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PART TWO
The Franco-German Declaration of December 6th,
1938
(October 19-December 22, 1938)
No. 17
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
October 19, 1938.
THE Chancellor of the Reich gave me a farewell audience
yesterday afternoon, not at Berchtesgaden, but in the
eagle's eyrie which he has had built on a rocky spur 6,000
feet high with a view extending over the vast arena of
mountains which surround Salzburg. The conversation, at
which the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs was present,
soon assumed an interesting and important character.
Referring to the Munich Agreement, Herr Hitler
expressed his regret that subsequent events had allowed a
dangerous state of tension to continue between the Great
Powers, and had not fulfilled his hopes. With regard to
France, he took a rather indulgent attitude but on the other
hand he insisted bitterly on the fact that he could, so he
said, discern in the British attitude the expression of a
fundamental antagonism.
Endeavouring to moderate and correct his views, I tried
more especially to explain to him the reasons for the
currents of opinion in France and in England as a result of
the speech at Saarbrucken, and after the conclusion of an
agreement which had saved peace, but at the price of heavy
sacrifices.
The Chancellor declared in a general way that he was
prepared to seek ways and means of improving existing
conditions and to develop the potentialities of appeasement
and conciliation which the Munich Agreement seemed to
contain.
(1) Herr Hitler would consent to sign an agreement by
which France and Germany would reciprocally recognize their
existing frontiers and express their determination not to
attempt to change them.
[19]
(2) For his part he believed that this text should be
accompanied by an undertaking to hold mutual consultations
on all questions likely to have repercussions on the
relations between the two countries.
(3) Alluding to the problem of the limitation of
armaments, Herr Hitler seemed extremely irritated and
greatly impressed by the military measures announced in
Great Britain and in the United States. He is of the opinion
that, owing to the practical difficulties which would arise
if a programme of disarmament were to be set up without
further preliminaries, it would be wiser and more opportune
to begin with a programme for the humanization of war
(bombardment of open cities, etc.).
(4) Speaking of economic questions such as, for
instance, the possibility of stabilizing the currencies,
Herr Hitler recognizes both their importance and the
difficulties they present. But he declared that, having
little knowledge of these matters, he would gladly, if need
be, have recourse to the services of experts.
At the end of this conversation, and in conclusion, the
Chancellor asked the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to
cause the different suggestions that had been examined in
the course of the interview to be studied, and more or less
detailed plans on their execution to be prepared. The texts
thus drawn up would then be communicated to us for careful
consideration and eventual correction and criticism.
In view of the conversations I have had with Your
Excellency, I took it upon myself to give the assurance that
the French Government would consider with the greatest
sympathy all proposals or suggestions favourably received by
the Chancellor or initiated by him. We agreed that the
preliminary study of these questions should remain
confidential until further notice, it being understood that
we would for our part ascertain the views of the British
Government while Germany reserves the right to inform the
Italian Government.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 18
M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
October 20, 1938.
WHEN on the evening of October 17, the German
Chancellor asked me to see him as quickly as possible, he
placed one of his private planes at my disposal. I therefore
left by air for Berchtesgaden on the
[20]
next day accompanied by Captain Stehlin. I arrived there
towards three in the afternoon. From there a car took me not
to the Obersalzberg villa where the Fhrer lives, but to an
extraordinary place where he likes to spend his days when
the weather is fine.
From a distance, the place looks like a kind of
observatory or small hermitage perched up at a height of
6,000 feet on the highest point of a ridge of rock. The
approach is by a winding road about nine miles long, boldly
cut out of the rock; the boldness of its construction does
as much credit to the ability of the engineer Todt as to the
unremitting toll of the workmen who in three years completed
this gigantic task. The road comes to an end in front of a
long underground passage leading into the mountain, and
closed by a heavy double door of bronze. At the far end of
the underground passage a wide lift, paneled with sheets of
copper, awaits the visitor. Through a vertical shaft of 330
feet cut right through the rock, it rises up to the level of
the Chancellor's dwelling-place. Here is reached the
astonishing climax. The visitor finds himself in a strong
and massive building containing a gallery with Roman
pillars, an immense circular hall with windows all round and
a vast open fireplace where enormous logs are burning, a
table surrounded by about thirty chairs, and opening out at
the sides, several sitting-rooms, pleasantly furnished with
comfortable arm-chairs. On every side, through the bay-
windows, one can look as from a plane high in the air, on to
an immense panorama of mountains. At the far end of a vast
amphitheatre one can make out Salzburg and the surrounding
villages, dominated, as far as the eye can reach, by a
horizon of mountain ranges and peaks, by meadows and forests
clinging to the slopes. In the immediate vicinity of the
house, which gives the impression of being suspended in
space, an almost overhanging wall of bare rock rises up
abruptly. The whole, bathed in the twilight of an autumn
evening, is grandiose, wild, almost hallucinating. The
visitor wonders whether he is awake or dreaming. He would
like to know where he is-whether this is the Castle of
Monsalvat where lived the Knights of the Graal or a new
Mount Athos sheltering the meditations of a cenobite, or the
palace of Antinea rising up in the heart of the Atlas
Mountains. Is it the materialization of one of those
fantastic drawings with which Victor Hugo adorned the
margins of his manuscript of Les Burgraves, the fantasy of a
millionaire, or merely the refuge where brigands take their
leisure and hoard their treasures? Is it the conception of a
normal mind, or that of a man tormented by megalomania,
[21]
by a haunting desire for domination and solitude, or merely
that of a being in the grip of fear?
One detail cannot pass unnoticed, and is no less
valuable than the rest for someone who tries to assess the
psychology of Adolf Hitler: the approaches, the openings of
the underground passage and the access to the house are
manned by soldiers and protected by nests of machineguns....
The Chancellor received me amiably and courteously. He
looks pale and tired. It is not one of his excitable days,
he is rather in a period of relaxation. Immediately, he
draws me towards the bay-windows of the great hall, shows me
the landscape and enjoys the surprise and admiration that I
make no effort to conceal. We exchange some compliments and
a few polite phrases. At his order, the tea is served in one
of the adjoining sitting-rooms. When the servants have left
and the doors are closed, the conversation begins between
the three of us; Herr von Ribbentrop intervenes only at rare
intervals, and always to stress and emphasize the Fhrer's
remarks.
Adolf Hitler is disappointed with the sequels of the
Munich Agreement. He had believed that the meeting of the
Four, which banished the spectre of war, would have marked
the beginning of an era of conciliation and improved
relations between nations. He cannot see that anything of
the kind has occurred. The crisis is not over; it threatens,
if the situation does not improve, to become worse within a
short time. Great Britain is sonorous with threats and calls
to arms. For the Chancellor this is an opportunity to utter,
against that country, against her selfishness and her
childish belief in the superiority of her rights over those
of others, one of those tirades which he has already
delivered several times in public.
The Chancellor's irritation calms down fairly quickly. I
point out to him that after the joy at the preservation of
peace, a reaction was inevitable; the realization of the
sacrifices exacted from Czecho-slovakia, the harsh treatment
meted out to that country could not fail to stir the hearts
and even to disturb the conscience of many people; and
especially, the Saarbrucken speech had spread the impression
that all these sacrifices had been made in vain, that their
only effect had been to increase the appetite of the Third
Reich. This speech had considerably strengthened the
position of the adversaries of the Munich Agreement.
The Fhrer protests; he had not started the present
trouble; the
[22]
English had done so; he had not uttered a single word
against France; and as to Czechoslovakia, it was not true
that he had ill-treated her; all that he had done was to
insist upon the rights of the German people, which had been
trodden underfoot!
I interrupt his self-justification; we must not linger
over the past, the future is more important; after the joy
at the preservation of peace and the subsequent bitterness
aroused by the sacrifices it exacted, a third stage is now
reached. The statesmen must now with more self-control
consider whether the Munich Agreement is only to be a
fruitless episode or whether now that experience has proved
that the democracies and the totalitarian states can
cooperate in promoting general appeasement, they will
attempt to develop this first successful experiment into a
larger enterprise and gradually lead back Europe towards
more normal and enduring conditions.
Herr Hitler does not raise any objection. He declares
that, as far as he is concerned he is quite prepared to do
this, and that he had asked me to visit him as much in order
to be able to discuss this matter with me as to allow me to
take my leave of him.
In my telegram of yesterday, I indicated in a
sufficiently explicit manner the course the conversation
then took. On the three points that were raised in turn, and
which, taken as a whole, form a complete programme starting
from Franco-German relations and widening to questions of
importance to all the Powers, the Chancellor is full of
arguments, objections and suggestions, like a man who has
already considered the matter and is not being caught
unaware.
As regards the suggestion of a written recognition by
France and Germany of their common frontier and an agreement
to hold consultations in all cases which might affect the
relations of the two countries, Herr Hitler declares that he
is ready to accept it immediately; actually, this appears to
be the point which makes the greatest appeal to him. He
stresses the difficulties which might arise from a formula
of non-aggression if it were accompanied by reservations
relating to the Covenant of the League of Nations, or to the
existence of pacts with a third party. He hopes that these
difficulties may be removed, and he does not ask once that
France should renounce her pact with Soviet Russia.
As to the problem of a limitation of armaments, he is
undecided; he is not opposed to the principle of such a
limitation, but he does not see by what means it can be put
into practice; he outlines, without dwelling on it, the
theory according to which Germany, situated in
[23]
the centre of Europe and exposed to simultaneous attacks on
several fronts, has no true equality of armaments unless she
is superior in that respect to any of the States that could
attack her; he also fears that if he were to speak of the
limitation of armaments, the opposition in Great Britain
would say that he was retreating before a display of British
energy; his thoughts remain uncertain. On the other hand, he
is ready to approach without hesitation the problem of the
humanization of war and to go fairly far in this matter. He
sees here a good introduction, a happy preface from which
might arise a more favourable atmosphere for the ultimate
examination of the disarmament question.
As to the monetary and economic problems, he obviously
leaves to others the task of dealing with them. That is no
business of his. He understands nevertheless that it is
important not to leave these matters in abeyance, but to
invite experts to take up again the work already begun and
to examine the possibilities offered by present conditions.
Concluding the conversation, he gives Herr von
Ribbentrop the order, as I have already said, to set his
department to work and to make them study the suggestions
arising out of our interview with a view to formulating
concrete proposals. Paris will then study the drafts and
state its own views. I promise that we shall receive his
suggestions with earnest sympathy and study them carefully,
being moved by the same peaceful intentions that appear to
animate the Fhrer. In the meantime, Germany will approach
Italy. France, on her side, can investigate British views.
We are not committed, on either side, to anything precise
but both sides are agreed to proceed in all good faith to an
investigation.
Therefore the utmost discretion should be maintained
towards the public until further notice; public opinion must
not be informed until the assurance of a positive result has
been obtained.
On two other subjects I attempt to persuade the Fhrer
to reveal his views: the claims of Hungary and the war in
Spain.
He admits frankly that he considers the pretensions of
the Hungarians excessive, although he adds that the cessions
and concessions of the Slovaks are insufficient. For him,
the only criterion is the ethnographical one, the race; it
was the only one on which he based his claims towards the
Czechs in tracing the new frontiers; the Hungarians and the
Poles had better keep to these principles as well; obviously
he has no sympathy with the efforts they are making to
obtain a common frontier. The Chancellor boasts that he has
brought
[24]
about the failure of the appeal which Hungary had intended
to make to the four Munich Powers. He believes that in so
doing, he has avoided a definite danger.
"Such a conference," he says, "would have placed us
before two conflicting theses. I should have been obliged,
regardless of my personal opinion, to side with the
Hungarians and Poles, because of the political ties that
unite them to us; Mussolini would have acted in the same
manner. You, however, and the English, for similar reasons,
would have defended the Czechs. Thus, three weeks after
Munich, we should again have had a conflict, which this time
could not have been settled. I rendered a service to Europe
in avoiding it. I preferred to exercise pressure on the
Hungarians and the Czechs and persuade them to take up the
interrupted negotiations, with less intransigence on both
sides. Mussolini helped me. I hope that a compromise will
take place. But the whole business is dangerous. This
occasion shows how wrong France and England were to promise
Czechoslovakia to guarantee her frontiers, even before the
latter were clearly defined. This may still lead to most
unpleasant complications."
With regard to Spain, the Chancellor repeats that he
never had any intention of establishing himself there
permanently. He had secured some economic advantages, but he
would have obtained them in any case. It is far from his
thoughts, so he assures me, to use Spain as a perpetual
menace against France. Spain herself needs to maintain good
relations with France. General Franco's attitude during the
September crisis proved this plainly. Let all the foreign
volunteers be withdrawn and let the two Spanish factions
remain face to face with each other; in these conditions
Franco will win in the end, and France will be none the
worse for it.
For nearly two hours Herr Hitler has been readily
listening to my questions; he has answered them without any
embarrassment, with simplicity and-at least apparently-with
candour. But the time has come to release him. Antinea's
Castle is now submerged in the shadow that spreads over the
valley and the mountains. I take my leave. The Fhrer
expresses the wish that I might later return to Germany and
come to visit him in a private capacity. He shakes both my
hands several times. After going down in the lift and
through the underground passage, I find the car waiting for
me; passing through Berchtesgaden it takes me back to the
airport, from where our plane starts immediately on its
night flight to Berlin.
[25]
During the whole of our conversation, except for a few
outbursts of violence when referring to England, the Fhrer
was calm, moderate, conciliatory. One would have been
justified in thinking that one was in the presence of a man
with a well-balanced mind, rich in experience and wisdom,
and wishing above all things to establish the reign of peace
among nations. There were moments when Herr Hitler spoke of
Europe, of his feelings as a European, which are, he
asserts, more genuine than those expressed so loudly by many
people.
He spoke of our "white civilization" as of a very
precious possession common to us all, which must be
defended. He appeared sincerely shocked at the persistent
antagonism which has remained after the Munich Agreement,
and which the British attitude revealed to his mind with
great clearness. Obviously, the possibility of a coming
crisis and the eventual outbreak of a general war are ever
present in his mind. Perhaps at heart he himself is
skeptical as to his chances of preventing this tragedy? In
any case, he seems willing to attempt to do so or he wishes
to feel he has made the attempt so as to calm if not his own
conscience, at least the conscience of his people. And it is
through France that he thinks this attempt must be made.
I have no illusions whatever about Adolf Hitler's
character. I know that he is changeable, dissembling, full
of contradictions, uncertain. The same man with the debonair
aspect, with a real fondness for the beauties of nature, who
discussed reasonable ideas on European politics round the
tea-table, is also capable of the worst frenzies, of the
wildest exaltations and the most delirious ambitions. There
are days when, standing before a globe of the world, he will
overthrow nations, continents, geography and history, like a
demiurge stricken with madness. At other moments, he dreams
of being the hero of an everlasting peace, in which he would
devote himself to the erection of the most magnificent
monuments. The advances that he is prepared to make to
France are dictated by a sentiment which he shares, at least
intermittently, with the majority of his countrymen, namely
the weariness of an age-long contest, and the desire to see
it end at last; this feeling is now strengthened by the
memories of the Munich interviews, by the sympathy that the
person of President Daladier aroused in him, and also by the
idea that our country's evolution tends to make it easier
for her to understand the Third Reich. But at the same time
we may be certain that the Fhrer remains true to his wish
to disintegrate the Franco-British bloc, and to stabilize
peace in the west, so as to have a free
[26]
hand in the east. What plans may be revolving already in his
mind? Is it Poland, Russia, the Baltic States which, in his
thoughts, will be called upon to pay the cost? Does he
himself even know?
Be that as it may, Hitler is one of those men with whom
one must never relax one's utmost vigilance, and whom one
can only trust with reservations. Personally, I do not draw
the conclusion that we should not listen to his suggestions.
In these circumstances, as in many other previous ones, I
hold that the main thing is that we should know exactly
where we stand and with whom we are dealing. But it does not
follow that an attitude of abstention and negation is the
right one. Dr. Goebbels said recently, and not without
reason, that one cannot win in a lottery if one does not
take at least the risk of buying a ticket. It is our bounder
duty not to neglect a single one of the ways that lead to
peace. If it so happens that Herr Hitler, either as a feint
or as a deliberate plan, engages himself far enough on that
path, it is possible that he will end by not being able to
turn back again, even if he wished.
Besides, who could predict the astounding changes of
front of which this dictator, impressionable, mutable and
abnormal, may be capable, and what will his personal destiny
and that of Germany be tomorrow ?
After the Munich conference, it was normal and
necessary that one should think of expanding the results of
an agreement on which public opinion had pinned such high
hopes.
As matters stand to-day, Germany is expressing a wish
to take the initiative; Germany is trying to work out a
formula and a plan.
If we were to turn a deaf ear, we would, to our
detriment, be providing her with the alibi which she wishes
for perhaps in order to cover her future enterprises.
Besides, the contracts she appears ready to enter into
have only a limited scope.
If these promises are kept, they will contribute in a
large measure to the lessening of tension in Europe.
If they are broken, the guilty party will assume a
moral responsibility which will weigh heavily on his future
position.
France should, therefore, undertake to consider the
proposals without fear. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to
think that the events France has now lived through may have
finally convinced her people of the pressing need for
national order and cohesion, for a certain moral
[27]
reform and for rapid and thorough overhauling and
improvement of our military organization.
No. 19
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
October 21, 1938.
THE suggestions which you have conveyed to me in your
telegram of October 19 arising out of your conversation with
Herr Hitler have been the subject of attentive scrutiny and
have in principle been favourably received by the French
Government. I should like you to inform the Chancellor of
this personally. The Government of the Republic are disposed
for their part to devote their utmost care to the study of
the plans announced as soon as they are submitted to them.
For this purpose they will not fail to make the necessary
contacts with the British Government while strictly
maintaining the utmost discretion, as agreed.
Moreover, referring to the two specifically Franco-
German questions of a mutual agreement to hold consultations
and a reciprocal recognition of existing frontiers, you will
add that the French Government declares itself prepared from
now on to take part with the Government of the Reich in a
preliminary exchange of views opening the negotiations, as
soon as the precise details of which you have been told are
submitted to them. Indeed, as you do, I look upon the
initiative taken by Herr Hitler with all the interest it
deserves, and I agree with you that we must endeavour to
reach concrete results as quickly as possible.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 20
FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
October 22,1938.
THIS morning, in the absence of Herr von Ribbentrop, I
have conveyed the communication prescribed by your telegram
of October 21 to Baron von Weizs„cker. He will pass it on
without delay, to the Chancellor of the Reich.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
[28]
No. 21
FRAN€OIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
October 24, 1938.
IN the course of a conversation, during a farewell
luncheon which he was giving for me, Field-Marshal Goering
declared that he was very much in favour of the projected
plans; he appeared very optimistic as to their realization,
and it seems that he himself will see that they are carried
out without delay. Herr von Ribbentrop, so Field-Marshal
Goering assured me, was also, as well as the Chancellor,
favourably disposed and would use all his efforts to further
the projects.
I have also had a conversation on the subject with Herr
Gauss, to whom the preparation of the drafts has been
entrusted; he had been summoned to Berchtesgaden, after my
visit to the Chancellor.
FRAN€OIS-PONCET.
No. 22
Note by the Minister
Paris,
November 22, 1938.
THE Polish Ambassador was informed, on November 22, by
M. Georges Bonnet, of the French Government's intention of
signing, with the German Government, a declaration about the
frontiers and an undertaking to hold consultations. This
declaration, reserving in principle the relations of the
contracting parties with third countries, and consequently
those of France with Poland, does not in any way interfere
with France's commitments towards the latter country.
M. Lukasiewicz showed himself very favourably disposed
towards this project.
No. 23
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
November 23, 1938.
YESTERDAY, at Berchtesgaden, I presented my credentials
to the Chancellor of the Reich.
The Fhrer received me affably in his simple and
elegant dwelling of the Berghof.
[29]
After we had exchanged the usual speeches, he conversed
with me for half an hour, and, contrary to his habit-for
usually he does not mention politics in the course of these
formal visits-he almost immediately attacked the problem of
Franco-German relations.
"These relations," the Fhrer said, "I wish to see
peaceable and pleasant, and I see no reason why they should
not be so. There is no cause for conflict between Germany
and France." He then looked at me insistently, but without
trace of harshness, and added, "I hope, in any case, should
difficulties arise, that you will do your utmost to smooth
them out, in the same spirit as your predecessor and with
the same sincerity."
The substance of my reply was that I was bringing with
me a certainty and a hope. The certainty of the absolute
sincerity dictated by my conscience and by my fervent
patriotism. (Here Herr Hitler signified his approval by
nodding his head with vivacity.)
I continued: "The hope is that of an effective and
enduring rapprochement between the two nations. I have
gained this hope both from your speeches, which I have
recently read over again, and through which the word
'reconciliation' seemed to shine as a gleam of light as well
as in the dispositions evident in France. During my last
stay in my country, when I returned from Moscow, I gathered
in the most varied circles precise indications that have
convinced me of the fact that the vast majority of the
French nation wishes for a rapprochement with Germany.
France was profoundly stirred by the September crisis; like
the German nation, she touched the fringe of war, and like
the German people, our people have expressed their gratitude
to the leader who preserved them from war. They look upon
the Munich Agreement as a possibility for opening up a path
for a policy of reconciliation and they wonder whether
France and Germany might not in the end reach a mutual
understanding, once and for all time, so as to avoid the
possibility of a repetition of such a menace."
I concluded that it was the task of the Governments to
answer this question, and I alluded to the last conversation
of M. Fran‡ois-Poncet with the Fhrer.
Herr Hitler assured me that he shared these feelings,
that he, on his side, was anxious without delay to translate
into action the good intentions he had expressed to my
predecessor, and he repeated that no territorial question
remained in suspense between France and Germany.
I then stressed the importance, in order to start the
two countries
[30]
on the path of reconciliation and collaboration, of not
delaying too long the first manifestation of the mutual
goodwill of the two Governments, otherwise we ran this
danger, that the effects of the psychological shock caused
by the September crisis would fade out like a photograph
which had not been fixed.
The Fhrer smiled and agreed, then he became more
animated, his tone warmed up and he said: "I am an ex-
Serviceman, I know what war is. I want to spare my people
these trials; even an alteration of the frontier between our
two countries would not be sufficient justification for the
sacrifices it would entail. That is my opinion, and I know
it is also that of President Daladier."
Herr Hitler then bade me good-bye after adding while
shaking hands: "We are both ex-Servicemen; if ever
difficulties should arise, we will find a way of solving
them peacefully."
It is in that spirit, with which the mysticism of the
National-Socialist regime is so largely permeated, that as
soon as I got back to Berlin, I laid a wreath on the tomb of
the Unknown Warrior of Germany.
At the luncheon which after I had been received by the
Chancellor was offered to me by Herr Meissner, Minister of
the Reich Chancellery, Herr Hitler's intimates evinced
satisfaction at the progress of the conversations which had
gone far beyond a mere expression of courtesy. A high
official whom I have known for twenty years said to me:
"From this you can infer the Fhrer's state of mind."
The Counselor and the Military Attach‚ of this Embassy
had accompanied me to Berchtesgaden. During the whole
journey we were the guests of the Government of the Reich,
and the German authorities did their utmost to show us
attentions and courtesy.
COULONDRE.
No. 24
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
November 24, 1938.
THE D.N.B. agency publishes the following communiqu‚
for its foreign service:
We have had the following information from an
authoritative source concerning Franco-German relations:
In the course of recent years, the Chancellor and
Fhrer has repeat-
[31]
edly seized opportunities of declaring that no problems
exist between France and Germany which could form a
fundamental obstacle to friendly and neighbourly relations.
After the meeting at Munich, both parties found they had the
wish to give concrete expression to this attitude. During
the last few weeks, the possibilities of a Franco-German
agreement on the lines of the Anglo-German declaration of
Munich have appeared in a very favourable light. This is the
reason why the French and German Governments are both
considering a declaration that would be prepared jointly
concerning the friendly relations between the two States,
and it is to be expected that Herr von Ribbentrop, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, will visit Paris very soon
in order to settle the agreement with M. Bonnet
COULONDRE.
No. 25
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
Paris,
November 25, 1938.
ON November 22 I saw Count von Welczeck, who informed
me that his Government accepts the draft which was
communicated to you before your departure from Paris, the
final text of which will be sent to you without delay.
The German Ambassador added that Herr von Ribbentrop is
ready to come to Paris for the exchange of signatures, which
could take place between November 28 and December 3. Perhaps
we shall have to postpone the date by two or three days; I
shall inform you as soon as it is fixed.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 26
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
M. DE SAINT-QUENTIN. French Ambassador in Washington.
Paris,
November 27, 1938.
IN my communication or October 3, [1] I called your
attention to the possibilities of an international d‚tente
contained in the Munich Agreement; it would have been
inconsistent not to attempt to translate such possibilities
into actual facts in so far as this action was
[1] See Document 15.
[32]
compatible with the execution of the policy of national
defence undertaken in France as well as in England.
The communiqu‚ which was published after an interview
between Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Herr Hitler on October 1
on the day immediately following the signature of the Munich
Agreement, showed that both parties were at one in their
desire for appeasement.
The Chancellor of the Reich, when he received M.
Fran‡ois-Poncet for a farewell audience on October 19,
declared himself ready to seek means to improve Franco-
German relations and to further the elements tending to a
rapprochement which are contained in the agreement of
September 29. At the same time, he made various suggestions
to this effect; the French Government, after examining them
carefully, informed Berlin as early as October 21 that they
were prepared to exchange views on this subject with the
authorities of the Reich without delay.
The two Governments soon arrived at an agreement on the
text of a declaration to be signed by the respective
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which would stress the
following main points:
(1) That pacific relations and a neighbourly attitude
between the two countries constitute an essential condition
for the preservation of peace; that efforts should be made
on both sides to develop their relations in this direction;
(2) That no problem of a territorial nature remains in
suspense between France and Germany, the existing frontier
being solemnly recognized as permanent;
(3) That the two Governments are determined, while
reserving their special relations with third Powers, to
remain in contact on all questions of importance to both
countries and to enter into consultation in case
developments arising out of these questions should threaten
to lead to international difficulties.
This document is to be signed in Paris, at a date which
is to be fixed shortly, and will then be published
immediately.
I do not consider it necessary to emphasize the
importance of this declaration: it will not escape your
notice that not only does it demonstrate the desire for
appeasement and reconciliation common to both Governments,
but also recognizes by means of a diplomatic instrument the
German intention, already expressed unilaterally by the
Chancellor in some of his speeches, of regarding the mere
possibility of territorial disputes between the two
countries as excluded, and of
[33]
recognizing the existing frontier between France and Germany
as permanent.
The procedure of mutual consultation foreseen in case
of international difficulties can, moreover, provide a
valuable means of avoiding, in future, certain sudden
initiatives likely to endanger the preservation of peace.
Finally, the text that has been adopted leaves us our
entire freedom of action regarding third parties to whom we
are bound.
Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, during the
conversations which took place in Paris yesterday, have
clearly expressed their satisfaction with a declaration,
which, in their opinion, is, like the Anglo-German
declaration, an immediate contribution to the task of
international appeasement.
You should be guided by the above considerations during
your conversations on the subject with the Secretary of
State, asking him also to treat them as confidential until
the document has been published.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 27
Note by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Paris,
November 28, 1938.
I RECEIVED M. Souritz on Tuesday, November 22. I
explained to him the main points of the plan for a Franco-
German declaration, emphasizing that this declaration made a
reservation about the special relations of the contracting
Powers with third Powers, and consequently about the Franco-
Russian pact.
M. Souritz took note of the information which I had
conveyed to him. He has informed his Government. He made no
special comment.
On the evening of the following day, M. Souritz
telephoned to ask me for the text of the agreement. I
answered that, as I had not yet communicated it to anyone,
it would be impossible for me to give it to him in its
entirety. Nevertheless, I informed him of the essential
points of the document over the telephone.
M. Souritz come to see me again on Saturday the 26th.
On that occasion I asked him whether he had any comment to
make with regard to the agreement.
He replied that he had received no communication from
his Gov-
[34]
ernment, and that, moreover, the agreement in its present
form could not be modified.
I drew his attention to the fact that before putting
the agreement before the Council of Ministers, I had
informed him of its main contents. M. Souritz made no
further comment.
No. 28
Franco-German Declaration
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
French Republic
and M. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the
German Reich,
ACTING in the name and by order of their respective
Governments, have agreed on the following points at their
meeting in Paris on December 6, 1938:
(1) The French Government and the German Government
fully share the conviction that pacific and neighbourly
relations between France and Germany constitute one of the
essential elements of the consolidation of the situation in
Europe and of the preservation of general peace.
Consequently both Governments will endeavour with all their
might to assure the development of the relations between
their countries in this direction.
(2) Both Governments agree that no question of a
territorial nature remains in suspense between their
countries and solemnly recognize as permanent the frontier
between their countries as it is actually drawn.
(3) Both Governments are resolved, without prejudice to
their special relations with third Powers, to remain in
contact on all questions of importance to both their
countries and to have recourse to mutual consultation in
case any complications arising out of these questions should
threaten to lead to international difficulties.
In witness whereof the Representatives of the two
Government have signed the present Declaration, which comes
into force immediately.
Executed in duplicate in the French and German
languages at Paris, on December 6, 1938.
Signed: GEORGES
BONNET,
JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP.
[35]
No. 29
Communiqu‚ published at the conclusion of the Franco-
German conversations
Paris,
December 6, 1938.
THE visit of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Reich to Paris on December 6, has provided the opportunity
for a Franco-German exchange of views over a wide range of
questions. In the course of the conversations that have
taken place, the principal European problems have been
examined, most especially those which have a direct bearing
on the political and economic relations between France and
Germany. It has been recognized on both sides that the
development of the relations between the two countries on
the basis of the unequivocal recognition of their frontiers
would not only serve their mutual interests, but also
constitute an essential contribution towards the maintenance
of peace.
In this spirit the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
both countries have signed a declaration which, while
reserving the special relations of both Governments with
third Powers, expresses their determination to cooperate in
a peaceful spirit on a basis of mutual respect, and thus
marks an important step on the way to general appeasement.
Declaration of M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for
Foreign Affairs
I WISH first of all to greet H. E. the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the German Reich, whom we are happy to
welcome and whose presence here emphasizes the importance of
the documents we have just signed.
The efforts of the present French Government,
continuing those of all its predecessors, have been directed
with unswerving sincerity towards the maintenance and the
organization of peace.
The furtherance of good neighbourly relations between
France and Germany, as well as the expression of their
mutual desire to develop peaceable relations, constitute an
essential element in this enterprise.
For this reason I feel gratified at the signing of this
Franco-German declaration, which, by solemnly recognizing
the existing frontiers, puts an end to a long historical
contest and opens the way to a collaboration which is made
easier by the conviction that no difference which might
endanger the peaceful basis of their relations now exists
between the two countries.
[36]
This conviction is further reinforced by the mutual
appreciation of the value of the intellectual exchanges
which have always existed between the two nations, and by
the esteem rightly felt for each other by two peoples which,
after fighting heroically during the Great War, now desire
to work in an atmosphere of understanding and peace.
Furthermore, I have no doubt that this joint
declaration will bring to the cause of general appeasement a
contribution the value of which will be confirmed in the
future; it marks a particularly important stage in the task
of reconciliation and cooperation in which France ardently
desires to see all nations participate.
Declaration of Herr von Ribbentrop, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich
WITH to-day's declarations, France and Germany, taking
into consideration the solid foundation constituted by the
friendship uniting them to other States, have agreed to put
an end to the age-long conflicts concerning their frontier,
and, by mutually recognizing their territories, hope to
facilitate the course of reciprocal understanding, and of
consideration for the vital national interest of both
countries.
As partners with equal rights, two great nations
declare themselves prepared, after serious differences in
the past, to establish good neighbourly relations in the
future. With this declaration of good will, they express the
conviction that no opposition of a vital nature exists
between them, which could justify a serious conflict. The
economic interests of the two countries complement each
other. German art and the spiritual life of Germany owe
valuable inspirations to France, just as Germany, on her
side, has often enriched French art.
The mutual esteem which arose from the courage shown by
the French and the German peoples during the World War can
find its natural complement in peace, and still increase,
thanks to the courageous effort of each nation in its daily
work.
I am therefore convinced that the Franco-German
declaration of today will help to remove historical
prejudices and that the d‚tente in our neighbourly relations
which finds expression in this declaration will meet with
unanimous approval not only from the leaders, but also from
the peoples of our States.
The feelings of the German people towards a new
orientation the relations between the two States were
manifested by the warm welcome given at Munich to the French
Prime Minister, M. Edouard
[37]
Daladier. The marks of sympathy which I have received during
the few hours of my stay in Paris prove how these feelings
are also shared by the French population.
I hope and trust that the declaration of to-day will
initiate a new era in the relations between our two peoples.
No. 30
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London.
Paris,
December 11, 1938.
I HAVE fully informed Sir Eric Phipps of the substance
of my conversations with the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs. Nevertheless I should be glad if you would call the
particular attention of the Secretary of State to the fact
that, in my conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, I made a
point of taking the initiative to state in the clearest
manner the character and scope of Franco-British solidarity
and its fundamental importance for the orientation of French
policy.
During my conversations with the German Minister, I
left him in no doubt of the impossibility of Germany being
able at any time to speculate on any dissociation of France
and Great Britain.
On the other hand, when examining with Herr von
Ribbentrop the means of translating into fact an easing of
Franco-German relations, I indicated very clearly that I
could not conceive such an effort except in the framework of
a general adjustment of European relations; any attempt at
developing Franco-German relations appeared to me futile
without a corresponding effort to improve the relations
between the Reich and Great Britain. Pointing out the
bitterness of the polemics against England in the German
Press, I remarked that they could only harm our efforts.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 31
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London,
December 12, 1938.
IN answer to a question put by Mr. Arthur Henderson,
the Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons this
afternoon:
"His Majesty's Government welcome the conclusion of the
Franco-
[38]
German agreement with great satisfaction, and the French
Government was so informed when it communicated, on November
24, the terms of the declaration to His Majesty's
Government."
A member of the Labour Party then asked Mr. Chamberlain
whether the Franco-German declaration, in its bearing on the
frontiers of France and the Reich, would in any way affect
the obligations of Great Britain under the Treaty of
Locarno. Mr. Chamberlain answered in the negative.
CORBIN.
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
French
Ambassadors in London, Berlin, Brussels, Rome and
Barcelona, and to
the French Minister in Prague.
Paris,
December 14, 1938.
HERR VON RIBBENTROP'S visit to Paris was undertaken for
the express and sufficient object of signing the Franco-
German declaration. Nevertheless, it has provided an
opportunity for a wide exchange of views between the Foreign
Ministers of the two countries. Although these conversations
on the whole retained a very general character, they have
made it possible to obtain definite information on the
German attitude regarding some particularly important
international questions.
The anti-French incidents that have recently occurred
in Italy naturally gave rise to the question of Franco-
Italian and German-Italian relations, and I expressed the
wish to see every element incompatible with the pursuance of
a policy of Franco-German appeasement disappear from the
relations between Paris, Berlin and Rome. Referring to the
solidarity between Germany and Italy, similar, he said, to
that uniting France and Great Britain, Herr von Ribbentrop
was at pains to assure me that nothing in the existence of
these two groups appeared to him to prejudice any attempt to
bring into harmony the relations between the four Powers,
which might eventually extend to an arrangement for
cooperation between the two Axes. By indicating that the
struggle against Bolshevism is the basis of the common
political views of the German and Italian Governments, but
without saying so openly, Herr von Ribbentrop wished to
convey to us the impression that no other aim could be
attributed to it. The recent demonstration in the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, which in his opinion involved no
government responsibility, appears to have made no
particular impression on
[39]
the German Minister, who affects in the circumstances to
consider the Mediterranean questions involved as outside the
scope of German interests; in any case he persists in
declaring himself convinced that the improvement of Franco-
German relations is of a nature to exert a favourable
influence on future Franco-Italian relations.
Concerning Spain, he gave us to understand that there
again the action of Germany had from the beginning been
inspired solely by the struggle against Bolshevism. The
German Minister continues to desire the victory of General
Franco, as, in his opinion, it would be a guarantee for the
re-establishment in Spain of a national order which would
favour a general resumption of commercial relations with
that country, without prejudice to the interests of France.
Moreover, he does not believe in the possibility of
mediation. He did not then dispute the propriety of the
position maintained by France as well as by Great Britain
regarding the application of the decisions of the Non-
Intervention Committee.
These considerations incidentally led the Foreign
Minister of the Reich to raise the question of French policy
toward the U.S.S.R., without however laying any particular
stress upon it and only with a view to informing himself of
the position. This policy appeared to him to be a survival
of the encirclement policy of Versailles. I had to remind
him that the Franco-Russian pact was not originally meant to
remain only bilateral, that it had been and still was
conceived as an element of collective agreement, in which
Germany and other Powers had been invited to participate,
and that it was the fault neither of France nor of the
U.S.S.R., if it had actually developed into an apparently
purely Franco-Soviet affair.
With regard to Great Britain, I stressed to Herr von
Ribbentrop the part that the improvement of Anglo-German
relations must play in any development in the policy of
European appeasement, which was considered to be the
essential object of any Franco-German action. The Minister
was at pains to throw all the blame for the present state of
affairs on the British Government. He said that the British
Government and especially the British Press, which in the
days following the Munich Agreement had appeared to show a
certain degree of understanding, had now adopted an attitude
that was most disappointing for Berlin; the emphasis placed
in London on the urgency of rearmament, the repeated
demonstrations in Parliament, under the influence of Mr.
Duff Cooper, Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr.
Morrison, and the articles in the newspapers, had been
strongly resented
[40]
in Germany, where he said it would have been impossible to
restrain the action of the Press. I again stressed the
fundamental and solid character of Franco-British
solidarity, and gave him very clearly to understand that a
genuine easing of Franco-German relations could not be
conceived as enduring without a corresponding improvement
between Great Britain and Germany.
With regard to Czechoslovakia, an exchange of
observations was necessary in order to leave no doubt as to
the implications of the international agreement of Munich,
if executed both in the letter and the spirit. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs is to re-examine, as soon as he returns
to Berlin, the question of the setting up of the
international guarantee, the principle of which was asserted
by Germany in protocol No. 1.
Such are the principal political questions mentioned,
in very general terms, in the course of the Franco-German
conversations of December 6, which never assumed the formal
character of a conference. Although they were not embodied
in detailed heads of agreement or in any official record,
they shed light on certain important points. These
explanatory talks were essential at the moment when the
Franco-German declaration was signed, which not only aims at
promoting peaceful cooperation between the two countries but
should also be conducive to a general appeasement in the
relations of the principal European Powers.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 33
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
December 15, 1938.
THE recent conversations between Your Excellency and
the Foreign Minister of the Reich must have enabled you to
ascertain the dispositions of the German Government as
regards the chief political problems of the moment. It is,
however, not unimportant perhaps that I should communicate
to you, if only for purposes of comparison, the impressions
I have received from my first contacts with German circles.
(1) The establishment of good relations with France
meets, at the present moment, the general desire of the
German people. All the leading personalities I have
approached have, without exception,
[41]
expressed their views on this subject in the most emphatic
manner and without the slightest reserve; they have all
assured me that Germany desired an understanding with France
on the basis of the territorial status quo, and wished to
make an end of the age-long quarrel between the two
countries.
This sentiment, the sincerity of which cannot be
questioned, also found expression in the satisfaction with
which the signing of the Franco-German declaration of
December 6 was received.
This feeling is explained by reasons which, no doubt,
may vary according to the different circles in which it can
be observed.
The German people, which taken as a whole is peacefully
minded, sees in the better understanding of the two
countries a guarantee of peace. Those who are disturbed by
the excesses of National-Socialist "dynamism" and by the
political and economic tension brought about by the regime,
are hoping for some relaxation in the internal and external
situation, which might help Germany to return gradually to
more normal conditions of life. As to the Party, it is
evident that they wanted an agreement with France
essentially because of the security it offers in the West,
if enterprises in other directions are contemplated.
(2) The will for expansion in the East, as a matter of
fact, seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third
Reich, as its disposition to put aside-at least for the
present-any idea of conquest in the West; the one is a
corollary of the other. The first half of Herr Hitler's
programme-the integration of the Deutschtum into the Reich-
has been carried out more or less completely; now the hour
of the "Lebensraum" has come. The insistence with which it
has been explained to me that Germany has no claims in the
direction of France would have been enough to enlighten me.
But I received even more explicit information; all those
with whom I held conversations, with the exception of Herr
Hitler, spoke to me, in different ways, and always with
intentional vagueness, of the necessity for German expansion
in Eastern Europe, Herr von Ribbentrop spoke of "the
creation of zones of influence in the East and South-East";
Field-Marshal Goering, of "an essentially economic
penetration in the South-East."
I have not personally received very definite
confidential information on this subject; but it appears
that little by little one can see the outlines of a great
German enterprise emerge from what is still nebulous. To
secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing
Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then
to create a Greater Ukraine under German control-this is
what essentially
[42]
appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi
leaders, and doubtless by Herr Hitler himself.
Unfortunately the vassalage of Czechoslovakia is almost
complete by this time. "My country is now nothing more than
a province," my Czech colleague said only yesterday. The
German Secret Service is said to be already only working
there with Poland in mind and certain German circles are
reported to have gone so far as to declare that from now on
the Czech army will be called on to play the same part as
the Bavarian army under the Second Reich. The construction
of the motor road between Breslau and Vienna and of the
canal between the Oder and the Danube will be entrusted
exclusively to Czech labour. From two equally trustworthy
sources I have learnt that in the near future a German-Czech
currency agreement will be concluded and will soon be
followed by an economic and monetary union.
In Hungary, where resistance will evidently be more
determined, they will first endeavour to establish a sort of
economic vassalage, and to ensure for the German Army the
right of transit, which has become indispensable for action
in the east, since Hungarian territory cuts across the
Slovak railway.
With regard to the Ukraine, it has been talked about by
the whole staff of the National-Socialist Party for the past
ten days. Dr. Rosenberg's Centre of Studies, Dr. Goebbels's
Services and the "Ost-Europa" organization under the former
Minister, Herr Curtius, as well as the Intelligence Service
of the German Army, are working on the question. It looks as
if the ways and means had not yet been decided upon, but the
aim appears to be well defined: to create a Greater Ukraine
which would become Germany's granary. In order to achieve
this Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet
Russia dispossessed; German dynamism is not to be stopped by
any of these obstacles, and in military circles, they
already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku.
It is unlikely that Herr Hitler will attempt to achieve
his plans concerning the Ukraine by direct military action.
It would be contrary to the principles he has professed at
different times, and according to which the regime wants
neither an ideological war nor the annexation of
heterogeneous populations. It seems, moreover, that he has
not yet decided on the means of action. Among those who
approach him, a political operation is thought of which
would repeat, on a larger scale, that of the Sudeten:
propaganda in Poland, in Rumania and in Soviet
[43]
Russia in favour of Ukrainian independence; support
eventually given by diplomatic pressure and by the action of
armed bands; Ruthenia would be the focus of the movement.
Thus by a curious turn of Fate, Czechoslovakia, which had
been established as a bulwark to stem the German drive, now
serves the Reich as a battering-ram to demolish the gates to
the East.
(3) Nobody in Germany has mentioned the Colonies to me.
For the moment at least, only certain specialized circles
are occupied with that question. When Herr von Ribbentrop
alluded to the demonstrations in France following the German
claims it was only to declare that the question might be
discussed in five or six years' time. He expressed himself
in precisely similar terms when speaking to one of my
colleagues, which points to the existence of instructions on
the subject. The Fhrer gave the Belgian Ambassador the
definite impression that he was not interested in the
question, and that he only raised it from time to time to
prevent the "rights of ownership" of Germany from falling
into abeyance. The Nazi leaders use the method of Descartes,
taking up each question in turn; above all, their appetites,
whetted both by their needs and by their ambitions, drive
them towards the East, towards the "glorious adventure" and
the great achievement of the regime, which they are eager to
undertake.
(4) It would appear that the difficulties of the
economic situation contribute largely to this haste. The
shortage of foreign currency following on the enormous
expenses for armament entails ever increasing restrictions,
particularly of food stuffs. The population is badly
nourished, and sometimes probably even underfed.
Unemployment has disappeared, in fact there is actually a
shortage of labour, as the manufacture of substitutes
requires much more labour than the preparation of natural
products, but the working men, who are forced to work ten
hours a day, are showing signs of weariness, and I have
heard of recent cases of ca' canny strikes that were fairly
serious. Competent authorities which do not belong to the
Party hold that the financial and economic capacity of the
country is strained to the limit. But most of the leaders
refuse to admit this. In order to sustain and reinforce this
preparatory war economy, there is need of a granary, of
mines, and of labour; the Ukraine is at the door of the
Reich.
(5) The situation within the Party itself appears
fairly tense. Well-informed people think that they can
detect the usual premonitory signs of internal convulsions
in the Third Reich, namely: unrest among the population, a
general feeling of uneasiness and anxiety, outbursts of
[44]
indignation and unexpectedly frank criticism of the regime
on the part of high functionaries, officers and Party
members, especially after the pogroms-in a word, the
atmosphere of a thunderstorm. It is said that the tension
between the Fhrer's principal lieutenants has increased:
Herr Himmler, for instance, is supposed to have made vain
efforts to bring about a reconciliation between Field-
Marshal Goering and Herr von Ribbentrop.
I have not been in Berlin long enough to be able to
reach personal conclusions on this last point. It certainly
does not seem to me that the personal prestige of the Fhrer
has suffered. He is above the clouds that pass over public
opinion, as he is above the quarrels that divide his
entourage. But it is quite possible that, among other
advantages, he will see in a Ukrainian adventure an
opportunity to divert the attention of his people from the
internal difficulties now increasing in a dangerous manner.
COULONDRE.
No. 34
M. RISTELHUEBER, French Minister in Sofia,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Sofa,
December 16, 1938.
IN the course of a recent conversation that I had with
the Prime Minister, the latter mentioned the great
satisfaction he felt in consequence of the recent Franco-
German declaration. He said that it had not come as a
surprise to him. When Baron von Neurath passed through Sofia
nearly two years ago, he stressed the very ardent desire of
his Government to arrive at an understanding with France, as
there were no questions at issue to divide the two
countries. He had even confessed himself pained at the lack
of enthusiasm with which Paris had responded to these
advances.
As for Germany, while her desire for expansion
eastwards was obvious, it was perhaps a mistake to imagine
that her first objective would be South-Eastern Europe. It
appeared to him that Poland was most menaced. The Polish-
Soviet rapprochement constituted a defence against this
danger. But the two Slav peoples hated each other so
profoundly that their understanding could only be ephemeral
and artificial. On the contrary, M. Kioss‚ivanov did not
consider as impossible an understanding between the U.S.S.R.
and the Reich, especially if the Comintern agreed to tone
down its propaganda. Such had always been
[45]
the dream of a section of the German General Staff. In that
event a fourth partition of Poland would allow Germany to
proceed with her forceful drive eastwards.
RISTELHUBER.
No. 35
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin.
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
December 22, 1938.
THE visit I paid yesterday morning to Herr von
Weizs„cker on his return from leave afforded me the
opportunity to discuss with the State Secretary various
political matters of a general character.
Baron von Weizs„cker is an extremely courteous, but
also, as it seemed to me, a very cautious man, proceeding
with the utmost care whenever he ventures off the beaten
track.
Stressing the importance of Anglo-German relations for
the promotion of a European d‚tente, as well as for the
building up of Franco-German cooperation, I asked the State
Secretary how he explained the tension now prevailing
between England and Germany. Was it merely a matter of the
Press, as Dr. Goebbels had told me ?
"Dr. Goebbels," he answered, "is thinking in
professional terms when he gives this explanation. As a
matter of fact, it is largely true. There is, in my opinion,
no serious cause of misunderstanding between the two
countries. It is a question of method rather than of
fundamental differences."
With regard to the international guarantee envisaged in
favour of Czechoslovakia, Baron von Weizs„cker was reticent.
When I reminded him that in Paris Herr von Ribbentrop had
expressed his intention of re-examining the question, and
asked whether there were any new developments, he answered
in the negative. "Could not this matter," he asked with a
smile, "be forgotten? Since Germany's predominance in that
area is a fact, would not the guarantee of the Reich be
sufficient?" I did not fail to remark that obligations
entered into cannot be forgotten, and placed the matter in
its true light. But I received the impression that my
interlocutor had already made up his mind.
"Besides," he concluded, "it would be for
Czechoslovakia to claim that guarantee. In any case we are
in no hurry to settle this question, and M. Chvalkovsky is
not coming to Berlin until after the holidays."
[46]
Actually, the visit of the Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister has already been postponed twice.
As my conversation with the State Secretary was no more
than an exchange of personal views in the course of a
courtesy visit I think that it would not be suitable to take
official cognizance of it. Nevertheless, I thought it my
duty to report his pronouncement on the last question to
Your Excellency, as it seems to me to confirm the misgivings
felt in Prague concerning the conditions that the Reich
might intend to attach to the granting of its guarantee.
COULONDRE.
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