The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know
exactly what your letter means, the one received from you
relating to the following documents which the letter says
have been withdrawn. What I want to know is, does it mean
that they are not to be translated? Let me read you the
numbers: 18, 19, 48,53, 76, 80, 81, 86, and 101. Now, does
your letter mean that those documents are not to be

DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British
Delegation informed me yesterday morning that the objections
against those documents on the part of the British
Delegation are withdrawn.


DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on the 30th of April,
in the afternoon, after I had had a conversation with Sir
David. The following morning I was informed -

THE PRESIDENT: We won't bother with that. You say that their
objections no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to
have been some misunderstanding about three of them, 80,
101, and 76. The others were not objected to.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be
some misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I
understood that he did not want to persist in the legal
report on the Altmark incident, and I think Dr. Siemers
thought that I wasn't persisting. However, I thought Dr.
Siemers was withdrawing that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is
not withdrawn, my Lord. However, the other ones in the list
your Lordship mentioned - that is 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, and 86
- there is no objection to.


DR . SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir
David, it can be struck out, as far as I am concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That's all I wanted to know.

DR. SIEMERS: No. 80 about which I have spoken in detail with
the British Delegation -

THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.

DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would
like to ask that it be admitted in any case.

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the
Translation Division should get on as soon as possible, the
Tribunal has decided upon these documents, and the only
question upon which the Tribunal has decided is that they
shall be translated. The question of their admissibility
will be decided after they have been translated, and I will
take them in the categories of objection which are set out
in Sir David's memorandum.

In category A, the first category, No. 66 will be allowed.
No. 76, as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. 101 to 106
will be allowed, the rest are disallowed in "A." In "B" the
following documents will be allowed: 39, 63, 64, 99 and 100.
And, of course, 102 to 107, which are allowed under "A." The
rest will not be allowed.

Category C: The following will be allowed: 38, 50,55 and 58.
The remainder are not allowed.

Category D: The following will be allowed: 29, 56, 57, 60,
and 62.

Category E: The following will be allowed: 31, 32, 36, 37,
39, 41 and, of course, 99 and 101, which have already been

In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very
great doubts as to the relevance of any of the documents in
that category, but it will have them all translated, with
the exception of Document 73.

LT.-COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the
Tribunal would allow me, to mention the document numbers of
the additional extracts from Der Sturmer, which were put in
during the cross-examination of Streicher. I have the
numbers ready to present at a convenient time.

THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?


THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them?

LT. - COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the
Tribunal, I have proposed to hand in that schedule, which is
in effect a catalogue or index to the two bundles which the
Tribunal had - Bundle A and Bundle B - and I proposed then
putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself, which will
become GB 450, and if the Tribunal agrees, that would save
reading any numbers out.


LT.-COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would
make. The original of the newspaper, Israelitisches
Wochenblatt, was put in, or has been put in. Those volumes I
have borrowed from a library, and I was going to ask the
Tribunal's permission to have the extracts photographed and
substitute, with the Tribunal's secretariat, the photostats
and take back the originals so that they might be returned.

THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.

LT.-COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.

THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?

DR. MARX (Counsel for defendant Streicher): No, Mr.
President, I have no objection to that. I reserved the right
to submit some counter documents, if it should be necessary.
But the presentation of these documents is in accordance
with what Lt.-Col. Griffith-Jones stated in the course of
the proceedings ... are submitted ...

THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this

DR. MARX: Yes.

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THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection
to the original of the Jewish newspaper being returned -


THE PRESIDENT: - after it is photographed.

DR: MARX: No, I have no objection to that.


LT.-COL. GRIFFITH -JONES: I am very much obliged.


The defendant Schacht resumed the witness-stand and
testified further as follows:



Q. Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your
answer to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you
the point that different memoranda, letters, etc., from you
to Hitler were full of National Socialist phraseology. I
said you dealt with letters and memoranda from the date of
the seizure of power until later when you went into
opposition. The prosecution, however, specifically in the
oral presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred
to at least one letter which you addressed to Hitler before
the seizure of power in November, 1932, and there is in the
files another letter of similar contents of August, 1932. I
think you should state your position with respect to these
two letters, supplementing your answer to my question.

A. I explained to you yesterday that up to the decisive
election of July, 1932, I had in no way intervened in the
development of the National Socialist movement, but remained
completely aloof from it. After that movement achieved its
overpowering success in July, 1932, of which I spoke
yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the development which
would result. According to the principles of the democratic
political concept there was only one possibility, namely,
that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now
have to undertake the forming of the government. The other
theoretical possibility of a military government and a
possibly resulting civil war, I rejected from the first, as
being impossible and incompatible with my principles.

Therefore, after I had recognized these facts, I endeavoured
in everything to gain influence over Hitler and his
movement, and the two letters which you have just mentioned
were written in that spirit.

Q. Now, we come to the territorial acquisitions of Hitler.
What did you know about Hitler's plans against Austria?

A. I have never known anything about plans against Austria.
Nor did I know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I
knew only that, like the majority of all Germans, he was in
favour of an Anschluss of Austria with Germany.

Q. What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia?

A. I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia, until
about the time of the Munich Conference.

Q. Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say,
after the peaceful, so far peaceful, settlement of the
Sudeten question, hear a remark of Hitler's about Munich
which was of importance in your later attitude toward
Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal about the remark which
you heard?

A. May I say firstly that, according to my knowledge of
conditions at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more
than he had ever expected. According to my information - and
I expressed this also in the conversation with Ambassador
Bullitt at that time - it was Hitler's purpose to gain
autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich the
Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German
territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that

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Hitler's ambition would be more than satisfied, and I can
only say that I was surprised and shocked when a few days
after Munich, I saw Hitler. I had no further conversation
with him at that time, but I met him with his entourage,
mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the
SS men, I could only catch the remark: "That fellow has
spoiled my entry into Prague." That is to say, made it

Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which
he had achieved in foreign politics, but, as I mentioned
when I spoke about it yesterday, I assumed from that remark,
that he regretted the loss of the glory and glamour of a
dramatic staging.

Q. And what were your feelings in regard to your whole
political attitude toward Hitler after Munich?

A. In spite of the foreign political success, I regretted
very deeply, and so did my close friends, that, by this
intervention on the part of the Allied Powers, our attempt
to remove the Hitler regime was ruined for a long time to
come-we did not know at that time, of course, what would
happen in the future - but, naturally, at that moment, we
had to resign ourselves to the fact.

Q. What did you know about Hitler's plans against Memel?

A. I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it.
As far as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by
Germany on my trip to India, which I had already started at
that time.

Q. And since you were in India at that time, you, of course,
heard nothing either about the negotiations, etc., which
preceded the attack on Poland?

A. I had no knowledge about that, and therefore I also knew
nothing of the May meeting of 1939, which has been discussed
several times. In the beginning of March, I left Berlin, and
then stayed for some time in Switzerland; at the end of
March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I learned
nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is, the
establishment of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of
Memel, nor of Poland, since I did not return from India
until the beginning of August.

Q. The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark
have been taken up here. Did you approve these measures and

A. Under no circumstances.

Q. Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere,
and how?

A. Before the invasion of Belgium, I was visited on the
order of the Chief of the General Staff, Haider, by the
Quartermaster-General, the then Colonel, later General,
Wagner, who, after the collapse, committed suicide. He
informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was
shocked, and I replied at that time:

  "If you want to commit that insanity too, then you are
  beyond help."


THE WITNESS: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it
was, I could not say. It may have been in November, 1939. It
may have been in April, 1940. I no longer know exactly when
it was.


Q. Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany
was after all engaged in a life and death struggle; did not
that cause you to put your active co-operation at their
disposal, since you were still Minister without portfolio,
though no longer held a special office?

A. I did not do that.

Q. Did anyone ask you to do that?

A. The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster-
General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff
Haider, was intended to persuade me to act in Germany's
interests during the expected occupation of Belgium. I was
to supervise and direct currency, finance and banking
matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was
approached again by the then military governor

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of Belgium, General von Falkenhausen, for advice concerning
the Belgian financial administration. I again refused to
give advice and did not make any statements or participate
in any way.

Q. When did you for the first time -

A. I could, perhaps, relate another instance when I was
approached. One day, shortly after America was drawn into
the war, I received a request from the newspaper published
by Goebbels, that, on account of my knowledge of American
conditions, I should write an article for das Reich, to
assure the German people that the war potential of the
United States should not be overestimated. I refused to
write that article for the reason that precisely because I
knew American conditions very well, my statement could only
amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused in this
instance also.

Q. When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which
we call here simply the Hoszbach meeting, or the meeting
concerning the Hoszbach protocol?

A. To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on
20th, October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely
astonished that during all previous interrogations I had
never been asked about this record, because it can be seen
clearly from it that the Reich Government was not to be
informed of Hitler's intentions for war, and therefore could
not know anything about them.

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