquishing their aims or
excluding the possibility of pursuing them actively, if and
when more favourable circumstances presented themselves. The
first phase of the Danzig affair, therefore, appear to have
led to a set-back for Herr von Ribbentrop, whom his
opponents, and
[239]
especially Field-Marshal Goering, accused, it was said, of
having irresponsibly involved Germany in a most dangerous
policy. At that moment, it might have been deduced that the
cause of peace had scored an important point.
Subsequently, certain signs led to the speculation
whether a revulsion of feeling had not occurred in the mind
of the all-powerful Lord of the Third Reich in the opposite
direction. The German newspapers (as also the Nazi organ at
Danzig), which towards August 22 stressed the desire of
Germany to obtain satisfaction by peaceful methods, have in
the last few days devoted themselves to showing that Germany
has nothing to fear even from a general conflict, which,
they declare, would find her in a much more favourable
position than in 1914. This is particularly the theme of the
majority of the articles devoted to the celebration of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry of Germany into the
Great War.
At the same time it became clear that the Press was
enlarging the scope of the German-Polish quarrel. It was no
longer a question solely of Danzig, but also of the Corridor
and even of Poznania and Upper Silesia. This was a somewhat
remarkable alteration of the tactics hitherto followed to
minimize the quarrel between Berlin and Warsaw and to convey
the impression that the German claims only affected a city
which was indisputably German in character.
Finally, the Nazi propaganda this very morning resumed
the campaign against the Polish Customs officials, which it
had abandoned from June onwards. Although for the last few
weeks the inspectors of Polish Customs in order to avoid any
clash, have allowed considerable supplies of arms and
munitions to enter the territory of the Free City, they are
declared by the German newspapers to have exceeded their
rights and to have behaved as "regular bandits." This is a
fresh application of the methods to which Germany resorted
in the Sudeten affair.
In the new attitude assumed by Germany in the last few
days there is undoubtedly a considerable element of bluff.
But it would, nevertheless, be unwise to remain satisfied
with that explanation.
Other factors have probably come into play.
We may be faced with the resumption of an offensive
attitude on the part of people like Herr von Ribbentrop, who
have not given up hope of persuading the Fhrer that Great
Britain will not in the end maintain her firm attitude and
that, in order to avoid war, it would again agree to a
solution similar to that of Munich.
[240]
The surprise visit of the Fhrer to Berlin on July 28,
his interview at the Wilhelmstrasse with Herr von
Ribbentrop, the fact that he proposes to conduct together
with him a new inspection of the Western fortifications,
clearly indicate that the Chancellor wishes to show that he
has not in any way withdrawn his confidence from his Foreign
Minister. Now it is known that, in respect of Danzig, Herr
von Ribbentrop is one of the strongest supporters of a
radical solution.
It may also be asked whether, in view of the slow
progress of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, the Nazi
leaders do not feel tempted to return to the plan of
lightning action, which would in a few weeks "liquidate" the
Polish army and face the Western Powers with an accomplished
fact. It is a plan which the German military authorities do
not consider free from danger; on the other hand it may be
assumed that they do not consider its execution impossible,
provided that Russian neutrality is assured. The risk of
seeing Germany rally to the support of such a solution
cannot be entirely excluded, so long as the Russian riddle
remains unanswered.
However that may be, there certainly exist at this
moment two opposite currents of opinion in Germany.
The supporters of the one are yielding to the war
psychosis and consider a catastrophe as inevitable. This
point of view is very widespread, especially in the
provinces, where it is supported by the calling up of
reservists, the departure of soldiers for unspecified
destinations, the antiaircraft preparations, the
requisitions, the restrictions on food and on other
commodities which are becoming more and more noticeable-the
continual movements of troops and the calling-up of the last
reserves of workers.
The others-whose faith in the Fhrer remains unshaken
are-convinced that the Chancellor will once more work a
miracle and will succeed-without war-in restoring Danzig to
the Reich. Some maintain that he has a scheme, the execution
of which will astound the world.
In circles that are usually well-informed they declare
that they have no knowledge. The Fhrer himself, they say,
does not know which policy he will adopt. It will depend
entirely on the circumstances.
In the same circles it is recognized that the only war
that Germany can possibly risk is a very short one and that
the chances of seeing the end of a war within a few months
are extremely slender. The same people hold that the leaders
of the Reich will have to come to their decision between now
and the beginning of September, the date at which
[241]
the Nuremberg congress is to begin. The critical period
would be the second half of August.
The leaders of the Third Reich seem, then, to be still
equally subject to doubts and to temptations. In so far as
they become convinced that from now on Poland can count on
the effective help of France and England and that a short
war is a mere chimera, we may hope that logic will outweigh
their leaning towards solutions based on trickery and
boldness.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No . 177
M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 2, 1939.
THIS morning I questioned M. Arciszewski concerning the
retaliatory measures taken by the Polish Government against
the Free City. He replied that the position was rather
serious, that the Polish Government had had the matter under
consideration yesterday evening and that, without knowing
the result of its deliberations, he thought he could assure
me that everything depended on the attitude taken by the
Senate in regard to the difficulties encountered by the
Polish Customs control.
M. Arciszewski gave me to understand that, in
accordance with its declared principles, the Polish
Government would not refuse to replace by others those
Customs inspectors whose relations with the local
authorities had become strained as a result of certain
incidents.
When I asked him what might be the intentions of the
Senate in regard to the opening of the Customs frontier with
East Prussia, M. Arciszewski replied that the Polish
Government had no special reason to fear such a possibility,
but that it was bearing in mind all contingencies which
might occur during the coming weeks. The view of the Polish
Government was that as long as the Government of the Reich
remained uncertain, what course of action Poland would adopt
in the various contingencies which might arise, it would
continue to feel its way.
M. Arciszewski was naturally not very explicit
concerning the tactics which his Government might adopt; but
it is in all probability in order to keep the Germans in
their present state of uncertainty that
[242]
the Polish Government has chosen not to remain consistently
passive in face of the Nazi actions in the Free City.
SEGUIN.
No. 178
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
August 3, 1939.
IT is with great surprise and considerable anxiety that
we have learned in Danzig of the measures of economic
reprisal taken by the Polish Government in reply to the
difficulties experienced by the Customs inspectors in the
performance of their duties.
The smuggling of arms having been carried on for months
without penalties and the Free City having been placed on a
military footing without protest from Warsaw, so drastic a
decision was no longer anticipated. Since August 1 the
margarine of the Amada Company, an English company with
Dutch capital, and the herrings caught by Dutch fishing
boats flying the Danzig flag cannot be imported free of duty
into Poland. The annual sales of these products amount to
15,000,000 and 5,000,000 zlotys respectively. The Amada
Company imports 8,000 tons into Poland, which amounts to 95
per cent of the total quantity consumed in that country, and
buys there 20,000 tons of colza, which amounts to 50 per
cent of the total output.
By way of reprisal the Senate has ordered its Customs
officials only to work with the Polish inspectors if they
are what they purport to be and not frontier guards in
disguise; at the same time no means of ascertaining this
difference has been indicated to them.
In official circles there are hints of the possibility,
if Poland persists in her "direct action," of the opening of
the Customs frontier between the Reich and Danzig. But there
is no concealing the fact that very serious consequences
might result from such a step.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 179
M. DE SEGUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 3, 1939.
THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has given the British
Ambassador the following explanations on the subject of the
recent decision of the
[243]
Danzig Senate: About three years ago the Polish Government
added to the Polish Customs inspectors serving in the
territory of the Free City some Customs officials, who were
given the special duty of checking the smuggling which was
then beginning to grow, and it was to free themselves from
this unwelcome hindrance that the Senate wished to be able
to distinguish the inspectors from the ordinary Customs
officials.
M. Beck added that the Polish Government would not
object to a fusion of these two classes of officials and to
giving them the same uniforms, provided that the Customs
service could in future perform its duties in conditions
that permitted of reasonable efficiency.
SEGUIN.
No. 180
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 3, 1939.
IN the course of the last week a very definite change
in the political atmosphere has been observed in Berlin.
Whereas after the middle of July there appeared to be a
certain d‚tente, towards the end of the month there were
signs of a fresh stiffening of attitude. The period of
embarrassment, hesitation, inclination to temporization or
even to appeasement which had been observable among the Nazi
leaders, has been succeeded by a new phase: today the
actions of the leaders of the Third Reich and the language
of their Press reveal two dominating purposes:
To convince the German people that it is threatened, as
in 1914, and that its very existence is imperiled.
To convince public opinion at home and abroad that the
Third Reich is invincible and that neither threats nor any
human power can arrest it in the pursuit of its vital
interests.
Nothing is neglected which may give the German people
such confidence in its own might as to allow it to await the
future with calmness, to resist attacks of all kinds and to
break through any obstacles which may impede its path.
I will try to show elsewhere how this propaganda is
conducted. It is not without interest to ask oneself what
motives have inspired it. It is probable that the rulers of
the Reich are endeavouring to allay the
[244]
fears which spread through the population when military
preparations are, as at the present moment, greatly
intensified.
On every side I am informed of what amounts to a
recrudescence of the war psychosis which had manifested
itself last September. The anxiety to allay the general
alarm is particularly shown by the persistence of the
efforts to convince the people that there is no danger of
air-raids.
On the other hand, at a time when the German military
preparations are being intensified and accelerated, when
clashes between the Poles and the members of the German
minority seem to multiply, when polemics regarding Danzig
are being resumed, the Nazi leaders are doubtless anxious to
impress foreign opinion with the conviction that Germany is
now once again prepared to go to any lengths, if necessary,
in order to obtain satisfaction and show that the Reich
would not give way, even if faced by the coalition the
crowning-piece of which would be a Franco-Anglo-Russian
agreement.
At the same time the possibility must not be ignored
that the leaders of the Third Reich may have wished to
stimulate the somewhat failing enthusiasm of their people
and to convince them that, their existence being threatened,
they must defend themselves and that it is not so much a
question of the Germans "dying for Danzig" as of their
fighting for the life of the German people itself.
The military activity displayed by the Third Reich
since June has all the time called for the greatest
vigilance on our part. The tone now adopted by its Press
must make us more vigilant still and as resolute as ever.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 181
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 6, 1939.
THE clash which occurred on August 4 between the
authorities of the Free City and the Polish Customs
inspectors has been reported by M. de Seguin. But I consider
it essential that I should touch on these Occurrences again
in order to make clear certain details which remained
obscure, and to deduce from them certain indications in view
of the coming difficulties.
On the afternoon of the 4th the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs learnt
[245]
that at four of the Danzig Customs posts on the East
Prussian frontier, the Polish Customs inspectors had been
given notice by the heads of the Danzig posts that they
could not continue to perform their duties after Sunday the
6th. The Polish Government took the step of addressing a
note to the Senate, requesting it to give by the following
evening a written assurance that the Customs officials would
be allowed to continue to perform their duties, otherwise
the Polish Government reserved to itself the right to take
necessary steps to safeguard its rights. Toward 8 p.m. the
French and British representatives were informed of the wish
of M. Beck to communicate matters of importance to them in
the evening. At about 10 p.m. the Private Secretary of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned a secretary of the
British Embassy and M. de Seguin, and informed them of the
events of the afternoon and of the Polish Government's
intentions. Count Lubienski added that M. Beck expected to
be in a position to inform the French and British
Governments next morning of the steps the Polish Government
might be led to take in the event of the Senate of the Free
City not giving a favourable reply.
The Polish note was delivered during the night to the
President of the Senate in person.
At 830 a.m. the Polish Commissioner informed the League
High Commissioner of the Polish d‚marche. Shortly
afterwards, M. Greiser telephoned to M. Chodacki that the
Senate of the Free City would not put any difficulties in
the way of the Polish officials performing the duties
assumed by them, but that it would not "for technical
reasons" reply in writing to the Polish note before Monday.
The Polish Government decided to be satisfied for the
time being by this reply, and at the end of the morning
informed the two Embassies of the relaxation in the crisis.
Such was the course of events. One point has not yet
been cleared up: what exactly took place between German and
Polish officials at the four frontier posts? In his
conversation on Saturday morning with Sir Howard Kennard, M.
Beck made it clear that the German notification was
addressed only to Customs officials in the strict sense of
the term (the Department is aware of the distinction which
the Senate seeks to establish between Customs inspectors and
the ordinary Customs officials whom it calls "Grenzer").
According to further information from official Polish
circles, there had been no notification to the Polish
officials, but a threat to remove them by force, if they did
not give up their posts. Finally, according to the version
reported by M. de la
[246]
Tournelle, M. Chodacki had taken his action because the
President of the Diet had issued orders for the arrest of
the "Grenzer" before 3 p.m. of that day.
In itself the episode of August 4 seems to have been
closed by Herr Greiser's answer to the Polish note, always
supposing that the Senate's promised note arrives to confirm
its terms. But this answer does not end the controversy on
the subject of the distinction the Senate claims to draw
between Customs inspectors and Customs officials. It neither
provides, nor does it point towards, a final solution of the
problem of the working of the system of Customs supervision.
However, a new factor has appeared. Although Poland has
taken no action against the remilitarization of the Free
City, she has taken a stand against the threat of an attack
aimed openly and publicly against her rights in the sphere
of the Customs. Before August 4 the Reich might speculate as
to how far it could go with its policy of "nibbling." This
is now determined, and henceforth the Reich, before it
frames its future policy, will have to take into its
calculations the Polish will to resist.
LON N™EL.
No. 182
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 7, 1939.
IN a recent conversation, M. Beck informed the British
Ambassador that military measures might have been taken, had
the Senate rejected the Polish note. It is, therefore, of
interest to refer to treaty articles applying either to the
case of an attack on Danzig from outside, or to that of an
attempt to alter by force the present status of the city.
The Treaty of Versailles contains no provision in
regard to these, nor does the Convention of 1920 specify
either the circumstances or methods of possible action for
the defence of the Free City.
"In its sitting of November 17, 1920, the Council of
the League of Nations adopted a report declaring that the
Polish Government seemed particularly fitted to receive from
the League of Nations in case of necessity the mandate to
undertake the defence of the Free City, but adding that this
mandate could at no time be given in a general form, but
only after consideration by the Council of the circumstances
peculiar to each case."
[247]
The Consultative Military Commission of the League of
Nations, declared at this same date:
"(1) The League of Nations can undertake the defence of
Danzig only by mandate.
"(2) A contingent mandate is of no military value; only
a permanent mandate can be taken into account.
"(3) The defence of the Free City cannot be separated
from that of the province of Pomerania.
"(4) Poland is the only Power in a position to organize
the defence of the Free City.
"(5) Poland must be allowed to build fortifications in
the territory of the Free City and to garrison them with
Polish troops.
"(6) These fortifications would be built facing the sea
and towards East Prussia. On the Pomeranian side Poland's
western frontier constitutes Danzig's line of defence.
"Following this statement, the Council of the League of
Nations decided to consult General Sir Richard Haking, at
that time High Commissioner in Danzig. On January 25, 1921,
he declared that Danzig had no need of defences as the Free
City could not be defended against a German attack, which
was the only possible contingency."
In June 1921, the Council adopted the following
resolution:
(1) The Polish Government is specially fitted to
ensure, if circumstances require it, and in the following
conditions, the defence of Danzig by land, as well as the
maintenance of order on the territory of the Free City, in
the event of the local police forces proving insufficient.
With this object in view, the High Commissioner will,
if occasion arises, request instructions from the Council of
the League of Nations and will, if he thinks fit, submit
proposals.
(2) It will nevertheless be within the competence of
the High Commissioner to anticipate the authorization of the
Council and to address a direct invitation to the Polish
Government to ensure the defence of Danzig, or "the
maintenance of order," in the following cases:
(a) In the event of the territory of the Free City
being the object of aggression, threat or danger of
aggression from a neighbouring country other than Poland,
after the High Commissioner has assured himself of the
urgency of the danger;
(b) In the event of Poland being, for any reason
whatever,
[248]
suddenly and effectively prevented from exercising the
rights possessed by her under Article 28 of the Treaty of
November 9th, 1920.
In these two cases the High Commissioner should report
to the Council the reasons for the action which he has
taken.
(3) As soon as the object in view has been achieved to
the satisfaction of the High Commissioner, the Polish troops
will be withdrawn.
(4) In all cases where Poland has to ensure the defence
of the Free City, the Council of the League of Nations may
provide for the collaboration of one or more States Members
of the League.
(5) The High Commissioner, after consultation with the
Polish Government, will present to the League of Nations a
general report on the measures for which it may be necessary
to provide in the above-mentioned cases.
Theoretically, therefore, Poland could be called upon
to provide for the defence of Danzig either if the League of
Nations appealed to it directly, or in certain circumstances
at the behest of the High Commissioner appointed by the
League of Nations. But Poland does not hold a permanent
mandate nor has she herself the right to intervene in the
matter, but is required by the resolution of the Council in
1921 to take no action until asked to do so by the High
Commissioner.
At the end of last May, the Counselor of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in charge of questions affecting Danzig
reminded M. Burckhardt when the latter was passing through
Warsaw of his rights in this respect, the High Commissioner
replied that if a contingency occurred that would justify
his intervention, he would straightway have recourse to the
Committee of Three.
LON N™EL.
No. 183
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 7, 1939.
I HAVE received from M. Beck the following particulars
with regard to the note that has today been handed to the
Polish Commissioner by the Danzig Senate.
The thesis already formulated verbally by Herr Greiser
to M. Chodacki is repeated in this note: that the Polish
Government, whose protest was based on mistaken information,
had no cause to take
[249]
umbrage. Moreover, the Senate declares that it is ready to
discuss the various points at issue in the matter of the
Danzig Customs with the Commissioner.
Although one may take it that the Senate's note is
hardly diplomatic in expression, M. Beck is sufficiently
pleased with it: he would seem to be right in interpreting
this reply as a refusal on the part of the Nazi elements in
Danzig.
The latter, either at Berlin's instigation or possibly
on their own initiative, provoked this incident to see how
the land lay.
The Polish Government considered that, after everything
that has happened recently in Danzig from the military point
of view, the time had come to call an immediate halt.
"Although openly conducted," said M. Beck to me, "the
smuggling of arms and men was not recognized by the Senate.
This time, however, we had to make a stand, as here was an
action being taken officially against our interests."
The Foreign Minister added that the Polish Customs
officers in the Free City had been ordered from the
beginning of this incident to carry out their duties in
uniform and armed, in case there should be an attempt made
to arrest them.
During the negotiations that are about to take place
with the Senate, Poland will be very conciliatory as far as
the details of the Customs control are concerned; with
respect to the principle itself of that control it will, on
the other hand, be very firm.
In M. Beck's view the general situation is still
serious; he tells me, however, that he considers the
attitude which the Danzig Senate has just adopted, after
consulting with Berlin, as a favourable sign which should
encourage us all to persevere in our joint policy of
firmness.
Only by strict adherence to this policy could we
overcome, without a war arising, a further crisis which
Colonel Beck also expects at the end of August or early in
September.
LON N™EL.
No. 184
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 7, 1939.
WHEN stressing the vital importance that Danzig has for
Poland, the Polish Press does not fail to emphasize the fact
that for Germany the fate of the Free City is not of any
great significance but really
[250]
only a part of a very much wider problem which the Reich
avoids mentioning at present for obvious tactical reasons.
M. Smogorzewski, writing in the Gazeta Polska, observes
with relation to this that many Germans, even in front of
foreign journalists, have not troubled of late to conceal
that a settlement of the Danzig question cannot be
considered without a settlement of the problem of the
Corridor, and that the access of eighty million Germans to
East Prussia was more important than the access of twenty
million Poles to the sea.
The officials of the Wilhelmstrasse and of the German
Propaganda Ministry are said to have received orders a few
days ago not to make such remarks; but M. Smogorzewski
quotes several examples to show that this is actually the
theory held by the German leaders: Dr. Goebbels' speech at
Cologne on May 19 last, in which the Corridor question was
plainly stated; a special number published by the review Der
Deutsche im Osten on the occasion of Dr. Goebbels' visit to
Danzig, which stated that a final adjustment of German-
Polish relations would involve the return to the Reich of
Danzig, the Corridor and "other territories"; and an article
appearing in the Schwarze Korps for July 20 which spoke of
Poland's access to the sea as an absurd anomaly, etc.
The Polish Press has hitherto done no more than briefly
report Herr Forster's statements to the representatives of
Paris Soir and the Daily Express. There is reason to
believe, however, that it has taken careful note of them;
Danzig's Bavarian Gauleiter incautiously provided it with a
number of arguments when he declared that what the Germans
want is "the restoration of Germany's pre-War frontiers and
the certainty of not having hostile neighbours on her
eastern border," adding: "Our claims seek only to redress
the wrongs perpetrated by the Treaty of Versailles."
In this connection I would point out to your Department
that the pamphlet Danzig-de quoi s'agit-il? which is being
circulated in France by the German Propaganda department, is
in fact the translation of a booklet in German, copies of
which were distributed some time ago by the Press service of
the Danzig Senate.
It too contains passages (pp. 16-17 of the French text)
declaring in so many words that Germany demands the return
not only of Danzig (her "last claim," according to Count
Welczeck) but also "the Corridor and other territories
arbitrarily torn from the Reich."
[251]
In my opinion such an avowal deserves to be noted and
commented upon by our Press.
LON N™EL.
No. 185
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 8, 1939.
LAST week-end seems to have opened a new chapter in the
development of the Danzig question: that of Polish
resistance to the encroachments of the Senate and the Nazis
of the Free City. This will to resist has assumed two forms:
the ultimatum addressed to the Senate on August 5 on the
subject of the Polish Customs officers, and Marshal Rydz-
Smigly's speech at Cracow (August 6). The result has been a
revival of anti-Polish agitation in the German and Danzig
newspapers, but at any rate for the present this further
outburst of ill-feeling seems chiefly designed to hide the
setback suffered last Saturday in Danzig.
The Nazi plan, as it appeared since the beginning of
June, evidently consisted in the gradual eviction of Poland
from Danzig by an unremitting series of infringements of the
statute; when the remilitarization of the Free City had been
completed, the next objective of the attack was the Customs
barrier separating Danzig from East Prussia.
Here too the Danzig Nazis proceeded by stages, and all
things considered, with a great deal of caution. They
differentiated among the Polish officials between Customs
officers and frontier guards. The latter were singled out
for a start, although of course there was every intention,
if successful, to turn their attention towards breaking down
entirely the Polish Customs control.
The conflict arose over the Amada margarine factory. By
way of a protest against the captiousness to which their
agents were subjected, the Polish authorities on August 2
prohibited the importation of this firm's products into
Polish territory. The Senate retorted by ordering the Danzig
Customs officials to collaborate only with Polish Customs
officers, and not with frontier guards disguised as Customs
men.
Next day, on August 4, Herr Forster demanded that
reprisals should cease and threatened to do away with the
Customs control. That same day, a high official of the
Danzig Customs House ordered the arrest of Polish inspectors
looked upon as "Grenzer" (frontier guards). On being
informed of this order, the Warsaw Government
[252]
issued on the morning of the 5th an ultimatum expiring at
six p.m., whereupon the Danzig Senate, startled by the
reaction of the Poles, finished by giving way, after
alleging that it knew nothing of the measure which had
provoked the Polish ultimatum.
Poland, which had for months tolerated countless
infringements of the Danzig statute in order to avoid
incidents, had scored the first point.
Next day, August 6, in the speech which he delivered at
Cracow before 150,000 legionaires, Marshal Rydz-Smigly
announced that Poland was determined to meet "force with
force" and to oppose any direct or indirect attempt to
tamper with her interests and rights. He added that Danzig,
bound to Poland for many centuries, formed the lung of her
economic organization and that in this matter the Government
of Warsaw had made its position completely and unequivocally
clear.
Thus the attempt at intimidation has been unsuccessful.
From now on the nibbling process will meet with Polish
resistance. That is what the past week-end has meant for
Germany.
In Berlin as in Danzig, it appears that the Nazis have
been somewhat disconcerted by the firmness of the Warsaw
Government. On Sunday morning the newspapers were silent
about the events which had taken place in Danzig on
Saturday. Not until Monday afternoon did a tendentious
version find its way into the whole Press which strove to
make things out as if the Senate had purely and simply
rejected the "barefaced" demand which the Poles had made and
"accompanied by threats." The Government in Warsaw was
accused of having taken action as a result of false rumours
and its attitude was announced as "a particularly dangerous
provocation." Furthermore, the papers in Danzig and the
Reich asserted that the Senate would seek to settle the
question of the Danzig Customs officials' authority by
negotiation and that it upheld the fundamental distinction
between Customs inspectors and frontier guards.
This was a thinly veiled retreat.
The comments of the Czas on Marshal Rydz-Smigly's
speech conveniently provided the Nazis with an opportunity
to cover this retreat with a clamour of threats and
imprecations. The Polish Conservative organ wrote that if
the Danzig Nazis tried to create a fait accompli, "Polish
guns would speak." "We are being threatened!" cried the
entire German Press. "Poland has overstepped all limits in
her insolence and irresponsibility. Poland, beware! It
should be understood
[253]
in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and in London, that if Polish
guns convert the German city of Danzig into a heap of ruins,
German guns will not remain silent."
After accepting the Polish ultimatum last Saturday, the
Nazis had in their turn started to utter threats. Thus the
balance tended to be established.
From the fact that after a long series of concessions,
the Poles last Saturday scored a point, one cannot draw any
conclusions as to the ultimate outcome of the Danzig affair.
Berlin and Warsaw still stand in complete opposition.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 186
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 8, 1939.
IT is only after a lapse of two days that the German
Press has seized on the happenings in Danzig to let fly at
Poland, which it accuses of war-like provocation. Similarly
the Czas article, which has supplied the campaign that was
initiated yesterday with abundant material, was not
immediately made use of by the German Press. Thus the
Essener National Zeitung, although regarded as semi-
official, abstained from commenting on the article in
tonight's edition.
One may therefore wonder whether these violent
diatribes which are not spontaneous but seem in some
respects to recall the process applied in September 1938 to
Czechoslovakia, are intended as the time when the German
army will be ready draws near, to pave the way for the test
of strength which is generally expected at the end of this
month, or whether it is not simply a question of the German
leaders covering by this means the retreat which the Danzig
Senate has been forced to make and preventing the Poles from
glorying in their success or attempting to follow it up.
Although there is a great deal of war talk among the
people, because the papers encourage it, and military
preparations are becoming more noticeable, still it should
be stated that nothing abnormal has happened since Saturday,
the day of the Polish ultimatum to the Danzig Senate.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
[254]
No. 187
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 8, 1939.
THE latest Polish-Danzig incident and the manner in
which it was settled are very typical of the attitudes of
the contending parties.
The Nazis continue to "nibble" in every possible way at
what remains of the statute of the Free City and the relics
of Poland's rights and interests in Danzig, no doubt hoping
to enable Herr Hitler to declare some day that "by the will
of the people of Danzig" nothing remains but the documents
of the regime instituted by the Treaty of Versailles, and
that it would be absurd to unleash a war for the sake of a
scrap of paper.
But at the same time Germany has been careful, hitherto
at least, not to push things to extremes. The Poles, in
their wish to gain time, had lately tolerated all that
happened in Danzig, and the Nazis had taken the fullest
possible advantage of the patience they displayed. This
time, in face of a determination to resist, they have become
conciliatory; according to information received by my
English colleague, the Senate have officially communicated
their draft memorandum to the High Commissioner of the
League of Nations, who is not accustomed to such courtesies,
and they have drawn back with the evident intention of
renewing their advance at the first opportunity.
The margin of concessions which Poland is still
prepared to make in her wish to temporize has become so
narrow, however, that any incautious act might well have the
most serious consequences. It would be well if Berlin were
to understand this.
LON N™EL.
No. 188
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 10, 1939.
HERR FORSTER, in a conversation which he had at the end
of the morning with the High Commissioner of the League, and
the tenor of which the latter has communicated to the Polish
Commissioner-General, said that the situation was regarded
as extremely serious in Berlin and that certain articles in
the Polish Press had incensed the
[255]
Chancellor; especially an article published three days ago
by the Czas, which has led the Government of Warsaw once
again to renew its counsels of moderation to the Press.
"In order not to make things more complicated," Herr
Hitler had enjoined him, Herr Forster continued, to avoid
any new incident in Danzig. M. Beck, comparing this
indication with the fact that the speech made by General von
Brauchitsch this afternoon in Danzig was comparatively
moderate, considers that to appreciate fully the real
significance of the German move one should take this into
account.
LON N™EL.
No. 189
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 10, 1939.
THE respite in the anti-Polish campaign which had
followed the verbal acceptance by President Greiser last
Saturday (August 5) of the Polish ultimatum in the affair of
the Customs inspectors turned out to be only of short
duration. The Nazis, both in Danzig and in the Reich, at
first a little taken aback by the Polish resistance, did not
take long to recover themselves. At the moment, the
agitation against Poland is more violent than ever.
The Germans in Danzig, as well as in the Reich,
completely overlooking the origins of the present crisis,
declare that they are threatened, so as to be able
themselves to adopt a threatening attitude with a semblance
of justification. Behind the question of the Free City, the
deep-seated animosity between Germans and Poles, which was
artificially masked by the 1934 agreement, is becoming more
and more apparent with its full implications and with ever-
increasing acuteness.
(1) On August 5, in the course of the day, Herr
Greiser, President of the Senate, taken aback by the Warsaw
Government's sudden determination to resist had hastily
parried this with verbal assurances which he had promised to
confirm in writing by Monday, (August 7). It had seemed for
a moment as though the Danzig authorities were going to seek
a peaceful solution to the quarrel raised by the Free City
in respect of the Polish Customs inspectors.
The German Press itself, despite the biased character
of its version of the discussion last Saturday between the
Free City authorities and M. Chodacki, hinted that
negotiations were about to begin between
[256]
Danzig and the Poles. The D.N.B. Agency's communiqu‚
referred to them.
In the note handed to M. Chodacki by the Senate on the
7th, there is, however, no longer any question of
negotiation, according to our Consul in Danzig. In any case
since August 9, no more mention of it has been made in the
German Press, which merely proclaimed the need for a swift
and thorough settlement of the dispute. That same day it was
announced that at a mass meeting of Danzigers to be held on
the evening of August 10, Herr Forster would speak "in
protest against the Polish threats."
It is difficult not to see in this decision the result
of the interview which the Danzig Gauleiter had with Herr
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the 8th. The Czas article perhaps
helped to suggest to the Chancellor the idea of a strong and
solemn protest by the Free City against "Polish threats."
Actually the moment had come for the Nazis to change their
tactics. Their system had now come up against the Warsaw
Government's determination to resist "nibbling." It was
therefore necessary to come back to the method of
intimidation, but this time making out that they were the
victims of intolerable bullying and would be obliged to
defend themselves by every means.
That will doubtless be the tenor of the speech which
Herr Forster is to deliver this evening in Danzig, a speech
composed on Herr Hitler's instructions and which official
German circles have already announced will be vehement in
tone.
In striving thus to create an unbearable tension
between Danzig and Warsaw, and apparently seeking in this
way to wreck all chances of a friendly agreement between the
two States, the rulers of the Reich would seem, if we are to
believe what we hear from well-informed quarters, to be
pursuing a well-defined aim: to get the Senate to declare
that it can no longer continue the talks with Poland on its
own and must ask the Reich to safeguard the interests of the
Free City within the scope of diplomatic action. The idea
seems to be to prepare the diplomatic abdication of Danzig
in favour of the Reich. In this way the differences between
Danzig and Warsaw would be transformed into a direct
conflict between Warsaw and Berlin. This would be a
procedure similar to that followed in the Sudeten dispute,
in which, at the decisive moment, the Reich took Herr
Henlein's place. Meanwhile the campaign of incitement
against Poland in the German Press has gone far beyond the
legal quarrel raised over Danzig.
[257]
By making great play with certain articles in the
Polish Press, such as that which appeared in Czas the day
before yesterday, and then one in the Kurjer Polski today,
the German papers have blazoned with sensational headlines
the charge that Poland not only wishes to "conquer" Danzig
and East Prussia and to reach the line of the Oder, but that
she seeks the complete destruction of the Reich and the
extermination of the German people, as formerly Rome desired
the ruin of Carthage. Normally such threats-if in fact they
are being uttered in Poland-should not in the least affect a
nation as proud of its size and of its strength as the
Greater German Reich. They should provoke nothing but
ridicule. They are, however, being exploited to the full to
fan the hatred against Poland and seem to reveal the
intention to aggravate systematically the present crisis.
The public pronouncements made in the last few days by
eminent personalities of the Third Reich, more especially,
Field-Marshal Goering and General von Brauchitsch, are also
not of a kind to simplify a solution of this crisis.
On the 25th anniversary of Germany's entry into the
War, the Embassy pointed out the two main objects which the
leaders of the Reich have in view: to persuade their people
that Germany is threatened and that if the Reich made war it
would be in self-defence; to convince public opinion that
the war could have no end but a victory for the German arms,
as the Reich was invulnerable and invincible.
It is this two-fold intention that was revealed in the
speech delivered by Field-Marshal Goering before the
"Rheinmetall" workmen on Sunday, the interview which he gave
to the Nachtausgabe (August 9), and the words spoken this
very day by General von Brauchitsch to workmen of the
armament factories.
In the present circumstances these speeches might well
seem to be the exhortation of a captain to his men before
leading them to the attack against the Polish enemy and
against the "encircling Powers."
It is not certain, however, that such is the true
meaning and the real aim of the anti-Polish campaign whose
revival at the present time we have just noted.
General von Brauchitsch stated that if the Fhrer
demanded the last and supreme sacrifice from the German
soldier, each would answer to his call; but he also asserted
that the Chancellor would not lightly risk the life of one
single German and that he would not decide to do so unless
there were no alternative.
As for Field-Marshal Goering, his chief concern was to
cover up the
[258]
weak points in Germany's armour. He was at pains to make it
clear that Germany did not want war, that the Reich was
awaiting the peace it desired with calm and with confidence
in the Fhrer, but that it would defend itself if it were
refused this peace or if someone were to commit the folly of
plunging Europe into war.
Neither Field-Marshal Goering nor General von
Brauchitsch touched on the problem of Danzig. It is a fact
worth noting.
The campaign of agitation now taking place in Germany
may have several objects in view:
Either to prepare the people's minds for a war, the
prospect of which is very far from filling the great
majority of Germans with enthusiasm;
Or to prepare a way out for the German Government. Only
recently a claimant, the Reich has abruptly become a
defendant. To read the German newspapers, it would seem to
be less a matter of annexing Danzig than of preventing
Poland from taking it, an intention which the Warsaw
Government has never held;
Or, finally, to intimidate the Poles and bluff the
Western Powers in the hope either of forcing Poland to come
to terms or of isolating her.
One cannot a priori reject any of these possibilities.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 190
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 12, 1939.
IN view of the tone of the Press, of the continual
calling-up of reserves, of the intense military activity
which is all the time increasing, and of new food
restrictions (there are queues outside the butchers' shops
this morning), the nervousness of the public has grown
suddenly sharper.
The semi-official Press is busy creating the impression
that important decisions are about to be taken today or to-
morrow. According to current rumours the Reichstag will meet
on Tuesday.
September 2 is, in fact, the opening date of the
Nuremberg Congress, which is to be the Congress of Peace
(the medal symbolizing this celebration has just been
struck) and the preparations for which
[259]
are being pushed forward with all speed. Between now and
then, it is hinted, Germany will in fact have made "her
Peace secure."
That is the date which this Embassy always indicated as
the one fixed for the Germany Army to be ready. Herr Hitler
has begun his consultations. He would seem to be on the
point of making a decision.
It seems very difficult to believe, separated as we are
by only three weeks from that Congress of Peace and with the
troops not yet concentrated, that, despite the illusions
which are held here about a "Blitzkrieg" which would not
give France and England time to intervene, anyone could hope
to obtain this peace, in so short a time, after having
imposed the German solution by warlike means. What they are
therefore counting on, is capitulation without war by the
Western Democracies, alarmed by the Reich's display of
military strength and by the self-confidence which it is
going to show in the course of the next few days.
Nevertheless, it is quite certain that the Reich in
building up this bluff is becoming more deeply involved both
in the political and in the military spheres, and that it
runs the risk of reaching a point from which it would be
difficult to draw back. In that case, however, it seems
probable to judge from the information so far in our hands,
that the Reich leaders will wait for the result of the
spectacular gatherings at Tannenberg and Nuremberg, as the
Danzig meeting did not produce the expected results. But if
the Congress of Peace were postponed or if preparations for
it were interrupted, the possibility of immediate action
being taken should, to my mind, be at least more seriously
considered.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 191
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 12, 1939.
GERMAN propaganda is now discoursing on the harsh
treatment of Germans by the Poles in order to create an
"atmosphere" which recalls the similar agitation made at the
time of the Sudeten affair, hoping in this way to convince
world-opinion and also to attempt for the last time to
persuade France and Great Britain to abandon Poland to her
fate.
In order to avoid that, in the game now being played,
Germany
[260]
should reach a point from which she could no longer draw
back, one may wonder whether it would not be advisable to
make it clear in some form or another that we are not
deceived and to try, on our side, to prevent this
"atmosphere" from being created. Undoubtedly it would be
necessary to act with care so as not to exasperate the
leaders of the Reich by reminding them of what they are
supposed to know or by arguing with them. But in my view it
would be useful to show that our attitude to the Danzig
question remains unchanged and to explain objectively why we
cannot allow our hearts to be softened by the fate of the
German population in Poland (as the German Press invites us
to do).
I therefore advise that our wireless stations should
broadcast, in an unprovocative manner, the following themes
(they are not new, but their very repetition would not fail
to have its effect):
(1) To justify her claims on Danzig Germany puts
forward the racial argument; why, then, is it occupying
Prague?
(2) From an historical point of view Germany maintains
that Danzig is "Urdeutsch," that is to say within the
homeland of the German people; even if we admitted this, it
is still inconceivable that the Reich has finally renounced
its claims on a land that was German at a far earlier date
and accepts the expulsion of the indigenous population of
the Upper Adige.
(3) For its own purposes, the German Press makes daily
mention of the incidents of which the German minority in
Poland is supposed to be a victim; but it would be worth
recalling those incidents of which the Polish minority in
Germany has been victim; that minority is as large as
Germany's minority in Poland (between 700,000 and a million
souls); it is deprived of its essential liberties; recently
several Polish schools have been closed. While the treatment
undergone by Germans abroad distresses deeply the German
Reich, it remains entirely silent about the regime which it
imposes in the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia, whence
it expels journalists and where it will allow no eye-
witnesses.
SAINT-HARDOUIN.
No. 192
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 12, 1939.
ATTENTION is drawn by Polish newspapers to the article
published
[261]
in the Angriff by Dr. Goebbels on the occasion of Herr von
Ribbentrop's conversations with Count Ciano. They point out
that Germany makes no secret of her desire for a general
revision of her eastern frontiers.
Dr. Goebbels's remarks provide further proof of
Germany's intentions of conquest, says the communiqu‚ at the
semi-official A.T.E. Agency, appearing in the Gazeta Polska.
Danzig is only a pretext; Germany wants to establish her
hegemony and seeks to use Danzig as a spring-board for
action on a larger scale in Eastern Europe.
LON N™EL.
No. 193
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 15, 1939.
I HAVE the honour to send herewith to your Department a
translation of the notes exchanged between the Commissioner-
General of the Polish Republic in Danzig and the President
of the Senate of the Free City, on August 4 and 7.
Your department will also find enclosed the text of a
communication addressed by the President of Customs
Administration of the Free City to the Head Office of the
Polish Customs on August 4.
LON N™EL.
The COMMISSIONER-GENERAL of the Polish Republic,
to the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the Free City of
Danzig.
I HAVE learned that the local authorities of the Danzig
Customs on duty at the posts situated on the frontier which
separates the Free City from East Prussia have addressed to
the Polish Customs inspectors a communication which is
without precedent in the history of Polish-Danzig relations.
This document states that the Danzig authorities intend,
from 7 a.m. on August 6 to prevent a certain number of
Polish Customs inspectors from carrying out their duties of
control which form part of the recognized rights of the
Polish Government on the Customs frontier. I am convinced
that this infringement of the existing agreements, which has
been committed by the local authorities, is the result of a
misunderstanding or of a false interpretation of
instructions given by the Senate of the Free City.
You are, I am sure, aware that the Polish Government
could not
[262]
permit the fundamental rights of Poland to be violated in
this way.
I expect to receive from you before 6 p.m. on August 5,
1939, a reply assuring me that you have countermanded the
steps taken by your subordinates.
Since the aforesaid incidents have occurred at several
frontier posts, I am obliged to inform you that all Polish
Customs inspectors have been ordered to carry out their
duties, as from August 6, in uniform and armed, and this in
all the frontier posts where they may consider it helpful to
their duties. Any attempt to interfere with the execution of
their duty, any attack or intervention by the police, will
be considered an act of violence directed against Polish
State officials in the discharge of their official
functions. Should such abuses occur, the Polish Government
would immediately initiate reprisals (retaliatory measures)
against the Free City and the responsibility for these would
fall entirely on the Senate.
I hope to receive a satisfactory reply at the time
stated.
CHODACKI.
His EXCELLENCY the Diplomatic Representative of the Polish
Republic,
M. M. CHODACKI, Minister Plenipotentiary in Danzig.
EXCELLENCY,
IN answer to your two notes of August 4, one of which
was not delivered to me until the 5th, I must express my
astonishment that you should take advantage of a completely
baseless rumour to send to the Danzig Government on behalf
of the Polish Government an ultimatum demanding a reply at
short notice, and that acting in this way without reason you
should court, at a time of great political unrest, dangers
which might lead to incalculable disasters. The order which
the Polish Government has abruptly given to all Polish
Customs inspectors to carry out their duties in uniform and
armed is contrary to all the stipulations of the Treaties in
force and cannot be considered other than as a provocation
likely to cause incidents and acts of violence of the most
serious nature.
In accordance with what I have since stated-and as I
informed you immediately by telephone on the afternoon of
Saturday, August 5-no official body, and in particular no
section of the Customs Administration of the Free City of
Danzig has ordered its officials from August 6, at 7 a.m.,
to prevent a certain number of Polish Customs inspectors
from carrying out their duties. I refer you, moreover, to my
note of June 3, 1939, in which I dealt at sufficient length
with the
[263]
question of the relationship between the Polish and Danzig
Customs officers on the frontier.
The Danzig Government protests with the utmost energy
against the reprisals with which it is threatened by the
Polish Government. It considers this procedure entirely
inadmissible and holds the Polish Government as entirely
responsible for any consequences which might occur.
I am, etc.,
GREISER.
The PRESIDENT of the Customs Administration of the Free City
of Danzig,
to the Head Office of the Polish Customs.
THE Senate of the Free City of Danzig has informed the
Polish Diplomatic representative in Danzig, in its letter of
July 29 of this year, that it has advised the Danzig Customs
Administration that the "so-called" frontier guards shall no
longer be treated as Polish Customs inspectors.
I beg to refer you to this communication from the
Senate.
By Order,
Dr.
KUNST,
Director of the Danzig Customs
Administration,
BEYLE.
No. 194
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 15, 1939.
I HAD this morning a conversation lasting one hour with
the State Secretary with whom I thought it advisable to
resume contact on my return to Berlin.
Herr von Weizs„cker asked me what impression I brought
back from Paris regarding the international situation.
I gave him as exact a picture as possible of France at
work, calm and peaceably inclined, but resolved to make all
the sacrifices necessary for the defence of her honour and
her position in the world. I made it clear that during my
stay in Paris, I had been able to satisfy myself that the
Government's foreign policy, which was supported almost
unanimously by the country, had been and remained, exactly
the same as the French Prime Minister and Your Excellency
had clearly defined
[264]
it, particularly with reference to Poland and Danzig. It
would be nothing short of dangerous to close our eyes to
obvious facts. Our positions were taken up quite definitely.
Between France, England, and Poland, undertakings for
assistance had been entered into, which would operate
automatically in case of aggression against any one of them.
But the French Government was also still inspired by the
most sincere wish to see an easing of the tension and an
agreement reached between Germany and Poland, and I was
able, in all sincerity and with a full knowledge of the
facts, to state that my Government would always use its good
offices to promote any settlement to which Poland, as a free
and sovereign state, might think it possible to subscribe.
I added that, on the other hand, I thought I had found
in Berlin an atmosphere slightly different from that
prevailing when I had left it in July. The Gauleiter of
Danzig between two visits to Berchtesgaden, had made two
violent speeches, one in the Free City, and one at Frth; in
the Press, space devoted to Polish incidents was on some
days assuming greater proportions, and the newspapers went
so far as to speak of German honour in connection with these
incidents. I was, therefore, very anxious to learn from the
State Secretary exactly how matters stood.
Herr von Weizs„cker replied that in actual fact he
regretted that he could not tell me that the situation was
still the same as when he had described it to me before my
departure. In May, and June, he had expressed the opinion
that time would do a great deal to improve matters, that the
Poles would gradually come round to wiser and more
conciliatory views. But the Poles were a changeable and
excitable people, and the English and French guarantee, that
"automatic" guarantee about which I had spoken, an offspring
of the policy of encirclement, had inclined them to follow a
course contrary to that which had been anticipated in
Berlin; time had therefore worked in an adverse direction
and they had now reached the point where an ultimatum from
Warsaw to the Danzig Senate had been followed by an exchange
of notes in which Poland went so far as to say that she
would consider any fresh German intervention that was
harmful to Polish rights and interests in Danzig as an act
of aggression.
The State Secretary then asked for these notes to be
brought to him so that he could show them to me. I pointed
out to him that I was not in a position to discuss the
matter and would have to reserve my opinion.
He did not insist, only mentioning that he had wished
to give me
[265]
a striking example in support of his allegations, and he
afterwards showed me a file of typewritten sheets: "There,"
he said, "is this morning's list of acts of persecution
suffered by the German minority in Poland. I have as many
every morning.
"Fortunately it's an ill wind that blows nobody any
good. This Polish policy must have the advantage of
ultimately loosening the bonds between you and Warsaw; I
refuse to believe that France intends always to screen these
Polish pranks."
In view of this direct hint and the insight which it
afforded into what the Germans had at the back of their
minds, it seemed to me necessary that I should be still more
explicit in my reply than I had been at the beginning of the
conversation.
I first of all reminded Herr von Weizs„cker that if we
had strengthened our bonds with Poland and if England had
similarly bound herself, he was well aware that it was
because of the events of last March, for which Germany was
alone responsible. Without renouncing either our role in
Europe, or our alliances, or our friendships, we had been
willing, after December 6, to consider Germany's special
position in central Europe. But the absorption of Bohemia
and Moravia had brought about a positive reversal of French
opinion. All, from the man in the street upwards, had
realized that a danger, the most formidable of dangers to
them, the loss of their liberty and of their independence,
threatened them; and they have been practically unanimous in
considering the restoration of a balance of power in Europe
as indispensable for the preservation of these blessings;
hence our policy, that was wholly devoid of any idea of
encirclement. I indicated that this detailed explanation
would no doubt enable the State Secretary to understand why
there could be no question of our loosening our ties with
Poland, and why the automatic operation of our guarantees
about which I had spoken was "real."
Herr von Weizs„cker then interrupted me in order to ask
me whether this automatic action would come into play even
if it were not a question of an "unprovoked" aggression. I
advised him not to lose himself in subtleties; the fact was
that if any of the three Allies, France, England, and
Poland, were attacked, the other two would automatically be
at her side.
After all, everything I had seen while in Paris had
convinced me of the moderation and even of the caution of
the Polish Central Government. I had been able to observe
that it turned a blind eye to the
[266]
importation of arms into Danzig, although the re-
militarization of the City is prohibited by its Statute.
"No doubt," retorted the State Secretary, "but the
Statute could not foresee that the City would have to defend
itself against its guardian! . . ."
I quote this phrase because it is very typical of the
state of mind of the Wilhelmstrasse. I added that if minor
incidents occurred in regions with German minorities, the
same was the case in Germany in regions with Polish
minorities.
Finally in order to leave no shadow of doubt in the
mind of Herr von Weizs„cker, I added that even as he could
rest assured that France was employing the language of
wisdom in Warsaw (a language which was moreover perfectly
well understood) and that she sincerely desired a German-
Polish understanding, so the German Government must likewise
take it as definite that France would not exert upon Poland,
an integral part of our defensive front, a pressure capable
of impairing the moral strength of that Power. In that
respect we had had one experience which would not be
repeated.
Returning then to the attitude of the Reich, I asked
the State Secretary whether he could give me an explicit
statement of official intentions. We had to consider the
claims of the Reich, and the Polish attitude. If I had
understood rightly what had been said to me in June and
July, the claims of the Reich could wait if the Polish
attitude permitted. Had the situation changed?
"It has changed," replied the State Secretary showing a
certain embarrassment; "I can tell you no more for the
moment; I only wish to add that I am pleased to see you back
here at this time."
I assured the State Secretary that I should devote the
whole of my strength to the service of peace, which was
particularly precious to my country.
To those who know the covert way in which the State
Secretary expresses himself, the language which he used to
me is distinctly pessimistic. Ten days ago he still gave my
English colleague a less gloomy view. There are, he told
him, four possible risks of an armed conflict: (1) An
English preventive war; (2) German refusal to believe that
England would fight for Danzig; (3) Things might go so far
that a retreat would no longer be possible; (4) A serious
Polish incident.
He eliminated Nos. 1 and 2 automatically. As regards
No. 3 Herr Hitler, he said, would know how to stop in time.
He only retained No. 4, the serious Polish incident, and
this was what he had told me.
[267]
Today, Herr von Weizs„cker is no longer willing even to
limit the risk of war to No. 4, and two or three times, I
had the feeling that he wanted to give me to understand that
events might move rapidly.
Is his attitude a maneuver intended to impress the
French Government? This is possible, and I hope in that case
that my reactions showed him that it was labour lost. In any
case, while I was making my statement he took numerous
notes, which is contrary to his habit.
Does his attitude on the contrary mean that, without
having detailed information of what is his master's secret,
he knows that important decisions have been made or
discussed? That is also possible.
Perhaps also he combined tactics and truthfulness. In
life things are seldom entirely black or white. It is not
unlikely that the same may also be true of Herr Hitler. The
latter, in all probability, does not want a general war
because he knows that he would have many chances of losing
everything by it, and because he is convinced that he can
hold out longer than the democracies in the present
bloodless war. It may therefore be anticipated that he will
strive to the last to achieve his plan without a general
conflict. For none of my colleagues here doubts any more
than I do, that he has a plan, and that as regards Poland,
it comprises, in addition to Danzig, the reincorporation of
the Corridor and Polish Silesia at the very least, that is
to say the return to the old frontiers, and the German
Press, moreover, does not hesitate to formulate such claims
from time to time.
But it is equally likely that the Fhrer, while he is
anxious to avoid a general war, may become irritated and his
anger gradually increasing against this neighbour who dares
to defy him, in his desire to bring matters to a conclusion
with Poland, he may be led to wage war against the latter,
minimizing, more or less consciously, the risk of an
extension of the conflict.
To guard as far as possible against this danger which
appears to me formidable and imminent I consider it
essential:
(1) To maintain absolute firmness, an entire and
unbroken unity of front, as any weakening, or even any
semblance of yielding will open the way to war; and to
insist every time the opportunity occurs on the automatic
operation of military assistance.
(2) To maintain the military forces of the Allies, and
in particular our own, on an equality with those of Germany,
which are being continuously increased. It is essential that
we should at the very least retain the previously existing
ratio between our forces and those of the
[268]
Reich, that we should not give the erroneous impression that
we are "giving ground."
(3) To expedite to the very utmost the conclusion of
the agreement with the Soviets. I can never repeat too often
how important a psychological factor this is for the Reich.
(4) To advise Warsaw to be more careful than ever and
to intensify the measures taken to avoid local incidents,
for example, by sending emissaries direct from the central
authority to the danger zones.
COULONDRE.
No. 195
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 15, 1939.
ON the morrow of the discussions between Count Ciano,
Herr von Ribbentrop, and the Fhrer (August 11, 12, and 13)
the situation, as seen from Berlin, is far from clear. It is
not possible to discern with any degree of certainty either
the immediate intentions of the leaders of the Reich, nor
the manner in which they intend, at a given moment, to
escape from the present deadlock nor to what extent they are
really prepared to run the risk of a general conflict.
There are, however, certain facts which control the
situation:
(1) The military preparations of the Reich are being
speeded up and intensified, and it may be accepted that
Germany has today reached an advanced stage of mobilization.
These factors have increased the war psychosis which is
becoming more and more prevalent among the German
population;
(2) In the Danzig problem, the Reich has become still
more entangled, and over and above the question of the Free
City, those of the German-Polish frontiers, and, in a more
general way of the east of Europe, have been clearly put
before German public opinion;
(3) In spite of the categorical statements of the Reich
Press, it is still impossible to gauge the degree of
understanding and effective solidarity already achieved
between Rome and Berlin;
(4) In addition to symptoms which call for the utmost
vigilance, others would seem to indicate that Berlin has not
yet decided to precipitate matters, and that they have not
given up all idea of temporizing.
[269]
(1) For several weeks past it has been evident that the
Reich was taking all necessary measures to have considerable
forces under arms from the middle of August (August 15 to
20), and by that date to have the country's military
preparedness in all directions at an advanced stage. The
measures observed at the present time can therefore hardly
occasion surprise. On the other hand, they can no longer be
explained only by the necessity-as officially pleaded-of
training the troops (regulars or reserves). If compared with
the military measures of last autumn, they are more and more
clearly distinguished from the latter by the following
features:
Extreme care is taken to maintain secrecy, and secrecy
is effectively maintained to a large extent thanks to
methods of concealment developed almost to a fine art;
Mobilization is effected on a much more extensive
scale; the civilian population-in so far as it is not called
up-is subject to requisitioning in much greater measure.
This fact is particularly appreciable in the case of female
labour; levies and requisitioning of all kinds (vehicles,
petrol, livestock, sundry commodities) have attained a
volume so great that the economic activity of the country is
seriously disorganized, while stocks and their replenishment
are hampered;
The anxiety to put Germany in the best possible
condition to sustain a war is such that, however great the
part played by bluff, it is impossible to avoid the
impression that more serious contingencies are not set
aside. Such, moreover, is the feeling of the German
population, among whom the fear of a war is universal;
Up to the present, if we except the assembling of
troops in many places in Upper Silesia and in East Prussia,
no important concentrations constituting an immediate threat
to Poland have yet been observed. Technical experts,
however, are of opinion that in the present state of German
mobilization such concentrations could be effected in a few
days.
(2) If, at the time of the Polish ultimatum of August
5, some surprise and some wavering was noticeable in the
attitude of the Nazis in Danzig and in the Reich, Germany
was, nevertheless, not slow in regaining her self
possession.
After the Senate climbed down in the matter of the
Polish Customs officers, the leaders of the Reich, tried, as
we had for several days been given to understand from the
German side they would, to take over the diplomatic
representation of the interests of Danzig. This was the
meaning of the verbal note handed by the German Government
[270]
to Warsaw on August 9. The Polish reply of the 11th in which
the Warsaw Government declared that it would consider any
fresh German intervention in the differences between Danzig
and Poland as an act of aggression, cut short this attempt.
This reply appears to have profoundly irritated the Nazi
leaders and the Fhrer himself.
Meanwhile, the campaign in favour of the return of
Danzig to the Reich was becoming more violent. On the
evening of August 10, Gauleiter Forster, back from
Berchtesgaden, made a speech in Danzig at a demonstration
organized in order to testify to the will of the Danzig
population to be reincorporated in the Reich. In this
speech, drafted in accordance with instructions received in
Obersalzberg, he expressed the conviction that the Fhrer
would know how to realise the unanimous will of the people
of Danzig to return to their German Fatherland. Two days
later, back in Germany once more, he delivered, in his
native town of Frth, a second speech in which some thought
they recognized the Fhrer's style, and in the course of
which he exclaimed: "Whatever happens, Danzig will
certainly, in the long run, return one day to the Reich."
The speeches of Herr Forster, and likewise the articles
published at the same time in the Reich Press marked
moreover a new phase in the anti-Polish campaign. Herr
Forster not only explicitly stated the German claims with
regard to Danzig; he called the Polish State itself to
account just as the Czechoslovak State was called to account
last year. He denied Poland the right of existence as an
independent state. This argument was abundantly developed in
semi-official newspapers such as the National Zeitung of
Essen, which, in its issue of August 13, proclaimed that the
existence of Poland was not in the least necessary to the
European balance of power. The period of German claims to
Pomerelia, Poznan, and Upper Silesia, was thus at once
outstripped.
The arguments now put forward are, moreover, strangely
similar to those which were produced before against the
Republic of M. Benes: total incapacity of the Government;
heterogeneous character of a population of which one third
is made up of minorities; and strategic weaknesses. Finally,
accompanying the threats and ill-treatment alleged to be
directed against the City of Danzig and the members of the
German minority in Poland appeared the further argument,
which had also been advanced at the time of the German-Czech
crisis, namely that of German honour.
Certain newspapers even went so far as to declare
openly that the
[271]
Polish problem was in itself only one particular case, and
that it was now time to settle the "Eastern problems."
It must, nevertheless, be observed that, up to the
present, no member of the Reich Government has taken up a
position over the Danzig problem so definite as to make a
final breach inevitable. The Fhrer has not referred to the
subject since April 28. From what is known of his
discussions with M. Burckhardt, at the time of the latter's
visit to Berchtesgaden on August 12, it would seem that he
has not altered his attitude since. Nor have any of his
Lieutenants made any definite pronouncements. The newspapers
themselves, while proclaiming their faith in the inevitable
return of the Free City to the Reich, have not yet mentioned
any date, nor declared that this return would have to be
secured "in one way or another" (so oder so).
(3) The German Press has not given any precise
information concerning the conversations at Salzburg and
Berchtesgaden. In so far as any items of information have
been given, these have sometimes proved contradictory. To
give one instance, certain newspapers have maintained that
Germany and Italy had, of course, examined the question of
the revision of the order of things established in Central
and South-Eastern Europe by the treaties of 1919. Others
have declared that neither Germany nor Italy had ever
contemplated giving the Western Powers the pleasure of such
a digression.
From what it has been possible to observe in Berlin,
the predominant impression left by the German-Italian
conversations may be summed up as follows: Italy has
endeavoured to exercise a moderating influence, to restrain
the Reich. But the results of this attempt are still
uncertain.
(4) The situation created by the Salzburg and
Berchtesgaden conversations is therefore precarious. Certain
indications, it is true, permit the hope that the danger of
war is not immediate. The crops have not yet been entirely
gathered in; the harvest was very late and was partly
damaged by the very abundant rains of the last few weeks.
Work on the fortifications is not completed either on the
Western Front, or on the German-Polish frontier. The
preparations for the demonstrations at Tannenberg (August
27) and Nuremberg (September 2-10) are apparently being
continued. The members of the Diplomatic Corps have just
been invited to the Congress, which, as nearly a million
Germans are expected to attend, will disorganize the railway
service for several weeks.
[272]
Nevertheless, these indications, cannot be considered
entirely conclusive.
The principal dangers of war may, therefore, be reduced
to these two:
(a) Illusion as to the attitude of France and Great
Britain.
(b) The hope of being able to destroy the Polish Army
before
the Western Powers have been able to give effective
assistance, and of having by this means created a "war map"
which would set London and Paris thinking.
(a) There is no doubt that certain of the Nazi leaders
and, in particular, Herr von Ribbentrop, still hope to give
some sort of satisfaction to the Western Powers by
restricting the German claims to Danzig, setting aside,
provisionally, the question of the Corridor and other claims
against Poland.
(b) The idea that the German Army could crush the
Polish Army and take Warsaw in a few weeks, or even a few
days, before France and England had time to intervene, or
even to come to a decision, is fairly widespread among the
public and in certain official circles. The Fhrer himself
is said to consider the undertaking as not impossible. It is
said that certain officers in his circle encourage him in
that view.
What is most likely at the present time, is that
Germany, while endeavouring to carry through the first
solution (a) is continuing to push on her preparations with
a view to being able if necessary to attempt the second
solution (b).
The best means of counteracting this manoeuvre
obviously aimed at gaining possession of Danzig in order to
prepare the ruin of Poland, to demoralize the small States
guaranteed by France and England, and to bring about the
collapse of the entire system, built up to resist aggression
is, it would seem, to invite the Germans, if they were to
submit proposals to us to this effect, to address themselves
to Warsaw.
At the same time it is, however, essential, in view of
the extent of the military measures adopted by the Reich,
that we should not allow ourselves to be forestalled by the
German mobilization. Moreover, it is by maintaining our
military forces on a level with theirs that we shall most
effectively help to persuade the Reich that we are fully
resolved to keep our engagements with our Polish allies,
and, if need be to intervene immediately in their favour.
COULONDRE.
[273]
No. 196
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 16, 1939.
M. BECK has confirmed to me that he will make every
effort to reach a peaceful settlement of the Danzig dispute
and that he would have recourse to the good offices of M.
Burckhardt should the occasion arise.
In the course of this morning, a conversation which
seems to have been satisfactory took place between M.
Chodacki and Herr Greiser. The latter notified the Polish
Commissioner General that the Polish Customs officers
arrested two days ago were to be released.
Last night, it is true, a fresh incident occurred with
regard to which M. Beck told me he had as yet no detailed
information: a Polish soldier was killed on the Polish-
Danzig frontier.
In order to cooperate in the settlement of questions
still outstanding, technical experts are going from Warsaw
to Danzig.
In this connection, I once more advised the Minister
for Foreign Affairs to act in such a way that the population
of Danzig, the majority of whom are hostile to the Nazi
agitation, should have the feeling that its economic
interests are being to the fullest possible extent
safeguarded by Poland.
M. Beck replied that, acting in this spirit, he would
oppose any measure of retaliation the necessity of which did
not arise.
LON N™EL.
No. 197
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 17, 1939.
FOR some days past, the German Press has entered upon a
new chapter of its anti-Polish campaign. It claims that a
sort of pogrom has been started by organized groups and
certain local authorities against the Germans in Poland.
This morning there were sensational headlines announcing
that on the other side of the frontier a positive man-hunt
was in progress against the "Volksdeutschen," that mass
arrests were being made among them, that Polish officials
were distributing arms to shady elements of the population
and that an intoler-
[274]
able terror menaced the entire German minority. Lastly,
refugees were said to be already flocking into German
territory.
Thus we meet again the tactics and methods by which
Nazi propaganda, nearly a year ago, was able to induce the
German people and part of foreign opinion to believe that
there was serious disorder in Sudetenland, that bloody
conflicts were occurring there daily, and that the Germans
there were treated as outlaws. Acting on orders from Berlin,
agents of Herr Henlein were trying to create a panic in
Northern Bohemia, and compelling members of the minority to
cross the frontier and seek refuge, without any reason, in
refugee camps, organized with great publicity in the
neighbourhood of Dresden or in Silesia.
The object of this maneuver is clear; the intention is
now, just as it was in September 1938, to inflame popular
passions within the country and create externally, by
artificial means, the impression, either that the opposing
party was indulging in more and more intolerable
provocations, or that its central authority, overwhelmed by
irresponsible elements, is no longer in a position to
maintain order. In both cases, the Reich can find a pretext
for intervention, in the need either to avenge German
honour, or to replace the irresolute authorities and
themselves undertake the protection of their "brothers by
race."
It should be noted that as a result of this campaign,
the Danzig question tends to recede into the background. The
problem assumes wider proportions and by implication
includes the question of the Corridor and that of the Polish
Provinces with a German minority.
In view of the results, direct and indirect, which
National-Socialist policy proposes to secure by this
propaganda, it is, in my view, important to counteract the
latter as rapidly as possible, and demonstrate to the rulers
of the Reich that foreign opinion, at least among the
Western Powers is no longer taken in by maneuvers to which
we now know what value to attach.
This counteracting process should be comparatively easy
if, as M. Lipski asserts, 95 per cent of the facts brought
forward by the German Press in support of its campaign are
exaggerated, distorted, or even merely fabricated. Thus the
Polish Ambassador gave me the following example: In its
issue of August 15, the Angriff reported on its front page,
in sensational manner, the murder of a German engineer in
Eastern Galicia. "Horrible Polish murder," the heading read,
"German engineer murdered."
This murder, had in actual fact, been committed as far
back as
[275]
June 15. The murderer was arrested, and the case is at
present before a Polish Court. It has been established that
the crime in question, whose motive was passion, and devoid
of any political bias, comes under common law. As a result
of their consul's report on the murder of this Reich
subject, the German authorities came to the same conclusion,
and on July 3, the German Ambassador in Warsaw informed the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, in view of the
character of the crime they would refrain from intervening.
Nevertheless National-Socialist propaganda seized the
occasion of the victim's funeral which took place on June
23, to write up the affair as though it had been a political
assassination, and the Angriff now returns to the charge.
This case is typical. It is not the only one; according
to M. Lipski, many other examples might be quoted. In every
case of this kind it would be desirable to set the facts in
their true light as soon as possible, and, in this way,
convict the German propaganda of mendacity and
overstatement. These rectifications, would of course, be
most valuable, in the first instance, to the competent
Polish authorities. However, in so far as the Western Powers
make common cause with the Poles the interests of their
propaganda are obviously identical.
Perhaps, if Your Excellency thought it advisable, our
Embassy in Warsaw might, if required, draw the attention of
the Polish administration to this matter.
By setting the facts in a true light, in a
dispassionate and objective manner, our Press and our
broadcasting stations (particularly in their broadcasts in
the German language) would very efficiently help in taking
the edge off the German propaganda and enlighten readers and
listeners, including those in the Reich, on the calculations
and the ulterior motives of Nazi policy.
COULONDRE.
No. 198
M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
London,
August 18, 1939.
THE British Ambassador had, on the date already
mentioned, a conversation with Herr von Weizs„cker, which
was very similar to the conversation reported by M.
Coulondre, but which dealt exclusively with German-Polish
relations and their international repercussions.
[276]
In the course of this conversation, the German State
Secretary was particularly aggressive and even brutal
towards Poland, on account of the notes sent by Warsaw both
to the Senate and to the Wilhelmstrasse, and of the
treatment meted out to the German-speaking population in
Polish territory. Without referring to the possibility of
England remaining outside the conflict, he declared that the
last limit of German patience had now been reached.
According to Sir Nevile Henderson's account, he replied
with equal vigour and put forward the other side of all
these questions. Not for one moment did he feel that he was
even holding the interest of the person to whom he spoke.
Lord Halifax has had this report sent to Colonel Beck for
information.
ROGER CAMBON.
No. 199
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 18, 1939.
DESPITE some indications of a local relaxation at
Danzig, the situation becomes increasingly tense. It is
difficult to say for the moment whether it will reach a
climax before or after the Nuremberg Congress. There are
indications favouring either view. Consequently, I shall
venture to recall the chief suggestions made in my last
telegrams:
(1) It is of the utmost importance to keep abreast of
Germany in all military matters. Germany is at the present
time calling up large numbers of reserves and is forming
them into divisions, and also carrying out considerable
movements of troops and war material.
(2) It is imperative to bring the Russian negotiations
to a satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible. I learn
from various sources that it is now the military authorities
who are most active in pressing the Chancellor to go to war
with Poland. The most powerful deterrent would be a pact
with the Russians.
(3) The most burning question today is perhaps less
that of Danzig than that of the German minorities in Poland,
and I wonder if Germany is not behaving thus in order to
find points of attack less explicitly covered than Danzig by
the Franco-British guarantees. It seems dear that the Reich
is now trying to confuse the issue and to collect a dossier
of such Polish acts of provocation as would permit her
[277]
to intervene against Poland in a military sense on other
grounds than Danzig, in the hope that these alleged acts of
Polish provocation would place the conflict outside the
framework of the pact existing between Poland and the
Western Powers. It would be useful to remember this when
drawing up the agreements which are at present being
prepared.
(4) On the other hand, the treatment dealt out to the
German minorities is one of the things to which Herr Hitler
is most sensitive. Besides, this tendency has been reflected
in the German Press for some days.
(5) It is of course important to bring no pressure to
bear on Poland which might injure her moral strength or
vital interests, and to leave her free to decide the limit
of the concessions she can make regarding Danzig, but at the
same time it seems to me that we should let her know the
value we attach to the safeguarding of peace, so that she
should give no grounds for complaint nor justification for
the German maneuver concerning the treatment of minorities,
and should do all she can to avoid incidents with Germany,
especially in the German-inhabited districts.
(6) Given the extremely precise indications, which have
reached me from a safe source, on the Chancellor's state of
mind, I consider that the Government should make use of its
powers and forbid the Press to make any attack which might
be taken as a personal insult against the Head of the German
State.
COULONDRE.
No. 200
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 18, 1939.
As the German campaign against Poland develops, the
analogies between it and that undertaken last autumn against
Czechoslovakia are becoming more and more apparent. The
methods used by the Reich on both occasions are so similar
that we can try and ascertain what point the crisis has
reached by a comparison with the events of 1938.
(1) M. Burckhardt went back to Danzig on August 14.
Last year, on about the same date, Lord Runciman arrived in
Prague to reopen negotiations between Herr Henlein's Party
and the Government in Prague. But from that time onwards it
was seen that these conferences
[278]
and the agreements which might be reached between the Czech
Government and the Sudeten Party were of secondary interest
in the eyes of the German rulers. It is more or less the
same today with the settlement of local questions affecting
Danzig. Yet it should be noted that the Nazis of the Free
City and of the Reich seem far more disposed to be
conciliatory in the settlement of these questions than the
German negotiators ever were with regard to the Czechs.
(2) Ever since the month of May last year-on May 28 to
be precise-the Fhrer had resolved not only to settle the
Sudeten question, but also to have done with Czechoslovakia
altogether. For a long time, the rulers of the Reich had
made no secret of their desire to wipe Czechoslovakia-that
"air-craft carrier for Soviet Russia"-off the map.
For the moment, the Danzig question has fallen into a
secondary place. The problem of the German minorities in
Poland, and indirectly that of the German frontiers of 1914,
have come into the foreground: but it cannot yet be affirmed
that the Fhrer has decided to liquidate Poland. The
existence of that State has so far been challenged in
comparatively few newspaper articles. The destruction of
Poland has not yet been presented to the German public as
one of the essential aims of German policy.
(3) From the end of August, 1938, it was clear that the
Reich, in fomenting a revolt of the Sudeten Germans, was
looking for a pretext for military intervention. Such is
probably the aim of the agitation going on at present about
the German minorities in Poland, but the manoeuvre has not
yet reached such an advanced stage. Violent as it is, the
campaign against the Poles is a long way from reaching the
size and the violence assumed by the anti-Czech agitation
towards the middle of August last year.
It is true that for some days past the German Press has
been describing ill treatment of every sort which is said to
be inflicted on the Germans in Poland: it speaks of mass
arrests, "man-hunts," the distribution of arms to doubtful
elements, of tens of thousands of people compelled to seek
refuge in Germany, of the violation of frontiers by military
planes. But last year, tales such as these, considerably
amplified and dramatized, were spread all over the German
papers for whole weeks, while the crisis reached its peak
only at the end of September.
(4) In conclusion, therefore, we cannot say that the
German-Polish crisis is any nearer its culmination now than
was the German-Czech crisis at a corresponding period last
year.
This remark does not apply to symptoms of a military
character.
[279]
In this sphere, the preparations would seem to be on a far
vaster scale and in a much more advanced stage. This is a
point to which we must attach the utmost importance.
COULONDRE.
No. 201
M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
August 19, 1939.
TAKEN in conjunction with the interview of the British
Ambassador with Herr von Weizs„cker, the conversation held
by the latter with M. Coulondre on August 10 would seem to
have been a "friendly warning" of the imminence of a German-
Polish conflict, given to France by the State Secretary by
order of Herr von Ribbentrop, though less brutally than to
Great Britain.
ROGER CAMBON.
No. 202
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 19, 1939.
A Pat Agency telegram from Berlin, reproduced this
morning in the Gazeta Polska, states that the persecutions
of the Poles have now reached terrifying proportions. In the
period from April 1 to June 30, it is stated that there have
been 976 acts of violence, attacks on farms, destructions of
property and forced evacuations from the frontier zone.
Since July 1, the situation is said to have grown worse.
LON N™EL.
[280]
Part Six
The International Crisis
(August 20-September 3, 1939)
I
The German Will to Aggression
(August 20-22, 1939)
No. 203
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 20, 1939.
(Received by air at 11 a.m.)
FROM a very reliable source I learn that Wilhelmstrasse
circles are gravely concerned by the turn of events and
believe that Herr Hitler is determined to "settle the Danzig
question" before the 1st September.
LON N™EL.
No. 204
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 20,
1939. 12.25 p.m.
(Received at 1.40 p.m.)
ONE of my colleagues heard yesterday evening from high
officials of the Wilhelmstrasse some very pessimistic views
on the development of the international situation. In their
opinion, German honour is at stake in Danzig and Germany
cannot retreat: they saw no hope of avoiding war. As to a
military intervention by Great Britain in favour of Poland,
they did not believe in it. "Why should England intervene
for Danzig, after allowing the Reich to seize Austria, the
Sudeten territory, the Czech regions and Memel?"
These German high officials, whose remarks also showed
an ex-
[281]
treme animosity towards the British, behaved as if, while
personally feeling deep anxiety and grave apprehension for
the future, they were trying hard to impress on my colleague
the imminence of a conflict on which Germany was resolved.
COULONDRE.
No. 205
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 21,
1939.1.50 a.m.
(Received at 7 a.m.)
A VERY important new fact in the military sphere,
namely, the beginning of a concentration of German forces,
is brought to light by the latest information collected,
particularly after today's investigations.
There are sure signs that the units of the Berlin
armoured division are on a war footing and that they will
probably move tonight. Many roads in the eastern direction
are under military guard; others have been prepared for
troop movements. Today, some tanks have been sent off by
train.
From Vienna comes news of an intense military activity
since August 19. At Bremen, the 22nd Division is mobilized
to war strength and ready to leave.
Mobilization has already been carried out on a very
large scale: but it is not possible to estimate even
approximately the actual figures. I do not consider
exaggerated the number given by a foreign source, according
to which the land forces alone amount to 2,400,000 men. A
very large proportion of reservists has also been called up
for the Air Force.
It may be that, by all these preparations, Germany only
means to support the political maneuver which is being
carried out by her at present. But it will become
increasingly difficult for her to stop on the slope where
Germany now finds herself.
Considering as I do that nothing should be left undone
which might prevent Germany from proceeding further, I feel
it my duty to stress once more the urgent and imperative
necessity of taking the necessary measures, both as to
calling up reserves and the mobilization of industry, so
that our preparations remain level with those of Germany.
Even more than a military necessity, this is, in my
opinion, a political necessity.
[282]
What constitutes one of the gravest dangers of war at
the present time is the doubt which the Government of the
Reich may still have concerning the intentions of France and
Britain to lend Poland their support.
If we prove by our military and other measures that we
are actually getting ready to fulfill our obligations, we
shall thereby make use of the best possible method to
dissipate this doubt. On the other hand, the Third Reich
would find dangerous encouragement in the thought that a
disparity in its favour may exist between the German
preparations and our own.
COULONDRE.
No. 206
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 21,
1939. 3.41 p.m.
(Received at 535 p.m.)
THE Pat Agency publishes a communiqu‚ to the effect
that it is authorized to give a categorical denial to the
absolutely baseless inventions of the Reich's propaganda
services as regards the "terror" of which the German
minority in Poland is said to be the victim, the alleged
"tortures" of arrested Germans and the "mass flights into
Germany."
On the other hand, the Polish newspapers announce that
many Polish schools in the frontier zone have been
requisitioned by the German authorities, that soldiers have
been billeted in them, and that the classroom furniture has
been thrown out into the street.
They announce too that many people employed in Polish
institutions or organizations in German Silesia have been
sent to labour camps and that the Polish workers have been
sent to the interior of Germany.
LON N™EL.
No. 207
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 21,
1939. 5.29 p.m.
(Received 7 p.m.)
OWING to the large numbers of troops moving eastward
during the whole of yesterday and the heavy traffic last
night on the Magdeburg-
[283]
Berlin motor road, it is no longer possible to doubt that
the concentration of forces is in progress.
However, Germany has not officially mobilized, and is
supposed to be using the army and calling up reserves for a
period of training; the reserves are being called up by
individual summons and not by proclamation.
I think that for our part it would be best to avoid any
ostentatious action while taking all necessary steps. The
measures we adopt will be all the more effective for being
discreet. The German Government will always get to know
enough about them to realize what they mean It will be able
neither to consider our attitude as a provocation, nor our
preparations as a piece of bluff.
COULONDRE.
No. 208
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 21,
1939. 9.7 p.m.
(Received on the 22nd at 12.10 a.m.)
I HAVE just heard, from a source which is usually
reliable, that the immediate intentions of Germany are as
follows:
(1) Orders have been given to all officer pilots of the
Berlin region to join their posts at midnight to-morrow,
with three days' provisions. Similar information reached me
from another source this morning stating that the
concentration of German forces was to be completed in two or
three days' time.
(2) An important decision is to be taken by the Reich
in the night from Tuesday to Wednesday, in connection with
the Danzig affair. This step on the precise nature of which
no information has been given, would cause very serious
international tension and would probably involve the closing
of the German frontiers.
(3) At the same time, Bohemia and Moravia would be
granted an independence similar to that of Slovakia, an
action calculated to have the appearance of generosity and
meant to confuse French and English public opinion, to
separate the Allies and to isolate Poland.
(4) The Fhrer would merely have the Siegfried Line
manned: he would not declare war on France or on Britain,
and would remain on the defensive. Even should the Western
Powers formally declare war on Germany, Herr Hitler would
wait to be attacked and avoid taking
[284]
any initiative. He is said to hope that the French and
British Governments will come to see the futility of any
intervention and will then accept the situation created de
facto on the eastern frontiers.
I am not able to vouch for the accuracy of these
indications; yet they come from a well-informed source and
seem to me likely to be true, as a maneuver of this kind
seems to correspond pretty well with Herr Hitler's mentality
and methods.
There must be no illusions concerning the independence
that the Czech provinces might obtain: by making such a
gesture while at the same time acting against Poland, the
Third Reich would endeavour to create the impression that
the establishment of a just peace was its sole concern,
while actually carrying on its policy of conquest.
COULONDRE.
No. 209
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 21,
1939.9.55 p.m.
(Received 11.30 p.m.)
IN THE opinion of our Military Attach‚, the German
forces will have completed their concentration in two or
three days' time. The greater part of the German forces will
be concentrated on the Polish frontier.
COULONDRE.
No. 210
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 21,
1939. 10.30 p.m.
THE German Press and wireless are widely exploiting the
alleged persecutions, of which the German minority in Poland
is supposed to be the victim, just as they did last year
over the Sudetens.
The Polish Government would be well advised, in order
to frustrate this manoeuvre: (1) To make the necessary
rectifications through the same channels, and perhaps to
provide the English and French wireless with all details in
order that they may refute these allegations; (2) To take,
locally, all such steps as may prevent incidents which might
be exploited by the German propaganda.
[285]
Although I have no doubt that the Government in Warsaw
is fully aware of all this, I leave it to your discretion to
confirm this, in whatever way seems to you most expedient
and with all due discretion.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 211
M. GARREAU, French Consul-General in Hamburg,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Hamburg, August 22,
1939. 4.10 p.m.
(Received 6 p.m.)
I LEARN on good authority that the German Government
hopes, by a lightning attack, to dispose of Poland before
the end of the month. The Reich seems to be convinced that
Great Britain and France, equally disconcerted by the
Russian attitude, will not move. The Reich believes that
Moscow is preparing a great political upheaval which would
tend to bring the ideologies of the two totalitarian regimes
into harmony.
The rumour that the offensive against Poland would be
launched on August 22 has been circulating in Hamburg for
several days. A great number of railway employees have been
ordered to report in various Polish towns, notably in
Warsaw, Ibrun and Poznan, on a date which would be notified
towards the end of the month. From this it would seem that
the occupation of these centres by the German Army was
expected very soon.
Many motor-cars have been requisitioned in Hamburg.
They are at once given military numbers and repainted grey.
The departure of the 20th Mechanized Division for the
Polish frontier has taken place within the last 48 hours;
these troops left Hamburg partly by train and partly in
three motor convoys which set out respectively for Rostock,
Ludwiglust and Lbeck.
GARREAU.
No. 212
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 22,
1939. 4.16 p.m.
(Received 8.45 p.m.)
HEARD that, in accordance with the request that I made
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Government
will daily from
[286]
to-morrow give the necessary corrective statements to the
Havas Agency, to your Department through the Polish Embassy
in Paris, and to me.
I took this opportunity to have a conversation with one
of M. Beck's private secretaries, in which I stressed the
points desired by Your Excellency. He assured me that
Poland, fully aware of the necessity for avoiding incidents,
would redouble her vigilance in this matter.
He told me that instructions had been given yesterday
morning to the Government newspapers to refrain, for some
days at least, from all attacks on the Reich and from giving
prominence to any news items which might possibly irritate
the Germans.
LON N™EL.
No. 213
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 22, 1939.
(Received by courier the 23rd at 12.30 p.m.)
A RESERVE officer, who has just been called up in a
Department of the German War Office, declared to a reliable
intermediary that in the General Staff it is considered
certain that action against Poland will be taken very
shortly. It is not doubted that this action will produce
decisive results in a very few days.
They would seem, in fact, to be anticipating that,
under the violence of the blows rained upon her, Poland will
collapse internally. They appear to be counting a great deal
upon upheavals among the racial minorities, chiefly the
Ukrainians.
The announcement of the non-aggression pact with Russia
has contributed powerfully to the strengthening of the
Army's confidence in the success of German arms.
COULONDRE.
[287]
II
Mr. Chamberlain's Message and Herr Hitler's Reply
(August 23-26)
No. 214
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 23, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.25 a.m.)
THE British Ambassador, who is to be received by the
German Chancellor today, has flown to Berchtesgaden. He is
taking a message from Mr. Chamberlain to Herr Hitler.
According to information sent to me by Sir Nevile
Henderson, the purport of this document is known to Your
Excellency. He emphasized that his mission is shrouded in
absolute secrecy.
COULONDRE.
No. 215
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 23,
1939. 8.35 p.m.
(Received at 11 p.m.)
ANOTHER six Polish railwaymen were arrested yesterday;
they are charged with being in possession of arms supplied
to them by the Customs officials. Two of these arrests have
been maintained. The body of the Polish soldier killed in
Danzig territory is said to have been sent to the Polish
Commissioner-General's office, after being filled with
viscera taken from other dead bodies.
Two Polish schools have just been requisitioned for
military purposes, by order of the Senate of the Free City.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 216
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET. Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 23,
1939. 11.50 p.m.
(Received at 12 midnight.)
I HAD an interview this evening with the State Under-
Secretary who
[288]
had summoned me to hear the message sent by Mr. Chamberlain
to Herr Hitler and the Chancellor's reply. Herr Woermann
made no comment whatever upon this communication.
COULONDRE.
No. 217
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 24, 1939.
(Received a 1 p.m. by telephone.)
I SAW the British Ambassador at midday today. My
colleague had two interviews with the Chancellor yesterday,
one in the morning lasting about three-quarters of an hour,
when he handed over the message from Mr. Chamberlain, the
other in the afternoon lasting about half an hour. Sir
Nevile made every effort to convince Herr Hitler that
England would fight at Poland's side. He firmly believes, so
he told me, that he had succeeded.
For his part, the Chancellor spoke of almost nothing
but the treatment of the German minorities in Poland. Should
hostilities break out, the blame, he said, would be
Britain's, and, recalling that he had made reasonable
proposals last April, he alleged that the British guarantee
had encouraged the Poles to ill-treat the German minorities
and had stiffened the Warsaw Government in its
uncompromising attitude; in his view, the limit had now been
reached, and if, in Sir Nevile's own words, any fresh
incidents were to take place against a German in Poland, "he
would march."
My colleague had asked Herr Hitler, should the latter
have nothing further to say to him, to have his reply
delivered to him at Salzburg. Herr Hitler had sent for him,
and that was the only favourable sign that the British
Ambassador had gathered from his visit.
During the second interview, the Chancellor again
emphasized strongly the necessity for putting an end to the
ill-treatment which, according to him, was being meted out
to the German minorities in Poland.
Sir Nevile Henderson, while doubting whether there is
still any hope of avoiding the worst, considers that the
only chance of, at least, delaying matters lies in the
immediate establishment of contact between Warsaw and
Berlin.
[289]
He has, therefore, suggested to his Government that it
should advise M. Beck to seek contact with the Chancellor
without delay.
My colleague thinks that Herr Hitler is waiting for the
return of Herr von Ribbentrop to take his final decision,
and that therefore only a few hours remains for this final
attempt.
Herr Hitler is adopting precisely the same attitude
toward Poland as he did towards Czechoslovakia in the last
days of September.
COULONDRE.
No. 218
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in London.
Paris, August 24,
1939. 1.25 p.m.
THE French Government will make a most urgent d‚marche
to the Polish Government to the effect that the latter
should abstain from military action should the Senate of the
Free City proclaim the return of Danzig to the Reich. It is
indeed important that Poland should not take up the position
of an aggressor, which might impede the entry into force of
some of our pacts and would furthermore place the Polish
Army in Danzig in a very dangerous position. The Warsaw
Government would in such a case reserve its freedom to
defend its rights by diplomatic action.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 219
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 6 p.m.
(Received 10.30 p.m.)
REFERRING to the conversation held yesterday between
the Polish Ambassador and M. Daladier, M. Beck informed me
today that in view of the scope of the Reich's military
measures directed against Poland, the Polish Government
decided last night to take additional precautionary
measures.
These measures are being carried out. They are on a
much larger scale than those taken hitherto, and aim at
bringing a great part of the Army up to war strength. The
corresponding requisitions have been made at the same time.
LON N™EL.
[290]
No. 220
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 6.30 p.m.
(Received 10.25 p.m.)
ON the instructions of M. Beck the Polish Ambassador in
Berlin has asked for an interview with the Reich State
Secretary. Provided that Herr von Weizs„cker does not at
once assume a provocative attitude, he will remind him that
the Warsaw Government has always shown itself ready for
discussion under normal conditions, and has not changed its
attitude in this respect.
LON N™EL.
No. 221
M. ROGER CAMBON, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
August 24, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.40 p.m.)
THE British Embassy in Paris has been put in a position
to report the essential points of the written communication
handed by Herr Hitler to the British Ambassador in Berlin,
in reply to Mr. Chamberlain's letter.
The British Government has taken special precautions to
keep this document a strict secret. The attention of the
British Embassy in Paris has been specially drawn to this
point.
I, nevertheless, think I should communicate to the
Department, for in case they may be useful, the following
details of this reply:
(1) For years Germany has tried in vain to win
Britain's friendship, by going to the very limit of the
Reich's interests.
(2) Like other States, Germany has historical and
economic interests which she cannot renounce. Among these
interests are the German city of Danzig and the related
problem of the Corridor.
(3) Germany is ready to settle these questions with
Poland on the basis of generous proposals. The British
action has dissuaded the Poles from negotiating on this
basis.
(4) The unconditional guarantee given by Britain to
Poland has encouraged the latter to terrorize the German
minorities, which number a million and a half people. Such
atrocities cannot be tolerated by a
[291]
great Power. Poland has likewise violated numerous legal
obligations which she had assumed with regard to Danzig. She
sent various ultimata and initiated the process of an
economic strangulation of the Free City.
(5) Germany recently made it clear to Poland that she
was not prepared to acquiesce in the development of such a
state of affairs. She would not tolerate any further
ultimata or the persecution of minorities. She would not
consent to the economic ruin of Danzig, nor consent to
receive fresh Notes amounting to downright provocations to
the Reich. Furthermore, the questions of Danzig and the
Corridor must be settled.
(6) Herr Hitler has taken note of the fact that the
British Government will come to Poland's assistance in the
case of intervention by the Reich. This is no way modifies
the determination of Germany to protect the interests
mentioned above. Herr Hitler shares the Prime Minister's
view as to the probability of a long war, but he is ready to
undergo any ordeal rather than sacrifice Germany's national
interests or honour.
(7) The German Government has received intelligence of
the British and French Governments' alleged intention to
take certain mobilization measures. Germany, on the other
hand, has no wish to take other than purely defensive
measures against France and Britain. A passage in Mr.
Chamberlain's letter seems to confirm the foregoing
intelligence and can be construed only as a threat to
Germany. If the measures in question are taken, they will
force Germany to order a general mobilization immediately.
(8) A pacific solution of present difficulties does not
depend upon Germany, but upon those Powers which, ever since
the Treaty of Versailles, have opposed any peaceful
revision.
(9) No improvement in Anglo-German relations is
possible until there is a change of mind among the Powers
responsible. Herr Hitler has struggled throughout his life
for the betterment of relations between his country and
Britain. Up to the present, his efforts have been in vain.
None more than he would welcome any change that might come
about in this respect in the future.
ROGER CAMBON.
[292]
No. 222
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 24,
1939. 6.40 p.m.
You should see M. Beck at the earliest possible moment
and tell him that in the new conditions resulting from the
Russo-German Pact, the French Government is more anxious
than ever that Poland should at all cost avoid laying
herself open to the charge of being the aggressor-this being
the whole purpose of the German manoeuvre-and thus playing
into Germany's hands. The disadvantages arising from such a
position would be as grave for Poland as for her allies, on
account of the repercussions it might have on the
obligations, virtual or actual, which bind the latter to
other Powers.
In the same way, the French Government urgently
recommends that the Polish Government abstain from all
military action in the event of the Danzig Senate
proclaiming the City's return to the Reich. To any possible
decision of this sort, it is important that Poland should
reply only by an action of the same kind, that is to say, by
making all reservations and stating her intention of having
recourse to all legal remedies which may be afforded to her
by diplomatic usage.
The Warsaw Government will understand this counsel all
the better since it corresponds to the intentions expressed
by Marshal Rydz-Smigly to General Ironside on July 19. As
for us, we have all the more grounds for clearly putting
forward this advice as it is in harmony with our General
Staff's view of the problem: for the Staff considers that,
from the strategical point of view, a Polish Army, after
advancing into the Free City territory, would be in an
extremely delicate position.
You should emphasize to M. Beck that, in our view, the
question is one solely of expediency and that, by taking up
such a position, the Polish Government would only be
safeguarding the full effect of our assistance and would in
no way be hampering its liberty of decision, in the event of
a definite German military attack; nor would the validity of
the French position with regard to Poland, as defined by
agreements which it is necessary to recall, be thereby
prejudiced.
GEORGES BONNET.
[293]
No. 223
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 7 p.m.
(Received 1155 p.m.)
THE Polish Press today announces the following
incidents:
(1) Arrest at the Silesian frontier of a Polish
diplomatic courier. He is said to have been imprisoned at
Breslau and is being detained, in spite of intervention by
the Consulate and by the Embassy.
(2) Last night a three-engined German bomber flew over
Bohumin. A Polish fighter went up after it and the bomber
returned to German territory.
(3) The body of the Polish soldier killed on Danzig
territory some days ago has been returned in a mutilated
condition to the Polish authorities. This has aroused great
indignation.
(4) The Polish Press publishes the following statements
about the two German commercial aircraft which, according to
the D.N.B., were shot at in the vicinity of Danzig: at eight
o'clock in the morning, a German plane was seen flying over
Polish territory, but no shot was fired. At four o'clock
another plane flew over the forbidden zone of the Hel
peninsula. After the Polish anti-aircraft batteries had
fired three warning salvos the German plane turned back.
LON N™EL.
No. 224
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 24,
1939. 750 p.m.
(Received 11.30 p.m.)
DEEMING the claims of the Senate to be unacceptable,
the Polish Government has today broken off the Customs
negotiations.
The Danzig authorities, according to the local Press,
deplore this breakdown.
LA TOURNELLE.
[294]
No. 225
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 24,
1939. 7.51 p.m.
(Received 10.15 p.m.)
BY a decree of August 23, the Senate has approved the
Gauleiter's appointment as Head of the State. I am informing
our Ambassadors in Warsaw and Berlin.
According to the Danziger Vorposten, this is the
consecration of a state of things which has, in fact,
existed ever since the Nazi Party seized power.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 226
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 8.25 p.m.
(Received August 25, 12.25 a.m.)
IN view of the threatening situation in Danzig, I
thought it my duty to approach M. Arciszewski again. I said
that, things being as they are in the Free City, we relied
upon the Polish Government not to take any initiative likely
to bring about irreparable results without first consulting
us. I requested him to inform M. Beck of my conversation
without delay.
LON N™EL.
No. 227
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 9 p.m.
(Received 1030 p.m.)
I HAVE once again drawn M. Beck's attention, in the
course of an interview, to the urgent need of avoiding
incidents and rash acts, and of doing all that is possible
in this direction.
M. Beck expressed his entire agreement.
LON N™EL.
[295]
No. 228
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, August 24, 1939.
9.50 p.m.
(Received 11.20 p.m.)
RECEIVED today at 3 o'clock by the King of Italy, the
United States Ambassador delivered to him a message from
President Roosevelt, calling attention to the dangers of the
present situation and urging the King to do all he could to
promote a peaceful solution.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 229
M. DE SAINT-QUENTIN, French Ambassador in Washington,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Washington, August 24, 1939.
10.11 p.m.
(Received August 25 at 6.50 a.m.)
THE Under-Secretary of State has just informed me that
President Roosevelt had today, 24th, sent a message to Herr
Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic adjuring
them to settle their differences by means of direct
negotiation, by arbitration or by conciliation with the help
of a citizen of a neutral country.
The message emphasizes that such solutions would
presuppose an undertaking by the parties concerned not to
commit any act of aggression against each other during an
agreed period, and to respect each other's independence and
territorial integrity.
Yet the substance of the two communications would seem
not to be identical. Recalling the President's message of
April 14 last, the appeal to Herr Hitler would appear to lay
stress on the willingness of the American Government, in the
event of a peaceful solution of the German-Polish dispute to
contribute to the reconstruction of world economy.
The text of these documents will be communicated to
Your Excellency by Mr. Bullitt and published to-morrow in
the Press.
SAINT-QUENTIN.
[296]
No. 230
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 10.12 p.m.
(Received August 25 at 2.50 a.m.)
THE Polish Ambassador has not been able to see Herr von
Weizs„cker, who is said to have left for Berchtesgaden. He
was received at 5 p.m. on August 24 by Field-Marshal
Goering. According to information which has been given me,
the Field-Marshal was cordial, deplored the aggravation in
German-Polish relations, but made no suggestion of any kind
and in general avoided giving political significance to the
interview.
LON N™EL.
No. 231
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 24,
1939. 10.15 p.m.
(Received August 25 at 2.50 a.m.)
ACCORDING to information just given me by M. Beck, M.
Chodacki has been instructed to deliver to the Senate of the
Free City, either tonight or to-morrow, a letter, on the
subject of the appointment of Herr Forster as Head of the
Danzig State.
The Government of Poland intends by this document to
challenge the legality of the appointment and to declare
that the responsibility for all possible results will fall
upon the Senate, should this initiative result in Poland
being faced with accomplished facts contrary to law.
LON N™EL.
No. 232
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 24,
1939.
(Received August 25 at 12.30 p.m.)
NEWS has reached me that official circles in Berlin
consider that, by the pact of August 23, Germany and Russia
have agreed to settle between themselves, not only the
matter of Poland, but all questions
[297]
concerning Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and this to the
exclusion of all other Powers.
From rumours circulating, it would seem that it is
expected here that the first consequence of the German-
Russian Pact will be the partition of Poland.
According to a statement attributed to State Secretary
Lammers, Berlin and Moscow have decided to establish a
common frontier on the Vistula. Russia would receive free
port facilities at Danzig.
According to other rumours, Poland is to be reduced to
the role of a buffer State; Lithuania would play the same
part and would recover Wilna.
The provinces of Bohemia and Moravia would receive a
limited independence and would act, so to speak, as a bridge
between the Slav and Germanic worlds.
The Reich and Soviet Russia would also revise by mutual
agreement the frontiers of the Baltic States and of Rumania.
I pass on this information with reserve, while pointing
out that it probably corresponds with certain cherished
hopes on the German side. In this respect, the greatest
importance is attributed by political circles in Berlin to
Article 3, which provides for a permanent consultation
between the two Governments.
On the other hand, they seem to expect Poland to
capitulate, and to attach great importance to Germany's not
appearing to be the aggressor.
COULONDRE.
No. 233
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 3.15 a.m.
(Received at 6 a.m.)
I CALLED on M. Beck yesterday evening, as instructed by
your telegram of August 24.
According to what he told me:
(1) The remark attributed by General Sir Edmund
Ironside to Marshal Rydz-Smigly was actually made by M. Beck
himself; the latter fully confirmed its substance.
(2) Should the Anschluss be proclaimed by the "municipal
authorities" of the Free City, the Warsaw Government would
immediately
[298]
get in touch with their allies and would refrain from any
military action until actually confronted by direct or
indirect aggression on the part of the Reich.
(3) Aware of the necessity of not allowing themselves
to be maneuvered by Germany into a false position, the
Polish Government, inspired by the same spirit as ourselves,
will continue to maintain the greatest composure.
Should Herr Forster proclaim the Anschluss, added M.
Beck, this could only be at the instigation of the
Chancellor, and action by Germany would probably follow with
very little delay.
LON N™EL.
No. 234
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 3.15 a.m.
(Received at 5.10 a.m.)
FROM the information given me yesterday by M. Beck, it
appears that Herr Forster on the night of the 24th ordered
the arrest of the chief officials of the Polish railways in
Danzig. M. Beck instructed M. Chodacki to make immediate
representations to the Senate, and to point out the gravity
of this measure which, if upheld, would be liable seriously
to impair one of the essential rights still remaining to
Poland in Danzig territory.
If these representations should have no result, the
Polish Government reserved the right to consider the
adoption of measures of retaliation. M. Beck stated
definitely in reply to a question I put to him on this
matter, that such methods could be only of an economic or
administrative nature.
LON N™EL.
No. 235
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 1 p.m.
(Received August 26, at 4 a.m.)
HAVAS dispatches transmitted to Paris announce a series
of incidents provoked by Germans which occurred last night
on the Polish frontier.
[299]
A refutation of certain groundless German allegations
has likewise been published by the same Agency. A communiqu‚
from the D.N.B. Agency, which appeared in the Press this
morning under the title "Blood Bath at Bielsko," claims that
Germans in this town have been subjected to threats. This is
formally denied by the Polish authorities. The latter
further announce that National-Socialist badges bearing the
inscription "Frei Korps," as well as a large quantity of war
material, have been seized by the Polish police in a search
made in the house of a German named Maskoh, in Upper
Silesia.
LON N™EL.
No. 236
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 3.48 p.m.
(Received at 6.10 p.m.)
GENERAL FAURY, in full agreement with me, called on the
Marshal this morning, to draw his attention to the incidents
which, according to the Germans, were occurring on the
Polish frontiers, and to urge him once again to give the
strictest instructions to the Polish troops to observe the
utmost self-restraint.
LON N™EL.
No. 237
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 3.48 p.m.
(Received at 6.47 p.m.)
ACCORDING to the Polish Press, several acts of
aggression were committed by Germans on Polish territory
during the night of the 23rd-24th at midnight. About twenty
Germans entered the station and Customs House of Makoszow,
near Katowice, and fired several hundred shots. From 12.30
a.m. to 1.45 a.m. and from 2.30 a.m. to 2.50 a.m. fresh acts
of aggression took place. A machine-gun attack was made on
the Customs House near Rybnik. A protest has been handed to
the German Government by the Polish Embassy.
LON N™EL
[300]
No. 238
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 6.5 p.m.
(Received at 630 p.m.)
FROM remarks made to General Faury by Marshal Rydz-
Smigly it appears that the latter is fully aware that German
maneuvers are aimed at inciting Poland to imprudent action;
he declares that he clearly perceives the trap and will not
fall into it.
LON N™EL.
No. 239
M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, August 25,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.10 p.m.)
TONIGHT'S Osservatore Romano announces that letters
have just been exchanged between the King of the Belgians
and the Pope.
The King of the Belgians has personally informed Pope
Pius XII of the declaration made by him on behalf of the
Heads of States represented at the Brussels Conference.
His Holiness has replied by thanking him for his
communication and expressing his high appreciation of the
initiative taken by the conference. He draws attention to
the similarity of their declaration to his own message of
yesterday, repeats the statement of principle set out in
that message, recognizes the identity of purpose in favour
of peace and the welfare of the nations, and finally
expresses the hope that this common effort for peace may
still attain its goal.
CHARLES-ROUX.
No. 240
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 25,
1939. 6.40 p.m.
(Received August 26, at 9.30 am.)
THE rate at which military preparations are being
carried out here grows faster and faster. Young men are
being brought in lorries from
[301]
East Prussia and at once equipped and sent to their battle
positions, while more heavy anti-aircraft batteries are
being placed along the shore.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 241
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 25,
1939. 8.18 p.m.
(Received August 26, at 3.10 a.m.)
THE Danzig Senate has received a very serious note from
the Polish Government, protesting against the appointment of
the Gauleiter as Head of the State.
This morning the Free City authorities decided upon the
dismissal of fifteen Polish officials who were members of
the Port Council and appointed Germans in their places.
Three hours later the persons concerned were informed that
there had been a misunderstanding and were able to resume
their functions.
In the course of a frontier incident, two Polish
soldiers are said to have been killed 400 metres inside
Polish territory.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 242
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 25,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 11 p.m.)
THIS afternoon I had an interview with Herr Hitler, who
had asked to see me at 5.30.
This is the substance of what he told me: "In view of
the gravity of the situation," he said, "I wish to make a
statement which I would like you to forward to M. Daladier.
As I have already told him, I bear no enmity whatever
towards France. I have personally renounced all claims to
Alsace-Lorraine and recognized the Franco-German frontier. I
do not want war with your country; my one desire is to
maintain good relations with it. I find indeed the idea that
I might have to fight France on account of Poland a very
painful one. The Polish provoca-
[302]
tion, however, has placed the Reich in a position which
cannot be allowed to continue.
"Several months ago I made extremely fair proposals to
Poland, demanding the return of Danzig to the Reich and of a
narrow strip of territory leading from this German city to
East Prussia. But the guarantee given by the British
Government has encouraged the Poles to be obstinate. Not
only has the Warsaw Government rejected my proposals, but it
has subjected the German minority, our blood-brothers, to
the worst possible treatment, and has begun mobilization.
"At first," pursued Herr Hitler, "I forbade the Press
of the Reich to publish accounts of the cruelties suffered
by the Germans in Poland. But the situation has now become
intolerable. Are you aware," he asked me emphatically, "that
there have been cases of castration? That already there are
more than 70,000 refugees in our camps? Yesterday seven
Germans were killed by the police in Bielitz, and thirty
German reservists were machine-gunned at Lodz. Our
aeroplanes can no longer fly between Germany and East
Prussia without being shot at; their route had been changed,
but they are now even attacked over the sea. Thus, the plane
which was carrying State Secretary Stuckart was fired at by
Polish warships, a fresh incident which I was not yet in a
position to bring to the notice of Sir Nevile Henderson this
morning."
Raising his voice, Herr Hitler went on: "No nation
worthy of the name can put up with such unbearable insults.
France would not tolerate it any more than Germany. These
things have gone on long enough, and I will reply by force
to any further provocations. I want to state once again: I
wish to avoid war with your country. I will not attack
France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it
through to the bitter end. As you are aware, I have just
concluded a pact with Moscow that is not only theoretical,
but, I may say, practical. I believe I shall win, and you
believe you will win: what is certain is that above all
French and German blood will flow, the blood of two equally
courageous peoples. I say again, it is painful to me to
think we might come to that. Please tell this to President
Daladier on my behalf."
With these words, Herr Hitler rose to show that the
interview was over. Under the circumstances I could make
only a brief reply. I told him, first of all, that I knew
that all misunderstanding had now been removed; yet that, in
a moment as grave as this, I emphatically gave him my word
of honour as a soldier that I had no doubt whatever that in
the event of Poland's being attacked, France would assist
her with all the forces at her command. I was able however
to give him
[303]
my word also that the Government of the Republic would still
do all it could to preserve peace and would not spare its
counsels of moderation to the Polish Government.
The Chancellor replied: "I believe you; I even believe
that men like M. Beck are moderate, but they are no longer
in control of the situation."
I added that if French and German blood were to flow,
this blood-money, however costly, would not be the only
payment to be made. The ravages of a war that would
certainly be a long one would bring a succession of ghastly
miseries in their train. Though I was, as he said,
definitely certain of our victory, I feared, at the same
time, that at the end of a war, the sole real victor would
be M. Trotsky. The Chancellor, interrupting me, exclaimed:
"Why, then, did you give Poland a blank cheque?"
I replied by recalling the events of last March and the
deep impression they had made on French minds, the feeling
of insecurity to which they had given rise and which had led
us to strengthen our alliances. I repeated that our most
ardent desire was to maintain peace; that we continued to
exert a moderating influence in Warsaw; and that I could not
believe that it was impossible to bring the incidents
complained of to an end.
I had hinted earlier that the German Press seemed to me
to have considerably exaggerated the number and importance
of these incidents, and I had mentioned in particular the
case reported by the Angriff on August 15 of the German
engineer who was said to have been brutally murdered for
political reasons, whereas, in actual fact, he had been on
June 15 the victim of an ordinary quarrel whose motives were
exclusively passionate. Herr Hitler replied that he had
indeed been informed of our moderating influence in Warsaw;
yet the incidents were increasing. As for the events of last
March, he added, it was true that he had taken the provinces
of Bohemia and Moravia under his protection, but he had
preserved the liberties of the inhabitants, and anyone who
touched a hair of their heads would pay dearly for it; this
was a point of honour for the Reich. The Polish minority in
these regions were not subjected to any kind of brutalities;
in the Saar, too, not a single Frenchman had had any reason
for complaint. "It is very painful for me," repeated the
Chancellor once again, "to think I might have to fight your
country; but the decision does not rest with me. Please tell
this to M. Daladier."
[304]
I was unable to prolong the interview any further, and
after these remarks I took my leave.
COULONDRE.
No. 243
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels.
Paris, August 25,
1939, 11 p.m.
I SEND you herewith the French Government's reply to
the broadcast appeal by His Majesty the King of the
Belgians, which you should communicate without delay to the
Prime Minister.
"The noble and magnanimous appeal made by His Majesty
the King of the Belgians in the name of the representatives
of the Oslo group of States meeting at Brussels has been
welcomed by the French Government with keen and profound
sympathy.
"The contributions which France has made on every
possible occasion to the service of peace, her constant
anxiety that all differences between peoples should be
settled by peaceful means, can leave no doubt as to the
general attitude of the French Government; it remains always
ready to cooperate in any initiative aimed at creating an
atmosphere favourable to the easing of the international
situation.
"On the other hand, it is resolved not to accept any
settlement imposed by violence, or under threat, and
believes that this attitude contributes to the cause of
peace, and, at the same time, to the creation in Europe and
throughout the world, of conditions in which the
independence of every state would be guaranteed and the
respect of their most sacred rights assured."
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 244
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 25,
1939. 11.5 p.m.
(Received August 26 at 136 a.m.)
PRESIDENT MOSCICKI has just sent the King of the
Belgians a telegram thanking him for his "noble" speech.
"Poland," he adds, "is also convinced that a lasting peace
cannot be founded on the crushing of the weak, and equally
that the surest guarantee of peace lies in the
[305]
peaceful settlement of international affairs by means of
direct negotiations conducted on the basis of mutual respect
for each other's rights and interests."
LON N™EL.
No. 245
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 12.5 a.m.)
IN the course of an interview with Sir Nevile Henderson
today, Herr Hitler made the following statement to my
colleague, the substance of which I report herewith as I had
it from the latter. "I am prepared," said the Chancellor,
"to make one more attempt to re-establish good relations
between our countries and to preserve peace. I am willing to
consider, within certain limits, a disarmament programme. I
still want colonies, but I can wait, three, four or even
five years; in any case, this will not be grounds for a war.
Moreover, it need not be a question of the former German
colonies. The important thing for me is to find fats and
timber." My British colleague replied that to pass on these
proposals with any hope of their being useful, he would have
to be convinced that Germany would not attack Poland.
Herr Hitler replied: "It is impossible for me to give
any such undertaking; I prefer that you should not pass on
my proposals."
The British Ambassador has the impression,
nevertheless, that hostilities will not break out during the
48 hours that his mission will take, for he is secretly
leaving for London to-morrow morning by air. I asked my
colleague if Herr Hitler had not referred to Poland. He
answered that the Chancellor had repeated his claims of last
April, namely, the return of Danzig, and access to the Free
City across the Corridor.
COULONDRE.
[306]
III
M. Daladier's Letter and Herr Hitler's Reply
(August 26-27)
No. 246
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August
26, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 12.15 a.m.)
YESTERDAY Herr Hitler informed my British colleague
that he was determined to remedy the weakness of his eastern
frontier, due to the presence there of alien minorities. Sir
Nevile Henderson asked him if, as in the Tyrol, he proposed
to carry out an exchange of populations, but the Fhrer gave
no definite answer.
My British colleague and I think that this is a most
interesting idea and one which might make possible the
reopening of conversations between Poland and Germany, and
might even bring about an improvement in the relations
between the two countries. We consider that this idea, which
in principle at least harmonizes with the Fhrer's views,
might be the object of an immediate proposal on the part of
the Polish Government to the Government of the Reich.
This opinion is shared by my Polish colleague. At my
suggestion, he will recommend it by telegram to his
Government, which has already been informed of his
conversation with the British Ambassador. I have pointed out
to him that, at the present juncture, gaining time may be
the decisive factor. It is not impossible that moderates in
the National-Socialist party may find in the Russian pact
fresh arguments to dissuade the Fhrer from going to war, by
calling his attention to the unlimited economic
possibilities of the Reich's collaboration with the Soviet.
Time presses, and a Polish approach should be made to
Herr Hitler within 48 hours.
I take the liberty of impressing on the Department the
importance of their instructing our Ambassador in Warsaw to
give the above suggestion emphatic support.
COULONDRE.
[307]
No. 247
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 26, 1939.
12.55 a.m.
(Received at 4.30 a.m.)
COUNT SZEMBECK has confirmed both to my British
colleague and myself, the reply given me by M. Beck in the
course of our conversation about Danzig late last night; the
Polish Government fully appreciates the motives and the
excellent grounds for our recommendations and will do all in
its power to avoid confronting us with a fait accompli; it
will consult with Great Britain and with ourselves before
making any important decision; it will not reply to attacks
on its rights in customs and transport matters except by
suitable retaliatory measures of a non-military character;
only in the event of a situation arising, in circumstances
at present impossible to predict, which would be so serious
that any delay would appear dangerous, does the Polish
Government reserve the right to act immediately, having
informed us, but without undertaking to consult us
beforehand.
I replied to Count Szembeck that, in so far as this
last part of his statement was concerned, I could only
regard it as a reservation made with a view to some wholly
unpredictable eventuality, and volunteered so to speak "to
leave no doubts."
LON N™EL.
No. 248
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 26,
1939. 1.40 a.m.
(Received at 9.55 a.m.)
MY British colleague, who has already transmitted by
telegram the overtures made by Herr Hitler to Britain, has
left for England to explain them verbally and recommend them
for consideration.
These proposals are in actual fact characterized by
important new features (handing over of colonies other than
those formerly German; transfer of populations to eliminate
minority disputes; partial disarmament). In my opinion, it
is important to avoid two dangers revealed by the Czech
experiences.
The first of these would be for us to be content, after
a settlement
[308]
of the German demands on Poland, with vague undertakings and
hypothetical promises in further matters. In this respect,
it is enough to recall the collective guarantee to
Czechoslovakia.
The second would be to lend ourselves to a maneuver to
break up the Allied Front. No pressure of a kind calculated
to demoralize Poland should be contemplated. Danzig is only
the point of least resistance by which the Reich is trying
to penetrate into that country. As M. Lipski said to me
yesterday: "What the Germans want is to be able to lay hands
on Poland, and one day have the Polish Army at their
disposal."
Finally, no negotiation should be entered upon, and
this is an essential preliminary condition, before all
threat of force has been withdrawn.
COULONDRE.
No. 249
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 26,
1939. 2.20 a.m.
As suggested by M. Coulondre and M. Lipski, you should
give emphatic support to the proposals to the Polish
Government made in the telegram from our Ambassador in
Berlin, which I transmit herewith.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 250
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 26,
1939. 11.4 a.m.
(Received at 2.15 p.m.)
OFFICIAL German circles take strong exception to the
message of the President of the United States. They profess
to be unable to understand the reasons which prompted Mr.
Roosevelt to launch this appeal. They maintain that the
Reich, by signing a whole series of non-aggression pacts, of
which the Russo-German Pact is the latest, has already
responded by deeds to the manifesto of April 14. It is to
the democratic countries, which encourage Polish
intransigence, and not to Germany that Mr. Roosevelt ought
to address himself. The Reich will never entrust to
international procedure the care of protecting Germans and
of defending its vital interests.
[309]
The President's proposals are no longer even mentioned
in this morning's Press.
COULONDRE.
No. 251
M. DE DAMPIERRE, French Minister in Ottawa,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Ottawa, August 26,
1939. 12 a.m.
(Received at 10 p.m.)
THIS morning the Prime Minister addressed an appeal,
through the German, Italian and Polish Consuls at Ottawa, to
Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, as well as to the
President of the Polish Republic. The messages intended for
Warsaw and Berlin are couched in identical terms. The Havas
Agency is telegraphing the full text of these documents.
The Governor-General has told me that he approves of
this initiative and that it would have a considerable
repercussion upon Canadian public opinion.
DAMPIERRE.
No. 252
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 1 p.m.)
I HAVE just seen M. Arciszewski and put before him the
plan suggested by M. Coulondre, with a request to let
Colonel Beck know of it immediately, as Colonel Beck could
not see me before twelve.
M. Arciszewski showed himself personally favourable to
this suggestion, of which he understood the importance and
advantages. Apart from the arguments set forth by M.
Coulondre, I also stressed the following considerations: a
Polish initiative in the sense indicated would bring the
problem into the field of nationality questions, and
consequently tend to safeguard the territorial status quo.
The Chancellor could not reject it without serious drawbacks
from his own point of view. Moreover, Italy, because of the
precedent of the Tyrol, would probably take an interest in
this solution.
LON N™EL.
[310]
No. 253
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris, August 26,
1939. 2.50 p.m.
IN reply to the message which, at the end of your
interview of the 25th August, Herr Hitler asked you to
convey to M. Daladier, please deliver urgently to the
Chancellor on behalf of the President of the Council of
Ministers the personal letter which follows:
Your Excellency,
The French Ambassador in Berlin has sent me your
personal message.
Faced as we are, as you remind me, with the gravest
responsibility that can ever be assumed by two heads of
government, that of allowing the blood of two great peoples
to be shed, when they desire nothing but peace and work, I
owe it to you, I owe it to our two peoples to say that the
fate of peace still rests solely in your hands.
You cannot doubt my sentiments towards Germany, nor
France's pacific dispositions towards your nation. No
Frenchman has ever done more than I have to strengthen
between our two peoples not merely peace, but a sincere
cooperation in their own interest as well as in that of
Europe and the whole world.
Unless you attribute to the French people a conception
of national honour less high than that which I myself
recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt either that
France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations,
such as Poland, which, I am perfectly sure, wants also to
live in peace with Germany.
These two facts are easily reconciled. There is nothing
today which need prevent any longer the pacific solution of
the international crisis with honour and dignity for all
peoples, if the will for peace exists equally on all sides.
I can vouch not only for the good will of France, but
also for that of all her allies. I can personally guarantee
the readiness which Poland has always shown to have recourse
to methods of free conciliation, such as may be envisaged
between the Governments of two sovereign nations. In all
sincerity I can assure you that there is not one of the
grievances invoked by Germany against Poland in connection
with the Danzig question which might not be submitted to
decision by such methods with a view to a friendly and
equitable settlement.
I can also pledge my honour that there is nothing in
the clear and
[311]
sincere solidarity of France with Poland and her allies
which could modify in any manner whatsoever the peaceful
inclinations of my country. This solidarity has never
prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from helping to
maintain Poland in her pacific inclinations.
In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no man
endowed with human feelings could understand that a war of
destruction should be allowed to break out without a last
attempt at a pacific adjustment between Germany and Poland.
Your will for peace may be exercised in all confidence in
this direction without the slightest derogation from your
sense of German honour. As for myself, the head of the
Government of France, a country which, like yours, only
desires harmony between the French people and the German
people, and which, on the other hand, is united to Poland by
bonds of friendship and by the pledged word, I am ready to
make all the efforts that an honest man can make in order to
ensure the success of this attempt.
Like myself, you were a soldier in the last war. You
realize, as I do, how a people's memory retains a horror for
war and its disasters, whatever may be its result. My
conception of your eminent rise as leader of the German
people, to guide them along the paths of peace towards the
full accomplishment of their mission in the common work of
civilization, prompts me to ask you for a reply to this
proposal. If the blood of France and that of Germany flow
again, as they did twenty-five years ago, each of the two
peoples will fight with confidence in its own victory, but
the most certain victors will be the forces of destruction
and barbarism.
EDOUARD DALADIER.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 254
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 26,
1939. 3.45 p.m.
THE following instructions have been sent by the
Foreign Office to your British colleague:
During any conversations that may be opened between the
German Government and the Polish Government upon the
questions at issue between the two countries, and in order
to prevent the Government of the Reich from seizing the
pretext of alleged ill-treatment inflicted on the German
minorities in Poland to break off such conversations,
[312]
it is suggested that the Government of Warsaw should provide
for the appointment in those regions of neutral observers,
offering every guarantee of impartiality.
You should let the Polish Government know that you are
in agreement with the d‚marche that your English colleague
is to make to this effect.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 255
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 26,
1939. 4.45 p.m.
(Received 7.20 p.m.)
ACCORDING to a telegram from M. Lipski, the Chancellor
yesterday reported to our Ambassador the murder of 24
Germans near Lodz and of eight others near Bielsko.
M. Arciszewski informs me, and I have no reason for
doubting his statement, that these two allegations are
totally groundless.
LON N™EL.
No. 256
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 4.45 p.m.)
THIS afternoon's papers announce in huge headlines the
"Polish attack in Danzig territory," in the course of which
two Germans, a S.S. and a S.A. are supposed to have been
killed. "A new and tragic violation of the frontier near
Danzig" is the heavy-type headline spread across its whole
front page by the B”rsenzeitung, which alleges in its
leading article that news is coming in hour by hour proving
that troops are taking up position with a view to attack.
"England is responsible" is another headline in this
same journal, repeating the words of Herr Rudolf Hess, at
the opening of the 7th Congress of Germans Abroad, yesterday
evening.
Apart from these fresh incidents alleged to have
occurred in Danzig territory, the Press sums up and develops
the accusations against Poland which were analyzed this
morning.
COULONDRE.
[313]
NO. 257
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 8.46 p m.)
LORD HALIFAX, to whom I communicated the substance of
the telegrams in which M. Coulondre described his interview
with the Chancellor, observed that this conversation
corresponded in the main with that between the British
Ambassador and Herr Hitler on the same day. The latter
reaffirmed his respect for the British Empire and his desire
to establish permanent bonds of friendship with Great
Britain.
He added that he had no objection against the close
relations uniting England and France, and that he had no
quarrel with the latter over the western frontier. Herr
Hitler, after specifying that the Polish question must be
settled as a preliminary, mentioned the possibility of
broaching the problem of disarmament if a general settlement
could be arrived at.
He also alluded to the colonial problem, but in terms
devoid of a provocative character.
In all references to the settlement of the difficulties
of the Reich with Poland, he never stated clearly the manner
in which he thinks that they could be solved. The language
he used may mean either that he feels it to be simply a
question of solving the problem of Danzig and the Corridor,
or that he contemplates more far-reaching changes.
Herr Hitler insisted that he did not wish to raise
questions in too narrow or absolute a manner, nor would he
ask the British Government to default on their pledges.
What he wanted was that the British Government should
make a gesture that would induce Poland to be amenable to
reason. During the whole interview the Chancellor had, as
usual, an appearance of complete sincerity and deep
conviction. Taking note of these various indications, Sir
Nevile Henderson interpreted Herr Hitler's advice to him to
visit London as a sign of the latter's good will. He even
believed that the postponement of the Tannenberg ceremony
indicated that the Fhrer would allow a certain delay in the
carrying out of his plans and would at least wait for the
replies from Paris and from London.
Lord Halifax, together with his colleagues of the inner
Cabinet, listened to the Ambassador's account, and is now
preparing a reply to
[314]
Herr Hitler. In its general lines, the document will first
proclaim the British Government's faith in the possibility
of continuing the negotiations with a view to avoiding a
conflict. It will emphasize that the Chancellor's
declarations do not, however, throw any light on the manner
in which he envisages the settlement of his difficulties
with Poland.
The British Government would regard it as dishonourable
to fail in its obligations. It could not, therefore, stand
aside and take no interest in the solutions which might be
contemplated for the present dispute.
The importance of preventing any fresh violence at the
expense of the German minority, in order to facilitate
direct negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw, is fully
recognized in London. The British Government would therefore
be pleased to see this subject discussed. But they realize
that these conversations will have no chance of success
unless:
(1) Herr Hitler shows a sincere intention to take into
consideration the vital interests and the economic rights of
Poland;
(2) The settlement envisaged is made subject to certain
international guarantees.
The document containing the British Government's answer
would add that a general discussion, if it should be opened,
could not have a better preface than a pacific settlement of
the German-Polish quarrel.
In conclusion, Lord Halifax told me that this document,
when drawn up and approved by the Cabinet, will be forwarded
to the French Government.
I took it upon myself to assure him that our reply
would be likewise communicated to the British Government.
CORBIN.
NO. 258
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 26,
1939. 9.5 p.m.
(Received 11.75 p.m.)
COLONEL BECK has just informed me, through Count
Szembeck, that the Polish Government were inclined to adopt
our suggestion. However, for fear that Herr Hitler should
misunderstand their intentions, they do not desire to take
the initiative.
M. Lipski is being asked to find an intermediary who
might in-
[315]
troduce the question. Count Szembeck thinks that certain
neutral colleagues, or even persons in Field-Marshal
Goering's circle, would accept this mission. Generally
speaking as soon as the initiative in this sense is taken by
somebody, the Polish Government will reply in the
affirmative.
It would be advisable for M. Coulondre to get into
touch on this matter with M. Lipski as soon as possible.
LON N™EL.
No. 259
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 10 p.m.)
ACCORDING to what Sir Nevile Henderson said this
afternoon to a member of Lord Halifax's staff, the question
of the exchange of populations had been the subject of only
one very vague allusion in the course of yesterday's
conversations with Herr Hitler, and it had arisen in the
following way.
During the interview the Fhrer spoke at one point of
"Macedonian conditions" which complicated the racial
problems on the German-Polish frontier.
The British Ambassador then remarked that this
situation is the more to be deplored as national sentiments
were today so strong that one could understand the exchanges
of population which certain countries had carried out.
Moreover, this remark, which could not, properly
speaking, be considered as a suggestion, was not taken up by
the German Chancellor.
CORBIN.
No. 260
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 26,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 10 p.m.)
I INVITE reference to M. Coulondre's telegram, which
was communicated to me this morning.
In his telegraphic report of his conversation yesterday
with Herr Hitler, the British Ambassador in Berlin did not
mention the possibility
[316]
of the Fhrer reverting to the programme he had laid down
last April, which was limited to the question of Danzig and
to that of a motor road across the Corridor.
Sir Nevile Henderson, in his communication to the
Foreign Office, definitely said that no allusion to the
proposals of last April was made yesterday by Herr Hitler in
the course of their interview.
CORBIN.
No. 261
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 27,
1939. 12.15 a.m.
(Received at 430 a.m.)
I REGRET to have to report to Your Excellency that the
proposal of Prime Minister Daladier has not been taken up by
Chancellor Hitler. For forty minutes I commented upon the
President's moving letter. I said everything that my heart
as a man and a Frenchman could prompt to induce the
Chancellor to agree to a supreme effort for a pacific
settlement of the question of Danzig. I conjured him, in the
name of history and for the sake of humanity, not to thrust
aside this last chance. For the peace of his conscience, I
begged him, who had built an empire without shedding blood,
not to shed it now, not to shed the blood of soldiers nor
that of women and children, without being absolutely certain
that this could not be avoided. I confronted him with the
terrible responsibilities that he would assume towards
western civilization. I told him that his prestige is great
enough outside Germany to remain undiminished even after a
gesture of appeasement, the men who feared him would perhaps
be astonished, but would admire him, mothers would bless
him. Perhaps I moved him; but I did not prevail. His mind
was made up.
Herr Hitler, after reading the Prime Minister's letter
and paying tribute to the noble thoughts it expressed, told
me that ever since Poland had had the English guarantee, it
had become vain to seek to lead her to a sound comprehension
of the situation. Poland's mind was set in morbid
resistance. Poland knew that she was committing suicide, but
was doing so telling herself that, thanks to the support of
France and England, she would rise once more.
Besides, he added, things have now gone too far. No
country having any regard for its honour could tolerate the
Polish provocations. France,
[317]
in Germany's place, would have already gone to war. No doubt
there were some reasonable men in Warsaw, but the soldiery
of that barbarous country had now broken loose. The central
Government no longer had the situation in hand.
I laid stress on the importance of the French proposal:
not only did M. Daladier undertake that Poland would agree
to seek a solution by free conciliation, but he bound
himself, with all the authority vested in his person, to
work for the success of an attempt at pacific settlement.
Herr Hitler replied that he did not doubt the
sentiments of M. Daladier and his sincere desire to save
peace, but he thought that the advice of the Prime Minister
to Warsaw, however pressing it might be, would not be
listened to, for Poland was deaf since she had the British
guarantee. Moreover, if Poland showed any willingness to
talk matters over, it would, doubtless, be in order to gain
time for her mobilization.
I returned many times to my point. I pointed out that
Poland and Germany had not talked to one another for a long
time, that in the course of the crisis the points of view
might perhaps have drawn closer, that at any rate it was
impossible to find this out unless conversations took place,
and that both sides might refrain from taking any military
measures while contacts were made.
"It is useless," Herr Hitler replied to me. "Poland
would not give up Danzig; and it is my will that Danzig, as
one of the ports of the Reich, should return to Germany."
In face of the impossibility of breaking down Herr
Hitler's resistance, and after having invoked the arguments
of sentiment reported at the beginning of this telegram, I
thought I ought to leave the door ajar by expressing the
hope that the Fhrer had not said his last word.
As I was taking leave, Herr Hitler announced to me that
he would reply in writing to M. Daladier's proposal.
COULONDRE.
No. 262
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 27, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 9.35 a m.)
HAVE arranged with Herr Hitler that no publicity should
be
[318]
given until further notice to the letter from M. Daladier,
and to the imminent reply from the Fhrer. I must beg that
all the competent services should receive the strictest
instructions to this effect.
COULONDRE.
No. 263
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 27, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 1.20 p.m.)
THE d‚marche made by me yesterday had to be made. No
doubt no immediate result can be expected from it, first
because apparently we have not yet reached the climax of the
trial of strength; then because Herr Hitler had to wait to
learn the reception accorded by London to his overtures
before taking up his position. It may nevertheless have had
some psychological effect, at once, by confirming Herr
Hitler in the belief that we are ready to fight, by making
him face his responsibility and by showing him that we
remain in favour of a solution honourable for both parties.
It is not to be ruled out that this d‚marche may bear
fruit at the moment when Herr Hitler must make his choice
between peace and war.
We cannot, however, in my opinion, expect a happy
result from it unless we are careful not to give the
impression that we are on the watch for every possible
compromise, whatever the cost may be. I know full well that
this is not in the minds of the French and British
Governments. I have simply emphasized the importance of
making appearances correspond with the facts to the very
end.
COULONDRE.
No. 264
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 27,
1939, 3.20 p.m.
(Received at 5.31 p.m.)
COLONEL BECK finds that, in spite of fresh incidents,
the aggressiveness of the Germans on the Polish frontiers
has rather diminished
[319]
during the last twenty-four hours. He told me that it was
his impression that the Chancellor had not yet decided to
make war.
LON N™EL.
No. 265
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, august 27,
1939, 3.20 p.m.
(Received at 5 p.m.)
THE Polish Press report fresh German acts of
aggression, pointing out that they are increasing in number
on the most different points of the frontier.
Two of these incidents on the frontier of Eastern
Prussia led to casualties. In the district of Mlawa, two
Polish frontier guards were killed by German soldiers firing
from German territory. Not far from there, near Dzialdowo, a
column of German artillery having entered Polish territory,
one of the gunners was killed.
Eight other less serious incidents are reported from
Pomerania, in the district of Czestochowa and in Silesia. On
the Slovak frontier an attack was made on a Polish post with
machine-gun fire.
According to the papers, German aeroplanes have again
flown over Polish territory and the prohibited zone of Hel.
LON N™EL.
No. 266
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 27, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 530 p.m.)
HERR VON RIBBENTROP communicated to me today a copy of
Herr Hitler's reply to M. Daladier. This reply is of a
negative character.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after having read
this document, stated to me: "I must add to the Fhrer's
letter that since yesterday the situation has become still
more acute. The Polish Government is no longer master in its
own country. This may perhaps be as well, as otherwise we
should have to hold it responsible for the provocations
directed against us. But I must warn you that we shall
strike at the first incident."
COULONDRE.
[320]
No. 267
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 27, 1939.
HERR VON WEIZSŽCKER has handed me, and I have the
honour to forward to you herewith the original of Chancellor
Hitler's reply to the personal letter from M. Daladier.
I attach two copies of the translation of that
document.
A duplicate copy of Herr Hitler's message must have
been handed to you by the German Embassy in Paris.
I dispatch the present communication by a special
messenger.
COULONDRE.
Personal
To His Excellency, M. DALADIER, President of the
Council of Ministers of France, at Paris.
MY DEAR PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL,
I can understand the thoughts that you have expressed.
Nor have I, for my part, ever minimized the high duties
devolving on those on whom the fate of peoples rests. As an
ax-Serviceman I am as aware as you are of the frightfulness
of war. Owing to this outlook and to this experience, I have
likewise made sincere efforts to eliminate all cause of
conflict between our two peoples. Some time ago I gave a
public assurance to the French people that the return of the
Saar territory was the preliminary condition of such an
appeasement. As soon as this return had been effected I
solemnly confirmed my renunciation of any other claim that
might affect France.
The German people has approved my attitude.
As you were able to ascertain on the occasion of our
last meeting, the German people, fully conscious of their
own attitude, did not and do not harbour any kind of
bitterness or of hatred towards their old and gallant
opponent. Quite the contrary. The appeasement on our Western
Frontier engendered a growing sympathy, at least on the part
of the German people, a sympathy which on numerous occasions
showed itself particularly demonstrative. The building of
great fortifications in the West, which has absorbed and
absorbs many millions of marks, amounts at the same time for
Germany to an official act of acceptance and fixation of the
final frontier of the Reich. The German people has
consequently renounced the two provinces which
[321]
belonged in the past to the German Empire, and were
conquered afresh with much blood and defended a last time
with yet more blood. This renunciation does not represent,
as your Excellency will certainly agree, any tactical
attitude for external consumption, but a decision which was
strictly confirmed by all the measures that we have taken.
You could not, Mr. Prime Minister, mention one instance
in which, either by a line or a speech, I have ever acted
contrary to this final fixation of the Western frontier of
the German Reich. By this renunciation and this attitude, I
thought to have eliminated every conceivable element of
conflict between our two peoples, which might lead to a
repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918. But this voluntary
limitation of the vital aspirations of Germany on the West
cannot be considered as an acceptance, valid in all other
spheres, of the Diktat of Versailles. I therefore year by
year sought to obtain, by means of negotiation, the revision
of at least the most incredible and most intolerable clauses
of this Dikat. I found this impossible. That this revision
ought to take place many far-seeing people in all countries
considered to be obvious. Whatever reproaches might be
leveled at my methods, however much you might feel obliged
to oppose them, no one has the right to overlook or to deny
that, thanks to them, it has been possible, in numerous
cases, without fresh shedding of blood, not only to find a
solution satisfactory for Germany, but also that, by such
methods, the statesmen of other nations have been freed from
the obligation (which it was often impossible for them to
fulfill) of assuming before their own peoples the
responsibility for this revision. For, in any case, it is a
point upon which your Excellency will agree with me: the
revision was inevitable. The Dikat of Versailles was
intolerable. No Frenchman of honour, you least of all, M.
Daladier, would have acted, in a similar situation,
differently from me. I have, therefore, in this spirit,
endeavoured to wipe out from the world the most unreasonable
of the provisions of the Dikat of Versailles. I made to the
Polish Government a proposal which alarmed the German
people. No one but I myself could have attempted to bring
such a proposal to the light of day. And therefore it could
be made only once. I am now convinced, in my innermost
conscience, that if England in particular, instead of
launching a savage Press campaign against Germany, and of
spreading rumours of German mobilization, had by one means
or another induced Poland to show herself reasonable, Europe
would be enjoying today and for twenty-five years the
profoundest peace. But on the contrary, through the
mendacious allegation of German aggression,
[322]
Polish public opinion was alarmed, it became more difficult
for the Polish Government to take of their own accord the
clear-cut decisions required, and above all their
appreciation of the actual limits of what was possible was
thereby obscured when we made our offer of a promise of
guarantee. The Polish Government rejected my proposals.
Polish public opinion, convinced that England and France
would henceforth fight for Poland, then started to advance
demands which could be treated as ludicrous follies if they
were not infinitely dangerous as well. Then began an
intolerable reign of terror, a physical and economic
oppression of the million and a half Germans still to be
numbered in the territories separated from the Reich. I do
not want to speak here of the horrors that have been
perpetrated. But Danzig itself, following the incessant
encroachments of the Polish authorities, has become
increasingly aware of being subjected, with no hope of
redemption, to the arbitrary exactions of a force alien to
the national character of the city and of its population.
May I be allowed, M. Daladier, to inquire how you would
act, as a Frenchman, if, as the unhappy result of a
courageous struggle, one of your provinces was separated by
a corridor occupied by a foreign Power; if a great city-let
us say Marseilles-were forcibly prevented from proclaiming
itself French, and if Frenchmen residing in this territory
were at the present moment beset, beaten, maltreated, nay
bestially done to death? You are a Frenchman, M. Daladier; I
know therefore how you would act. I am a German. Have no
doubt, M. Daladier, as to my feeling of honour and as to my
conviction that it is my duty to act precisely thus. If you
suffered what we are suffering, would you accept, M.
Daladier, that Germany should want to intervene without any
motive so that the corridor should continue to cut across
France?-so as to prevent the return of the stolen
territories to the mother country?-so as to prohibit the
return of Marseilles to France? In any case, the idea would
never occur to me, M. Daladier, that Germany should embark
on a struggle with you for this reason. For I and all of us
have renounced Alsace-Lorraine to avoid a fresh shedding of
blood. And still less should we shed blood in order to
maintain a state of affairs which would be intolerable for
you and which would be of no value to us. All that you
express in your letter, M. Daladier, I feel exactly as you
do. Perhaps, just because we are ax-Servicemen, we are able
to understand each other more easily in many spheres. But I
beg of you, do understand this equally well; it is not
possible for a nation of honour to give up nearly two
millions
[323]
of human beings and to see them ill-treated on its
frontiers. I have therefore formulated a precise demand;
Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany. The
Macedonian situation must be liquidated on our eastern
frontier. I do not see the possibility of bringing to a
pacific solution a Poland who now feels herself inviolable
under the protection of her guarantees. But I should despair
of an honourable future for my people if, under such
circumstances, we had not decided to settle the question in
one way or another. If, consequently, fate compels our two
peoples to fight afresh, there would nevertheless be a
difference between the motives of the one and the others. I,
M. Daladier, should then be fighting with my people for the
reparation of an injustice which was inflicted upon us,
while the others would fight for maintenance of that
injustice. This is the more tragic, since many of the most
important personalities of your own nation have recognized
the insanity of the solution of 1919, as well as the
impossibility of its indefinite prolongation. I perfectly
realize the heavy consequences which such a conflict would
involve. But I believe that the heaviest would fall on
Poland, for it is a fact that, whatever the issue of a war
born of this question, the Polish State of today would be
lost anyhow. That for this result our two peoples must
engage in a new and bloody war of extermination, is a matter
of the deepest sorrow not only for you, M. Daladier, but
also for me. But, as already indicated, I fail to see any
possibility for us to obtain any result from Poland by
reasonable means so as to redress a situation which is
intolerable for the German people and for the German nation.
ADOLF HITLER.
No. 268
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 27,
1939. 8.40 p.m.
(Received at 10.25 p.m.)
THE arrival at the Polish Frontiers of a new German
division in the north-west and of a second division of
reserves in Eastern Prussia is reported.
The German troops in Slovakia are advancing westward
and have reached Poprad.
The latest information gathered by the Polish
authorities confirms that the German mobilization appears to
be general.
LON N™EL.
[324]
No. 269
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 27,
1939. 10 p.m.
(Received August 28, at 1.15 a.m.)
THE population of the districts adjoining the Polish
frontier has been evacuated. Only military vehicles are
circulating in Danzig, where life is that of an entrenched
camp. Defence arrangements appear to be complete.
All Polish stocks, notably 3,000 tons of wheat, 2,500
tons of petrol, and 1,000 tons of salt, have been
confiscated by the Senate.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 270
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels.
Paris, August 27,
1939. 10.30 p.m.
PLEASE request the King of the Belgians to grant you an
audience, and hand him the following communication on behalf
of the Government of the Republic:
"The Government of the Republic have neglected nothing
that might contribute to the maintenance of peace. If their
efforts should fail, the French Government know that the
Belgian Government would act in exact conformity with their
international obligations.
"In the event of Belgium adopting an attitude of
neutrality, the French Government would, of course, as in
1914, fully respect this neutrality. Only in the event of
Belgian neutrality not being respected by another Power
might France be led to modify her attitude in order to
secure her own defence.
"The binding promises of assistance given by the French
Government to Belgium, as expressly stated in their
communication to the Belgian Government of August 24, 1937,
as a matter of course, retain their full value."
GEORGES BONNET.
[325]
No. 271
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the French Ambassadors in London, Warsaw,
Washington, Istanbul,
and Bucharest.
Paris, August 27,
1939. 11 p.m.
ON the evening of August 26 the Chancellor of the Reich
declared verbally to our Ambassador in Berlin that he could
not accept M. Daladier's suggestion to agree to a supreme
attempt at a pacific settlement with Poland.
GEORGES BONNET.
IV
Herr Hitler Agrees to Hold Direct Conversations
with Poland
(August 28-30, 1939)
No. 272
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 1.50 p.m.
(Received at 430 a.m.)
ACCORDING to what Colonel Beck has told me, the Polish
Government feel compelled, on account of the intentions
towards Poland expressed in the communication made by the
German Chancellor to the British Ambassador, to complete
their military measures by calling up fresh classes of
reservists.
This seems to mean putting on a war footing those of
the first line divisions which have not yet been mobilized.
LON N™EL.
No. 273
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 12 a.m.
(Received at 1.35 p.m.)
THE Polish troops have received orders from Marshal
Rydz-Smigly not to reply to any German provocation. Their
task is to drive back
[326]
any incursions into Polish territory but to take strict care
not to cross the frontier.
LON N™EL.
No. 274
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 3.30 p.m.
(Received at 5.45 p.m.)
THE Polish Press reports ten fresh cases of German
aggression in Polish territory at widely separated points of
the frontier. Either patrols have penetrated into Polish
territory, or rifles and machineguns have been fired from
German territory on the frontier guards stationed in Polish
territory.
Near Dzialdowo, (on the East Prussian frontier) a
patrol of German cavalry was encountered 6 kilometres within
the frontier line. A German cavalryman and his horse were
killed. A skirmish took place near Nowy-Targ, on the Slovak
frontier.
From the official Polish version it transpires that in
each case the German patrols only encountered frontier
guards on the Polish side.
LON N™EL.
No. 275
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 6 p.m.
(Received at 8.40 p.m.)
IN an interview which I had with the German Ambassador
on July 15, the latter admitted that, while he had cause to
complain of some administrative measures taken by the Polish
authorities against Germans, he had not had to complain of
acts of any other kind for some time past.
I advised M. Arciszewski to take steps to cause an
investigation to be made on the spot by some neutral in
order to destroy the legend that the German Chancellor is
trying to establish.
LON N™EL.
[327]
No. 276
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 6.5 p.m.
(Received at 9.5 p.m.)
THE ill-treatment, murders, etc., of which the Poles
are accused by Chancellor Hitler are sheer calumnies. The
denials issued by the national authorities cannot be
doubted. It is impossible for Germans to be killed on the
outskirts of Danzig or at Bielsko without the knowledge of
the French who live in these districts. Moreover, it should
be pointed out that the Germans did not mention any definite
facts, names or dates.
No protest has been lodged with the Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador.
LON N™EL.
No. 277
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
August 28, 1939.
(Received by telephone 6.15 p.m.)
THE Prime Minister has just communicated to me the
final text of the British reply to the Chancellor's
communication. A few verbal changes have been made by the
inner Cabinet in the initial text, but the general tenor is
not altered.
I have the honour to transmit the following document to
Your Excellency:
The Secretary of State again insists that no
indiscretion should take place with regard to the contents
of the document in question.
(1) His Majesty's Government have received the message
conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's
Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care
which it demands.
They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to
make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany
and the British Empire, and they fully share this desire.
They believe with him that if a complete and lasting
understanding between the two countries could be established
it would bring untold blessings to both nations.
(2) The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of
questions:
[328]
those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany
and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of
Germany and Great Britain. In connexion with these last, His
Majesty's Government observe that the German Chancellor has
indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition,
he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a
general understanding. These proposals are, of course,
stated in a very general form and would require closer
definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully prepared
to take them, with some additions, as subjects for
discussion, and they would be ready, if the differences
between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to
proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a
sincere desire to reach an agreement.
(3) The condition which the German Chancellor lays down
is that there must first be a settlement of the differences
between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's
Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon
the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is
to be reached. On these points, the importance of which
cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is
silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point
out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to
achieving further progress. The German Government will be
aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to
Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to
honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great
Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which would put in
jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given
their guarantee.
(4) In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a
reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and
Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the
two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding
of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his
speech of April 28 last the German Chancellor recognized the
importance of these interests to Poland.
But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter
to the German Chancellor of August 22, His Majesty's
Government consider it essential for the success of the
discussions which would precede the agreement that it should
be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at
would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's
Government would be ready if desired to make their
contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.
In the view of His Majesty's Government, it follows
that the next
[329]
step should be the initiation of direct discussions between
the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would
include the principles stated above, namely, the
safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the
securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.
They have already received a definite assurance from
the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into
discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope
that the German Government would for their part also be
willing to agree to this course.
If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion
led to an agreement the way would be open to the negotiation
of that wider and more complete understanding between Great
Britain and Germany which both countries desire.
(5) His Majesty's Government agree with the German
Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German-
Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the
treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with
its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment
and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace.
It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all
incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly
suppressed and that unverified reports should not be allowed
to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without
provocation on either side, for a full examination of the
possibilities of a settlement. His Majesty's Government are
confident that both the Governments concerned are fully
alive to these considerations.
(6) His Majesty's Government have said enough to make
their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue
between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German
Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's
Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to
Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to
assist the achievement of a solution which may commend
itself both to Germany and to Poland.
That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His
Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons
directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but
also because of the wider considerations of which the German
Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.
(7) It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress
the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to
settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results
of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the
Prime Minister's letter to the Chancellor of
[330]
August 22, and His Majesty's Government do not doubt that
they are as fully recognized by the Chancellor as by
themselves.
On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting
with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the
message, now under consideration to a limitation of
armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be
obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be
anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition
from preparation for war to the normal activities of
peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.
(8) A just settlement of these questions between
Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure
to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding
between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two
countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole
world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without
parallel in history.
CORBIN.
No. 278
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 28, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.15 p.m.)
M. LIPSKI has received the instructions announced (my
telegram of August 26) which authorize him to make indirect
overtures with a view to settling the question of minorities
by exchanges of population.
The Polish ambassador intends to act on these
instructions when an opportunity arises.
COULONDRE.
No. 279
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. HENRY CAMBON, French Minister in Luxemburg.
Paris, August 28, 1939.
6.45 p.m.
PLEASE transmit the following communication to M. Beck,
on behalf of the French Government.
"The Government of the Republic believes that, in the
present circumstances, it can contribute to allay the
preoccupations of the Government of Luxemburg by declaring
its firm intention, should the need arise, to respect the
inviolability of the Grand Duchy's terri-
[33I]
tory. It is only in the event of an infringement of that
inviolability by another Power that the Government of the
Republic might be compelled to change this attitude, in
order to secure its own defence."
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 280
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 8.10 p.m.
(Received at 10.40 p.m.)
THE British Ambassador has just informed Colonel Beck
of the substance of the reply which the British Government
is giving to Herr Hitler. He requested him at the same time
to confirm that Poland was still prepared to hold direct
conversations with Germany under the conditions set out in
the British document.
Colonel Beck, who expressed great satisfaction at the
English answer, replied in the affirmative to the British
Ambassador's question.
LON N™EL
No. 281
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 8.15 p.m.
(Received at 11 p.m.)
AMONG other contradictions of false allegations, the
Press publishes the following news, supplied by the Pat
Agency:
1. The Vice-Vo‹vode of Silesia, M. Malhomme, accused by
the German wireless stations of having ordered the
maltreatment of women and children, has been seriously ill
for a month and is under treatment at Warsaw;
2. Plundering by bands of insurgents in Silesia is a
complete invention. Captain Blacha, who is alleged to be
leading them, has been dead two years.
LON N™EL.
[332]
No. 282
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 28,
1939. 8.20 p.m.
(Received at 9.50 p.m.)
THE number of Germans residing in Poland is less than
one million. It is therefore far from reaching the figure
given by Herr Hitler.
I may add that in a conversation with me on that
question, in 1937, the German Ambassador recognized that the
number of Poles in Germany and Germans in Poland was almost
the same.
LON N™EL.
No. 283
Note addressed to M. Bargeton, French Ambassador in
Brussels, by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on
August 28, 1939
(Transmitted at
8.38 p.m.)
(Received at 10 p.m.)
BY his note of August 28, 1939, the Ambassador of the
French Republic was good enough to define, on the occasion
of the present international crisis, the attitude that the
French Government would observe towards Belgium in the event
of a conflict in Europe becoming unavoidable.
The King's Government has taken note of this
communication, by which the Government of the Republic
intimates that if Belgium in such a contingency maintains
her neutrality, the French Government is firmly resolved, in
conformity with its traditional policy, integrally to
respect this neutrality.
On its side, the King's Government, faithful to the
policy of which France took cognizance in the declaration of
April 24, 1937, intends to remain outside any conflict;
consequently it will not tolerate any violation of this
neutrality and will resist with all the forces at its
disposal such violation if it should occur.
If, contrary to its expectation, Belgium were the
object of an aggression, she would not hesitate to appeal to
France. She does not doubt that in this case she would
receive the assistance requested, according to the
assurances now renewed by the Government of the Republic.
[333]
The King's Government thanks the Government of the
Republic for this fresh proof that it remains true to its
traditional policy towards Belgium.
No. 284
M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Brussels, August 28,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.30 p.m.)
THE Prime Minster has just summoned me and requests me
to inform you that the Queen of the Netherlands and the King
of the Belgians have agreed to offer their "good offices" in
view of a settlement of the crisis. This offer is made to
the Governments of France, of England, of Germany, of Italy,
and of Poland. An identical communication is being made this
evening by the Netherlands Government to the representatives
of the said five Powers at the Hague.
BARGETON.
No. 285
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 29,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 1.45 a.m.)
THE British Ambassador, who is engaged in drafting his
report to London, has this moment sent his first secretary
in order to inform me of the substance of an interview
lasting an hour and ten minutes which he had with Chancellor
Hitler:
"While showing himself very calm, the Chancellor
refused to abate any of his claims against Poland. He
demanded all the Corridor, without even mentioning Danzig,
and territorial changes in Upper Silesia with the
possibility of an exchange of populations. He declared,
however, that the English communication would retain his
most serious attention and that he would give his reply in
writing to-morrow."
COULONDRE.
[334]
No. 286
M. HENRY CAMBON, French Minister in Luxemburg,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Luxemburg, August 29,
1939. 11.8 a.m.
(Received at 3.19 p.m.)
THE declaration contained in your telegram of yesterday
has been handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has
charged me to express the thanks of the Grand Ducal
Government to the French Government.
CAMBON.
No. 287
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 29,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 1.20 p.m.)
MY British colleague has acquainted me with his
interview with Herr Hitler, the substance of which is as
follows:
"All through the interview the Fhrer returned again
and again to his claims against Poland. In April he made a
generous offer, which could not be repeated. What he wants
today is Danzig, the Corridor, and territorial
rectifications in Polish Silesia. Sir Nevile Henderson, who
refused to be drawn into a discussion of this programme,
said and repeated: England accepts the offer to conclude an
agreement with Germany; but England stipulates as a
preliminary condition that the Reich should reach an
agreement with Poland, by free negotiations, conducted on a
footing of complete equality, safeguarding essential Polish
interests, under an international guarantee. The Ambassador
added that Poland was willing to discuss on that basis.
"At the end of the interview my colleague put two
questions to Herr Hitler:
"1. Are you willing to take part in direct
conversations with Poland?
"'I cannot answer you now,' replied the Fhrer, 'as I
must first of all study with the most careful attention the
communication of the British Government.' He added, turning
towards Herr von Ribbentrop: 'This must be seen to
immediately. Ask Field-Marshal Goering to work with you.'
[335]
"2. Would you be disposed to consider an exchange of
populations for the settlement of the question of
minorities?
"'That is a formula which might be found favourable,'
replied the Fhrer.
"Herr Hitler informed the British Ambassador that he
thought he would give his reply this very day. Sir Nevile
replied to him: 'It took us two days to draw up our note. I
am in no hurry.'
"'But I am,' replied the Fhrer.
"Herr Hitler declared that, contrary to certain
insinuations made abroad, he was not bluffing. The British
Ambassador answered the Chancellor that any act of force
against Poland could not fail to bring about a war between
England and the Reich."
COULONDRE.
No. 288
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 29,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 3 p.m.)
THE written reply of Chancellor Hitler was dispatched
by an aeroplane which left Tempelhof towards noon. It is
believed at the Foreign Office that it should therefore be
received towards 4.30 p.m.
The conversation which the British Ambassador had
yesterday with Herr Hitler gave no indication of the
latter's intentions.
Sir Nevile Henderson definitely told Herr Hitler that
it was for the Reich now to make its choice between British
friendship and war, by the attitude which it would adopt
towards Poland. Field-Marshal Goering was summoned in the
morning by Herr Hitler, probably in order to discuss the
situation.
The German reply to M. Daladier has created a
pessimistic impression at the Foreign Office. Sir Alexander
Cadogan told me this morning that he did not see how the
Chancellor, after having announced his aims in categorical
terms, could beat a retreat without discrediting himself.
CORBIN.
[336]
No. 289
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 29,
1939. 8.10 p.m.
(Received at 9.55 p.m.)
I AM told that the Senate has forbidden the Polish
company Paged to dispose of its stocks of wood which are
valued at 5 million zlotys. It is also reported to me that
200 Polish workers of the international shipyards have been
dismissed, after their identity papers had been confiscated
and without having their wages paid. An orderly of the
military section of the General Commissioner's office is
said also to have been arrested.
LA
TOURNELLE.
No. 290
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 29,
1939. 10.3 p.m.
(Received August 30, 1939, at 12.15 a.m.)
HERE are some data concerning the German minorities in
Poland:
1. At the Census of 1931 they numbered 741,000 persons,
i.e. 2.13 per cent of the total population. Since then the
coefficient of births being greater with the Poles than with
the Germans, this percentage can only have diminished.
2. The German minority forms nowhere a compact group.
It is spread all over the territory. One finds small German
islands as far as the Russian frontier.
3. There is only a very feeble proportion of Germans in
the Corridor.
4. There is no doubt that a great part of the German
minority wishes to live on peaceful terms with the Poles.
LON N™EL.
[337]
No. 291
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 29, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 10.15 p.m.)
HERR HITLER has personally handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson the German reply to the British communication. The
British Ambassador is transmitting it at this moment by
telephone to London.
Here is what Sir Nevile Henderson told me of his
conversation:
"The interview was stormy; the Chancellor told me:
'Here is my reply to the two questions put by the British
Government:
"'A. Direct conversations. Although I am skeptical as
to results, I accept. But on condition that a Polish
plenipotentiary comes to Berlin to-morrow, August 30.
"'B. International guarantee. I could only give a
territorial guarantee in full agreement with the Government
of the U.S.S.R.'
"On Question A, I pointed out to the Chancellor that
his proposal resembled an ultimatum. He replied this was not
so because the present situation could not be prolonged. The
mobilized Polish and German armies are facing each other;
fresh incidents constantly occur; five more men were killed
today, but England laughs at that.
"I protested against such an allegation, and insisted
that the prescribed period should be prolonged. Herr Hitler
maintained the date of the 30th, pointing out that an
aeroplane only took 90 minutes to come from Warsaw to
Berlin.
"I asked him whether the Polish plenipotentiary would
be received with all the courtesy due to him, and if the
negotiation would be conducted on a footing of equality. His
reply was: 'Yes, of course.'
"The Fhrer reminded me afresh of his demands: he wants
Danzig and the Corridor. He wants also the suppression of
all possibility of incidents with Poland, and to that effect
he will have an economic plan drafted by to-morrow.
"On Question B, I replied to the Chancellor that, in
view of his agreement with the Soviets, his reservation did
not seem to be likely to raise any difficulties.
"In taking leave, I told Herr Hitler that I would
transmit his reply to my Government. I recalled that if the
Reich, failing an understanding, attacked Poland, it meant
war with England."
COULONDRE.
[338]
No. 292
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels,
and to M. DE VITROLLES, French Minister in The Hague.
Paris, August 29,
1939. 11 p.m.
PLEASE inform immediately, in reply to the
communication which you have received tonight:
For Brussels: the Belgian Prime Minister.
For the Hague: the Netherlands Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
That the Government of the Republic welcomes with the
greatest interest the offer which the King of the Belgians
and the Queen of the Netherlands have made of their good
offices with a view to a settlement of the European crisis.
The French Government, which earnestly desires that the
noble initiative of the two Sovereigns should attain its
realization, is ready, for its part, to further this
endeavour with all its power.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 293
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 29,
1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.55 p.m.)
I HAVE obtained the following supplementary details
regarding the conversation which took place yesterday
evening between Herr Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson.
After adding Silesia to his former claims, the
Chancellor gave clearly to understand that what remained of
Poland could not count upon an independent future.
In resounding phrases, the German Chancellor emphasized
the future vistas that would open out from an Anglo-German
rapprochement. A golden age for humanity could not fail to
result therefrom. Sir Nevile Henderson appears always to
have led him back to the necessity of a previous settlement
of the German-Polish difference.
Herr Hitler, replying to a question from Sir Nevile
Henderson, insisted that he could never return to his
proposal of March 23 to the Polish Government. He let it be
understood that he would negotiate
[339]
with Poland only if he were sure in advance that the Polish
Government would accede to all his wishes.
Mr. Chamberlain said a few words to me about the
diplomatic situation. It is significant, according to the
Prime Minister, that Chancellor Hitler has so far abstained,
despite his menacing preparations, from starting any
decisive action. As you told Sir Eric Phipps, each day which
passes is in the Prime Minister's opinion, a day gained for
the safeguarding of peace. The Fhrer cannot fail to realize
the "disgust" which has been provoked in the whole civilized
world by the conclusion by Germany of an agreement with a
Power, which, on the very day before this agreement, was
regarded by Germany as her worst enemy. The resolute
firmness shown by the Western Powers cannot have failed to
impress him.
I said that Paris had welcomed the clear terms of the
British reply brought by Sir Nevile Henderson to Herr
Hitler, and notably the precision with which it was
indicated that no enterprise of conciliation could be
considered before the settlement of the German-Polish
conflict. The Prime Minister replied that it was only Herr
Hitler who could imagine that Great Britain, in order to be
reconciled with Germany, would let herself be lured to a
general conference, without regard for the country to which
she had given her guarantee. Mr. Neville Chamberlain added
that the facility with which the Moscow agreement had been
concluded must have warped Herr Hitler's judgment.
CORBIN.
No. 294
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 30, 1939.
1 a.m.
M. COULONDRE has given me a provisional account of the
interview which Sir Nevile Henderson had this afternoon with
Herr Hitler, in the course of which the German reply was
delivered. I am communicating this document to you.
However disagreeable may be the form in which the
Chancellor expresses his thoughts, nevertheless, I notice
that, for the first time, he accepts the principle of a
direct conversation, to which he has hitherto been opposed.
At first sight it is a point which seems worthy of
attention. It appears to me that it would be difficult to
meet it with a flat refusal.
[340]
As soon as the British Government is in possession of
the text of the German reply as well as of the comments
which accompany it, I propose to consult with the British
Government with a view to defining our common attitude.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 295
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 30,
1939.1 a.m.
For London. I am sending the following telegram to
Berlin and Warsaw:
THERE is an increasing number of incidents between the
German troops and the Polish troops, who are now in contact
at many points.
Should it be possible to open negotiations, I wonder
whether it would not be feasible to envisage the withdrawal
of these troops a few miles on either side of the Frontier.
You should examine the possibility of making
suggestions of this nature in Warsaw and in Berlin.
GEORGES BONNET.
No . 296
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 30, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 2 a.m.)
ACCORDING to what I have been told by my British
colleague, his interview of yesterday has left him with a
rather bad impression. He is less optimistic than he was
yesterday.
Nevertheless, he thinks that M. Beck should accept the
invitation of the German Chancellor, for it would be to
Poland's interest to show her good will before the eyes of
the world. Sir Nevile Henderson is telegraphing to his
Government in that sense.
For my part I consider that the Polish Government
should agree to appoint a plenipotentiary, since, after all,
the German Chancellor
[341]
accedes to the suggestion made to him by Britain and
France for direct contact between Berlin and Warsaw.
Nevertheless, there would be serious objections to M.
Beck's coming to Berlin in the present circumstances. The
journey would inevitably recall the unhappy precedents of
Dr. Schuschnigg and Dr. Hacha. It would be exploited by the
Reich, with all the dramatic effects of which German
propaganda is capable, as a moral victory and a sign of
weakening. German demands would thereby be increased. If,
therefore, the Ministers of the two countries were to meet,
it seems to me that it should be in some town close to the
frontier. If, on the other hand, the negotiations had to
take place in Berlin, they should, in my opinion, be
entrusted to M. Lipski. This solution would, moreover, have
the advantage that the Polish Government would not appear to
be yielding to a time limit which has every appearance of an
ultimatum.
Should the negotiations take a favourable turn, the
subsequent visit of M. Beck would no longer present the same
disadvantages.
COULONDRE.
No. 297
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 30, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.20 a.m.)
GOING far beyond his demands of March 21, the German
Chancellor today claims, besides Danzig, the Corridor, which
is territory racially Polish, and also Gdynia, which is a
Polish creation. Furthermore, by claiming an economic
agreement and "the elimination of any possibility of
incidents with Poland," he is opening the door to
unspecified demands.
The reservation which he makes with regard to the
establishment of an international guarantee recalls the one
to which last autumn he subordinated the guarantee to be
given to the Czechoslovak State for its new frontier.
According to all appearances, he expects a refusal from the
Soviet. It is, moreover, impossible to imagine that such
terms, which would mark the beginning of Poland's
enslavement, would be accepted by that country.
LON N™EL.
[342]
No. 298
M. BARGETON, French Ambassador in Brussels,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Brussels, August 30,
1939. 12.5 p.m.
(Received at 1.55 p.m.)
THE Prime Minister of Belgium, whom I approached early
this morning according to your instructions, expressed his
most cordial thanks.
Our reply is the first he has received, but he has also
received intimation of a favourable reply from Britain. He
has up to the moment heard nothing from Rome or Berlin;
Press reports lead him to suppose that one will be received
from Poland.
BARGETON.
No. 299
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August
30, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 1.10 p.m.)
I GIVE below the text of the reply sent by Herr Hitler
to the British Government; the Foreign Office has on this
occasion repeated its request for absolute secrecy already
made in connection with the previous communication.
"The British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the
British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in
order:
"1. To give expression once more to the will of the
Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding,
cooperation and friendship;
"2. To leave no room for doubt as to the fact that such
an under standing could not be bought at the price of a
renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the
abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common
human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our
people.
"The German Government have noted with satisfaction
from the reply of the British Government and from the oral
explanations given by the British Ambassador that the
British Government for their part are also prepared to
improve the relationship between Germany and
[343]
England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the
German suggestion.
"In this connexion, the British Government are
similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish
tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite
for the realization of this hope.
"Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last
occasion in March 1939, there were submitted to the Polish
Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having
regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and
Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the
questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British
Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in
March last, definitely to reject these proposals. At the
same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an
occasion for taking military measures which have since been
continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last
month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This
was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City
of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities;
threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only
in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the
frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of Customs
policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also
traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of
bringing about the political exhaustion and economic
destruction of this German community.
"To this were added barbaric acts of ill-treatment
which cry to Heaven, and other forms of persecution of the
large German national group in Poland, which extended even
to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible
removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of
affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced
Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months,
in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding
of legitimate German interests. And indeed the German
Government can but assure the British Government in the most
solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been
reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with
indifference.
"The demands of the German Government are in conformity
with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this
territory, which has always been recognized as being
necessary, viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to
Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German
national group in the territories remaining to Poland. The
German Government note with satisfaction that the British
Govern-
[344]
ment also are in principle convinced that some solution must
be found for the new situation which has arisen.
"They further feel justified in assuming that the
British Government too can have no doubt that it is a
question now of conditions, for the elimination of which
there no longer remain days, still less weeks, but perhaps
only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs
obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents
intervening, which it might be impossible for Germany to
tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.
"While the British Government may still believe that
these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct
negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no
longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have
made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations,
but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish
Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of
measures of a military character which have led to the
developments alluded to above.
"The British Government attach importance to two
considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent
explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by
direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish
State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist,
should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and
political sphere by means of international guarantees.
"On this subject the German Government make the
following declaration:
"Though skeptical as to the prospectus of a successful
outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the
English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They
do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result
of the impression made upon them by the written statement
received from the British Government that they too desire a
pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines
indicated to the British Ambassador.
"The German Government desire in this way to give the
British Government and the British nation proof of the
sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter on a lasting
friendship with Great Britain.
"The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to
point out to the British Government that in the event of a
territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be
able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate
in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated
therewith.
[345]
"For the rest, in making these proposals, the German
Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's
vital interests or questioning the existence of an
independent Polish State. The German Government,
accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the
British Government's offer of their good offices in securing
the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full
powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on
Wednesday, August 30, 1939.
"The German Government will immediately draw up
proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will,
if possible, place these at the disposal of the British
Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator."
CORBIN.
No. 300
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 30, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 130 p.m.)
THE text of the German reply which was delivered
yesterday to Sir Nevile Henderson has just been communicated
to me by the British Embassy.
It is brutal and reads more like a Diktat imposed upon
a conquered country than an agreement to negotiate with a
sovereign State.
Even if the conversations should be broken off almost
as soon as begun, I nevertheless consider that Poland
should, at least, to start with, agree to open them through
the intermediary of her Ambassador in Berlin.
COULONDRE.
No. 301
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 30,
1939. 3.20 p.m.
(Received at 5.40 p.m.)
THE Press announces the arrest of several members of
the German minority, affiliated to terrorist organizations,
who have been instructed to engage in conjunction with the
military authorities of the Reich in "acts of diversion" and
to impede the transport of troops. At Lodz 17 kilograms of
dynamite and 4 kilograms of nitro-glycerine have been
[346]
found at the houses of two employees of a German bank. A
similar organization has been discovered at Poznan. A member
of the German minority belonging to a similar organization
has been arrested at the frontier in a car belonging to the
German Consulate at Katowice.
The victims of the terrorist outrage at Tarnow number
18.
LON N™EL.
No. 302
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 30,
1939. 5.40 p.m.
(Received at 7.45 p.m.)
THREE principal facts emerge from the German Press
today:
1. The newspapers continue to reflect the irritation,
noticed for the last two or three days. The campaign against
Poland continues in the same strain.
2. The whole problem of the Polish-German frontier is
kept well in the foreground. The racial principle is again
invoked, as if the Reich, since March 15, still had the
right to invoke it.
3. With the greatest insistence the newspapers
underline the final character of the Berlin-Moscow Pact and
its wide implications. One is given to understand that
Russia and Germany are in perfect agreement, not only on the
solution of the Polish problem, but also on the solution of
other Eastern European problems.
Similar insinuations, which are worthy of attention,
should be compared with the declaration which the Chancellor
made yesterday to Sir Nevile Henderson, according to which
the Reich could not give Poland a territorial guarantee
without the assent of Russia. However much intimidation and
tactical maneuver may be behind this attitude, we cannot in
my opinion watch too closely the development of Russo-German
relations. Germany's object is to bring about between the
two countries complete political and military cooperation in
which the leadership will obviously be assumed by the Reich.
In this connection there has even been talk in certain
well-informed quarters in Berlin of a new surprise which
might be in store for us very shortly. One of the reasons
why the Reich has up till now deferred its action against
Poland would appear to be the mysterious negotiations which
are being conducted by Berlin and Moscow.
COULONDRE.
[347]
No. 303
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig, August 30,
1939. 10.15 p.m.
(Received at 1130 p.m.)
As a reply to the seizure of trucks of goods carried
out by the Danzig Customs Control, the Polish Government has
reduced from yesterday the number of passenger trains.
Tonight, the Senate protested on the subject to the
Polish Commissioner-General. An agreement was reached this
afternoon after a meeting of officials; the two Polish
negotiators, who are railway officials, were however
arrested by the Gestapo when leaving the meeting.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 304
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, August 30, 1939.
11.20 p.m.
THE British Government have submitted to the French
Government the instructions sent to your British colleague
by the Foreign Office. You should, in accordance with these
instructions, support the steps taken by the British
Ambassador.
GEORGES BONNET.
V
Italy's Suggestion for a Conference and German
Maneuvering to Bring About the Rupture of Negotiations
(August 31)
No. 305
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11 am.)
British Ambassador saw M. Beck during the night. The Polish
[348]
Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed his
representations and promised to give him the Polish
Government's reply at noon.
Upon receipt of your instructions I supported the steps
taken by my colleague.
LON N™EL.
No. 306
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 15 p.m.)
CONFIRMATION of telephone message to M. Georges Bonnet
at 12.50 p.m., August 31.
Count Ciano summoned me at 12.35 p.m. to the Palazzo
Chigi. He made the following verbal communication to me:
Signor Mussolini offers, if France and England agree,
to invite Germany to a conference which will take place on
September 5 with the object of examining the clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of the present
trouble. The invitation to Germany will be sent to the
latter only after France and Great Britain have given their
assent.
Count Ciano made the same communication to the British
Ambassador.
He requests an immediate reply for fear that
hostilities may begin in the meantime.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 307
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 150 p.m.)
M. BECK has just telephoned to me so say that he is
giving a favourable reply to the British Government and that
he is willing to enter into direct negotiations with the
Reich on the bases previously set forth by Lord Halifax. The
Polish Government is ready, subject to reciprocity, to take
the measures necessary to avoid any frontier incidents, and
suggests that for the duration of the proposed negotiations
a "simple" modus vivendi be applied to Danzig. Finally, the
Polish
[349]
Government expresses a wish to know what form of
international guarantee the British Government had in mind,
and trusts that Poland can also count for the future upon
the good offices of Great Britain to facilitate the
application of any agreement reached.
M. Beck informed me at the same time that, bearing in
mind our suggestions, he is asking his ambassador to request
an audience at the Wilhelmstrasse in order to resume
contact. M. Lipski is instructed to state that the Polish
Government gives a reply in the affirmative to the
memorandum by which the British Government informed the
Polish Government last night of the former's conversations
with the Reich on the subject of the possibilities of a
peaceful settlement of the dispute.
M. Beck insists that the reply which he has just made
to the British Government be kept secret both in Paris and
in London.
LON N™EL.
No. 308
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London.
Paris, August 31,
1939. 2 p.m.
You should inform the British Government that it
appears to me of vital importance that, as soon as an
affirmative reply, favouring in principle the conversations,
is received from the Polish Government, the British
Ambassador in Berlin should be instantly empowered to make
it known to the Wilhelmstrasse.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 309
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 31,
1939. 2.10 p.m.
(Received at 10.45 p.m.)
INCIDENTS all along the frontiers continue to be
reported. There were, however, no casualties yesterday.
Within Poland, action against German espionage and
terrorist organizations is increasing. At Novy-Sacz, members
of the German minority have been arrested for preparing an
attempt on a railway bridge. A German, whose arrest at
Katowice I reported yesterday, has confessed that
provocative outrages against certain German property
[350]
owners in Polish territory had been prepared about ten days
ago in cooperation with the authorities of the National-
Socialist Party of Silesia and upon instructions from the
Gestapo.
The Press reports at the same time a series of
aggressive acts committed on the Slovak frontier by a party
about 100 strong wearing swastika badges.
LON N™EL.
No. 310
M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 2.15 p.m.)
THE following message from His Holiness has just been
transmitted to me by the Cardinal Secretary of State, with
the request that it be forwarded immediately to Your
Excellency:
His Holiness is unwilling to abandon hope that the
negotiations now proceeding may bring about the just and
peaceful solution which the whole world has not ceased to
pray for.
"In the Name of God, His Holiness therefore begs the
Polish and German Governments to do everything within their
power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any
measure likely to aggravate the existing tension. He begs
the French, British and Italian Governments to give their
support to his request."
CHARLES-ROUX.
No. 311
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August
31. 1939.
(Received by telephone at 3.10 p.m.)
I HAVE just received the text of the reply from the
Polish Government to the British Government, which was
announced in my previous telegram. After reading it I am in
a position to give details on the following points:
1. The "simple" modus vivendi for Danzig, alluded to by
M. Beck, would aim solely at ensuring provisionally
tolerable conditions of existence for the Poles within the
Free City. It would leave aside the question of the Statute.
[351]
2. The Polish Government declares that, as far as the
international guarantee, in the relations between Poland and
the Reich is concerned, it must reserve its opinion until
the British Government has forwarded further explanations.
3. The Polish Government expresses the hope that, in
the event of its entering into conversations with the
Government of the Reich, it may continue to be assured of
the good offices of the British Government.
LON N™EL.
No. 312
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 31,
1939. 3.10 p.m.
(Received at 5.10 p.m.)
THE German Press is manifestly divided today between
its care to keep the public on tenterhooks and its desire
not to excite public opinion too much. The expectant
attitude which has been maintained during the last few days
by the newspapers is now visibly tinged with a certain
embarrassment.
This attitude confirms what I have already reported on
the subject of the uncertainty and vacillation which would
seem to prevail in Government circles. The impression that
the Reich has not decided to go any further is beginning to
spread among the population.
The creation of a ministerial council for National
Defence would appear to be intended to some extent to convey
the impression that the Government is doing something,
although many people notice that things are not progressing,
despite the immense effort called for from the country.
In semi-official circles they entertain, or pretend to
entertain, a double hope.
The first, which is steadily growing fainter, is to see
the crisis move towards a compromise similar to that of
Munich.
The second, which becomes more and more definite, aims
at securing from Russia active assistance, the very promise
of which would make the strategic situation of Poland appear
untenable.
The B”rsenzeitung this morning clearly threatens Poland
and its allies with this Russo-German military collusion. On
the German side, without doubt, no stone will be left
unturned to achieve it, at least on
[352]
paper. It is probably one of the last trump cards kept in
reserve by Herr von Ribbentrop.
COULONDRE.
No. 313
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.35 p.m.)
THE following is the substance of the instructions
which my Polish colleague has received from his Government:
"The Polish Government have tonight received from the
British Government a communication on the subject of the
proposed direct conversations between the Polish and the
German Governments. The Polish Government are favourably
disposed towards this suggestion: they propose to
communicate their answer immediately to the German
Government."
Having been instructed to advise Herr von Ribbentrop of
this communication, M. Lipski asked at 1 p.m. for an
interview.
The State Secretary, Herr von Weizs„cker, telephoned to
M. Lipski at 3 p.m. and asked him whether he was to deliver
this message in his capacity as plenipotentiary or
Ambassador. M. Lipski having replied that it was as
Ambassador, the State Secretary told him that he would
inform Herr von Ribbentrop accordingly, and asked whether he
could get in touch with M. Lipski at his residence during
the subsequent hours. The Polish Ambassador replied in the
affirmative. He had received no reply from Herr von
Ribbentrop up to the time at which I am sending this
telegram (6.15 p.m.)
COULONDRE.
No. 314
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August, 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 8 p.m.)
MY Polish colleague informs me that he has just been
received by Herr von Ribbentrop and that he has handed him
the communication prescribed.
COULONDRE.
[353]
No. 315
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by courier on September 1, at 10 p.m.)
AT five minutes past nine this morning my British
colleague telephoned me. "I know from a reliable source," he
said, "that if the Polish Government has not accepted before
noon the proposal to send a plenipotentiary, the German
Government will consider that Poland has given up any
intention to seek a peaceful solution of the dispute, and it
will give the German troops the order to attack."
"First of all, we must get a clear idea of the
situation," I replied, and I immediately went to see him.
Sir Nevile had been informed that, once before, on the
evening of the 25th, war had all but broken out and that
once again there was a risk of its breaking out today.
I knew that Sir Nevile's information about the 25th was
accurate but it seemed to me that if the German Government
had really decided in the absence of the Polish reply to
attack at noon, it would have officially apprised the
British Government, with which it was in contact. My British
colleague told me then and there the sources, assuredly
trustworthy, from which he had received his information.
Sir Nevile Henderson added that the night before, at
midnight, he had gone to Herr von Ribbentrop to take him a
British communication, intimating that Herr Hitler's reply
had been transmitted to Warsaw. The German Foreign Minister
had rapidly read through the detailed plan of settlement
given in the German reply, but had refused to deliver the
text of it to Sir Nevile, on the grounds that the period
stipulated for a Polish plenipotentiary to be sent to Berlin
had expired.
I decided to go immediately to the Polish Ambassador,
who told me that he had been woken up at 2 a.m. by Sir
Nevile, who had urged him strongly to go immediately to Herr
von Ribbentrop to establish the required contact. M. Lipski
had refused, because he was without instructions to that
effect from his Government. He had, however, telephoned in
the morning to Warsaw asking that some instructions be sent.
After examining the position, it seemed to us desirable
that Poland while being careful not to appear to yield to a
German ultimatum, should not expose herself to the reproach
of having sought to avoid a
[354]
direct conversation, which she had accepted both in her
reply to President Roosevelt's message, and in her exchanges
of views with Paris and London.
M. Lipski accordingly decided to telephone once again
to Warsaw, and I myself telephoned to Your Excellency the
communication which I here repeat as a reminder:
"The British Ambassador has just informed me that,
according to information which is not official, but which he
considers reliable, the German Government is seriously
displeased at the non-arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary,
and he considers that the present situation cannot be
prolonged beyond the end of the morning without involving
the most serious consequences.
"I consider that this news should not induce us to
depart from the dignified composure with which the exchange
of views must be conducted.
"But it seems to me that it would certainly be to the
interest of the Polish Government to inform Berlin without
delay that the Polish Government accepts the direct
negotiations which, moreover, have been suggested by the
French and British Governments, and that, while reserving
judgment on the German note, it is preparing to send to M.
Lipski the necessary instructions to meet the Germans in the
capacity of plenipotentiary.
"I would add that it would seem advisable for M. Lipski
not to limit himself to receiving communication of the
German claims, but himself to present a statement of the
Polish point of view in order that the balance may be
maintained.
"It would probably be well if, in order to gain time,
you would telephone to Warsaw immediately to this effect."
At 12.10 p.m. Your Excellency was good enough to inform
me by telephone that the Polish Government would in a few
minutes give a reply which would be affirmative in
principle.
At 2 p.m. M. Lipski did, in fact, receive notice from
his Government that it favoured the establishment of contact
and that it was preparing a reply on the subject. He
immediately requested an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop.
At 3 p.m. the State Secretary, Herr von Weizs„cker, asked
him whether he was requesting this audience as a
plenipotentiary or as an Ambassador. M. Lipski replied that
it was as an Ambassador.
My Polish colleague has just informed me (7.45 p.m.)
that he has just been received by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and that he in
[355]
formed the latter of the communication transmitted to him by
his Government.
COULONDRE.
No. 316
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, August 31,
1939. 9.55 p.m.
(Received on September 1 at 1 a.m.)
As a result of the events of the last few days in
Danzig, the Poles find themselves temporarily stripped of
all their prerogatives, except for their share in the
administration of the port, which up to the moment has not
been directly affected. They have lost control of the
railways, Danzig Station has been occupied by the Nazis, and
the rolling-stock has been requisitioned.
The safety of Polish citizens is no longer assured. The
Gestapo has arrested two officials who had come to negotiate
with the representatives of the Senate regarding Danzig's
food supply and the passenger train services.
All these facts are reported by the Polish Press, which
is cautious enough not to stress them. The Press has
obviously received instructions to avoid focusing the
attention of the public on the question. All these events
appear under the general heading of German provocations with
no more prominence than the frontier incidents and the acts
of terrorism.
LON N™EL.
No. 317
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.15 p.m.)
I WAS summoned at 9.25 p.m. to the State Secretary, who
gave me the following communication.
"I am instructed by my Government to deliver to you for
the information of the French Government the two documents
herewith." [1]
[1] These documents contained the proposals which Herr von
Ribbentrop
read to Sir Nevile Henderson on the evening of August 30
(cf. No. 315)
and which the German wireless broadcast at 9 p.m. on the
31st, stating
that the Reich Government considered them as having been
refused.
[356]
The first is a communiqu‚ to the Press. The second is a
German plan for the settlement of the question of Danzig and
the Corridor and the German-Polish minorities problem."
On receiving these documents, I noted that they were
given to me for information and stated that it would be on
that basis that I should transmit them to my Government.
My British colleague had received the same
communication at 9.15 p.m.
COULONDRE.
No. 318
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.30 p.m.)
WE are faced with a new manoeuvre to make Poland appear
as if she is trying to evade any attempt at a peaceful
settlement.
In order to frustrate this manoeuvre and to throw into
relief the method used, it is enough to emphasize that,
despite the tone of the German note, the conditions which it
embodied and the ultimatum-like form in which it was
couched, the Polish Government has not sought to avoid the
conversation, but has on the contrary given its agreement in
principle in the communication which M. Lipski made to Herr
von Ribbentrop.
COULONDRE.
No. 319
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
August 31, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 12.0 midnight)
A BULLETIN on Polish-German relations has just been
broadcast by Germany. In this connection M. Beck has sent
me, by Count Lubienski, the following message intended for
Your Excellency:
At 1 p.m. today M. Lipski asked to be received by Herr
von Ribbentrop. The conversation must have taken place at 6
p.m. M. Beck has no information about what had happened as
communications between Berlin and Warsaw have been cut off.
But the German radio bulletin is at pains to point out that
negotiations have been broken off.
[357]
M. Beck is anxious to emphasize all the efforts which
the Polish Government has made to facilitate the work of
conciliation which had been undertaken. In addition he
reserves judgment on the German communication and wonders
whether we are faced with a last attempt at blackmail or an
act preliminary to the opening of hostilities.
I asked Count Lubienski to indicate to the Polish
Foreign Minister that it was indeed important when
confronted with a document the true character of which in
any case requires to be made clear to reserve our final
judgment on its significance.
LON N™EL.
VI
The Outbreak of Hostilities
(September 1)
No. 320
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 130 a.m.)
THE account of the conversation between the British
Ambassador in Warsaw and M. Beck reached the Foreign Office
at 6.30 p.m. The delay to which telegrams in Central Europe
are subjected is the cause of the late delivery of this
text, which should have reached London much earlier and the
end of which had to be sent by telephone.
M. Beck stated that, in conformity with the British
proposal, M. Lipski had been instructed to make contact with
the German Government. In reply to a question from the
British Ambassador, M. Beck explained that the Polish
Ambassador would not be authorized, in the event of the text
of the German proposals being presented to him, to accept
such a document. The Polish Government, which has not
forgotten the experiences of others or of similar ultimata,
considers it indeed preferable not to receive a note
delivered in such circumstances. M. Lipski's main duty
would, therefore, be to establish contact and to discuss
where and how negotiations could be opened.
M. Beck mentioned that the situation in Danzig was
becoming and more serious, that it seemed indispensable to
set up without
[358]
delay a modus vivendi which would guarantee the release of
the arrested Polish officials and the resumption of railway
traffic. Perhaps the High Commissioner of the League of
Nations would be able to act as intermediary in this
connection.
The Polish Foreign Minister added at the end of the
interview that he had no intention of going personally to
Berlin nor of being another President Hacha, and that in the
event of negotiations being opened he was afraid that,
during their course, he would be obliged to appeal to the
British Government for its good offices.
The written reply delivered to Sir Howard Kennard may
be summarized as follows:
1. As already stated on several occasions, the Polish
Government is prepared to agree to any exchange of views
with the German Government on the basis of the British
proposals;
2. The Polish Government is also prepared, subject to
the desired conditions of reciprocity, to guarantee that the
Polish troops will not commit any violation of the German
frontier;
3. The immediate establishment of a modus vivendi in
Danzig seems to the Polish Government essential;
4. The Polish Government deems it necessary to reserve
its attitude towards the international guarantee mentioned
by the British Government until a more definite idea can be
reached of its exact implications;
5. The Polish Government hopes that it will always be
able to call upon the good offices of Great Britain in the
future.
CORBIN.
No. 321
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 1,
1939. 2.11 a.m.
(Received 5.10 a.m.)
THE fifteen points of the German claims broadcast
tonight by wireless, call for the following comments:
1. Herr Hitler is trying by this broadcast to escape
from the diplomatic negotiation in which, contrary to his
methods, he got involved by Great Britain. It is thus
important to make every effort if the Reich does not
immediately attack Poland, to re-open the conversations
between Berlin and London.
2. One is bound to conclude from the very text of this
broadcast
[359]
that if the plenipotentiaries had come to Berlin they would
have been compelled to accept these terms, without the
possibility of discussion.
3. Ethnographical maps show that in 1914 the region
referred to in the broadcast was inhabited by a Polish
majority.
LON N™EL.
No. 322
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 8 70 a.m.)
THE Polish Army Headquarters report that German troops
debouching from Danzig, crossed the Eastern frontier of the
Corridor this morning from 4 o'clock onwards, in particular
near Kartuzy and Gardeja. German aeroplanes have attacked
the Polish town of Tczew to the south of Danzig.
Aggression by German armed bands and also flights of
aircraft have also been reported at various points of the
Silesian frontier.
LON N™EL.
No. 323
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 8.30 a.m.)
ACCORDING to the latest information just received by
the Polish Army Headquarters the German attack is general on
all frontiers.
In East Prussia, in South Poznania, in Silesia and on
the Slovak frontier, there has been bombing without warning
at numerous points.
In addition, Danzig has proclaimed its Anschluss with
the Reich.
LON N™EL.
No. 324
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.30 a.m.)
THE session of the Reichstag has just come to an end,
having lasted one hour.
[360]
In his opening speech Field-Marshal Goering stated that
it was only at 3 o'clock in the morning that the decision to
summon the Reichstag had been taken. He added that more than
one hundred delegates were absent because they were in the
ranks of the Wehrmacht.
The following is an analysis and a translation of the
essential passages of the speech made by the Chancellor:
"Since 1919 we have all been suffering the torments
inflicted upon us by a problem created by the Diktat of
Versailles, a problem which has become intolerable in its
effects.
"Danzig has always been, and is, a German city: the
Corridor has always been, and is, German. Both these
territories owe their cultural development to the German
people. Danzig was separated from Germany, and the Corridor
annexed. In other regions, Germans have been ill-treated in
such a manner that more than a million of them have had to
abandon their homes.
"I have always tried to obtain an alteration of this
position by peaceful methods. It is a lie to pretend that we
have always had recourse to violence. In each case, not once
but several times, I have tried to obtain indispensable
modifications through the way of negotiation. My proposals
for limitation of armaments, for the abolition of certain
arms and for the elimination of certain methods of warfare,
which I considered incompatible with the law of nations,
were rejected.
"I tried in vain to solve amicably the problems of
Austria, the Sudeten, Bohemia and Moravia. It is impossible
to claim that only peaceful revisions can be admitted, and
at the same time continually persist in rejecting them.
"For us, the Treaty of Versailles has never had the
force of law!"
Then, passing on to the situation existing in the
Polish regions with German minorities, the Fhrer declared
that no people with any feelings of honour would accept for
long such a state of affairs.
"I made, however, a final effort," the Fhrer added.
"The British Government proposed that direct contact should
be established between Poland and Germany. I accepted this
proposal and I prepared bases for negotiation. For two whole
days I waited without the Poles sending their
plenipotentiaries. Last night the Polish Ambassador informed
us that his Government was examining in what degree it would
agree to the opening of negotiations.
"If it could be thought that the German Reich and its
Leader could be treated in that way, nothing would be left
for Germany but to disappear from the political stage.
[361]
"I am wrongly judged.... My love for peace is not to be
mistaken for cowardice. I accordingly decided to inform the
British Government last night that I considered the
negotiations to have failed.
"As a first reply to my acceptance, Poland decreed
general mobilization. There was a recrudescence of
terrorism. I then decided to speak to Poland in her own
language....
"If France and England consider that their essential
interests are thus affected, that is an attitude which
cannot make me hesitate to fulfill my duty.
"I have already declared that I ask nothing and that I
never will ask anything from the Western Powers. That is a
declaration which has a final value.
"I have always offered England my friendship, but love
can never be unilateral. I have no interest in the West. Our
Western frontier is final. Our western wall is for all time
the frontier of the Reich. In that region we have no aims of
any kind for the future. This attitude will not change. I
thank Italy for having understood our attitude and for
having backed us, but you will understand also that for the
carrying on of this struggle I have no need of foreign aid.
We shall carry out this task ourselves. I shall respect the
neutrality of the neutral countries to the same extent that
they respect it themselves.
"You know that Russia and Germany are governed by two
different doctrines. But between the two countries there was
only one question that had to be cleared up. Germany has no
intention of exporting her doctrine, nor Russia hers.
Neither of the two countries has any reason to take up a
position against the other. We have, therefore, resolved to
conclude a pact which excludes for ever any use of violence
between us, which imposes the obligation on us to consult
together in certain European questions and makes possible
for us economic cooperation. Never again can it happen that
the powers of these two countries will be used against one
another. Any attempt on the part of Western Powers to bring
about any change in this will fail. This political decision
means a tremendous departure for the future, and it is a
final one. I believe that the whole German people will hail
this political attitude with satisfaction.
"In the World War Germany and Russia fought against one
another, and in the end both of them were its victims. This
will not happen a second time.
"The pact of non-aggression and consultation has been
ratified by Berlin and Moscow. In Moscow the pact has been
greeted with as much
[362]
satisfaction as in Germany. I can only endorse word for word
the speech made yesterday by M. Molotov.
"And now. here is our goal I am determined to solve:
"1. The Danzig question;
"2. The question of the Corridor:
"3. To see to it that a change is made in the
relationship between Germany and Poland that shall ensure a
peaceful collaboration of the peoples.
"I am resolved to continue to fight until the Polish
Government accepts this change, or until another Polish
Government accepts it. I wish to remove from the German
frontier in the East every element of discord and lasting
danger. There must reign in the East a peace similar to that
on our other frontiers.
"The necessary measures will be taken so that the war
is not directed against and does not affect women and
children. But if the enemy thinks he can from that draw
carte blanche on his side to act as he wills, he will
receive a reply which will deprive him of hearing and sight.
"This night Polish soldiers fired upon our territory.
Since a quarter to six we have been returning the fire. From
now on, bombs will be with bombs. And if gas-warfare is
started, we shall reply with gas.
Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare can
only expect that we shall do the same. The struggle will be
continued until the safety of the Reich and its rights are
secured.
"I have worked for six years and I have spent ninety
milliards in building up our army. It is better-armed and
much finer than the army of 1914. I have an unshakable
confidence in it. If I ask of this army and of all Germans
sacrifices, it is because I myself am prepared to make every
personal sacrifice. I am prepared to accept any post
whatever, however dangerous it may be. I have consecrated
the whole of my life to the National-Socialist movement. I
have had no other ambition than to be the first soldier of
the Reich. I have taken this uniform and I shall not lay it
aside until the victory is secured, or I will not survive
the outcome.
:"If anything should happen to me, my successor will be
Goering. If anything should happen to Goering, Hess will be
the successor.
"I ask that they should be given an obedience as blind
as is given to me. If anything should happen to Goering and
to Hess, an electoral college appointed by me will choose
the most worthy, that is, the most valiant."
[363]
The Fhrer then stated that a National-Socialist did
not know the word capitulation, and that a second November
1918 could never be. "It matters little," he said, "that we
individuals disappear, provided that our country lives on."
The Chancellor exhorted the deputies to see that the morale
of the people was maintained, and he concluded by saying
that he counted upon the spirit of sacrifice and discipline
of men, women and youth.
COULONDRE.
No. 325
Appeal of President Roosevelt to Great Britain,
France, Italy, Germany and Poland
September 1, 1939.
"THE ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in
unfortified centres of population during the course of the
hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the
earth in the past few years, which have resulted in the
maiming and death of thousands of defenseless women and
children, has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity.
"If resort is had to this sort of inhuman barbarism
during the period of tragic conflagration with which the
world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent
human beings, who have no responsibility for, and who are
not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which
have broken out, now will lose their lives.
"I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every
Government, which may be engaged in hostilities, publicly to
affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no
event and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from
the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon
the understanding that the same rules of warfare will be
scrupulously observed by all their opponents.
"I request an immediate reply."
No. 326
M. WALTER STUCKI, Swiss Minister in Paris,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Paris,
September 1, 1939.
THE Federal Government has instructed me, by telegram,
to notify Your Excellency as follows:
"The international situation, which makes it necessary
for the Swiss
[364]
Confederation to take military measures, leads it to
formulate, once again, its unshakable resolve to depart in
no way from the principles of neutrality which have been the
basis of its policy for many centuries and to which the
Swiss people are deeply attached, in that these principles
are consonant with their aspirations, their internal
organization and their position in relation to other States.
By virtue of the special mandate which has just been
conferred upon it by the Federal Assembly, the Federal
Council formally declares that the Swiss Confederation will
preserve and defend, with all the means at its disposal, the
inviolability of its territory and the neutrality which the
treaties of 1815 and their complementary obligations have
recognized as being in the true interests of the whole
European political system.
"The Confederation will make it a point of honour to
facilitate, as it has during past wars, the impartial
activity of humanitarian work which may help to relieve the
sufferings arising from a conflict. Relying on the
assurances which have been solemnly reiterated, the Federal
Council is convinced that the present declaration will be
considered as a faithful statement of the implications for
the Swiss Confederation of the treaties and international
obligations which concern it."
No. 327
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome.
Paris,
September 1, 1939.
(By telephone at 11.45 a.m.)
YOUR telegram of August 31.
You should inform Count Ciano as follows:
"The French Government values highly the spirit in
which the proposal of the Royal Government has been made,
and reaffirms its willingness to seek all possible means,
and to associate itself with any steps intended to
facilitate and render possible an amicable settlement of the
dispute which has arisen between Germany and Poland.
"The French Government pays sincere tribute to the
effort made to this end by the Italian Government, and
thanks it for its communication regarding a plan to call a
conference, which has been transmitted by the French
Ambassador in Rome and to which a favourable reply has been
given.
"The French Government must nevertheless point out that
in its opinion such a conference could not raise problems
touching the inter
[365]
ests of powers not represented, and no arrangement could be
made affecting the interests of any power unless that power
were present.
"The French Government considers that the activities of
such a conference should not be restricted to an attempt to
seek partial and temporary solutions of limited and
immediate problems: it should, by raising all the problems
of a general character which are at the root of any dispute,
result in general appeasement such as will allow the peace
of the world to be re-established and organized on solid
foundations."
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 328
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 12 noon.)
As the telegram which I dispatched yesterday by special
courier may arrive too late, I think it desirable to
summarize it.
On August 31, at 9.5 a.m., my British colleague
telephoned me to say that he had learned from a trustworthy
source that if at 12 noon Poland had not agreed to send a
plenipotentiary, the German Government would order its
troops to march.
I went to see him immediately. He confirmed his news,
which had come from Herr von Ribbentrop's entourage. He
added that, during the night, he had taken the British reply
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter read to him
the text of the German plan for a German-Polish settlement,
but he read it so quickly that the Ambassador was only able
to gather fragments of it. Sir Nevile Henderson asked for
the text, but Herr von Ribbentrop refused to give it to him,
on the grounds that the time allotted to Poland for sending
a plenipotentiary had expired.
I went immediately to M. Lipski and got him to urge
Warsaw by telephone to let him have an immediate and
affirmative reply from the Polish Government to the proposal
for conversations.
I myself telephoned Your Excellency suggesting an
approach to Warsaw on the same lines.
At 12.10 p.m. Your Excellency telephoned me that in a
few minutes the Polish Government would give an affirmative
reply in principle. I immediately informed my English and
Polish colleagues. At 1 p.m. M. Lipski received the order to
deliver the communication which I
[366]
telegraphed to you. After Herr von Weizs„cker had asked him
at 3 p.m. whether he came as a plenipotentiary or as an
Ambassador, he was received at 7.45 p.m. by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The latter took note of his communication
but did not inform him of the German plan for settlement. At
9.15 p.m. and 9.25 p.m. my English colleague and I were
successively summoned by Herr von Weizs„cker, who handed us,
for the information of our respective Governments, the text
of the German plan and a communiqu‚ to the Press. At 9 p.m.
as it appears, these documents were published.
COULONDRE.
No. 329
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 12.15 p.m.)
THE Polish Ambassador went to the Foreign Office this
morning to inform the State Secretary of the information he
had received, via Paris, regarding the acts of aggression
which Germany had just committed against Poland. He stated
that Polish territory had been attacked at four different
points and that air raids had been made on various towns,
causing, especially in Warsaw, victims among the civilian
population, some of whom were women and children.
Count Raczynski stated that events appeared to him to
justify the application of the British guarantee. Giving his
personal view, Lord Halifax replied that for him there was
no shadow of doubt of this.
CORBIN.
No. 330
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 12.45 p.m.)
REUTER'S AGENCY has just published an authorized
bulletin, the essential passage of which I reproduce below:
"It is pointed out in official circles in London that
if Herr Hitler's proclamation to the German people, as it
has been reported, is intended to signify, as it appears to
do, that Germany has declared war on
[367]
Poland, it can be stated on the highest authority that Great
Britain and France are inflexibly resolved to fulfill to the
end their obligations towards the Polish Government.
"The German version of the course of the negotiations
is, of course, entirely mendacious. On August 29 the German
Chancellor informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he would,
on the following day, expect in Berlin a Polish
plenipotentiary having full powers to negotiate a
settlement.
"He added that he hoped to draw up his proposals in the
meantime.
"In other words, he expected the Polish Government
would submit to the same treatment as that which he had
imposed on the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and
would send to Berlin an emissary ready to accept terms the
nature of which was completely unknown to the Polish
Government.
"As can readily be understood, the Polish Government
did not consent to putting itself in this humiliating
position.
"Even when peace terms are imposed upon a conquered
Power, it is not customary to forbid negotiators to refer to
their Governments for instructions.
"It is impossible in such a short while to comment on
the mendacious statements of the German Government, but the
attitude of His Majesty's Government may be briefly defined
as follows:
"If the German Government had been sincerely desirous
of settling the dispute by negotiation, it would not have
adopted a procedure which is in the nature of an ultimatum.
It would, on the contrary, as is the normal practice of
civilized Governments, have opened negotiations with the
Polish Government with a view to fixing the place and time
for the opening of the negotiations.
"In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Polish
Government was fully justified in refusing to submit to the
treatment which the German Government endeavoured to impose
on it.
"As regards the terms which have now been published and
have never, up to the moment, been communicated to the
Polish Government, His Majesty's Government can only say
that these terms should naturally have been submitted to the
Polish Government, leaving the latter enough time to
ascertain whether they interfered or not with the vital
interests of Poland, which Germany, in her written
communication to the British Government, had declared it was
her intention to respect."
CORBIN.
[368]
No. 331
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 1,
1939. 1.50 p.m.
(Received at 5.58 p.m.)
M. BECK has just telephoned to me to emphasize:
1. The aggressive nature of the action directed against
the Polish frontier by the German troops.
2. The fact that yesterday, at 730 p.m. in the course
of an interview which he had himself requested, M. Lipski
confirmed to Herr von Ribbentrop that Poland was still
prepared to negotiate.
3. That German aircraft have this morning bombed a
great number of localities.
M. Lipski has been instructed to ask for his passports.
The Government is putting into force the legislation
prepared for application in war.
M. Beck also informed me that, in view of the
circumstances, he left it to the French and British
Governments to take proper account of the reply given
yesterday by the Polish Government.
LON N™EL
No. 332
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET. French Ambassador in Rome,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, September 1,
1939. 2.30 p.m.
(Received at 430 p.m.)
THE French Government's reply to the Italian suggestion
for the calling of a conference was delivered by me today at
12.45 p.m. to Count Ciano.
The French Government's reply was manifestly gratifying
to Count Ciano; he told me that he was very pleased with it
and thanked me. He nevertheless added that he was not in a
position to tell me whether the Italian proposal could still
serve any purpose and whether it could be sent to Herr
Hitler.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
[369]
No. 333
The French Government's Reply to the Appeal of the
President of the United States of America regarding Aerial
Bombardment
Paris,
September 1, 1939.
THE French Government hastens to reply to the appeal
which the President of the United States of America has
addressed to all the Governments which are liable to be
involved in the conflict, requesting them to refrain from
having recourse, in any event and circumstances, to aerial
bombardment of civilian populations.
The French Government highly appreciates the spirit
which inspires the step taken by Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
and affirms its intention to conduct hostilities, if war
should be imposed upon it as a result of German aggression,
in strict conformity with the laws of warfare, and to do
everything within its power to spare civilian populations
the sufferings which modern warfare can involve. It is in
this spirit of humanity, which has ever dictated in all
circumstances the conduct of the French Government, that
orders have already been given to the Commanders-in-Chief of
all the French forces.
These orders exclude in particular the bombardment of
civil populations and restrict aerial bombardment to
strictly military objectives.
It is, of course, understood that the French Government
reserves the right to have recourse to any action it may
consider appropriate if its adversary should not observe the
restrictions which the French Government has itself imposed
upon the operations of its own Air Force.
No. 334
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. WALTER STUCKI, Swiss Minister in Paris.
Paris,
September 1, 1939.
I beg to acknowledge receipt of the Swiss Government's
declaration of neutrality of which you have notified me
today. I take due note of this communication.
The French Government, so far as it is concerned, will
not fail scrupulously to respect the neutrality of the Swiss
Confederation and
[370]
the integrity of the territory of that Confederation, in
accordance with the treaties of 1815 and their complementary
obligations.
I am,
Sir, etc.,
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 335
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 530 p.m.)
MY recent telephonic communication with the Political
Department: Sir Alexander Cadogan has just apprised me of
the instructions which the British Government propose to
send to Sir Nevile Henderson, and which he will be requested
to carry out at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
The text is as follows:
"On the instructions received from His Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the
honour to make the following communication:
"Early this morning, the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German Army which clearly indicated that
he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the
French Government indicates that German troops have crossed
the Polish frontier and that attacks on Polish towns are
proceeding.
"In these circumstances it appears to the Governments
of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the
German Government have created conditions (viz., an
aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the
independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by
the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the
undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.
"I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that,
unless the German Government are prepared to give His
Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German
Government have suspended all aggressive action against
Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces
from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their
obligations to Poland."
Sir Alexander Cadogan has informed me that, in the view
of the
[371]
British Government, the above communication should be
embodied in an identical and joint note delivered by our
Ambassador on behalf of our two Governments.
CORBIN.
VII
Franco-British D‚marche in Berlin and the Entry
into War
(September 1-3)
No. 336
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 535 p.m.)
THE British Government, in a statement issued to the
Press last night, was at pains to emphasize the fact that
the German proposals to Poland, broadcast one hour
previously, came as a surprise and that these had never been
officially communicated to them. The proposals had been
hurriedly read over once only to Sir Nevile Henderson on the
previous night.
It is a fact that when the British Ambassador asked
Herr von Ribbentrop to let him have the text of what had
just been read over to him, he met with a refusal.
The German Secretary of State put the paper in question
back into his pocket. I should like to draw the Government's
attention to this action, in view of the fact that the
German Government has endeavoured to compromise the British
Government by affirming that it had definitely exercised a
mediatory function.
CORBIN.
No. 337
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris, September 1,
1939. 5.55 p.m.
THE following is in confirmation of my telephone call:
The British Government have instructed your colleague
to present
[372]
to the German Government an urgent communication of which
Sir Nevile Henderson will himself inform you. You should
associate yourself with this step.
You should confine yourself, if a reply is given, to
stating that you will refer the matter to your Government.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 338
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris, September 1,
1939. 6.25 p.m.
As I have already informed you by telephone, the
Italian Government has offered to call an international
conference in which France, Great Britain, Poland, Germany
and Italy would take part.
Please let me know (at your very earliest convenience)
whether this proposal would find acceptance with the Warsaw
Government.
It should be understood that the object of such a
conference would be, the settlement of all the questions
involved in the construction of a lasting peace and would
not apply merely to the current dispute.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 339
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 1,
1939. 6.50 p.m.
(Received on September 2 at 330 a m.)
THE Reich's Charg‚ d'Affaires has just asked the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his passports.
LON N™EL.
No. 340
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all Diplomatic Representatives.
Paris, September 1,
1939. 7 p.m.
I AM now to give you the following details relative to
the events of the last thirty-six hours, which reveal the
responsibility of the Reich in the acts of aggression which
have been committed against Poland.
[373]
The British Government having obtained the assent of
the German Government to the opening of direct negotiations
with Poland, the French and British Ambassadors in Warsaw
called during the night of August 30-31 and in the morning
of August 31 upon M. Beck, with a view to obtaining his
consent to fall in with this procedure.
At noon on September 31 M. Beck gave notice of his
acceptance and indicated that he had instructed his
Ambassador in Berlin to request an audience at the
Wilhelmstrasse in order to state that the Polish Government
gave a reply in the affirmative to the British Memorandum.
At 2 p.m. M. Lipski asked to be received by Herr von
Ribbentrop.
At 3 p.m. Herr von Weizs„cker asked him by telephone
whether it was in the capacity of a plenipotentiary or an
Ambassador that he had a communication to make. M. Lipski
explained that he was acting as Ambassador, and Herr von
Weizs„cker informed him that he would report the matter to
Herr von Ribbentrop.
At 7.45 p.m., the Polish Ambassador delivered to the
Foreign Minister of the Reich the communication with which
his Government had entrusted him. Herr von Ribbentrop did
not inform him of the German proposals.
At 8.30 p.m. the German radio announced that an
important communication would be made at 9 p.m.
This broadcast dealt with the German proposals, of
which the British Government was alleged to have been
informed (this is untrue-see the official bulletin on the
subject which appeared in the Press of September 1) and
which the Reich Government regarded as having been refused
by the Polish Government, the latter not having sent a
plenipotentiary within the period fixed by the Reich.
At about 10.30 p.m. the German radio announced a Polish
raid on the broadcasting station at Gleiwitz.
On September 1, at 4 a.m., it broadcast a proclamation
by the Chancellor of the Reich, stating that Germany would
henceforth meet force with force.
Towards 7 a.m. it announced that the Anschluss of
Danzig to the Reich had been proclaimed by Herr Forster.
At 830 a.m. a communication from M. LON N™EL informed
this Department that the German troops had, at 5 a.m.,
attacked on all the Polish frontiers without ultimatum or
previous warning.
GEORGES BONNET.
[374]
No. 341
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 7.45 p m.)
IT was noticed at this morning's session of the
Reichstag that the Fhrer received the applause of the whole
assembly only when he stated that he would fight like a
soldier and that he would not wage war on women and
children. Even then, enthusiasm was moderate. For the rest
of the time, one half only of the deputies applauded the
Fhrer. The praises bestowed upon M. Molotov found no echo.
The atmosphere, generally speaking, was rather dull.
Among the people, although they still wish to cherish
the illusion that this is merely a German-Polish conflict,
today's events have produced nothing short of consternation.
It is to be noted, moreover, that the Fhrer has taken
pains to represent the action of the German troops as a
police operation rather than as the beginning of a campaign,
and that he avoided the word "war."
COULONDRE.
No. 342
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 1,
1939. 9.29 p.m.
(Received on September 2, at 1.10 p.m.)
THIS afternoon M. Beck received the Slovak Minister,
who authorized him to publish a letter in which M. Szathmary
protests "in the name of the Slovak nation," now dominated
by brute force and powerless, against the aggression
directed by Germany against "Poland, a friendly nation."
LON N™EL.
[375]
No. 343
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 1,
1939. 9.31 p.m.
(Received on September 2 at 3 p.m.)
M. BECK has just made the following reply to Your
Excellency's communication:
"We are in the thick of war, as the result of
unprovoked aggression. The question before us is not of a
conference but that the common action which should be taken
by the Allies to resist. I have heard nothing, moreover,
from any quarter of the Italian plan."
M. Beck added that the air attacks had been unrelenting
since the morning. There have been considerable numbers of
civilian victims at Poznan and Lwow. German aircraft have
again flown over Warsaw.
M. Beck has asked me to inform Your Excellency of these
attacks in order to show the position in which Poland now
finds herself. The people are indignant at the German
aggression and its methods, but still remain calm and
resolute.
The atmosphere is no longer one for conciliation.
LON N™EL.
No. 344
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11 p.m.)
I TOOK the steps prescribed in Your Excellency's
instructions in an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop at 10
p.m.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after remarking that
my communication was identical with that which had just been
handed to him by my British colleague, replied as follows:
"There has not been, on the German side, any aggression
against Poland. It is Poland that, for months, has resorted
to continual provocation by stifling the economic life of
Danzig, ill-treating minorities and incessantly violating
the frontiers.
"The Fhrer has endured this provocation with the
greatest patience, in the hope that Poland would again
revert to reason. But the
[376]
very opposite has been the case. Poland, which has been
mobilizing for months, decreed general mobilization last
night. The Poles have made three attacks on German
territory. In such circumstances there can be no question of
German aggression.
"I am handing your communication to the Fhrer and will
let you know his answer as soon as it reaches me."
In accordance with Your Excellency's instructions by
telephone, I confined myself to telling Herr von Ribbentrop
that I would report his answer to my Government.
My colleague and I had asked to be received together.
Herr von Ribbentrop preferred to receive us separately.
COULONDRE.
No. 345
Text of the communication handed over on September
1, 1939, at 10 p.m. by M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in
Berlin, to Herr von Ribbentrop
Excellency,
According to instructions from the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to submit the following
statement:
Early this morning, the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German army which gave clear evidence
that he was just about to attack Poland.
Information which has reached the French Government and
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom goes to show
that troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that
attacks are now being made on Polish towns.
This being so, it would seem to the French and British
Governments that by its action, (that is to say, an act of
force of an aggressive character against Poland, threatening
that country's independence), the German Government has
brought about those conditions which call for the carrying
out by the Governments of France and of the United Kingdom
of their undertaking to Poland to come to her help.
As a consequence, I have to inform Your Excellency
that, unless the German Government is prepared to give the
French Government satisfactory assurances that the German
Government has suspended all aggressive action against
Poland and is ready promptly to withdraw its
[377]
forces from Polish territory, the French Government will
unhesitatingly fulfill its obligations towards Poland.
I am, Sir, etc.
COULONDRE.
No. 346
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CHARLES-ROUX, French Ambassador to the Holy See.
Paris, September 1,
1939. 11.15 p.m.
You should inform the Sovereign Pontiff that the French
Government, deeply alive to the thought that has inspired
him, thanks him for his moving message.
The French Government have given their unreserved
adherence to all the steps towards the maintenance of peace
taken during these last days of August. It is their wish
that these noble efforts may yet fulfill their purpose and
allow a peace founded on justice and honour to prevail once
more among all free nations.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 347
Havas Note communicated to the Press during the
night of September 1-2, 1939
THE French Government has been made cognizant,
yesterday, as were several Governments, of an Italian move
with the object of insuring the settlement of the European
difficulties. After carefully considering the question the
French Government has given a "positive" reply.
No. 348
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 11.55 a.m.)
THROUGH the Press and the wireless, Germany is still
maintaining that it was Poland who rejected the peaceful
settlement put forward by the Fhrer, and who thus made a
conflict inevitable. German propaganda absolutely denies the
statement that the Polish Government was
[378]
informed of the proposals which it is accused of having
rejected.
In support of its contentions it puts forward two
facts:
No. 1. Herr von Ribbentrop, in the night of August 30-
31, not only read to the British Ambassador the text of the
German proposals, but it is further claimed that he
commented at length on these proposals:
No. 2. In the evening of Thursday, August 31, the
Polish wireless, it is alleged, declared that the German
proposals could not be accepted as a basis for discussion.
That, so it is claimed, is a clear proof that the Warsaw
Government had been informed of the German plan for a
settlement.
As to No. 1 of the above paragraphs, the matter has
already been put in its true light. Herr von Ribbentrop read
the German proposals at such a speed that Sir Nevile
Henderson could not get any definite idea of them.
Although the British Ambassador explicitly requested
that the said document should be handed to him, the German
Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this plan had
already been rendered obsolete, as the Polish
plenipotentiary had not presented himself on August 30.
Such was the pretext used by Herr von Ribbentrop for
refusing to hand the text to Sir Nevile Henderson.
As to No. 2 of the above paragraphs, there is clearly
on the German side a manoeuvre to bring about a deliberate
confusion between the plan read out by Herr von Ribbentrop
at midnight on the 30th, and the note addressed on the 29th
by the Reich Government to the British Government.
In the latter note, drawn up in brutal terms, the
German Government laid down most drastic conditions. In
particular it referred "to what would be left of Poland
after the alleged agreement had been reached." If the Polish
wireless declared on the evening of the 31st that the German
proposals were absolutely unacceptable, this assertion can
apply only to the German note of the 29th sent to the
British Government and not to the German plan comprising 16
points.
Not only was the Warsaw Government kept uninformed of
the German proposals, but furthermore the French and British
Governments did not have in their hands the text of the
German plan until after the German wireless had announced
that Poland had rejected the proposals of the Reich and that
negotiations were broken off.
It was, in fact, at 9 p m. on the 31st that the German
wireless gave out the communiqu‚ announcing the breaking off
of the negotiations and the text of the plan.
[379]
But it was only at 9.15 p.m. and at 9.25 p.m. that the
British and the French Ambassadors had been respectively
summoned by Herr von Ribbentrop in order to receive a copy
of the communiqu‚ and of the plan.
From this it follows that there was never a time when
Warsaw, or London, or Paris was in a position to examine the
proposals, which were communicated to them by the German
Government only after the latter had already declared them
to be null and void.
Moreover, the fact cannot be over-stressed that on
August 31, as early as 1 p.m., the Polish Ambassador in
Berlin requested Herr von Ribbentrop to receive him in order
to inform him of the consent by Poland to conversations
being opened.
It was not till 7.45 p.m. that M. Lipski was received
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who confined himself to
taking note of his communication, without informing him as
to the contents of the German plan or even making mention of
it in any way.
COULONDRE.
No. 349
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 2,
1939. 12 noon.
(Received at 3 p.m.)
IN contradiction to German assertions, the aggressor's
aircraft have not confined themselves to striking at
objectives of military importance.
According to an official communiqu‚ in the course of
yesterday's raids and those of last night 130 persons were
killed, among whom were only 12 belonging to the army. Of
the civilian victims 50 per cent are women and children. A
lunatic asylum for children was hit in Warsaw.
Also, civilian refugees who were in a train coming from
Poznan were bombed. The victims in both cases were very
numerous.
LON N™EL
[380]
No. 350
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET. Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw. September 2.
1939. 12 noon.
(Received at 2.50 p.m.)
IN reply to President Roosevelt's initiative, the
German Government has, through the good offices of the
Netherlands, sent a note to the Polish Government, informing
it that Herr Hitler had given orders to confine the bombing
from the air to military objectives.
The Polish Government, through the same channel,
replied that it had given identical orders, that it was
adhering to them in spite of cases of bombing which had made
many victims among the Polish civilian population, but that
it was reserving to itself the right to retaliate, if this
happened again.
No. 351
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 2,
1939. 1 p.m.
(Received at 6 p.m.)
FIERCE fighting is continuing, according to the latest
news given out by the Polish General Staff, on all the
Polish-German frontiers. The Germans seem to be exerting
their main efforts in Silesia and in the north and the south
of the industrial area.
The great activity of the German air force still
continues.
LON N™EL.
No. 352
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, September 2,
1939. 1.10 p.m.
(Received at 2.30 p.m.)
COUNT CIANO had asked me yesterday, September 1, at
2.45 p.m., whether we had reason to think that Poland would
still agree to the calling of a conference. I had replied at
about 5 p.m. that the attitude of Poland was uncertain but
that it was worth while all the same to give a trial to the
course suggested by Signor Mussolini.
[381]
Count Ciano summoned me again last night, at 9 p.m., to
the Palazzo Chigi. He declared to me that the Duce was in a
state of great hesitation and that he feared lest Herr
Hitler, faced by military operations in full course, should
accuse him of trying to balk him of his victory. Signor
Mussolini, however, did not give up the idea of intervening
and was still on the watch to make use of the first
favourable opening.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 353
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, September 2,
1939. 1.45 p.m.
(Received at 6 p.m.)
THE German air force keeps up its great activity. The
civilian victims are numerous.
LON N™EL
No. 354
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 2.30 p.m.)
THE attitude the German Government is going to take up
as a result of the communication, made yesterday evening in
Berlin by the French and British Ambassadors, is exercising
the minds of the British Government. It is asking itself
whether Chancellor Hitler, in order to increase his hold on
Polish territory, is not deliberately putting off his
answer. Once the positions which he may judge to be
necessary have been occupied, the Chancellor will turn to
the other Powers and declare that he has no wish to go on
with the war with Poland, that, having taken back Danzig and
the Corridor and brought help to the German minorities, he
is prepared to make a magnanimous peace based on the
conditions he stated on August 31.
Lord Halifax deems it impossible to allow the present
situation to continue any longer.
That was why, as early as last night, he had suggested
that our representatives in Berlin should, without further
delay, inform the Government of the Reich of the obligation
under which both our
[382]
Governments would be to consider themselves in a state of
war with Germany if satisfaction was not given, or if no
answer had reached them within a few hours. Lord Halifax
even contemplated a communication in which the Ambassadors
would make a declaration that France and England consider
themselves from now on as being in a state of war with the
Reich.
We must, however, foresee a case in which Chancellor
Hitler, in order to gain time, might make a declaration of
the kind specified above. The British Government, should
this happen, would be inclined to reply that it was not
possible to open negotiations before Polish territory had
been evacuated by the German troops.
Lord Halifax would highly appreciate an early
intimation of your views on this subject.
CORBIN
No. 355
Message addressed by M. Albert Lebrun,
President of the Republic, to the French Parliament.
September 2, 1939 [1]
GENTLEMEN of the Senate, Gentlemen of the Chamber of
Deputies,
You have been summoned at a critical time in our
national life. War has broken out in Central Europe; men are
killing one another; innocent victims are falling under
machine-gun fire from the air.
How has this come about?
Two nations had differences to settle. They could do
this by way of free and fair negotiations, as they had been
advised from every side. At the moment when their
plenipotentiaries were about to meet, Germany brutally
attacked Poland, thus bringing about a state of war which
nothing could justify. (Applause.)
England and France, steadfastly devoted to a policy of
prudence, wisdom and moderation, did all that was humanly
possible to avert this crisis. The voices of their Heads of
Government, together with the voices of the highest moral
and political authorities in the world, joined in adjuring
the men who held war or peace in their hands, to give
careful thought to their decisions before unleashing the
dread scourge.
That was of no avail. And, unless they should be, even
at this
[1] Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of Saturday, September 2,
1939 (Journal
Officiel, of September 3, 1939).
[383]
hour, willing to listen to the appeal of universal
conscience which is rising towards them, the worst must be
expected.
With great calmness, with cool resolve and in perfect
order, France has taken the steps required by her own safety
and her faithfulness to her obligations. (Loud applause on
the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the
right.)
For the last few days already, our young men have been
keeping watch on the frontiers. Today general mobilization
summons all the forces to the defence of our country.
On behalf of the nation I send our land, sea and air
forces an affectionate greeting and the expression of the
unanimous confidence which the country has in them. (Loud
applause everywhere.)
The people within the country also are doing their
whole duty. The union of all citizens, more sacred than
ever, has once more come about spontaneously. Fortitude,
discipline, hopefulness have one and all stirred their
innermost souls. (Fresh applause.)
They realise that over and above the fate of their own
country the freedom of the world and the future of
civilization are both at stake.
They can be relied on to face the most portentous
decisions unflinchingly.
Let us remain united! Long live France!
(The deputies rise. Prolonged applause.)
No. 356
Declaration read out on September 2, 1939, to the Chamber of
Deputies by M. Edouard Daladier, President of the Council of
Ministers, and to the Senate by M. Camille Chautemps, Vice-
President of the Council [1]
GENTLEMEN,
The Government yesterday decreed general mobilization.
The whole nation is answering the call with serious and
resolute calm. The young men have rejoined their regiments.
They are now defending our frontiers. The example of
dignified courage which they have just set to the world must
provide inspiration for our debates. (Applause.) In a great
impulse of national brotherliness they have forgotten
everything which only yesterday could divide them. They
[1] Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of Saturday, September 2,
1939 (Journal Officiel, of September 3, 1939).
[384]
no longer acknowledge any service but the service of France.
As we send them the grateful greeting of the nation let us
all pledge ourselves together to be worthy of them. (Loud
and unanimous applause.)
Thus has the Government put France into a position to
act in accordance with our vital interests and with national
honour.
It has now the duty of setting forth before you the
facts as they are, fully, frankly, and clearly.
Peace had been endangered for several days. The demands
of Germany on Poland were threatening to provoke a conflict.
I shall show you in a moment how-perhaps for the first time
in history-all the peaceful forces of the world, moral and
material, were leagued together during those days and during
those nights to save the world's peace. But just when it
could still be hoped that all those repeated efforts were
going to be crowned with success, Germany abruptly brought
them to naught.
During the day of August 31 the crisis reached its
peak. When Germany had at last let Great Britain know that
she agreed to hold direct negotiations with Poland, a course
which she had, let it be said, refused to me, Poland, in
spite of the terrible threat created by the sudden armed
invasion of Slovakia by the German forces, at once
endeavoured to resort to this peaceful method. (Loud
applause on all the benches.) At one o'clock in the
afternoon M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany,
requested an audience from Herr von Ribbentrop. Peace seemed
to be saved. But the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
would not receive M. Lipski till 7.45 p.m., seven hours
later. While the latter was bringing the consent of his
Government to direct conversations, the German Minister
refused to communicate Germany's claims to the Polish
Ambassador, on the pretext that the Ambassador had not full
powers to accept or reject them on the spot. (Sensation.)
At 9 p.m. the German wireless was communicating the
nature and the full extent of these claims; it added that
Poland had rejected them. That is a lie. (Long applause on
the left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the
right.) That is a lie, since Poland did not even know them.
(Renewed applause.)
And at dawn on September 1 the Fhrer gave his troops
the order to attack. Never was aggression more unmistakable
and less warranted; nor for its justification could more
lies and cynicism have been brought into play. (Unanimous
applause.)
Thus was war unleashed at the time when the most
noteworthy
[385]
forces, the authorities who were at the same time the most
respected and the most impartial, had ranged themselves in
the service of peace; at the time when the whole world had
joined together to induce the two sides to come into direct
contact so as to settle peacefully the conflict which
divides them.
The Head of Christianity had given voice to reason and
feelings of brotherhood; President Roosevelt had sent moving
messages and proposed a general conference to all countries;
the neutral countries had been active in offering their
impartial good offices. Need I say that to each of these
appeals the French Government gave an immediate welcome and
complete assent? (Applause.)
I myself, Gentlemen, if I may be allowed a reference to
my own person, thought it my duty as a Frenchman to approach
Herr Hitler directly. The Head of the German Government had
let me know on August 25, through M. Coulondre, our
Ambassador in Berlin, that he deplored the fact that in case
of an armed conflict between Germany and Poland, German
blood and French blood might be shed. I immediately had a
definite proposal put to the Fhrer, a proposal wholly
inspired by the real concern to safeguard without any delay
the peace of the world now imperiled. (Loud applause on the
left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right.)
You were able to read, I think in fact that you must
have read these texts. You know the answer I was given; I
will not dwell on it.
But we were not disheartened by the failure of this
step, and once more we backed up the effort to which Mr.
Chamberlain devoted himself with splendid stubbornness.
(Loud and prolonged applause on the same benches.) The
documents exchanged between London and Berlin have been
published. On the one side impartial and persevering
loyalty; on the other side, embarrassment, shifty and
shirking behavior. I am also happy at this juncture to pay
my tribute to the noble efforts made by the Italian
Government. (Applause.) Even yesterday we strove to unite
all men of goodwill so as at least to stave off hostilities,
to prevent bloodshed and to ensure that the methods of
conciliation and arbitration should be substituted for the
use of violence. (Loud applause.)
Gentlemen, these efforts towards peace, however
powerless they were and still remain, will at least have
shown where the responsibility lies. They insure for Poland,
the victim, the effective cooperation and moral support of
the nations and of free men of all lands.
What we did before the beginning of this war, we are
ready to do
[386]
once more. If renewed steps are taken towards
conciliation, we are still ready to join in. (Loud and
unanimous applause. On the extreme left, on the left, in the
centre, and on the right the deputies rise and
applaud again.)
If the fighting were to stop, if the aggressor were to
retreat within his own frontiers, if free negotiations could
still be started, you may well believe, Gentlemen, the
French Government would spare no effort to ensure, even
today, if it were possible, the success of these
negotiations, in the interests of the peace of the world.
(Loud and prolonged applause.)
But time is pressing; France and England cannot look on
when a friendly nation is being destroyed (renewed
applause), a foreboding of further onslaughts, eventually
aimed at England and France. (Applause.)
Indeed, are we only dealing with the German-Polish
conflict? We are not, Gentlemen; what we have to deal with
is a new stage in the advance of the Hitler dictatorship
towards the domination of Europe and the world. (Loud and
unanimous applause.) How, indeed, are we to forget that the
German claim to the Polish territories had been long marked
on the map of Greater Germany, and that it was only
concealed for some years to facilitate other conquests? So
long as the German-Polish Pact, which dates back only a few
years, was profitable to Germany, Germany respected it; on
the day when it became a hindrance to marching towards
domination it was denounced unhesitatingly. (Applause.)
Today we are told that, once the German claims against
Poland were satisfied, Germany would pledge herself before
the whole world for ten, for twenty, for twenty-five years,
for all time, to restore or to respect peace. Unfortunately,
we have heard such promises before! (Loud applause on a very
great many benches.)
On May 25, 1935, Chancellor Hitler pledged himself not
to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria and not to
unite Austria to the Reich; and on March 11, 1938, the
German army entered Vienna; Chancellor Schuschnigg was
imprisoned for daring to defend his country's independence,
and no one today can say what is his real fate after so many
physical and moral sufferings. (Loud applause.) Now we are
to believe that it was Dr. Schuschnigg's acts of provocation
that brought about the invasion and enslavement of his
country!
On September 12, 1938, Herr Hitler declared that the
Sudeten problem was an internal matter which concerned only
the German minority in Bohemia and the Czechoslovak
Government. A few days
[387]
later he maintained that the violent persecutions carried on
by the Czechs were compelling him to change his policy.
On September 26 of the same year he declared that his
claim on the Sudeten territory was the last territorial
claim he had to make in Europe. On March 14, 1939, Herr
Hacha was summoned to Berlin: ordered under the most
stringent pressure to accept an ultimatum. A few hours later
Prague was being occupied in contempt of the signed pledges
given to other countries in Western Europe. In this case
also Herr Hitler endeavoured to put on the victims the onus
which in fact lies on the aggressor. (Unanimous applause.)
Finally, on January 30, 1939, Herr Hitler spoke in loud
praise of the non-aggression pact which he had signed five
years previously with Poland. He paid a tribute to this
agreement as a common act of liberation, and solemnly
confirmed his intention to respect its clauses.
But it is Herr Hitler's deeds that count, not his word.
(Loud and repeated applause on all the benches.)
What, then, is our duty? Poland is our ally. We entered
into commitments with her in 1921 and 1925. These
commitments were confirmed.
I, myself, in the Chamber said, on May 11 last:
"As a result of the journey of the Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs to London and of the reciprocal pledges of
guarantee given by Great Britain and Poland, by a common
agreement with this noble and brave nation we took the
measures required for the immediate and direct application
of our treaty of alliance."
Parliament approved this policy.
Since then we have never failed both in diplomatic
negotiations and in public utterances, to prove faithful to
it. Our Ambassador in Berlin has several times reminded Herr
Hitler that, if a German aggression were to take place
against Poland, we should fulfill our pledges. And on July
1, in Paris, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said to the
German Ambassador to France:
"France has definite commitments to Poland. These
engagements have been further strengthened as a result of
the latest events, and consequently France will at once be
at Poland's side as soon as Poland herself takes up arms."
Poland has been the object of the most unjust and
brutal aggression. The nations who have guaranteed her
independence are bound to intervene in her defence.
Great Britain and France are not Powers that can
disown, or dream
[388]
of disowning, their signatures. (Loud and prolonged applause
on the extreme left, on the left, in the centre, and on the
right.)
Already last night, on September 1, the French and
British Ambassadors were making a joint overture to the
German Government. They handed to Herr von Ribbentrop the
following communication from the French Government and the
British Government, which I will ask your leave to read out
to you:
"Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German army which clearly indicated that
he was about to attack Poland.
"Information which has reached His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates
that German troops had crossed the Polish frontier and that
attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding.
"In these circumstances, it appears to the Governments
of the United Kingdom and France that, by their action, the
German Government have created conditions (viz., an
aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the
independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by
the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the
undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.
"I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that,
unless the German Government are prepared to give the French
Government and His Majesty's Government satisfactory
assurances that the German Government have suspended all
aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly
to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, the French
Government and His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to
Poland."
And indeed, Gentlemen, it is not only the honour of our
country: it is also the protection of its vital interests
that is at stake.
For a France which should allow this aggression to be
carried out would very soon find itself a scorned, an
isolated, a discredited France, without allies and without
support, and, doubtless, would soon herself be exposed to a
formidable attack. (Applause.)
This is the question I lay before the French nation,
and all nations. At the very moment of the aggression
against Poland, what value has the guarantee, once more
renewed, given for our eastern frontier, for our Alsace
(loud applause), for our Lorraine (loud applause), after the
repudiation of the guarantees given in turn to Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland? More powerful through their
conquests, gorged with the plunder of Europe, the masters of
inexhaustible natural
[389]
wealth, the aggressors would soon turn against France with
all their forces. (Fresh applause.)
Thus, our honour is but the pledge of our own security.
It is not that abstract and obsolete form of honour of which
conquerors speak to justify their deeds of violence: it is
the dignity of a peaceful people, which bears hatred towards
no other people in the world (loud and prolonged applause on
all benches) and which never embarks upon a war save only
for the sake of its freedom and of its life.
Forfeiting our honour would purchase nothing more than
a precarious peace liable to rescission, and when, tomorrow,
we should have to fight after losing the respect of our
allies and the other nations, we should no longer be
anything more than a wretched people doomed to defeat and
bondage. (Loud and unanimous applause.)
I feel confident that not a single Frenchman harbours
such thoughts today. But I well know, too, Gentlemen, that
it is hard for those who have devoted their whole lives to
the cause of peace and who are still prompted by a peaceful
ideal to reply, by force if needed, to deeds of violence. As
head of the Government, I am not the man to make an apology
for war in these tragic hours. I fought before like most of
you. I can remember. I shall not utter a single one of those
words that the genuine fighters look upon as blasphemous.
(Applause.) But I desire to do my plain duty, and shall do
it, as an honourable man. (Fresh applause.)
Gentlemen, while we are in session, Frenchmen are
rejoining their regiments. Not one of them feels any hatred
in his heart against the German people. (Loud and unanimous
applause.) Not one of them is giving way to the intoxicating
call of violence and brutality; but they are ready,
unanimously, to discharge their duty with the quiet courage
which derives its inspiration from a clear conscience.
(Fresh applause.)
Gentlemen, you who know what those Frenchmen are
thinking, you who even yesterday were among them in our
provincial towns and in our countryside, you who have seen
them go off-you will not contradict me if I evoke their
feelings here. They are peace-loving men, but they have
decided to make every sacrifice needed to defend the dignity
and freedom of their country. If they have answered our
call, as they have done, without a moment's hesitation,
without a murmur, without flinching, that is because they
feel, all of them, in the depths of their hearts that it is,
in truth, whatever may be said,
[390]
the very existence of France that is at stake. (Loud and
unanimous applause.)
You know better than anyone else that no government, no
man, would be able to mobilize France merely to launch her
into an adventure. Never would the French rise to invade the
territory of a foreign country. (Loud and prolonged applause
on all the benches.) Theirs is the heroism for defence and
not for conquest. When you see France spring to arms it is
because she feels herself threatened.
It is not France only that has arisen; it is that
whole, far-flung empire under the sheltering folds of our
tricolour. (Applause.) From every corner of the globe moving
protestations of loyalty from all the protected or friendly
races are reaching the mother country today. (Applause.) The
union of all Frenchmen is thus echoed beyond the seas by the
union of all peoples under our protection who in the hour of
danger are proffering both their arms and their hearts.
(Loud applause.) And I wish also to salute all the
foreigners settled on our soil (loud applause) who on this
very day in their thousands and thousands, as though they
were the volunteers of imperiled freedom, are placing their
courage and their lives at the service of France. (Renewed
applause.)
Our duty is to make an end of aggressive and violent
undertakings; by means of peaceful settlement, if we can
still do so, and this we shall strive our utmost to achieve
(unanimous applause), by the wielding of our strength, if
all sense of morality as well as all glimmering of reason
has died within the aggressors. (Renewed applause.)
If we were not to keep our pledges, if we were to allow
Germany to crush Poland, within a few months, perhaps within
a few weeks, what could we say to France, if we had to face
aggressors once more? Then would those most determined
soldiers ask us what we had done with our friends. They
would feel themselves alone, under the most dreadful threat,
and might lose, perhaps for all time, the confidence which
now spurs them on.
Gentlemen, in these hours when the fate of Europe is in
the balance, France is speaking to us through the voice of
her sons, through the voice of all those who have already
accepted, if need be, the greatest sacrifice of all. Let us
recapture, as they have done, that spirit which fired all
the heroes of our history. France rises with such impetuous
impulses only when she feels in her heart that she is
fighting for her life and for her independence.
Gentlemen, today France is in command. (Loud and
repeated
[391]
applause on all the benches. The deputies sitting on the
left, on the extreme left, in the centre, and on the right
rise and applaud at great length.)
No. 357
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 4.15 p.m.)
THE sittings of both Houses of Parliament yesterday
afternoon were marked by the same feeling of dignity and
quiet determination.
According to the information I have gathered from all
sides, the Members, who on returning from the parliamentary
recess had just renewed contact with their constituents,
were struck by the firmness shown by all sections of the
people regarding the foreign policy that should be followed.
All Englishmen were absolutely resolved not to see a
repetition of the events of last September and March.
Convinced that sooner or later the British Empire would have
to make a stand against German ambitions, the majority held
that it was better to have done with it at once and not to
continue the uncertainty about the morrow which was
hindering any normal life.
The aggression by the Reich against Poland once known,
everyone understood that in any case the hour for action had
now struck. No one dreamed for a moment that it was even
possible to hesitate as to his duty in face of the open
attack on a country to which Great Britain had given a
formal guarantee, thus pledging her honour.
The speech by the Prime Minister in the House of
Commons was therefore in agreement with the unanimous
feeling in Parliament and the country. He was listened to
with the seriousness called for by the situation; but the
Members none the less drowned in cheers the words with which
Mr. Chamberlain, using a language new on his lips and
obviously satisfied to be able to express at last what he
thought of the leaders of the Reich, branded Herr Hitler's
"senseless ambitions" and the "sickening technique" of the
Nazi Government. Cheers also welcomed the Prime Minister's
speech in which he declared that it was no longer a time for
words but for deeds, that there was only one course left to
Britain and that she was ready to face the situation,
whatever it might be.
The leaders of the two sections of the Opposition gave
their support
[392]
to the Head of the Government, each in his own way, but both
of them with the same determination; and the House
unanimously voted a credit of œ500,000,000 for war supplies
and various extraordinary measures directed to the same
purpose.
The Press this morning announces that all the Ministers
have proffered their resignations to Mr. Chamberlain, so as
to allow him to form a National Government without delay. It
is, however, uncertain whether the Labour Party will agree
to join in. The Left newspapers, in fact, say that this
party would rather for the moment stand aside, while
supporting with all its power the Government's policy, in
the country. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the
attitude in political circles completely corresponds with
the prevailing opinion in the country. The British people is
united as it has perhaps never been throughout its history,
by its will to resist any German attempt at domination and
to safeguard the essential principles of international
morality. It knows that it is entering upon an ordeal which
undoubtedly will be a lengthy one and will call for the
heaviest sacrifices; but it is resolved to carry out to the
end what it deems to be both a duty and a mission not only
in respect of its own country but also in respect of the
civilized world.
CORBIN.
No. 358
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.40 p.m.)
M. LIPSKI left the Polish Embassy early in the morning
with his whole staff. The Polish mission has been sent by
train to Denmark, whence it will go back to its own country.
The house will be looked after by two lesser officials left
in Berlin.
I tried in vain during the day to telephone to my
Polish colleague.
COULONDRE.
[393]
No. 359
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 6.55 p.m.)
HERR VON RIBBENTROP has not yet given an answer at 1.30
p.m. either to my British colleague or to me.
Sir Nevile Henderson and I are awaiting our
instructions.
COULONDRE.
No. 360
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome.
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, September 2,
1939. 7.25 p.m.
(Received at 10 p.m.)
THE British Ambassador and I were called today at 2
p.m. to the Palazzo Chigi. Count Ciano informed us there
that he had finally resolved to inform the Fhrer and Herr
von Ribbentrop, but without putting any pressure upon them,
that France and Great Britain had agreed to the suggestion
for a conference to which they had hope of bringing Poland.
This conference could follow very closely upon an immediate
armistice, leaving the adversaries in their respective
positions.
This suggestion had not been at once rejected from the
German side, but Herr Hitler had pointed out that, being
faced with a French note and a British note which the
Ambassadors of the two countries had handed him on the
evening of the 1st, he wished to know if these notes were in
the nature of an ultimatum or not. If so, he would
definitely reject them. If the contrary was true, he would
ask for some time to think them over until noon to-morrow.
Herr Hitler further requested that the answer to his two
questions should be sent him through Rome.
Count Ciano then telephoned directly to Your
Excellency, who, after stating that the note handed
yesterday by the French Ambassador was not in the nature of
an ultimatum, gave approval in principle, in so far as the
time limit was concerned, subject to the views of the
President of the Council.
Count Ciano then telephoned to Lord Halifax, who
himself also
[394]
stated to him that the English note was not in the nature of
an ultimatum and informed him that on the question of the
time limit he (Lord Halifax) must consult his Government. He
added that in his opinion to halt the troops on their
positions would be insufficient; the occupied territories
would have to be evacuated.
Count Ciano replied that in his opinion there was
little possibility of obtaining this from the Germans.
So as to leave time for the necessary consultations to
be held, and after I had pointed out that the consent of the
Poles would be harder to get, we decided to part and to meet
again in Count Ciano's room at 4 p.m.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 361
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 7.30 p.m.)
THE Polish Ambassador went this afternoon to Downing
Street and was received during the Cabinet meeting, which
was being held at the Prime Minister's house.
Count Raczinski gave the information that, according to
the news received from Warsaw, the German offensive had been
violently resumed this morning along the whole Polish front,
and that since the beginning of the afternoon there had been
bombing from the air of unprecedented intensity on a great
many towns.
The Ambassador made a fresh and urgent appeal to Mr.
Neville Chamberlain for the immediate putting into force of
the British guarantee.
Sir Alexander Cadogan requested Sir Eric Phipps by
telephone to inform the French Government at once of this
d‚marche.
CORBIN.
No. 362
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
September 2, 1939.
(Received by telephone 9.45 p.m.)
LORD HALIFAX has just made a declaration in the House
of Lords
[395]
which was received with cheers. The Secretary of State
pointed out that the British Ambassador was received last
night at 9.30 by Herr von Ribbentrop, to whom he delivered
the warning message that was read to the House yesterday.
Herr von Ribbentrop replied that he must submit the
communication to the German Chancellor
Our Ambassador declared his readiness to receive the
Chancellor's reply, but up to the present no reply has been
received. "It may be," Lord Halifax pointed out, "that delay
is caused to a proposal which, meanwhile, had been put
forward by the Italian Government that hostilities should
cease and that there should then immediately be a conference
between the five Powers-Great Britain, France, Poland,
Germany, and Italy.
"While appreciating the efforts of the Italian
Government, His Majesty's Government, for their part, would
find it impossible to take part in a conference whilst
Poland is being subjected to invasion. Her towns are under
bombardment, and Danzig has been made the subject of a
unilateral settlement by force."
This last passage was interrupted by great cheering.
Resuming, Lord Halifax recalled that the British
Government, as stated yesterday, would be bound to take
action unless the German forces were withdrawn from Polish
territory.
"The Government," he stated, "is in communication with
the French Government as to the limit of time within which
it would be necessary for the two Governments to know
whether the German Government were prepared to effect such
withdrawal.
"If the German Government would agree to withdraw their
forces then His Majesty's Government would be willing to
regard the position as being the same as it was before the
German forces crossed the Polish frontier. That is to say,
the way would be open to discussion between the German and
Polish Governments of the matters at issue between them, on
the understanding that the settlement arrived at was one
that safeguarded the vital interests of Poland and was
secured by an international guarantee.
"If the German and Polish Governments wished that other
Powers should be associated with them in the discussion, His
Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to
agree.
"There is one other matter to which allusion should be
made in order to make the present situation perfectly clear.
Yesterday, Herr Forster, who on August 23 had, in
contravention of the Danzig Con-
[396]
stitution, become the head of the State, decreed the
incorporation of Danzig in the Reich and the dissolution of
the Constitution.
"Herr Hitler was asked to give effect to this decree by
German law. At the meeting of the Reichstag, yesterday
morning, a law was passed for the reunion of Danzig with the
Reich. The international status of Danzig as a Free City is
established by a treaty of which His Majesty's Government
are a signatory, and the Free City was placed under the
protection of the League of Nations.
"The rights given to Poland in Danzig by treaty are
defined and confirmed by agreements concluded between Danzig
and Poland. The action taken by the Danzig authorities and
the Reichstag yesterday is the final step in the unilateral
repudiation of these international instruments which could
only be modified by negotiation.
"His Majesty's Government do not therefore recognize
either the validity of the grounds on which the action of
the Danzig authorities was based, the validity of this
action itself, or of the effect given to it by the German
Government."
At the same time the Prime Minister made a declaration
in identical terms in the House of Commons. In the course of
this statement, which was greeted with warm cheering, he
said, in substance:
"The Government is in a somewhat difficult position. I
suppose it always must be a difficulty for allies who have
to communicate with one another by telephone to synchronize
their thoughts and actions as quickly as those who are in
the same room; but I should be horrified if the House
thought for one moment that the statement that I have made
to them betrayed the slightest weakening either of this
Government or of the French Government in the attitude which
we have taken up.
"I am bound to say that I myself share the distrust
which Mr. Greenwood expressed of maneuvers of this kind....
I should have to be convinced of the good faith of the other
side ... before I could regard the proposition of a
conference as a proposition having reasonable chances of a
successful issue.
"I should have been very glad had it been possible for
me to say to the House now that the French Government and
ourselves were agreed to make the shortest possible limit to
the time when action should be taken by both of us.
"It is very possible that the communication which we
have had with the French Government will receive a reply
from them in the course of the next few hours.
[397]
"I feel certain that I can make a statement to the
House of a definite character to-morrow when the House meets
again. I anticipate that there is only one answer. I hope
that the issue will be brought to a close at the earliest
possible moment so that we may know where we are."
CORBIN.
No. 363
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Rome,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rome, September 2,
1939. 11.10 p.m.
(Received September 3, at 3.10 a.m.)
SIR PERCY LORAINE and I have returned to our respective
Embassies, after waiting an hour in Count Ciano's room for
the communications from London and Paris. It was agreed
that, as soon as the telephone replies had reached him,
Count Ciano would make them known to us.
At 7.20 p.m. Count Ciano informed me that Lord Halifax
accepted the Italian suggestion, but on condition that the
German troops should withdraw to the frontiers of the Reich.
Count Ciano told me that he did not think he was in a
position to put forward such a request to Germany. This was
likewise Signor Mussolini's opinion.
The speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies by M.
Daladier intimated that the position of the French
Government was the same as that of the British Government.
Consequently, it seemed that the Italian suggestion would
have to be abandoned.
Count Ciano informed me that he had therefore just
telephoned to Signor Attolico that, in these circumstances,
Signor Mussolini did not think he could follow up his
suggestion.
The above news has been conveyed to your department by
a telephone call received by M. Hoppenot.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 364
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris, September 2, 1939.
12 midnight.
I WILL specify to you to-morrow morning the terms of a
new d‚marche which I would ask you to make on September 3,
at noon, at the Wilhelmstrasse.
GEORGES BONNET.
[398]
No. 365
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris, September 3,
1939. 10.20 a.m.
LAST night, following a communication made to us by the
British Government, and following the meeting of the French
Chamber of Deputies, the French Government at a Cabinet
meeting took the following decisions, which I have been
charged to transmit to you.
You should present yourself today, September 3, at
noon, at the Wilhelmstrasse and ask for the German
Government's reply to the communication which you handed in
at 10 p. m. on September 1.
If the reply to the questions contained in that
communication is in the negative, you should recall the
responsibility of Germany which you evoked during your last
interview, and you should notify to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Reich or to his representative that the
French Government find themselves, by reason of the German
reply, compelled to fulfill as from today, September 3, at 5
p. m., the engagements which France entered into towards
Poland, and which are known to the German Government.
As from that moment you may ask for your passports.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 366
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 3, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 2 p.m.)
MY communication by telephone at 1 p.m. with Your
Excellency.
At 12.40 p.m. today I made the communication prescribed
by Your Excellency to Herr von Ribbentrop.
The First Secretary of this Embassy is at this moment
asking for my passports.
COULONDRE.
[399]
No. 367
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
September 3, 1939.
(Received by telephone at 5.50 p.m.)
I HAVE the honour to confirm as here below the
communication which I made to Your Excellency by telephone
at 1 p.m.
Herr von Ribbentrop returned at noon. I was received at
this hour by the State Secretary, but the latter informed me
that he was not in a position to tell me whether a
satisfactory reply had been made to my letter of September
1, nor even whether such a reply could be given thereto. He
insisted that I should see Herr von Ribbentrop himself. In
these circumstances I asked to be received by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs at the earliest possible moment.
I was received by Herr von Ribbentrop at 1230 p.m.
I asked him whether he could give me a satisfactory
reply to my letter which I had handed to him on September 1
at 10 p.m.
He replied to me as follows:
"After the delivery of your letter, the Italian
Government notified the German Government of a proposed
compromise, stating that the French Government was in
agreement. Later, Signor Mussolini intimated to us that the
contemplated compromise had failed owing to British
intransigence. This morning the British Ambassador handed us
an ultimatum, due to expire two hours later. We rejected it
for the reason which is explained in the memorandum which I
handed to the British Ambassador today and of which I give
you a copy.
"If the French Government feels bound by its
commitments to Poland to enter into the conflict, I can only
regret it, for we have no feeling of hostility towards
France. It is only if France attacks us that we shall fight
her, and this would be on her part a war of aggression.
I then asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if I was
to infer from his utterances that the reply of the
Government of the Reich to my letter of September 1 was in
the negative. "Yes," he replied.
"In these circumstances I must, on behalf of my
Government, remind you for the last time of the heavy
responsibility assumed by the Government of the Reich by
entering, without a declaration of war, into hostilities
against Poland and in not acting upon the suggestion made by
the Governments of the French Republic and of His Britannic
[400]
Majesty to suspend all aggressive action against Poland and
to declare itself ready to withdraw its forces promptly from
Polish territory.
"I have the painful duty to notify you that as from
today, September 3, at 5 p.m., the French Government will
find itself obliged to fulfill the obligations that France
has contracted towards Poland, and which are known to the
German Government."
"Well," Herr von Ribbentrop remarked, "it will be
France who is the aggressor."
I replied to him that history would judge of that.
COULONDRE.
No. 363
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to
Paris.
Paris,
September 3, 1939.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,
In conformity with Article 2 of Convention III of The
Hague, dated October 18, 1907, I have the honour to send you
herewith the notification relative to the State of War
existing between France and Germany.
GEORGES BONNET.
The aggression which the German Government, scorning
the methods of peaceful settlement of differences to which
it had bound itself to have recourse, and the appeals to
free discussion or to mediation addressed to it by the most
authoritative voices, committed against Poland on September
1, in violation of engagements most freely accepted both
towards Poland herself as well as towards all the signatory
States of the Pact of renunciation of war of August 27,
1928, has confronted the French Republic with its
obligations to assist Poland, obligations resulting from
public treaties and known to the Government of the Reich.
The supreme effort, attempted by the Government of the
French Republic and by the British Government with a view to
maintain peace by the cessation of aggression, was
frustrated by the refusal of the German Government.
In consequence, as a result of the aggression aimed by
Germany against Poland, a state of war exists between France
and Germany as from September 3, 1939, at 5 p.m.
The present notification is made in conformity with
Article 2 of
[401]
Convention III of The Hague, dated October 18, 1907,
relating to the outbreak of hostilities.
No. 369
Joint Anglo-French Declaration
THE Governments of the United Kingdom and France
solemnly and publicly affirm their intention should a war be
forced upon them to conduct hostilities with a firm desire
to spare the civilian population and to preserve in every
way possible these monuments of human achievement which are
treasured in all civilized countries.
In this spirit they have welcomed with deep
satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of
bombing from the air. Fully sympathizing with the
humanitarian sentiments by which that appeal was inspired,
they have replied to it in similar terms.
They had indeed some time ago sent explicit
instructions to the Commanders of their armed forces
prohibiting the bombardment, whether from the air, or the
sea, or by artillery on land, of any except strictly
military objectives in the narrowest sense of the word.
Bombardment by artillery on land will exclude
objectives which have no strictly defined military
importance, in particular large urban areas situated outside
the battle zone. They will furthermore make every effort to
avoid the destruction of localities or buildings which are
of value to civilization.
As regards the use of naval forces, including
submarines, the two Governments will abide strictly by the
rules laid down in the Submarine Protocol of 1936 which have
been accepted by nearly all civilized nations. Further they
will only employ their aircraft against merchant shipping at
sea in conformity with the recognized rules applicable to
the exercise of maritime belligerent rights by warships.
Finally, the two allied Governments reaffirm their
intention to abide by the terms of the Geneva Protocol of
1925 prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous
or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. An
inquiry will be addressed to the German Government as to
whether they are prepared to give an assurance to the same
effect.
It will, of course, be understood that in the event of
the enemy not observing any of the restrictions which the
Governments of the United Kingdom and France have thus
imposed on the operations of their
[402]
forces these Governments reserve the right to take all such
action as they may consider appropriate.
No. 370
Appeal to the Nation
by M. EDOUARD DALADIER, President of the Council of
Ministers.
Paris,
September 3, 1939.
Men and Women of France,
Since daybreak on September 1, Poland has been the
victim of the most brutal and most cynical of aggressions.
Her frontiers have been violated. Her cities are being
bombed. Her army is heroically resisting the invader.
The responsibility for the blood that is being shed
falls entirely upon the Hitler Government. The fate of peace
was in Hitler's hands. He chose war.
France and England have made countless efforts to
safeguard peace. This very morning they made a further
urgent intervention in Berlin in order to address to the
German Government a last appeal to reason and request it to
stop hostilities and to open peaceful negotiations.
Germany met us with a refusal. She had already refused
to reply to all the men of goodwill who recently raised
their voices in favour of the peace of the world.
She therefore desires the destruction of Poland, so as
to be able to dominate Europe quickly and to enslave France.
In rising against the most frightful of tyrannies, in
honoring our word, we fight to defend our soil, our homes,
our liberties.
I am conscious of having worked unremittingly against
the war until the last minute.
I greet with emotion and affection our young soldiers,
who now go forth to perform the sacred task which we
ourselves did perform before them. They can have full
confidence in their chiefs, who are worthy of those who have
previously led France to victory.
The cause of France is identical with that of
Righteousness. It is the cause of all peaceful and free
nations. It will be victorious.
Men and women of France!
We are waging war because it has been thrust on us.
Every one of us is at his post, on the soil of France, on
that land of liberty where
[403]
respect of human dignity finds one of its last refuges. You
will all cooperate, with a profound feeling of union and
brotherhood, for the salvation of the country.
Viva la France!
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