The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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Last-Modified: 2000/12/04


Documents 58, 58A, 58B and c deal with the assertion on the
part of the prosecution that the SD had participated in the
confiscation by force and partitioning of public and private

I shall quote one sentence from Document SD-58:

  "The confiscation will be declared by the main offices of
  the State Police for the benefit of the Greater German

SD-59 and SD-60 deal with the third-degree methods during
interrogations. In this connection I beg to draw the
Tribunal's attention to filing reference Roman numeral IV
which deals with the jurisdiction of Amt IV, Secret State

In Document SD-60 the existing regulations applicable to the
Security Police in the Government General are expressly

Documents 60A to SD-64 deal with the charge against the SD
according to which Crimes Against Humanity were committed.
SD-60A to 63 deal with the persecution of Jews. In
connection with Document SD-62 I beg to draw the attention
of the Tribunal again to IVB and also to the signature
"Muller, Chief of the Secret State Police."

Document SD-64 refers to the charge against the SD in
reference to the persecution of the Churches (statement of
evidence VIIB, Page 57). Documents SD-65 to 69 set forth the
legal regulations on the strength of which during the war a
large portion of members of the SD Amt III and VI were
called up for compulsory and emergency service; I should
like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the following
sentence in Document SD-65:

  "As employers of labour" - and I shall omit a few words -
  "the SD sections can request the labour offices to place
  at their disposal replacement and supplementary manpower
  in accordance with the principles of allotment and use of
  the population during war time."

SD-60 contains the punishment decreed for those who have not
complied with such regulations.

I now come to Document SD-70, regarding which I have been
unable to agree with the prosecution. I ask, therefore, that
first a decision be made as to whether or not I may
introduce this document.

THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one document book.

DR. GAWLIK: It is in the appendix, your Lordship. May. I
send up the original, your Lordship?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you tell the Tribunal what it is

DR. GAWLIK: With this document I want first of all to prove
that the SD did not belong to the police and did not belong
to the SS. Furthermore, I wish to establish that the SD in
the Reich and the organization of the Security Police and
the SD outside the Reich wore separate organizations, and I
want to establish the tasks of Department III. I beg to draw
the Tribunal's attention to the fact that in Section 4 the
SD is mentioned under German Intelligence Service.

                                                  [Page 300]

THE PRESIDENT: This is a book produced by the Allied
Command, is it not? Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Forces, and you are offering that, is that it?

DR. GAWLIK: The General Secretary

THE PRESIDENT: Has there been any formal application for
this document?

DR. GAWLIK: Oh, yes. The document is contained in the
appendix to the document book. But I have not been able to
reach an agreement with the prosecution regarding the
appendix of this book.

THE PRESIDENT: We will hear the prosecution about it.

LT.-COMMANDER HARRIS: May it please the Tribunal, we have no
strong objection to this document. It is simply one of
several which we discussed and we did not agree upon it. Our
objection is primarily to its value in so far as evidence is
concerned. It is an intelligence book and therefore what is
said in that book relates exclusively to matters of
intelligence. It is dated April, 1945, That is the date of
its publication and quite obviously, as of that date, the
information could not be available such as is now available
to the Tribunal in a competent form.

DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship -

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will admit the book for what it
is worth.

DR. GAWLIK: First of all, I beg to draw the Tribunal's
attention to the fact that in this book the organization of
the State and the Party is subdivided into four parts and
the Intelligence Service is given a section of its own -
Roman numeral IV. Roman numeral I is the State and Party;
Roman numeral II is Para-Military Units; Roman numeral III
is the German Police, and Roman numeral IV is the German
Intelligence Service; the organization of Offices 3 and 6.

I then beg to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that in the case of the SS it states that the SS consists of
(1) Waffen SS, (2) the General SS, and (3) the Germanic SS.
The SD is not listed there. And I further beg to draw the
Tribunal's attention to the fact that the Intelligence
Service mentioned under Roman numeral IV is subdivided into
SD III, the organization of the Security Police, and the SD
outside the Reich, and thirdly into Offices 6 and 7.

And then I beg to draw the attention of the Tribunal
particularly to the following statements regarding the
activities of Office 3. There it says:

  "The information supplied by intelligence agents is
  digested into situation reports and ..." it goes on to
  say ... "these reports are extraordinarily frank and
  sincere" - I translated that myself - "and contain a
  complete and unvarnished picture of the attitude and
  frame of mind in  Germany."

I now pass on to my last document. That is a letter from an
assistant master (Studienassessor) Wolfarts, and I submitted
the letter because I had only just. received it and I could
not get an affidavit. The letter refers to Document 142. It
is the well-known document from Koehem, where the SD is
supposed to have supervised the voting ... and this letter
mentions the evangelical clergyman Alferich Wolfarts, who
voted "no," and the vote is attached to the report. The
daughter's letter shows that no measures were taken either
by the Gestapo or the SD against the father, who has since

I have finished.

Your Lordship, should I read to the Tribunal a list of the
documents or should I submit a written statement as to where
the documents are to be found? Most of the documents have
already been submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got that. Have we not got it
at the beginning of your document book? We have an index.

                                                  [Page 301]


THE PRESIDENT. You mean to make a separate document of it?

DR. GAWLIK: I only have part of the documents, some of them
are documents of the prosecution, of course.

THE PRESIDENT: If you think it would serve a useful purpose,
by all means submit your index under a separate number and
deposit it with the Tribunal.

DR. GAWLIK: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, when you were dealing with the
witnesses did we deal with the Reich Cabinet next? Are you
prepared to go on with your documents?

DR. KUBUSCHOK (counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Altogether I
have four affidavits. They have been submitted to the
Commission. They are being translated. However, the
translations are not yet ready. I shall submit them at a
later stage, and I shall confine myself today to reading
into the record a few very important passages from these

Affidavit 1 was given by the State Secretary Dr. Otto
Meissner, who later became minister. I shall read the
following passages from this affidavit:

First of all, Meissner deals with the work of the Cabinet,
particularly during the first period, after Hitler had
formed his Government: and he states in this connection:

  "It - that is the Reich Government - worked according to
  previous custom; that is to say, draft laws were decided
  upon at meetings of the Cabinet, during which procedure
  objections could be raised. Right from the beginning the
  superior and uncontested leader of that Government was
  Hitler, who likewise based his actions, formally
  speaking, on the Reich Constitution, according to which
  the guiding principles of policy should be decided by the
  Reich Chancellor. These guiding principles did not differ
  from those which he publicly proclaimed in the many
  speeches which he made during that period."

A little farther on he says that all the important political
decisions, such as the annexation of Austria, the march into
the Sudetenland, the signing of the pact with Italy, the
march into Bohemia and Moravia, and the attack against
Poland and the neutral countries, took place without
previous resolutions being passed by the Cabinet, and even
without the members of the Government being informed of them
beforehand. Except where they had been informed by Hitler
personally, they learned of these events just like every
other citizen through the radio and the Press. The members
of the Cabinet were thus forced out of any political
activity, against their will and without any guilt on their
part, and they were limited to the management of their
departments. They were merely leading civil servants in
their departments.

Therefore these ministers could not know that Hitler had any
intention to begin a war or that he intended to misuse his
power to commit acts of violence and make attacks in
violation of International Law.

The affidavit further deals with the lam, of the 3rd of July
after the end of the Roehm Putsch. Finally, the affidavit
goes on to state as follows:

  "The fact that members of the Reich Cabinet, in spite of
  the increasing brutality of the course pursued, remained
  in their offices, is, according to my own observation -
  apart from the fact that the Fuehrer as a matter of
  principle would not accept resignations and particularly
  in war time considered them as acts which undermined the
  country's defence - because they, at least the middle-
  class (burgerlichen) ministers, believed that if they
  resigned their posts would only be filled by more extreme
  and untrained successors. Thus they would not only have
  abandoned the intrinsic interests of their departments
  but also the personal interests of their employees."

                                                  [Page 302]

Affidavit No. 2 originates from the former Reich Minister
Darre; and I quote:

  "Basic questions of foreign policy were, as far as I
  remember, not discussed in the Cabinet. Never during any
  Cabinet meetings were there any utterances or even hints
  from which it could be inferred that an aggressive war
  was contemplated."

In another part of the affidavit he says:

  "I emphasize that no aggressive plans against Poland were
  known to me, and that to this end no tasks were given to
  me in my capacity as Minister of Agriculture."

Darre then goes on to describe his differences with Hitler,
and he states:

  "During a discussion with Hitler about this subject which
  took place before the actual passing of the law - there
  had been arguments about a law which was to be introduced
  into the occupied territories - it came to a very serious
  clash, in the course of which I resigned. Hitler
  thereupon replied that I came under martial law, and that
  I would leave my post when it suited him, Hitler, and not
  when it suited me."

How Darre was finally eliminated from his position is shown
in the last part of the affidavit. Hitler had given orders
to Darre .... I quote:

  "I was to give out to the outside world, that I was sick
  and it was desired that the public should get the
  impression that I was temporarily resigning my office for
  reasons of health. I refused to do this, and I was told
  to leave Berlin. Since then I have lived in a remote log-
  house in the Schorfheide. Nominally, E I remained a
  minister up to the collapse of the German Reich, although
  I asked Lammers repeatedly to relieve me from office, and
  Lammers had reported to Hitler on this point."

The third affidavit comes from the former minister of the
Reich, Count Schwerin-Krosigk. Schwerin-Krosigk describes in
one part of the affidavit a meeting with the former Reich
Chancellor Bruening in 1932. I quote:

  "I was to this extent in agreement with Bruening, who, a
  few weeks before his resignation, had told me at
  Badenweiler, where we were both taking a cure, that the
  time had now come to give responsible positions to the
  National Socialists. One could not continue to govern by
  means of the emergency laws published by the Reich
  President, and the strongest party could not permanently
  be left in the opposition. The only effective way of
  combating the unbridled agitation of the National
  Socialists was to force them to accept responsibility."

In another part of the affidavit Schwerin-Krosigk points out
that he saw Hitler for the first time in his life on the
20th of January, 1933. I quote:

  "My reason for joining Hitler's Cabinet was that I,
  together with all the other middle-class ministers,
  wanted to form a counterbalance in the Cabinet to the
  totalitarian claims for power put up by the Party."

Regarding the initial period of this Government, the
affidavit deals with this at great length. I quote only one

  "Moreover, the course that was followed at that time
  appeared a moderate one and objections raised by the
  middle-class ministers did, in fact, lead to less drastic
  measures, and in some cases certain legal rulings which
  had been proposed by him were even withdrawn."

Regarding the amalgamation of the office of the Chancellor
and that of the Reich President, the affidavit states among
other things:

  "Hitler's demand to unite both offices in his person and
  thus complete the last step in forming a totalitarian
  regime could not be opposed by the middle-class
  ministers, because it was perfectly clear even at that
  time that such power in the hands of Hitler was
  completely in accordance with the will of the German

                                                  [Page 303]

The affidavit goes on to say with reference to this same

  "I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler
  himself made his demand for uniting both these positions
  acceptable to the Cabinet by stating that he did not
  consider that to be the final solution, but made it quite
  clear that these two offices might again be separated
  later on."

In a summary the affidavit says:

  "The Reich Cabinet as such had no political tasks as far
  as giving orders or leadership was concerned. It .did not
  even serve as adviser to Hitler, but a circle of persons
  chosen by him personally served in this capacity."

At the end of the affidavit Schwerin-Krosigk states:

  "Upon retrospective reflection I must maintain that
  Hitler deceived his ministers no less than he deceived
  the German people, and, what is more, he deceived the
  world. The statements he used to make to us as his
  Ministers regarding his intentions were no different
  basically from those he made publicly. We could not
  suspect that he had other quite different intentions, so
  great was the power of his words to convince. This
  applies in particular to his will for peace, stressed by
  him so often.
  If I am told today that as early as November, 1937,
  Hitler was thinking of war as a means of achieving his
  foreign policy aims, then this is diametrically opposed
  to what he, at the beginning of 1939, had expressly
  communicated to me through the State Secretary Reinhardt:
  'I need no longer worry about armament expenditure since
  we had now before us a long period of peace, and
  therefore a reduction of these expenses would follow.' "

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