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DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND
GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.
No. 1.
TEXT OF GERMAN-POLISH AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 26, 1934.
(Translation.)
The German Government and the Polish Government
consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in
the political relations between Germany and Poland by a
direct understanding between State and State. They have,
therefore, decided to lay down the principles for the future
development of these relations in the present declaration.
The two Governments base their action on the fact that
the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between
their countries is an essential pre-condition for the
general peace of Europe.
They have therefore decided to base their mutual
relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris
of the 17th August, 1928, and propose to define more exactly
the application of these principles in so far as the
relations between Germany and Poland are concerned.
Each of the two Governments, therefore, lays it down
that the international obligations undertaken by it towards
a third party do not hinder the peaceful development of
their mutual relations, do not conflict with the present
declaration, and are not affected by this declaration. They
establish, moreover, that this declaration does not extend
to those questions which under international law are to be
regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one of the
two States.
1
2 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Both Governments announce their intention to settle
directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their
mutual relations.
Should any disputes arise between them and agreement
thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in
each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek
a solution by other peaceful means, without prejudice to the
possibility of applying, if necessary, those methods of
procedure in which provision is made for such cases in other
agreements in force between them. In no circumstances,
however, will they proceed to the application of force for
the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.
The guarantee of peace created by these principles will
facilitate the great task of both Governments of finding a
solution for problems of political, economic and social
kinds, based on a just and fair adjustment of the interests
of both parties.
Both Governments are convinced that the relations
between their countries will in this manner develop
fruitfully, and will lead to the establishment of a
neighbourly relationship which will contribute to the well-
being not only of both their countries, but of the other
peoples of Europe as well.
The present declaration shall be ratified, and the
instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw as
soon as possible.
The declaration is valid for a period of ten years,
reckoned from the day of the exchange of the instruments of
ratification.
If the declaration is not denounced by one of the two
Governments six months before the expiration of this period,
it will continue in force, but can then be denounced by
either Government at any time on notice of six months being
given. Made in duplicate in the German and Polish languages.
Berlin, January 26, 1934.
For the German Government:
FREIHERR VON NEURATH.
For the Polish Government
JOSEF LIPSKI.
HITLER ON GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS 3
STATEMENTS MADE BY HERR HITLER SINCE THE GERMAN-POLISH
AGREEMENT RECORDING HIS SATISFACTION AT THE IMPROVEMENT
IN GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS.
No. 2.
Reichstag Speech, May 21, 1935.
(Translation.)
"WE recognize, with the understanding and the heartfelt
friendship of true Nationalists, the Polish State as the
home of a great, nationally-conscious people."
"The German Reich and, in particular, the present
German Government, have no other wish than to live on
friendly and peaceable terms with all neighbouring States."
No. 3.
Reichstag Speech, March 7, 1936.
(Translation.)
"I would like the German people to learn to see in
other nations historical realities which a visionary may
well like to wish away, but which cannot be wished away. I
should like them to realise that it is unreasonable to try
and bring these historical realities into opposition with
the demands of their vital interests and to their
understandable claims to live. I would therefore like the
German people to understand the inner motives of National
Socialist foreign policy, which finds it painful that the
outlet to the sea of a people of 35 millions is situated on
territory formerly belonging to the Reich, but which
recognises that it is unreasonable and impossible to deny a
State of such a size as this any outlet to the sea at all
.... It is possible that politicians, particularly by
invoking might, may carry out such violations of national
interests; but the more frequently this happens, the greater
becomes the pressure for an outlet of the excited and
constrained powers and energies."
4 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 4.
Reichstag Speech, January 30, 1937.
(Translation.)
"By a series of agreements we have removed existing
tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an
improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall our
agreement with Poland, which has worked out to the advantage
of both sides .... And to my own fellow-citizens I would say
that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become
a reality .... The peoples of these States (i.e., Italy,
Poland and the Balkan States) desire to live and they will
live."
No. 5.
Reichstag Speech, February 20, 1938.
(Translation.)
"It fills us, in the fifth year following the first
great foreign political agreement of the Reich, with sincere
gratification to be able to establish that in our
relationship to the State with which we had perhaps the
greatest differences, not only has there been a d‚tente, but
that in the course of these years a constant improvement in
relations has taken place. I know perfectly well that this
was above all attributable to the circumstance that at the
time there was no Western parliamentarism in Warsaw, but a
Polish field-marshal, who as an eminent personality felt the
significance, so important to Europe, of such a Germano-
Polish d‚tente. This good work, which had been doubted by so
many at the time, has meanwhile stood the test, and I may
say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its
perpetual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed in the
new commissioner a man of great personal attainments, this
most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace
has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State
respects the national conditions in this State, and both the
city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the
way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved,
an understanding which, starting from Danzig, has to-day suc-
HITLER ON GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS 5
ceeded in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers
in finally taking the poison out of the relations between
Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere,
friendly co-operation."
No. 6.
Speech at Nuremberg, September 14, 1938.
(Translation.)
"In Poland a great patriot and a great statesman was
ready to make an accord with Germany; we immediately
proceeded to action and completed an agreement which was of
greater importance to the peace of Europe than all the
chattering in the temple of the League of Nations at
Geneva."
No. 7.
Speech in the Sportpalast, September 26, 1938.
(Translation.)
"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted
was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger
that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary
enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I
should not have been successful if Poland had had a
democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge
in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war
agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy, but a man;
and with him I succeeded, in precisely twelve months, in
coming to an agreement which, for ten years in the first
instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are
all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realise that here are two peoples which
must live together and neither of which can do away with the
other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an
outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be
found; it has been found; and it will be ever further
extended. Certainly things were hard in this area. The
nationalities and small national groups frequently
quarrelled among themselves.
6 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all
reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples
and in the two countries, possess the firm will and
determination to I improve their relations. It was a real
work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the
League of Nations Palace at Geneva."
No. 8.
Reichstag Speech, January 30, 1939.
(Translation.)
"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the
conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can
scarcely be any difference of opinion to-day among the true
friends of peace with regard to the value of this agreement.
One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to
Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not
been entered into five years ago. In signing it, this great
Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great
a service as the leaders of the National Socialist State
rendered the German people. During the troubled months of
the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland was
one of the reassuring factors in the political life of
Europe."
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION RESULTING FROM GERMAN
ACTION AGAINST CZECHO-SLOVAKIA ON MARCH 15, 1939.
No. 9.
Speech by the Prime Minister at Birmingham on March 17,
1939.
I HAD intended to-night to talk to you upon a variety
of subjects, upon trade and employment, upon social service,
and upon finance. But the tremendous events which have been
taking place this week in Europe have thrown everything else
into
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 7
the background, and I feel that what you, and those who are
not in this hall but are listening to me, will want to hear
is some indication of the views of His Majesty's Government
as to the nature and the implications of those events.
One thing is certain. Public opinion in the world has
received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered
to it, even by the present regime in Germany. What may be
the ultimate effects of this profound disturbance on men's
minds cannot yet be foretold, but I am sure that it must be
far-reaching in its results upon the future. Last Wednesday
we had a debate upon it in the House of Commons. That was
the day on which the German troops entered Czecho-Slovakia,
and all of us, but particularly the Government, were at a
disadvantage because the information that we had was only
partial; much of it was unofficial. We had no time to digest
it, much less to form a considered opinion upon it. And so
it necessarily followed that I, speaking on behalf of the
Government, with all the responsibility that attaches to
that position, was obliged to confine myself to a very
restrained and cautious exposition, on what at the time I
felt I could make but little commentary. And, perhaps
naturally, that somewhat cool and objective statement gave
rise to a misapprehension, and some people thought that
because I spoke quietly, because I gave little expression to
feeling, therefore my colleagues and I did not feel strongly
on the subject. I hope to correct that mistake to-night.
But I want to say something first about an argument
which has developed out of these events and which was used
in that debate, and has appeared since in various organs of
the press. It has been suggested that this occupation of
Czecho-Slovakia was the direct consequence of the visit
which I paid to Germany last autumn, and that, since the
result of these events has been to tear up the settlement
that was arrived at at Munich, that proves that the whole
circumstances of those visits were wrong. It is said that,
as this was the personal policy of the Prime Minister, the
blame for the fate of Czecho-Slovakia must rest upon his
shoulders. That is an entirely unwarrantable conclusion The
facts as they are to-day cannot change the facts as they
were last September. If I was right then, I am still right
now. Then there are some people who say: "We considered
8 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
you were wrong in September, and now we have been proved to
be right."
Let me examine that. When I decided to go to Germany I
never expected that I was going to escape criticism.
Indeed,; I did not go there to get popularity. I went there
first and foremost because, in what appeared to be an almost
desperate situation, that seemed to me to offer the only
chance of averting a European war. And I might remind you
that, when it was first announced that I was going, not a
voice was raised in criticism. Everyone applauded that
effort. It was only later, when it appeared that the results
of the final settlement fell short of the expectations of
some who did not fully appreciate the facts-it was only then
that the attack began, and even then it was not the visit,
it was the terms of settlement that were disapproved.
Well, I have never denied that the terms which I was
able to secure at Munich were not those that I myself would
have desired. But, as I explained then, I had to deal with
no new problem. This was something that had existed ever
since the Treaty of Versailles-a problem that ought to have
been solved long ago if only the statesmen of the last
twenty years had taken broader and more enlightened views of
their duty. It had become like a disease which had been long
neglected, and a surgical operation was necessary to save
the life of the patient.
After all, the first and the most immediate object of
my visit was achieved. The peace of Europe was saved; and,
if it had not been for those visits, hundreds of thousands
of families would to-day have been in mourning for the
flower of Europe's best manhood. I would like once again to
express my grateful thanks to all those correspondents who
have written me from all over the world to express their
gratitude and their appreciation of what I did then and of
what I have been trying to do since.
Really I have no need to defend my visits to Germany
last autumn, for what was the alternative? Nothing that we
could have done, nothing that France could have done, or
Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czecho-
Slovakia from invasion and destruction. Even if we had
subsequently gone to war to punish Germany for her actions,
and if after the frightful losses which would have been
inflicted upon all
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 9
partakers in the war we had been victorious in the end,
never could we have reconstructed Czecho-Slovakia as she was
framed by the Treaty of Versailles.
But I had another purpose, too, in going to Munich.
That was to further the policy which I have been pursuing
ever since I have been in my present position-a policy which
is sometimes called European appeasement, although I do not
think myself that that is a very happy term or one which
accurately describes its purpose. If that policy were to
succeed, it was essential that no Power should seek to
obtain a general domination of Europe; but that each one
should be contented to obtain reasonable facilities for
developing its own resources, securing its own share of
international trade, and improving the conditions of its own
people. I felt that, although that might well mean a clash
of interests between different States, nevertheless, by the
exercise of mutual goodwill and understanding of what were
the limits of the desires of others, it should be possible
to resolve all differences by discussion and without armed
conflict. I hoped in going to Munich to find out by personal
contact what was in Herr Hitler's mind, and whether it was
likely that he would be willing to co-operate in a programme
of that kind. Well, the atmosphere in which our discussions
were conducted was not a very favourable one, because we
were in the middle of an acute crisis; but, nevertheless, in
the intervals between more official conversations I had some
opportunities of talking with him and of hearing his views,
and I thought that results were not altogether
unsatisfactory.
When I came back after my second visit I told the House
of Commons of a conversation I had had with Herr Hitler, of
which I said that, speaking with great earnestness, he
repeated what he had already said at Berchtesgaden-namely,
that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in
Europe, and that he had no wish to include in the Reich
people of other races than German. Herr Hitler himself
confirmed this account of the conversation in the speech
which he made at the Sportpalast in Berlin, when he said:
"This is the last territorial claim which I have to make in
Europe." And a little later in the same speech he said: "I
have assured Mr. Chamberlain, and I emphasise it now, that
when this problem is solved Germany has no more
10 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
territorial problems in Europe." And he added: "I shall not
be interested in the Czech State any more, and I can
guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs any more."
And then in the Munich Agreement itself, which bears
Herr Hitler's signature, there is this clause: "The final
determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the
international commission"-the final determination. And,
lastly, in that declaration which he and I signed together
at Munich, we declared that any other question which might
concern our two countries should be dealt with by the method
of consultation.
Well, in view of those repeated assurances, given
voluntarily to me, I considered myself justified in founding
a hope upon them that once this Czecho-Slovakian question
was settled, as it seemed at Munich it would be, it would be
possible to carry farther that policy of appeasement which I
have described. But, notwithstanding, at the same time I was
not prepared to relax precautions until I was satisfied that
the policy had been established and had been accepted by
others, and therefore, after Munich, our defence programme
was actually accelerated, and it was expanded so as to
remedy certain weaknesses which had become apparent during
the crisis. I am convinced that after Munich the great
majority of British people shared my hope, and ardently
desired that that policy should be carried further. But to-
day I share their disappointment, their indignation, that
those hopes have been so wantonly shattered.
How can these events this week be reconciled with those
assurances which I have read out to you? Surely, as a joint
signatory of the Munich Agreement, I was entitled, if Herr
Hitler thought it ought to be undone, to that consultation
which is provided for in the Munich declaration. Instead of
that he has taken the law into his own hands. Before even
the Czech President was received, and confronted with
demands which he had no power to resist, the German troops
were on the move, and within a few hours they were in the
Czech capital.
According to the proclamation which was read out in
Prague yesterday, Bohemia and Moravia have been annexed to
the German Reich. Non-German inhabitants, who, of course,
include the Czechs, are placed under the German Protector in
the German Protectorate. They are to be subject to the
political,
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 11
military and economic needs of the Reich. They are called
self-governing States, but the Reich is to take charge of
their foreign policy, their customs and their excise, their
bank reserves, and the equipment of the disarmed Czech
forces. Perhaps most sinister of all, we hear again of the
appearance of the Gestapo, the secret police, followed by
the usual tale of wholesale arrests of prominent
individuals, with consequences with which we are all
familiar.
Every man and woman in this country who remembers the
fate of the Jews and the political prisoners in Austria must
be filled to-day with distress and foreboding. Who can fail
to feel his heart go out in sympathy to the proud and brave
people who have so suddenly been subjected to this invasion,
whose liberties are curtailed, whose national independence
has gone? What has become of this declaration of "No further
territorial ambition"? What has become of the assurance "We
don't want Czechs in the Reich"? What regard had been paid
here to that principle of self-determination on which Herr
Hitler argued so vehemently with me at Berchtesgaden when he
was asking for the severance of Sudetenland from Czecho-
Slovakia and its inclusion in the German Reich?
Now we are told that this seizure of territory has been
necessitated by disturbances in Czecho-Slovakia. We are told
that the proclamation of this new German Protectorate
against the will of its inhabitants has been rendered
inevitable by disorders which threatened the peace and
security of her mighty neighbour. If there were disorders,
were they not fomented from without? And can anybody outside
Germany take seriously the idea that they could be a danger
to that great country, that they could provide any
justification for what has happened?
Does not the question inevitably arise in our minds, if
it is so easy to discover good reasons for ignoring
assurances so solemnly and so repeatedly given, what
reliance can be placed upon any other assurances that come
from the same source?
There is another set of questions which almost
inevitably must occur in our minds and to the minds of
others, perhaps even in Germany herself. Germany, under her
present regime, has sprung a series of unpleasant surprises
upon the world. The Rhineland, the Austrian Anschluss, the
severance of
12 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Sudetenland-all these things shocked and affronted
public opinion throughout the world. Yet, however much we
might take exception to the methods which were adopted in
each of those cases, there was something to be said, whether
on account of racial affinity or of just claims too long
resisted-there was something to be said for the necessity of
a change in the existing situation.
But the events which have taken place this week in
complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German
Government itself seem to fall into a different category,
and they must cause us all to be asking ourselves: "Is this
the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a
new?"
"Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it
to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the
direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?"
Those are grave and serious questions. I am not going
to answer them to-night. But I am sure they will require the
grave and serious consideration not only of Germany's
neighbours, but of others, perhaps even beyond the confines
of Europe. Already there are indications that the process
has begun, and it is obvious that it is likely now to be
speeded up.
We ourselves will naturally turn first to our partners
in the British Commonwealth of Nations and to France, to
whom we are so closely bound, and I have no doubt that
others, too, knowing that we are not disinterested in what
goes on in South-Eastern Europe, will wish to have our
counsel and advice.
In our own country we must all review the position with
that sense of responsibility which its gravity demands.
Nothing must be excluded from that review which bears upon
the national safety. Every aspect of our national life must
be looked at again from that angle. The Government, as
always, must bear the main responsibility, but I know that
all individuals will wish to review their own position, too,
and to consider again if they have done all they can to
offer their service to the State.
I do not believe there is anyone who will question my
sincerity when I say there is hardly anything I would not
sacrifice for peace. But there is one thing that I must
except, and that
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 13
is the liberty that we have enjoyed for hundreds of years,
and which we will never surrender. That I, of all men,
should feel called upon to make such a declaration-that is
the measure of the extent to which these events have
shattered the confidence which was just beginning to show
its head and which, if it had been allowed to grow, might
have made this year memorable for the return of all Europe
to sanity and stability.
It is only six weeks ago that I was speaking in this
city, and that I alluded to rumours and suspicions which I
said ought to be swept away. I pointed out that any demand
to dominate the world by force was one which the democracies
must resist, and I added that I could not believe that such
a challenge was intended, because no Government with the
interests of its own people at heart could expose them for
such a claim to the horrors of world war.
And, indeed, with the lessons of history for all to
read, it seems incredible that we should see such a
challenge. I feel bound to repeat that, while I am not
prepared to engage this country by new unspecified
commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be
foreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to
suppose that, because it believes war to be a senseless and
cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will
not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a
challenge if it ever were made. For that declaration I am
convinced that I have not merely the support, the sympathy,
the confidence of my fellow-countrymen and countrywomen, but
I shall have also the approval of the whole British Empire
and of all other nations who value peace, indeed, but who
value freedom even more.
No. 10.
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the
House of Lords on March 20, 1939.
IT is quite true, as both the noble Lord who spoke
first and the noble Marquess have said, that recent events
have been a profound shock to all thinking people in this
country and very far outside it. It may perhaps be of use if
with all brevity I
14 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
give the House a short narrative in order to make sure we
have the setting correct of what has actually passed during
the last few days. The German military occupation of Bohemia
and Moravia began on the morning of the 15th March, and was
completed, as we know, without serious incident. It is to be
observed-and the fact is surely not without significance-
that the towns of M„hrisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice were
actually occupied by German S.S. detachments on the evening
of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign
Minister of Czecho-Slovakia were still on their way to
Berlin and before any discussion had taken place. On the
16th March Herr Hitler issued the decree, to which the noble
Marquess has just referred, proclaiming that the former
Czecho-Slovak territory occupied by German troops belonged
henceforth to the German Reich and came under its protection
under the title of "The Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia."
It is not necessary to recapitulate the terms of that
decree-it has been published-but it should be noted that,
while the head of the Administration now to be set up is
said to hold the rank of Head of State, and while the
protectorate is said to be autonomous and self-
administering, a Reich protector is resident in Prague with
full powers of veto on legislation. Foreign affairs and the
protection of nationals abroad devolve on the German
Government, which will also maintain military garrisons and
establishments in the protectorate. The protectorate is,
further, in the German Customs Union, and, finally, the
German Government can issue decrees valid in the
protectorate and take any measures for the preservation of
security and order. Perhaps I might quote one short article
which seems to me to sum up the situation. It says:-
"The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
shall exercise its sovereign rights in consonance
with the political, military and economic
importance of the Reich."
As to Slovakia, the independence of Slovakia was
proclaimed on the 14th March, but at the request of Dr.
Tiso, the head of the Slovak State, Herr Hitler has
undertaken to place Slovakia under German protection and the
military occupation of the territory by German troops is now
proceeding. As regards
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 15
Ruthenia, the occupation of Ruthenia by Hungary, which began
on the 14th March, has also proceeded. By the 16th March the
Hungarian troops had reached the Polish frontier and had
virtually completed the occupation of the province.
Therefore, as a result of these several actions, the
dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia may be said now to be
complete.
Before I come to some one or two of the things that
fell from the noble Lord who moved, I would like to say
something as to the grounds on which the German Government
seek to justify the action that they have taken. The
immediate cause of the present crisis in Central Europe
originated in Slovakia, and it is claimed that the German
Government was entitled to intervene on receiving the
request for assistance from the dismissed Slovak Prime
Minister. As your Lordships are well aware, there has always
been a party in Slovakia which advocated autonomy. That
autonomy was, in fact, achieved after Munich in agreement
between the various Slovak parties and the Central
Government in Prague. The extremist elements in Slovakia,
however, were not satisfied with these arrangements, but on
all the evidence that is available to me I find it
impossible to believe that the sudden decision of certain
Slovak leaders to break off from Prague, which was followed
so closely by their appeal for protection to the German
Reich, was reached independently of outside influence.
It is said that German intervention in Czecho-Slovakia
was justified owing to the oppression of the German minority
by the Czechs. But, as a matter of fact again it was only
very shortly before Herr Hitler's ultimatum to the Czech
President that the German press began to renew its campaign
of last summer about the alleged Czech brutalities against
German citizens Actually the position of the German
minority, which is about 250,000, would appear, since the
Munich Agreement, to have been one of what might be termed
exceptional privilege. Notwithstanding the right of option
which had been accorded by article 7 of that agreement, the
members of the German minority were encouraged to remain in
Czecho-Slovakia in order that they might form useful centres
of German activity and propaganda; and advice to that effect
was given to the minority by its leader.
16 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
It was as a result of the German-Czecho-Slovak
Agreement for the mutual protection of minorities that the
German Government obtained the legal right to take a direct
interest in the treatment of their minority in Czecho-
Slovakia. That minority at once obtained the right to set up
separate organisations, and the Czecho-Slovak Government
subsequently agreed that the German National Socialist Party
in Czecho-Slovakia should be given full liberty to pursue
its activities in Bohemia and Moravia. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the bulk of the incidents which
occurred before the German invasion were deliberately
provoked and that the effects were greatly magnified. It
must be added in fairness that the Czecho-Slovak authorities
received orders to act, and did act, with great restraint in
the fact of that provocation. It is not necessary, I think,
to say much upon the assertion that the Czecho-Slovak
President really assented to the subjugation of his people.
In view of the circumstances in which he came to Berlin, and
of the occupation of Czech territory which had already taken
place, I think most sensible people must conclude that there
was little pretence of negotiation, and that it is more
probable that the Czech representatives were presented with
an ultimatum under the threat of violence, and that they
capitulated in order to save their people from the horrors
of a swift and destructive aerial bombardment.
Finally, it is said that Germany was in some danger
from Czecho-Slovakia. But surely the German Government
itself can hardly have expected that that contention could
be seriously entertained in any quarter. Indeed, if I may
sum up my own thought on these various explorations, I could
wish that, instead of the communications and explanations
which have been issued and which carry scant conviction,
German superior force had been frankly acknowledged as the
supreme arbiter that in fact it was.
In these circumstances, as you are aware, His Majesty's
Government thought fit at once to take certain action. Here
I touch a point which was touched both by the noble Lord who
moved and by the noble Marquess who followed him. His
Majesty's Government immediately suspended the visit of the
President of the Board of Trade and the Secretary of the De-
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 17
partment of Overseas Trade to Berlin, by means of which it
had been hoped that His Majesty's Government could directly
intervene in those unofficial contacts of industrial
representatives which were at that very moment taking place.
We felt, and feel, as I think I said in my statement a few
days ago, that in the circumstances which have arisen any
development of our efforts in that direction was, as the
noble Marquess said, frankly out of the question, and that
that and many other things had to be and must remain
indefinitely postponed. His Majesty's Government, as your
Lordships also know, have recalled to report His Majesty's
Ambassador in Berlin, and he reached this country yesterday.
Further than those two practical steps, we have lodged
a formal protest with the German Government in the sense of
informing them that we cannot but regard the events of the
last few days as a complete repudiation of the Munich
Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the
negotiators of that agreement bound themselves to co-operate
for a peaceful settlement. We have also taken occasion to
protest against the changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia by
German military action, and have said that, in our view,
those changes are devoid of any basis of legality. I think,
therefore, that we may claim to have left the German
Government in no doubt of the attitude of His Majesty's
Government, and although I do not cherish any exaggerated
hopes of what may be the effect of protests, I think your
Lordships will feel it abundantly right that such protests
should be registered.
I have from time to time seen efforts made by German
apologists to justify the action of their Government by some
reference to the past history of the British Empire. It is
not necessary to remind you that the principle on which the
British Empire is conducted is education in self-government.
Wherever we have been in the world, we have left a trail of
freedom and of self-government, and our record has nothing
in common with the suppression of liberty and independence
of people whose political developments had already brought
them to the point of enjoyment of those opportunities for
self-expression. It has also been objected that what has
happened in Czecho-Slovakia is of no interest or concern to
this country. It is
18 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
quite true that we have always recognised that, for reasons
of geography, if for no other, Germany must from some points
of view be more interested in Czecho-Slovakia or South-
Eastern Europe than we are ourselves. It was the natural
field for the expansion of German trade. But apart from the
fact that changes in any part of Europe produce profound
effects elsewhere, the position is entirely changed when we
are confronted with the arbitrary suppression of an
independent sovereign State by force, and by the violation
of what I must regard as the elementary rules of
international conduct.
It is natural enough that in the light of these events
His Majesty's Government should be told, as the noble Lord
told them this afternoon, that the policy of Munich was a
tragic mistake. I cannot, of course, claim to correct the
noble Lord upon an expression of opinion which he sincerely
holds, but I can correct him, I think, on one limited
observation that fell from him. He referred to the policy
pursued by the Prime Minister as a personal policy. If by
that he means that it was a policy to which the Prime
Minister had given every ounce of energy, imagination and
resolution that he possessed, I should not disagree with
him, but if he suggests that it was a policy that was
pursued without the fullest co-operation of myself as
Foreign Secretary, and of every member of His Majesty's
Government, then I must take leave to oppose to what he said
the most emphatic contradiction.
My Lords, the Munich Settlement, which was approved by
this House and in another place, was accepted by His
Majesty's Government for two purposes, quite distinct. The
first purpose was to effect a settlement, as fair as might
be in all the extremely difficult circumstances of that
time, of a problem which was a real one, and of which the
treatment was an urgent necessity if the peace of Europe was
to be preserved. As to that, I would say, as I have said
before in this House, that I have no doubt whatever that His
Majesty's Government were right, in the light of all the
information available to them, to take the course they did.
The second purpose of Munich was to build a Europe more
secure, upon the basis of freely accepted consultation as
the means by which all future differences might be adjusted;
and that long-term purpose, my Lords, has been, as
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 19
we have come to observe, disastrously belied by events. We
are charged with having too readily believed the assurances
which were given by Herr Hitler-that after Munich he had no
further territorial ambitions, and no desire to incorporate
non-German elements in the Reich. The noble Lord referred to
the Prime Minister as the "too-simple Prime Minister." I can
assure your Lordships that neither the Prime Minister nor I,
myself, nor any member of His Majesty's Government, has
failed at any moment to be acutely conscious of the
difference between beliefs and hope. It was surely
legitimate and right to have hopes. But we have always acted-
and I challenge any noble Lord to produce any evidence to
the contrary-in the knowledge that only with time can hope
be converted into sure beliefs.
It is no doubt the case that previous assurances had
been broken, whatever justification might have been advanced
by Herr Hitler, on the grounds of his mission, as he
conceives it, to incorporate ex-German territory and
predominantly German areas in the Reich. But in his actions
until after Munich a case could be made that Herr Hitler had
been true to his own principles, the union of Germans in,
and the exclusion of non-Germans from, the Reich. Those
principles he has now overthrown, and in including 8 million
Czechs under German rule he has surely been untrue to his
own philosophy. The world will not forget that in September
last Herr Hitler appealed to the principle of self-
determination in the interests of 2 million Sudeten Germans.
That principle is one on which the British Empire itself has
been erected, and one to which accordingly, as your
Lordships will recollect, we felt obliged to give weight in
considering Herr Hitler's claim. That principle has now been
rudely contradicted by a sequence of acts which denies the
very right on which the German attitude of six months ago
was based, and whatever may have been the truth about the
treatment of 250,000 Germans, it is impossible for me to
believe that it could only be remedied by the subjugation of
8 million Czechs.
What conclusions, as asked the noble Marquess, are we
to draw from this conquest of Czecho-Slovakia? Are we to
believe that German policy has thus entered upon a new
phase? Is
20 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
German policy any longer to be limited to the consolidation
of territory predominantly inhabited by persons of German
race? Or is German policy now to be directed towards
domination over non-German peoples? These are very grave
questions which are being asked in all parts of the world to-
day. The German action in Czecho-Slovakia has been furthered
by new methods, and the world has lately seen more than one
new departure in the field of international technique. Wars
without declarations of war. Pressure exercised under threat
of immediate employment of force. Intervention in the
internal struggles of other States. Countries are now faced
with the encouragement of separatism, not in the interest of
separatist or minority elements but in the imperial
interests of Germany. The alleged ill-treatment of German
minorities in foreign countries which, it is true, may
sometimes, perhaps often, arise from natural causes, but
which may also be the subject and result of provocation from
outside, is used as a pretext for intervention.
These methods are simple and, with growing experience,
quite unmistakable. Have we any assurance that they will not
be employed elsewhere? Every country which is Germany's
neighbour is now uncertain of the morrow, and every country
which values its national identity and sovereignty stands
warned against the danger from within, inspired from
without. During the last few days there have been rumours
that the German Government were adopting a harsh attitude in
their negotiations with the Roumanian Government on economic
matters. I am glad to say that the Roumanian Government have
themselves denied a report that went so far as to speak of
an "ultimatum"; but even if there is no menace to Roumania
to-day, or even if that menace has not to-day developed, and
even though it may not develop on these lines, it is not
surprising if the Government of Bucharest, like other
Governments, should view with the gravest misgivings the
happenings of these last few days.
For years past the British people have steadily desired
to be on friendly terms with the German people. There is no
stronger national instinct among our people than the
instinct that leads them, when they have a fight, to shake
hands and try to make it up. Our people were not backward in
recognising some of
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 21
the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty that required
remedying, but each time during these last years that there
has seemed a chance of making progress in understanding, the
German Government has taken action which has made that
progress impossible. More especially has that been the case
in recent months. Very shortly after Munich certain measures
were taken by the German Government that gave a profound
shock to world opinion. Quite recently it was to be hoped,
although there were many clouds still over and below the
horizon, that we could look forward to closer economic
collaboration, and it was in the hope of developing that
economic collaboration into something wider that, as your
Lordships know, we had decided on those visits to which I
referred a moment ago. All that initiative has been
frustrated by the action of the German Government last week,
and it is difficult to see when it can be easily resumed.
These affairs, as I said a moment or two ago, have
raised wide issues, and the events in Czecho-Slovakia
require His Majesty's Government and require every free
people to rethink their attitude towards them. Broadly
speaking, there have been, at all events since the war, two
conflicting theses as to the best method of avoiding
conflicts and creating security for the nations of the
world. The first thesis is that which upholds the creation
of and supports machinery for consultation, conciliation and
arbitration with, if possible, the sanction of collective
force, and involves an invitation to all States, willing to
accept a wide degree of obligation to one another, to agree
that an attack on one should be treated as an attack on all.
That, your Lordships know well enough, has been the thesis
expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Perhaps
it is true to say that more precise effect was sought to be
given to it in the Geneva Protocol, and it has itself given
rise to a number of regional agreements for mutual
assistance between the several Powers concerned. That is the
first thesis.
The second, which has been in conflict, has been upheld
by those who consider that systems seeking to provide
collective security, as it has been termed, involved
dangerously indefinite commitments quite disproportionate to
the real security that these commitments gave. Those who
took that view were per-
22 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
suaded that States, conscious of their own pacific purposes,
would be wise to refrain from such commitments which might
draw them into a war in which their own vital interests were
not threatened, and that, therefore, States should not bind
themselves to intervene in conflicts unless they themselves
were directly attacked.
That is the conflict of philosophy of which your
Lordships are very well aware, because in one form or
another it has constantly been debated in this House. I have
no doubt that in considering these two theses the judgment
of many has been influenced by the estimate that they place,
rightly or wrongly, upon the probability of direct attack.
If it were possible, in their judgment, to rate that
probability low, then that low probability of direct attack
had to be weighed against what might seem to them the
greater risk of States being involved in conflicts that were
not necessarily arising out of their own concerns. But if
and when it becomes plain to States that there is no
apparent guarantee against successive attacks directed in
turn on all who might seem to stand in the way of ambitious
schemes of domination, then at once the scale tips the other
way, and in all quarters there is likely immediately to be
found a very much greater readiness to consider whether the
acceptance of wider mutual obligations, in the cause of
mutual support, is not dictated, if for no other reason than
the necessity of self-defence. His Majesty's Government have
not failed to draw the moral from these events, and have
lost no time in placing themselves in close and practical
consultation, not only with the Dominions, but with other
Governments concerned upon the issues that have suddenly
been made so plain.
It is not possible as yet fully to appraise the
consequences of German action. History, to which the noble
Marquess always refers us with great profit and enjoyment,
records many attempts to impose a domination on Europe, but
all these attempts have, sooner or later, terminated in
disaster for those who made them. It has never in the long
run proved possible to stamp out the spirit of free peoples.
If history is any guide, the German people may yet regret
the action that has been taken in their name against the
people of Czecho-Slovakia. Twenty years ago that people of
Czecho-Slovakia recovered their liberties with the support
and encouragement of the
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 23
greater part of the world. They have now been deprived of
them by violence. In the course of their long history this
will not be the first time that this tenacious, valiant and
industrious people have lost their independence, but they
have never lost that which is the foundation of independence
the love of liberty. Meanwhile, just as after the last war
the world watched the emergence of the Czech nation, so it
will watch to-day their efforts to preserve intact their
cultural identity and, more important, their spiritual
freedom under the last and most cruel blow of which they
have been the victims.
No. 11.
Question and the Prime Minister's answer in the House of
Commons on March 23, 1939.
Mr. Attlee (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister
whether he has any further statement to make on the
European situation?
Answer.
The Prime Minister: His Majesty's Government have
already made clear that the recent actions of the German
Government have raised the question whether that Government
is not seeking by successive steps to dominate Europe, and
perhaps even to go further than that. Were this
interpretation of the intentions of the German Government to
prove correct, His Majesty's Government feel bound to say
that this would rouse the successful resistance of this and
other countries who prize their freedom, as similar attempts
have done in the past.
I am not yet in a position to make a statement on the
consultations which have been held with other Governments as
a result of recent developments. I wish to make it clear,
however, that there is no desire on the part of His
Majesty's Government to stand in the way of any reasonable
efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade.
On the contrary, we were on the point of discussing in the
most friendly way the possibility of trade arrangements
which would have benefited both countries when the events
took place which, for the time being at any rate, put a stop
to those discussions. Nor is this Govern-
24 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
ment anxious to set up in Europe opposing blocks of
countries with different ideas about the forms of their
internal administration. We are solely concerned here with
the proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure under
which independent States are subjected to such pressure
under threat of force as to be obliged to yield up their
independence, and we are resolved by all means in our power
to oppose attempts, if they should be made, to put such a
procedure into operation.
No. 12.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.
My Lord, Berlin,
May 28, 1939.
I PAID a short visit to Field-Marshal G”ring at
Karinhall yesterday.
2. Field-Marshal G”ring, who had obviously just been
talking to someone else on the subject, began by inveighing
against the attitude which was being adopted in England
towards everything German and particularly in respect of the
gold held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czecho-
Slovakia. Before, however, I had had time to reply, he was
called to the telephone and on his return did not revert to
this specific question. He complained, instead, of British
hostility in general, of our political and economic
encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he
described as the war party in England, &c.
3. I told the field-marshal that, before speaking of
British hostility, he must understand why the undoubted
change of feeling towards Germany in England had taken
place. As he knew quite well the basis of all the
discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last
year had been to the effect that, once the Sudeten were
allowed to enter the Reich, Germany would leave the Czechs
alone and would do nothing to interfere with their
independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite assurance to
that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of the 27th
September. By yielding to the advice of his "wild men" and
deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had
not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had
infringed the whole principle of self-determination on which
the Munich Agreement rested.
4. At this point the field-marshal interrupted me with
a
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 25
description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told
Field-Marshall G”ring that it was not possible to talk of
free will when I understood that he himself had threatened
to bombard Prague with his aeroplanes, if Dr. Hacha refused
to sign. The field-marshal did not deny the fact but
explained how the point had arisen. According to him Dr.
Hacha had from the first been prepared to sign everything
but had said that constitutionally he could not do so
without reference first to Prague. After considerable
difficulty telephonic communication with Prague was obtained
and the Czech Government had agreed, while adding that they
could not guarantee that one Czech battalion at least would
not fire on the German troops. It was, he said, only at that
stage that he had warned Dr. Hacha that, if German lives
were lost, he would bombard Prague. The fieldmarshal also
repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the story that
the advance occupation of Witkowitz had been effected solely
in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to
have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the
first opportunity.
5. I thereupon reminded Field-Marshal G”ring that,
while I had always appreciated the necessity for the Czechs,
in view of their geographical position, to live in the
friendliest political and economic relations with Great
Germany, he had personally assured me last October that this
was all that his Government desired. The precipitate action
of Germany on the 15th March, which I again ascribed to the
wild men of the party, had consequently, apart from
everything and everybody else, been a great shock to me
personally and had undone all that I had sought to achieve
during my two years at Berlin. Moreover, however indifferent
this might seem to him, I could not but regard the
destruction of the independence of the Czechs as a major
political error, even in Germany's own interests.
6. The field-marshal appeared a little confused at this
personal attack on his own good faith, and assured me that
he himself had known nothing of the decision before it had
been taken. He would not, he said, have gone to San Remo if
he had; nor had his stay there profited him, as he had hoped
owing to the unexpected amount of work which had in
consequence been thrust upon him. He then proceeded to give
a somewhat unconvincing explanation, though similar to that
26 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
which Baron von Weiz„cker had furnished me with last March,
of the German attempt to come to a satisfactory arrangement
with the Czechs and of its failure owing to Czech obstinacy
and the revival of what he called the Benes spirit as the
result of American encouragement.
7. As my time was limited, I told Field-Marshal G”ring
that I was well aware of the reasons adduced by his
Government to justify its action, but I thought it more
important that he himself should understand the British
point of view in consequence of it. As the result of the
Prague coup His Majesty's Government and the British people
were determined to resist by force any new aggression. No
one desired an amiable arrangement between Germany and
Poland in respect of Danzig and the Corridor more than
ourselves. But, if Germany endeavoured to settle these
questions by unilateral action such as would compel the
Poles to resort to arms to safeguard their independence, we
and the French as well as other countries would be involved,
with all the disastrous consequences which a prolonged world
war would entail, especially for Germany, &c. Field-Marshal
G”ring did not appear to question our readiness to fight and
restricted his reply to an attempt to prove that
circumstances in 1939 were different to those in 1914, that
no Power could overcome Germany in Europe, that a blockade
this time would prove unavailing, that France would not
stand a long war, that Germany could do more harm to Great
Britain than the latter to her, that the history of Germany
was one of ups and downs, and that this was one of the "up"
periods, that the Poles had no military experience and that
their only officers of any value were those who had acquired
their training in the German army, that they were not and
never had been a really united nation and that, since France
and ourselves could not, and Russia out of self-interest
would not, give them any effective military assistance, they
would be taught a terrible lesson, &c. The field-marshal
used, in fact, all the language which might be expected in
reply to a statement that Germany was bound to be defeated.
While I was perturbed at his reference to the unreality of
Polish unity, which resembled the German arguments last year
in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, he gave me the impression, by
somewhat overstating his case, of considerably less
confidence than he expressed.
DETERIORATION IN EUROPEAN SITUATION 27
8. At the end of this tirade, moreover, he asked me
whether England, "out of envy of a strong Germany," was
really bent on war with her and, if not, what was to be done
to prevent it. I said that nobody in their senses could
contemplate modern war without horror, but that we should
not shrink from it if Germany resorted to another act of
aggression. If, therefore, war was to be avoided, patience
was necessary and the wild men in Germany must be
restrained. Admittedly present-day Germany was in a dynamic
condition, whereas England was by tradition the land of
compromise. But compromise had its limits, and I did not see
how the situation could be saved unless his Government were
prepared to wait in order to allow excited spirits to calm
down again and negotiations to be resumed in a better
atmosphere.
9. At this point Field-Marshal G”ring remarked that if
the Poles tried to seize Danzig nothing would stop the
Germans from acting at once. As my time was short, I made no
comment on this but continued that neither the Prime
Minister nor yourself had yet abandoned hope of a peaceful
solution either as between Germany and Poland or between
Germany and Great Britain, but that everything now entirely
depended on Germany's behaviour and actions.
10. As I had already got up to go, the conversation
then took a more amicable turn. Though I was in a hurry, he
insisted on showing me with much pride the great structural
alterations which he is making to the house at Karinhall and
which include a new dining-room to hold an incredible number
of guests and to be all of marble and hung with tapestries.
He mentioned incidentally that the rebuilding would not be
completed before November. He also produced with pride
drawings of the tapestries, mostly representing naked ladies
labelled with the names of various virtues, such as
Goodness, Mercy, Purity, &c. I told him that they looked at
least pacific, but that I failed to see Patience among them.
I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
28 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS.
Explanatory Note.
CERTAIN discussions took place between the German and
Polish Governments at the end of 1938 and in the early part
of 1939. The German and Polish statements regarding these
negotiations are to be found in the annexed documents.
No. 13.
Extract from Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on April
28, 1939.
(Translation.)
There is little to be said as regards German-Polish
relations. Here, too, the Peace Treaty of Versailles-of
course intentionally-inflicted a most severe wound on
Germany. The strange way in which the Corridor giving Poland
access to the sea was marked out was meant, above all, to
prevent for all time the establishment of an understanding
between Poland and Germany. This problem is-as I have
already stressed-perhaps the most painful of all problems
for Germany. Nevertheless, I have never ceased to uphold the
view that the necessity of a free access to the sea for the
Polish State cannot be ignored, and that as a general
principle, valid for this case, too, nations which
Providence has destined or, if you like, condemned to live
side by side would be well advised not to make life still
harder for each other artificially and unnecessarily. The
late Marshal Pilsudski, who was of the same opinion, was
therefore prepared to go into the question of clarifying the
atmosphere of German-Polish relations, and, finally, to
conclude an agreement whereby Germany and Poland expressed
their intention of renouncing war altogether as a means of
settling the questions which concerned them both. This
agreement contained one single exception which was in
practice conceded to Poland. It was laid down that the pacts
of mutual assistance already entered into by Poland-this
applied to the pact with France- should not be affected by
the agreement. But it was obvious that this could apply only
to the pact of mutual assistance already concluded
beforehand, and not to whatever new pacts
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 29
might be concluded in the future. It is a fact that the
German-Polish Agreement resulted in a remarkable lessening
of the European tension. Nevertheless, there remained one
open question between Germany and Poland, which sooner or
later quite naturally had to be solved-the question of the
German city of Danzig. Danzig is a German city and wishes to
belong to Germany. On the other hand, this city has
contracts with Poland, which were admittedly forced upon it
by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles. But since,
moreover, the League of Nations, formerly the greatest
stirrer-up of trouble, is now represented by a High
Commissioner-incidentally a man of extraordinary tact-the
problem of Danzig must in any case come up for discussion,
at the latest with the gradual extinction of this calamitous
institution. I regarded the peaceful settlement of this
problem as a further contribution to a final loosening of
the European tension. For this loosening of the tension is
assuredly not to be achieved through the agitations of
insane warmongers, but through the removal of the real
elements of danger. After the problem of Danzig had already
been discussed several times some months ago, I made a
concrete offer to the Polish Government. I now make this
offer known to you, Gentlemen, and you yourselves will judge
whether this offer did not represent the greatest imaginable
concession in the interests of European peace. As I have
already pointed out, I have always seen the necessity of an
access to the sea for this country, and have consequently
taken this necessity into consideration. I am no democratic
statesman, but a National Socialist and a realist.
I considered it, however, necessary to make it clear to
the Government in Warsaw that just as they desire access to
the sea, so Germany needs access to her province in the
east. Now these are all difficult problems. It is not
Germany who is responsible for them, however, but rather the
jugglers of Versailles, who either in their maliciousness or
their thoughtlessness placed 100 powder barrels round about
in Europe, all equipped with hardly extinguishable lighted
fuses. These problems cannot be solved according to old-
fashioned ideas; I think, rather, that we should adopt new
methods. Poland's access to the sea by way of the Corridor,
and, on the other hand, a German route through the Corridor
have, for example, no kind of
30 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
military importance whatsoever. Their importance is
exclusively psychological and economic. To accord military
importance to a traffic route of this kind, would be to show
oneself completely ignorant of military affairs.
Consequently, I have had the following proposal submitted to
the Polish Government:-
(1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework
of the German Reich.
(2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a
railway line at her own disposal possessing the
same extraterritorial status for Germany as the
Corridor itself has for Poland.
In return, Germany is prepared:-
(1) To recognise all Polish economic rights in Danzig.
(2) To ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of
any size desired which would have completely free
access to the sea.
(3) To accept at the same time the present boundaries
between Germany and Poland and to regard them as
ultimate.
(4) To conclude a twenty-five-year non-aggression
treaty with Poland, a treaty therefore which would
extend far beyond the duration of my own life.
(5) To guarantee the independence of the Slovak State
by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointly-which means
in practice the renunciation of any unilateral
German hegemony in this territory.
The Polish Government have rejected my offer and have
only declared that they are prepared (1) to negotiate
concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner
of the League of Nations and (2) to consider facilities for
the transit traffic through the Corridor.
I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude
of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive
fact, the worst is that now Poland, like Czecho-Slovakia a
year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying
international campaign, that it must call up troops,
although Germany on her part has not called up a single man
and had not thought of proceeding in
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 31
any way against Poland. As I have said, this is in
itself very regrettable and posterity will one day decide
whether it was really right to refuse this suggestion made
this once by me. This-as I have said-was an endeavour on my
part to solve a question which intimately affects the German
people by a truly unique compromise, and to solve it to the
advantage of both countries. According to my conviction
Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all but
only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all
doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to
attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by
the international press, led as you know to the so-called
guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the
Polish Government for mutual assistance, which would also,
under certain circumstances, compel Poland to take military
action against Germany in the event of a conflict between
Germany and any other Power and in which England, in her
turn, would be involved. This obligation is contradictory to
the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time
ago, seeing that in this agreement reference is made
exclusively to existing obligations, that is at that time,
namely, to the obligations of Poland towards France of which
we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is
contrary to the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression
pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered
into this pact at that time, because what sense can non-
aggression pacts have if in practice leaves open an enormous
number of one partner exceptions.
There is either collective security, that is collective
insecurity and continuous danger of war, or clear agreements
which, however, exclude fundamentally any use of arms
between the contracting parties. I therefore look upon the
agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time
concluded as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland
and thereby no longer in existence!
I have sent a communication to this effect to the
Polish Government. However, I can only repeat at this point
that my decision does not constitute a modification of my
attitude in principle with regard to the problems mentioned
above. Should the Polish Government wish to come to fresh
contractual arrangements governing its relations with
Germany, I can but
32 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that these
arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation
binding both parties in equal measure. Germany is perfectly
willing at any time to undertake such obligations and also
to fulfil them.
No. 14.
German Government Memorandum handed to the Polish Government
on April 28, 1939.
(Translation.)
THE German Government have taken note of the Polish-
British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the
negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great
Britain. According to this declaration there has been
concluded between the Polish Government and the British
Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly
by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving
of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the
event of the independence of one of the two States being
directly or indirectly threatened.
2. The German Government consider themselves obliged to
communicate the following to the Polish Government:-
3. When in 1933 the National Socialist Government set
about the reshaping of German policy, after Germany's
departure from the League of Nations, their first object was
to stabilise German-Polish relations on a new plane. The
Chancellor of the German Reich and the late Marshal
Pilsudski concurred in the decision to break with the
political methods of the past and to enter, as regards the
settlement of all questions affecting both States, on the
path of direct understanding between them.
4. By means of the unconditional renunciation of the
use of force, guarantees of peace were instituted in order
to assist the two States in the difficult task of solving
all political, economic and cultural problems by means of
the just and equitable adjustment of mutual interests. These
principles, contained in a binding form in the German-Polish
Peace Declaration of the 26th January, 1934, had this aim in
view [sic] and by their practical success were intended to
introduce an entirely new phase of German
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 33
Polish relations. The political history of the last five
years shows that they proved efficacious in practice for
both nations. As recently as the 26th January of this year,
on the fifth anniversary of the signature of the
declaration, both sides publicly confirmed this fact, while
emphasising their united will to maintain in the future
their adhesion to the principles established in 1934.
5. The agreement which has now been concluded by the
Polish Government with the British Government is in such
obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few
months ago that the German Government can take note only
with surprise and astonishment of such violent reversal of
Polish policy. Irrespective of the manner in which its final
formulation may be determined by both parties, the new
Polish-British Agreement is intended as a regular pact of
alliance, which by reason of its general sense and of the
present state of political relations is directed exclusively
against Germany. From the obligation now accepted by the
Polish Government it appears that Poland intends in certain
circumstances to take an active part in any possible German-
British conflict in the event of aggression against Germany,
even should this conflict not affect Poland and her
interests. This is a direct and open blow against the
renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934
declaration.
6. The contradiction between the German-Polish
Declaration and the Polish-British Agreement is, however,
even more far-reaching in its importance than that. The 1934
declaration was to constitute a basis for the regulation of
all differences arising between the two countries,
independently of international complications and
combinations, by means of direct discussion between Berlin
and Warsaw, to the exclusion of external influences.
Naturally, such a basis must rest on the mutual confidence
of both parties and on the political loyalty of the
intentions of one party with regard to the other.
7. The Polish Government, however, by their recent
decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany,
have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of
help by a third Power to the direct guarantee of peace by
the German Government. In view of this the German Government
are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at
present attach any importance to seeking a solution of
German-Polish problems by means of direct friendly
discussions with the German Government. The Polish
34 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934
for the shaping of German-Polish relations.
8. The Polish Government cannot in this connexion
appeal to the fact that the 1934 declaration was not to
affect the obligations previously accepted by Poland and
Germany in relation to third parties, and that the Treaty of
Alliance between Poland and France maintained its value side
by side with that declaration. The Polish-French Alliance
already existed in 1934 when Poland and Germany proceeded to
reorganise their relations. The German Government were able
to accept this fact, since they were entitled to expect that
the possible dangers of the Polish-French Alliance, dating
from the period of the acutest German-Polish differences,
would automatically lose more and more of their significance
through the establishment of friendly relations between
Germany and Poland. However, the entry of Poland into
relations of alliance with Great Britain, which was effected
five years after the publication of the declaration of 1934,
can for this reason in no way be compared politically with
the still valid Polish-French Alliance. By this new alliance
the Polish Government have subordinated themselves to a
policy inaugurated from another quarter aiming at the
encirclement of Germany.
9. The German Government for their part have not given
the least cause for such a change in Polish policy. Whenever
opportunity offered, they have furnished the Polish
Government, both publicly and in confidential conversations,
with the most binding assurances that the friendly
development of German-Polish relations is a fundamental aim
of their foreign policy, and that, in their political
decisions, they will always respect Poland's proper
interests. Thus the action taken by Germany in March of this
year with a view to the pacification of Central Europe did
not, in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, disturb
Polish interests in any way. This action led to the creation
of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which had constantly
been described on Poland's side as an important political
objective. Moreover, the German Government gave unequivocal
expression to their readiness to discuss with the Polish
Government in a friendly manner all problems which, in the
Polish Government's opinion, might arise out of the changed
conditions in Central Europe.
10. In an equally friendly spirit the German Government
tried
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 35
to regulate yet another question outstanding between Germany
and Poland, namely, that of Danzig. The fact that this
question required settlement had long been emphasised on the
German side, and was not denied on the Polish side. For a
long time past the German Government have endeavoured to
convince the Polish Government that a solution was certainly
possible which would be equitable to the interests of both
parties and that the removal of this last obstacle would
open a path for a political collaboration of Germany and
Poland with the most favourable prospects. In this connexion
the German Government did not confine themselves to
allusions of a general nature, but in March of this year
proposed to the Polish Government in a friendly form a
settlement of this question on the following basis:-
11. The return of Danzig to the Reich. An extra-
territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia
and the Reich. In exchange, the recognition by the Reich of
the whole Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's western
frontier; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact for twenty-
five years; the maintenance of Poland's economic interests
in Danzig and the settlement of the remaining economic and
communications problems arising for Poland out of the union
of Danzig with the Reich. At the same time, the German
Government expressed their readiness to respect Polish
interests in ensuring the independence of Slovakia.
12. Nobody knowing conditions in Danzig and the
Corridor and the problems connected therewith can deny, in
judging the matter objectively, that this proposal
constitutes the very minimum which must be demanded from the
point of view of German interests, which cannot be
renounced. The Polish Government, however, gave a reply
which, although couched in the form of counter-proposals,
showed in its essence an entire lack of comprehension for
the German point of view and was equivalent merely to a
rejection of the German proposals. The Polish Government
proved that they did not consider their reply suitable for
the initiation of friendly discussions by proceeding at the
same time, in a manner as unexpected as it was drastic, to
effect a partial mobilisation of the Polish army on a large
scale. By these entirely unjustified measures, the Polish
Government demonstrated the meaning and object of the
negotiations which they im-
36 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
mediately afterwards entered upon with the British
Government. The German Government do not consider it
necessary to reply to the partial Polish mobilisation by
counter-measures of a military character. They cannot,
however, disregard without a word the decisions recently
taken by the Polish Government, and are forced, to their own
regret, to declare as follows:-
(1) The Polish Government did not avail themselves of
the opportunity offered to them by the German
Government for a just settlement of the Danzig
question, for the final safeguarding of Poland's
frontiers with the Reich, and thereby for a
permanent strengthening of the friendly
neighbourly relations between the two countries.
The Polish Government even rejected German
proposals made with this object.
(2) At the same time the Polish Government accepted,
with regard to another State, political
obligations which are not compatible either with
the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-
Polish Declaration of the 26th January, 1934.
Thereby the Polish Government arbitrarily and
unilaterally rendered this declaration null and
void.
13. In spite of this necessary statement of fact, the
Government of the Reich do not intend to alter their
fundamental attitude towards the question of the future of
German-Polish relations. Should the Polish Government attach
importance to a new settlement of these relations by means
of a treaty, the German Government are ready to do this, but
on one condition, namely, that such a settlement would have
to consist of a clear obligation binding on both parties.
No. 15.
Speech made by M. Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign
Affairs in Parliament on May 5, 1939.
(Translation.)
THE session of the Parliament provides me with an
opportunity of filling in some gaps which have occurred in
my work of recent months. The course of international events
might perhaps justify
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 37
more statements by a Foreign Minister than my single expos‚
in the Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs.
2. On the other hand it was precisely that swift
development of events that prompted me to postpone a public
declaration until such time as the principal problems of our
foreign policy had taken on a more definite form.
3. The consequences of the weakening of collective
international institutions and of a complete change in the
method of intercourse between nations, which I have reported
on several occasions in the Houses, caused many new problems
to arise in different parts of the world. That process and
its results have in recent months reached the borders of
Poland.
4. A very general definition of these phenomena may be
given by saying that relations between individual Powers
have taken on a more individual character, with their own
specific features. The general rules have been weakened. One
nation simply speaks more and more directly to another.
5. As far as we are concerned, very serious events have
taken place. Our contact with some Powers has become easier
and more profound, while in some cases serious difficulties
have arisen. Looking at things chronologically, I refer, in
the first place, to our agreement with the United Kingdom,
with Great Britain. After repeated diplomatic contacts,
designed to define the scope and object of our future
relations, we reached on the occasion of my visit to London
a direct agreement based on the principle of mutual
assistance in the event of a direct or indirect threat to
the independence of one of our countries. The formula of the
agreement is known to you from the declaration of Mr.
Neville Chamberlain of the 6th April, the text of which was
drafted by mutual agreement and should be regarded as a pact
concluded between the two Governments. I consider it my duty
to add that the form and character of the comprehensive
conversations held in London give a particular value to the
agreement. I should like Polish public opinion to be aware
that I found on the part of British statesmen not only a
profound knowledge of the general political problems of
Europe, but also such an attitude towards our country as
permitted me to discuss all vital problems with frankness
and confidence without any reservations or doubts.
6. It was possible to establish rapidly the principles
of Polish-British collaboration, first of all because we
made it clear to each
38 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
other that the intentions of both Governments coincide as
regards fundamental European problems; certainly, neither
Great Britain nor Poland have any aggressive intentions
whatever, but they stand equally firmly in defence of
certain basic principles of conduct in international life.
7. The parallel declarations of French political
leaders confirm that it is agreed between Paris and Warsaw
that the efficacy of our defence pact not only cannot be
adversely affected by changes in the international
situation, but, on the contrary, that this agreement should
constitute one of the most essential elements in the
political structure of Europe. The Polish-British Agreement
has been employed by the Chancellor of the German Reich as
the pretext for unilaterally declaring non-existent the
agreement which the Chancellor of the Reich concluded with
us in 1934.
8. Before passing to the present stage of this matter,
allow me to sketch a brief historical outline.
9. The fact that I had the honour actively to
participate in the conclusion and execution of that pact
imposes on me the duty of analysing it. The pact of 1934 was
a great event in 1934. It was an attempt to improve the
course of history as between two great nations, an attempt
to escape from the unwholesome atmosphere of daily discord
and wider hostile intentions, to rise above the animosity
which had accumulated for centuries, and to create deep
foundations of mutual respect. An endeavour to oppose evil
is always the best form of political activity.
10. The policy of Poland proved our respect for that
principle in the most critical moments of recent times.
11. From this point of view, Gentlemen, the breaking
off of that pact is not an insignificant matter. However,
every treaty is worth as much as the consequences which
follow it. And if the policy and conduct of the other party
diverges from the principles of the pact, we have no reason
for mourning its slackening or dissolution. The Polish-
German Pact of 1934 was a treaty of mutual respect and good
neighbourly relations, and as such it contributed a positive
value to the life of our country, of Germany, and of the
whole of Europe. But since there has appeared a tendency to
interpret it as limiting the freedom of our policy, or as a
ground for demanding from us unilateral concessions contrary
to our vital interests, it has lost its real character.
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 39
12. Let us now pass to the present situation. The
German Reich has taken the mere fact of the Polish-British
understanding as a motive for the breaking off of the pact
of 1934. Various legal objections were raised on the German
side. I will take the liberty of referring jurists to the
text of our reply to the German memorandum, which will be
handed to-day to the German Government. I will not detain
you any longer on the diplomatic form of this event, but one
of its aspects has a special significance. The Reich
Government, as appears from the text of the German
memorandum, made its decision on the strength of press
reports, without consulting the views of either the British
or the Polish Government as to the character of the
agreement concluded. It would not have been difficult to do
so, for immediately on my return from London I expressed my
readiness to receive the German Ambassador, who has hitherto
not availed himself of the opportunity.
13. Why is this circumstance important? Even for the
simplest understanding it is clear that neither the
character nor the purpose and scope of the agreement
influenced this decision, but merely the fact that such an
agreement had been concluded. And this in turn is important
for an appreciation of the objects of German policy, since
if, contrary to previous declarations, the Government of the
Reich interpreted the Polish-German declaration of non-
aggression of 1934 as intended to isolate Poland and to
prevent the normal friendly collaboration of our country
with Western Powers, we ourselves should always have
rejected such an interpretation.
14. To make a proper estimate of the situation, we
should first of all ask the question, what is the real
object of all this? Without that question and our reply, we
cannot properly appreciate the character of German
statements with regard to matters of concern to Poland. I
have already referred to our attitude towards the West.
There remains the question of the German proposals as to the
future of the Free City of Danzig, the communication of the
Reich with East Prussia through our province of Pomorze, and
the further subjects raised as of common interest to Poland
and Germany.
15. Let us, therefore, investigate these problems in
turn.
16. As to Danzig, first some general remarks. The Free
City of Danzig was not invented by the Treaty of Versailles.
It has
40 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
existed for many centuries as the result-to speak
accurately, and rejecting the emotional factor-of the
positive interplay of Polish and German interests. The
German merchants of Danzig ensured the development and
prosperity of that city, thanks to the overseas trade of
Poland. Not only the development, but the very raison d'ˆtre
of the city has been due to the formerly decisive fact of
its situation at the mouth of our only great river, and to-
day to its position on the main waterway and railway line
connecting us with the Baltic. This is a truth which no new
formulae can obliterate. The population of Danzig is to-day
predominantly German, but its livelihood and prosperity
depend on the economic potential of Poland.
17. What conclusions have we drawn from this fact? We
have stood and stand firmly on the ground of the rights and
interests of our sea-borne trade and our maritime policy in
Danzig. While seeking reasonable and conciliatory solutions,
we have purposely not endeavoured to exert any pressure on
the free national, ideological and cultural development of
the German majority in the Free City.
18. I shall not prolong this speech by quoting
examples. They are sufficiently well-known to all who have
been in any way concerned with the question. But when, after
repeated statements by German statesmen, who had respected
our standpoint and expressed the view that "this provincial
town will not be the object of a conflict between Poland and
Germany," I hear a demand for the annexation of Danzig to
the Reich, when I receive no reply to our proposal of the
26th March for a joint guarantee of the existence and rights
of the Free City, and subsequently I learn that this has
been regarded as a rejection of negotiations-I have to ask
myself, what is the real object of all this?
19. Is it the freedom of the German population of
Danzig, which is not threatened, or a matter of prestige-or
is it a matter of barring Poland from the Baltic, from
which: Poland will not allow herself to be barred?
20. The same considerations apply to communication
across our province of Pomorze. I insist on the term
"province of Pomorze." The word "corridor" is an artificial
invention, for this is an ancient Polish territory with an
insignificant percentage of German colonists.
21. We have given the German Reich all railway
facilities,
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 41
we have allowed its citizens to travel without customs or
passport formalities from the Reich to East Prussia. We have
suggested the extension of similar facilities to road
traffic.
22. And here again the question arises-what is the real
object of it all?
23. We have no interest in obstructing German citizens
in their communication with their eastern province. But we
have, on the other hand, no reason whatever to restrict our
sovereignty on our own territory.
24. On the first and second points, i.e., the question
of the future of Danzig and of communication across Pomorze,
it is still a matter of unilateral concessions which the
Government of the Reich appear to be demanding from us. A
self-respecting nation does not make unilateral concessions.
Where, then, is the reciprocity? It appears somewhat vague
in the German proposals. The Chancellor of the Reich
mentioned in his speech a triple condominium in Slovakia. I
am obliged to state that I heard this proposal for the first
time in the Chancellor's speech of the 28th April. In
certain previous conversations allusions were merely made to
the effect that in the event of a general agreement the
question of Slovakia could be discussed. We did not attempt
to go further with such conversations, since it is not our
custom to bargain with the interests of others. Similarly,
the proposal for a prolongation of the pact of non-
aggression for twenty-five years was also not advanced in
any concrete form in any of the recent conversations. Here
also unofficial hints were made, emanating, it is true, from
prominent representatives of the Reich Government. But in
such conversations various other hints were made which
extended much further than the subjects under discussion. I
reserve the right to return to this matter if necessary.
25. In his speech the Chancellor of the Reich proposes,
as a concession on his part, the recognition and definite
acceptance of the present frontier between Poland and
Germany. I must point out that this would have been a
question of recognising what is de jure and de facto our
indisputable property. Consequently, this proposal likewise
cannot affect my contention that the German desiderata
regarding Danzig and a motor road constitute unilateral
demands.
26. In the light of these explanations, the House will
rightly
42 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
expect from me an answer to the last passage of the German
memorandum, which says: "Should the Polish Government attach
importance to a new settlement of Polish-German relations by
means of a treaty, the German Government are prepared to do
this." It appears to me that I have already made clear our
attitude, but for the sake of order I will make a resume.
27. The motive for concluding such an agreement would
be the word "peace," which the Chancellor emphasised in his
speech.
28. Peace is certainly the object of the difficult and
intensive work of Polish diplomacy. Two conditions are
necessary for this word to be of real value: (1) peaceful
intentions, (2) peaceful methods of procedure. If the
Government of the Reich is really guided by those two pre-
conditions in relation to this country, then all
conversations, provided, of course, that they respect the
principles I have already enumerated, are possible.
29. If such conversations took place, the Polish
Government will, according to their custom, approach the
problem objectively, having regard to the experience of
recent times, but without withholding their utmost goodwill.
30. Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our
generation, which has shed its blood in several wars, surely
deserves a period of peace. But peace, like almost
everything in this world, has its price, high but definable.
We in Poland do not recognize the conception of "peace at
any price." There is only one thing in the life of men,
nations and States which is without price, and that is
honour.
No. 16.
Memorandum communicated to the German Government by the
Polish Government on May 5, 1939, in reply to the
German Government memorandum of April 28, 1939. *
(Translation.)
As appears from the text of the Polish-German
Declaration of the 26th January, 1934, ** and from the
course of the negotiations which preceded its conclusion,
this declaration had as its object
*No. 14
**No. 1.
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 43
to lay the foundations for a new framing of mutual relations
based on the following two principles:-
(a) The renunciation of the use of force as between
Poland and Germany, and
(b) The friendly settlement by means of free
negotiations of any contentious questions which
might arise in the relations between the two
countries.
The Polish Government have always understood in this
manner their obligations under the declaration, and it is in
this spirit that they have always been prepared to conduct
neighbourly relations with the German Reich.
2. The Polish Government had foreseen for several years
that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations
in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a
confused situation which it was in Poland's and Germany's
interest to unravel. For several years the Polish Government
had given the German Government to understand that frank
conversations should be held on this subject. The German
Government, however, avoided these and confined themselves
to stating that Polish-German relations should not be
exposed to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig.
Moreover, the German Government more than once gave
assurances to the Polish Government regarding the Free City
of Danzig. It is sufficient here to quote the declaration
made by the Chancellor of the Reich on the 20th February,
1938.
The Chancellor made publicly in the Reichstag the
following declaration regarding Danzig:-
"The Polish State respects the national conditions
in this State, and the Free City and Germany respect
Polish rights. It has thus been possible to clear the
way for an understanding which, while arising out of
the question of Danzig, has to-day in spite of the
efforts of certain disturbers of the peace succeeded in
effectively purifying relations between Germany and
Poland and has transformed them into sincere and
friendly collaboration."
It was only after the events of September, 1938, that
the German Government suggested the opening of Polish-German
con-
44 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
versations regarding the alteration in the situation in
Danzig and regarding the transit routes between the Reich
and East Prussia. In this connexion the German memorandum of
the 28th April, 1939, refers to the suggestion put forward
by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in his
conversation of the 21st March, 1939, with the Polish
Ambassador in Berlin. In this conversation emphasis was laid
on the German side on the necessity for a rapid settlement
of these questions which was a condition of the Reich
maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. The
Polish Government, animated by the desire to maintain good
relations with the Reich, although surprised at the pressing
form in which these proposals were put forward, and by the
circumstances in which they were advanced, did not refuse
conversations although they considered the German demands
thus couched to be unacceptable.
In order to facilitate endeavours to reach an amicable
solution of the question, the Polish Government on the 26th
March, 1939, formulated their point of view in writing to
the German Government, stating that they attached full
importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations
with the German Reich. The Polish point of view was
summarised in the following points:-
(a) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by
Poland and Germany of the separate character of
the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which
was to be based on complete freedom of the local
population in internal affairs and on the
assurance of respect for Polish rights and
interests.
(b) The Polish Government were prepared to examine
together with the German Government any further
simplifications for persons in transit as well as
the technical facilitating of railway and motor
transit between the German Reich and East Prussia.
The Polish Government were inspired by the idea of
giving every possible facility which would permit
the citizens of the Reich to travel in transit
across Polish territory, if possible without any
hindrances. The Polish Government emphasised that
their intention was to secure the most liberal
treatment possible of the German desiderata in
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 45
this respect with the sole reservation that Poland
could not give up her sovereignty over the belt of
territory through which the transit routes would
run. Finally, the Polish Government indicated that
their attitude in the question of facilitating
communications across Pomerania depended on the
attitude of the Reich regarding the Free City of
Danzig.
In formulating the above proposals the Polish
Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German
Declaration of 1934 which, by providing the direct exchanges
of views on questions of interest to both countries,
authorised each State to formulate its point of view in the
course of negotiations.
The Polish Government received no formal reply to their
counter-proposals for a month, and it was only on the 28th
April, 1939, that they learnt from the Chancellor's speech
and from the German Government's memorandum that the mere
fact of the formulation of counter-proposals instead of the
acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without
alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as
a refusal of discussions.
It is clear that negotiations in which one State
formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept
those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit
of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the
vital interests and dignity of Poland.
In this connexion it should be pointed out that the
Polish Government were unable at that time to express an
opinion regarding the Polish-German-Hungarian guarantee of
the independence of Slovakia which was alluded to in a
general way in the German memorandum and more precisely
stated in the Chancellor's speech of the 28th April, 1939,
since a proposal of this description and in this form had
never been made to them before. It is, moreover, difficult
to imagine how such guarantee could be reconciled with the
political and military protectorate of the Reich over
Slovakia which had been announced a few days previously
before the German Reich formulated its proposals towards
Poland.
3. The Polish Government cannot accept such an
interpretation of the declaration of 1934 as would be
equivalent to a
46 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
renunciation of the right to conclude political agreements
with third States and, consequently, almost a renunciation
of independence in foreign policy. The policy of the German
Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German
Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from the
declaration as far as they themselves were concerned. The
obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and
the German-Slovak Agreement of March, 1939, are clear
indications of such an interpretation by the German
Government of the declaration of 1934. The Polish Government
must here recall that in their relations with other States
they give and require full reciprocity as being the only
possible foundation of normal relations between States.
The Polish Government reject as completely without
foundation all accusations regarding the alleged
incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of
April, 1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934.
This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no
way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the
Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the
Declaration of 1934 has been recognised by the German Reich.
The declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs
clearly stated that both Governments have "decided to base
their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the
Pact of Paris of the 27th August, 1928." Now the Pact of
Paris, which constituted a general renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, just as the declaration of
1934 constituted such renunciation in bilateral Polish-
German relations, contained the explicit reservation that
"any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote
its national interests by resort to war should be denied the
benefits furnished by this treaty." Germany accepted this
principle in signing the Pact of Paris and re-affirmed in
the declaration of 1934, together with other principles of
the Pact of Paris. It appears from this that the declaration
of 1934 would cease to be binding on Poland should Germany
have recourse to war in violation of the Pact of Paris.
Poland's obligations arising out of the Polish British
understanding would come into operation in the event of
German action threatening the independence of Great Britain,
and, consequently, in the very circumstances in which the
dec-
GERMAN-POLISH DISCUSSIONS 47
laration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris had ceased to be
binding on Poland as regards Germany.
The German Government in making a complaint against the
Polish Government for undertaking obligations to guarantee
the independence of Great Britain and in regarding this as a
violation by Poland of the declaration of 1934, ignore their
own obligations towards Italy of which the Chancellor spoke
on the 30th January, 1939, and in particular their
obligations towards Slovakia contained in the agreement of
the 18th and 23rd March, 1939. The German guarantees of
Slovakia did not exclude Poland [sic], and, indeed, as
appears from the provisions of the above agreement regarding
the distribution of garrisons and military fortifications in
Western Slovakia, were directed primarily against Poland.
4. It appears from the above that the Government of the
German Reich had no justification for their unilateral
decision to regard the declaration of 1934 as not binding.
The pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any
possibility of denunciation during that time. It should be
pointed out that the decision to regard the 1934 Declaration
as not binding took place after the previous refusal of the
German State to accept explanations as to the compatibility
of the Anglo-Polish guarantee with the 1934 Declaration,
which it was the intention of the Polish Government to
furnish to the representative of the Reich in Warsaw.
5. Although the Polish Government do not share the view
of the German Government that the treaty of 1934 has been
violated by Poland, nevertheless, should the German
Government attach importance to the fresh regulation, by
means of a treaty, of Polish-German relations on a good
neighbourly basis, the Polish Government would be prepared
to entertain suggestions of this kind with the reservation
of their fundamental observations contained above in the
present memorandum
48 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT.
No. 17.
Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
March 31, 1939.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): The right hon.
gentleman the leader of the Opposition asked me this morning
whether I could make a statement as to the European
situation. As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government
have no official confirmation of the rumours of any
projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be
taken as accepting them as true.
I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the
general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have
constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free
negotiation between the parties concerned, of any
differences that may arise between them. They consider that
this is the natural and proper course where differences
exist. In their opinion there should be no question
incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see
no justification for the substitution of force or threats of
force for the method of negotiation.
As the House is aware, certain consultations are now
proceeding with other Governments. In order to make
perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in
the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now
have to inform the House that during that period, in the
event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly
considered it vital to resist with their national forces,
His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once
to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.
They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this
effect.
I may add that the French Government have authorised me
to make it plain that they stand in the same position in
this matter as do His Majesty's Government.
ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT 49
No. 18.
Anglo-Polish communiqu‚ issued on April 6, 1939.
The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide
field and shown that the two Governments are in complete
agreement upon certain general principles.
It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to
enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal
character to replace the present temporary and unilateral
assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish
Government. Pending the completion of the permanent
agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an
assurance that the Polish Government would consider
themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His
Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those
contained in the temporary assurance already given by His
Majesty's Government to Poland.
Like the temporary assurance, the permanent agreement
would not be directed against any other country but would be
designed to assure Great Britain and Poland of mutual
assistance in the event of any threat, direct or indirect,
to the independence of either. It was recognised that
certain matters, including a more precise definition of the
various ways in which the necessity for such assistance
might arise, would required further examination before the
permanent agreement could be completed.
It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned
should not preclude either Government from making agreements
with other countries in the general interest of the
consolidation of peace.
No. 19.
Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom
and Poland.-London, August 25, 1939.
THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Polish Government:
Desiring to place on a permanent basis the
collaboration be-
50 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
tween their respective countries resulting from the
assurances of mutual assistance of a defensive character
which they have already exchanged:
Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose
and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland:
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Halifax, K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs;
The Polish Government:
His Excellency Count Edward Raczynski, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish
Republic in London;
Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed following provisions:-
ARTICLE I.
Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in
hostilities with a European Power in consequence of
aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the
other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting
Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance
in its power.
ARTICLE 2.
(1) The provisions of Article I will also apply in the
event of any action by a European Power which clearly
threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one
of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that
the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with
its armed forces.
(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become
engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence
of action by that Power which threatened the independence or
neutrality of another European State in such a way as to
constitute a clear menace to the security of that
Contracting Party, the provisions of Article I will apply,
without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other
European State concerned.
ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT 51
ARTICLE 3.
Should a European Power attempt to undermine the
independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes
of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting
Parties will support each other in resistance to such
attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon
embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting
Parties, the provisions of Article I will apply.
ARTICLE 4.
The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual
assistance provided for by the present Agreement are
established between the competent naval, military and air
authorities of the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 5.
Without prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the
Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and
assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they
will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any
development which might threaten their independence and, in
particular, concerning any development which threatened to
call the said undertakings into operation.
ARTICLE 6.
(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each
other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against
aggression which they have already given or may in future
give to other States.
(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to
give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the
present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be
informed thereof.
(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties
may enter into in future shall neither limit their
obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly
create new obligations between the Contracting Party not
participating in these undertakings and the third State
concerned.
52 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
ARTICLE 7.
Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in
hostilities in consequence of the application of the present
Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of
peace except by mutual agreement.
ARTICLE 8.
(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a
period of five years.
(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of
this period it shall continue in force, each Contracting
Party having thereafter the right to denounce it at any time
by giving six months' notice to that effect.
(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on
signature.
In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their
seals.
Done in English in duplicate, at London, the 15th
August, 1939. A Polish text shall subsequently be agreed
upon between the Contracting Parties and both texts will
then be authentic.
(L.S.) HALIFAX.
(L.S.) EDWARD RACZYNSKI.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 53
No. 20.
Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939.
(Translation.)
GERMANS! Volksgenossen und Volksgenossinnen!
Whoever wishes to estimate the decline and regeneration
of Germany must look at the development of a city like
Wilhelmshaven. A short time ago it was a dead spot almost
without any title to existence, without any prospect of a
future; to-day it is filled again with the hum of work and
production. It is good if one recalls again to memory this
past.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 53
When the city experienced its first rise to prosperity,
this coincided with the regeneration of the German Reich
after its battle for unification. This Germany was a Germany
of peace. At the same time as the so-called peace-loving
virtuous nations were carrying on quite a number of wars,
the Germany of that time had only one aim, namely, to
preserve peace, to work in peace, to increase the prosperity
of her inhabitants and thereby to contribute to human
culture and civilisation.
This peace-time Germany tried with unceasing industry,
with genius and with perseverance to set up its inner life
and to assure for itself a proper place in the sun through
participation in peaceful rivalry with other nations.
In spite of the fact that this Germany was for decades
the surest guarantor of peace and devoted herself only to
her own peaceful business, other nations, and particularly
their statesmen, could not refrain from persecuting this
regeneration with envy and hate and finally answering it
with a war.
We know to-day from historical records how the
encirclement policy of that time had been systematically
pursued by England. We know from numerous established facts
and publications that in that land one was imbued with the
conception that it was necessary to crush Germany militarily
because its annihilation would assure to every British
citizen a larger measure of this world's goods.
Certainly Germany at that time committed errors. Its
worst error was to see this encirclement and to take no
steps in time to avoid it. The only reproach which we can
level at the regime of that day is the fact that it had full
knowledge of the devilish plan for a surprise attack on the
Reich, and even so was unable to make up its mind to avoid
in time such an attack, but allowed this encirclement to
mature right up to the outbreak of the catastrophe.
The result was the World War.
In this war the German people, although they were in no
way armed the best, fought heroically. No nation can claim
for itself the glory of having beaten us to our knees, least
of all those whose statesmen to-day are boasting.
Germany at that time remained unbeaten and unvanquished
on land, sea and in the air. And yet we lost the war. We
know
54 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
the power which at that time vanquished Germany. It was the
power of falsehood, the poison of a propaganda which did not
shrink from distortion and untruthfulness and which caught
the German Reich because it was unprepared and defenceless.
When the Fourteen Points of President Wilson were
announced, many German "Volksgenossen," particularly the
leading men of the time, saw in those Fourteen Points not
only the possibility for ending the World War but for a
final pacification of all nations of this world. There would
come a peace of reconciliation and understanding, a peace
which would recognise neither victors nor vanquished, a
peace without war indemnities, a peace of equal rights for
all, a peace of equal distribution of colonial territory and
of equal consideration for colonial desiderata. A peace
which would finally be crowned with a league of free
nations. A peace which, by guaranteeing equal rights would
make it appear superfluous for nations in future still to
endure the burden of armament which, as is known, previously
weighed down so heavily on them.
Disarmament, therefore, and in fact disarmament of all
nations.
Germany was to give a good example by taking the lead
and all undertook to follow her disarmament.
The era of so-called secret diplomacy was to come to an
end as well. All problems were to be discussed and
negotiated openly and freely.
The right of self-determination for nations was to be
finally established and be regarded as the most important
factor.
Germany believed these assurances. Relying on these
declarations Germany laid down her weapons. And then a
breach of faith began such as world history has never seen.
At the moment when our people had laid down their arms
a period of blackmail, oppression, pillage and slavery
began.
No longer any word of peace without victors and
vanquished, but a sentence of condemnation for the
vanquished for time without end.
No longer any word of equal rights, but rights for one
side and absence of rights and injustice for the other. One
robbery after another, one blackmail after another were the
results.
No man in this democratic world bothered about the
suffering
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 55
of our people. Hundreds of thousands fell in the war, not
through enemy action, but through the hunger blockade. And
when the war came to an end this blockade was continued
still for months in order to bring still further pressure on
our nation. Even the German prisoners of war had to remain
in captivity for indefinite periods. The German colonies
were stolen from us, German foreign securities were simply
confiscated, and our mercantile marine was taken away.
Then came financial pillage such as the world has never
up to this day seen. Payments were imposed on the German
people which reached astronomical figures, and about which
English statesmen said that they could only be effected if
the whole German nation reduced its standard of living to
the utmost and worked fourteen hours a day.
What German spirit and German diligence had created and
saved in decades was now lost in a few years. Millions of
Germans were torn away from the Reich, others were prevented
from returning into the Reich. The League of Nations was
made not an instrument of a just policy of understanding,
but a guarantor of the meanest dictate that human beings had
ever thought out.
A great people was thus raped and led towards the
misery that all of you know. A great people was deprived of
its rights by breach of promise and its existence in
practice was made impossible. A French statesman gave sober
expression to this by declaring: "There are 20 million
Germans too many in the world!"
There were Germans who, in despair, committed suicide,
others who lethargically submitted to their inevitable fate,
and others again who were of the opinion that there was
nothing left to do but to destroy everything; others again
ground their teeth and clenched their fists in impotent
rage, others again believed that the past must be restored
as it had been.
Every individual had adopted some sort of attitude. And
I at that time, as the unknown soldier of the World War,
took up my position.
It was a short and simple programme; it ran: removal of
the domestic enemies of the nation, termination of the
internal division of Germany, co-ordination of the entire
national force of our people in a new community, and the
smashing of the Peace
56 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Treaty in one way or another ("so oder so!") For as long as
this dictate of Versailles weighed upon the German people,
it was actually doomed to go under.
When other statesmen talk about the necessity of
justice reigning in this world, then I may tell them that
their crime is not justice, that their dictate was neither
rightful nor legal, and that the permanent vital rights of
peoples come before this dictate.
The German people was created by Providence, not in
order to obey a law which suits Englishmen or Frenchmen, but
to stand up for its vital right. That is what we are there
for!
I was determined to take up this struggle for standing
up for German vital rights. I took it up first of all within
the nation. The place of a number of parties, classes and
associations has now been taken by one single community, the
community of the German people!
It is the duty of us all to realise this community and
to continue to intensify it. In the course of this time I
have had to hurt many an individual. But I believe that the
happiness shared to-day by the entire nation must more than
compensate every individual for the things which were dear
to him and which he individually had to give up.
You have all sacrificed your parties, your clubs, your
associations, but you have instead received a great and
strong Reich!
And this Reich is to-day, thank God, sufficiently
strong to take under its protection your rights. We are now
no longer dependent upon the favour or disfavour of other
States or their statesmen.
When over six years ago I came into power, I took over
a pitiful heritage. The Reich appeared to possess no
possibilities for existence for its citizens. At that time I
began work with the only capital which I possessed. It was
the capital of your power to work! It was your power to
work, my "Volksgenossen," that I began to put into use. I
had not foreign exchange and no gold; I only had one thing:
my faith and your work! We have now founded a new economic
system, a system which is called: capital is power to work,
and money is covered by our production. We have founded a
system based upon the most noble principle in existence,
namely, form your life yourself! Work for your existence!
Help yourself, then God will also help you!
We thus began a gigantic work of reconstruction,
supported
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 57
by the confidence of the nation, filled with faith and
confidence in its permanent values. In a few years we tore
Germany from its despair. The world did not help us in doing
so!
If an English statesman to-day believes that all
problems can and must be solved by frank discussion and
negotiations, then I would like to say to this statesman: an
opportunity to do so existed for fifteen years before our
time! If the world to-day says that one must divide the
nations into virtuous and non-virtuous categories-and that
the English and French belong in the first place to the
virtuous nations and the Germans and Italians to the non-
virtuous-then we can only answer: the decision as to whether
a nation is virtuous or not virtuous can hardly be made by a
mortal human being, and should be left to God!
Perhaps this same British statesman will reply: God has
already delivered judgment, for he has given to the virtuous
nations one-quarter of the globe and has taken away
everything from the non-virtuous! In answer to that, one may
be permitted to ask: by what means have the virtuous nations
acquired this quarter of the globe? And the answer must be,
they have not been virtuous methods!
For 300 years this England has acted only as an
unvirtuous nation, and now in old age she is beginning to
talk about virtue. It was thus possible that during the
British non-virtuous period 46 million Englishmen have
conquered almost a quarter of the world, while 80 million
Germans, on account of their virtue, have to exist at the
rate of 140 to the square kilometre.
Yes, twenty years ago the question of virtue was not
yet quite clear in the minds of British statesmen, in so far
as it touched conceptions of property. At that time it was
still thought to be compatible with virtue simply to take
away from another people the colonies which it had acquired
by contract or by purchase because one had the power to do
so.
A power which now it is true is to count as something
disgusting and contemptible. In this respect, I can only say
one thing to these gentlemen: we do not know whether they
believe that sort of thing themselves or not. We assume,
however, that they do not believe it. For if we were to
assume that they really believed it themselves, then we
would lose every feeling of respect for them.
58 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
For fifteen years Germany had borne this fate
patiently. I also tried at the beginning to solve every
problem by discussion. At every problem I made offers, and
they were every time refused! There can be no doubt that
every people possesses sacred interests, simply because they
are identical with its life and its vital right.
If a British statesman to-day demands that every
problem concerning vital German interests should first be
discussed with England, then I could make precisely the same
claim and demand that every British problem must first be
discussed with us. Admittedly, this Englishman would answer:
Palestine is none of your business! But, just as Germany has
no business in Palestine, so has England no business in the
German Lebensraum! And if the problem is claimed to be a
question of general rights, then I can only agree to this
opinion if it were regarded as universal and obligatory. One
says we had no right to do this or that. I would like to ask
a counter-question: what right-just to quote only one
example has England to shoot down Arabs in Palestine, only
because they are standing up for their home? Who gives
England the right to do so?
We at any rate have not slaughtered thousands in
Central Europe, but have solved our problems in a peaceful
and orderly manner! There is one thing, however, that I must
say: the German people of to-day, the German Reich of the
present time, are not willing to sacrifice interests, and
they are also not willing to stand up to rising dangers
without taking action! When the allies at one time changed
the map of Europe with no consideration for expediency,
justice, tradition or even common-sense, we did not have the
power to prevent them from doing so. But if they expect the
Germany of the present day patiently to allow vassal States,
whose only duty consists in their being set to work against
Germany, to carry on as they like until the day comes when
their services are to be actively employed, then they are
confounding present-day Germany with the Germany of pre-war
days. Those who declare that they are prepared to pull
chestnuts out of the fire for these Great Powers must also
expect to burn their fingers in the course of the process.
We have really no feelings of hatred for the Czech
people, we have lived together for years. English statesmen
do not know
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 59
that. They have no idea that the Hradschin was built not by
an Englishman but by Germans, and that the St. Veit's
Cathedral was also not built by Englishmen but by Germans.
Frenchmen also were not active there. They do not know that
already, at a time when England was still very small, homage
was done to a German Emperor on this hill, and that, a
thousand years before I did so myself, the first German King
stood there and received the homage of this people. This the
English do not know, they cannot know it and they need not
know it.
It is sufficient that we know it, and that it is true
that for a thousand years this area belonged to the
Lebensraum of the German people. We would, nevertheless,
have had nothing against an independent Czech State if this
State had not, firstly, oppressed Germans, and, secondly, if
it had not been an instrument for a future attack on
Germany.
But when a former French Air Minister writes in a
newspaper that it is the task of this Czechia, because of
her splendid geographical position, to strike at Germany's
industry by air attacks in a war, then one will understand
that it is not without interest to us, and that we drew
certain conclusions therefrom.
It would have been a matter for England and France to
defend this air base. It was our affair, at any rate, to
prevent the possibility of such an attack taking place. I
believed that I could achieve this end in a natural and
simple way. It was not until I saw that such an attempt was
doomed to fail, and that the anti-German elements would once
more gain the upper hand, and it was not until I also saw
that this State had for a long time lost its inner capacity
to live and that it had already collapsed, that I re-
enforced ancient German right and reunited what had to be
united by history, geographical position and all rules of
common-sense.
Not for the purpose of suppressing the Czech people! It
will have more freedom than the oppressed peoples of the
virtuous nations!
I have, so I believe, thereby rendered a great service
to peace, for I have in good time made valueless an
instrument that was designed to become effective in time of
war against Germany.
If people now say that this is the signal for Germany's
desire to attack the whole world, then I do not believe they
mean it seriously; such a statement could only be the
expression of the
60 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
very worst of consciences. Perhaps it is anger at the
failure of a far-reaching plan; perhaps it is belief that
the premises can thereby be created for a new policy of
encirclement? Whatever the case may be, I am convinced that
I have thereby rendered a great service to peace.
And it is from this conviction that I determined three
weeks ago to give the coming Party Rally the name of "Party
Rally of Peace." For Germany does not dream of attacking
other nations.
What we do not, however, desire to renounce is the
extension of our economic relations. To this we have a
right, and I do not accept orders in this respect from any
statesman inside or outside Europe!
The German Reich is not only a great producer, but also
a tremendous consumer. In the same way as we become an
unreplaceable commercial partner as consumer, so are we
suited as a producer honestly to pay for what we consume.
We do not dream of waging war on other nations,
subject, of course, to their leaving us in peace also. The
German Reich is, however, in no case prepared permanently to
tolerate intimidation, or even a policy of encirclement.
I once concluded an agreement with England-the Naval
Agreement. It is based on the ardent desire, shared by us
all, never to be forced to fight a war against England. This
desire can, however, only be a reciprocal one. If it no
longer exists in England, then the practical premises for
the agreement have been removed. Germany would accept even a
situation of this kind with calm composure! We are so sure
of ourselves because we are strong, and we are strong
because we are united, and also because we keep our eyes
open! And in this town more than elsewhere I can only urge
you to look at the world and all happenings therein around
us with open eyes. Do not deceive yourselves regarding the
most important prerequisite which exists in life, namely,
the necessary power at one's own disposal. He who does not
possess power loses the right to live! We have had fifteen
years' experience of such a condition. That is why I have
made Germany strong again and why I have created a defence
force on land, on the waters and in the air.
But when there is talk in other countries of present
rearmament and of continued and still greater rearmament,
then I can
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 61
only say to these statesmen: it will not be me whom they
will tire out!
I am determined to continue to march along this road,
and I am convinced that we shall advance faster than the
others. No Power in the world will ever wheedle our arms
from us by mere words. But should anyone at any time show
any desire to measure his strength against ours by force,
then the German people will always be in a position and
ready and determined to do the same!
And our friends think just as we do, especially the
State with which we are closely bound and with which we
march, now, and in all circumstances, and for all time. When
hostile journalists do not know what else to write about,
then they write of cracks in the Axis. They can be at ease.
This Axis is the most natural political instrument in
the world. It is a political combination of ideas which owes
its existence not only to reason and the desire for justice,
but also to strength inspired by idealism.
This structure will hold out better than the present
alliances of non-homogeneous bodies on the other side. For
if anybody tells me to-day that there are no differences in
world outlook or ideologies between England and Soviet
Russia, I can only say: I congratulate you, Gentlemen.
I believe we shall not have long to wait before we see
that the unity in world outlook between Fascist Italy and
National Socialist Germany is, after all, different from
that between democratic Great Britain and the Bolshevik
Russia of Stalin.
But if there should really be no ideological difference
between them, then I can only say: how right is, after all,
my attitude towards Marxism, communism and to democracy! Why
two apparitions, when after all they are made of the same
substance?
We are experiencing in these days a very great triumph
and a feeling of deep inner satisfaction. A country that was
also devastated by bolshevism, in which hundreds and
thousands of human beings, women, men, children and old
people, were slaughtered, has liberated itself, and
liberated itself in spite of ideological friends of
bolshevism who sit in Great Britain, France and other
countries.
We can only too well understand this Spain in her
struggle,
62 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
and we greet her and congratulate her on her victory. We
Germans can say so with special pride, for many young German
men have done their duty there.
They have helped as volunteers to break a tyrannical
regime and to recover for a nation its right to self-
determination. We are glad to see how quickly, yes, how
extremely quickly, here also a change in the world outlook
of the suppliers of war material to the Red side has come
about, how extensively one now suddenly understands National
Spain and how ready one is to do business with this National
Spain, perhaps not ideological business, but at least
economic business!
This also is an indication of the direction
developments are taking. For I believe that all States will
have to face the same problems that we once had to face.
State after State will either succumb to the Jewish
Bolshevik pest or will ward it off. We have done so, and we
have now erected a national German People's State.
This People's State desires to live in peace and
friendship with every other State, it will, however, never
again permit itself to be forced to its knees by any other
State.
I do not know whether the world will become Fascist! I
do not believe that the world will become National
Socialist! But that the world will in the end ward off this
worst form of bolshevistic threat in existence, of that I am
absolutely convinced.
And, therefore, I believe in a conclusive understanding
among peoples which will come sooner or later. There is no
point in bringing about co-operation among nations, based
upon permanent understanding, until this Jewish fission-
fungus of peoples has been removed.
To-day we must depend upon our own power! And we can be
satisfied with results of this confidence in ourselves! At
home and abroad!
When I came into power, Germany was torn and impotent
at home, and abroad a toy of foreign will. To-day we have
order at home and our economy is flourishing. Abroad we are
perhaps not popular, but we are respected. That is the
decisive factor. Above all, we have given millions of our
"Volksgenossen" the greatest happiness they could have
wished for: their home-coming into our Great German Reich.
And, secondly, we have given great happiness to Central
Europe, namely, peace, peace pro-
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 63
tected by German power. And this power shall not be broken
again by any force in the world. That shall be our oath.
We thus realise that the "Volksgenossen," more than 2
million in number, who died in the Great War, did not die in
vain. From their sacrifice a new Great German Reich has
arisen. From their sacrifice this strong young German Reich
of the "Volk" has been called to life and has now stood its
test in life.
And in the face of this sacrifice, we would not fear
any sacrifice if it should ever become necessary. This the
world should take note of!
They can conclude agreements, make declarations, as
many as they like: I put my trust not in scraps of paper,
but I put my trust in you, my "Volksgenossen."
Germans have been the victims of the greatest breach of
promise of all time. Let us see to it that our people at
home may never again become easy to break up, then no one in
the world will ever be able to threaten us. Then peace will
be maintained for our people or, if necessary, it will be
enforced. And then our people will flourish and prosper.
It will be able to place its genius, its capability,
its diligence, and its perseverance at the disposal of the
work of peace and home culture. That is our desire; it is
that which we hope and in which we believe.
Twenty years ago the party was founded, at that time a
very small structure. Recall the distance covered from that
time until to-day. Recall the extent of the miracle that has
been worked upon us. And have faith, therefore, by the very
reason of our miraculous progress, in the further road of
the German people in the coming great future!
Germany: Sieg-Heil! Sieg-Heil! Sieg-Heil!
No. 21.
Extract from speech by Herr Hitler to the Reichstag on
April 28, 1939.
(Translation.)
I believe that it is a good thing for millions and
millions of people that I, thanks to the last-minute insight
of responsible men on the other side, succeeded in averting
such an explosion, and
64 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
found a solution which I am convinced has finally abolished
this problem of a source of danger in Central Europe.
The contention that this solution is contrary to the
Munich Agreement can neither be supported nor confirmed.
This agreement could, under no circumstances, be regarded as
final, because it admitted that other problems required and
remained to be solved. We cannot really be reproached for
the fact that the parties concerned-and this is the deciding
factor-did not turn to the four Powers, but only to Italy
and Germany; nor yet for the fact that the State as such
finally split up of its own accord, and there was,
consequently, no longer any Czecho-Slovakia. It was,
however, understandable that, long after the ethnographic
principle had been made invalid, Germany should take under
her protection her interests dating back a thousand years,
which are not only of a political but also of an economic
nature.
The future will show whether the solution which Germany
has found is right or wrong. However, it is certain that the
solution is not subject to English supervision or criticism.
For Bohemia and Moravia, as the remnants of former Czecho-
Slovakia, have nothing more whatever to do with the Munich
Agreement. Just as English measures in, say, Northern
Ireland, whether they be right or wrong, are not subject to
German supervision or criticism, this is also the case with
these old German electorates.
However, I entirely fail to understand how the
agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain and myself at
Munich can refer to this case, for the case of Czecho-
Slovakia was settled in the Munich protocol of the four
Powers as far as it could be settled at all at that time.
Apart from this, provision was merely made that if the
interested parties should fail to come to an agreement they
should be entitled to appeal to the four Powers, who had
agreed in such a case to meet for further consultation after
the expiration of three months. However, these interested
parties did not appeal to the four Powers at all, but only
to Germany and Italy. That this was fully justified,
moreover, is proved by the fact that neither England nor
France have raised any objections thereto, but have
themselves accepted the decision given by Germany and Italy.
No, the agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain and myself
did not relate to this problem but exclusively to questions
which refer to the mutual relationship between Eng-
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 65
land and Germany. This is clearly shown by the fact that
such questions are to be treated in future in the spirit of
the Munich Agreement and of the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement, that is, in a friendly spirit by way of
consultation. If, however, this agreement were to be applied
to every future German activity of a political nature,
England too should not take any step, whether in Palestine
or elsewhere, without first consulting Germany. It is
obvious that we do not expect this; likewise we refuse to
gratify any similar expectation of us. Now, if Mr.
Chamberlain concludes from this, that the Munich Agreement
is for this reason annulled, as if we had broken it, then I
shall take cognisance of the fact and proceed accordingly.
During the whole of my political activity I have always
expounded the idea of a close friendship and collaboration
between Germany and England. In my movement I found
innumerable others of like mind. Perhaps they joined me
because of my attitude in this matter. This desire for Anglo-
German friendship and co-operation conforms not merely to
sentiments which result from the racial origins of our two
peoples, but also to my realisation of the importance for
the whole of mankind of the existence of the British Empire.
I have never left room for any doubt of my belief that the
existence of this empire is an inestimable factor of value
for the whole of human cultural and economic life. By
whatever means Great Britain has acquired her colonial
territories-and I know that they were those of force and
often brutality-nevertheless, I know full well that no other
empire has ever come into being in any other way, and that
in the final resort it is not so much the methods that are
taken into account in history as success, and not the
success of the methods as such, but rather the general good
which the methods yield. Now there is no doubt that the
Anglo-Saxon people have accomplished immeasurable colonising
work in the world. For this work I have a sincere
admiration. The thought of destroying this labour appeared
and still appears to me, seen from a higher human point of
view, as nothing but the effluence of human wanton
destructiveness. However, this sincere respect of mine for
this achievement does not mean forgoing the securing of the
life of my own people. I regard it as impossible to achieve
a lasting friendship between the German and Anglo-Saxon
peoples if the other side does not
66 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
recognise that there are German as well as British
interests, that not only is the preservation of the British
Empire the meaning and purpose of the lives of Britishers,
but also that for Germans the freedom and preservation of
the German Reich is their life purpose. A genuine, lasting
friendship between these two nations is only conceivable on
the basis of mutual regards. The English people rules a
great empire. It built up this empire at a time when the
German people was internally weak. Previously Germany had
been a great empire. At one time she ruled the Occident In
bloody struggles and religious dissensions, and as a result
of internal political disintegration, this empire declined
in power and greatness, and finally fell into a deep sleep.
But as this old empire appeared to have reached its end, the
seeds of its rebirth were springing up. From Brandenburg and
Prussia there arose a new Germany, the second Reich, and out
of it has grown at last the German People's Reich. And I
hope that all English people understand that we do not
possess the slightest feeling of inferiority to Britishers.
Our historical past is far too tremendous for that!
England has given the world many great men and Germany
no fewer. The severe struggle for the maintenance of the
life of our people has in the course of three centuries cost
a sacrifice in lives which far exceeds that which other
peoples have had to make in asserting their existence.
If Germany, a country that was for ever being attacked,
was not able to retain her possessions, but was compelled to
sacrifice many of her provinces, this was due only to her
political misdevelopment and her impotence as a result
thereof! That condition has now keen overcome. Therefore, we
Germans do not feel in the least inferior to the British
nation. Our self-esteem is just as great as that of an
Englishman for England. In the history of our people, now of
approximately two thousand years' standing, there are
occasions and actions enough to fill us with sincere pride.
Now, if England cannot understand our point of view,
thinking perchance she may look upon Germany as a vassal
State, then our love and friendly feelings have, indeed,
been wasted on England. We shall not despair or lose heart
on that account, but-relying on the consciousness of our own
strength and on the
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 67
strength of our friends-we shall then find ways and means to
secure our independence without impairing our dignity.
I have heard the statement of the British Prime
Minister to the effect that he is not able to put any trust
in German assurances. Under the circumstances I consider it
a matter of course that we no longer wish to expect him or
the British people to bear the burden of a situation which
is only conceivable in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.
When Germany became National Socialist and thus paved the
way for her national resurrection, in pursuance of my
unswerving policy of friendship with England, of my own
accord I made the proposal for a voluntary restriction of
German naval armaments. That restriction was, however, based
on one condition, namely, the will and the conviction that a
war between England and Germany would never again be
possible. This wish and this conviction is alive in me to-
day.
I am, however, now compelled to state that the policy
of England is both unofficially and officially leaving no
doubt about the fact that such a conviction is no longer
shared in London, and that, on the contrary, the opinion
prevails there that no matter in what conflict Germany
should some day be entangled, Great Britain would always
have to take her stand against Germany. Thus a war against
Germany is taken for granted in that country. I most
profoundly regret such a development, for the only claim I
have ever made, and shall continue to make, on England is
that for a return of our colonies. But I always made it very
clear that this would never become the cause of a military
conflict. I have always held that the English, to whom those
colonies are of no value, would one day understand the
German situation and would then value German friendship
higher than the possession of territories which, while
yielding no real profit whatever to them, are of vital
importance to Germany.
Apart from this, however, I have never advanced a claim
which might in any way have interfered with British
interests or have become a danger to the Empire and thus
have meant any kind of damage to England. I have always kept
within the limit of such demands as are intimately connected
with Germany's living space and thus the eternal property of
the German nation. Since England to-day, both by the press
and officially, upholds the view that Germany should be
opposed under all circumstances, and con-
68 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
firms this by the policy of encirclement known to us, the
basis for the Naval Treaty has been removed. I have
therefore resolved to send to-day a communication to this
effect to the British Government. This is to us not a matter
of practical material importance-for I still hope that we
shall be able to avoid an armaments race with England-but an
action of self-respect. Should the British Government,
however, wish to enter once more into negotiations with
Germany on this problem, no one would be happier than I at
the prospect of still being able to come to a clear and
straightforward understanding.
No. 22.
Memorandum from the German Government denouncing the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement.
(Translation.)
WHEN in the year 1935 the German Government made the
British Government the offer to bring the strength of the
German fleet to a fixed proportion of the strength of the
naval forces of the British Empire by means of a treaty, it
did so on the basis of the firm conviction that for all time
the recurrence of a warlike conflict between Germany and
Great Britain was excluded. In voluntarily recognising the
priority of British interests at sea through the offer of
the ratio 100:35 it believed that, by means of this
decision, unique in the history of the Great Powers, it was
taking a step which would lead to the establishment of a
friendly relationship for all time between the two nations.
This step on the part of the German Government was naturally
conditional on the British Government for their part also
being determined to adopt a political attitude which would
assure a friendly development of Anglo-German relations.
On this basis and under these conditions was the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement on the 18th June, 1935, brought into
being. This was expressed in agreement by both parties on
the conclusion of the agreement. Moreover, last autumn after
the Munich Conference the German Chancellor and the British
Prime Minister solemnly confirmed in the declaration, which
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 69
they signed, that they regarded the agreement as symbolical
of the desire of both peoples never again to wage war on one
another.
The German Government has always adhered to this wish
and is still to-day inspired by it. It is conscious of
having acted accordingly in its policy and of having in no
case intervened in the sphere of English interests or of
having in any way encroached on these interests. On the
other hand it must to its regret take note of the fact that
the British Government of late is departing more and more
from the course of an analogous policy towards Germany. As
is clearly shown by the political decisions made known by
the British Government in the last weeks as well as by the
inspired anti-German attitude of the English press, the
British Government is now governed by the opinion that
England, in whatever part of Europe Germany might be
involved in warlike conflict, must always take up an
attitude hostile to Germany, even in a case where English
interests are not touched in any way by such a conflict. The
British Government thus regards war by England against
Germany no longer as an impossibility, but on the contrary
as a capital problem of English foreign policy.
By means of this encirclement policy the British
Government has unilaterally deprived the Naval Agreement of
the 18th June, 1935, of its basis, and has thus put out of
force this agreement as well as the complementary
declaration of the 17th July, 1937.
The same applies to Part III of the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of the 17th July, 1937, in which the obligation is
laid down to make a mutual Anglo-German exchange of
information. The execution of this obligation rests
naturally on the condition that a relationship of open
confidence should exist between two partners. Since the
German Government to its regret can no longer regard this
relationship as existing, it must also regard the provisions
of Part III referred to above as having lapsed.
The qualitative provisions of the Anglo-German
Agreement of the 17th July, 1937, remain unaffected by these
observations which have been forced upon the German
Government against its will. The German Government will
abide by these provisions also in the future and so make its
contribution to the avoidance of a general unlimited race in
the naval armaments of the nations.
Moreover, the German Government, should the British
Government desire to enter into negotiations with Germany,
in re-
70 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
gard to the future problems here arising, is gladly ready to
do so. It would welcome it if it then proved possible to
reach a clear and categorical understanding on a sure basis.
Berlin, April 27, 1939.
No. 23.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
Sir, Foreign Office,
June 16, 1939.
THE German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office this
morning to sign a technical agreement of no great importance
between the two Governments, and I had a few moments'
conversation with him afterwards. In part this followed the
familiar line of assertion on his part of the effect that
was being produced in Germany by encirclement. The
Ambassador expressed the view that, just as the old phrase
"The Fleet in being" suggested pressure even without overt
action, so now the regrouping of Powers that we were
organising was, in fact, designed to operate as coercive
pressure on Germany, and it was this which was resented. His
Excellency said, and made the same observation at a later
stage in our conversation, that much of the feeling at the
present time was due to all the discussion about our anti-
aggression negotiations with Russia. In his view the
situation would be easier when these negotiations were
settled one way or the other. I thought this observation
perhaps not without significance.
2. I replied by saying that, if anybody was encircling
Germany, it was herself by the policy that she persisted in
pursuing. Whatever might be thought about the policy now
being pursued by this country, it seemed to us quite plain
that the German Chancellor had broken the china in Europe
and it was only he who could put it together again. We
repeatedly made efforts from this side to open the way to a
diminution of tension and improvement of relations, but this
had so far elicited nothing in the nature of response from
Herr Hitler.
3. I told Herr von Dirksen that I hoped he would let me
know if at any time he had anything that he might wish to
communicate
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 71
to me that he thought of value, and he replied by expressing
a similar wish that I would not hesitate at any time to send
for him.
I am, &c.
HALIFAX.
No. 24.
Memorandum from His Majesty's Government of June 23, 1939,
replying to the German memorandum * denouncing the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement.
General Considerations.
IN their memorandum of the 27th April last the German
Government state that, in making their offer in 1935 to
limit themselves to a percentage of the British naval
forces, they did so "on a basis of the firm conviction that
for all time the recurrence of a warlike conflict between
Germany and Great Britain was excluded."
2. The German Government justify their action in
terminating the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, the
Supplementary Declaration of 1937, and Part III of the Naval
Agreement of 1937, on the ground that the attitude of His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom showed that they
now held the view that, in whatever part of Europe Germany
might be involved in warlike conflict, Great Britain must
always be hostile to Germany even in cases where English
interests were not touched by such a conflict.
3. The question whether the attitude of His Majesty's
Government can in any case justify the German Government in
terminating these instruments without, at least, previous
consultation between the two Governments is dealt with
hereafter. It is not the case that in whatever part of
Europe Germany might be involved in warlike conflict Great
Britain must always take up an attitude hostile to Germany.
Great Britain could only be hostile to Germany if Germany
were to commit an act of aggression against another country;
and the political decision, to which it is understood the
German Government refer in their memorandum
* No. 22.
72 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
involving guarantees by Great Britain to certain countries,
could only operate if the countries concerned were to be
attacked by Germany.
4. In the memorandum from the German Government the
claim is made to describe British policy as a policy of
encirclement. This description is without any justification,
and indicates a misunderstanding and misreading of British
purposes which must be corrected.
5. The action recently taken by the German Government
to incorporate certain territories in the Reich, whatever
may have been held by them to be the justifying reasons, has
undoubtedly resulted in a great increase of anxiety in many
quarters. The actions subsequently taken by the United
Kingdom Government have no other purpose than to contribute
to the removal of this anxiety, by assisting smaller nations
to feel secure in the enjoyment of their independence, to
which they have the same right as Great Britain or Germany
herself. The commitments which Great Britain has recently
undertaken in pursuance of this purpose are limited, and as
stated above could only become effective if the countries
concerned were the victims of aggression.
6. Nor have His Majesty's Government either the
intention or the desire to restrict the development of
German trade. On the contrary, under the Anglo-German
Payments Agreement a considerable supply of free exchange
has been made available to Germany for the acquisition of
raw materials. This agreement is as favourable to Germany as
any which has been concluded, and His Majesty's Government
would look forward to further discussion of measures for the
improvement of Germany's economic position, if only the
essential pre-condition could be secured, namely, the
establishment of mutual confidence and goodwill which is the
necessary preliminary to calm and unprejudiced negotiation.
7. The consistent desire of His Majesty's Government,
far from being the promotion of a war with Germany, has been
and is to establish Anglo-German relations on the basis of
the mutual recognition of the needs of both countries,
consistently with due regard for the rights of other
nations.
8. But, while for these reasons His Majesty's Government
cannot agree that there has been any change in their policy
or
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 73
attitude which would justify the recent action of the German
Government, they must add that in their view the main object
of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was to introduce an
element of stability into the naval situation and to avoid
unnecessary competition in armaments.
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.
9. For this reason the Agreements contained no
provision for unilateral denunciation at the instance of one
of the parties alone, but clearly contemplated termination
or modification only by mutual consultation-a procedure
which His Majesty's Government regret that the German
Government have not seen their way to adopt in the present
case. The Agreement of 1935, indeed, was expressly stated to
be permanent in character, and His Majesty's Government
would draw the attention of the German Government to the
actual terms of the Exchange of Notes of the 18th June,
1935, which constituted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
that year, from which both the character of the Agreement
and the circumstances in which its modification was
contemplated are made absolutely clear.
10. In the opening Note, Sir Samuel Hoare referred to
the conversations which had taken place "the primary purpose
of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a
general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval
armaments." He then referred to the German proposal for a
ratio of 100:35 between the fleets of the British
Commonwealth and Germany and said that "His Majesty's
Government regard this proposal as a contribution of the
greatest importance to future naval limitation." He
expressed the belief that the Agreement would "facilitate
the conclusion of a general agreement on the subject of
naval limitation between all the naval Powers of the world."
11. In his reply of the same date, Herr von Ribbentrop
recapitulated the terms of Sir Samuel Hoare's Note and
confirmed that it correctly set forth the proposal of the
German Government. He expressed the opinion that the
Agreement "will facilitate the conclusion of a general
agreement on this question between all the naval Powers of
the world."
12. The wording of the notes thus shows clearly that
the
74 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Agreement was regarded as a contribution to the solution of
the problem of naval limitation. If the German Government
now allege that the Agreement has a different meaning, His
Majesty's Government must observe that such an allegation
finds no warrant in the terms of the Agreement itself,
comprehensive and detailed though they were.
13. The Agreement was equally clear on the subject of
its duration. In Sir Samuel Hoare's Note it is stated to be
"a permanent and definite Agreement as from to-day." Herr
von Ribbentrop in his reply stated that the German
Government also regarded it "as a permanent and definite
agreement with effect from to-day."
14. In paragraph 2 (a) of the Notes it is stated that
"the ratio of 35:100 is to be a permanent relationship,
i.e., the total tonnage of the German Fleet shall never
exceed a percentage of 35 of the aggregate tonnage of the
naval forces of the members of the British Commonwealth."
15. In paragraph 2 (c) of the Notes it is stated that
"Germany will adhere to the 35:100 in all circumstances,
e.g., the ratio will not be affected by the construction of
other Powers. If the general equilibrium of naval armaments,
as normally maintained in the past, should be violently
upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other
Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine
the new situation thus created." This was the only provision
which contemplated any general modification (i.e., apart
from the special case of submarines) of the terms of the
Agreement; and it will be observed that the only condition
foreseen that might entail modification was a violent
disturbance of the general equilibrium of naval armaments.
Moreover, under the terms of the Agreement modification
could even then only take place after the situation had been
examined in consultation with His Majesty's Government.
16. The German Government, however, do not maintain
that such a condition in fact exists. Still less have they
invited His Majesty's Government to examine the situation
before taking their action. That such consultation was
essential is further clear from paragraph 3 of the Notes,
which states that His Majesty's Government recognised
Germany's right to depart from the 35
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 75
per cent. ratio in the circumstances contemplated by
paragraph 2 (c) "on the understanding that the 35:100 ratio
will be maintained in default of agreement to the contrary
between the two Governments."
17. Even if the memorandum which the German Government
have now addressed to His Majesty's Government is intended
to be read, not as a denunciation, but as a statement of the
opinion of the German Government that His Majesty's
Government have so acted as to cause the Agreement to lose
its force, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that such a
plea could properly be advanced without any prior
consultation between the two Governments as a reason for non-
compliance with the express terms of the Agreement.
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1937.
18. Considerations of a similar character apply to the
German action regarding Part III of the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of the 17th July, 1937. This Agreement also makes
no provision for unilateral denunciation or modification
apart from the special cases contemplated by the so-called
"escalator clauses" which are not here relevant. Apart from
these, the Agreement is expressed to "remain in force until
the 31st December, 1942."
19. This Agreement is, moreover, complementary to the
London Naval Treaty of 1936, to which France, Italy and the
United States are also parties, and to similar agreements
between His Majesty's Government and other naval Powers. All
these instruments have as their object the avoidance of a
useless and expensive competition in naval armaments. This
may arise by one country producing special types of ships to
which others feel they must reply; or by uncertainty as to
the actions and intentions of others and the suspicion that
large numbers of ships are being built which must then be
matched by competitive building on the part of those
affected. The qualitative limits of these agreements are
therefore designed to prevent useless competition in types,
and the provisions for exchange of information are designed
to destroy unfounded suspicions of excessive building. Even
if the relations between two countries were not good, this
would not
76 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
appear to His Majesty's Government to afford ground for
terminating an agreement which eliminates unprofitable
competition, and prevents a wasteful race in armaments which
can benefit neither party.
Qualitative limitation.
20. It is in the light of these considerations,
presumably, that the German Government desire the
"qualitative provisions of the Anglo-German Agreement of the
17th July, 1937, to remain unaffected." In principle, His
Majesty's Government would share this desire: but they are
bound to point out that the retention of the qualitative
provisions alone will not suffice to create that feeling of
mutual security, to which it was the purpose of the Anglo-
German Agreement to contribute, and of which the provisions
for the exchange of information were the expression. His
Majesty's Government would, however, at all times be ready
to consider with the German Government the possibility in
the words of their Note of reaching "a clear and categorical
understanding" on a sure basis.
21. From the terms in which the German Government
announced their decision to retain the qualitative limits of
the 1937 Agreement, it is not clear what are the exact
limitations by which they consider themselves to be bound in
the matter of cruisers. The qualitative limits of cruisers
are fixed by Article 6 (1) of the Anglo-German Agreement of
1937 as 8,000 tons displacement with guns not exceeding 6.1-
inch calibre, and it is by this limit that all signatory
Powers of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 are also bound.
Although Article 6 (2) of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1937
permitted Germany under certain circumstances to increase
her 8-inch gun cruiser tonnage, she was in practice
precluded from building more than five such cruisers by the
limits of her quota under the 1935 Agreement. Now that the
German Government have terminated the latter Agreement, the
position with regard to cruiser limits is no longer clear,
but it is presumed that the limit to which the German
Government intend to adhere is that of 8,000 tons and 6.1-
inch guns. The German Government are requested to confirm
this assumption.
22. The past forecasts of strength at the end of 1942
and 1943
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 77
that His Majesty's Government have made to the German
Government have been given solely for the purpose of
implementing the provisions of the 1935 Agreement. It is
clear that no further forecasts will be necessary since they
were designed merely to allow Germany to make full use of
her 1935 quota. But if Germany is to be no longer bound to
the limit of 35 per cent. specified in the Agreement, it
should be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government
can no longer be bound by their past forecasts of strength,
which must therefore be considered to be cancelled.
23. In the last paragraph of their memorandum the
German Government declare that they are ready to enter into
negotiations in regard to future problems, if His Majesty's
Government desire to do so. As indicated above, there
results from the recent German action a situation which is
in some respects uncertain, and an exchange of views would
help to clarify it. For instance, besides the question of
tonnage and gun limits for cruisers, it is desirable to know
whether the German Government intend to regard themselves as
bound by all the articles of the Agreement of 1937 other
than those in Part III.
24. If, however, what the German Government contemplate
is the negotiation of another Agreement to replace those
provisions which they have now terminated, His Majesty's
Government would be glad to receive some indication of the
scope and purpose which the German Government would consider
appropriate to such an Agreement.
25. In particular His Majesty's Government desire to
know, first, when, in the German view, discussions for the
conclusion of such an Agreement should take place. Secondly,
His Majesty's Government desire to know how the German
Government would propose to ensure that any action in the
shape of denunciation or modification of the new Agreement
during the terms of its validity should carry the consent of
both parties.
78 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 25.
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at
Chatham House on June 29, 1939.
WHEN I look back to the speech which I delivered at the
Chatham House Dinner in June a year ago, I am conscious, as
we all are, of the great changes that have taken place. A
year ago we had undertaken no specific commitments on the
Continent of Europe, beyond those which had then existed for
some considerable time and are familiar to you all. To-day
we are bound by new agreements for mutual defence with
Poland and Turkey: we have guaranteed assistance to Greece
and Roumania against aggression, and we are now engaged with
the Soviet Government in a negotiation, to which I hope
there may very shortly be a successful issue, with a view to
associating them with us for the defence of States in Europe
whose independence and neutrality may be threatened. We have
assumed obligations, and are preparing to assume more, with
full understanding of their causes and with full
understanding of their consequences. We know that, if the
security and independence of other countries are to
disappear, our own security and our own independence will be
gravely threatened. We know that, if international law and
order is to be preserved, we must be prepared to fight in
its defence.
In the past we have always stood out against the
attempt by any single Power to dominate Europe at the
expense of the liberties of other nations, and British
policy is, therefore, only following the inevitable line of
its own history, if such an attempt were to be made again.
But it is not enough to state a policy. What matters is,
firstly, to convince the nation that the policy is right,
and secondly, to take the steps necessary for that policy to
succeed. I believe that at no time since the War has there
been such national unity on the main essentials of our
foreign policy, and that with this spirit of unity goes a
deep and widespread determination to make that policy
effective. But I believe, too, that among all classes of our
people who, in virtue of their common citizenship, are being
called upon to defend their country, and the causes for
which it stands, there is an increasing desire to look
beyond the immediate present, and to see before them some
goal for which they would willingly sacrifice their leisure
and, if need be, their lives.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 79
We are already asking for great sacrifices from all
ages and classes in the call for national service. In one
way and another, every man and woman has a part to play, and
I know is prepared to do so. The immense effort that the
country is making in equipping itself for defence at sea, in
the air and on land is without parallel in peace time. We
have an unchallengeable Navy. Our Air Force, still
undergoing an expansion which has outstripped all
expectations of a few months ago, has now nothing to fear
from any other. I have little doubt that its personnel, in
spirit and in skill, is superior to all others. Our army,
once derided, but which survived to prove its worth so that
it made a boast of that derision, is, no doubt, small in
comparison with that of some other countries. But, as
happened once before, we are creating here also a powerful
weapon for the defence of our own liberty and that of other
peoples. With every week that passes, that effort gains
momentum, and on every side of life, political,
administrative, industrial, we have abundant evidence of how
firmly this national effort is driven and supported by the
people's will. Behind all our military effort stand the
British people, more united than ever before, and at their
service their wealth and industrial resources. These, again,
are the object of contemptuous reference, but they have been
earned by the labour, skill and courage of our people. None
of this formidable array of strength will be called into
play except in defence against aggression. No blow will be
struck, no shot fired. Of the truth of that, everyone in
this country is convinced. I believe, myself, that most
people in other countries really accept it in spite of the
propaganda that dins into their ears the contrary. What is
also now fully and universally accepted in this country, but
what may not even yet be as well understood elsewhere, is
that, in the event of further aggression, we are resolved to
use at once the whole of our strength in fulfilment of our
pledges to resist it.
These great changes in our national life could not,
indeed, be brought about, were they not backed by deep
conviction, which is immensely strengthened by what we hear
and read almost daily from other parts of the world. We are
often told that, though once we were a great nation, our
ways are now old-fashioned, and that our democracy has no
life in it. We read the mischievous misrepresentations of
our actions and of our motives, which some people in
countries holding a different international philos-
80 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
ophy from our own think fit to make. We read them with
resentment, knowing that they are false and knowing that
those who make them know it, too. These things do not pass
unnoticed here, nor, I may say, do provocative insults
offered to our fellow-countrymen further afield. I can say
at once that Great Britain is not prepared to yield either
to calumnies or force. It may afford some satisfaction to
those who have pronounced our nation to be decadent to learn
that they themselves have found the cure-and one most
effective. Every insult that is offered to our people, every
rude challenge that is made to what we value and are
determined to defend, only unites us, increases our
determination and strengthens our loyalty to those others
who share our feelings and aspirations. Over a large part of
the world the old standards of conduct and of ordinary human
decency, which man had laboriously built up, are being set
aside. Things are being done to-day which we can hardly read
without amazement; so alien are they to our conception of
how men should deal with their fellow-men. Rules of conduct
between nations are overridden with the same callous
indifference as rules of conduct between man and man.
The first thing, therefore, which we have to do is to
see that our own standards of conduct do not deteriorate. On
that point there must be-and I know there is-complete
national unity. We respect our fellow-men. We know that
without that there can be no real self-respect either for
individuals, or, in the long run, for nations. The day that
we lose our respect for our fellowmen, our democracy would
have lost something on which its vitality depends, and would
justly become what our critics like to think it, moribund,
and dead, for it would, indeed, have lost the right to live.
If, then we hold fast to these principles, what is the
application of them to our foreign policy? At a time when
our aims are being constantly misrepresented, it is perhaps
well to restate them boldly and with such plainness of
speech as I can command. And I would try to deal briefly
both with our aims in the immediate present, and our aims in
the future; what we are doing now and what we should like to
see done as soon as circumstances make it possible.
Our first resolve is to stop aggression. I need not
recapitulate the acts of aggression which have taken place,
or the effect they
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 81
have had upon the general trust that European nations feel
able to place in words and undertakings. For that reason,
and for that reason alone, we have joined with other nations
to meet a common danger. These arrangements we all know, and
the world knows, have no purpose other than defence. They
mean what they say-no more and no less. But they have been
denounced as aiming at the isolation-or, as it is called,
the encirclement-of Germany and Italy, and as designed to
prevent them from acquiring the living space necessary for
their national existence. I shall deal with these charges to-
night, and I propose to do so with complete frankness.
We are told that our motives are to isolate Germany
within a ring of hostile States, to stifle her natural
outlets, to cramp and throttle the very existence of a great
nation. What are the facts? They are very simple and
everybody knows them. Germany is isolating herself, and
doing it most successfully and completely. She is isolating
herself from other countries economically by her policy of
autarky, politically by a policy that causes constant
anxiety to other nations, and culturally by her policy of
racialism. If you deliberately isolate yourself from others
by your own actions you can blame nobody but yourself, and
so long as this isolation continues, the inevitable
consequences of it are bound to become stronger and more
marked. The last thing we desire is to see the individual
German man, or woman, or child suffering privations; but if
they do so, the fault does not lie with us, and it depends
on Germany and Germany alone whether this process of
isolation continues or not, for any day it can be ended by a
policy of co-operation. It is well that this should be
stated plainly so that there may be no misunderstanding here
or elsewhere.
I come next to Lebensraum. This word, of which we have
not heard the last, needs to be fairly and carefully
examined. Every developed community is, of course, faced
with the vital problem of living space. But the problem is
not solved simply by acquiring more territory. That may
indeed only make the problem more acute. It can only be
solved by wise ordering of the affairs of a country at home,
and by adjusting and improving its relations with other
countries abroad. Nations expand their wealth, and raise the
standard of living of their people by gaining the confi-
82 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
dence of their neighbours, and thus facilitating the flow of
goods between them. The very opposite is likely to be the
consequence of action by one nation in suppression of the
independent existence of her smaller and weaker neighbours.
And if Lebensraum is to be applied in that sense, we reject
it and must resist its application. It is noteworthy that
this claim to "living space" is being put forward at a
moment when Germany has become an immigration country,
importing workers in large numbers from Czecho-Slovakia,
Holland and Italy to meet the needs of her industry and
agriculture. How then can Germany claim to be over-
populated? Belgium and Holland, and to a less extent our own
islands, have already proved that what is called over-
population can be prevented by productive work. The wide
spaces and the natural resources of the British Empire and
the United States of America were not able to save them from
widespread distress during the great slump of 1929 to 1932.
Economically the world is far too closely knit together for
any one country to hope to profit itself at the expense of
its neighbours, and no more than any other country can
Germany hope to solve her economic problems in isolation. It
is no doubt impossible at present for us to foresee the day
when all trade everywhere will be completely free. But it is
possible to make arrangements, given the opportunities,
which would greatly enlarge the area of freedom. Through co-
operation-and we, for our part, are ready to cooperate-there
is ample scope for extending to all nations the opportunity
of a larger economic life with all that this means, which is
implied in the term "Lebensraum."
If the world were organised on such lines, neither
Germany nor Italy need fear for her own safety, and no
nation could fail to profit from the immense material
benefits which the general application of science has
brought within universal reach. But no such society of
nations can be built upon force, in a world which lives in
fear of violence, and has to spend its substance in
preparing to resist it. It is idle to cry peace where there
is no peace, or to pretend to reach a settlement unless it
can be guaranteed by the reduction of warlike preparations,
and by the assured recognition of every nation's right to
the free enjoyment of its independence. At this moment the
doctrine of force bars the way to settlement, and fills the
world with envy, hatred, malice
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 83
and all uncharitableness. But if the doctrine of force were
once abandoned, so that the fear of war that stalks the
world was lifted, all outstanding questions would become
easier to solve. If all the effort which is now devoted to
the senseless multiplication of armaments, with the
consequent increase of insecurity and distrust, were to be
applied to the common peaceful development of resources, the
peoples of the world would soon find an incentive to work
together for the common good; they would realise that their
true interests do not conflict, and that progress and well-
being depend upon community of aim and effort. The nations
would then be in a position to discuss with real promise of
success both political grievances and economic difficulties,
whether in the international or colonial field.
This brings me to say something about the principles of
our colonial administration. There was a time when in the
British Empire, as elsewhere, colonies were regarded merely
as a source of wealth and a place of settlement for
Europeans. You have only to read any of the colonial
literature of those days to see for how little counted the
rights and welfare of the natives. But during the last half
century a very different view has gained ground, a view
which has been finely expressed in Article 22 of the
Covenant, namely, that the well-being and development of
"people not yet able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world" is "a sacred trust
of civilisation."
That trust has been steadily fulfilled since the War in
the case of the Mandated Territories, on which the operation
of the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant has
conferred immense benefits. The British Commonwealth is
fully aware of the heavy responsibility resting upon it to
see that, through respect for these principles, continuity
and development is assured to the native populations. The
mandatory system, in fact, derives from exactly the same
inspiration as that which governs British colonial
administrative policy. We have applied the same principles
to India and Burma, where they are now steadily at work on a
scale that twenty or thirty years ago would have seemed far
beyond the bounds of reasonable expectation. Within the last
few years we have seen the transformation of Eire into a
separate and independent member of the British Commonwealth,
enjoying with
84 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
our other partners of the Empire full Dominion status. For
many years we tried, as the phrase went, to hold Ireland,
under the mistaken belief, which is to-day invoked to
justify the subjection of Czecho-Slovakia, that it was
indispensable to our national security. But we have now
realised that our safety is not diminished, but immeasurably
increased, by a free and friendly Ireland. And so both here
and in every country for which we have been responsible we
have steadily moved in one direction. The whole picture is a
significant and faithful reflection of British thought,
projected into political form, and expressing itself,
through history and now, in the development of institutions.
We recognise, as the United States have recognised, that
self-government should be the ultimate goal of colonial
policy, a goal which is near or distant, according to the
capacity of the peoples concerned to manage their own
affairs. In one of your own studies, "The Colonial Problem,"
the type of research which enhances the name and reputation
of Chatham House, you have considered the question whether
colonies pay. You drew attention to the benefits of cheap
imports which the consumers of a country possessing colonies
obtain as the result of the relatively low cost of
production of certain commodities in colonial territories.
But under an international system, under which the present
trade barriers were to a great extent abolished, those
benefits, already shared as they are to a considerable
extent by many countries not possessing colonies, would be
shared still more widely. On all sides there could be more
free and ready access to markets and raw materials of the
world; wider channels of trade down which would flow the
goods which nations require to buy and sell. Such are some
of the possibilities within everybody's reach.
How does all this affect our wider problems? One of the
most significant facts in world history is the extent to
which the principle of trusteeship has come to be adopted in
the British Commonwealth during the last thirty years, and
there is surely something here that can be used for the
great benefit of mankind. Can we not look forward to a time
when there may be agreement on common methods and aims of
colonial development, which may ensure not only that the
universally acknowledged purpose of colonial administration
will be to help their inhabitants steadily to raise their
level of life, but also that colonial territories may
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 85
make a growing contribution to the world's resources? On
such an agreed foundation of purpose we hope that others
might be prepared with us to make their contribution to a
better world. If so, I have no doubt that in the conduct of
our colonial administration we should be ready to go far
upon the economic side, as we have already done on the
political side, in making wider application of the
principles which now obtain in the mandated territories,
including, on terms of reciprocity, that of the open door.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the colonial problem, or
of any other, I would not despair of finding ways of
settlement, once everybody has got the will to settle. But,
unless all countries do, in fact, desire a settlement,
discussions would only do more harm than good. It is,
moreover, impossible to negotiate with a Government whose
responsible spokesmen brand a friendly country as thieves
and blackmailers and indulge in daily monstrous slanders on
British policy in all parts of the world. But if that
spirit, which is clearly incompatible with any desire for a
peaceful settlement, gave way to something different, His
Majesty's Government would be ready to pool their best
thought with others in order to end the present state of
political and economic insecurity. If we could get so far,
what an immense stride the world would have made! We should
have exorcised the anxiety which is cramping and arresting
business expansion and we should have brought back an
atmosphere of confidence among nations and assurance for the
future among the youth of this and every other European
country. Our next task would be the reconstruction of the
international order on a broader and firmer foundation. That
is too large a topic for me to embark upon this evening, but
I should like to commend it to your thinking.
We must ask ourselves how far the failure of the League
was due to shortcomings in the Covenant itself, or how far
it was the absence of some of the greatest countries at
every stage of its history that has crippled both its moral
authority and strength. Is it beyond the political genius of
mankind to reconcile national individuality with
international collaboration? Can human purpose rise high
enough to solve the riddle? An examination of the history of
the Covenant may perhaps disclose that some of its
obligations were too loose and others too rigid. It has been
suggested, for instance, that some system of specific
regional guar-
86 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
antees for the preservation of the peace would be more
effective than the indefinite but universal obligations of
Articles 10 and 16, and it is not impossible that the
grouping of the Powers as it exists to-day, instead of
dividing Europe, might be so moulded as to become the embryo
of a better European system.
That is one side of the problem. But it is not enough
to devise measures for preventing the use of force to change
the status quo, unless there is also machinery for bringing
about peaceful change. For a living and changing world can
never be held in iron clamps, and any such attempt is the
high road to disaster. Changes in the relations, needs, and
outlook of nations are going on all the time. And there is
no more urgent need, if we are ever to find a workable
system of international organisation, than to invent
peaceful means by which such changes can be handled. To-day
when the European nations, forgetful of their common
civilisation, are arming to the teeth, it is more important
than ever that we should remind ourselves of the essential
unity of European civilisation. European minds meet across
political frontiers. With the same background of knowledge,
with the same heritage of culture, they study the same
problems; the work of the great masters of science, and
literature or art is the common property of all peoples; and
thinkers in every land exchange knowledge on equal and
friendly terms. Truly is a divided Europe a house divided
against itself. Our foreign policy must, therefore,
constantly bear in mind the immediate present and the more
distant future, the steps we are now taking and the goal to
which they are meant to lead.
I have strained your patience, but if you will allow me
a few moments more I will endeavour to pick up the threads
of my thought and perhaps make a few points more explicit.
British policy rests on twin foundations of purpose. One is
determination to resist force. The other is our recognition
of the world's desire to get on with the constructive work
of building peace. If we could once be satisfied that the
intentions of others were the same as our own, and that we
all really wanted peaceful solutions-then, I say here
definitely, we could discuss the problems that are to-day
causing the world anxiety. In such a new atmosphere we could
examine the colonial problem, the questions of raw
materials, trade barriers, the issue of Lebensraum, the
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 87
limitation of armaments, and any other issue that affects
the lives of all European citizens.
But that is not the position which we face to-day. The
threat of military force is holding the world to ransom, and
our immediate task is-and here I end as I began-to resist
aggression. I would emphasise that to-night with all the
strength at my command, so that nobody may misunderstand it.
And if we are ever to succeed in removing misunderstanding
and reaching a settlement which the world can trust, it must
be upon some basis more substantial than verbal
undertakings. It has been said that deeds, not words, are
necessary. That also is our view. There must be give and
take in practical form on both sides, for there can be no
firm bargains on the basis of giving something concrete in
return for mere assurances. None of us can in these days see
very far ahead in the world in which we live, but we can and
must always be sure of the general direction in which we
wish to travel. Let us, therefore, be very sure that,
whether or not we are to preserve for ourselves and for
others the things that we hold dear, depends in the last
resort upon ourselves, upon the strength of the personal
faith of each one of us, and upon our resolution to maintain
it.
DETERIORATION IN THE LOCAL SITUATION AT DANZIG.
No. 26.
Note from the President of the Danzig Senate to the Polish
Commissioner-General of June 3, 1939, about the
question of Polish Customs Inspectors.
(Translation.)
Mr. Minister,
SEVERAL months ago I had the honour to draw your
attention to the fact that the ever-increasing number of
Polish Customs Inspectors was not compatible with the
execution of their prescribed duties. Since the latest
additions there are now well over 100 Polish Customs
Inspectors in Danzig territory. Their behaviour, both in
their official and their private life, has given rise to
increasing complaint. The Danzig population, like the German
88 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
population, in their local frontier intercourse feel
themselves constantly offended by the way in which the
Polish Customs officials perform their duty and by their
behaviour in private life.
I have no fear that incidents on the part of the
population might arise on that account. Still less is the
safety of the Polish officials in any way endangered. I have
therefore taken steps to ensure that they may, as hitherto,
perform their duties absolutely safely and without
hindrance. I believe, however, that ways and means must be
found to eliminate the constant friction and tension.
For all these reasons I consider it necessary forthwith
to restrict the activity of the Polish Customs Inspectors to
a general supervision in conformity with the agreement. In
particular, I must urge that their official activities be
confined to the offices, and not performed outside of them.
I can also no longer permit the Danzig Customs officials to
take instructions, even in the form of suggestions, from the
Polish Customs officials. I will, however, see that
questions addressed to officials will be answered
officially.
I have directed the President of the Customs
Administration of the Free City to instruct his officials
accordingly. I have the honour, Mr. Minister, to request you
to inform your Government accordingly and to exert your
influence towards meeting the wishes of the Danzig
Government.
I avail myself of this opportunity to revert to our
conversation of the 8th February last. At that time I
explained to you, Mr. Minister, that I would give
instructions to abstain for the present from swearing in the
customs officials, and that, should the occasion arise, I
would communicate with you before administering the oath.
I have the honour to inform you, with reference to the
contents of my letter of the 3rd January last (pages 2 and
3), that I have now left it to the discretion of the Finance
Department of the Senate to administer the oath to the
customs officials if they regard it as desirable.
I have, &c.
GREISER
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 89
No. 27.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
June 11, 1939.
FOLLOWING is full summary of note, as published here,
addressed on 10th June by Polish Commissioner-General to
President of Danzig Senate in reply to latter's note of 3rd
June*:-
2. President of Senate's complaint of behaviour of
Polish Customs Inspectors on and off duty is not supported
by any proofs and must be regarded as unfounded. On the
other hand, behaviour of certain Danzig elements, including
Customs officials, has been highly provocative, as
Commissioner-General has frequently pointed out orally and
in writing. Polish Inspectors have reacted with dignity and
moderation and refused to be provoked. The Polish Government
still expect Senate to take measures to secure personal
safety of Polish Customs Inspectors to allow free execution
of their duty, with reference to Point 3 of Polish-Danzig
Agreement of 1922, which lays down that Polish officials in
Danzig should receive the same treatment as corresponding
Danzig officials.
3. As regards alleged excessive number of Polish
Customs officials, Polish Government, on the contrary,
consider it at present rather insufficient. This can be
shown by present state of affairs as regards handling of
goods in Danzig harbour and passenger traffic between Danzig
and Poland, and is partly due to obstruction encountered by
officials in execution of their duty.
4. Polish Government, moreover, cannot agree to any
restriction of activity of Polish Inspectors as forecast in
note of Danzig Senate. Present treaty arrangements would not
permit of Inspectors merely exercising general supervision
within customs offices, a restriction which would be
contrary to Sections 1 and 4 of Article 204 of the Warsaw
Treaty of the 24th October, 1921. In this connexion Polish
note also quotes Article 10 of Polish-Danzig Customs
Agreement of the 6th August, 1934, which lays down that
Danzig officials shall conform to instructions of Polish
Customs Inspectors in connexion with manifest cases of
smuggling.
* No. 26
90 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
5. Polish Government must regard Senate as fully
responsible for any disputes which may arise in this last
connexion, and must regard as illegal and contrary to treaty
obligations any attempts by Danzig Customs authorities
arbitrarily to restrict Polish rights of control.
Instructions given to Danzig Customs officials as described
in Senate's note must be regarded as a violation of the
principle of collaboration between Danzig Customs
Administration and Polish Inspectors. Latter have been
instructed to continue exercising their functioning within
the same limits-which are in conformity with treaty
situation-as in the past twenty years, and hope is expressed
that they will not meet with obstruction from Danzig
authorities.
6. As regards question of swearing-in Customs
officials, Polish note refers to written communications of
Senate on this subject and to Commissioner-General's
interviews with President. Should Senate not take account of
fully justified demands of Polish Government, and should
they proceed to swearing-in of officials in spite of
assurance by President of Senate that this would not take
place except after consultation with Commissioner-General,
Polish Government will have to consider question of
strengthening customs control, since Danzig Customs
officials will in future be giving a less binding guarantee
of their respect for, and proper execution of, Polish
Customs regulations.
7. Essence of whole question is that territory of Free
City is part of Polish Customs Territory, both legally and
in virtue of treaty obligations. Authorities must therefore
be assured of thorough-going execution of their Polish
customs policy and regulations on external frontier of their
Customs territory. Hence any measures by Danzig authorities
which threaten to obstruct, if only in part, the functioning
of the Polish Customs system can only provoke reaction by
Polish Government in the form of measures designed fully to
protect Poland's rightful interest.
8. Polish Government desire, as before, to regulate all
vital questions concerning Free City of Danzig in agreement
with Danzig Senate. In the situation recently created,
however, they consider it their duty to warn the Senate that
any shortcomings or obstructions in functioning of Polish
Customs system and administration must react unfavourably on
the economic inter-
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 91
ests of Danzig and its population, a consequence which
Polish Government desire to avoid.
No. 28.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
June 27, 1939.
I ASKED the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs this
morning what information he had regarding the constitution
of the Freicorps at Danzig. He told me that according to
Polish information a corps of 4,000 was being formed of whom
2,000 would be quartered at barracks in Danzig itself and
2,000 in new buildings which were being constructed at
Praust.
2. As regards the general situation in Danzig it was
perhaps a little better. There had been some fifty cases of
Danzig officials refusing to carry out the instructions of
the Polish Customs Inspectors during the past fortnight, but
during the past few days there had been no cases of this
kind. This may be due to the fact that the arms for the
Freicorps were being surreptitiously introduced into the
Free City from East Prussia during the past fortnight and
that presumably now that the arms were in Danzig there is
less occasion for contravention of the Polish Customs
regulations.
3. M. Arciszewski did not think that Germany would go
to the length of risking a general war in connexion with
Danzig, but felt that she would gradually strengthen her
position there, weaken any authority that Poland might still
have there and hope that Poland would finally be reduced to
such a state of economic exhaustion that she would have to
accept some solution as regards Danzig which would be
favourable to Germany. Further, Germany would in the
meantime, no doubt, assiduously propagate the idea that
Great Britain and France would not implement their guarantee
as regards Danzig and thereby endeavour still further to
undermine Polish morale.
92 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 29.
Mr. G. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
June 28, 1939.
IN contrast to calm in Warsaw, the last week has been
increasingly eventful here.
2. For the past fortnight the S.A. men have been
nightly preparing defences around the Free City, and on the
night of 26th-27th June were ordered to stand by for a
possible emergency, perhaps in connexion with celebration in
Gdynia of Polish Feast of the Seas or because Polish
frontier on Danzig-Gdynia road was closed to traffic from
midnight on 26th-27th June until 4 P.M. on 27th June,
presumably in connexion with completion of anti-tank
defences.
3. The approaches for a pontoon bridge are in active
construction on both sides of the Vistula.
4. On 23rd June Danzig members of German Automobile
Club received an urgent request to complete and return a
questionnaire regarding their cars.
5. All Danzig owners of motor lorries, trucks, &c.,
were recently ordered to leave them over-night at military
police barracks for inspection after which each vehicle was
numbered and returned to its owner.
6. To-day several hundred draught and saddle horses
have been similarly ordered to barracks nominally for
inspection, but as some of them have come from distant parts
of the Free City, it seems possible that they may be
retained, especially as carloads of saddles have also been
delivered there.
7. Formation of Freicorps is proceeding rapidly.
8. In addition to unusually heavily advertised
programme of week-end events, nearly 1,000 S.S. men from
East Prussia and a number of high S.S. officers from Germany
arrived here almost unannounced on 25th June ostensibly for
sporting contests with local S.S.
9. Dr. Boettcher was absent from Danzig and presumably
in Berlin on 26th June and 27th June.
10. In a speech on 25th June Herr Forster said: "Before
us lies a new era and for Germany a great epoch. During
recent weeks our Danzig has become the centre of political
events. We
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 93
are all aware that we are in the final throes of our fight
for freedom. The Free State of Danzig has taken the longest
time. Today everyone knows that the Free State will soon
come to an end and we also know how it will end."
11. A considerable number of visiting S.S. men remained
here when others left last Sunday night. Those remaining are
reputed to have performed their military service in Germany
and to be members of Adolf Hitler's Verfgungstruppen. They
are readily distinguishable by their deportment and slightly
different uniforms from local S.S. men. About 300 of them
are in military police barracks, which are now very full,
and others are in other former local barracks which are
capable of accommodating from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and have
hitherto been occupied by Danzig social welfare organisation
which is being transferred to an hotel that has been
requisitioned for the purpose. According to sub-editor of
Dantziger Vorposten, the largest youth hostel in the world,
which is approaching completion here, is to be used as a
barracks.
12. A number of workmen's dwellings at Praust are said
to have been requisitioned for storage of ammunition, and my
Argentine colleague informs me that he saw a number of
military police equipped with gas masks.
13. All Danzig civil servants and students are required
to remain within the Free City during their vacations, and
the latter must devote their holidays to harvesting. All
categories of military police have been kept in barracks
yesterday and to-day, and to-night members of various
National Socialist organisations are apparently again
standing by, as remarkably few of them are visible about the
City.
No. 30.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
June 30, 1939.
You should at once seek interview with Minister for
Foreign Affairs and ask him how the Polish Government
propose to deal with the situation which appears to be
impending. It would seem that Hitler is laying his plans
very astutely so as to present the
94 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Polish Government with a fait accompli in Danzig, to which
it would be difficult for them to react without appearing in
the role of aggressors. I feel that the moment has come
where consultation between the Polish, British and French
Governments is necessary in order that the plans of the
three Governments may be co-ordinated in time. It is in the
view of His Majesty's Government essential that these plans
shall be so devised as to ensure that Hitler shall not be
able so to manage matters as to manoeuvre the Polish
Government into the position of aggressors.
No. 31.
Mr. G. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
June 30, 1939.
HORSES continued to arrive yesterday, and about 600 of
them are being kept in barracks at which large quantities of
hay have also been delivered.
2. For the last few nights the two great shipyards here
which normally work all night were closed under strict guard
and all workmen evacuated from them.
3. As from to-night Danzig and suburbs were to be
blacked out until further notice and, in case of air raid
alarm, all inhabitants were ordered to take refuge in their
cellars or public shelters. This order was cancelled this
afternoon.
4. Former local barracks are now occupied by large
number of young men with obvious military training who wear
uniforms similar to Danzig S.S. but with deaths-head emblem
on the right collar and "Heimwehr Danzig" on sleeves.
Courtyard is occupied by about fifteen military motor
lorries (some with trailers) with East Prussia licences and
covered with tarpaulins, also by about forty field kitchens.
5. Two thousand men are working twenty-four hours a day
in three shifts on construction of barracks at Matzkshuter
to accommodate 10,000 men. Work is stated to be well
advanced.
6. All dressmakers here are said to be working on
bedding, clothing, &c., for barracks and their occupants.
7. It has just been announced that Tiegenmorse-Einlage
section of Danzig-Elbing road is closed for major repairs
until 1st
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 95
August, and it seems unlikely that pontoon bridge will be
ready before that date.
8. My personal impression is that extensive military
preparations which are being pressed forward so feverishly
are part of large-scale operations but not intended for use
before August, unless unexpected developments precipitate
matters and that emergency defensive measures, referred to
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this telegram, may be due to
fear lest those preparations should cause the Poles to
substitute a sudden offensive for defensive measures which
they have hitherto adopted.
No. 32.
Mr. Norton to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
July 1, 1939.
YOUR telegram of 30th June.*
I read M. Beck the gist of your telegram. M. Beck said
that he would first give me a piece of information. German
Government yesterday notified the Polish Government in
proper legal manner that the K”nigsberg would visit Danzig
for three days on 25th August. Polish Government were at
once passing this on to the Danzig Senate with all courtesy
adding that they had no objection.
2. Passing to the substance of your Lordship's message,
M. Beck asked me to assure you that he entirely shared your
view as to the necessity of foreseeing a situation in which
Poland might be manoeuvred into a dilemma of either
accepting a fait accompli or appearing to be aggressive.
3. He therefore was fully in favour of an exchange of
views. He was, however, leaving Warsaw this evening for
forty-eight hours and would prefer to go into the matter
more thoroughly with me on Tuesday when he had thought
things over especially as he had only returned yesterday
from a week's leave.
4. He said that reading between the lines of your
message he felt you might be thinking of a joint d‚marche in
Berlin. He did not at first sight think the time had come
for this. It might put
* No. 30.
96 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
us all into a position where we had to proceed more vigorously
than seemed wise to either of our two countries.
5. I asked whether he thought Great Britain's action
would be better taken with the Danzig Senate. He was
inclined to think so but preferred not to commit himself at
the moment.
6. He asked me assure you that despite some people's
ideas of Polish rashness, the Polish Government were
determined not to be scared by any psychological terrorism
into imprudent action. Only last night there had been a
rumour (the forty-ninth of its kind) that the Germans were
going to march into Danzig at once. He had seen the Polish
Chief of Staff and it had been decided that not one Polish
soldier was to be moved. He had gone to bed and slept
peacefully.
7. I asked if it was not the case that recent Nazi
activities in Danzig were creating a worse military position
for Poland. M. Beck replied that it was in a sense true, but
a war was not won by a few thousand "tourists." The Germans
knew that quite well and were mainly hoping to provoke and
intimidate Poland. They would not succeed, and it must be
clear to them now that any actual aggression would be met by
the solid block of Great Britain, France and Poland.
8. He had not changed his attitude one jot since he
spoke with you and the Prime Minister in London. He still
desired peaceful and normal relations with Germany.
No. 33.
Mr. G. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
July 1, 1939.
YESTERDAY morning four German army officers in mufti
arrived here by night express from Berlin to organise Danzig
Heimwehr.
All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which
constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of
the city have been closed with barbed wire and "Verboten"
notices.
3. The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards
"Comrades, keep your mouths shut lest you regret
consequences."
4. Master of a British steamship whilst he was roving
K”nigsberg from 28th June to 30th June observed considerable
military
DETERIORATION IN DANZIG SITUATION 97
activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged
covered lorries and similar material by small coasting
vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers loaded with
troops, lorries, field kitchens, &c., left K”nigsberg
ostensibly returning to Hamburg after manoeuvres but
actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers were
Hohenhorn, with heavy derricks each capable of lifting about
50 tons, Sharhorn, Tilsit and Utlandhorn, all modern well-
equipped vessels, each about 5,000 tons gross.
No. 34.
Mr. Norton to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
July 3, 1939.
FROM the austere calm which continues to prevail in
Polish official circles and generally throughout Poland, it
would appear that gradual remilitarisation of Free City of
Danzig has not yet attained dimensions sufficiently serious
to alarm Polish Government.
2. They are, of course, aware that the process is
intended to facilitate a coup by Herr Hitler should he
decide on one.
3. Their attitude to this latter possibility seems to
be as follows :-
(a) They are strengthening their powers of defence
ceaselessly and to the extent of their financial
ability;
(b) They have no intention of provoking a quarrel or of
showing weakness;
(c) If their rights in Danzig and the Corridor are
seriously threatened they will reply by counter-
measures proportionate to the circumstances;
(d) That Herr Hitler will think twice before
challenging the anti-aggression front openly;
(e) If he does so, Poland will put up the best show she
can.
4. This attitude may seem over-simplified, but at least
it is comprehensible, restrained, and well-calculated to
counteract German technique of "psychological terrorism."
5. It is unfortunately inevitable that the initiative
should rest with the would-be aggressor.
98 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTS IN DANZIG.
No. 35.
Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
July 10, 1939.
Mr. Harold Macmillan asked the Prime Minister whether
His Majesty's Government will issue a declaration to the
effect that any change in the present status of Danzig,
other than by an agreement to which the Polish Government is
a party, whether brought about externally by military action
on the part of Germany or internally by a movement initiated
or supported by the German Government, will be regarded as
an act of aggression on the part of Germany and, therefore,
covered by the terms of our pledge to Poland?
Lieut.-Commander Fletcher asked the Prime Minister
whether any attempt to alter the existing regime at Danzig
by aggression from outside or penetration from within will
be regarded as within the terms of our pledge to maintain
the independence of Poland; and has a communication been
made to the Polish Government in these terms?
Mr. A. Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether he
has any statement to make on the present situation in
Danzig?
Mr. V. Adams asked the Prime Minister whether he has
any further statement to make on the attitude of His
Majesty's Government towards the position of Danzig?
Mr. Thurtle asked the Prime Minister whether he is now
satisfied that the head of the German Government no longer
has any doubt of the intention of this country to discharge
to the full the undertaking it has given to Poland; or has
he under consideration any further action with a view to
removing any possible doubt or misunderstanding which may
still exist?
The Prime Minister: I would ask hon. Members to be good
enough to await the statement which I propose to make at the
end of questions.
Later-
The Prime Minister: I have previously stated that His
Majesty's Government are maintaining close contact with the
Polish and French Governments on the question of Danzig. I
have
BRITISH ATTITUDE DANZIG DEVELOPMENTS 99
nothing at present to add to the information which has
already been given to the House about the local situation.
But I may, perhaps, usefully review the elements of this
question as they appear to His Majesty's Government.
Racially Danzig is, almost wholly, a German city; but
the prosperity of its inhabitants depends to a very large
extent upon Polish trade. The Vistula is Poland's only
waterway to the Baltic, and the port at its mouth is
therefore of vital strategic and economic importance to her.
Another Power established in Danzig could, if it so desired,
block Poland's access to the sea and so exert an economic
and military stranglehold upon her. Those who were
responsible for framing the present statute of the Free City
were fully conscious of these facts, and did their best to
make provision accordingly. Moreover, there is no question
of any oppression of the German population in Danzig. On the
contrary, the administration of the Free City is in German
hands, and the only restrictions imposed upon it are not of
a kind to curtail the liberties of its citizens. The present
settlement, though it may be capable of improvement, cannot
in itself be regarded as basically unjust or illogical. The
maintenance of the status quo had in fact been guaranteed by
the German Chancellor himself up to 1944 by the ten-year
Treaty which he had concluded with Marshal Pilsudski.
Up till last March Germany seems to have felt that,
while the position of Danzig might ultimately require
revision, the question was neither urgent nor likely to lead
to a serious dispute. But in March, when the German
Government put forward an offer in the form of certain
desiderata accompanied by a press campaign, the Polish
Government realised that they might presently be faced with
a unilateral solution, which they would have to resist with
all their forces. They had before them the events which had
taken place in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and the Memelland.
Accordingly, they refused to accept the German point of
view, and themselves made suggestions for a possible
solution of the problems in which Germany was interested.
Certain defensive measures were taken by Poland on the 23rd
March and the reply was sent to Berlin on the 26th March. I
ask the House to note carefully these dates. It has been
freely stated in Germany that it was His Majesty's
Government's guarantee
100 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
which encouraged the Polish Government to take the action
which I have described. But it will be observed that our
guarantee was not given until the 31st March. By the 26th
March no mention of it, even, had been made to the Polish
Government.
Recent occurrences in Danzig have inevitably given rise
to fears that it is intended to settle her future status by
unilateral action, organized by surreptitious methods, thus
presenting Poland and other Powers with a fait accompli. In
such circumstances any action taken by Poland to restore the
situation would, it is suggested, be represented as an act
of aggression on her part, and if her action were supported
by other Powers they would be accused of aiding and abetting
her in the use of force.
If the sequence of events should, in fact, be such as
is contemplated on this hypothesis, hon. Members will
realise, from what I have said earlier, that the issue could
not be considered as a purely local matter involving the
rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally
are in no way threatened, but would at once raise graver
issues affecting Polish national existence and independence.
We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the
case of a clear threat to her independence, which she
considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and
we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking.
I have said that while the present settlement is
neither basically unjust nor illogical, it may be capable of
improvement. It may be that in a clearer atmosphere possible
improvements could be discussed. Indeed, Colonel Beck has
himself said in his speech on the 5th May that if the
Government of the Reich is guided by two conditions, namely,
peaceful intentions and peaceful methods of procedure, all
conversations are possible. In his speech before the
Reichstag on the 28th April the German Chancellor said that
if the Polish Government wished to come to fresh contractual
arrangements governing its relations with Germany he could
but welcome such an idea. He added that any such future
arrangements would have to be based on an absolutely clear
obligation equally binding on both parties.
His Majesty's Government realise that recent
developments in the Free City have disturbed confidence and
rendered it difficult at present to find an atmosphere in
which reasonable counsels can prevail. In face of this
situation, the Polish Government have
BRITISH ATTITUDE DANZIG DEVELOPMENTS 101
remained calm, and His Majesty's Government hope that the
Free City, with her ancient traditions, may again prove, as
she has done before in her history, that different
nationalities can work together when their real interests
coincide. Meanwhile, I trust that all concerned will declare
and show their determination not to allow any incidents in
connection with Danzig to assume such a character as might
constitute a menace to the peace of Europe.
No. 36.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.
My Lord, Berlin,
July 15, 1939.
I TOOK the opportunity of a visit to the State
Secretary yesterday to mention to him that I had been
informed that one of the Under-Secretaries at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Keppler, had said that Herr Hitler
was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig.
2. I said to Baron von Weizs„cker that when I was in
London I had assured your Lordship and the Prime Minister
that Herr Hitler could not possibly be in any doubt as to
the facts of the case, namely, that, if Germany by
unilateral action at Danzig in any form compelled the Poles
to resist, Britain would at once come to their assistance.
He (Baron von Weizs„cker) could not himself be under any
misapprehension on the subject, and it seemed to me highly
undesirable that a member of his Department should talk in
this misleading fashion. That sort of remark would be
repeated in London, and would once more make His Majesty's
Government wonder what further steps they could take to
convince Herr Hitler that they were in earnest. It was
solely because they doubted whether Herr Hitler was
correctly informed on this point that they continued to
reiterate their determination to resist force by force in
future. If Herr Hitler wanted war, it was quite simple. He
had only to tell the Danzigers to proclaim the re-attachment
of the Free City to Germany. Obviously that would put the
onus of action on the Poles, but not even that would cause
us to hesitate to support them, if Germany
102 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
attacked them, since we would realise quite well that the
Senate at Danzig would only adopt such a resolution on the
direct order of the Chancellor.
3. Baron von Weizs„cker observed that he was not so
certain that the Senate would not act one day of its own
accord. I told him that I could not possibly believe that,
especially as I clearly realized that the Senate would have
already so acted if it had not been for Herr Hitler's orders
to the contrary. That he had given those orders was one of
the chief grounds for my belief that Herr Hitler still
sought a peaceable solution of this question. Nor did the
State Secretary demur to this.
4. As regards my general observations, Baron von
Weizs„cker said that Dr. Keppler, who had been in the early
days a kind of economic adviser of Herr Hitler's and still
saw him occasionally at long intervals, was an honest man,
who was also in fairly close relations with Herr von
Ribbentrop. There were Baron von Weizs„cker said, so many
distinctions about a statement to the effect that England
would not go to war over Danzig. Anybody, including Herr
Hitler himself, might well say that England did not wish to
fight about Danzig, and it would be true. Nor did Germany.
Anybody, including Herr Hitler, might say that one day
Danzig would revert without war to Germany, and that might
equally be true as the result of a pacific settlement with
the Poles in their own true interests.
5. I admitted that there were possibilities of twisting
the facts. Yet these were, I said, plain enough, and His
Majesty's Government could never be reproached this time, as
they had been in 1914, of not having made their position
clear beyond all doubt. If Herr Hitler wanted war, he knew
exactly how he could bring it about. Baron von Weizs„cker
replied to this that he would also draw a distinction about
the position in 1914. He had never reproached Sir Edward
Grey for not having publicly announced British intentions at
that time. The fault, in his opinion, had been that His
Majesty's Government had not made them known privately to
the German Government before it was too late. Why did His
Majesty's Government to-day insist all the time upon these
public utterances? If something had to be said to Herr
Hitler, why could it not be said privately without all the
world being kept informed? That had been the mistake last
year during
TEMPORARY EASING DANZIG SITUATION 103
the Czech crisis. Public warnings only made it more
difficult for Herr Hitler to heed them.
6. Though I appreciate personally the force of this
hint of the State Secretary's in favour of the private
communication rather than the public warning, I confined
myself to replying that one of our main causes for anxiety
in England was our belief that disagreeable facts were
withheld from Herr Hitler by those who were responsible for
making them known to him. To this Baron von Weizs„cker
replied that, while he could not tell me what reports the
Chancellor read or did not read, Herr Hitler was influenced
by nobody, but regarded situations as a whole and was guided
solely by his own appreciations of them.
I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
TEMPORARY EASING IN THE DANZIG SITUATION.
No. 37
Mr. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
July 19, 1939.
GAULEITER FORSTER visited the High Commissioner at noon
to-day. The latter has sent me, in a personal and
confidential form, notes of conversation, of which the
following is a translation:-
The Gauleiter told me the result of his interview with
German Chancellor was as follows:-
1. There is no modification of German claims regarding
Danzig and the Corridor as formulated in Chancellor's speech
to Reichstag.
2. Nothing will be done on the German side to provoke a
conflict on this question.
3. Question can wait if necessary until next year or
even longer.
4. The Gauleiter said that the Senate would henceforth
seek intervention of High Commissioner in difficult
questions which might arise between the Senate and Polish
representative. This would, he said, terminate a war of
notes which only poisons the
104 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
situation, but he added that "a single press indiscretion to
the effect that the Senate and German Government are having
recourse to politics would immediately terminate practice
and more direct and consequently more dangerous method would
again be applied." He said verbatim: "We are having recourse
to High Commissioner and not to Geneva itself."
5. He requested High Commissioner to intervene
officially at once in the matter of military trains not
announced beforehand. Non-observance of this rule, which was
established by an exchange of letters between the Senate and
Polish representative in 1921, would have effect beyond
local Danzig question and would, for example, entail a
modification of German usage announcing to Polish Government
visit of warships to port of Danzig. In addition, according
to information at disposal of Senate, there were 300 men at
Westerplatte in place of 100 agreed to. Herr Forster gave
his word of honour that there were at Danzig only a few anti-
aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and light infantry guns-no
heavy guns, not an invading German soldier-nobody but
Danzigers and four German officers. He claimed that a sharp
watch at the frontier was necessary by the extensive
importation of weapons for 3,000 Polish reservists resident
in the district.
6. Herr Forster will publish an article which he had
already read to me confidentially on the occasion of our
last interview, when he said he would submit the question of
publication to the Chancellor's decision. This article
underlines point of view announced in Reichstag speech. Herr
Forster declared that if repercussion of his article is not
violent and if there is no incident, this will put an end to
all Danzig-Polish polemics and press would be ordered to
drop the subject of Danzig completely.
7. If there is a d‚tente in situation, all military
measures now taken in Danzig would be dropped.
8. The Gauleiter promised his loyal collaboration.
9. High Commissioner would be happy if it were possible
to obtain from Poland a positive reaction in any formal
matter which might arise in the near future so that new
methods may be given a good initiation.
10. The Gauleiter said that Herr Hitler would have
liked to take an opportunity to talk to the High
Commissioner about the Danzig situation, but that Herr von
Ribbentrop, who was pres-
TEMPORARY EASING DANZIG SITUATION 105
ent at the interview at Obersalzberg, had raised objections
to which the Chancellor replied evasively: "Well, it will be
a little later, I will let you know."
No. 38.
Viscount Halifax to Mr. Norton (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
July 21, 1939.
DANZIG telegram of 19th July.*
I am most anxious that this tentative move from German
side should not be compromised by publicity or by any
disinclination on part of Polish Government to discuss in
friendly and reasonable spirit any concrete question which
may be taken up by Senate through High Commissioner.
2. Unless you see most serious objection, please
approach M. Beck in following sense.
3. His Majesty's Government have learnt with great
regret of further incident, but they hope that Polish
Government will handle it with same restraint and
circumspection which they have hitherto shown, more
especially as there is some reason to think that German
policy is now to work for a d‚tente in the Danzig question.
It is nevertheless essential not to destroy possibility of
better atmosphere at outset, and I trust that more care than
ever will be taken on Polish side to avoid provocation in
any sphere and to restrain press. Above all, if any sign is
forthcoming of more reasonable attitude on the part of
Senate or German Government, it is important that from
Polish side this should not be made occasion for provocative
assertions that German Government are weakening. Moreover, I
hope that if Senate show any sign of desiring to improve
atmosphere by discussing concrete questions, the Polish
Government for their part will not be slow to respond in a
friendly and forthcoming manner.
4. For your own information, I hope to arrange that we
shall be informed through High Commissioner and His
Majesty's Consul-General in Danzig when any concrete
question is to be taken up by High Commissioner at the
request of Senate, and, of
* No. 37.
106 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
course, of the discussions, in order that we may have an
opportunity of discreetly urging moderation on Polish
Government.
5. Finally, when newspaper article referred to in
telegram under reference appears, please do what you can to
ensure that Polish Government and press treat it calmly,
perhaps on the lines that it does not introduce any new
element into the situation. You might also say that the
publication of the proposed article does not modify
impression of His Majesty's Government that Senate and the
German Government, in fact, desire a d‚tente and an
improvement in the atmosphere.
6. Whatever may be the import of this German move,
position of Polish Government cannot be worsened in any
respect by doing their utmost to make a success of procedure
proposed by Gauleiter to High Commissioner.
No. 39.
Mr. Norton to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
July 25, 1939.
YOUR telegram of 21st July.*
I developed your Lordship's ideas to M. Beck this
morning.
2. M. Beck asked me to assure you that Polish
Government were always on the look-out for signs of a German
wish for a d‚tente. They are inspired by the same principles
as your Lordship, since it was in everyone's interest that
temperature should be allowed to fall. Polish Commissioner
in Danzig had received formal instructions to deal with each
question in a purely practical and objective manner. Even
shooting of Polish Customs guard, which Polish Government
now considered to have been deliberate, was being treated as
a local incident.
3. The most important question was whether new German
tendency reported by M. Burckhardt was a manoeuvre or not.
M. Beck was naturally suspicious since Poland had much
experience of German mentality and Germans real interest
must be by any and every means to attempt to separate Poland
from Great Britain. At one moment they tried to achieve this
by threats, at another by talk of appeasement. In actual
fact Polish Govern-
* No. 38.
TEMPORARY EASING DANZIG SITUATION 107
ment had not received the slightest concrete sign of a
desire for a relaxation of tension. For example,
remilitarisation of Danzig was proceeding and
identifications of fresh German troops on Polish frontier
had been received. Marshal Smigly-Rydz had not decided to
counter these for the moment since amongst other things
Poland was not so rich as to be able to spend money for
military purposes freely.
4. Words let fall by Herr Forster were not in
themselves sufficient evidence of German intentions. Herr
Forster had within the last few days complained to M.
Burckhardt about Polish intention to put armed guards on
their railways in Danzig.
M. Burkhardt had said that such complaint had better be
made by Herr Greiser. Latter had at once said that he had no
evidence of any such Polish intention. M. Beck feared that
this allegation by Herr Forster was only a pretext for
increasing militarisation of Danzig.
5. All in all M. Beck, while entirely understanding and
sharing your Lordship's general desire, did not at present
see any facts on which to base a forecast of German change
of policy.
6. He said incidentally that he had not given up the
idea that d‚marche in the form of warning to Danzig Senate,
supported by French and British representations, might be
advisable.
No. 40.
Mr. F. M. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
July 25, 1939.
HERR FORSTER informed High Commission yesterday that
Danzig question could, if necessary, wait a year or more,
and said that military precautions now being taken would be
liquidated in the middle of September.
2. Meanwhile, there is increasing amount of horse and
motor transport visible, and frequent reports reach me of
men being called up and of arrival of men and material from
East Prussia. While I cannot at present confirm these
reports, it would be unwise to ignore them. There are
numerous warehouses and other buildings in Danzig where
material could be stored and men housed.
110 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
3. I learn that a certain Major-General Eberhard is now
in command here.
No. 41.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
July 31, 1939.
I ASKED Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day what
impressions he had brought back from his visit to Gdynia and
how far he thought that the d‚tente at Danzig, foreshadowed
in the conversation between the Gauleiter and the High
Commissioner, should be taken seriously.
2. M. Beck said that, unfortunately, there were no
indications that the Danzig Senate intended to behave more
reasonably. They had just demanded that the Polish customs
police who accompany the customs officials on their duties
should be withdrawn, despite the fact that they have been
employed in Danzig by the Polish customs authorities for
some years past.
3. It was possible that the remilitarisation of Danzig
was not proceeding so actively, and he had no information as
to the intention of the German Government to send a General
Officer Commanding to Danzig.
4. He, further, had no information of a serious
increase in German concentrations on the Polish frontier,
but he was somewhat perturbed by the reports which he had
received from some eight Polish Consular representatives in
Germany to the effect that an intensive official propaganda
is now being conducted in Germany demonstrating the
necessity of an isolated war against Poland without any
British or French intervention. This, coupled with the
notices which have been sent to German reservists who are to
be called up during the second fortnight in August, was
somewhat ominous. He said that an intensive propaganda was
also being conducted in East Prussia, where reservists up to
58 years old were being called up.
5. M. Beck did not think that the moment had yet come
to convey a serious joint warning to the Danzig authorities,
and felt that it would be well to await further developments
and see how far the Gauleiter's suggestion of a d‚tente was
to be taken seriously.
TEMPORARY EASING DANZIG SITUATION 109
6. The most essential thing was to show by every
possible means the solidarity of the three Governments of
Great Britain, France and Poland in their resistance to
German aggression in any form.
No. 42.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 2, 1939.
I DISCUSSED the situation at Danzig at some length
informally with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day
and asked him more especially for information regarding the
controversy respecting the reduction of the Polish customs
personnel in the Free State. M. Arciszewski said that three
years ago there had only been about thirty Polish customs
inspectors, and that in view of the numerous cases of
smuggling and so forth, some eighty frontier guards had been
added for the purpose of surveillance. The frontier guards
wore a different uniform from the customs inspectors, and he
thought that provided the Danzig Senate were acting in good
faith and any concession would not be interpreted as a sign
of weakness, it might be possible to come to some
arrangement by which the customs officials and frontier
guards should wear the same uniform and the number of the
latter might be somewhat reduced. He did not think that any
threat of a customs union with Germany should be taken too
seriously as hitherto the Senate had never risked coming too
far into the open. He admitted that the general situation
might become critical towards the end of this month He
agreed that it was very difficult to fix a limit at which
the Polish Government must react seriously to the
accentuation of the surreptitious methods by which Germany
was endeavouring to bring about a fait accompli at Danzig,
but he still thought that she would hesitate before going to
the length where a serious crisis must develop.
He admitted that the situation might develop within a
few hours from the political to the military phase, but felt
that the military preparations at Danzig were to some extent
exaggerated. If the Reich really did not wish or intend to
participate in a European war over the Danzig question, and
there were real
110 The BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
signs of a d‚tente, it might be possible to resume
conversations, but he thought that Herr Forster's assertions
were in the present circumstances only a manoeuvre, and that
until there were serious indications that the German
Government's intentions were reasonable, it would not be
possible to discuss any practical solution.
FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION AT DANZIG.
No. 43.
Mr. Norton to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 4, 1939.
M. BECK to-night, through his "chef de cabinet,"
informed me that at four customs posts on Danzig-East
Prussian frontier Polish customs inspectors were to-day
informed that by decision of Danzig Senate they would
henceforth not be allowed to carry out their duties.
2. Polish Government take a very serious view of this
step. Previous action of Danzig Senate has been clandestine,
but this is an open challenge to Polish interests.
3. Polish Commissioner-General has therefore been
instructed to deliver a note to-night requesting immediate
confirmation that Polish customs inspectors will be allowed
to carry out their duties, and warning to Senate that if
they are interfered with Polish Government will react in the
strongest manner. A reply is requested by to-morrow evening,
5th August.
4. "Chef de cabinet" could not say what steps the
Polish Government would take. M. Beck proposed to give me
further information to-morrow morning. Meanwhile, he was
most anxious that his Majesty's Government should be
informed at once of the serious turn events have taken.
5. Polish note is, I gather, not being published nor
its contents revealed to press.
6. M. Burckhardt is being informed by the Polish
Commissioner-General.
FURTHER DETERIORATION DANZIG SITUATION 111
No. 44.
Mr. F. M. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
August 4, 1939.
POLISH representative saw the High Commissioner this
morning on his return from Warsaw and read to him a
translation of a note which he will hand to the Senate this
afternoon. It is polite but firm, and ends on a conciliatory
note. Referring to the threat to open the East Prussian
frontier M. Chodacki requested the High Commissioner to give
the President of the Senate a personal message to the effect
that such a move would be for Poland a casus belli.
2. The President of the Senate complained to the High
Commissioner that Gauleiter had not passed on to him the
desire of the Fhrer to terminate the war of notes and to
work towards a d‚tente. Herr Greiser was incensed at having
been placed in a false position, and said he would not have
sent his notes of 29th July had he been kept au courant.
3. The President and Polish representative will meet at
the High Commissioner's house on 7th August.
No. 45.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 9, 1939.
POLISH attitude towards the dispute over recent Danzig
attempt to eliminate Polish customs inspection has been firm
but studiously moderate. There was at first no attempt to
represent the Danzig Senate as having climbed down, but, as
was inevitable, the papers have since reproduced comment to
this effect from the French and British press. The Polish
Government said little to the press about what really
passed, and even now nothing has been said of any time
limit. Polish attitude to diplomatic conversations is also
moderate.
2. It is true that on 7th August the independent
Conservative Czas, in a commentary on Marshal Smigly-Rydz's
speech, said that Poland was ready to fight for Danzig, and
that if a fait
112 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
accompli were attempted, then guns would fire. It also
emphasized at length the Marshal's insistence that Poland
had no aggressive intentions (the German press does not seem
to be interested in that point).
3. The Polish Telegraph Agency to-day-in a message from
its German correspondent-replies to attacks of Deutches
Nachrichten-Bro and German press, pointing out that one
sentence in the article in Czas had been singled out to give
a distorted picture of Polish opinion in order to represent
Poland as a potential aggressor. "Polish provocations" was
the term used in Germany to describe Poland's attempts to
defend her just interests. "A volley fired by German guns
will be the closing point of the history of modern Poland,"
that was the pious desire of "peaceful and persecuted
Germany." The message concluded by emphasising again that
everyone knew that Poland had no aggressive intentions.
4. I fear that at times of strong national feeling it
is almost inevitable that occasional remarks like that of
Czas should occur in the press. Experience shows that the
Germans can wax indignant with anyone and on any subject if
Goebbels so desires. And the "provocation" of one article in
a small and independent Warsaw newspaper compares strangely
with the official utterances of Dr. Goebbels and Herr
Forster in Danzig and the daily military and civil violation
of all the treaties on which Poland's rights are based.
5. Possibly the German campaign is intended to cover up
the Senate's withdrawal in Danzig, where the situation is
regarded as somewhat easier.
6. I shall, of course, continue to urge moderation
here, both in official and press declarations.
No. 46.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 10, 1939.
MINISTER for Foreign Affairs communicated to me to-day
the text of a communication which was made to Polish Charg‚
d'Affaires at Berlin by State Secretary yesterday and of
reply of
FURTHER DETERIORATION DANZIG SITUATION 113
the Polish Government which was made this afternoon. (Text
of these communications, which are strictly confidential and
are not being published at present, will be found in my
immediately following telegram.*). Both these communications
were made verbally though notes were taken of their contents
in either case.
2. M. Beck drew my attention to the very serious nature
of German d‚marche as it was the first time that the Reich
had directly intervened in the dispute between Poland and
Danzig Senate. He had already, through Polish Ambassador in
London, warned your Lordship briefly of what he had
communicated to me, but he asked me to request you to
consider whether you could take any useful action in Berlin
to reinforce Polish attitude. He would leave it to your
Lordship to decide the nature of any such action, but would
be glad in any case to learn your views as to the
significance of this d‚marche on the part of the Reich. M.
Beck has made a similar communication to my French
colleague.
3. He further told me that the High Commissioner had
communicated to him the tenor of a conversation which M.
Burckhardt had had with Herr Forster this morning.
Conversation was relatively moderate, and Herr Forster said
Herr Hitler had told him that no incident should take place
at Danzig at present time in view of gravity of the
situation. Herr Forster said that he intended in his
declaration which he is to make to-night to deal with
aggressive tone of Polish press.
4. M. Beck finally said that he felt that a serious
political crisis would develop during the last fortnight of
this month, which while it need not necessarily lead to war
would require very careful handling. No further military
measures were being taken by the Polish Government for the
moment, but he would at once inform me if they became
necessary.
5. M. Beck stated that while he had not thought it
necessary to refer, in his reply to the German Government,
to the specific question of Polish customs inspectors, he
could have refuted German allegations as the Polish
Government had documentary proof that Danzig customs
officials had definite instructions from authorities to
inform Polish inspectors that they could no longer carry out
their functions.
* No. 47
114 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 47.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 10, 1939.
MY immediately preceding telegram.*
Following is translation of German note verbale:-
"German Government have learnt with lively
surprise of tenor of note addressed by Polish
Government to Senate of Free City of Danzig, in which
Polish Government demand in the form of an ultimatum
cancellation of an alleged measure whose existence was
based on incorrect rumours. This measure, designed to
prevent activity of Polish customs inspectors, was not,
in fact, decreed by Senate. In case of refusal the
threat was expressed that measures of reprisal would be
taken.
"The German Government are compelled to call
attention to the fact that repetition of such demands
having the nature of an ultimatum and addressed to the
Free City of Danzig as well as of threats of reprisals,
would lead to an aggravation of Polish-German
relations, for consequences of which responsibility
will fall exclusively on Polish Government, German
Government being obliged to disclaim here and now any
responsibility in this respect.
"Further, the German Government call attention of
Polish Government to the fact that steps which latter
have taken to prevent export of certain Danzig goods to
Poland are of such a nature as to cause heavy economic
losses to the population of Danzig.
"Should Polish Government persist in maintaining
such measures the German Government are of the opinion
that in present state of affairs the Free City of
Danzig would have no choice but to seek other
opportunities of exporting, and, consequently, also of
importing goods."
2. Following is translation of Polish reply:-
"The Government of Polish Republic have learnt
with liveliest surprise of declaration made on 9th
August, 1939, by State Secretary at German Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to Polish Charg‚ d'Affaires ad interim
at Berlin regarding exist-
* No. 46.
FURTHER DETERIORATION DANZIG SITUATION 115
ing relations between Poland and the Free City of
Danzig. The Polish Government indeed perceive no
juridical basis capable of justifying intervention of
Germany in these relations.
"If exchanges of views regarding the Danzig
problem have taken place between Polish Government and
German Government these exchanges were solely based on
goodwill of Polish Government and arose from no
obligation of any sort.
"In reply to above-mentioned declaration of the
German Government the Polish Government are obliged to
warn the German Government that in future, as hitherto,
they will react to any attempt by authorities of the
Free City which might tend to compromise the rights and
interests which Poland possesses there in virtue of her
agreements, by employment of such means and measures as
they alone shall think fit to adopt, and will consider
any future intervention by German Government to
detriment of these rights and interests as an act of
aggression."
No. 48.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 16, 1939.
STATE Secretary, whom I visited yesterday evening, said
at once that the situation had very gravely deteriorated
since 4th August. When I last saw him he had regarded the
position as less dangerous than last year; now he considered
it no less dangerous and most urgent. Deterioration was due
firstly to Polish ultimatum to Danzig Senate of 4th August,
and secondly to last sentence-which he quoted-of Polish
reply to German Government of 10th August, but also in
general to the unmistakable set policy of persecution and
extermination of the German minority in Poland.
I told Baron von Weizs„cker that there was quite
another side to the case. Polish note of 4th August had been
necessitated by the succession of measures, and particularly
military ones, undertaken in Danzig with view to undermining
the Polish position
116 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
there; Polish reply of 10th August had been provoked by
German verbal note of 9th August, and moreover only
described as aggression "acts to the detriment of Polish
rights and interests"; and Polish Ambassador had only the
day before complained to me of the number of cases of
persecution of Polish minority in Germany.
State Secretary replied with some heat that though
isolated cases of persecution of Poles had occurred, there
was absolutely no comparison between them and what was being
done in Poland. Hitherto, he said, not too much stress had
been laid in the German papers on what was happening in this
respect, but there was a limit to everything and that limit
had now been reached. As he put it the bottle was full to
the top. (In other words Herr Hitler's patience was now
exhausted.)
He admitted the militarisation of Danzig, but said that
its object had been entirely defensive in order to protect
the town against what should have been its protector.
As regards the Polish note of 10th August he said that
if any German intervention to the detriment of Polish rights
and interests in Danzig was to be regarded as an act of
aggression, it meant asking Germany to disinterest herself
altogether in the Free City, since the whole basis of her
former negotiations with Poland had been with a view to
modifying the position there in favour of Germany. It was a
claim which made the whole situation intolerable and even
His Majesty's Government had admitted that there might be
modifications to be made.
I told Baron von Weizs„cker that the trouble was that
Germany could never see but one side to any question, and
always wanted everything modified in her favour. We disputed
with acrimony about the rights and wrongs of the case
without either apparently convincing the other. With these
details I need not trouble you.
I eventually said that what was done could not now be
undone. We seemed to be rapidly drifting towards a situation
in which neither side would be in a position to give way and
from which war would ensue. Did Herr Hitler want war? I was
prepared to believe that Germany would not yield to
intimidation. Nor certainly could His Majesty's Government.
If Germany resorted to force, we would resist with force.
There could be no possible
FURTHER DETERIORATION DANZIG SITUATION 117
doubt whatsoever about that. The position had been finally
defined in your Lordship's speech at Chatham House on 29th
June and by the Prime Minister's statement in the House of
Commons on 10th July. From that attitude we could not
deviate.
In reply to a suggestion of mine, State Secretary
observed that whereas it might just have been possible
before 5th August, it was absolutely out of the question now
to imagine that Germany could be the first to make any
gesture. Even apart from the recent Polish ultimatum and the
verbal note about aggression, a German initiative could
hardly have been possible in view of Colonel Beck's speech
on 5th May in which he had deigned to say that if Germany
accepted the principles laid down by him Poland would be
ready to talk, but not otherwise. That was language which
Germany could not admit. I made the obvious retort. State
Secretary's only reply was that the fact remained that to
talk of a German initiative now was completely academic.
Baron von Weizs„cker then proceeded to say that the
trouble was that the German Government's appreciation of the
situation was totally different from that of His Majesty's
Government. Germany, with innumerable cases of the
persecution of Germans before her eyes, could not agree that
the Poles were showing calm and restraint: Germany believed
that Poland was deliberately running with her eyes shut to
ruin: Germany was convinced that His Majesty's Government
did not realise whither their policy of encirclement and
blind assistance to Poland were leading them and Europe: and
that finally his own Government did not, would not and could
not believe that Britain would fight under all circumstances
whatever folly the Poles might commit.
I told Baron von Weizs„cker that the last was a very
dangerous theory and sounded like Herr von Ribbentrop who
had never been able to understand the British mentality. If
the Poles were compelled by any act of Germany to resort to
arms to defend themselves there was not a shadow of doubt
that we would give them our full armed support. We had made
that abundantly clear and Germany would be making a tragic
mistake if she imagined the contrary.
State Secretary replied that he would put it
differently (and he gave me to understand that the phrase
was not his own). Germany believed that the attitude of the
Poles would be or was
118 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
such as to free the British Government from any obligation
to follow blindly every eccentric step on the part of a
lunatic.
I told the State Secretary that we were talking in a
circle. The Polish Government had shown extreme prudence
hitherto, and would, moreover, take no major step without
previous consultation with us; just as in accordance with
their military agreement I understood that the German
Government would take no irrevocable step without prior
consultation with the Italian Government. His Majesty's
Government had given their word and must be sole judges of
their action. It was consequently hypothetical to speak of
"under all circumstances" or of blindly "following Poland's
lead."
Baron von Weizs„cker's reply was that Poland had not
consulted His Majesty's Government either before M.
Chodacki, who could not have so acted without previous
authority from Colonel Beck, had addressed his ultimatum to
Danzig Senate, or before replying to the German verbal note
of 9th August. Yet, in his opinion, both these were major
steps fraught with the most serious consequences. He
admitted that some of the Poles were, or wished to be,
prudent, but they were, unfortunately, not the rulers of
Poland to-day. The real policy of Poland, over which His
Majesty's Government had no control and of which they
probably were ignorant, was the thousands of cases of
persecution and excesses against Germans in Poland. It was a
policy based on the Polish belief in the unlimited support
of the British and French Governments. Who, he asked, could
now induce the Poles to abandon such methods? It was those
methods, combined with the Polish press articles, which
encouraged them, which made the situation no longer tenable
and so extremely dangerous. The matter had since 4h August
changed to one of the utmost seriousness and urgency. Things
had drifted along till now, but the point had been reached
when they could drift no longer.
There is no doubt that Baron von Weizs„cker was
expressing, as he assured me very solemnly that he was, the
considered views of his Government and the position as he
himself sees it. He told me, though he admitted that he
could not say anything for certain, that it was likely that
Herr Hitler would in fact attend the Tannenberg celebration
on 27th August. But he hinted that things might not only
depend on a speech. Yet if nothing happens
FURTHER DETERIORATION DANZIG SITUATION 119
between now and then I fear that we must at least expect
there on Herr Hitler's part a warlike pronouncement from
which it may well be difficult for him later to withdraw. As
Baron von Weizs„cker himself observed, the situation in one
respect was even worse than last year as Mr. Chamberlain
could not again come out to Germany.
I was impressed by one thing, namely, Baron von
Weizs„cker's detachment and calm. He seemed very confident,
and professed to believe that Russian assistance to the
Poles would not only be entirely negligible, but that the
U.S.S.R. would even in the end join in sharing in the Polish
spoils. Nor did my insistence on the inevitability of
British intervention seem to move him.
No. 49.
Explanatory Note on Herr Hitler's Meeting with M. Burckhardt
on August 11, 1939.
M. BURCKHARDT accepted an invitation from Herr Hitler
to visit him at Berchtesgaden. M. Burckhardt accordingly had
a conversation of a private character with Herr Hitler on
the 11th August, in the course of which it is understood
that the Danzig question in its relationship to the general
European situation was discussed between them.
No. 50.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
August 15, 1939.
I HAVE the impression that Herr Hitler is still
undecided, and anxious to avoid war and to hold his hand if
he can do so without losing face. As there is a possibility
of him not forcing the issue, it is evidently essential to
give him no excuse for acting, whether or not conversations
about Danzig at some future time may be possible. It
therefore seems of the first importance to endeavour to get
the local issues (customs inspectors, margarine and
herrings) settled at once, and not to let questions of
procedure or
120 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
"face" at Danzig stand in the way. It also seems essential
that the Polish Government should make every effort to
moderate their press, even in the face of a German press
campaign and to intensify their efforts to prevent attacks
on their German minority.
2. In dealing with local Danzig issues, I would beg M.
Beck to work through the intermediary of the High
Commissioner, or at all events after consultation with him,
rather than direct with the Senate. I should like M. Beck to
treat M. Burckhardt with the fullest confidence, as in my
opinion he is doing his best in a very difficult situation.
3. While the present moment may not be opportune for
negotiations on general issues as opposed to local
differences, the Polish Government would in my judgment do
well to continue to make it plain that, provided essentials
can be secured, they are at all times ready to examine the
possibility of negotiation over Danzig if there is a
prospect of success. I regard such an attitude as important
from the point of view of world opinion.
4. Before speaking to M. Beck on the above lines,
please concert with your French colleague who will be
receiving generally similar instructions in order that you
may take approximately the same line with M. Beck.
No. 51.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 15, 1939.
I SPOKE to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the
sense of your telegram of 15th August.* M. Beck agreed that
Herr Hitler was probably still undecided as to his course of
action. German military activity was nevertheless
disturbing, though he did not take too alarmist a view at
present.
2. M. Beck agreed that an effort should be made to
settle local issues in Danzig and said that he was
endeavouring to separate economic from political questions
with a view to settling the former quickly and equitably. He
hoped that to-morrow's con-
* No. 50.
GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND 121
versation between Polish Commissioner-General and President
of the Senate might lead to some results.
3. M. Beck said that if he could not arrive at a direct
settlement of new incident which had occurred he would
invoke M. Burckhardt's intervention.
4. This incident was as follows: Three Polish customs
inspectors, while making their round of harbour in a motor
boat, discovered a German vessel entering the harbour
without lights, and, as they suspected smuggling of
munitions, turned their searchlight on her. On landing, they
were arrested by Danzig police. Polish Commissioner-General
has sent in a note demanding their release, though not in
unduly energetic language. If he did not receive a reply
shortly he would invite High Commissioner to settle this
incident.
5. As regards press, he remarked that it was not the
Poles but the British and other foreign press who first
suggested that firmness of the Polish Government had caused
the Senate to yield in the matter of Polish customs
inspectors.
TREATMENT OF GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND.
No. 52.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 24, 1939.
WHILE I am of course not in a position to check all the
allegations made by the German press of minority
persecutions here, I am satisfied from enquiries I have made
that the campaign is a gross distortion and exaggeration of
the facts.
2. Accusations of beating with chains, throwing on
barbed wire, being forced to shout insults against Herr
Hitler in chorus, &c., are merely silly, but many individual
cases specified have been disproved.
3. M. Karletan, for instance, arrested in connexion
with murder of Polish policeman on 15th August, was alleged
by German press to have been beaten to death and his wife
and children thrown out of the window. Manchester Guardian
correspondent tells me that he visited him in prison on
Sunday and
122 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
found him in good health. He had not been beaten or
physically injured at all. Story about wife and child was
equally devoid of any foundation whatever.
4. It is true that many of the German minority have
left Poland illegally, but I hear both from the Acting
British Consul at Katowice and from British Vice-Consul at
Lodz that the Germans themselves have told many to leave.
There was an initial exodus last May. Many subsequently
asked to come back, but the Poles were not anxious to have
them, as they had no doubt been trained in propaganda,
sabotage and espionage activities, such as Jungdeutsche
Partei in Katowice have been conducting. In Lodz area some
of those who left recently raised all the money and credit
they could before leaving, and the Voivode told Vice-Consul
on 20th August that from evidence available he was satisfied
that German Consulate had transferred these funds to Germany
and was no doubt privy to their departure. Many of those who
left, especially from Lodz, are of the intelligentsia, and
they are said to include Herr Witz, leader of Volksbund.
British Vice-Consul at Lodz says many German organisations
have been closed there, but they were notoriously conducting
Nazi propaganda, and Polish authorities could not ignore it
altogether. I think, however, many Germans have lost their
jobs, especially in factories of military or semi-military
importance, and some 2,000 workmen have left Tomaszow.
5. Many of those who left their homes undoubtedly did
so because they wished to be on German side of the front in
event of war, and in general there is by common consent less
individual friction with members of the minority now than
last May.
6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs tell me that figure of
76,000 refugees quoted in German press is a gross
exaggeration. I should say 17,000 was the absolute maximum.
Gazeta Polska correspondent in Berlin has asked to be shown
refugee camps of the 76,000 and apparently received no
answer.
7. In Silesia the frontier is not fully open, but a
special frontier card system is in force and considerable
daily traffic is possible. The German authorities having
closed frontier in Rybnik area where Poles cross to Poland,
Polish authorities closed it elsewhere where Germans cross
into Germany. In view of revelations of activities of
Jungdeutsche Partei, the Polish
GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND 123
authorities feel greater control of frontier traffic is in
any case necessary.
8. Polish press has recently published many complaints
of wholesale removal of Poles from frontier districts in
Silesia and East Prussia to the interior of Germany,
smashing of property, especially in Allenstein district,
closing of all Polish libraries in Silesia and other forms
of persecution. According to semi-official Gazeta Polska,
from April to June there were recorded 976 acts of violence
against the minority, and since then the number of cases is
stated to have increased beyond all bounds. For the last two
days, however, no further information has been published, as
M. Beck has damped the press down.
9. In general, responsible organs of the Polish press
have not published violent tirades, still less claimed
German territory for Poland, and A.B.C., recently quoted in
Germany, is a violent Opposition newspaper with little
reputation and less influence.
No. 53.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 26, 1939.
SERIES of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.
2. Polish patrol met party Germans 1 kilometre from
East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire.
Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being
returned.
3. German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near
Szczyglo, twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing
shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with
machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested
vigorously to Berlin.
4. Gazeta Polska, in inspired leader to-day, says these
are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of
aggression of para-military disciplined detachments supplied
with regular army's arms, and in one case it was a regular
army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.
5. These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm
and strong attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves
and acts
124 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
of aggression came from German side. This was best answer to
ravings of German press.
6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German
detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded
another.
No. 54.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 26, 1939.
MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story
recounted by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-
four Germans were recently killed at Lodz and eight at
Bielsko. Story is without any foundation whatever.
No. 55.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 27, 1939.
So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-
treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross
exaggerations, if not complete falsifications.
2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation
by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw (and so far as I can
ascertain the rest of Poland) is still completely calm.
3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda
methods regarding Czecho-Slovakia last year.
4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate
German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has
since March exacerbated feeling between the two
nationalities. I suppose this has been done with object of
(a) creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public
opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
aggression in Poland.
5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two
latter objects.
6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by
Herr Hitler.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 125
7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority
is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged
sufferings of Germans in Poland, where, be it noted, they do
not amount to more than 10 per cent. of population in any
commune.
8. In face of these facts, it can hardly be doubted
that, if Herr Hitler decides on war, it is for the sole
purpose of destroying Polish independence.
9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on
Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything
possible to prove that Herr Hitler's allegations regarding
German minority are false.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING IMMEDIATELY TO THE OUTBREAK OF
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER
3, 1939.
No. 56.
Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the
German Chancellor.
Your Excellency, 10 Downing Street,
August 22, 1939.
YOUR Excellency will have already heard of certain
measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in
the press and on the wireless this evening.
These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's
Government, been rendered necessary by the military
movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the
fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet
Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate
that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no
longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater
mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature
of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great
Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's
Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and
which they are determined to fulfil.
It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government
had made their position more clear in 1914, the great
catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is
any force in
126 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that
on this occasion there shall be no such tragic
misunderstanding.
If the case should arise, they are resolved, and
prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their
command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of
hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion
to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early
end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on
which it will be engaged should have been secured.
Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish
to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two
peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I
am certain that it is desired neither by our people, nor by
yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the
questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not
and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only
a situation of confidence could be restored to enable
discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from
that which prevails to-day.
We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist
in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take
place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to
discuss the wider problems affecting the future of
international relations, including matters of interest to us
and to you.
The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion
in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and
the longer that tension is maintained, the harder will it be
for reason to prevail.
These difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not
removed, provided that there could for an initial period be
a truce on both sides-and indeed on all sides-to press
polemics and to all incitement.
If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of
that period, during which steps could be taken to examine
and deal with complaints made by either side as to the
treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that
suitable conditions might have been established for direct
negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues
between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if
both sides should think that that would be helpful).
But I am bound to say that there would be slender hope
of
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 127
bringing such negotiations to successful issue unless it
were understood beforehand that any settlement reached
would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers. His
Majesty's Government would be ready, if desired, to make
such contribution as they could to the effective operation
of such guarantees.
At this moment I confess I can see no other way to
avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.
In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which
may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that
Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the
considerations which I have put before you.
Yours sincerely,
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
No. 57.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received August 24).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 23, 1939.
Two difficulties were raised last night before visit to
Herr Hitler was actually arranged. In first place it was
asked whether I would not be ready to wait until Herr von
Ribbentrop's return. I said that I could not wait as my
instructions were to hand letter myself as soon as possible.
An hour or so later I was rung up again by State Secretary
on the telephone asking for gist of letter and referring to
publication of some private letter addressed to Herr Hitler
last year. I told Baron von Weizs„cker that I had no
recollection of publication of any private letter last year
and assured him that there was no intention of publishing
this one. As regards Prime Minister's letter I said that its
three main points were (1) that His Majesty's Government was
determined to fulfil their obligations to Poland, (2) that
they were prepared, provided a peace atmosphere was created,
to discuss all problems affecting our two countries, and (3)
that during period of truce they would welcome direct
discussions between Poland and Germany in regard to
minorities.
State Secretary appeared to regard these replies as
likely to be satisfactory, but deferred a final answer to 8
a. m. this morning. At that hour he telephoned me to say
that arrangements made
128 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
had been confirmed and that he would accompany me to
Berchtesgaden, leaving Berlin at 9:30 a. m.
We arrived Salzburg soon after 11 a. m. and motored to
Berchtesgaden, where I was received by Herr Hitler shortly
after 1 p. m. I had derived impression that atmosphere was
likely to be most unfriendly and that probability was that
interview would be exceedingly brief.
In order to forestall this I began conversation by
stating that I had been instructed to hand to Chancellor
personally a letter from Prime Minister on behalf of His
Majesty's Government, but before doing so I wished to make
some preliminary remarks. I was grateful to his Excellency
for receiving me so promptly as it would have been
impossible for me to wait for Herr von Ribbentrop's return
inasmuch as the fact was that His Majesty's Government were
afraid that the situation brooked no delay. I asked his
Excellency to read the letter, not from the point of view of
the past, but from that of the present and the future. What
had been done could not now be undone, and there could be no
peace in Europe without Anglo-German co-operation. We had
guaranteed Poland against attack and we would keep our word.
Throughout the centuries of history we had never, so far as
I knew, broken our word. We could not do so now and remain
Britain.
During the whole of this first conversation Herr Hitler
was excitable and uncompromising. He made no long speeches
but his language was violent and exaggerated both as regards
England and Poland. He began by asserting that the Polish
question would have been settled on the most generous terms
if it had not been for England's unwarranted support. I drew
attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our
guarantee having been given on 31st March and Polish reply
on 26th March. He retorted by saying that the latter had
been inspired by a British press campaign, which had
invented a German threat to Poland the week before. Germany
had not moved a man any more than she had done during the
similar fallacious press campaign about Czecho-Slovakia on
the 20th May last year.
He then violently attacked the Poles, talked of 100,000
German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans,
closing of German institutions and Polish systematic
persecution of Ger-
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 129
man nationals generally. He said that he was receiving
hundreds of telegrams daily from his persecuted compatriots.
He would stand it no longer, &c. I interrupted by remarking
that while I did not wish to try to deny that persecutions
occurred (of Poles also in Germany) the German press
accounts were highly exaggerated. He had mentioned the
castration of Germans. I happened to be aware of one case.
The German in question was a sex-maniac, who had been
treated as he deserved. Herr Hitler's retort was that there
had not been one case but six.
His next tirade was against British support of Czechs
and Poles. He asserted that the former would have been
independent to-day if England had not encouraged them in a
policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles
would be to-morrow if Britain ceased to encourage them to-
day. He followed this by a tirade against England, whose
friendship he had sought for twenty years only to see every
offer turned down with contempt. The British press was also
vehemently abused. I contested every point and kept calling
his statements inaccurate but the only effect was to launch
him on some fresh tirade.
Throughout the conversation I stuck firmly to point (1)
namely our determination to honour our obligations to
Poland; Herr Hitler on the other hand kept harping on point
(3), the Polish persecution of German nationals. Point (2)
was not referred to at all and apparently did not interest
him. (I had been warned that it would not.)
Most of the conversation was recrimination, the real
points being those stressed in his reply in regard to the
threat to Poland if persecutions continue and to England and
France if they mobilise to such an extent as to constitute a
danger to Germany.
At the end of this first conversation Herr Hitler
observed, in reply to my repeated warnings that direct
action by Germany would mean war, that Germany had nothing
to lose and Great Britain much; that he did not desire war
but would not shrink from it if it was necessary; and that
his people were much more behind him than last September.
I replied that I hoped and was convinced that some
solution was still possible without war and asked why
contact with the Poles could not be renewed. Herr Hitler's
retort was that, so long as England gave Poland a blank
cheque, Polish unrea-
130 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
sonableness would render any negotiation impossible. I
denied the "blank cheque" but this only started Herr Hitler
off again and finally it was agreed that he would send or
hand me his reply in two hours' time.
No. 58.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received August 24).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 24, 1939.
FOLLOWING is continuation of my telegram of the 23rd
August.*
After my first talk yesterday I returned to Salzburg on
understanding that if Herr Hitler wished to see me again I
would be at his disposal, or, if he had nothing new to say,
he could merely send me his reply to Prime Minister by hand.
As in the event he asked to see me, I went back to
Berchtesgaden. He was quite calm the second time and never
raised his voice once. Conversation lasted from 20 minutes
to half an hour but produced little new, except that
verbally he was far more categoric than in written reply as
to his determination to attack Poland if "another German
were ill-treated in Poland."
I spoke of tragedy of war and of his immense
responsibility but his answer was that it would be all
England's fault. I refuted this only to learn from him that
England was determined to destroy and exterminate Germany.
He was, he said, 50 years old: he preferred war now to when
he would be 55 or 60. I told him that it was absurd to talk
of extermination. Nations could not be exterminated and
peaceful and prosperous Germany was a British interest. His
answer was that it was England who was fighting for lesser
races whereas he was fighting only for Germany: the Germans
would this time fight to the last man: it would have been
different in 1914 if he had been Chancellor then.
He spoke several times of his repeated offers of
friendship to England and their invariable and contemptuous
rejection. I referred to Prime Minister's efforts of last
year and his desire for co-operation with Germany. He said
that he had believed in Mr. Chamberlain's good will at the
time, but, and especially since
* No. 57.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 131
encirclement efforts of last few months, he did so no
longer. I pointed out fallacy of this view but his answer
was that he was now finally convinced of the rightness of
views held formerly to him by others that England and
Germany could never agree.
In referring to Russian non-aggression pact he observed
that it was England which had forced him into agreement with
Russia. He did not seem enthusiastic over it but added that
once he made agreement it would be for a long period. (Text
of agreement signed to-day confirms this and I shall be
surprised if it is not supplemented later by something more
than mere non-aggression).
I took line at end that war seemed to me quite
inevitable if Herr Hitler persisted in direct action against
Poland and expressed regret at failure of my mission in
general to Berlin and of my visit to him. Herr Hitler's
attitude was that it was England's fault and that nothing
short of complete change of her policy towards Germany could
now ever convince him of British desire for good relations.
No. 59.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 8:30 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 24, 1939.
I HAVE hitherto not made particular reference to the
underlined portion in Herr Hitler's reply* to the Prime
Minister in regard to German general mobilisation as a
counter to British and French mobilisations.
2. When Herr Hitler gave me his reply, readjusted, I
asked him what exactly was intended by this sentence, as I
would, I said, regard a general German mobilisation as the
equivalent to war. The answer I got was confused, as was the
actual German text. But the gist was that if the French and
British mobilisations convinced Herr Hitler that the Western
Powers meant to attack him he would mobilise in self-
defence. I pointed out that any British military
mobilisation would in any case fall far short of what
already existed in Germany. Herr Hitler's reply was that
this sentence was more particularly intended as a warning
* Given in italics in No. 60.
132 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
to France, and that, as I gathered, the French Government
was being or would be so informed.
3. I feel that the main objects of inserting this
underlined passage in his letter was (a) to indicate that
Germany could not be intimidated; and (b) to serve as an
excuse for general mobilisation if and when Herr Hitler
decides on it.
No. 60.
Communication from the German Chancellor to the Prime
Minister, handed to His Majesty's Ambassador on August 23,
1939.
(Translation.)
Your Excellency,
THE British Ambassador has just handed to me a
communication in which your Excellency draws attention in
the name of the British Government to a number of points
which in your estimation are of the greatest importance.
I may be permitted to answer your letter as follows:-
1. Germany has never sought conflict with England and
has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary,
she has for years endeavoured-although unfortunately in vain-
to win England's friendship. On this account she voluntarily
assumed in a wide area of Europe the limitations on her own
interests which from a national-political point of view it
would have otherwise been very difficult to tolerate.
2. The German Reich, however, like every other State
possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible
to renounce. These do not extend beyond the limits of the
necessities laid down by former German history and deriving
from vital economic pre-requisites. Some of these questions
held and still hold a significance both of a national-
political and a psychological character which no German
Government is able to ignore.
To these questions belong the German City of Danzig,
and the connected problem of the Corridor. Numerous
statesmen, historians and men of letters even in England
have been conscious of this at any rate up to a few years
ago. I would add that all these territories lying in the
aforesaid German sphere of interest
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 133
and in particular those lands which returned to the Reich
eighteen months ago received their cultural development at
the hands not of the English but exclusively of the Germans
and this, moreover, already from a time dating back over a
thousand years.
3. Germany was prepared to settle the questions of
Danzig and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on
the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity.
The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German
mobilisation against Poland, the assertion of aggressive
designs towards Roumania, Hungary, &c., as well as the so-
called guarantee declarations which were subsequently given
had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a
basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for
Germany also.
4. The unconditional assurance given by England to
Poland that she would render assistance to that country in
all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a
conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that
country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under
cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism
against the one and a half million German inhabitants living
in Poland. The atrocities which since then have been taking
place in that country are terrible for the victims, but
intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich which
is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these
happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of
her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has
made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated
a process of economic strangulation.
5. The Government of the German Reich therefore
recently caused the Polish Government to be informed that it
was not prepared passively to accept this development of
affairs, that it will not tolerate further addressing of
notes in the character of ultimata to Danzig, that it will
not tolerate a continuance of the persecutions of the German
minority, that it will equally not tolerate the
extermination of the Free City of Danzig by economic
measures, in other words, the destruction of the vital bases
of the population of Danzig by a kind of Customs blockade,
and that it will not tolerate the occurrence of further acts
of provocation directed against the Reich. Apart from this,
the questions of the Corridor and of Danzig must and shall
be solved.
134 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
6. Your Excellency informs me in the name of the
British Government that you will be obliged to render
assistance to Poland in any such case of intervention on the
part of Germany. I take note of this statement of yours and
assure you that it can make no change in the determination
of the Reich Government to safeguard the interests of the
Reich as stated in paragraph 5 above. Your assurance to the
effect that in such an event you anticipate a long war is
shared by myself. Germany, if attacked by England, will be
found prepared and determined. I have already more than once
declared before the German people and the world that there
can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new
German Reich rather to accept, for however long it might be,
every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its
national interests, let alone its honour.
7. The German Reich Government has received information
to the effect that the British Government has the intention
to carry out measures of mobilisation which, according to
the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly
directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of
France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of
taking military measures other than those of a defensive
character against England or France, and, as has already
been emphasised, has never intended, and does not in the
future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that
this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister,
in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of
menace directed against the Reich. I therefore inform your
Excellency that, in the event of these military
announcements being carried into effect, I shall order
immediate mobilisation of the German forces.
8. The question of the treatment of European problems
on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany
but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed
any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the
part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change
in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all
my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude
adopted by British diplomacy-at any rate up to the present-
has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an
attempt. Should there be
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 135
any change in this respect in the future nobody could be
happier than I.
ADOLF HITLER.
No. 61.
Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
(Translation.)
THE Government of the German Reich and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the
desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and taking as a
basis the fundamental regulations of the Neutrality
Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the
following agreement:-
Article I. The two Contracting Parties bind themselves
to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive action and
any attack on one another, both singly and also jointly with
other Powers.
Art. 2. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties
becoming the object of warlike action on the part of a third
Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner
support this third Power.
Art. 3. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties
shall in future remain continuously in touch with one
another, by way of consultation, in order to inform one
another on questions touching their joint interests.
Art. 4. Neither of the two Contracting Parties shall
participate in any grouping of Powers which is directed
directly or indirectly against the other Party.
Art. 5. In the event of disputes or disagreements
arising between the Contracting Parties on questions of this
or that kind, both Parties would clarify these disputes or
disagreements exclusively by means of friendly exchange of
opinion or, if necessary, by arbitration committees.
Art. 6. The present Agreement shall be concluded for a
period of ten years on the understanding that, in so far as
one of
136 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
the Contracting Parties does not give notice of termination
one year before the end of this period, the period of
validity of this Agreement shall automatically be regarded
as prolonged for a further period of five years.
Art. 7. The present Agreement shall be ratified within
the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification
shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement takes effect
immediately after it has been signed.
For the German Reich Government:
RIBBENTROP.
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
MOLOTOV.
Moscow, August 23, 1939.
No. 62.
Mr. F. M. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Danzig,
August 26, 1939.
FOLLOWING is translation of decree of Senate dated 23rd
August:-
"Decree: Article I.-Gauleiter of Danzig is Head of
State ('Staatsoberhaupt') of the Free City of Danzig.
"Article 2.-This decree comes into force on 23rd
August, 1939."
Following are translations of letters dated 24th August
(a) from President of Senate to Herr Forster, and (b) of
latter's reply:-
"(a) At its meeting yesterday the Senate passed a
resolution according to which you have been
declared Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of
Danzig as from yesterday. A copy of the certified
resolution is enclosed. In addition, a legal
decree has been prepared to-day and signed making
the above-mentioned resolution of the Senate
operative. By means of these two acts of the
Government the Danzig Constitution has been
altered in the above-mentioned sense. The Senate
has authorized me to request you, Herr Gauleiter,
to
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 137
accept this office forthwith in order in these
difficult but wonderful last decisive days
outwardly to give expression to the unity between
party and State, which has so often been stressed
and which inwardly has always existed.
"(b) I have taken cognisance of the contents of your
letter of the 24th instant and of the enclosed
certified copy of the decree regarding the
Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of Danzig of 23rd
August, 1939, and of the copy of the Senate's
resolution of the 23rd August, 1939, which was
also enclosed. It, of course, goes without saying
that in my capacity as Leader of the N.S.D.A.P. of
the Danzig district I am prepared in days which
are so fateful for Danzig also to conduct the
affairs of the State. With this decree promulgated
on the 23rd August, 1939, a state of affairs is
officially sanctioned which, since the accession
to power by the National Socialists in 1933, has
in practice been in force."
No. 63.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 24, 1939.
FOLLOWING is translation of Polish note to the Danzig
Senate:-
"Herr Staatsrat Boettcher to-day informed Councillor of
the Polish Commissariat-General of the resolution of the
Senate of the Free City conferring on Gauleiter Forster the
functions and position of the head of the State
('Staatsoberhaupt') of the Free City, this being confirmed
in to-day's Danzig press. I address myself to the Senate of
the Free City as the body which, in accordance with the
legally binding Constitution of the Free City, exercises
supreme authority in that territory, in order to make on
behalf of my Government the following declaration-
"My Government sees no legal foundation for the
adoption by the Senate of the Free City of a resolution
instituting a new
138 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
State function for which there is no provision whatever in
the Constitution of the Free City, and to which, as would
appear, the authorities hitherto functioning in the Free
City would be subordinated. The Polish Government reserve
the right to adopt a further attitude in this respect.
"In this connexion the Polish Government consider it
necessary to remind the authorities of the Free City that
they have already more than once warned the Senate of the
Free City in the most decisive fashion against a policy of
fait accompli, the consequence of which might be most
serious and the responsibility for which would fall
exclusively upon the authorities of the Free City of
Danzig."
No. 64.
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
August 24, 1939.
WHEN at the beginning of this month Hon. Members
separated for the summer recess, I think there can have been
few among us who anticipated that many weeks would elapse
before we should find ourselves meeting here again.
Unfortunately, those anticipations have been fulfilled, and
the Government have felt obliged to ask that Parliament
should be summoned again, in order to take such new and
drastic steps as are required by the gravity of the
situation. In the last debate which we had upon foreign
affairs, which took place on the 31st July, I observed that
the Danzig situation required very careful watching. I
expressed my anxiety about the pace at which the
accumulation of war weapons was proceeding throughout
Europe. I referred to the poisoning of public opinion by the
propaganda which was going on, and I declared that if that
could be stopped and if some action could be taken to
restore confidence, I did not believe there was any question
which could not be solved by peaceful discussion. I am sorry
to say that there has been no sign since of any such action.
On the contrary, the international position has steadily
deteriorated until to-day we find ourselves confronted with
the imminent peril of war.
At the beginning of August a dispute arose between the
Polish
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 139
Government and the Danzig Senate as to the position and
functions of certain Polish Customs officials. It was not a
question of major importance. Many more acute difficulties
have been easily settled in the past under less tense
conditions and even in this case discussions had actually
begun between the parties last week. While those discussions
were in progress, the German Press opened a violent campaign
against the Polish Government. They declared that Danzig
could not be the subject of any conference or any compromise
and that it must come back to the Reich at once and
unconditionally. They went further. They linked up with the
Danzig question the question of the Corridor. They attacked
the whole policy and the attitude of the Polish Government,
and they published circumstantial accounts of the alleged
ill-treatment of Germans living in Poland. Now we have no
means of checking the accuracy of those stories, but we
cannot help being struck by the fact that they bear a strong
resemblance to similar allegations that were made last year
in respect of the Sudeten Germans in Czecho-Slovakia. We
must also remember that there is a large Polish minority in
Germany and that the treatment of that minority has also
been the subject of bitter complaints by the Polish
Government.
There is no subject which is calculated to arouse ill-
feeling in any country more than statements about the ill-
treatment of people of their own race in another country.
This is a subject which provides the most inflammable of all
materials, the material most likely to cause a general
conflagration. In those circumstances one cannot but deeply
regret that such incidents, which, if they were established,
would naturally excite sympathy for the victims and
indignation against the authors of this alleged ill-
treatment, should be treated in a way which is calculated
still further to embitter the atmosphere and raise the
temperature to the danger point. But I think it will be
agreed that, in face of this campaign, declarations by
Polish statesmen have shown great calm and self-restraint.
The Polish leaders, while they have been firm in their
determination to resist an attack upon their independence,
have been unprovocative. They have always been ready, as I
am sure they would be ready now, to discuss differences with
the German Government, if they could be sure that those
discussions would be carried on without threats of force or
violence, and with some
140 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
confidence that, if agreement were reached, its terms would
be respected afterwards permanently, both in the letter and
in the spirit. This Press campaign is not the only symptom
which is ominously reminiscent of past experience. Military
preparations have been made in Germany on such a scale that
that country is now in a condition of complete readiness for
war, and at the beginning of this week we had word that
German troops were beginning to move towards the Polish
frontier. It then became evident that a crisis of the first
magnitude was approaching, and the Government resolved that
the time had come when they must seek the approval of
Parliament for further measures of defence.
That was the situation on Tuesday last, when in Berlin
and Moscow it was announced that negotiations had been
taking place, and were likely soon to be concluded, for a
non-aggression pact between those two countries. I do not
attempt to conceal from the House that that announcement
came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a
very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been
rumours about an impending change in the relations between
Germany and the Soviet Union, but no inkling of that change
had been conveyed either to us or to the French Government
by the Soviet Government. The House may remember that on the
31st July I remarked that we had engaged upon steps almost
unprecedented in character. I said that we had shown a great
amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the
negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful
conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and
airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before
we had any assurance that we should be able to reach an
agreement on political matters. Well, Sir, nevertheless,
moved by the observation of the Russian Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful
conclusion of our military discussions, political agreement
should not present any insuperable difficulties, we sent the
Mission.
The British and French Missions reached Moscow on the
11th August. They were warmly received, in friendly fashion,
and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded
on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung
down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to
learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that
basis, the Soviet Govern-
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 141
ment were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for
purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with
the objects of their foreign policy, as we had understood
it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final
judgment upon this incident. That, I think, would be
premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting
with the French Government as to the meaning and the
consequences of this agreement, the text of which was
published only this morning. But the question that the
Government had to consider when they learned of this
announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation
would have upon their own policy. In Berlin the announcement
was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great
diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since we
and France would no longer be likely to fulfil our
obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove
any such dangerous illusion.
The House will recollect that the guarantee which we
had given to Poland was given before any agreement with
Russia was talked of, and that it was not in any way made
dependent upon any such agreement being reached. How, then,
could we, with honour, go back upon such an obligation,
which we had so often and so plainly repeated? Therefore,
our first act was to issue a statement that our obligations
to Poland and to other countries remained unaffected. Those
obligations rest upon agreed statements made to the House of
Commons, to which effect is being given in treaties which
are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. Those
treaties, when concluded, will formally define our
obligations, but they do not in any way alter, they do not
add to or subtract from, the obligations of mutual
assistance which have already been accepted. The communiqu‚
which we issued to the Press after the meeting of the
Cabinet this week spoke also of certain measures of defence
which we had adopted. It will be remembered that, as I have
said, Germany has an immense army of men already under arms
and that military preparations of all kinds have been and
are being carried on on a vast scale in that country.
The measures that we have taken up to now are of a
precautionary and defensive character, and to give effect to
our determination to put this country in a state of
preparedness to meet any emergency, but I wish emphatically
to repudiate any suggestion, if such a suggestion should be
made, that these measures imply an
142 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
act of menace. Nothing that we have done or that we propose
to do menaces the legitimate interests of Germany. It is not
an act of menace to prepare to help friends to defend
themselves against force. If neighbours wishing to live
together peacefully in friendly relations find that one of
them is contemplating apparently an aggressive act of force
against another of them, and is making open preparations for
action, it is not a menace for the others to announce their
intention of aiding the one who is the subject of this
threat.
There is another action which has been taken to-day in
the financial sphere. Hon. Members will have seen the
announcement that the Bank Rate, which has remained at 2 per
cent. for a long time past, has to-day been raised to 4 per
cent., and the House will recognise that this is a normal
protective measure adopted for the purpose of defending our
resources in a period of uncertainty. There is in this
connexion a contribution to be made by British citizens
generally. The public can best co-operate in reducing as far
as possible any demands which involve directly or indirectly
the purchase of foreign exchange; next by scrupulously
observing the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer
that capital should not at present be sent or moved out of
the country; and, finally, by holding no more foreign assets
than are strictly required for the normal purpose of
business.
In view of the attitude in Berlin to which I have
already referred, His Majesty's Government felt that it was
their duty at this moment to leave no possible loophole for
misunderstanding, and so that no doubt might exist in the
mind of the German Government, His Majesty's Ambassador in
Berlin was instructed to seek an interview with the German
Chancellor and to hand him a message from me on behalf of
the British Government. That message was delivered yesterday
and the reply was received today. The object of my
communication to the German Chancellor was to restate our
position and to make quite sure that there was no
misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government felt that this
was all the more necessary having regard to reports which we
had received as to the military movements taking place in
Germany and as to the then projected German-Soviet
Agreement. I therefore made it plain, as had been done in
the communiqu‚ issued after the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday,
that if the case
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 143
should arise His Majesty's Government were resolved and
prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their
command.
On numerous occasions I have stated my conviction that
war between our two countries, admitted on all sides to be
the greatest calamity that could occur, is not desired
either by our own people or the German people. With this
fact in mind I informed the German Chancellor that, in our
view, there was nothing in the questions arising between
Poland and Germany which could not be, and should not be,
resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of
confidence could be restored. We expressed our willingness
to assist in creating the conditions in which such
negotiations could take place. The present state of tension
creates great difficulties, and I expressed the view that if
there could be a truce on all sides to press polemics and
all other forms of incitement suitable conditions might be
established for direct negotiations between Germany and
Poland upon the points at issue. The negotiations could, of
course, deal also with the complaints made on either side
about the protection of minorities.
The German Chancellor's reply includes what amounts to
a re-statement of the German thesis that Eastern Europe is a
sphere in which Germany ought to have a free hand. If we
this is the thesis-or any country having less direct
interest choose to interfere, the blame for the ensuing
conflict will be ours. This thesis entirely misapprehends
the British position. We do not seek to claim a special
position for ourselves in Eastern Europe. We do not think of
asking Germany to sacrifice her national interests, but we
cannot agree that national interests can only be secured by
the shedding of blood or the destruction of the independence
of other States. With regard to the relations between Poland
and Germany, the German Chancellor in his reply to me has
referred again to the situation at Danzig, drawing attention
to the position of that city and of the Corridor, and to the
offer which he made early this year to settle these
questions by methods of negotiation. I have repeatedly
refuted the allegation that it was our guarantee to Poland
that decided the Polish Government to refuse the proposals
then made. That guarantee was not, in fact, given until
after the Polish refusal had been conveyed to the German
Government. In view of the delicacy of the situation I must
refrain for the present from any further comment upon the
144 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
communications which have just passed between the two
Governments. Catastrophe has not yet come upon us. We must,
therefore, still hope that reason and sanity may find a way
to reassert themselves. The pronouncement we made recently
and what I have said to-day reflects, I am sure, the views
of the French Government, with whom we have maintained the
customary close contact in pursuance of our well established
cordial relations.
Naturally, our minds turn to the Dominions. I
appreciate very warmly the pronouncements made by Ministers
in other parts of the British Commonwealth. The indications
that have been given from time to time, in some cases as
recently as yesterday, of their sympathy with our patient
efforts in the cause of peace, and of their attitude in the
unhappy event of their proving unsuccessful, are a source of
profound encouragement to us in these critical times. The
House will, I am sure, share the appreciation with which His
Majesty's Government have noted the appeal for peace made
yesterday by King Leopold in the name of the heads of the
Oslo States, after the meeting in Brussels yesterday of the
representatives of those States. It will be evident from
what I have said that His Majesty's Government share the
hopes to which that appeal gave expression, and earnestly
trust that effect will be given to it.
The Foreign Secretary, in a speech made on the 29th
June to the Royal Institute of International Affairs,* set
out the fundamental bases of British foreign policy. His
observations on that subject were, I believe, received with
general approval. The first basis is our determination to
resist methods of force. The second basis is our recognition
of the world desire to pursue the constructive work of
building peace. If we were once satisfied, my noble Friend
said, that the intentions of others were the same as our
own, and if we were satisfied that all wanted peaceful
solutions, then, indeed, we could discuss problems which are
to-day causing the world so much anxiety. That definition of
the basic fundamental ground of British policy still stands.
We want to see established an international order based upon
mutual understanding and mutual confidence, and we cannot
build such an order unless it conforms to certain principles
which are essential to the establishment of confidence and
trust. Those principles
* No. 35
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 145
must include the observance of international undertakings
when they have once been entered into, and the renunciation
of force in the settlement of differences. It is because
those principles, to which we attach such vital importance,
seem to us to be in jeopardy that we have undertaken these
tremendous and unprecedented responsibilities.
If, despite all our efforts to find the way to peace-
and God knows I have tried my best-if in spite of all that,
we find ourselves forced to embark upon a struggle which is
bound to be fraught with suffering and misery for all
mankind and the end of which no man can foresee, if that
should happen, we shall not be fighting for the political
future of a far away city in a foreign land; we shall be
fighting for the preservation of those principles of which I
have spoken, the destruction of which would involve the
destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the
peoples of the world. This issue of peace or war does not
rest with us, and I trust that those with whom the
responsibility does lie will think of the millions of human
beings whose fate depends upon their actions. For ourselves,
we have a united country behind us, and in this critical
hour I believe that we, in this House of Commons, will stand
together, and that this afternoon we shall show the world
that, as we think, so will we act, as a united nation.
No. 65.
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the
House of Lords on August 24, 1939.
MY Lords, I am glad to accede to the invitation of the
noble Lord opposite, and perhaps your Lordships will forgive
me if I make a statement of somewhat greater length than is
customary in answer to a formal question. It will perhaps be
of some usefulness if I sketch in a word or two the
background of the international developments which have led
to the recall of Parliament. The events of this year are
fresh in all our minds, and the cumulative effect of them
had been to lead many countries of Europe to feel themselves
confronted with an attempt on the part of Germany to
dominate and control their destiny, and there were few
146 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
which had not reason to fear that their liberties were in
greater or less degree in danger. As a matter of history,
successive British Governments have felt obliged to resist
attempts by a single Power to dominate Europe at the expense
of others, and the imposition of one country's will by force
of arms. This country has stood for the maintenance of the
independence of those States who both valued their liberties
and were ready to defend them, and have endeavoured to
uphold the principle that changes which must inevitably take
place in the relations between nations can and should be
effected peacefully and by free negotiation between those
concerned.
His Majesty's Government accordingly entered into
consultation with the countries who felt themselves to be
more immediately threatened, for the sole purpose of
concerting resistance to further aggression if such should
be attempted. His Majesty's Government at the same time
endeavoured to make clear their attitude both by word and
deed so that no doubt might anywhere exist as to the policy
which they were determined to pursue. They introduced
compulsory service and made efforts unprecedented in times
of peace to expand and equip the armed forces of the Crown
and to place both the civil and military defences of the
country in a state of full preparedness. The declarations of
policy which have been made in this House and in another
place have sought to set out both general principles of
British policy and also the attitude of His Majesty's
Government to particular questions, such as Danzig, which
have from time to time held the forefront of the stage. The
declarations which were thus made and the action which was
taken met, I think, with the general approval both of
Parliament and people.
Before the adjournment early this month my right
honourable friend the Prime Minister said that the
situation, in which the accumulation of the weapons of war
was going on at such a pace, was one which could not but be
regarded with anxiety. He referred to the bad feeling which
was being created by poisonous propaganda, and said that if
that could be stopped and if some action could be taken to
restore confidence in Europe, there was no question which
should not be capable of solution by a peaceful means. Of
such action, however, there has unhappily been no sign, and
since the House adjourned the international situation
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 147
has deteriorated, until to-day we are confronted with the
imminent peril of war.
At the beginning of August further differences arose
between the Polish Government and the Danzig Senate
concerning the position and functions of the Polish Customs
Inspectors in the Free City. These differences were
relatively unimportant in themselves and in an atmosphere of
less tension would no doubt have been capable of being
settled amicably, as similar differences have been settled
in the past. Discussion of the questions at issue was in
fact proceeding at the end of last week. But while efforts
were being made to set the machinery of negotiation in
motion, the German press opened a violent campaign against
the Polish Government. This campaign, as noble Lords may
have noticed, was not confined solely, or even principally,
to the question of Danzig. On this question it was stated
that there could be no compromise: Danzig must return
unconditionally to the Reich. With it was linked the
question of the so-called Corridor, and the attack on Poland
has extended to cover the general attitude and policy of the
Polish Government, and in particular the position of the
German minority in Poland.
In regard to the German minority I would say this.
Every country must be concerned to secure just treatment for
minorities, and must naturally feel particular interest in
minorities allied to it by race. No one in this country,
certainly, would wish to defend conditions under which such
treatment was denied to any minority section, but if causes
of complaint exist let them not be made the ground for such
embitterment of the atmosphere as must make any settlement a
hundred times more difficult, but let them be fairly and
dispassionately brought to examination, so that before the
public opinion of the world some ground may be established
for their consideration and redress. It is impossible to
ignore the fact that the accusations against Poland bear a
strong resemblance to the accusations made last year against
Czecho-Slovakia, and it is right also to remember that there
is a large Polish minority in Germany, of whose treatment
the Polish Government also bitterly complain.
Of the general attitude of Poland it must be admitted,
I think, that in the face of a campaign which appears to
threaten not only their independence of action, but also the
existence of Poland as a
148 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
nation, the declarations of the Polish leaders have been
firm but quite unprovocative. I am confident that they have
been, and are at all times, ready to discuss the differences
between themselves and Germany, if they could be reasonably
certain that the discussion would take place under free
conditions, without the menace of force, and with assurance
that the results of the discussion would be loyally and
permanently observed. If at times the Polish newspapers have
replied in kind to the onslaught of the German press, this
has not been reflected in the attitude of the Polish
Government. Concurrently with the press campaign there has
been much active military preparation in Germany, and that
country is being placed on a footing of complete readiness
for war. At the beginning of this week there were
indications that German troops were moving towards the
Polish frontiers, and, in the face of what was obviously
becoming a very menacing situation, His Majesty's Government
decided that the time had come when they must seek the
approval of Parliament for further measures of defence.
That, in outline, was the situation when on the 22d
August, the day before yesterday, it was officially stated
in Berlin and Moscow that negotiations had been in progress,
and were to be at once continued, for the signature of a non-
aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. I do
not conceal the fact that this announcement came as a
surprise to His Majesty's Government. For some time past
there had been rumours of a change in the relations between
the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a
change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His
Majesty's Government or the French Government, with whom
they were in negotiation; and on the 31st July last the
Prime Minister remarked in another place that His Majesty's
Government were showing a great degree of trust, and a
strong desire to bring their negotiations with the Soviet
Government to a successful issue, when, before any agreement
had been finally reached on political matters, they agreed
to send a Military Mission to Moscow to discuss military
plans. The Military Missions of France and this country
reached Moscow on the 11th August, and the conversations
were proceeding to all appearance on a basis of mutual
confidence, and it is, I do not conceal from your Lordships,
certainly disturbing to learn that while these conver-
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 149
sations were taking place the Soviet Government were
secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which,
on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects, as we
had understood them, of their foreign policy.
I would not now pass any final judgment on this matter.
That would be premature until we have had time to consult
with the French Government as to the meaning and the
consequences of the agreement, the actual text of which has
been published this morning, but one matter forces itself
upon the immediate attention of His Majesty's Government.
They had to consider what effect this changed situation
should have on their policy. In Berlin the agreement was
somewhat cynically welcomed as a great diplomatic victory
which removed the danger of war, since, so it was alleged,
Great Britain and France would no longer fulfil their
obligations to Poland, and His Majesty's Government felt it
their first duty to remove this dangerous illusion. It
should be recalled, if it is not in mind, that our guarantee
to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was in
prospect, and without condition that such agreement should
be reached. His Majesty's Government therefore at once
issued a statement that their obligations to Poland and
other countries remained unaffected; and throughout these
days, as noble Lords will imagine, we have been in close and
constant contact with the French Government, whose attitude
is identical with our own. Our obligations rest on the
agreed statements which were made in this House and in
another place, and which are binding. Effect is being given
to them in treaties, which are in an advanced stage of
negotiation, and these treaties will formally define the
mutual obligations of the parties, but they neither add to
nor subtract from the obligations of mutual assistance which
have been already accepted.
Certain necessary measures of precaution have already
been taken. Some of these measures have already been
announced, and other steps will be taken, as judged
necessary, as soon as the legislation is passed, which I
understand it is proposed to invite your Lordships to
consider this afternoon. There is another action which has
been taken to-day in the financial sphere. Your Lordships
will have seen the announcement that the bank rate, which
has remained for a long time past at 2 per cent., has to-day
been raised to 4 per cent. The House will recognise that
this is a nor-
150 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
mal protective measure, which is adopted for the purpose of
defending our resources in a period of uncertainty. There
is, in this connection, a contribution to be made generally
by British citizens. The public can best co-operate by
reducing, so far as possible, any demands which involve,
directly or indirectly, the purchase of foreign exchange;
next, by scrupulously observing the Chancellor of the
Exchequer's request that capital should not at present be
sent or moved out of the country; and, finally, by holding
no more foreign assets than are strictly required for the
normal purpose of business.
My Lords, I have said that His Majesty's Government
have tried to make their position quite clear, but, in order
that no possible doubt might exist in the mind of the German
Government, His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was
instructed yesterday to seek an interview with Herr Hitler
and to give him a message on His Majesty's Government's
behalf. The object of this message to the German Chancellor
was to restate our position and to make quite sure that
there was no misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government, as
I have suggested, felt that that was all the more necessary
having regard to the reports which we have received as to
the military movements in Germany and as to the then
projected German-Soviet Agreement. My right honourable
Friend the Prime Minister, therefore, on behalf of His
Majesty's Government, made it plain, as had, indeed, been
made plain in the statement issued after the meeting of the
Cabinet on Tuesday last, that if the case should arise His
Majesty's Government were resolved and prepared to employ
without delay all the forces at their command.
On numerous occasions the Prime Minister has stated his
conviction, which is shared, I would suppose, by all people
of this country, that war between the British and the German
peoples-admitted on all sides to be the greatest calamity
that could occur-was not desired either by our people or by
the German people. And the Prime Minister further informed
the German Chancellor that we did not see that there was
anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland
which could not and should not be resolved without the use
of force, if only a situation of confidence could be
restored. We have expressed our willingness to assist in
creating the conditions in which such negotiations could
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 151
take place. It was obvious that the present state of tension
created great difficulties, and the Prime Minister expressed
the view that, if there could be a truce on all sides to
press polemics and all incitements, a suitable condition
might be established for direct negotiations between Germany
and Poland upon the points between them. The negotiations
could, of course, also deal with the complaints made on
either side about the treatment of minorities.
The German Chancellor's reply includes what amounts to
a re-statement of the German thesis that Eastern Europe is a
sphere in which Germany seeks to have a free hand; if we or
any country having less direct interests choose to
interfere, the blame for the ensuing conflict will be ours.
The British position is, of course, that we do not in any
way seek to claim a special position for ourselves; we do
not think of asking Germany to sacrifice her national
interests, but we do insist that the interests of other
States should be respected. We cannot agree that national
interests can only be secured by the shedding of blood or by
the destruction of the independence of other States; and,
unfortunately, events such as those of last March make it
difficult to accept assurances, even now repeated, about the
limitations of German interests. Herr Hitler has often said
that he has fought for a better Anglo-German understanding,
but it has, as we see it, been the acts of Herr Hitler
himself that have time and again destroyed our earnest and
sincere endeavours to that end; and as regards relations
between Germany and Poland, the German Chancellor has
referred again to the situation at Danzig, drawing attention
to the position of that City and of the Corridor, and to the
offer which he made only this year to settle those questions
by methods of negotiation. The allegation that it was our
guarantee to Poland that decided the Polish Government to
refuse the proposals then made has been repeatedly refuted.
That guarantee was not, in fact, given until after the
Polish refusal had been conveyed to the German Government.
My Lords, in view of the delicacy of the situation I
would refrain at this time from any further comment upon the
communications which have just passed between the two
Governments. Catastrophe has not yet come upon Europe, and
we must, therefore, still hope that reason and sanity may
find means to reassert
152 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
themselves. As to the military measures that we have taken,
it must be remembered that, as I have said, Germany has
already an immense number of men under arms, and has also
made military preparations of all kinds on a vast scale. The
measures taken in this country have so far been only of a
precautionary and defensive kind, but no threats will affect
our determination to do what is necessary to prepare the
country for any emergency. I would with emphasis repudiate
any suggestion that the measures we are taking imply a
contemplated act of menace on our part. Nothing that we have
done or propose to do constitutes a threat to any of
Germany's legitimate interests. It is no act of menace to
prepare oneself to help one's friends to defend themselves
against the use of force.
In a speech that I made some six weeks or two months
ago to the Royal Institute of International Affairs I tried
to set out in terms which were fortunate enough to meet with
almost unanimous approval the twin foundations of purpose on
which British policy rests. The first was a determination to
resist force, and the second was the recognition of the
world's desire to get on with the constructive task of
building peace. And if we could once, as I said, be
satisfied that the intentions of others were the same as our
own, and that we all really wanted peaceful solutions, then,
I said, we could discuss all the problems that were causing
the world anxiety. That definition of the policy of His
Majesty's Government stands. Our object is, and has been, to
build an international order based on mutual understanding
and mutual confidence, but that order can only rest on the
basis of certain moral principles which are widely
recognised to be essential to the peaceful and the orderly
life of nations, and among those principles I place high the
renunciation of forcible solutions and the respect for the
pledged word in international relationships. And,
fundamentally, it is those principles which are to-day as we
see it in danger, and it is those principles which we
consider it vital to try and protect.
There are some who say that the fate of European
nations is no concern of ours, and that we should not look
far beyond our own frontiers. But those who thus argue
forget, I think, that in failing to uphold the liberties of
others we run great risk of betraying the principle of
liberty itself, and with it our own freedom and
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 153
independence. We have built up a society with values which
are accepted not only in this country but over vast areas of
the world. If we stand by and see these values set at nought
the security of all those things on which life itself
depends seems, to my judgment, to be undermined, and that is
a fundamental matter on which I scarcely think that there
will be any difference of opinion. I have no doubt that
those with whom rest the issues of peace and war will
measure their responsibilities to present and future
generations before precipitating a struggle in which many
nations of Europe must immediately be involved, of which the
duration cannot be foreseen, and by which even those who
stand aside from active participation will be vitally and
dangerously affected. And I would earnestly hope that in
face of all the certain consequences of a resort to force,
and before any step is taken which cannot be retraced,
reason may yet prevail. His Majesty's Government have noted
with warm appreciation the appeal for peace made by King
Leopold after the meeting at Brussels yesterday in the name
of the heads of the Oslo States. It will be evident from
what I have said that His Majesty's Government share the
hopes to which that appeal gave such moving expression, and
earnestly trust that effect may be given to it.
My Lords, in this moment of anxiety I trust that the
ground on which His Majesty's Government have determined to
take their stand will meet with the approval of all parties
in this House. I believe it will, and I do not doubt that
the Government may rely on the support of the whole country
in any measures necessary to defend the cause of just
dealing between the nations and to preserve secure the place
of honourable freedom in the world.
No. 66.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 8 p. m.)
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 24, 1939.
M. BECK told me that he considered situation most
grave. Attitude of Danzig authorities was becoming more
provocative, though he had no intention for the moment of
actually breaking off negotiations regarding customs
inspectors and so forth.
2. M. Beck has, as requested, instructed Polish
Ambassador
154 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
in Berlin to seek immediate interview with State Secretary,
and, unless he found attitude of Herr von Weizs„cker
unsatisfactory, he would attempt to examine all points at
issue with a view to ascertaining whether anything can be
done to relieve present tension.
3. M. Beck referred to certain incidents on the
frontier, and I asked him more especially whether one which
has caused great indignation here was true: it was reported
in the press this morning that body of Polish frontier guard
shot on 16th August was returned in a state of shocking and
gruesome mutilation. M. Beck said that the facts were as
stated in the press and that Commissioner-General was
protesting to Danzig Senate without, however, demanding any
reply.
4. As far as I can see, calm prevails, and M. Beck has
assured me that strict orders have been given to prevent any
provocative action either of military or any other nature.
Frontier is still covered by ordinary frontier guards, and
there would seem from M. Beck's attitude no necessity for
warning which, nevertheless, I and my French colleague have
given him to do nothing which would further aggravate
present critical state of affairs.
No. 67.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.
(Despatched at 2:35 a. m. on August 25 and received at 9:30
a. m. on August 25.)
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 24, 1939.
MY telegram of 24th August.*
The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Polish
Ambassador in Berlin had an interview with Field-Marshal
Goring this afternoon. The interview was most cordial and he
told me the Marshal expressed his regret that his policy of
maintaining friendly relations with Poland should have come
to nought and admitted that he no longer had influence to do
much in the matter. The Marshal had, however, no concrete
suggestion to make beyond what had struck M. Beck as a most
signifi-
* No. 66.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 155
cant remark which he requested me to convey to you most
confidentially. The Marshal stated that the question of
Danzig and so forth were relatively small matters, but the
main obstacle to any diminution of the tension between the
two countries was Poland's alliance with Great Britain.
2. M. Beck had consulted the President and Marshal
Smigly-Rydz, and it had been decided that if the German
Government should put forward this suggestion in any other
way the answer would be categorically in the negative. M.
Beck feels that the German Government may make every effort
to secure a free hand in Eastern Europe by such methods and
he feels that it should be clearly understood that Poland
will not be drawn into any intrigue of this nature.
3. I asked M. Beck about the proposed interview between
M. Lipski and the State Secretary. M. Beck said that Herr
von Weizs„cker was in Berchtesgaden and would probably not
return until the end of the week, but that M. Lipski had
asked for an interview and was awaiting reply.
No. 68.
Supplementary Communication from the German Chancellor
handed to His Majesty's Ambassador on August 25, 1939.
THE following is a translation of the text of a verbal
communication made to Sir Nevile Henderson by Herr Hitler at
his interview on the 25th August:-
"By way of introduction the Fhrer declared that
the British Ambassador had given expression at the
close of the last conversation to the hope that, after
all, an understanding between Germany and England might
yet be possible. He (the Fhrer) had therefore turned
things over in his mind once more and desired to make a
move as regards England which should be as decisive as
the move as regards Russia which had led to the recent
agreement. Yesterday's sitting in the House of Commons
and the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax
had also moved the Fhrer to talk once more to the
British Ambassador. The assertion that Germany affected
to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire
em-
156 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
braced 40 million square kilometres, Russia 19 million
square kilometres, America 9 1/2 million square
kilometres, whereas Germany embraced less than 600,000
square kilometres. It is quite clear who it is who
desires to conquer the world.
"The Fhrer makes the following communication to the
British Ambassador:-
"1. Poland's actual provocations have become
intolerable. It makes no difference who is responsible.
If the Polish Government denies responsibility, that
only goes to show that it no longer itself possesses
any influence over its subordinate military
authorities. In the preceding night there had been a
further twenty-one new frontier incidents; on the
German side the greatest discipline had been
maintained. All incidents had been provoked from the
Polish side. Furthermore, commercial aircraft had been
shot at. If the Polish Government stated that it was
not responsible, it showed that it was no longer
capable of controlling its own people.
"2. Germany was in all the circumstances
determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on
her eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the
interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests
of European peace.
"3. The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be
solved.-The British Prime Minister had made a speech
which was not in the least calculated to induce any
change in the German attitude. At the most, the result
of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war
between Germany and England. Such a war would be
bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the
last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two
fronts. Agreement with Russia was unconditional and
signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which
would last a very long time. Russia and Germany would
never again take up arms against each other. Apart from
this, the agreements reached with Russia would also
render Germany secure economically for the longest
possible period of war.
"The Fhrer had always wanted an Anglo-German
understanding. War between England and Germany could at
the best bring some profit to Germany but none at all
to England.
"The Fhrer declared that the German-Polish
problem must be solved and will be solved. He is,
however, prepared
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 157
and determined after the solution of this problem to
approach England once more with a large comprehensive
offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case
also he will be capable of being great in his action.
He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge
himself personally for its continued existence and to
place the power of the German Reich at its disposal if-
"(1) His colonial demands which are limited and can be
negotiated by peaceful methods are fulfilled and
in this case he is prepared to fix the longest
time limit.
"(2) His obligations towards Italy are not touched; in
other words, he does not demand that England gives
up her obligations towards France and similarly
for his own part he cannot withdraw from his
obligations towards Italy.
"(3) He also desires to stress the irrevocable
determination of Germany never again to enter into
conflict with Russia. The Fhrer is ready to
conclude agreements with England which, as has
already been emphasised, would not only guarantee
the existence of the British Empire in all
circumstances as far as Germany is concerned, but
also if necessary an assurance to the British
Empire of German assistance regardless of where
such assistance should be necessary. The Fhrer
would then also be ready to accept a reasonable
limitation of armaments which corresponds to the
new political situation, and which is economically
tolerable. Finally, the Fhrer renewed his
assurances that he is not interested in Western
problems and that a frontier modification in the
West does not enter into consideration. Western
fortifications which have been constructed at a
cost of milliards were final Reich frontier on the
West.
"If the British Government would consider these ideas a
blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might
result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no
case would Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war
proved this.
"The Fhrer repeats that he is a man of ad infinitum
decisions by which he himself is bound and that this is his
last offer.
158 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Immediately after solution of the German-Polish question he
would approach the British Government with an offer."
No. 69.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 7 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 25, 1939.
IN my immediately preceding telegram* I give text of a
verbal communication which Chancellor made to me this
morning. He was absolutely calm and normal and spoke with
great earnestness and apparent sincerity. Minister for
Foreign Affairs was present but took practically no part in
the conversation.
Herr Hitler began by saying that he had always and
still desired good relations with Great Britain, and his
conscience compelled him to make this final effort to secure
them. It was his last attempt. He suggested that I should
fly to England myself in order to put the case to His
Majesty's Government.
3. Conversation lasted an hour, my attitude being that
Russian Pact in no way altered standpoint of His Majesty's
Government, and that I must tell him quite honestly that
Britain could not go back on her word to Poland and that I
knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a
negotiated settlement of the Polish question. Herr Hitler
refused to guarantee this on grounds that Polish provocation
might at any moment render German intervention to protect
German nationals inevitable. I again and again returned to
this point but always got the same answer.
I told Herr Hitler that I could not discuss rights and
wrongs of mutual provocation and incidents: that was for the
Polish Ambassador to discuss with Herr von Ribbentrop and I
suggested that he should do so. Herr Hitler's reply was that
M. Lipski had seen Field-Marshal Goring, but had not been
able to propose anything new.
5. I told Herr Hitler that we could not abandon Poland
to her fate, but I made the entirely personal suggestion
that M. Beck and Herr von Ribbentrop should meet somewhere
and discuss the way out which alone might save Europe from
war. Herr Hitler's
* Conveying the substance of No. 68.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 159
reply was that he had invited M. Beck to come and talk the
matter over last March only to have his invitation flatly
refused. Only intervention by Herr von Ribbentrop in the
discussion was to confirm this and to say that M. Lipski,
who had had to convey this message, was obliged to put it in
other words to soften the abruptness of it.
6. When I kept saying that His Majesty's Government
could not in my opinion consider his offer unless it meant
at the same time a peaceful settlement with Poland, Herr
Hitler said: "If you think it useless then do not send my
offer at all." He admitted the good intentions of M. Beck
and M. Lipski, but said they had no control over what was
happening in Poland. Only signs of excitement on Herr
Hitler's part were when he referred to Polish persecutions.
He mentioned that Herr von Ribbentrop on his return to
Germany from Russia had had to fly from Konigsberg over the
sea to avoid being shot at by the Poles, who fired at every
German aeroplane that flew over normal routes across Polish
territory. He also said that there had been another case of
castration.
7. Among various points mentioned by Herr Hitler were:
that the only winner of another European war would be Japan;
that he was by nature an artist not a politician, and that
once the Polish question was settled he would end his life
as an artist and not as a war-monger; he did not want to
turn Germany into nothing but a military barracks and he
would only do so if forced to do so; that once the Polish
question was settled he himself would settle down; that he
had no interest in making Britain break her word to Poland;
that he had no wish to be small-minded in any settlement
with Poland and that all he required for an agreement with
her was a gesture from Britain to indicate that she would
not be unreasonable.
8. After I had left, Herr von Ribbentrop sent Dr.
Schmidt to the Embassy with text of verbal statement and
also a message from him to the effect that Herr Hitler had
always and still wished for an agreement with Britain and
begging me to urge His Majesty's Government to take the
offer very seriously.
160 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 70.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 25,
1939, 11 p. m.
PLEASE sound Polish Government on proposal for corps of
neutral observers which, if accepted, would, of course, only
come into operation if and when it was found possible to
start any negotiations.
No. 71.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 26,
1939, 5 p. m.
IT is clear that Herr Hitler is laying chief emphasis
on ill-treatment of Germany minority, and may use this at
any moment as an excuse for taking some irrevocable action.
2. Is it not possible for Polish Government to adopt
suggestion that they should approach German Government with
enquiry as to whether they would contemplate making exchange
of populations an element to be considered in any
negotiation? It is true this would afford no immediate
safeguard as it is a remedy that would take some time to
apply, but it would be a pledge that Polish Government
recognise the difficulty and are genuinely seeking means to
overcome it, and it would give Polish Government some
definite and new point on which to open up negotiation.
3. If action is to be taken by the Polish Government in
this sense it ought to be done immediately.
No. 72.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 5:5 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 27, 1939.
YOUR telegrams of 25th and 26th August.*
I discussed questions of exchange of populations and
neutral observers with M. Beck this morning.
* Nos. 70 and 71.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 161
2. As regards first, he said that in principle he saw
no objection and was prepared to convey to German Government
that he was ready to consider such a proposal, possibly not
directly to State Secretary, but in such a manner that he
was sure it would reach the highest authorities.
3. As regards question of neutral observers, he had
again consulted President of the Council, but he would let
me know his decision in the course of the day.
4. As he told me that the Pope had during the night,
through the Nuncio, asked if there was anything he could do,
I suggested to M. Beck that he should inform His Holiness
that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations
and also use of neutral observers in order to demonstrate
that German accusations of maltreatment were completely
without foundation. The Pope could then communicate these
proposals to the German Government with approval of Polish
Government. M. Beck seemed to consider this favourably and
promised he would give it his immediate consideration. I
warned him that there was no time to lose.
5. As regards Danzig, M. Beck did not from his latest
information anticipate fait accompli there to-day or in very
immediate future. For the moment all was quiet there as far
as he knew.
6. I again emphasised to his Excellency importance of
his giving sufficient warning to His Majesty's Government of
any action which Polish Government or army contemplated
taking as result of any fait accompli at Danzig. His
Excellency again promised to do this, though he made
reservation that situation might arise where immediate
action would be necessary.
No. 73
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 28,
1939, 2 p. m.
OUR proposed reply to Herr Hitler* draws a clear
distinction between the method of reaching agreement on
German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution to
be arrived at. As to the method we wish to express our clear
view that direct discussion on equal terms between the
parties is the proper means.
* No. 74
162 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
2. Polish Government enjoy protection of Anglo-Polish
Treaty.
3. His Majesty's Government have already made it plain
and are repeating in their reply to Herr Hitler to-day that
any settlement of German-Polish differences must safeguard
Poland's essential interests and must be secured by
international guarantee.
4. We have, of course, seen reports of Herr Hitler's
reply to M. Daladier, but we should not consider intimation
by Polish Government of their readiness to hold direct
discussions as in any way implying acceptance of Herr
Hitler's demands, which would, as made plain above, have to
be examined in light of principles we have stated.
5. As Polish Government appear in their reply to
President Roosevelt to accept idea of direct negotiations,
His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that in the light of
the considerations set forth in foregoing paragraphs Polish
Government will authorise them to inform German Government
that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussion
with Germany.
6. Please endeavour to see M. Beck at once and
telephone reply.
No. 74.
Reply of His Majesty's Government dated August 28, 1939, to
the German Chancellor's Communications of August 23 and 25,
1939.*
HIS Majesty's Government have received the message
conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's
Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care
which it demands.
They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to
make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany
and the British Empire and they fully share this desire.
They believe with him that if a complete and lasting
understanding between the two countries could be established
it would bring untold blessings to both peoples.
* Nos. 60 and 68.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 163
2. The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of
questions: those which are the matters now in dispute
between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate
relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connexion with
these last, His Majesty's Government observe that the German
Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to
one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British
Government for a general understanding. These proposals are,
of course, stated in very general form and would require
closer definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully
prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for
discussion and they would be ready, if the differences
between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to
proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a
sincere desire to reach agreement.
3. The condition which the German Chancellor lays down
is that there must first be a settlement of the differences
between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's
Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon
the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is
to be reached. On these points, the importance of which
cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is
silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point
out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to
achieving further progress. The German Government will be
aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to
Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to
honour They could not, for any advantage offered to Great
Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the
independence of a State to whom they have given their
guarantee.
4. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a
reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and
Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the
two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding
of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his
speech of the 28th April last the German Chancellor
recognised the importance of these interests to Poland.
But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter
to the German Chancellor of the 22nd August, His Majesty's
Government consider it essential for the success of the
discussions which
164 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
would precede the agreement that it should be understood
beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be
guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would
be ready if desired to make their contribution to the
effective operation of such a guarantee.
In the view of His Majesty's Government it follows that
the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions
between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which
would include the principles stated above, namely, the
safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the
securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.
They have already received a definite assurance from
the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into
discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope
the German Government would for their part also be willing
to agree to this course.
If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion
led to agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of
that wider and more complete understanding between Great
Britain and Germany which both countries desire.
5. His Majesty's Government agree with the German
Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German-
Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the
treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with
its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment
and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace.
It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all
incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly
suppressed and that unverified reports should not be allowed
to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without
provocation on either side, for a full examination of the
possibilities of settlement. His Majesty's Government are
confident that both the Governments concerned are fully
alive to these considerations.
6. His Majesty's Government have said enough to make
their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue
between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German
Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's
Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to
Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to
assist the achievement of a
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 165
solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to
Poland.
That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His
Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons
directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but
also because of the wider considerations of which the German
Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.
7. It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the
advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle
the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a
decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime
Minister's letter to the Chancellor of the 22nd August, and
His Majesty's Government do not doubt that they are as fully
recognised by the Chancellor as by themselves.
On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting
with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the
message now under consideration to a limitation of
armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be
obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be
anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition
from preparation for war to the normal activities of
peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.
8. A just settlement of these questions between Germany
and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach
it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between
Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries
into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into
war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in
history.
No. 75.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 2:35 a. m.
August 29).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 28, 1939.
I SAW the Chancellor at 10:30 this evening. He asked me
to come at 10 p. m., but I sent word that I could not have
the translation ready before the later hour. Herr von
Ribbentrop was present, also Dr. Schmidt. Interview lasted
one and a quarter hours.
2. Herr Hitler began by reading the German translation.
166 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
When he had finished, I said that I wished to make certain
observations from notes which I had made in the
conversations with the Prime Minister and His Majesty's
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the first place I
wished to say that we in England regarded it as absurd that
Britain should be supposed by the German Government to
consider the crushing of Germany as a settled policy. We
held it to be no less astonishing that anyone in Germany
should doubt for a moment that we would not fight for Poland
if her independence or vital interests were menaced.
3. Our word was our word, and we had never and would
never break it. In the old days Germany's word had the same
value, and I quoted a passage from a German book (which Herr
Hitler had read) about Marshal Blucher's exhortation to his
troops when hurrying to the support of Wellington at
Waterloo: "Forward, my children, I have given my word to my
brother Wellington, and you cannot wish me to break it."
4. Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that
things were different 125 years ago. I said not so far as
England was concerned. He wanted, I said, Britain's
friendship. What value would he place on our friendship if
we began it by disloyalty to a friend? Whatever some people
might say, the British people sincerely desired an
understanding with Germany, and no one more so than the
Prime Minister (Herr von Ribbentrop remarked that Mr.
Chamberlain had once said to him that it was his dearest
wish). To-day the whole British public was behind the Prime
Minister. The recent vote in the House of Commons was an
unmistakable proof of that fact. The Prime Minister could
carry through his policy of an understanding if, but only
if, Herr Hitler were prepared to co-operate. There was
absolutely no truth in the idea sometimes held in Germany
that the British Cabinet was disunited or that the country
was not unanimous. It was now or never, and it rested with
Herr Hitler. If he was prepared to sacrifice that
understanding in order to make war or immoderate demands on
Poland, the responsibility was his. We offered friendship
but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated
solution of the Polish question.
5. Herr Hitler replied that he would be willing to
negotiate, if there was a Polish Government which was
prepared to be
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 167
reasonable and which really controlled the country. He
expatiated on misdoings of the Poles, referred to his
generous offer of March last, said that it could not be
repeated and asserted that nothing else than the return of
Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him,
together with a rectification in Silesia, where 90 per cent.
of the population had voted for Germany at the post-war
plebiscite but where, as a result of Haller-Korfanti coup,
what the Plebiscite Commission had allotted had nevertheless
been grabbed by Poland.
6. I told Herr Hitler that he must choose between
England and Poland. If he put forward immoderate demands
there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Corridor was
inhabited almost entirely by Poles. Herr Hitler interrupted
me here by observing that this was only true because a
million Germans had been driven out of that district since
the war. I again said the choice lay with him. He had
offered a Corridor over the Corridor in March, and I must
honestly tell him that anything more than that, if that,
would have no hope of acceptance. I begged him very
earnestly to reflect before raising his price. He said his
original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would
not make it again. I observed that it had been made in the
form of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference.
7. Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could
never be reasonable: she had England and France behind her,
and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later
recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He
spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of
similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He
retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be
reasonable. I said that it was just because we remembered
the experience of Czecho-Slovakia last year that we
hesitated to press Poland too far to-day. Nevertheless, we
reserved to ourselves the right to form our own judgment as
to what was or what was not reasonable so far as Poland or
Germany were concerned. We kept our hands free in that
respect.
8. Generally speaking, Herr Hitler kept harping on
Poland, and I kept on just as consistently telling Herr
Hitler that he had to choose between friendship with England
which we offered him and excessive demands on Poland which
would put an end
168 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
to all hope of British friendship. If we were to come to an
understanding it would entail sacrifices on our part. If he
was not prepared to make sacrifices on his part there was
nothing to be done. Herr Hitler said that he had to satisfy
the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for
battle, his people were united behind him, and he could not
tolerate further ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, &c.
9. It is unnecessary to recall the details of a long
and earnest conversation in the course of which the only
occasion in which Herr Hitler became at all excited was when
I observed that it was not a question of Danzig and the
Corridor, but one of our determination to resist force by
force. This evoked a tirade about the Rhineland, Austria and
Sudeten and their peaceful reacquisition by Germany. He also
resented my references to 15th March.
10. In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was
he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he
ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations?
He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though
I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a
rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said
he could not give me an answer until after he had given
reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration
which such a document deserved. In this connexion he turned
to Herr von Ribbentrop and said: "We must summon Field-
Marshal Goring to discuss it with him."
11. I finally repeated to him very solemnly the main
note of the whole conversation so far as I was concerned,
namely, that it lay with him as to whether he preferred a
unilateral solution which would mean war as regards Poland,
or British friendship. If he were prepared to pay the price
of the latter by a generous gesture as regards Poland, he
could at a stroke change in his favour the whole of public
opinion not only in England but in the world. I left no
doubt in his mind as to what the alternative would be, nor
did he dispute the point.
12. At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I
could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the
country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I
said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and
would, provided Germany co-operated with him. Herr Hitler
asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance
with Germany.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 169
I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a
possibility provided the developments of events justified
it.
13. Conversation was conducted in quite a friendly
atmosphere, in spite of absolute firmness on both sides.
Herr Hitler's general attitude was that he could give me no
real reply until he had carefully studied the answer of His
Majesty's Government. He said that he would give me a
written reply to-morrow, Tuesday. I told him that I would
await it, but was quite prepared to wait. Herr Hitler's
answer was that there was no time to wait.
14. I did not refer to the question of a truce. I shall
raise that point to-morrow if his answer affords any real
ground for hope that he is prepared to abandon war for the
sake of British understanding.
No. 76.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 4:55 p. m.).
(Telegraphic) Berlin,
August 29, 1939.
Following are additional points in amplification of my
telegram of 28th August*:-
Herr Hitler insisted that he was not bluffing, and that
people would make a great mistake if they believed that he
was. I replied that I was fully aware of the fact and that
we were not bluffing either. Herr Hitler stated that he
fully realised that that was the case. In answer to a
suggestion by him that Great Britain might offer something
at once in the way of colonies as evidence of her good
intentions, I retorted that concessions were easier of
realisation in a good rather than a bad atmosphere.
No. 77.
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
August 29, 1939.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): Since the House
met on Thursday last there has been little change in the
main features of the situation. The catastrophe, as I said
then, is not
* No. 75.
170 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
yet on us, but I cannot say that the danger of it has yet in
any way receded. In these circumstances it might perhaps
have seemed that it was unnecessary to ask the House to meet
again before the date which had been fixed, but in times
like these we have felt that it was right that the House
should be kept as far as possible continuously informed of
all the developments in the situation as they took place.
That will continue to be the principle which will guide us
in further meetings of this House.
There is one thing that I would like to say at this
moment with regard to the press. I think it is necessary
once more to urge the press to exercise the utmost restraint
at a time when it is quite possible for a few thoughtless
words in a paper, perhaps not of particular importance, to
wreck the whole of the efforts which are being made by the
Government to obtain a satisfactory solution. I have heard
that an account purporting to be a verbatim description of
the communication of the British Government to Herr Hitler
was telegraphed to another country last night or this
morning. Such an account could only be an invention from
beginning to end. It is, I think, very unfortunate that
journalists in the exercise of their profession should take
such responsibilities upon themselves, responsibilities
which affect not only themselves, but the inhabitants,
perhaps, of all the countries in the world.
I hope that it will not be necessary this afternoon to
have any long Debate. I will attempt to give the House an
account of the events of the last few days, but, of course,
there has been no change in the policy of the Government,
and, therefore, there would not appear to be any necessity
for any lengthy discussion. On the day after the House
adjourned-on Friday, that is-we received information in the
course of the morning that the German Chancellor had asked
the British Ambassador in Berlin to call upon him at half-
past one that day, and in the course of the afternoon we
were told by telephone that Sir Nevile Henderson had had an
interview lasting about an hour and a half with Herr Hitler,
that he was sending us an account of that interview, and
that Herr Hitler had suggested to him that it would be a
good thing if he were to fly over to this country the next
morning in order to give us a verbal and more extended
account of the conversation. We received the record of the
interview from our
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 171
Ambassador on that evening, on Friday evening, but it was
not completely deciphered until after midnight, and I did
not myself see the whole of it until the next morning,
Saturday morning. On Saturday Sir Nevile Henderson arrived
by plane from Berlin shortly before lunch, and we understood
from him that in Berlin it was not considered to be
necessary that he should go back the same day, as the German
Government were very anxious that we should give careful
study to the communication he had to make to us.
Accordingly, we devoted the whole of Saturday and the Sunday
morning to a very careful, exhaustive and thorough
consideration of the document which was brought to us by the
British Ambassador and of the reply that we proposed to send
back, and our final answer was taken by the Ambassador
yesterday afternoon, when he flew back to Berlin and
delivered it to the Chancellor last night.
I should be glad if I could disclose to the House the
fullest information as to the contents of the communications
exchanged with Herr Hitler, but hon. members will understand
that in a situation of such extreme delicacy, and when
issues so grave hang precariously in the balance, it is not
in the public interest to publish these confidential
communications or to comment on them in detail at this
stage. I am, however, able to indicate in quite general
terms some of the main points with which they deal. Herr
Hitler was concerned to impress upon His Majesty's
Government his wish for an Anglo-German understanding of a
complete and lasting character. On the other hand, he left
His Majesty's Government in no doubt of his views as to the
urgency of settling the German-Polish question. His
Majesty's Government have also frequently expressed their
desire to see the realisation of such an Anglo-German
understanding, and as soon as circumstances permit they
would naturally welcome an opportunity of discussing with
Germany the several issues a settlement of which would have
to find a place in any permanent agreement. But everything
turns upon the manner in which the immediate differences
between Germany and Poland can be handled and the nature of
the proposals which might be made for any settlement. We
have made it plain that our obligations to Poland, cast into
formal shape by the agreement which was signed on 25th
August, on Friday last, will be carried out. The House will
remember
172 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
that the Government have said more than once, publicly, that
the German-Polish differences should be capable of solution
by peaceful means.
Meanwhile, the first prerequisite, if there is to be
any general and useful discussion, is that the tension
created by frontier clashes and by reports of incidents on
both sides of the border should be diminished. His Majesty's
Government accordingly hope that both Governments will use
their best endeavours to prevent the occurrence of such
incidents, the circulation of exaggerated reports, and all
other activities that result in dangerous inflammation of
opinion. His Majesty's Government would hope that if an
equitable settlement of Polish-German differences could be
reached by free negotiation, this might in turn lead on to a
wider agreement which would accrue to the lasting benefit of
Europe and of the world at large. At this moment the
position is that we are waiting for the reply of Herr Hitler
to our communication. On the nature of that reply depends
whether further time can be given for the exploration of the
situation and for the operation of the many forces which are
working for peace. A waiting period of that kind is often
very trying, but nothing, I think, can be more remarkable
than the calm which characterises the attitude of the whole
British people. It seems to me that there are two
explanations of that attitude. The first is that none of us
has any doubt of where our duty lies. There is no difference
of opinion among us; there is no weakening of our
determination. The second explanation is our confidence that
we are ready for any eventuality.
The House might like to hear one or two particulars of
the preparations which have been made. Obviously, there are
many things which I cannot very well say here because they
could not be confined to those whom I see before me. My
statement must, therefore, be in very general terms. Some of
the measures which we had to take, such as those in
connexion with requisitioning, necessarily must cause some
degree of inconvenience to the public. I am confident that
the people of the country generally recognise that the
nation's needs must now be paramount and that they will
submit willingly, and even cheerfully, to any inconvenience
or hardships that may be involved. At any rate, we have not
had to begin here by issuing rationing cards. To deal
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 173
first with the active defence of the country, the air
defence of Great Britain has been placed in a state of
instant readiness. The ground anti-aircraft defences have
been deployed and they are manned by territorial anti-
aircraft units. The regular squadrons of the Royal Air Force
have been brought up to war strength by the addition of the
necessary reservists, including a portion of the Volunteer
Reserve. The fighter and general reconnaissance squadrons of
the Auxiliary Air Force have been called up and are standing
ready and the balloon barrage is in position. The Observer
Corps are at their posts, and, indeed, the whole warning
system is ready night and day to be brought into instant
operation. The coast defences are ready and are manned by
the coast defence units of the Territorial Army.
Arrangements have also been made for the protection by the
National Defence companies, by the Militia and by units of
the Territorial Army of a very large number of important
points whose safety is essential for the national war
effort.
As to the Navy, the House will remember that in July
last it was announced that the Reserve Fleet would be called
up at the beginning of August in order to take part in
combined Fleet and Air exercises. For that purpose a number
of reservists were called up under the provisions of the
Reserves and Auxiliary Forces Act. As a result, the Navy was
in an advanced state of preparedness when the present crisis
arose, and the whole of our fighting Fleet is now ready at a
moment's notice to take up the dispositions which would be
necessary in war. A number of other measures have been taken
during the past week to increase the state of our naval
preparedness. I need not go into all the details, but the
naval officers in charge of the various commercial ports
have been appointed and have taken up their duties, and the
naval ports and bases have been put into an advanced state
of preparedness. As hon. members will be aware, the
Admiralty has also assumed control of merchant shipping,
acting under the powers conferred by the Emergency Powers
Act, and written instructions have already been issued to
merchant shipping on various routes. A considerable number
of movements have been carried out of units of the armed
land forces both at home and overseas. These movements are
part of prearranged plans to provide that in order to ensure
a greater state of readiness a
174 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
number of units should, if possible, move to their war
stations before the outbreak of war. The Civil Defence
regional organisation has been placed on war footing.
Regional commissioners and their staffs are at their war
stations.
The main responsibility for the organisation of Civil
Defence measures generally rests with the local authorities.
Instructions have been sent to the local authorities to
complete all the preparatory steps so that action can be
taken at the shortest notice. Plans for the evacuation of
school children, mothers with young children, expectant
mothers and blind persons from certain congested areas-plans
which have involved an immense amount of detailed thinking-
are ready. Those who have to carry out those plans have been
recalled for duty, school teachers in evacuation areas have
been kept in easy reach of school assembly points since
Saturday, and a rehearsal of the arrangements for evacuating
school children was carried out yesterday. Nearly a week ago
local authorities were warned to make arrangements for the
extinction of public lighting and to prepare the necessary
aids to movement when the lighting has been extinguished.
Arrangements have been completed for calling up at very
short notice of the personnel of the Air-Raid Precautions
Service, and duty officers are available throughout the
twenty-four hours at key posts. The last item I mention is
that the necessary preliminary steps have been taken to
prepare hospitals for the reception of casualties.
I have given a number of instances of steps which have
been taken over and above the measures which have already
been put into operation. A complete and continuous survey is
being carried out over the whole range of our defence
preparations, and preparatory measures are being taken in
order to ensure that further precautionary measures, if and
when they should be found necessary, can be given effect to
as rapidly as possible. The instances I have given to the
House are merely illustrations of the general state of
readiness, of which the House and the country are aware. I
think that they justify and partly account for the general
absence of fear, or, indeed, of any violent emotion. The
British people are said sometimes to be slow to make up
their minds, but, having made them up, they do not readily
let go. The issue of peace or war is still undecided, and we
still will hope,
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 175
and still will work, for peace; but we will abate no jot of
our resolution to hold fast to the line which we have laid
down for ourselves.
No. 78.
Reply of the German Chancellor to the Communication of
August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.* This
reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler
during the evening of August 29, 1939.
(Translation.)
THE British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the
British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in
order-
(1) to give expression once more to the will of the
Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German
understanding, co-operation and friendship;
(2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an
understanding could not be bought at the price of
a renunciation of vital German interests, let
alone the abandonment of demands which are based
as much upon common human justice as upon the
national dignity and honour of our people.
The German Government have noted with satisfaction from
the reply of the British Government and from the oral
explanations given by the British Ambassador that the
British Government for their part are also prepared to
improve the relationship between Germany and England and to
develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion.
In this connexion, the British Government are similarly
convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension,
which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the
realisation of this hope.
Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last
occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish
Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having
regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and
Poland, offered
* No. 74
176 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute
acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware
that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally
to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this
rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military
measures which have since been continuously intensified.
Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in
a state of mobilisation. This was accompanied by numerous
encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the
instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands
in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were
addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at first
in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended
later in a military sense affecting also traffic and
communications, was imposed with the object of bringing
about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of
this German community.
To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment
which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the
large German national group in Poland which extended even to
the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible
removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of
affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced
Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months,
in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding
of justified German interests. And indeed the German
Government can but assure the British Government in the most
solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been
reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with
indifference.
The demands of the German Government are in conformity
with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this
territory which has always been recognised as being
necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to
Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German
national group in the territories remaining to Poland.
The German Government note with satisfaction that the
British Government also are in principle convinced that some
solution must be found for the new situation which has
arisen.
They further feel justified in assuming that the
British Government too can have no doubt that it is a
question now of conditions, for the elimination of which
there no longer remain days,
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 177
still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the
disorganised state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the
possibility of incidents intervening, which it might be
impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be
reckoned with.
While the British Government may still believe that
these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct
negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no
longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have
made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations,
but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish
Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of
measures of a military character in favour of the
development alluded to above.
The British Government attach importance to two
considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent
explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by
direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish
State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist,
should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and
political sphere by means of international guarantees.
On this subject the German Government makes the
following declaration:-
Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful
outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the
English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They
do so, as has already been emphasised, solely as the result
of the impression made upon them by the written statement
received from the British Government that they too desire a
pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines
indicated to the British Ambassador.
The German Government desire in this way to give the
British Government and the British nation a proof of the
sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting
friendship with Great Britain.
The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to
point out to the British Government that in the event of a
territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be
able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate
in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated
therewith.
For the rest, in making these proposals the German
Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's
vital
178 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
interests or questioning the existence of an independent
Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these
circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer
of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of
a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the
arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August,
1939.
The German Government will immediately draw up
proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will,
if possible, place these at the disposal of the British
Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.
No. 79.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:15 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 29, 1939.
HERR HITLER handed me German reply at 7.15 this
evening. Translation of full text will follow as soon as
possible.
2. In reply to two British proposals, namely, for
direct German-Polish negotiations and international
guarantee of any settlement, German Government declares:-
(1) That, in spite of its scepticism as to the prospect
of their success, it accepts direct negotiation
solely out of desire to ensure lasting friendship
with Britain, and
(2) In the case of any modifications of territory
German Government cannot undertake or participate
in any guarantees without consulting the U.S.S.R.
3. Note observes that German proposals have never had
for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests,
and declares that German Government accepts mediation of
Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish
plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on
arrival of such plenipotentiary to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th
August.
4. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an
ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler
and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended
to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilised
armies were standing face to face.
5. I said that I would transmit this suggestion
immediately
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 179
to His Majesty's Government, and asked whether, if such
Polish plenipotentiary did come, we could assume that he
would be well received and that discussions would be
conducted on footing of complete equality. Herr Hitler's
reply was "of course."
6. German demands are declared to be revision of
Versailles Treaty; namely, return of Danzig and the Corridor
to Germany, security for lives of German national minorities
in the rest of Poland; note concludes with statement that
the German Government will immediately elaborate proposals
for an acceptable solution, and inform British Government,
if possible, before arrival of Polish plentipotentiary.
No. 80.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 10:25 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 19, 1939.
INTERVIEW this evening was of a stormy character and
Herr Hitler far less reasonable than yesterday. Press
announcement this evening that five more Germans had been
killed in Poland and news of Polish mobilisation had
obviously excited him.
2. He kept saying that he wanted British friendship
more than anything in the world, but he could not sacrifice
Germany's vital interests therefor, and that for His
Majesty's Government to make a bargain over such a matter
was an unendurable proposition. All my attempts to correct
this complete misrepresentation of the case did not seem to
impress him.
3. In reply to his reiterated statement that direct
negotiations with Poland, though accepted by him, would be
bound to fail, I told his Excellency that their success or
failure depended on his goodwill or the reverse, and that
the choice lay with him. It was, however, my bounden duty to
leave him in no doubt that an attempt to impose his will on
Poland by force would inevitably bring him into direct
conflict with us.
4. It would have been useless to talk of a truce, since
that can only depend on whether M. Beck or some other Polish
representative came to Berlin or not.
180 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 81.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939, 2 a. m.
WE shall give careful consideration to German
Government's reply,* but it is, of course, unreasonable to
expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin
to-day, and German Government must not expect this.
It might be well for you at once to let this be known
in proper quarters through appropriate channels. We hope you
may receive our reply this afternoon.
No. 82.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 1 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 30, 1939.
YOUR message** was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs at 4 a. m. this morning. I had made similar
observation to Herr Hitler yesterday evening, his reply
being that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a
half hours.
2. I repeated the message this morning by telephone to
State Secretary, who said that it had already been conveyed
to Herr Hitler. He added that something must be done as soon
as possible.
3. While I still recommend that the Polish Government
should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct
contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the
world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifice
for preservation of peace, one can only conclude from the
German reply that Herr Hitler is determined to achieve his
ends by so-called peaceful fair means if he can, but by
force if he cannot. Much, of course, may also depend on
detailed plan referred to in the last paragraph of the
German reply.
4. Nevertheless, if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue
to have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only
be either war or once again victory for him by a display of
force and encourage-
*No. 78.
**No. 81.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 181
ment thereby to pursue the same course again next year or
the year after.
No. 83.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939, 2:45 p. m.
WE are considering German note * with all urgency and
shall send official reply later in afternoon.
We are representing at Warsaw how vital it is to
reinforce all instructions for avoidance of frontier
incidents, and I would beg you to confirm similar
instructions on German side.
I welcome the evidence in the exchanges of views, which
are taking place, of that desire for Anglo-German
understanding of which I spoke yesterday in Parliament.
No. 84.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 10 a. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 30, 1939.
I FEEL sure that it would be impossible to induce the
Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other
representative immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement
on basis proposed by Herr Hitler. They would certainly
sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such
humiliation, especially after examples of Czecho-Slovakia,
Lithuania and Austria.
2. I would suggest that if negotiations are to be
between equals it is essential that they should take place
in some neutral country or even possibly Italy, and that the
basis for any negotiations should be some compromise between
the clearly defined limits of March proposals on the German
side and status quo on the Polish side.
3. Considering that the Polish Government, standing
alone and when they were largely unprepared for war, refused
the March terms it would surely be impossible for them to
agree to proposals which appear to go beyond the March terms
now that
* No. 78.
182 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
they have Great Britain as their ally, France has confirmed
her support and world public opinion is clearly in favour of
direct negotiations on equal terms and is behind Poland's
resistance to a dictated settlement.
4. I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish
Government, nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's
reply * till I receive instructions which I trust will be
without delay.
No. 85.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939, 5:30 p. m.
ATMOSPHERE may be improved if strict instructions are
given or confirmed by Polish Government to all their
military and civil authorities:-
(1) Not to fire on fugitives or members of the German
minority who cause trouble, but to arrest them;
(2) To abstain themselves from personal violence to
members of German minority, and to prevent similar
violence on the part of the population;
(3) To allow members of the German minority wishing to
leave Poland to pass freely;
(4) To stop inflammatory radio propaganda.
Please inform M. Beck, adding that I realise that Herr
Hitler is using reports to justify immoderate action, but I
am anxious to deprive him of this pretext. I am requesting
German Government to reciprocate; and warning them that
Polish Government can only be expected to maintain such
instructions if no provocation is offered by members of the
German minority.
No. 86.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 8:15 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 30, 1939.
M. BECK has asked me to say:-
1. His Majesty's Government may rest absolutely assured
that Polish Government have no intention of
provoking
* No. 78.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 183
any incidents. On the other hand, they point out
that German provocation at Danzig is becoming more
and more intolerable.
2. In connexion with proposed British answer to Herr
Hitler, Polish Government feels sure that His
Majesty's Government will not express any definite
views on problems concerning Poland without
consulting Polish Government.
No. 87.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939, 5-30 p. m.
IN informing German Government of the renewed
representations which have been made in Warsaw, please make
it clear that Polish Government can only be expected to
maintain an attitude of complete restraint if German
Government reciprocate on their side of frontier and if no
provocation is offered by members of German minority in
Poland. Reports are current that Germans have committed acts
of sabotage which would justify the sternest measures.
No. 88.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939, 6:50 p. m.
WE understand that German Government are insisting that
a Polish representative with full powers must come to Berlin
to receive German proposals.
2. We cannot advise Polish Government to comply with
this procedure, which is wholly unreasonable.
3. Could you not suggest to German Government that they
adopt the normal procedure, when their proposals are ready,
of inviting Polish Ambassador to call and handing proposals
to him for transmission to Warsaw and inviting suggestions
as to conduct of negotiations.
4. German Government have been good enough to promise
they will communicate proposals also to His Majesty's Govern-
184 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
ment. If latter think they offer reasonable basis they can
be counted on to do their best in Warsaw to facilitate
negotiations.
No. 89.
Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's
Communication of August 29, 1939.* This reply was
handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at
Midnight on August 30, 1939.
His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly
reference in the Declaration contained in the reply of the
German Government to the latter's desire for an Anglo-German
understanding and to their statement of the influence which
this consideration has exercised upon their policy.
2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they
reciprocate the German Government's desire for improved
relations, but it will be recognised that they could not
sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain
that improvement. They fully understand that the German
Government cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but
the Polish Government are in the same position and His
Majesty's Government believe that the vital interests of the
two countries are not incompatible.
3. His Majesty's Government note that the German
Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to
enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.
4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German
Government accept in principle the condition that any
settlement should be made the subject of an international
guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this
guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His
Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the
German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the
assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the Guarantee
His Majesty's Government have always assumed.
5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German
Government accept the position of the British Government as
to Poland's vital interests and independence.
6. His Majesty's Government must make an express
reservation in regard to the statement of the particular
demands put
* No. 78.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 185
forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in
their reply. They understand that the German Government are
drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these
proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It
can then be determined how far they are compatible with the
essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have
stated and which in principle the German Government have
expressed their willingness to accept.
7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the
Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The
method of contact and arrangements for discussions must
obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and
Polish Governments, but in His Majesty's Government's view
it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as
to-day.
8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the need
for speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share
the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the
proximity of two mobilised armies standing face to face.
They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties
should undertake that, during the negotiations, no
aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty's
Government feel confident that they could obtain such an
undertaking from the Polish Government if the German
Government would give similar assurances.
9. Further, His Majesty's Government would suggest that
a temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig,
which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to
render German-Polish relations more difficult.
No. 90.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Sent to Sir H. Kennard on August 30 and acted on in the
early morning of August 31.)
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
August 30, 1939.
MY telegram to Berlin gives the text of the reply of
His Majesty's Government * to the German communication **
which has been repeated to you.
2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing so, you
should
*No. 89
**No. 78.
186 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
point out that, whilst the first part of the German
Government's reply consists of an indefensible and
misleading presentation of the German case, the really
important part of the reply consists of Germany's acceptance
of the proposal for direct discussion, of the suggestion of
the proposed international guarantee, and Germany's
assertion that she intends to respect Poland's vital
interests.
3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception at this
stage to much that finds place in the German reply, of which
His Majesty's Government would be as critical as, they have
no doubt, would be the Polish Government, but His Majesty's
Government have made an express reservation in regard to
statement of the particular demands put forward in the
German note. The point that seemed to call for immediate
comment was the German demand that a Polish representative
should present himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see
the line we took last night on this (see my telegram to
Berlin *) and the further reference we have made to point in
our reply to German Government's latest communication.
German Government are now drawing up proposals for a
solution, and it will be in the light of these, and of other
developments, that the decision as to future procedure,
including place and conditions of discussion, will have to
be taken.
4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's
Government that the proposal has been made for a military
standstill during discussions, to which His Majesty's
Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government will
have no objection.
5. His Majesty's Government would be glad to have the
views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of the fact
that the Polish Government have authorised His Majesty's
Government to say that they are prepared to enter into
direct discussions with the German Government, His Majesty's
Government hope that, provided method and general
arrangement for discussions can be satisfactorily agreed,
Polish Government will be prepared to do so without delay.
We regard it as most important from the point of view of the
internal situation in Germany and of world opinion that, so
long as the German Government profess themselves ready to
negotiate, no opportunity should be given them for placing
the blame for a conflict on Poland.
*No. 81.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 187
6. You should, of course, emphasise that His Majesty's
Government have made it quite clear to Herr Hitler that they
are irrevocably determined to implement their obligations
without reserve. On this point there is no misunderstanding
in Berlin. The position of the Polish Government is very
different from that which they occupied last March, since it
is now supported both by direct British guarantee and
promise of British participation in guarantee of any
settlement reached on bases we have indicated, and the
conversations would be carried on against this background.
No. 91.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 2 45 a. m.
August 31).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 30, 1939.
I INFORMED Herr von Ribbentrop to-night of the advice
given to the Polish Government in your telegram of 30th
August to Warsaw.*
2. Practically his only comment was that all
provocation came from the side of Poland. I observed that
His Majesty's Government had constantly warned the Polish
Government that all provocative action should be vigorously
discouraged and that I had reason to believe that the German
press accounts were greatly exaggerated. Herr von Ribbentrop
replied that His Majesty's Government's advice had had
cursed ("verflucht") little effect. I mildly retorted that I
was surprised to hear such language from a Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
No. 92.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:30 a. m.
August 31).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 30, 1939.
I TOLD Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His
Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish
Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply,
and suggested
*No. 85.
188 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German
proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and
to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government
with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added
that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's
Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw
to temporize negotiations.
2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy
document which he read out in German aloud at top speed.
Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not
attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles
which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee
accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to
Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line
Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Sch”nlanke; plebiscite to
be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st
January, 1919, absolute majority to decide; international
commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members
to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal
communications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the
plebiscite; Gydnia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be
purely commercial city and demilitarised.
3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these
proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply
of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish
representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.
4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant
that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin
on 30th August constituted, in fact, an ultimatum in spite
of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he
denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my
imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal
procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish
Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned
me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to
Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von
Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to
visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for
interview it might be different. I said that I would
naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said
while those were his personal views he would
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 189
bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was
for Chancellor to decide.
5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that
Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant
interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed
incidentally against Polish mobilisation, but I retorted
that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also
mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me
yesterday.
No. 93.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 8 a. m.).
(Telegraphic) Warsaw,
August 31, 1939.
I HAVE communicated to M. Beck the reply of His
Majesty's Government to Herr Hitler and made the comments
therein in the sense of your telegram of 30th August.* M.
Beck stated that before giving me a definite reply he would
have to consult his Government but he could tell me at once
that he would do everything possible to facilitate the
efforts of His Majesty's Government which he greatly
appreciated. I think he was greatly relieved to know that
His Majesty's Government had not in any way committed
themselves as regards demands put forward by German
Government and he fully realised the main importance which
His Majesty's Government attaches to the necessity for not
giving the German Government any opportunity for placing the
blame on Poland in any refusal to enter into direct
negotiations.
2. He has promised me the considered reply of his
government by mid-day to-morrow.**
3. I took the opportunity of impressing upon him again
the necessity of avoiding any incidents in the meantime and
asked him whether any had recently occurred. He said he had
just heard that there had been a clash between German and
Polish military forces but as at present informed he did not
think it had amounted to more than an exchange of shots
without serious casualties.
*No. 90.
**i.e., meaning August 31.
190 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 94.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 31,
1939, 12 noon.
You should concert with your French colleague in
suggesting to Polish Government that they should now make
known to the German Government, preferably direct, but if
not, through us, that they have been made aware of our last
reply to German Government and that they confirm their
acceptance of the principle of direct discussions.
French Government fear that German Government might
take advantage of silence on part of Polish Government.
No. 95.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 31, 1939, 1:45 p. m.
BERLIN telegram of 30th August.*
Please at once inform Polish Government and advise
them, in view of fact that they have accepted principle of
direct discussions, immediately to instruct Polish
Ambassador in Berlin to say to German Government that, if
latter have any proposals, he is ready to transmit them to
his Government so that they may at once consider them and
make suggestions for early discussions.
No. 96.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 7:15 p. m.)
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 31, 1939.
MY telegram of 31st August.**
M. Beck has just handed me in writing Polish reply to
my d‚marche last night***; translation is in my immediately
following telegram.# He particularly asked that it should be
treated as most confidential.
*No. 92.
**No. 93
***i.e., the night of August 30/31.
#No. 97.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 191
2. I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in
order to establish contact with the German Government. He
said he would now instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview
either with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or State
Secretary in order to say Poland had accepted British
proposals. I urged him to do this without delay.
3. I then asked him what attitude Polish Ambassador
would adopt if Herr von Ribbentrop or whoever he saw handed
him the German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not
be authorized to accept such a document as, in view of past
experience, it might be accompanied by some sort of
ultimatum. In his view it was essential that contact should
be made in the first instance, and that then details should
be discussed as to where, with whom, and on what basis
negotiations should be commenced.
4. As regards Danzig he pointed out that the situation
there was becoming extremely serious. Polish officials were
being arrested, railway traffic was suspended, and he
thought it essential that immediate steps should be taken to
secure a modus vivendi as a result of which those arrested
would be released and railway traffic would be resumed. He
suggested M. Burckhardt might be able to effect this.
5. He confirmed that no other serious incidents had
occurred, but stated that he feared that in connexion with
any negotiations he would have to appeal to the intervention
of His Majesty's Government.
6. He added that if invited to go to Berlin he would of
course not go, as he had no intention of being treated like
President Hacha.
No. 97.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 6:30 p. m.)
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
August 31, 1939.
FOLLOWING is text of Poland's reply dated 31st August,
1939:
"(1) Polish Government confirm their readiness which
has previously been expressed for a direct
exchange of views with the German Government on
the basis pro-
192 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
posed by British Government and communicated to me
by Lord Halifax's telegram of 28th August
addressed to the British Ambassador, Warsaw.*
"(2) Polish government are also prepared on a
reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that
in the event of negotiations taking place Polish
troops will not violate the frontiers of the
German Reich provided a corresponding guarantee is
given regarding non-violation of frontiers of
Poland by troops of the German Reich.
"(3) In the present situation it is also essential to
create a simple provisional modus vivendi in the
Free City of Danzig.
"(4) As regards the suggestions communicated to Polish
Government on 28th August through the intermediary
of the British Ambassador at Warsaw, an
explanation of what the British Government
understands by international guarantee would be
required in regard to relations between Poland and
the German Reich. In default of an answer to this
fundamental question the Polish Government are
obliged completely to reserve their attitude
towards this matter until such time as full
explanations are received.
"(5) Polish Government express hope that in the event
of conversations with the German Reich being
initiated, they will continue to be able to take
advantage of good offices of His Majesty's
Government."
No. 98.
Message which was communicated to H.M. Ambassador in Berlin
by the State Secretary on August 31, 1939, at 9:15 p. m.
(Translation.)
HIS Majesty's Government informed the German
Government, in a note dated the 28th August, 1939,** of
their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct
negotiations between
*Conveying the substance of No. 74.
**No. 74
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 193
Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing
they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of
the urgent need for progress in view of the continuous
incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated
the 28th August,* the German Government, in spite of being
sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come
to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the
interests of peace to accept the British mediation or
suggestion. After considering all the circumstances
prevailing at the time, they considered it necessary in
their note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe
was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and
without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready
to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up
to the evening of the 30th August, with the proviso that the
latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to
conduct and conclude negotiations.
Further, the German Government pointed out that they
felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an
understanding available to the British Government by the
time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.
Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an
authorised Polish personage, the first answer the Government
of the Reich received to their readiness for an
understanding was the news of the Polish mobilisation, and
only towards 12 o'clock on the night of the 30th August,
1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of
British readiness to help towards the commencement of
negotiations.
Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected
by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the
necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government
of the views of the German Government as regards possible
bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government
themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between
Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Herr von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the
occasion of the presentation of the last British note
precise information as to the text of the German proposals
which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the
event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.
*No. 78.
194 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
The Government of the German Reich considered
themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a
Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate
retroactively.
For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their
part continually not only to emphasise their willingness to
start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while
being from the Polish side merely put off with empty
subterfuges and meaningless declarations.
It has once more been made clear as a result of a
d‚marche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish
Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary powers
either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.
The Fhrer and the German Government have thus waited
two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with
plenary powers.
In these circumstances the German Government regard
their proposals as having this time too been to all intents
and purposes rejected, although they consider that these
proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the
British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and
practicable.
The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the
public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated
to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop.
The situation existing between the German Reich and
Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further
incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the
military forces which have taken up their position on both
sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as
to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this
situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered,
and that thus not only the East of Europe, but also other
territories shall not be brought into such a state of
tension. The causes of this development lie in: (1) the
impossible delineation of frontiers, as fixed by the
Versailles dictate; (2) the impossible treatment of the
minority in the ceded territories.
In making these proposals, the Reich Government are,
therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting
solution which will remove the impossible situation created
by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties
their vitally important line of
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 195
communication, which may-as far as it is at all possible-
remove the minority problem and, in so far as this is not
possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a
tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their
rights.
The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is
essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918
should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of
course, regard this obligation as being binding for both
parties.
These considerations lead to the following practical
proposals:-
(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German
Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of
the unanimous will of its population;
(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which
extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-
Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and thence may run in a
westerly direction to Sch”nlanke, shall itself decide as to
whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;
(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in
this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all
Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on the
1st January, 1918, or who by that date have been born there,
and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, &c., domiciled in this
territory on the above day (the 1st January, 1918) or born
there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from
this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their
vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and
also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation
necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the
case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision
of an international commission to be formed immediately, on
which shall be represented the four Great Powers-Italy, the
Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall
exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory.
With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated
within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed
upon, by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the
Polish authorities;
(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally
constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is
confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be
excluded from the
196 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port
should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if
necessary, delimited by an international committee of
arbitration;
(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the
execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out
of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place
before the expiry of twelve months;
(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication
between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the
sea during this period, roads and railways shall be
established to render free transit traffic possible. In this
connexion only such taxes as are necessary for the
maintenance of the means of communication and for the
provision of transport may be levied;
(7) The question as to the party to which the area
belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes
recorded;
(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication
with her province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her
connexion with the sea after the execution of the plebiscite-
regardless of the results thereof-Germany shall, in the
event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive an
extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line from
Butow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down an
autobahn and a 4-track railway line. The road and the
railway shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of
communication are not affected, i.e., they shall pass either
over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone shall be
fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German sovereign
territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to Germany,
Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those accorded to
Germany, to a similar extra-territorial communication by
road and railway for the purpose of free and unrestricted
communication with her port of Gdynia;
(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the
German Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an
exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which
the nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;
(10) Any special right desired by Poland in the port of
Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of territory against
similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of
Gdynia;
(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that
either
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 197
side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have the
character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to say,
without military installations and military fortifications;
(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the
plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in
either case have similarly to be demilitarised;
(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the
most vehement complaints to make against the Polish
treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government for
their part feel obliged to make complaints against Germany,
both parties declare their agreement to have these
complaints laid before an international committee of
enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints as
regards economic or physical damage, and any other acts of
terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good
economic or other damage done to minorities on either side
since the year 1918, or to cancel expropriation as the case
may be, or to provide complete compensation to the persons
affected for this and any other encroachments on their
economic life;
(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in
Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the
feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to
render them secure against being called upon to perform
action or to render services incompatible with their
national sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee
the rights of both minorities by means of the most
comprehensive and binding agreement, in order to guarantee
to these minorities the preservation, the free development
and practical application of their nationality (Volkstum),
and in particular to permit for this purpose such
organisation as they may consider necessary. Both parties
undertake not to call upon members of the minority for
military service;
(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these
proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to
decree and to carry out the immediate demobilisation of
their armed forces;
(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid
execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by
both Germany and Poland conjointly.
198 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 99.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 31,
1939, 11 p. m.
PLEASE inform German Government that we understand that
Polish Government are taking steps to establish contact with
them through Polish Ambassador in Berlin.
2. Please also ask them whether they agree to the
necessity for securing an immediate provisional modus
vivendi as regards Danzig. (We have already put this point
to German Government.) Would they agree that M. Burckhardt
might be employed for this purpose if it were possible to
secure his services?
No. 100.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 1, 1939,
12:50 a. m.
YOUR telegrams of 31st August*:-
1. I am glad to learn that Polish Ambassador at Berlin
is being instructed to establish contact with German
Government.
2. I fully agree as to the necessity for discussing
detailed arrangements for the negotiations and as to the
undesirability of a visit by M. Beck to Berlin.
3. On the other hand, I do not see why the Polish
Government should feel difficulty about authorising Polish
Ambassador to accept a document from the German Government,
and I earnestly hope that they may be able to modify their
instructions to him in this respect. There was no mention of
any ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which
has been furnished to us, and the suggestion that the demand
for the presence of a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin on
30th August amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously
repudiated by Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with His
Majesty's Ambassador. If the document did contain an
ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally refuse to
discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other
hand, a refusal by them to receive proposals would be
gravely misunderstood by outside opinion.
* Nos. 96 and 97.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 199
4. I should have thought that the Polish Ambassador
could surely be instructed to receive and transmit a
document and to say (a) if it contained anything like an
ultimatum, that he anticipated that the Polish Government
would certainly be unable to discuss on such a basis, and
(b) that, in any case, in the view of the Polish Government,
questions as to the venue of the negotiations, the basis on
which they should be held, and the persons to take part in
them, must be discussed and decided between the two
Governments.
5. If negotiations are initiated, His Majesty's
Government will at all times be ready, if desired, to lend
any assistance in their power to achieve a just settlement.
6. As regards an international guarantee, this will no
doubt have to be fully discussed. What His Majesty's
Government had in mind was a guarantee of the full and
proper observance of any settlement reached.
7. As regards Danzig, we fully share the view of M.
Beck as to the importance of establishing some modus
vivendi. We have already made a suggestion in this sense to
the German Government and will in the light of paragraph 4
of your telegram of 31st August** do so again. If German
Government agree, I will at once approach M. Burckhardt.
8. Please speak to M. Beck immediately in the above
sense.
No. 101.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (dated 7 43 p. m.
September 1 and received 2 a. m. September 2).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
September 1, 1939.
YOUR telegram of 1st September* was decyphered at 4 a.
m. to-day.
2. M. Lipski had already called on the German Foreign
Minister at 6:30 p. m. yesterday. In view of this fact,
which was followed by German invasion of Poland at dawn to-
day, it was clearly useless for me to take the action
suggested.
**No 96
*No. 100.
200 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 102.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 12:10 a. m.
September 1).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
August 31, 1939.
FOLLOWING is translation from text of communication
handed by Polish Ambassador to German Minister for Foreign
Affairs this evening:-
"During the course of the night the Polish Government
received from the British Government news of the exchange of
information with the German Government regarding the
possibility of direct discussion between the Government of
the Reich and the Polish Government.
"The Polish Government are weighing favourably the
British Government's suggestion; a formal answer in this
matter will be communicated to them in the immediate
future." I understand that no discussion took place.
No. 103.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received in the early
hours of September 1, 1939).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
WRITTEN communication was made to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs early this morning in the sense of paragraph
2 of your telegram of 31st August.*
No. 104.
Explanatory Note upon the actual Course of Events.
THE reply to the German Government of 28th August was,
before its delivery, communicated to the French and Polish
Governments. The Polish Government authorised His Majesty's
Government to inform the German Government that Poland was
ready at once to enter into direct discussions with Germany.
*No. 99.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 201
It will be seen that paragraph 4 of the British reply
of 28th August made plain the attitude of the Polish
Government on this point.
The British reply was handed to Herr Hitler at 10:30 p.
m. on 28th August, and he promised to give a written reply
the following day.
The German reply in writing was handed to His Majesty's
Ambassador at 7:15 p. m. on 28th August. Apart from the
complete distortion of events leading up to the crisis, the
German Government's reply demanded the arrival in Berlin of
a Polish emissary with full powers during the course of the
following day.
The reply of the British Government is self-
explanatory. It was communicated by His Majesty's Ambassador
to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs at midnight on
30th August. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a
long document which he read out rapidly in German. It was
apparently the sixteen-point plan which the German
Government have since published. When Sir N. Henderson asked
for the text of these proposals in accordance with the
undertaking in the German reply of 28th August Herr von
Ribbentrop asserted that it was now too late as the Polish
plenipotentiary had not arrived in Berlin by midnight, as
had been demanded by the German Government in their
communication of the previous evening.
The Polish Government on learning of these developments
informed His Majesty's Government during the afternoon of
31st August that they would authorise their Ambassador to
inform the German Government that Poland had accepted the
British proposals for negotiations.
The Polish Ambassador in Berlin (M. Lipski) was not
received by Herr von Ribbentrop until the evening of 31st
August. After this interview the German Government broadcast
their proposals forthwith. M. Lipski at once tried to
establish contact with Warsaw but was unable to do so
because all means of communication between Poland and
Germany had been closed by the German Government.
202 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 105.
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
September 1, 1939.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): I do not propose
to say many words to-night. The time has come when action
rather than speech is required. Eighteen months ago in this
House I prayed that the responsibility might not fall upon
me to ask this country to accept the awful arbitrament of
war. I fear that I may not be able to avoid that
responsibility. But, at any rate, I cannot wish for
conditions in which such a burden should fall upon me in
which I should feel clearer than I do to-day as to where my
duty lies. No man can say that the Government could have
done more to try to keep open the way for an honourable and
equitable settlement of the dispute between Germany and
Poland. Nor have we neglected any means of making it crystal
clear to the German Government that if they insisted on
using force again in the manner in which they had used it in
the past we were resolved to oppose them by force. Now that
all the relevant documents are being made public we shall
stand at the bar of history knowing that the responsibility
for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one
man-the German Chancellor, who has not hesitated to plunge
the world into misery in order to serve his own senseless
ambitions.
I would like to thank the House for the forbearance
which they have shown on two recent occasions in not
demanding from me information which they recognised I could
not give while these negotiations were still in progress. I
have now had all the correspondence with the German
Government put into the form of a White Paper. On account of
mechanical difficulties I am afraid there are still but a
few copies available, but I understand that they will be
coming in in relays while the House is sitting. I do not
think it is necessary for me to refer in detail now to these
documents, which are already past history. They make it
perfectly clear that our object has been to try and bring
about discussions of the Polish-German dispute between the
two countries themselves on terms of equality, the
settlement to be one which safeguarded the independence of
Poland and of which the due observance would be secured by
international guarantees.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 203
There is just one passage from a recent communication, which
was dated the 30th August, which I should like to quote,
because it shows how easily the final clash might have been
avoided had there been the least desire on the part of the
German Government to arrive at a peaceful settlement. In
this document we said:-
"His Majesty's Government fully recognise the need
for speed in the initiation of discussions and they
share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from
the proximity of two mobilised armies standing face to
face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that
both parties should undertake that during the
negotiations no aggressive military movements should
take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident
that they could obtain such an undertaking from the
Polish Government if the German Government would give
similar assurances."
That telegram, which was repeated to Poland, brought an
instantaneous reply from the Polish Government, dated the
31st August, in which they said:-
"The Polish Government are also prepared on a
reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee in the
event of negotiations taking place that Polish troops
will not violate the frontiers of the German Reich
provided a corresponding guarantee is given regarding
the non-violation of the frontiers of Poland by troops
of the German Reich."
We never had any reply from the German Government to
that suggestion, one which, if it had been followed, might
have saved the catastrophe which took place this morning. In
the German broadcast last night, which recited the 16 points
of the proposals which they have put forward, there occurred
this sentence:-
"In these circumstances the Reich Government
considers its proposals rejected."
I must examine that statement. I must tell the House
what are the circumstances. To begin with let me say that
the text of these proposals has never been communicated by
Germany to Poland at all. The history of the matter is this.
On Tuesday, the 28th August, in replying to a Note which we
had sent to them, the German Government said, among other
things, that they would immediately draw up proposals for a
solution acceptable to themselves and
203 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
"will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the
British Government before the arrival of the Polish
negotiator."
It will be seen by examination of the White Paper that
the German Government had stated that they counted upon the
arrival of a plenipotentiary from Poland in Berlin on the
30th, that is to say, on the following day. In the meantime,
of course, we were awaiting these proposals. The next
evening, when our Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop, the
German Foreign Secretary, he urged upon the latter that when
these proposals were ready-for we had heard no more about
them-he should invite the Polish Ambassador to call and
should hand him the proposals for transmission to his
Government. Thereupon, reports our Ambassador, in the most
violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said he would never ask
the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if the Polish
Ambassador asked him for an interview it might be different.
The House will see that this was on Wednesday night,
which, according to the German statement of last night, is
now claimed to be the final date after which no negotiation
with Poland was acceptable. It is plain, therefore, that
Germany claims to treat Poland as in the wrong because she
had not by Wednesday night entered upon discussions with
Germany about a set of proposals of which she had never
heard.
Now what of ourselves? On that Wednesday night, at the
interview to which I have just referred, Herr von Ribbentrop
produced a lengthy document which he read out in German,
aloud, at top speed. Naturally, after this reading our
Ambassador asked for a copy of the document, but the reply
was that it was now too late, as the Polish representative
had not arrived in Berlin by midnight. And so, Sir, we never
got a copy of those proposals, and the first time we heard
them-we heard them-was on the broadcast last night. Well,
Sir, those are the circumstances in which the German
Government said that they would consider that their
proposals were rejected. Is it not clear that their
conception of a negotiation was that on almost instantaneous
demand a Polish plenipotentiary should go to Berlin-where
others had been before him-and should there receive a
statement of demands to be accepted in their entirety or
refused? I am not pronouncing any opinion upon the terms
themselves, for I do not feel called upon to do so. The
proper course, in our
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 205
view-in the view of all of us-was that these proposals
should have been put before the Poles, who should have been
given time to consider them and to say whether, in their
opinion, they did or did not infringe those vital interests
of Poland which Germany had assured us on a previous
occasion she intended to respect. Only last night the Polish
Ambassador did see the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von
Ribbentrop. Once again he expressed to him what, indeed, the
Polish Government had already said publicly, that they were
willing to negotiate with Germany about their disputes on an
equal basis. What was the reply of the German Government?
The reply was that without another word the German troops
crossed the Polish frontier this morning at dawn and are
since reported to be bombing open towns. [An Hon. Member:
"Gas?"] In these circumstances there is only one course open
to us. His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and the French
Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German
Government the following document:-
"Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly
that he was about to attack Poland. Information which
has reached His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German
troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that
attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these
circumstances it appears to the Governments of the
United Kingdom and France that by their action the
German Government have created conditions, namely, an
aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the
independence of Poland, which call for the
implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom
and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her
assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency
that unless the German Government are prepared to give
His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that
the German Government have suspended all aggressive
action against Poland and are prepared promptly to
withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland."
[An Hon. Member: "Time limit?".] If a reply to this
last warning is unfavourable, and I do not suggest that it
is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty's Ambassador is
instructed to ask for
206 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
his passports. In that case we are ready. Yesterday, we took
further steps towards the completion of our defensive
preparations. This morning we ordered complete mobilisation
of the whole of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. We
have also taken a number of other measures, both at home and
abroad, which the House will not perhaps expect me to
specify in detail. Briefly, they represent the final steps
in accordance with prearranged plans. These last can be put
into force rapidly, and are of such a nature that they can
be deferred until war seems inevitable. Steps have also been
taken under the powers conferred by the House last week to
safeguard the position in regard to stocks of commodities of
various kinds.
The thoughts of many of us must at this moment
inevitably be turning back to 1914, and to a comparison of
our position now with that which existed then. How do we
stand this time? The answer is that all three Services are
ready, and that the situation in all directions is far more
favourable and reassuring than in 1914, while behind the
fighting Services we have built up a vast organisation of
Civil Defence under our scheme of Air Raid Precautions. As
regards the immediate man-power requirements, the Royal
Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force are in the fortunate
position of having almost as many men as they can
conveniently handle at this moment. There are, however,
certain categories of service in which men are immediately
required, both for Military and Civil Defence. These will be
announced in detail through the Press and the B.B.C. The
main and most satisfactory point to observe is that there is
to-day no need to make an appeal in a general way for
recruits such as was issued by Lord Kitchener 25 years ago.
That appeal has been anticipated by many months, and the men
are already available.
So much for the immediate present. Now we must look to
the future. It is essential in the face of the tremendous
task which confronts us, more especially in view of our past
experiences in this matter, to organise our man-power this
time upon as methodical, equitable and economical a basis as
possible. We, therefore, propose immediately to introduce
legislation directed to that end. A Bill will be laid before
you which for all practical purposes will amount to an
expansion of the Military Training Act. Under its operation
all fit men between the ages of 18 and 41 will
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 207
be rendered liable to military service if and when called
upon. It is not intended at the outset that any considerable
number of men other than those already liable shall be
called up, and steps will be taken to ensure that the man-
power essentially required by industry shall not be taken
away.
There is one other allusion which I should like to make
before I end my speech, and that is to record my
satisfaction, and the satisfaction of His Majesty's
Government, that throughout these last days of crisis Signor
Mussolini also has been doing his best to reach a solution.
It now only remains for us to set our teeth and to
enter upon this struggle, which we ourselves earnestly
endeavoured to avoid, with determination to see it through
to the end. We shall enter it with a clear conscience, with
the support of the Dominions and the British Empire, and the
moral approval of the greater part of the world. We have no
quarrel with the German people, except that they allow
themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as
that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so
persistently followed during the last two years, there will
be no peace in Europe. We shall merely pass from one crisis
to another, and see one country after another attacked by
methods which have now become familiar to us in their
sickening technique. We are resolved that these methods must
come to an end. If out of the struggle we again re-establish
in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of
force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed
upon us will find their fullest justification.
No. 106.
Speech by Herr Hitler to the Reichstag on September 1, 1939.
(Translation.)
FOR months we have been suffering under the torture of
a problem which the Versailles Diktat created-a problem
which has deteriorated until it becomes intolerable for us.
Danzig was and is a German city. The Corridor was and is
German. Both these territories owe their cultural
development exclusively to the German people. Danzig was
separated from us, the Corridor
208 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
was annexed by Poland. As in other German territories of the
East, all German minorities living there have been ill-
treated in the most distressing manner. More than 1,000,000
people of German blood had in the years 1919-20 to leave
their homeland.
As always, I attempted to bring about, by the peaceful
method of making proposals for revision, an alteration of
this intolerable position. It is a lie when the outside
world says that we only tried to carry through our revisions
by pressure. Fifteen years before the National Socialist
Party came to power there was the opportunity of carrying
out these revisions by peaceful settlements and
understanding. On my own initiative I have, not once but
several times, made proposals for the revision of
intolerable conditions. All these proposals, as you know,
have been rejected-proposals for limitation of armaments and
ever, if necessary, disarmament, proposals for the
limitation of war-making, proposals for the elimination of
certain methods of modern warfare. You know the proposals
that I have made to fulfil the necessity of restoring German
sovereignty over German territories. You know the endless
attempts I made for a peaceful clarification and
understanding of the problem of Austria, and later of the
problem of the Sudetenland, Bohemia, and Moravia. It was all
in vain.
It is impossible to demand that an impossible position
should be cleared up by peaceful revision and at the same
time constantly reject peaceful revision. It is also
impossible to say that he who undertakes to carry out these
revisions for himself transgresses a law, since the
Versailles Diktat is not law to us. A signature was forced
out of us with pistols at our head and with the threat of
hunger for millions of people. And then this document, with
our signature, obtained by force, was proclaimed as a solemn
law.
In the same way, I have also tried to solve the problem
of Danzig, the Corridor, &c., by proposing a peaceful
discussion. That the problems had to be solved was clear. It
is quite understandable to us that the time when the problem
was to be solved had little interest for the Western Powers.
But that time is not a matter of indifference to us.
Moreover, it was not and could not be a matter of
indifference to those who suffer most.
In my talks with Polish statesmen I discussed the ideas
which you recognise from my last speech to the Reichstag. No
one could say that this was in any way an inadmissible
procedure or undue
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 209
pressure. I then naturally formulated at last the German
proposals, and I must once more repeat that there is nothing
more modest or loyal than these proposals. I should like to
say this to the world. I alone was in the position to make
such proposals, for I know very well that in doing so I
brought myself into opposition to millions of Germans. These
proposals have been refused. Not only were they answered
first with mobilisation, but with increased terror and
pressure against our German compatriots and with a slow
strangling of the Free City of Danzig-economically,
politically, and in recent weeks by military and transport
means.
Poland has directed its attacks against the Free City
of Danzig. Moreover, Poland was not prepared to settle the
Corridor question in a reasonable way which would be
equitable to both parties, and she did not think of keeping
her obligations to minorities.
I must here state something definitely; Germany has
kept these obligations; the minorities who live in Germany
are not persecuted. No Frenchman can stand up and say that
any Frenchman living in the Saar territory is oppressed,
tortured, or deprived of his rights. Nobody can say this.
For four months I have calmly watched developments,
although I never ceased to give warnings. In the last few
days I have increased these warnings. I informed the Polish
Ambassador three weeks ago that if Poland continued to send
to Danzig notes in the form of ultimata, if Poland continued
its methods of oppression against the Germans, and if on the
Polish side an end was not put to Customs measures destined
to ruin Danzig's trade, then the Reich could not remain
inactive. I left no doubt that people who wanted to compare
the Germany of to-day with the former Germany would be
deceiving themselves.
An attempt was made to justify the oppression of the
Germans by claiming that they had committed acts of
provocation. I do not know in what these provocations on the
part of women and children consist, if they themselves are
maltreated, in some cases killed. One thing I do know-that
no great Power can with honour long stand by passively and
watch such events.
I made one more final effort to accept a proposal for
mediation on the part of the British Government. They
proposed, not that they themselves should carry on the
negotiations, but rather that
210 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Poland and Germany should come into direct contact and once
more to pursue negotiations.
I must declare that I accepted this proposal, and I
worked out a basis for these negotiations which are known to
you. For two whole days I sat with my Government and waited
to see whether it was convenient for the Polish Government
to send a plenipotentiary or not. Last night they did not
send us a plenipotentiary, but instead informed us through
their Ambassador that they were still considering whether
and to what extent they were in a position to go into the
British proposals. The Polish Government also said that they
would inform Britain of their decision.
Deputies, if the German Government and its Leader
patiently endured such treatment Germany would deserve only
to disappear from the political stage. But I am wrongly
judged if my love of peace and my patience are mistaken for
weakness or even cowardice. I, therefore, decided last night
and informed the British Government that in these
circumstances I can no longer find any willingness on the
part of the Polish Government to conduct serious
negotiations with us.
These proposals for mediation have failed because in
the meanwhile there, first of all, came as an answer the
sudden Polish general mobilisation, followed by more Polish
atrocities. These were again repeated last night. Recently
in one night there were as many as twenty-one frontier
incidents; last night there were fourteen, of which three
were quite serious. I have, therefore, resolved to speak to
Poland in the same language that Poland for months past has
used towards us. This attitude on the part of the Reich will
not change.
The other European States understand in part our
attitude. I should like here above all to thank Italy, which
throughout has supported us, but you will understand that
for the carrying on of this struggle we do not intend to
appeal to foreign help. We will carry out this task
ourselves. The neutral States have assured us of their
neutrality, just as we had already guaranteed it to them.
When statesmen in the West declare that this affects
their interests, I can only regret such a declaration. It
cannot for a moment make me hesitate to fulfil my duty. What
more is wanted? I have solemnly assured them, and I repeat
it, that we ask nothing of these Western States and never
will ask anything.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 211
I have declared that the frontier between France and Germany
is a final one. I have repeatedly offered friendship and, if
necessary, the closest co-operation to Britain, but this
cannot be offered from one side only. It must find response
on the other side. Germany has no interests in the West, and
our western wall is for all time the frontier of the Reich
on the west. Moreover, we have no aims of any kind there for
the future. With this assurance we are in solemn earnest,
and as long as others do not violate their neutrality we
will likewise take every care to respect it.
I am happy particularly to be able to tell you of one
event. You know that Russia and Germany are governed by two
different doctrines. There was only one question that had to
be cleared up. Germany has no intention of exporting its
doctrine. Given the fact that Soviet Russia has no intention
of exporting its doctrine to Germany, I no longer see any
reason why we should still oppose one another. On both sides
we are clear on that. Any struggle between our people would
only be of advantage to others. We have, therefore, resolved
to conclude a pact which rules out for ever any use of
violence between us. It imposes the obligation on us to
consult together in certain European questions. It makes
possible for us economic co-operation, and above all it
assures that the powers of both these powerful States are
not wasted against one another. Every attempt of the West to
bring about any change in this will fail.
At the same time I should like here to declare that
this political decision means a tremendous departure for the
future, and that it is a final one. Russia and Germany
fought against one another in the World War. That shall and
will not happen a second time. In Moscow, too, this pact was
greeted exactly as you greet it. I can only endorse word for
word the speech of the Russian Foreign Commissar, Molotov.
I am determined to solve (1) the Danzig question; (1)
the question of the Corridor; and (3) to see to it that a
change is made in the relationship between Germany and
Poland that shall ensure a peaceful co-existence. In this I
am resolved to continue to fight until either the present
Polish Government is willing to bring about this change or
until another Polish Government is ready to do so. I am
resolved to remove from the German frontiers the element of
uncertainty, the everlasting atmosphere
212 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
of conditions resembling civil war. I will see to it that in
the East there is, on the frontier, a peace precisely
similar to that on our other frontiers.
In this I will take the necessary measures to see that
they do not contradict the proposals I have already made
known in the Reichstag itself to the rest of the world, that
is to say, I will not war against women and children. I have
ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on
military objectives. If, however, the enemy thinks he can
from that draw carte blanche on his side to fight by the
other methods he will receive an answer that will deprive
him of hearing and sight.
This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers
fired on our own territory. Since 5:45 a. m. we have been
returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met with
bombs. Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with
poison gas. Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare
can only expect that we shall do the same. I will continue
this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of
the Reich and its rights are secured.
For six years now I have been working on the building
up of the German defences. Over 90 milliards have in that
time been spent on the building up of these defence forces.
They are now the best equipped and are above all comparison
with what they were in 1914. My trust in them is unshakable.
When I called up these forces and when I now ask sacrifices
of the German people and if necessary every sacrifice, then
I have a right to do so, for I also am to-day absolutely
ready, just as we were formerly, to make every personal
sacrifice.
I am asking of no German man more than I myself was
ready throughout four years at any time to do. There will be
no hardships for Germans to which I myself will not submit.
My whole life henceforth belongs more than ever to my
people. I am from now on just first soldier of the German
Reich. I have once more put on that coat that was the most
sacred and dear to me. I will not take it off again until
victory is secured, or I will not survive the outcome.
Should anything happen to me in the struggle then my
first successor is Party Comrade Goring; should anything
happen to Party Comrade G”ring my next successor is Party
Comrade Hess.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 213
You would then be under obligation to give to them as Fhrer
the same blind loyalty and obedience as to myself. Should
anything happen to Party Comrade Hess, then by law the
Senate will be called, and will choose from its midst the
most worthy-that is to say the bravest-successor.
As a National Socialist and as German soldier I enter
upon this struggle with a stout heart. My whole life has
been nothing but one long struggle for my people, for its
restoration, and for Germany. There was only one watchword
for that struggle: faith in this people. One word I have
never learned: that is, surrender.
If, however, anyone thinks that we are facing a hard
time, I should ask him to remember that once a Prussian
King, with a ridiculously small State, opposed a stronger
coalition, and in three wars finally came out successful
because that State had that stout heart that we need in
these times. I would, therefore, like to assure all the
world that a November 1918 will never be repeated in German
history. Just as I myself am ready at any time to stake my
life-anyone can take it for my people and for Germany-so I
ask the same of all others.
Whoever, however, thinks he can oppose this national
command, whether directly or indirectly, shall fall. We have
nothing to do with traitors. We are all faithful to our old
principle. It is quite unimportant whether we ourselves
live, but it is essential that our people shall live, that
Germany shall live. The sacrifice that is demanded of us is
not greater than the sacrifice that many generations have
made. If we form a community closely bound together by vows,
ready for anything, resolved never to surrender, then our
will will master every hardship and difficulty. And I would
like to close with the declaration that I once made when I
began the struggle for power in the Reich. I then said: "If
our will is so strong that no hardship and suffering can
subdue it, then our will and our German might shall
prevail."
214 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 107
Herr Hitler's Proclamation to the German Army on September
1, 1939.
(Translation.)
THE Polish State has refused the peaceful settlement of
relations which I desired, and has appealed to arms. Germans
in Poland are persecuted with bloody terror and driven from
their houses. A series of violations of the frontier,
intolerable to a great Power, prove that Poland is no longer
willing to respect the frontier of the Reich.
In order to put an end to this lunacy, I have no other
choice than to meet force with force from now on. The German
Army will fight the battle for the honour and the vital
rights of reborn Germany with hard determination. I expect
that every soldier, mindful of the great traditions of
eternal German soldiery, will ever remain conscious that he
is a representative of the National-Socialist Greater
Germany. Long live our people and our Reich!
No. 108.
Proclamation by Herr Forster and Exchange of Telegrams
between Herr Forster and Herr Hitler, September 1, 1939.
HERR FORSTER'S proclamation to the people of Danzig, as
given over the German wireless, was as follows:-
(Translation.)
"Men and women of Danzig: The hour for which you
have been longing for twenty years has come. This day
Danzig has returned to the great German Reich. Our
Fhrer, Adolf Hitler, has freed us.
"The Swastika flag, the flag of the German Reich,
is flying to-day for the first time from the public
buildings of Danzig. It also flies from the former
Polish buildings, and everywhere in the harbour, the
towers of the ancient town hall and St. Mary's Church.
The bells ring in Danzig's hour of liberation.
"We thank our God that He gave the Fhrer the
power and the opportunity of freeing us from the evil
of the Versailles
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 215
Diktat. We Danzigers are happy to be able to become now
citizens of the Reich. Men and women of Danzig, we wish
to stand together in this solemn hour and stretch out
our hand and take a solemn oath to the Fhrer to do
everything that lies in our power for our glorious
Greater Germany. Long live German Danzig, which has
been liberated and returned again to the Reich! Long
live our great German fatherland!"
Herr Forster also sent the following telegram to Herr
Hitler:-
(Translation.)
"My Fhrer, I have just signed the following
constitutional law concerning the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich, and I have put it into force:-
"The constitutional law concerning the reunion of
the Free City of Danzig with the German Reich from
September 1:-
"Article 1. The Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig is cancelled with immediate effect.
"Art. 2. All legislative and executive power is in
the hands of the head of the State.
"Art. 3. The Free City of Danzig with its
territory and population shall immediately form part of
the territory of the German Reich.
"Art. 4. Until the Fhrer makes a definite
decision about the introduction of German Reich law,
all legal provisions of the Constitution remain in
force as they are at the moment of the issue of this
constitutional law.
"I ask you, my Fhrer, in the name of Danzig and
its population, to agree to this constitutional law and
to carry out the re-incorporation of Danzig by a law of
the German Reich. The eternal gratitude and everlasting
faith of Danzig is devotedly pledged to you, my
Fhrer."
Herr Hitler sent the following telegram in reply:-
(Translation.)
"I accept the proclamation of the Free State of
Danzig concerning the return to the German Reich.
"I thank you, Gauleiter Forster, and all Danzig
men and
216 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
women for the resolute loyalty which you and they
have preserved for so many years. Greater Germany
greets you with overflowing heart. The law for reunion
is ratified forthwith. I appoint you herewith as head
of the civil administration of Danzig."
No. 109.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 1,
1939, 4:45 p. m.
MY immediately following telegram contains the text of
a communication that you should, in conjunction with your
French colleague, make at once to the German Government.
2. You should ask for immediate reply and report result
of your interview. I shall then send you further
instructions.
3. In reply to any question you may explain that the
present communication is in the nature of warning and is not
to be considered as an ultimatum.
4. For your own information. If the German reply is
unsatisfactory the next stage will be either an ultimatum
with time limit or an immediate declaration of war.
No. 110.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 1,
1939, 5:45 p. m.
FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately
preceding telegram:-
On the instructions of His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to
make the following communication:-
Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a
proclamation to the German army which indicated clearly that
he was about to attack Poland.
Information which has reached His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates
that
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 217
German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that
attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding.
In these circumstances, it appears to the Governments
of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the
German Government have created conditions (viz., an
aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the
independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by
the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the
undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.
I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless
the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's
Government satisfactory assurances that the German
Government have suspended all aggressive action against
Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces
from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their
obligations to Poland.
No. 111.
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 10:30 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin,
September 1, 1939.
YOUR telegrams of 1st September.*
I was received by Herr von Ribbentrop at 9:30 this
evening, and handed him the communication from His Majesty's
Government. After reading it, he said that he wished to
state that it was not Germany who had aggressed Poland, that
on the contrary it was Poland who had provoked Germany for a
long time past; that it was the Poles who had first
mobilised and that yesterday it was Poland that had invaded
German territory with troops of the regular army.
I said that I was instructed to ask for immediate
answer. The Minister replied that he would submit the
British communication to the Head of the State.
I replied that I realised that this would be necessary,
and that I was at his disposal at whatever time he might be
in a position to give the Chancellor's answer.
* Nos. 109 and 110.
218 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Herr von Ribbentrop then remarked that if His Majesty's
Government had been as active, vis-…-vis Poland, as they had
been vis-…-vis Germany, a settlement would have been reached
at an early stage.
French Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop immediately
after and received an identic reply.
As I was leaving Herr von Ribbentrop gave me long
explanation of why he had been unable to give me text of
German proposals two nights ago. I told him that his
attitude on that occasion had been most unhelpful and had
effectively prevented me from making a last effort for
peace, and that I greatly deplored it.
He was courteous and polite this evening. I am inclined
to believe that Herr Hitler's answer will be an attempt to
avoid war with Great Britain and France, but not likely to
be one which we can accept.
No. 112.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 2 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
September 1, 1939.
MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me
in the middle of an air raid to beg me to point out to your
Lordship that various cases of armed German aggression,
which have occurred this morning on Polish soil, cannot be
taken longer as mere isolated cases but constitute acts of
war. Various open towns have been bombed from the air, with
heavy civilian casualties, and his Excellency drew my
attention to desirability of some military action from the
air this afternoon.
2. His Excellency pointed out that at 6:30 p. m. Polish
Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop and expressed readiness
of Polish Government to enter into direct negotiations. At
dawn this morning, without any further diplomatic
development or declaration of war, Germany had committed
various acts of unprovoked aggression on a major scale, and
thus, while Polish Government had made every effort to avoid
serious clashes, German forces had deliberately attacked
Polish territory and
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 219
already caused deaths of numerous innocent civilians. Polish
Government had, therefore, no course but to break off
relations with German Government, and Polish Ambassador at
Berlin has asked for his passports.
3. His Excellency failed to see what measures could now
be taken to prevent European war, and while he did not say
so in so many words it is obvious that he hopes His
Majesty's Government will take some action of a military
character to relieve the pressure on this field of
operations.
4. M. Beck has also given me a categorical and official
denial that any Polish act of aggression occurred last night
as stated by Deutsches Nachrichten-Bro.
5. French Ambassador has suggested to me that French
and British wireless should repeatedly point out that
Germany has openly and flagrantly attacked Poland without
warning.
No. 113.
Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
Sir, Foreign Office,
September 1, 1939.
THE Polish Ambassador called to see me at his request
at 10:30 this morning. Count Raczynski said that he had been
officially informed from Paris that German forces had
crossed the frontier at four points. He added that the towns
of Vilno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Lodz, Katowice and Cracow
were being bombed and that at 9 a. m. an air attack had been
made on Warsaw, as a result of which there were many
civilian victims, including women and children. As regards
the German attack, he understood, although he had no
official information, that the points at the frontier which
had been crossed were near Danzig, in East Prussia and Upper
Silesia. His Excellency said that he had few words to add,
except that it was a plain case as provided for by the
treaty. I said that I had no doubt on the facts as he had
reported them that we should take the same view.
I am, etc.
HALIFAX.
220 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 114.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
Sir, Foreign Office,
September 1, 1939.
I ASKED the German Charge d'Affaires to call on me at
10, Downing Street at 10:50 this morning, and informed him
that I had done this because we had received a good many
reports to the effect that German forces had crossed the
Polish frontier at several points. Dr. Kordt interrupted me
to ask whether I meant the Polish frontier or that of the
Danzig Free State. I replied that the Polish Ambassador had
mentioned four points, but that I did not know which points
these were. We also had information that several Polish
towns, including Warsaw, had been bombed.
2. I asked Dr. Kordt whether he had any information
which would enable him to cast any light upon these reports.
He replied that he had no information whatsoever. I then
said that I assumed, therefore, that he had no communication
to make to us from his Government. Dr. Kordt replied that he
had none with the exception of two notes which he had sent
in earlier in the morning relating to the limitation of
shipping and of the passage of aircraft in the Gulf of
Danzig. Dr. Kordt explained that this related to the whole
gulf and not only to the port of Danzig. I informed Dr.
Kordt that I had not yet seen these notes.
3. I went on to inform Dr. Kordt that the reports to
which I had drawn his attention created a very serious
situation. It was not necessary for me to say anything more
at the present except to let him know that the Cabinet would
meet later in the morning and that any further communication
which we might have to make would be addressed to his
Government in Berlin, but we should inform him of the
character of that communication.
4. Before he left, Dr. Kordt stated that he had just
listened on the wireless to the beginning of the Fhrer's
speech in the Reichstag. He had not heard the latter mention
any of the points to which I have drawn attention. The
Fhrer had said, however, that the situation was intolerable
and that he was obliged to draw the necessary consequences.
5. Dr. Kordt subsequently telephoned at 11:30 a. m. to
say that he had received a telephone message from the News
Department in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the
effect that the
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 221
news that Warsaw and other towns were being bombed was
untrue. He also repeated to me a sentence from the Fhrer's
speech to the effect that since this morning shooting was
taking place from the Polish side, and the Germans were
shooting back.
I am, etc.
HALIFAX.
No. 115.
Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 8 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw,
September 2, 1939.
M. BECK requested French Ambassador and me to see him
to-day and points out while the Polish army was sternly
resisting the German attack it found itself much hampered by
German superiority in the air. It was possible for German
Air Force to throw whole of their weight on this front at
present, and he very discreetly suggested it was essential
that there should be some diversion as soon as possible in
the West.
2. He hoped, therefore, we would inform him as soon as
possible of entry of the two countries into the war and that
our aircraft would find it possible to draw off a
considerable proportion of German aircraft operating on this
front.
3. His Excellency also drew our attention to the fact
that German aircraft had not confined themselves strictly to
military objectives. They have bombed factories not engaged
in war work, villages not near military objectives, and have
caused severe losses among civilian population.
4. I trust I may be informed at the earliest possible
moment of our declaration of war and that our air force will
make every effort to show activity on western front with a
view to relieving pressure here.
No. 116.
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
September 2, 1939.
The Prime Minister: Sir Nevile Henderson was received
by Herr von Ribbentrop at half-past nine last night, and he
delivered
222 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
the warning message which was read to the House yesterday.
Herr von Ribbentrop replied that he must submit the
communication to the German Chancellor. Our Ambassador
declared his readiness to receive the Chancellor's reply. Up
to the present no reply has been received.
It may be that the delay is caused by consideration of
a proposal which, meanwhile, had been put forward by the
Italian Government, that hostilities should cease and that
there should then immediately be a conference between the
five Powers, Great Britain, France, Poland, Germany and
Italy. While appreciating the efforts of the Italian
Government, His Majesty's Government, for their part, would
find it impossible to take part in a conference while Poland
is being subjected to invasion, her towns are under
bombardment and Danzig is being made the subject of a
unilateral settlement by force. His Majesty's Government
will, as stated yesterday, be bound to take action unless
the German forces are withdrawn from Polish territory. They
are in communication with the French Government as to the
limit of time within which it would be necessary for the
British and French Governments to know whether the German
Government were prepared to effect such a withdrawal. If the
German Government should agree to withdraw their forces then
His Majesty's Government would be willing to regard the
position as being the same as it was before the German
forces crossed the Polish frontier. That is to say, the way
would be open to discussion between the German and Polish
Governments on the matters at issue between them, on the
understanding that the settlement arrived at was one that
safeguarded the vital interests of Poland and was secured by
an international guarantee. If the German and Polish
Governments wished that other Powers should be associated
with them in the discussion, His Majesty's Government for
their part would be willing to agree.
There is one other matter to which allusion should be
made in order that the present situation may be perfectly
clear. Yesterday Herr Forster who, on 23rd August, had, in
contravention of the Danzig constitution, become the head of
the State, decreed the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich
and the dissolution of the Constitution. Herr Hitler was
asked to give effect to this decree by German law. At a
meeting of the Reichstag yesterday morning
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 223
a law was passed for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich.
The international status of Danzig as a Free City is
established by a treaty of which His Majesty's Government
are a signatory, and the Free City was placed under the
protection of the League of Nations. The rights given to
Poland in Danzig by treaty are defined and confirmed by
agreement concluded between Danzig and Poland. The action
taken by the Danzig authorities and the Reichstag yesterday
is the final step in the unilateral repudiation of these
international instruments, which could only be modified by
negotiation. His Majesty's Government do not, therefore,
recognise either the validity of the grounds on which the
action of the Danzig authorities was based, the validity of
this action itself, or of the effect given to it by the
German Government.
Later in the debate, the Prime Minister said: I think
the House recognises that the Government is in a somewhat
difficult position. I suppose it always must be a difficulty
for allies who have to communicate with one another by
telephone to synchronise their thoughts and actions as
quickly as those who are in the same room; but I should be
horrified if the House thought for one moment that the
statement that I have made to them betrayed the slightest
weakening either of this Government or of the French
Government in the attitude which we have already taken up. I
am bound to say that I myself share the distrust which the
right hon. Gentleman expressed of manoeuvres of this kind. I
should have been very glad had it been possible for me to
say to the House now that the French Government and
ourselves were agreed to make the shortest possible limit to
the time when action should be taken by both of us.
It is very possible that the communications which we
have had with the French Government will receive a reply
from them in the course of the next few hours. I understand
that the French Cabinet is in session at this moment, and I
feel certain that I can make a statement to the House of a
definite character to-morrow when the House meets again. I
am the last man to neglect any opportunity which I consider
affords a serious chance of avoiding the great catastrophe
of war even at the last moment, but I confess that in the
present case I should have to be convinced of the good faith
of the other side in any action which they took before I
could regard the proposition which has been made as
224 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
one to which we could expect a reasonable chance of a
successful issue. I anticipate that there is only one answer
I shall be able to give to the House to-morrow. I hope that
the issue will be brought to a close at the earliest
possible moment so that we may know where we are, and I
trust that the House, realising the position which I have
tried to put before it, will believe me that I speak in
complete good faith and will not prolong the discussion
which, perhaps, might make our position more embarrassing
than it is.
No. 117.
Mr. Preston to Viscount Halifax.
(Telegraphic.) Kovno,
September 2, 1939.
FOLLOWING from M. Burckhardt:-
"I arrived here by car evening of 1st September.
From midnight 30th August until midnight 31st August I
was under surveillance of agents of Gestapo in Danzig.
On 1st September at 8 a. m. I was visited by Herr
Forster and Vice-President of Danzig Senate. Herr
Forster informed me that he considered my functions as
High Commissioner had terminated and that he intended
to fly Hakenkreuz from building of High Commission. If
I wished to leave before he did so I had better depart
within two hours. During these two hours I was
constantly visited by agents of Gestapo who endeavoured
to induce me to expedite my departure. I am remaining
at Kovno for the present intending to leave for
Geneva."
No. 118.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 3,
1939, 5 a. m.
PLEASE seek interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs
at 9 a. m. to-day, Sunday or, if he cannot see you then,
arrange to convey at that time to representative of German
Government the following communication:-
"In the communication which I had the honour to
make to
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 225
you on 1st September I informed you, on the
instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless the German
Government were prepared to give His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory
assurances that the German Government had suspended all
aggressive action against Poland and were prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish
territory, His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their
obligations to Poland.
"Although this communication was made more than
twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but
German attacks upon Poland have been continued and
intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform
you that, unless not later than 11 a. m., British
Summer Time, to-day 3rd September, satisfactory
assurances to the above effect have been given by the
German Government and have reached His Majesty's
Government in London, a state of war will exist between
the two countries as from that hour."
If the assurance referred to in the above communication
is received, you should inform me by any means at your
disposal before 11 a. m. to-day, 3rd September. If no such
assurance is received here by 11 a. m. , we shall inform the
German representative that a state of war exists as from
that hour.
No. 119.
Memorandum handed to Sir N. Henderson at 11:2O a. m. on
September 3, 1939, by Herr von Ribbentrop.
(Translation.)
THE German Government have received the British
Government's ultimatum of the 3rd September, 1939.* They
have the honour to reply as follows:-
1. The German Government and the German people refuse
to receive, accept, let alone to fulfil, demands in the
nature of ultimata made by the British Government.
2. On our eastern frontier there has for many months
already reigned a condition of war. Since the time when the
Versailles
*No. 118.
226 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Treaty first tore Germany to pieces, all and every peaceful
settlement was refused to all German Governments. The
National Socialist Government also has since the year 1933
tried again and again to remove by peaceful negotiations the
worst rapes and breaches of justice of this treaty. The
British Government have been among those who, by their
intransigent attitude, took the chief part in frustrating
every practical revision. Without the intervention of the
British Government-of this the German Government and German
people are fully conscious-a reasonable solution doing
justice to both sides would certainly have been found
between Germany and Poland. For Germany did not have the
intention nor had she raised the demands of annihilating
Poland. The Reich demanded only the revision of those
articles of the Versailles Treaty which already at the time
of the formulation of that Dictate had been described by
understanding statesmen of all nations as being in the long
run unbearable, and therefore impossible for a great nation
and also for the entire political and economic interests of
Eastern Europe. British statesmen, too, declared the
solution in the East which was then forced upon Germany as
containing the germ of future wars. To remove this danger
was the desire of all German Governments and especially the
intention of the new National Socialist People's Government.
The blame for having prevented this peaceful revision lies
with the British Cabinet policy.
3. The British Government have-an occurrence unique in
history-given the Polish State full powers for all actions
against Germany which that State might conceivably intend to
undertake. The British Government assured the Polish
Government of their military support in all circumstances,
should Germany defend herself against any provocation or
attack. Thereupon the Polish terror against the Germans
living in the territories which had been torn from Germany
immediately assumed unbearable proportions. The Free City of
Danzig was, in violation of all legal provisions, first
threatened with destruction economically and by measures of
customs policy, and was finally subjected to a military
blockade and its communications strangled. All these
violations of the Danzig Statute, which were well known to
the British Government, were approved and covered by the
blank cheque given to Poland. The German Government, though
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 227
moved by the sufferings of the German population which was
being tortured and treated in an inhuman manner,
nevertheless remained a patient onlooker for five months,
without undertaking even on one single occasion any similar
aggressive action against Poland. They only warned Poland
that these happenings would in the long run be unbearable,
and that they were determined, in the event of no other kind
of assistance being given to this population, to help them
themselves. All these happenings were known in every detail
to the British Government. It would have been easy for them
to use their great influence in Warsaw in order to exhort
those in power there to exercise justice and humaneness and
to keep to the existing obligations. The British Government
did not do this. On the contrary, in emphasising continually
their obligation to assist Poland under all circumstances,
they actually encouraged the Polish Government to continue
in their criminal attitude which was threatening the peace
of Europe. In this spirit, the British Government rejected
the proposal of Signor Mussolini, which might still have
been able to save the peace of Europe, in spite of the fact
that the German Government had declared their willingness to
agree to it. The British Government, therefore, bear the
responsibility for all the unhappiness and misery which have
now overtaken and are about to overtake many peoples.
4. After all efforts at finding and concluding a
peaceful solution had been rendered impossible by the
intransigence of the Polish Government covered as they were
by England, after the conditions resembling civil war, which
had existed already for months at the eastern frontier of
the Reich, had gradually developed into open attacks on
German territory, without the British Government raising any
objections, the German Government determined to put an end
to this continual threat, unbearable for a great Power, to
the external and finally also to the internal peace of the
German people, and to end it by those means which, since the
Democratic Governments had in effect sabotaged all other
possibilities of revision, alone remained at their disposal
for the defence of the peace, security and honour of the
Germans. The last attacks of the Poles threatening Reich
territory they answered with similar measures. The German
Government do not intend, on account of any sort of British
intentions or obli-
228 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
gations in the East, to tolerate conditions which are
identical with those conditions which we observe in
Palestine, which is under British protection. The German
people, however, above all do not intend to allow themselves
to be ill-treated by Poles.
5. The German Government, therefore, reject the
attempts to force Germany, by means of a demand having the
character of an ultimatum, to recall its forces which are
lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to accept
the old unrest and the old injustice. The threat that,
failing this, they will fight Germany in the war,
corresponds to the intention proclaimed for years past by
numerous British politicians. The German Government and the
German people have assured the English people countless
times how much they desire an understanding, indeed close
friendship, with them. If the British Government hitherto
always refused these offers and now answer them with an open
threat of war, it is not the fault of the German people and
of their Government, but exclusively the fault of the
British Cabinet or of those men who for years have been
preaching the destruction and extermination of the German
people. The German people and their Government do not, like
Great Britain, intend to dominate the world, but they are
determined to defend their own liberty, their independence
and above all their life. The intention, communicated to us
by order of the British Government by Mr. King-Hall, of
carrying the destruction of the German people even further
than was done through the Versailles Treaty is taken note of
by us, and we shall therefore answer any aggressive action
on the part of England with the same weapons and in the same
form.
No. 120.
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
September 3, 1939.
The Prime Minister: When I spoke last night to the
House I could not but be aware that in some parts of the
House there were doubts and some bewilderment as to whether
there had been any weakening, hesitation or vacillation on
the part of His
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 229
Majesty's Government. In the circumstances, I make no
reproach, for if I had been in the same position as hon.
members not sitting on this Bench and not in possession of
all the information which we have, I should very likely have
felt the same. The statement which I have to make this
morning will show that there were no grounds for doubt. We
were in consultation all day yesterday with the French
Government and we felt that the intensified action which the
Germans were taking against Poland allowed no delay in
making our own position clear. Accordingly, we decided to
send to our Ambassador in Berlin instructions which he was
to hand at 9 o'clock this morning to the German Foreign
Secretary and which read as follows:-
"Sir,
"In the communication which I had the honour to
make to you on the 1st September, I informed you, on
the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, that unless the German
Government were prepared to give His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory
assurances that the German Government had suspended all
aggressive action against Poland and were prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish
territory, His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their
obligations to Poland.
"Although this communication was made more than
twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but
German attacks upon Poland have been continued and
intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform
you that, unless not later than 11 a. m., British
Summer Time, to-day 3rd September, satisfactory
assurances to the above effect have been given by the
German Government and have reached His Majesty's
Government in London, a state of war will exist between
the two countries as from that hour."
That was the final Note. No such undertaking was
received by the time stipulated, and, consequently, this
country is at war with Germany. I am in a position to inform
the House that, according to arrangements made between the
British and French Governments, the French Ambassador in
Berlin is at this moment making a similar d‚marche,
accompanied also by a definite time
230 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
limit. The House has already been made aware of our plans.
As I said the other day, we are ready.
This is a sad day for all of us, and to none is it
sadder than to me. Everything that I have worked for,
everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have
believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.
There is only one thing left for me to do; that is, to
devote what strength and powers I have to forwarding the
victory of the cause for which we have to sacrifice so much.
I cannot tell what part I may be allowed to play myself; I
trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been
destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established.
No. 121.
Herr Hitler's Proclamations of September 3, 1939, to the
German People and the German Army.
(Translation.)
Appeal to the German People.
GREAT BRITAIN has for centuries pursued the aim of
rendering the peoples of Europe defenceless against the
British policy of world conquest by proclaiming a balance of
power, in which Great Britain claimed the right to attack on
threadbare pretexts and destroy that European State which at
the moment seemed most dangerous. Thus, at one time, she
fought the world power of Spain, later the Dutch, then the
French, and, since the year 1871, the German.
We ourselves have been witnesses of the policy of
encirclement which has been carried on by Great Britain
against Germany since before the war. Just as the German
nation had begun, under its National Socialist leadership,
to recover from the frightful consequences of the Diktat of
Versailles, and threatened to survive the crisis, the
British encirclement immediately began once more.
The British war inciters spread the lie before the War
that the battle was only against the House of Hohenzollern
or German militarism; that they had no designs on German
colonies; that they had no intention of taking the German
mercantile fleet. They then oppressed the German people
under the Versailles
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 231
Diktat the faithful fulfilment of which would have sooner or
later exterminated 20 million Germans.
I undertook to mobilise the resistance of the German
nation against this, and to assure work and bread for them.
But as the peaceful revision of the Versailles Diktat of
force seemed to be succeeding, and the German people again
began to live, the new British encirclement policy was
resumed. The same lying inciters appeared as in 1914. I have
many times offered Great Britain and the British people the
understanding and friendship of the German people. My whole
policy was based on the idea of this understanding. I have
always been repelled. I had for years been aware that the
aim of these war inciters had for long been to take Germany
by surprise at a favourable opportunity.
I am more firmly determined than ever to beat back this
attack. Germany shall not again capitulate. There is no
sense in sacrificing one life after another and submitting
to an even worse Versailles Diktat. We have never been a
nation of slaves and will not be one in the future. Whatever
Germans in the past had to sacrifice for the existence of
our realm, they shall not be greater than those which we are
to-day prepared to make.
This resolve is an inexorable one. It necessitates the
most thorough measures, and imposes on us one law above all
others: If the soldier is fighting at the front, no one
shall profit by the war. If the soldier falls at the front
no one at home shall evade his duty.
As long as the German people was united it has never
been conquered. It was the lack of unity in 1918 that led to
collapse. Whoever offends against this unity need expect
nothing else than annihilation as an enemy of the nation. If
our people fulfils its highest duty in this sense, that God
will help us who has always bestowed His mercy on him who
was determined to help himself.
Appeal to the German Army on the Western Front.
Soldiers of the Western Army; just as before the War,
so after the War Great Britain has pursued the policy of
Germany's encirclement. In spite of the fact that Germany
has no demands to make on any other State to the West of the
Reich; in spite of the fact that Germany claims no
territorial revision in this territory; and in spite of the
fact that Germany has made, above all
232 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
to Great Britain just as to France, the offer of a cordial
understanding, indeed of friendship. The British Government,
driven on by those warmongers whom we knew in the last War,
have resolved to let fall their mask and to proclaim war on
a threadbare pretext.
The German people and your comrades in the East now
expect from you, soldiers of the Western Front, that you
shall protect the frontiers of the Reich, unshakable as a
wall of steel and iron, against every attack, in an array of
fortifications which is a hundred times stronger than that
western front of the Great War, which was never conquered.
If you do your duty, the battle in the East will have
reached its successful conclusion in a few months, and then
the power of the whole National Socialist State stands
behind you. As an old soldier of the World War, and as your
Supreme Commander, I am going, with confidence in you, to
the Army on the East. Our plutocratic enemies will realise
that they are now dealing with a different Germany from that
of the year 1914.
(Signed ADOLF HITLER.)
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES.
Message from the President of the United States of America
to His Majesty the King of Italy of August 23, and His
Majesty's Reply of August 30, 1939.
No. 122.
From the President of the United States of America to the
King of Italy.
AGAIN a crisis in world affairs makes clear the
responsibility of heads of nations for the fate of their own
people, and, indeed, of humanity itself.
It is because of the traditional accord between Italy
and the United States and the ties of consanguinity between
the millions of our citizens that I feel I can address your
Majesty on behalf of the maintenance of world peace.
It is my belief, and that of the American people, that
your
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 233
Majesty and your Majesty's Government can greatly influence
the averting of an outbreak of war.
Any general war would cause to suffer all the nations,
whether belligerent or neutral, whether victors or
vanquished, and would clearly bring devastation to the
peoples and perhaps the Governments of some nations most
directly concerned.
The friends of the Italian people, and among them the
American people, could only regard with grief the
destruction of the great achievements which European nations
and the Italian nation in particular have attained in the
past generation.
We in America, having welded a homogeneous nation out
of many nationalities, often find it difficult to visualise
the animosities which so often have created a crisis among
nations of Europe which are smaller than ours in population
and territory, but we accept the fact that these nations
have an absolute right to maintain their national
independence if they so desire.
If that is a sound doctrine, then it must apply to the
weaker nations as well as the stronger. The acceptance of
this means peace, because fear of aggression ends.
The alternative, which means of necessity efforts by
the strong to dominate the weak, will lead not only to war
but to long future years of oppression on the part of the
victors and rebellion on the part of the vanquished-so
history teaches us.
On the 14th April last I suggested, in essence, an
understanding that no armed forces should attack or invade
the territory of any other independent nation, and that,
this being assured, discussions should be undertaken to seek
progressive relief from the burden of armaments and open the
avenue of international trade, including the sources of raw
materials necessary for the peaceful economic life of each
nation.
I said that in these discussions the United States
would gladly take part, and such peaceful conversations
would make it wholly possible for Governments other than the
United States to enter into peaceful discussions of the
political and territorial problems in which they are
directly concerned.
Were it possible for your Majesty's Government to
formulate proposals for a pacific solution of the present
crisis along these lines, you are assured of the earnest
sympathy of the United States.
The Governments of Italy and the United States can to-
day
234 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
advance those ideals of Christianity which of late seem so
often to have been obscured.
The unheard voices of countless millions of human
beings ask that they shall not be vainly sacrificed again.
No. 123.
From the King of Italy to the President of the United States
of America.
I am grateful for your interest. I immediately
transmitted your message to my Government. As is known to
all, we have done and are doing everything possible to bring
about peace with justice.
Messages sent by the President of the United States of
America to Herr Hitler and the President of Poland and
the reply of the President of Poland.
No. 124.
The following is the text of the message from President
Roosevelt to Herr Hitler of August 14, 1939:-
IN the message which I sent you on the 14th April, I
stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great
nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from
the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were
immediately made, with good will on all sides, to find a
peaceful and constructive solution to existing
controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting
must end in catastrophe. To-day that catastrophe appears to
be very near-at hand, indeed.
To the message which I sent you last April I have
received no reply, but because my confident belief that the
cause of world peace-which is the cause of humanity itself-
rises above all other considerations I am again addressing
myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and
the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.
I therefore urge with all earnestness-and I am likewise
urging the President of the Republic of Poland-that the
Govern-
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 235
ments of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to
refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable
stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common
accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between
them by one of the three following methods:-
First, by direct negotiation;
Second, by the submission of these controversies to an
impartial arbitration in which they can both have
confidence; or
Third, that they agree to the solution of these
controversies through the procedure of conciliation,
selecting as a conciliator or moderator a national of one of
the American Republics, which are all of them free from any
connexion with, or participation in, European political
affairs.
Both Poland and Germany being sovereign Governments, it
is understood, of course, that, upon resort to any one of
the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord
complete respect to the independence and territorial
integrity of the other.
The people of the United States are as one in their
opposition to policies of military conquest and domination.
They are as one in rejecting the thesis that any ruler or
any people possess the right to achieve their ends or
objectives through the taking of action which will plunge
countless of millions into war, and which will bring
distress and suffering to every nation of the world,
belligerent and neutral, when such ends and objectives, so
far as they are just and reasonable, can be satisfied
through the processes of peaceful negotiation or by resort
to judicial arbitration.
I appeal to you in the name of the people of the United
States, and I believe in the name of peace-loving men and
women everywhere, to agree to a solution of the
controversies existing between your Government and that of
Poland through the adoption of one of the alternative
methods I have proposed.
I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of
Germany and Poland be willing to solve their differences in
the peaceful manner suggested, the Government of the United
States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the
solution of the problems which are endangering world peace
in the form set forth in my message of the 14th April.
236 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 125.
The following is the text of the message from President
Roosevelt to the President of Poland of August 24, 1939:-
The manifest gravity of the existing crisis imposes the
urgent obligation upon all to examine every possible means
which might prevent the outbreak of a general war. With this
in mind I feel justified in suggesting that certain possible
avenues of solution be considered. [Mr. Roosevelt then
mentions the three methods described in his message to Herr
Hitler.]
Should you determine to attempt a solution by any of
these methods you are assured of the earnest and complete
sympathy of the United States and of their people. During
exploration of the avenues I appeal to you, as I have
likewise appealed to the Government of the German Reich, to
agree to refrain from any positive act of hostility.
It is, I think, well known to you that, speaking on
behalf of the United States, I have exerted, and will
continue to exert, every influence on behalf of peace. The
rank and file of the population of every nation-large and
small-want peace. They do not seek military conquest. They
recognise that disputes, claims and counter-claims will
always arise from time to time between nations, but that all
such controversies, without exception, can be solved by a
peaceful procedure, if the will on both sides exists so to
do.
No. 126.
The following is the text of the reply of August 25,
1939, to President Roosevelt from President Moscicki:-
I appreciate the noble message which your Excellency
has been kind enough to send me. I should like to emphasise
that the Polish Government have ever considered direct talks
between Governments to be the most suitable method of
resolving difficulties which may arise between States. We
consider that this method is all the more suitable where
neighbouring States are concerned. On the basis of these
principles Poland concluded
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 237
non-aggression pacts with Germany and Russia. We consider
also that the method of conciliation through the
intermediary of a disinterested and impartial third party is
a just method of resolving differences which have been
created between nations.
Although I clearly wish to avoid even the appearance of
desiring to profit by this occasion to raise points of
litigation, I deem it my duty, nevertheless, to make clear
that in the present crisis it is not Poland which is
formulating demands and demanding concessions of any other
State. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that Poland
should hold aloof from any action of this kind, direct or
indirect. I would like to close by expressing my ardent wish
that your message of peace may contribute to a general
appeasement which is so necessary to enable the nations once
more to regain the blessed path of progress and
civilisation.
No. 127.
The following is the text of President Roosevelt's
second appeal to Herr Hitler, dated August 25, 1939:-
I have this hour received from the President of Poland
a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency
and to him last night.
[The text of President Moscicki's reply is then given.
President Roosevelt continues as follows]:-
Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the
aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and
reasonable.
In his reply to my message the President of Poland has
made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon
the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the
controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland
and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of
conciliation.
Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may
still be restored that the nations of the modern world may
even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich
will agree to
238 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government
of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will
accept.
Broadcast Appeal by His Majesty the king of the Belgians in
the name of the Heads of States of the Oslo Group of
Powers on August 23, 1939, and Replies.
No. 128.
(Translation.) The Appeal.
THE declaration which I am about to read is being made
in the Palace of Brussels in the presence of the Foreign
Ministers of the Oslo Group of States and in the name of the
Heads of those States.
The world is living through a period of tension such
that there is a risk that all normal collaboration between
States will become impossible. The Great Powers are taking
measures almost equivalent to the mobilisation of their
armed forces. Have not the small Powers reason to fear that
they will be victims in a subsequent conflict into which
they will be dragged against their will in spite of their
policy of indisputable independence and of their firm desire
for neutrality? Are they not liable to become the subject of
arrangements reached without their having been consulted?
Even if hostilities do not begin, the world is menaced
by economic collapse. Mistrust and suspicion reign
everywhere. Beneath our very eyes the camps are forming,
armies are gathering and a fearful struggle is being
prepared in Europe. Is our continent to commit suicide in a
terrifying war at the end of which no nation could call
itself victor or vanquished, but in which the spiritual and
material values created by centuries of civilisation would
founder?
War psychosis is invading every home, and although
conscious of the unimaginable catastrophe which a
conflagration would mean for all mankind, public opinion
abandons itself more and more to the idea that we are
inevitably to be dragged into it. It is important to react
against so fatal a spirit of resignation.
There is no people-we assert it with confidence-which
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 239
would wish to send its children to death in order to take
away from other nations that right to existence which it
claims for itself.
It is true that all States do not have the same
interests, but are there any interests which cannot be
infinitely better reconciled before than after a war?
The consciousness of the world must be awakened. The
worst can still be avoided, but time is short. The sequence
of events may soon render all direct contact still more
difficult.
Let there be no mistake. We know that the right to live
must rest on a solid basis, and the peace that we desire is
the peace in which the rights of all nations shall be
respected. A lasting peace cannot be founded on force, but
only on a moral order.
Does not wisdom order us to withstand the war of words,
incitements and threats, and agree to discuss the problems
before us? We herewith solemnly express the wish that the
men who are responsible for the course of events should
agree to submit their disputes and their claims to open
negotiation carried out in a spirit of brotherly co-
operation.
It is for this reason that in the name of His Majesty
the King of Denmark, the President of the Republic of
Finland, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg,
His Majesty the King of Norway, Her Majesty the Queen of the
Netherlands, His Majesty the King of Sweden, and in my own
name, each of us, acting in agreement with our respective
Governments, issue this appeal. We express the hope that
other heads of States will join their voices to ours in this
same anxiety to maintain peace and safety for their peoples.
To-morrow hundreds of millions of men will be at one
with us in their wish to stop the course of events leading
to war. We can only hope that those in whose hands rests the
fate of the world will respond to these sentiments, give
effect to the desire which they have so often expressed that
the disputes which separate them shall be settled in peace,
and thereby avoid the catastrophe which threatens humanity.
240 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 129.
Reply of His Majesty's Government.
Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Clive (Brussels).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
August 24, 1939.
His Majesty's Government welcome and are in full
sympathy with the appeal issued by His Majesty the King of
the Belgians on behalf of representatives of the Oslo Group
of Powers assembled in conference at Brussels.
His Majesty's Government for their part have repeatedly
expressed their desire to see all questions arising between
nations settled by free negotiation, and they are at all
times willing to do their utmost to contribute to the
creation of conditions in which such negotiation might be
carried to a successful and satisfactory conclusion.
Acquiescence in the imposition of settlements by force
or threat of force can only hinder and thwart the efforts of
those who strive to establish an international order of
things in which peace may be maintained and justice done
without violating the rights or independence of any
sovereign State.
No. 130.
Translation of the reply of the French Government of August
26, 1939.
The noble and generous appeal put forward by His
Majesty the King of the Belgians in the name of the
representatives of the Oslo Group of States assembled at
Brussels has been welcomed by the French Government with the
deepest sympathy. The contributions which France has made at
all times to the cause of peace and her constant
preoccupation to see peaceful methods set up for the
settlement of all the problems which arise between peoples
leaves no room for doubt as to the general views of the
French Government. They remain ready to associate themselves
with any initiative the object of which is to create an
atmosphere
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 241
favourable to a lessening in international tension. While
resolved to accept no solution imposed by violence or
threats, they believe that by their attitude they are
contributing to the maintenance of peace and at the same
time to the establishment in Europe and in the world of
conditions assuring all States that their independence will
be guaranteed and their most sacred rights respected.
No. 131.
President Roosevelt's reply of August 25, 1939.
I have read with great satisfaction Your Majesty's
proclamation of the 23rd August, and your appeal for the
maintenance of peace made in the name of the Oslo group of
Powers. Your Majesty expressed the hope that other Heads of
States might join their voices with yours in the same desire
to preserve peace and safety for their peoples. I take this
opportunity to assure you that the people of the United
States and their Government cordially share the hopes and
aspirations so eloquently expressed by Your Majesty.
No. 132.
Translation of the Polish reply of August 25, 1939.
I have noted the noble speech of Your Majesty with
profound admiration for the ideas which you have expressed.
Poland has always defended the idea that power, if it is to
last, cannot be based on the oppression of others.
Similarly, Poland has always considered the best guarantee
of peace to be the settlement of international disputes by
the method of direct negotiations based on justice and
respect for the rights and interests of those concerned.
242 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
No. 133
His Holiness The Pope's reply.
In his reply, which was in the form of an autograph
letter, Pope Pius XII conveyed his gratitude to the King of
the Belgians and expressed his sincere hope that the
sentiments expressed by the King of the Belgians would be
favourably received by the parties concerned.
Joint Offer of Mediation by His Majesty the King of the
Belgians and Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands
and Replies.
No. 134.
Sir R. Clive to Viscount Halifax (received 11:30 p. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Brussels,
August 28, 1939.
I HAVE just been to see Prime Minister, who tells me he
had also convoked French, German and Italian Ambassadors and
Polish Minister for the following purpose:-
The King of the Belgians and the Queen of Holland wish
jointly to offer their good offices in the hope of averting
war.
Similar communication was being made at The Hague to
the same five representatives.
I promised to telephone immediately to your Lordship.
No. 135.
Reply of His Majesty's Government.
Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Clive (Brussels) and Sir N. Bland
(The Hague).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 31,
1939, 3:30 p. m.
YOUR telegram of 28th August: Initiative of Belgian and
Netherlands Sovereigns.
Please inform Belgian/Netherlands Government that His
Majesty's Government have received with pleasure the
intimation that the King of the Belgians and the Queen of
the Netherlands
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 243
wish jointly to offer their good offices in the interests of
moderation in the present crisis, and in the hope of
averting war. His Majesty's Government welcome this offer on
the part of the two Sovereigns, and will be glad to take
advantage of it should the occasion present itself.
Meanwhile, they deeply appreciate the intentions which have
prompted this initiative.
No. 136.
Reply of the French Government.
In their reply the French Government welcomed with the
greatest interest the offer of their good offices made by
the two Sovereigns. For their part they were ready to
support this initiative in any way possible and they
sincerely wished it every success.
No. 137.
Translation of communiqu‚ recording reply of Italian
Government.
"The Italian Government have taken careful note of the
offer of their good offices made by Their Majesties the
Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians. They
deeply appreciate this initiative and request the Belgian
Government to transmit on their behalf to the two Sovereigns
their sincere gratitude."
No. 138.
Reply of the Polish Government.
In their reply the Polish Government referred to the
telegram from President Moscicki to President Roosevelt, in
which the principle of mediation had already been accepted
by Poland. The Polish Government further expressed their
approval of the initiative taken by the two Sovereigns. They
also emphasised that they were not for the moment prepared
to make any more detailed
244 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
statement, since none of the proposals of a similar nature
had hitherto called forth any favourable response from the
German Government.
Broadcast Appeal for Peace by His Holiness the Pope, August
24, 1939, and the Reply of His Majesty's Government.
No. 139.
The Appeal.
(Translation.)
ONCE again a critical hour strikes for the great human
family; an hour of tremendous deliberations, towards which
our heart cannot be indifferent and from which our spiritual
authority, which comes to us from God to lead souls in the
ways of justice and of peace must not hold itself aloof.
Behold us then with all of you, who in this moment are
carrying the burden of so great a responsibility, in order
that through our voice you may hear the voice of that Christ
from Whom the world received the most exalted example of
living, and in whom millions and millions of souls repose
their trust in a crisis in which His word alone is capable
of mastering all the tumultuous disturbances of the earth.
Behold us with you, leaders of peoples, men of State
and men of arms, writers, orators of the radio and of the
public rostrum and all those others who have the power to
influence the thought and action of their fellow-men for
whose destiny they are responsible.
We, armed only with the word of Truth and standing
above all public disputes and passions, speak to you in the
name of God from "Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is
named"-in the name of Jesus Christ, Our Lord, who desired
that all men be brothers-in the name of the Holy Ghost, Gift
of God most High, inexhaustible source of love in the hearts
of men.
To-day, notwithstanding our repeated exhortations and
our very particular interest, the fear of bloody
international conflict becomes more excruciating; to-day,
when the tension of minds seems to have arrived at such a
pass as to make the outbreak of
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 245
the awful scourge of war appear imminent, we direct with
paternal feeling a new and more heartfelt appeal to those in
power and to their peoples: to the former that, laying aside
accusations, threats, causes of mutual distrust, they may
attempt to resolve their present differences with the sole
means suitable thereto, namely, by reciprocal and trusting
agreements; to the latter that in calm tranquillity, without
disordered agitation they may encourage the peaceful efforts
of those who govern them.
It is by force of reason and not by force of arms that
Justice makes progress; and empires which are not founded on
Justice are not blessed by God. Statesmanship emancipated
from morality betrays those very ones who would have it so.
The danger is imminent but there is yet time.
Nothing is lost with peace; all may be with war. Let
men return to mutual understanding. Let them begin
negotiations anew. Conferring with goodwill and with respect
for reciprocal rights they will find that to sincere and
conscientious negotiators, an honourable solution is never
precluded.
They will feel a sense of greatness-in the true sense
of the word-if by silencing the voices of passion, be it
collective or private, and by leaving to reason its rightful
rule, they will have spared the blood of their fellow men
and saved their country from ruin.
May the Almighty grant that the voice of this Father of
the Christian family, of this Servant of servants, who bears
amongst men, unworthily, indeed, but nevertheless really,
the person, the voice and the authority of Jesus Christ,
find in the minds and in the hearts of men a ready and
willing reception.
May the strong hear us that they may not become weak
through injustice, may the powerful hear us if they desire
that their power be not a destruction but rather a
protection for their peoples and a safeguard to tranquillity
in public order and in labour.
We beseech them by the blood of Christ, whose
conquering force in the world was His mildness in life and
in death. And beseeching them we know and we feel that we
have with us all those who are upright of heart; all those
who hunger and thirst after justice all those who already
suffer every sorrow through the evils of life. We have with
us the heart of mothers which
246 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
beats as one with ours; the fathers who would be obliged to
abandon their families; the lowly who labour and do not
understand; the innocent upon whom weighs heavily the awful
threat; the young men, generous knights of the purest and
noblest ideals. And with us also is the soul of this ancient
Europe which was the product of the faith and of Christian
genius. With us all humanity seeks justice, bread, freedom;
not steel which kills and destroys. With us that Christ, Who
has made His one solemn commandment-Love of One's Brother-
the very substance of His religion and the promise of
salvation for individuals and for nations.
Recalling finally that human efforts are of no avail
without Divine assistance, we invite all to raise their eyes
to Heaven and to beseech the Lord with fervent prayer that
His divine grace descend in abundance upon this world in its
upheaval, placate dissensions, reconcile hearts and evoke
the resplendent dawn of a more serene future.
To this end and with this hope we impart to all, from
the heart, our paternal Benediction.
No. 140.
Viscount Halifax to Mr. Osborne (Holy See).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 25,
1939, 5:15 p. m.
PLEASE inform the Cardinal Secretary of State, or if it
is practicable the Pope himself, that His Majesty's
Government have much appreciated the moving and dignified
appeal for peace which His Holiness broadcast to the world
last night.
2. In my own broadcast yesterday evening I referred to
the Pope's message, but I should wish His Holiness to know
in a more direct manner of the response which his words have
evoked in the hearts and minds not only of His Majesty's
Government, but of the people of this country as a whole.
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 247
Further Appeal by His Holiness the Pope and action by His
Majesty's Government.
No. 141.
Mr. Osborne to Viscount Halifax (received 3:45 p. m.)
(Telegraphic.) Holy See,
August 31, 1939.
CARDINAL SECRETARY of State has just handed me a note
of which the following is a translation:-
"The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that
pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific
solution such as the whole world continues to pray for.
"His Holiness therefore, in the name of God,
beseeches the German and Polish Governments to do all
that is in their power to avoid any incident and to
abstain from taking any step that might aggravate the
present tension.
"His Holiness begs the British, French and Italian
Governments to support his appeal."
Copies of the above were also handed to the Ambassadors
of Germany, Poland, France and Italy. His Eminence also gave
a copy to the Spanish Ambassador and is causing a copy to be
conveyed to the United States Ambassador to the Quirinal.
No. 142.
Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) and Sir H.
Kennard (Warsaw).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 31,
1939, 10 p. m.
PLEASE make following communication to German/Polish
Government:-
"His Majesty's Government have been informed of
the Pope's appeal to your Government to do all that is
in their power to avoid any incident and to abstain
from taking any step that might aggravate the present
tension.
248 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
"His Majesty's Government desire to support this
appeal with all the earnestness at their command."
Similar instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador
at Warsaw/Berlin.
No. 143
Efforts by the Italian Government.
Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax (received 3 a. m.,
September 5).
(Telegraphic) Rome,
September 4, 1939.
Following is translation of Stefani* communiqu‚ issued
to-night:-
"In view of aggravation of European situation on
31st August, Duce, while realising exceptional
difficulties which then made pacific solution extremely
problematic, wished to make final attempt to save
European peace. With this object English and French
Governments were informed that Duce, if he could have
previous certainty of Franco-British adhesion and
Polish participation assured by action in London and
Paris, would have been able to summon an international
conference for 5th September with object of reviewing
clauses of Treaty of Versailles which are cause of
present disturbance in life of Europe. Italian
Government did not fail to emphasise necessity of
extreme urgency of replying, but French and English
Governments were not able to convey their answer until
next day, 1st September. In the meantime, in night
between 31st August and 1st September frontier
incidents occurred which led Fhrer to initiate
military operations against Poland. Replies reaching
Italian Government being favourable in principle both
on French and English side and great interest having
been shown on French side despite military clash which
had already taken place between Germany and Poland in a
possible development of initiative of Duce, Italian
Government on morning of 2nd September at 10 o'clock
informed Chancellor Hitler … titre d'information that
* The official Italian news agency.
ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BY OTHER STATES 249
there was still possibility of summoning conference,
preceded by armistice conference, which would have been
designed to solve German-Polish conflict by peaceful
means. Hitler replied to Duce, through our Ambassador
to Berlin, that he did not reject … priori possibility
of conference. He wished, however, to know by way of
preliminary (a) if notes presented by French and
British at Berlin had character of ultimatum, in which
case negotiation would be useless; and (b) if he could
count on a period of twenty-four hours to mature and
take his decision on matter. Italian Government,
getting again into contact with Governments of London
and Paris at 2 p. m. on 2nd September, informed them of
Fhrer's request. In late evening reply came from
London and Paris affirmative [sic] * as regards two
requests above, but adding that France and England, in
view of new fact which had occurred between 31st August
and 2nd September, viz., occupation of Polish territory
by German forces, laid down as fundamental condition
for participation in international conference
evacuation of occupied territories. In these
circumstances, Italian Government confined themselves
again to informing Fhrer of this condition, adding
that, unless German Government were of contrary
opinion, they did not think they could take further
action."
THE PRIME MINISTER'S BROADCAST TALK TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE ON
SEPTEMBER 4, 1939.
No. 144
GERMAN PEOPLE.-Your country and mine are now at war.
Your Government has bombed and invaded the free and
independent State of Poland, which this country is in honour
bound to defend. Because your troops were not withdrawn in
response to the Note which the British Government addressed
to the German Government, war has followed.
With the horrors of war we are familiar. God knows this
* See Nos. 109, 110 and 116. The communication from His
Majesty's Government was in the nature of a warning and was
not to be considered as an ultimatum. The Italian Government
were so informed.
250 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
country has done everything possible to prevent this
calamity. But now that the invasion of Poland by Germany has
taken place, it has become inevitable.
You are told by your Government that you are fighting
because Poland rejected your Leader's offer and resorted to
force. What are the facts? The so-called "offer" was made to
the Polish Ambassador in Berlin on Thursday evening, two
hours before the announcement by your Government that it had
been "rejected." So far from having been rejected, there had
been no time even to consider it.
Your Government had previously demanded that a Polish
representative should be sent to Berlin within twenty-four
hours to conclude an agreement. At that time the 16 Points
subsequently put forward had not even been communicated to
the Polish Government. The Polish representative was
expected to arrive within a fixed time to sign an agreement
which he had not even seen. This is not negotiation. This is
a dictate. To such methods no self-respecting and powerful
State could assent. Negotiations on a free and equal basis
might well have settled the matter in dispute.
You may ask why Great Britain is concerned. We are
concerned because we gave our word of honour to defend
Poland against aggression. Why did we feel it necessary to
pledge ourselves to defend this Eastern Power when our
interests lie in the West, and when your Leader has said he
has no interest to the West? The answer is-and I regret to
have to say it-that nobody in this country any longer places
any trust in your Leader's word.
He gave his word that he would respect the Locarno
Treaty; he broke it. He gave his word that he neither wished
nor intended to annex Austria; he broke it. He declared that
he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so.
He gave his word after Munich that he had no further
territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He gave his word
that he wanted no Polish provinces; he broke it. He has
sworn to you for years that he was the mortal enemy of
Bolshevism; he is now its ally.
Can you wonder his word is, for us, not worth the paper
it is written on?
PRIME MINISTER TO GERMAN PEOPLE 251
The German-Soviet Pact was a cynical volte face,
designed to shatter the Peace Front against aggression. This
gamble failed. The Peace Front stands firm. Your Leader is
now sacrificing you, the German people, to the still more
monstrous gamble of a war to extricate himself from the
impossible position into which he has led himself and you.
In this war we are not fighting against you, the German
people, for whom we have no bitter feeling, but against a
tyrannous and forsworn regime which has betrayed not only
its own people but the whole of Western civilisation and all
that you and we hold dear.
May God defend the right!
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