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Last-Modified: 1999/09/14

                                                  [Page 185]


                     FIFTEENTH DAY

               FRIDAY, 7th DECEMBER, 1945

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday
afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the
stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the
activities of the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged.
And the Court will remember that I submitted in evidence
Document C-65, which was a report from the defendant
Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling, and ending with the
infamous words: "Quisling gives figures of the number of
German troops required which accord with German
calculations."

The Court has already received in evidence and heard read
material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of
Raeder to Admiral Assmann, which disclosed how, in December,
1939, the defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and
Hagelin.

I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for
the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB 86. The Court
will observe that that is a report by Raeder of the meeting
of the Naval Staff with Hitler on 12th December, 1939, at
1200 hours, in the presence of the defendants Keitel and
Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to
Hitler.

The report is headed "Norwegian Question", and the first
sentence reads:

   "C.-in-C. Navy" - who of course was the defendant Raeder
   - "has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates
   the impression of being reliable."

And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a
statement of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is
by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the
Document 007-PS; but I draw the Court's attention to the
fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning:

   "The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally
   so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to
   see Rosenberg once more first, as the latter had known
   Quisling for a long while. C.-in-C. Navy" - that is, of
   course, Raeder - "suggests that if the Fuehrer formed a
   favourable impression, the O.K.W. should obtain
   permission to make plans with Quisling for the
   preparation and carrying out of the occupation.
   
      (a) By peaceful means: that is to say, German Forces
      summoned by Norway;
      
      (b) To agree to do so by force."

That was 12th December, the meeting at which Raeder made
this report to Hitler.

                                                  [Page 186]

If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is
Raeder's record of these transactions for the purpose of
history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the
second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed

"(b) Weserubung", these words:

   "Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who
   came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were
   taken to the Fuehrer - "

THE PRESIDENT: I have not got it.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is
Document C-66, the second page, headed "Weserubung", in the
second paragraph.

   "Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who
   came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were
   taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of
   Reichsleiter Rosenberg."

And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the
page:-

   "At the crucial moment, R" - presumably Rosenberg -
   "hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on
   the morning of 14th December."

That is, of course, Raeder's note, and it indicates the
extent of his complicity in this conspiracy.

The report continues

   "On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with
   Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon Of 14th December,
   the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the
   Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme
   Command of the Armed Forces.
   
   Until that moment the Naval War Staff had taken no part
   in the development of the Norwegian question, and
   continued to be somewhat sceptical about it. The
   preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Crank in
   Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded,
   however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff."

The Court may well think that the note of the defendant
Raeder referring to "the crucial moment" was an appropriate
one, because the Court will see that on that day, 14th
December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the
Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is
further on in the document book, and which the Court will
remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his
organisation - it is after the "D" documents - if the Court
will turn to about ten lines from the bottom of the first
page of Annex 1, dealing with Norway, the Court will see
that there were further meetings between Quisling and the
Nazi chiefs in December, and I am going to read now the
section beginning:

   "Quisling was granted a personal audience with the
   Fuehrer on 16th December, and once more on the 18th
   December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer
   emphasised repeatedly that he personally would prefer a
   completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the
   whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
   theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the
   conflict."

As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of
the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be
brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in
these operations.

The report continues

   "Should the enemy attempt" - there is a mis-translation
   here - "to extend the war, however, with the aim of
   achieving further throttling

                                                  [Page 187]

   and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would
   be compelled to gird himself against such an
   undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy
   propaganda activity, he promised Quisling financial
   support of his movement, which was based on Greater
   Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question
   now raised was assigned to the special military staff,
   which transmitted special missions to Quisling.
   Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
   exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by
   the Ministry for Foreign Affairs" - that is to say, by
   Ribbentrop's organisation - "the Minister for Foreign
   Affairs" - that is to say, Ribbentrop - "being kept
   continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau" -
   which, of course, was Rosenberg's organisation.
   
   Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining
   liaison with Quisling. In the course of further
   developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in
   Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled
   with strictest secrecy".

Here again the Court will note the close link between the
Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.

The information that is available to the prosecution as to
the events of January, 1940, is not full, but the Court will
see that the agitation of the defendants Raeder and
Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to
consider a letter of Keitel's, Document C-63, which, for the
purposes of the record, will be Exhibit GB 87. The Court
will observe that that is an order - a memorandum - signed
by the defendant Keitel, dated the 27th January, 1940. It is
marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'" -
which was another code name for the Weserubung Preparations
- "Access only through an officer".

It is headed: "C.-in-C. of the Navy" - that is to say, the
defendant Raeder - "has a report on this."

The document reads:

   "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
   wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under
   my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest
   conjunction with the general war policy. For these
   reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the
   direction of further preparations.
   
   A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command
   of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and
   this represents, at the same time, the nucleus of a
   future operational staff."

Then, at the end of the memorandum:

   "All further plans will be made under the cover name
   'Weserubung'."

I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention
to the importance of that document, to the signature of
Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision.

Prior to this date, 27th January, 1940, the planning of the
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had
been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had
been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking
this Norwegian operation. The issuance of this directive of
Keitel's on 27th January, 1940, was the signal that the
Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the O.K.W., had
accepted the proposition of

                                                  [Page 188]

the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure,
and turned the combined resources of the German military
machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated
plans for the Norwegian operation.

The Court will observe that from January onward the
operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark
was started through the normal channels.

And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary
of the defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations
progressed. That is Document 1809-PS, which will be, for the
purposes of the record, Exhibit GB 88. That, the Court will
observe, is the last document in the document book.

There is a slight confusion in the order in which the
entries are set out in the diary, because the first three
pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another
part of the case.

I invite the Court's attention to Page 3 of these extracts
from Jodl's diary, beginning at the bottom, 6th February.
The entry under the date line of 6th February, 1940 starts:
"New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only and
guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."

I would like to repeat that entry, if I may be permitted to
do so

   "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and
   guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the
   war."

The next entry to which I invite the Court's attention is
the entry of the 21st February.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean: "To carry
out 'H'"?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is a reference to another code word,
"Hartmut", which the Court will see disclosed in a
subsequent document. That is another code word for this
Norwegian and Danish operation.

The entry of 21st February in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer
has talked with General von Falkenhorst and charges him with
preparation of 'Weser Exercise'. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed
Forces."

Then the next entry, on the next page -

THE PRESIDENT: "Weser Exercise" - is that Norway too?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is Norway too, my Lord, yes. That is
a translation of "Weserubung".

The entry on the next page, under the date of 28th February:

   "I propose, first to the Chief of O.K.W. and then to the
   Fuehrer, that Case Yellow" - which, as the Court knows,
   is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands -
   "and Weser Exercise" - the invasion of Norway and
   Denmark - "must be prepared in such a way that they will
   be independent of one another as regards both time and
   forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this
   is in any way possible."

So the Court will observe that the new idea of 6th February,
that the neutrality of Belgium might be observed, had been
abandoned by 28th February.

The next entry is of 29th February - I am not troubling the
Court with further entries of 28th February, which relate to
the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and
Denmark.

                                                  [Page 189]

29th February, the second paragraph

   "Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in
   Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how
   individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock
   troops. Warlimont, Chief of Landesverteidigung,
   instructed to make out immediately the order of the
   Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces
   to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening
   of the staff."

And there, for the moment, I will leave the entries in
Jodl's diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C-
174, which, for the purposes of the record, will be Exhibit
GB 89. The Court will see, from that document, that it is
Hitler's operation order to complete the preparations for
the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of 1st
March, 1940, and it is headed: "The Fuehrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, most Secret."

Then, "Directive for Fall Weserubung."

   "The development of the situation in Scandinavia
   requires the making of all preparations for the
   occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German
   Armed Forces-Fall Weserubung. This operation should
   prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the
   Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in
   Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
   line against Britain."

The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:

   "In view of our military and political power in
   comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the
   force to be employed in the Fall Weserubung will be kept
   as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be
   balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On
   principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
   appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is
   the military protection of the neutrality of the
   Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be
   transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the
   occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and
   the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If,
   in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all
   military means will be used to crush it."

There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:

   "I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of
   the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding
   General of the 21st Army Corps, General von
   Falkenhorst."

Paragraph 3:

   "The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in
   Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that
   the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible.
   In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway,
   we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-
   measures.
   
   It is most important that the Scandinavian States as
   well as the Western opponents should be taken by
   surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly
   those of transport and of readiness, drafting and
   embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor
   in mind.
   
   In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer
   be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be
   deceived with fictitious objectives."

Then Paragraph 4 on the next page. "The Occupation of
Denmark which is given the code name of "Weserubung Sud".

                                                  [Page 190]


   "The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of
   Jutland and of Fyen immediately after occupation of
   Seeland.
   
   Added to this, having secured the most important places,
   the Group will break through as quickly as possible from
   Fyen to Skagen and to the East coast."


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