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THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation
was put in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this
copy of the Order.

THE PRESIDENT: By whom?

MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the
Order, which was the Naval War Staff.

   "2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential
   to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
   available.
   
   For this purpose, the High Commands of the branches of the
   Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous
   manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German
   war and combat experience, and for assistance in military
   economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,
   but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.
   Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
   which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
   
   In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to
   himself.
   
   3. The harmonising of the operational plans of the two parties
   is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
   
   This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
   
      (a) The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed
      as forcing England to the ground quickly, thereby keeping
      the United States out of the war. Beyond this, Germany has
      no political, military, or economic interests in the Far
      East which would give occasion for any reservations with
      regard to Japanese intentions.
      
      (b) The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
      warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ
      strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this
      connection every opportunity to support German mercantile
      warfare must be exploited.
      
      (c) The raw material situation of the Pact Powers demands
      that Japan should acquire possession of those territories
      which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially
      if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be
      carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war,
      since they are of vital importance to Germany.
      
      (d) The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in
      the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire
      conduct of war of the Three Powers.
   
   In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
   naval power - extending to those of American naval power only
   if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be
   prevented - will result in

                                                        [Page 268]

   weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also,
   just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down
   substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).
   
   A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet
   be fixed.
   
   4.In the Military Commissions to be formed in accordance with
   the Three-Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with
   as equally concern the three participating powers. These will
   include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
   
   The working out of the details is the responsibility of the
   Main Commission, with the co-operation of the Armed Forces
   High Command.
   
   5.The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
   'Barbarossa' operations."

It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution of this list, you
will see that it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed
Forces High Command, joint Operation Staff, Intelligence
Divisions, and to the Chief of Foreign Affairs, simultaneously for
Foreign Office.

It appears from what I have just read that the Nazi's cardinal
operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as
March, 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against
Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases. I shall pass over,
for the moment, other references to the United States in Basic
Order No. 24 and take that point up later.

I now wish to refer to our Document No. C-152, which has already
been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB 122. This
document is the top secret record of a meeting on 18th March,
1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24; a
meeting attended by Hitler, the defendant Raeder, the defendant
Keitel and the defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with
Paragraph 2 in this instance, where Raeder, then Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:-

   "Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
   since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
   English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
   against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
   Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this
   action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese
   officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to
   land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her
   efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has
   Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the
   U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines,
   Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
   
   Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against U.S.A. She can
   do so if she takes Singapore as soon as possible."

The fact clearly appears, from these minutes, that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese, to discuss
the activation of Japanese military support against the British,
and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the
second sentence in Paragraph 2 of our Document C-152.

   "Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but
   according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
   will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in
   England."

                                                        [Page 269]

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the
Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their
performance under the contract.

I now turn to further efforts by the defendant Ribbentrop to
induce the Japanese to aggression against the British
Commonwealth. On 29th March, 1941, he met the Japanese Foreign
Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A report of their
conversations, found in the German Foreign Office archives, is
contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I now offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA 152.

Relevant portions of this document have been translated into
English. I shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English
translation:

   "The R.A.M. (that is Ribbentrop) resumed the preceding
   conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks
   with the Russians, in Moscow, where they had left off. He
   expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view
   of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the
   Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would
   develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany
   would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He
   was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that
   Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without
   fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part
   of the German Army was in any case on the Eastern frontiers of
   the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
   He (the R.A.M.), however, believed that Russia would try to
   avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however,
   enter into a conflict with Russia, the U.S.S.R. would be
   finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had, of
   course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted
   to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain
   from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
   
   He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia
   would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
   intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He
   (the R.A.M.) wanted to point out to Matsuoka that a conflict
   with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any
   case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon
   his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
   impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such
   a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
   considered possible."

I now omit five pages of the German text and continue directly
with the English translation:-

   "Next, the R.A.M. turned again to the Singapore question. In
   view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible
   attacks by submarines based on the Philippines, and of the
   intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home Fleets, he
   had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder.
   The latter had stated that the British Navy, during this year,
   would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in
   the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a
   single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had
   described the U.S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not
   bother about them at all.
   
   Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a low
   estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the
   view,

                                                        [Page 270]

   that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be
   able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it was
   afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
   their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
   perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused
   considerable worry in Japan.
   
   The R.A.M. replied that America could not do anything against
   Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps, for
   this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding
   on active measures against Japan; for, while on one hand he
   could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand,
   there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan.
   For the American President, of course, this would mean a
   considerable loss of prestige; and because of the inadequate
   rearmament he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
   
   In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing
   everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted
   as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key
   position of England in the East. Therefore it might be
   possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to
   be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not
   be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in
   order to reassure the British, but also in order to foot the
   pro-British and pro-American elements until, one day, he would
   suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
   
   In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were
   based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
   Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one
   blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the R.A.M. remarked.)
   He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese
   statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of
   the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then the nation will
   be united.' The Japanese needed to be shaken up to awaken.
   After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would
   come, whether you wanted it or not."

I then omit part of the German text, and continue with what
appears in the English translation:-

   "Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
   the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached
   to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German
   written promise of assistance.
   
   The R.A.M. replied that he had already discussed these
   questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure
   maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer - who probably
   must be considered the greatest expert on military questions
   at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of
   attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare,
   too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report,
   based on their European experiences, for the Japanese, on the
   use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity, against
   the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would
   be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
   
   Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
   British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

                                                        [Page 271]

   The R.A.M. replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed
   new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified
   positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which
   he could make available to the Japanese.
   
   Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
   expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,
   were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval Forces would need
   three months before they could capture Singapore. As a
   cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He
   believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from
   America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore
   required still more time, and if the operations should even
   drag out for a year, the situation with America would become
   extremely critical, and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
   
   If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
   Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack
   in this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be
   brought into operation again only after one or two years.
   
   The R.A.M. added that Japan would gain decisive influence over
   the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
   Singapore."

On 5th April, about a week after the conference from whose minutes
I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met Matsuoka, and again
pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war.
The notes of this conference, which were also found in the German
Foreign Office Archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS,
which I now offer as Exhibit USA 153. I shall read a few brief
extracts from these notes, starting with the third paragraph on
Page 1 of the English translation.

   "In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now
   awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would
   take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation,
   the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of
   course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as
   the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of
   the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
   armament, and with the resignation from the League of
   Nations."

I now omit several pages of the German text and continue with the
English translation.

   "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
   would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
   traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,
   which in its time was the only dominant power on the European
   Continent.
   
   In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again
   summarised the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan
   with him from his trips-:
   
       1.Germany had already won the war. With the end of this
       year, the world would realise this. Even England would have
       to concede it, if she had not collapsed before then, and
       America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
       
       2.There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
       Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated in
       the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in
       the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

                                                        [Page 272]

       3.Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
       would hasten victory if Japan entered the war. Such an
       entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of
       Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique
       opportunity, which would hardly ever return, for the
       fulfilment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance
       which would make it possible for her to play a really
       leading role in East Asia."

Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing
the same theme I have previously noted. Germany has already won
the war for all practical purposes. Japan's entry will hasten the
inevitable end. But Japan had better get the positions she wants
during the war.

I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances,
expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS, previously, that
if Japan entered the conflict she likewise had nothing to fear
from the Soviet Union. The references to the weaknesses of the
United States, scattered throughout the quotations I have read,
were also an ingredient in this brew which was being so carefully
prepared and brought to the boil.

I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the
case dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to
aggression against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document
1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 154. This document is a
top secret report, dated 24th May, 1941, from the German Military
Attache in Tokyo, to the Intelligence Division of the O.K.W. I
wish merely to call attention, at this point, to the last sentence
in Paragraph 1, wherein it is stated:-

   "The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand."

I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however,
the fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that
the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese
Operational Plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators
had fostered.

Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the
U.S.S.R.

I invite the Tribunal's attention at this point, to the language
of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote,
beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page

   "The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression
   would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at
   war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly,
   the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a 'new order of
   things.'

The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with
particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We
now turn to their effort to induce the Japanese to commit a "stab
in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here
again, the defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.


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