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Q. I just want to deal with that, but I want to read
out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about
that, because it is not what you are saying, you know.
On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10th
November, 1945, he was asked:

  "Question: Were negotiations as to the intervention
  of Japan carried out by the Foreign Office alone, or
  in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy
  and the OKW? "

And defendant Raeder's answer was:

  "No negotiations took place between the Foreign
  Office and the Japanese diplomats. Ambassador Oshima
  was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign
  Office in his capacity as delegate, but, apart from
  that, he was enough of an expert to judge the whole
  matter from the military point of view. Military
  authorities had long before that carried on
  negotiations with military and naval attaches about
  those matters essential to Japan. This was all
  talked about and thrashed out with the military and
  naval attaches."

That is a very different version of the fact from the
version you have given, witness, is it not? Now, there
are two more matters which I want to deal with.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I don't know whether it will be
convenient, my Lord, to have a brief adjournment.

(A recess was taken.)

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with
regard to the extract from the interrogation of the
defendant Raeder, which I read, I wanted to be clear
that the defendant was then dealing with the
relationship generally, between the German authorities
in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not
want to have given the Tribunal the impression it was a
direct negotiation with regard to intervention against
America itself. I do not want to mislead the Tribunal
in any way with regard to that matter.

BY MAJOR ELWYN JONES:

Q. Did you know of the shooting, in December 1942, by a
naval unit under the German Naval officer in command at
Bordeaux, of two British Royal Marines who took part in
a raid on shipping in the Girond Estuary?

A. I learned of that later.

Q. Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting
in the SKL war diary?

                                             [Page 308]

A. No, here in Nuremberg, defence counsel showed me an
entry, but I do not know whether it was the war diary
of the Naval Operations Staff.

Q. It has been suggested by both counsel for the
defendant, Donitz and counsel for the defendant,
Raeder, that the entry in D-658, which contained the
sentence: "The measure was in accordance with the
Fuehrer's special order, but is, nevertheless,
something new in International Law, since these
soldiers were in uniform," that that entry was not from
the SKL war diary. Now, you are familiar with the
initial of the defendant Raeder, are you not?

I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so
that it may be established beyond conjecture that this
matter was entered in the SKL war diary. I will put in
a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will
allow me, because the original is required for other
purposes. D-658 was Exhibit GB 229, and it may be
convenient to call the photostats of the originals
D--658-A, and Exhibit GB 229-A.

BY MAJOR ELWYN JONES:

Q. That is the war diary of the SKL, is it not?

A. Yes, I recognized it as such.

Q. And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that
dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?

A. From the war diary I can see - such is my impression
- that afterward, on 9th December, they were informed
about the fact of the shooting -

Q. And their laconic comment was -

A. - in the Armed Forces communique. It says:
"According to the Armed Forces communique, the two
soldiers have been shot in the meantime." This can be
seen in the war diary of the SKL, and I acknowledge it.

Q. And the humane comment of the SKL is, "It is
something new in International Law, since the soldiers
were in uniform."

There is one final matter which I wish to ask you
about: Is it your contention that the German Navy
fought a clean war at sea?

A. I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean
war, and that has nothing to do with the fact that it
is said here in the diary of the SKL, as taken from the
Armed Forces communiqu‚, that two soldiers were shot,
and that this was in accordance with the special order
given by the Fuehrer which has been cited, but, as the
Naval Operations Staff adds, was something new in the
history of naval warfare. This too -

Q. I am turning to another matter, but you say
generally -

A. May I just say in conclusion that this postscript
has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case,
Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask
we whether I approved that order or something of the
sort, I would give you my personal opinion of the
matters which Raeder and I discussed.

Q. But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if the
Commanders-in-Chief did not? Here was a matter directly
reflecting on the honour of German Armed Forces, and
despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the
Geneva Convention for those British Marines, he
continued in office, after they were deliberately
murdered.

A. That is a distortion. I reply to that as follows:
The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a
form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines
by means of air landings or otherwise.

Q. Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your
own report in the SKL war diary says so.

A. I have to comment on that order which was issued
earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since
there was knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers,
or - I do not remember the exact wording any more -
since these soldiers were given orders not to bother
taking German prisoners, but rather to shoot them while
carrying out their work in the so-called Commando
raids, the following directives had to be issued.

                                             [Page 309]

At that time, I spoke with Raeder about this case, of
course, and I can merely state my personal opinion. I
felt that I could believe this preamble because I am of
the opinion that if I resorted to let us say, sabotage
behind the lines, then, of course, I could not be
bothered with taking prisoners, because then the
element of surprise would be excluded. If, therefore, a
troop of three to five men, a so-called commando
undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to
destroy enemy installations, then, of course, they
cannot burden themselves with prisoners without running
the risk of being killed themselves or of being
recognized before they can carry out their undertaking.
Therefore, I considered this preamble quite credible,
and I expressly said so at that time.

Q. And you think that that shooting of those two
marines was, therefore, perfectly justified? That is
your position on this matter, is it not? Just say "yes"
or "no" on that; I will not argue with you.

A. I have not asserted that in any way. Rather I said,
here is a fact of which we were informed only by the
Armed Forces communiqu‚, and that Raeder and the High
Command had not been heard on this point. That is what
I stated.

Q. Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about; you
have indicated that, in your opinion, Germany fought a
clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new
Document D-873, which will be Exhibit GB 481, which is
the log book of U-boat U-71, under the date-line 21st
June, 1941, when the defendant Raeder was
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the
entry reads:

  "Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John
  Pederson drifting under sail. Three survivors were
  lying exhausted under a tarpaulin, and only showed
  themselves as the U-boat was moving away again. They
  stated that their ship had been torpedoed
  twenty-eight days before. I turned down their
  request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat
  with food and water and gave them the course and
  distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crew were
  in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather,
  offered hardly any prospects of rescue. Signed:
  Flachserberg."

Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?

A. I observe that the commanding officer did what he
could, having said that in view of the bad weather, he
could not rescue them. He threw provisions to them in a
sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not
know what there is about that that is inhumane. If he
had left without giving them food and the course, then
you might make that accusation.

Q. But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These
were three men who did -

A. No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the
commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in
charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the
weather, because it says here "Medium swell." That
could also -

Q. But you see here the U-boat commander must have
spoken to these people, and physically, it must have
been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to
their fate, knowing quite well he was leaving them to
die.

A. No, not at all. He need not have given them any food
and the course to the coast. What makes you think that
they had to die?

Q. The last sentence is a clear indication that the
U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am
suggesting to you that he could have taken them aboard,
and should have done so if he had the elements of
humanity in him.

A. No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat,
whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on
board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on
a U-boat, otherwise you wouldn't judge it like that.
Considering that the crew of a U-boat which is under
water for weeks, and uses every last bit of space, and
is exposed to the greatest dangers day and night, one
cannot simply say that it would have been a humane act,
to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the
commander himself says there was hardly a chance of
rescue in view of the prevailing weather.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES.: I have no further questions, my
Lord.

                                             [Page 310]

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few
points which Major Elwyn Jones put to you.

An entry was shown to you from the document by Assmann
of 10th October, 1939, with the assertion that from
this it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway
only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should like to
read to you the full entry, and I should like you then
to state your attitude to the entire document:

"The Fuehrer agrees that full use of the only two
battleships which we have should not be made for the
time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk.

Question of siege of England. Fuehrer and
Commander-in-Chief of Navy agree that all objections by
neutrals have to be rejected, even in view of the
danger of entry of USA into the war, which seems
certain if the war goes on.

The more 'brutally' the war is conducted, the greater
the effect, the sooner the end.

Capacity for large U-boat production programme. Fuehrer
rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or
brought from Russia for political reasons.
Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no advantages to be
won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian coast;
refers to the value of winning Norwegian bases -
Trondhjem - with the help of Russian pressure. Fuehrer
will consider the question."

Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a
complete clarification of the Norwegian problem?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Am I right in concluding that here a great number of
questions are treated and only one strategic question
with reference to Norway -

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the
translation came through as, "no advantage of
occupation of Norwegian bases," and the translation
which is in the document is "Raeder stresses importance
of obtaining Norwegian bases." Perhaps if there might
be a careful - I am not saying this in any critical
sense - a very careful translation of the entry, it
might be important.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you give that an exhibit number?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: No, my Lord. That is the entry from
Assmann's headline diary.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know
the exhibit number.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I will have an extract made and the
exhibit number given this evening, my Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: It would be Exhibit GB 482, would it
not?

MAJOR ELWYN ]ONES: Yes, my Lord, that is it; Exhibit GB
482.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg
your pardon if it does not agree; but the document from
which I read I received through the courtesy of Major
Elwyn Jones.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of
translation, and get that settled.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: Yes, your Lordship.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. At any rate, Admiral, both entries are of l0th
October, that is, of the same conference. Am I right in
saying there were many strategic questions, not one of
which, it can be said, has been treated completely and
conclusively?

                                             [Page 311]

A. No, I believe that this complex of questions has
nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between
Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway.
The Norwegian question was touched upon the occupation
of Norway, and then a few points which Raeder had
jotted down in his notebook were discussed. Apart from
the question whether an occupation of Norway was
necessary or not, the possibility of conquering bases
outside German territory was, purely by chance, touched
on the same day.

Q. Therefore, Russia's offer of Murmansk was discussed.

A. From Russia to Belgium - all along the coast,
wherever there were possibilities and advantages for
our submarine strategy.

Q. If in the war diary a sentence in connection with a
conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation
marks, does that mean that these words were used by
Hitler? Can one assume that?

A. If it says -

MAJOR ELWYN J ONES: If your Lordship please, the
translation has now been checked, and the original
reading of "Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining
Norwegian bases" appears to be a perfectly correct
translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.

THE WITNESS: I understood, Doctor Siemers, shall I
speak about that?

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Yes, did you want to add something to that point?

A. Yes. I understand it has just been pointed out that
Raeder allegedly called Hitler's attention to the
necessity of acquiring submarine bases and, in that
connection, once spoke about Russian assistance and
also about the possibility of acquiring bases from
Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive
intentions.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I
asked Dr. Kranzbuhler also to check the translation.
The German text, as I should like to point out, says:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out the
value of winning Norwegian bases." That is something
different from the English translation. But I should
like to come back to this later.


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