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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: "Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk
of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other
means. For that reason the German Government issues a fresh
and most urgent warning against sailing in the danger zone."

At the end of the note, the German Government refuses to
assume any responsibility for damage or loss incurred in
this area.

I reproduce as the next document, on Page 214, with the new
exhibit number Donitz 105, an official German statement made
on the occasion of the announcement of the total blockade on
17th August, 1940. I only want to mention it.

I now come to several documents dealing with the treatment
of neutrals outside the declared danger zones. As the first
document I submit - on Page 226, an excerpt of the
prosecution's Exhibit GB 196. It is a standing war order
from the Commander-in-Chief U-boats which was also issued
before May, 1940. I read the first sentences:

  "Not to be sunk are:
  
  (a) All ships readily recognized as neutral so long as
  they do not (1) move in an enemy convoy, (2) move into a
  declared danger zone."

                                                  [Page 320]

The next Document, Donitz 760, Page 227, shows the concern
of the Naval War Command that the neutrals should really be
recognizable as such. I read the first sentences of the
entry of 10th January, 1942:

  "In view of the further extension of the war, the Naval
  War Command has asked the Foreign Office to point out
  again to the neutral seafaring nations, with the
  exception of Sweden, the necessity of carefully marking
  their ships in order that they shall not be mistaken for
  enemy ships."

The next Document, Donitz 770, on Page 228, is an entry
dated 24th June, 1942, from the War Diary of the Flag
Officer U-boats:

  "All commanders will again be given detailed instructions
  as to their conduct towards neutrals."

I have already submitted Donitz 178 - excuse me, it has not
been submitted. Donitz 78, Page 229, contains examples of
the consideration which the Commander-in-Chief U-boats
showed to neutrals. The entry Of 23rd November, 1942, shows
that a submarine was ordered to leave one area solely
because there was a great deal of neutral traffic in that
area. The second entry of December, 1942 specifies that a
Portuguese naval tanker had to be treated in accordance with
directives; in other words, allowed to proceed.

On page 230 there is a document which I have already
mentioned. It contains an account of court martial
proceedings taken against a commanding officer who had
torpedoed a neutral by mistake.

The next document, Donitz 79, Page 231, is an order
decreeing the treatment of neutrals which remained in force
up to the end of the war. I do not think I have to read it.
It again stresses the necessity of neutral ships being
easily recognizable as such and refers to shipping
agreements which have been made with a number of countries,
such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date of it? You said -

DR. KRANZBUHLER: 1st August, 1944, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: That's on the original -

DR. KRANZBUHLER: The original date was 1st April, 1943. The
order was revised on 1st August, 1944, on the basis of the
revisions necessitated by the shipping agreements.

So far I have dealt with the general principles which have
been attacked by the prosecution's Exhibits 191 and GB 224.
Now I should like to submit several documents on individual
points contained in the prosecution's Exhibit GB 19l.
Mention is made there of a speech by Adolf Hitler ending
with the words:

  "Every ship, with or without escort, which comes within
  range of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed."

I now wish to present as Donitz 80, on Page 232, an excerpt
from that speech. It shows in that connection that the
Fuehrer's statement only applied to ships carrying war
materials to England.

I now come to two examples mentioned in Exhibit GB 191 as
characteristic examples of illegal German naval warfare. The
first is the case of the Danish steamer Vendia. The
prosecution's document says -

"On 30th September, 1939, the first sinking of a neutral
ship by a submarine took place without a warning signal
having been given. On that occasion some people lost their
lives. The ship was the Danish steamer Vendia."

With reference to this, I am submitting Donitz 83, Page 235.
That is the War Log of Submarine U-3, which sank the Vendia.
I should like to read parts of it on account of its
importance. I begin with the second sentence:

  "The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed.
  The boat comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to
  escape.
  
  The steamer is clearly recognizable as the Danish steamer
  Vendia.
  
  Boat reduces speed and uncovers her machine-gun.
  
                                                  [Page 321]
  
  Several warning shots are fired across the steamer's bow.
  Thereupon the steamer stops very slowly; nothing more
  happens for a while. Then some more shots are fired. The
  Vendia lies into the wind.
  
  For ten minutes nothing is visible on deck to remove
  suspicion of possible intended resistance, at 11.24 hours
  I suddenly see bow waves and screw movements. The steamer
  swings sharply round toward the boat. The officer on
  watch and the first mate agree with my view that this is
  an attempt at ramming. For this reason I turn in the same
  angle as the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 seconds
  later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear
  of stern. The stem is torn off and goes down. The front
  part remains afloat.
  
  By risking the loss of our own crew and boat (heavy sea
  and numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the
  Danish crew are rescued, among them the captain and
  helmsman. No further survivors can be seen. In the
  meantime, the Danish steamer Sawa approaches and is
  stopped. She is requested to send her papers across in a
  boat. She is carrying a mixed cargo from Amsterdam to
  Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred to
  the steamer for repatriation."

I read the second last sentence on the next page

  "After the crew of the steamer had been handed over, it
  was learned that the engineer artificer of the steamer
  had told the stoker Blank that the captain had intended
  to ram the submarine."

The document on page 237, an excerpt from the prosecution's
Exhibit GB 82, shows that the Vendia case formed the subject
of a protest by the German Government to the Danish
Government.

I shall deal now with the sinking of the City of Benares on
18th September, 1940. In this connection I should like first
to read several sentences from the prosecution's document,
because, in my opinion, it is characteristic of the
probative value of the entire Exhibit GB 191. I read from
the British Document Book, Page 23, starting at the passage
where the prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will
remember that the City of Benares had children on board. The
Foreign Office report says here:-

  "The captain of the U-boat presumably did not know that
  there were children on board the City of Benares when he
  fired the torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the
  name of the ship, although there the evidence suggests
  strongly that he had been dogging her for several hours
  before torpedoing her. He must have known, however, that
  this was a large merchant ship, probably with civilian
  passengers on board, and certainly with a crew of
  merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and he
  knew that they were six hundred miles from land, and yet
  he followed them outside the blockade area and
  deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until
  after nightfall when the chances of rescue would be
  enormously reduced."

The next document I submit is Donitz 84, Page 238, the War
Diary of U-boat 48, which sank the City of Benares. I read
the entry of 17th September, 1940:-

  "Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees,
  speed seven nautical miles. Contact maintained, since
  underwater attack is no longer possible because of the
  heavy swell. No escort can be seen with the convoy."

I will summarize the entry of 18th September, 1940.

It describes the firing of a torpedo on a ship belonging to
that convoy - the City of Benares.

A few minutes later, at 0007 hours, the submarine attacked a
second ship in the convoy, the British steamer Marina. Both
ships send wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the
submarine again has an artillery combat with a tanker from
the convoy. That is the true story of the City of Benares.

I reproduce the prosecution's Exhibit GB 192 again on Page
240. It concerns the sinking of the Sheaf Mead. In this
connection I should like to point out that that ship was
heavily armed, and that it probably was no merchant vessel,
but a submarine trap.

                                                  [Page 322]

Prosecution's Exhibit GB 195, which was dealt with in
yesterday's hearing, contains an order issued by the Fuehrer
in July, 1941, concerning attacks on United States merchant
vessels in the blockade zone which had been declared around
England. On the basis of this document, the prosecution
charges Donitz with conducting a cynical and opportunistic
warfare against neutrals. My next document is Di5nitz 86,
Page 43. It shows the efforts -

THE PRESIDENT: Was it not 243?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: 243, Mr. President. I beg your pardon. It
shows the efforts which were made to avoid a conflict with
the United States. I read the entry dated 5th March, 1940,
from the War Diary of the Naval War Command (SKL):-

  "With reference to the conduct of economic warfare,
  orders are given to the Naval Forces that US ships are
  not to be stopped, seized or sunk. The reason is the
  assurance given by the Commander-in-Chief to the American
  Naval Attache, whom he received on 20th February, that
  German submarines had orders not to stop any American
  ships whatsoever. All possibility of difficulties arising
  between the USA and Germany as a result of economic
  warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the start."

This order means, therefore, that illegal measures were
renounced.

The next document, Donitz 87, Page 244, shows the practical
recognition of the American zone of neutrality. It reads:-

  "4th April, 1941.
  
  The following WIT message is directed to all ships at
  sea:-
  
  American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south
  of 20 degrees North only at a distance of 300 nautical
  miles from the coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the
  hitherto existing limitation will for the time being
  continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned
  line."

That means full recognition of the neutral zone.

My next document, Donitz 88, shows President Roosevelt's
attitude to the question of neutrality toward Germany in
that war. It's an excerpt from the speech of 11th September,
1941, and is well known:-

  "Hitler knows that he must win the mastery of the seas if
  he wants to win the mastery of the world. He knows that
  he must first tear down the bridge of ships which we are
  building over the Atlantic and over which we constantly
  transport the war material that will help, in the end, to
  destroy him and all his works. He has to destroy our
  patrols on the sea and in the air."

I should like to say a few words about the view also
expressed in Exhibit GB 191, namely, that the crews of enemy
merchant ships were civilians and non-combatants. On Page
254 of the document book - I reproduce part of Document
Donitz 67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt
from the confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders, and deals with
gunnery training for the civilian crews of merchant ships. I
only wish to refer to the first page of these orders which
say that, as a general rule, there should be only one Navy
man at a gun, all the rest being taken from the crew of the
ship. I read from the paragraph headed "Training," Section
(d):-

  "In addition to the gunlayer and the men specially
  trained for serving guns, five to seven men more -
  depending on the size of the gun - are needed to complete
  the gun crew and to bring ammunition from the magazine."

This is followed by regulations for training in port, and
gunnery drill for the crews.

The next document, re-numbered Donitz 106, is a circular
decree issued by the French Minister for the Merchant Marine
on 11th November, 1939. It deals with the creation of a
special badge for men serving on merchant ships who are
liable for military service. That is on Page 256. I should
like to point out that this decree was signed by the head of
the Military Cabinet, a Rear Admiral. The character of the
order is demonstrated by the second last paragraph:-

                                                  [Page 323]

  "This armlet may only be worn in France or in the French
  colonies. In no case may men issued with the armlet wear
  it in foreign waters."

I come now to several documents dealing with the question of
the rescue of survivors. These documents can be found in
Document Books I and 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, don't you think it would be
sufficient if you were to refer to these documents, give us
the numbers without reading from them? They are all dealing,
as you say, with rescue.

D R. KRANZBUHLER: I believe I can do this with most of them.
On Page 9 there is the ruling of the Hague Convention,
regarding the application of the Geneva Convention to naval
warfare. Page 10 is Document Donitz 8, the order of 4th
October, 1939, concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen.
It contains the order already read: namely, that rescues
should be effected wherever possible without endangering
their own ship.

Donitz 9, Page 12, gives examples of exaggerated rescue
measures by German submarines which even let enemy ships
pass without attack while so engaged.

Donitz 10 deals with the same subject, and gives a further
example.

The collection of statements made by commanding officers in
Donitz 13 can be found on Pages 19 to 26. I should like to
deal with it along with War Order 145, which is the
prosecution's Exhibit GB 196. These statements contain
numerous examples, taken from all the war years, of rescue
measures on the part of German submarines. One of these
statements is supplemented by photographs - Page 21 - which
are included in the original. The facts stated in these
statements are confirmed by Document Donitz 14, Page 27, on
rescue measures in the War Diary of a submarine; and at the
end we find the sentence:-

  "Taking British airmen on board is sanctioned. It is
  signed by the Commander-in-Chief U-boats."

The next document, Donitz 15, is again an excerpt from the
War Diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a
battle with a convoy on 21st October, 1941. It is on Page
28.

The next two documents concern the Laconia order. The
Tribunal has permitted me to use Standing War Orders 511 and
513 in cross-examining Mohle. They deal with the capture of
captains, chief engineers and air crews. I submit them as
Donitz 24 and 25, and they can be found on Page 46 and 47, I
should like to point out that both orders explicitly state
that capture should only be effected as far as is possible
without endangering the boats.

Document Donitz 24 explains that the British Admiralty, on
its part, has issued orders to prevent the capture of
British captains by German submarines.

The next excerpt, on Page 48, cites an example showing that
this British order was carried out and that a U-boat
searched in vain among the life-boats for the captain.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, could you inform the
Tribunal what Paragraph 2 on Page 46 refers to and means?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: The paragraph refers to Standing War Order
No. 101, i.e., the order specifying which neutral ships can
be sunk. That is, of course, in the blockade area.

THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be
sunk with the ship, or what?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains
and ships' officers of neutral ships might be left in the
lifeboats and must not be taken aboard the submarine from
the lifeboats. The fact that it was actually much safer on
the lifeboat than on the submarine, is seen from the English
order instructing captains to remain in the lifeboats and to
hide from the U-boats.


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