The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Shofar FTP Archive File: imt/tgmwc//tgmwc-06/tgmwc-06-57.17

Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06-57.17
Last-Modified: 1997/11/08

In March, 1941 Eberhard Kinzel, a colonel of the German
General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit
was to make final arrangements for the attack on Yugoslavia.

                                                  [Page 292]
This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter (Page 5 of
the Russian text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152
of the document book):

     "Colonel Kinzel arrived in Budapest in March, 1941,
     bringing with him a letter from General Halder to
     General Werth. This letter contained an urgent request
     on the part of Germany that Hungary should participate
     in the possible war against Yugoslavia by mobilizing
     the following Army Corps: I. Budapest, II.
     Szekesfehervar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pecs, V. Szeged,
     and in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15
     operational units, including one cavalry division, two
     mechanized brigades, and one mountain (rifle) brigade.
     The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest
     of a German delegation, headed by Lieutenant-General
     Paulus, for discussing combined operations and the
     movement of German troops against Yugoslavia through
     Hungarian territory.
     In reply to this letter General Werth issued an
     invitation to the German delegation, held out prospects
     of Hungary's participation in the war against
     Yugoslavia and of mobilising, for this purpose, three
     Army Corps, i.e., I, IV and V.
     Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in
     principle, promising at least to mobilise Army Corps
     VIII, Kopitze, as well as the mechanized tactical units
     demanded by Halder.
     I was informed personally about this exchange of
     correspondence by Colonel of the German General Staff,
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see
that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal
whether Hungary was going to put one Army Corps, or two Army
Corps, or three Army Corps against the Russians. It was
absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we are
to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December, 1940,
was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany's disposal,
for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it
matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units?

It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely
cumulative. It doesn't add anything in the least to what you
have already given us, and you could go on to the next
document, which is No. USSR 150. Everything up to there is
simply the negotiations between members of the German and
Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the
Hungarian Army were to be used.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that
the presentation of the documents on this question should be

THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain
information pertaining not only to the number of units
pledged by Hungary to Germany in case of war with the Soviet
Union; but there is, for example, an indication as to what
methods in the preparation for war were being used by the
Fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite
conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these
methods, and that is why I request your permission to quote
certain passages in this document.

What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification
of the information regarding the number of Soviet units
concentrated on the Hungarian border.

THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as

     "My immediate superior, Major-General Laszlo, as Chief
     of the
     Operational Group, ordered the Second Section of the
     General Staff to prepare a situation report according
     to which fourteen Soviet Russian operational units were
     concentrated on the Hungarian border, including eight
     motorized units. This situation report was prepared by
     Colonel Cornell Hidai, of Intelligence.
                                                  [Page 293]
     I should like to point out that according to subsequent
     explanations supplied by the Second Section of the
     Royal Hungarian General Staff, there were only four
     Soviet operational units actually concentrated on the
     Hungarian border. This circumstance I truthfully
     reported to General Werth and Major-General Laszlo, but
     the latter altered my truthful, objective report in
     accordance with his wishes."
Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up
by the militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of
creating incidents abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet

Ujszaszy states (Page 10, Line 4 from the top of the
document, Page 157 of the document book):

     "These plans emanated from Lieutenant-General
     Fuetterer, from his assistant Lieutenant-Colonel
     Frimond, and from Major-General Laszlo. They proposed
     that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged as
     Russian planes, should bomb the Eastern border
     districts of Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian
And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days
preceding the attack on the Soviet Union (this is Page 11 of
the document, Page 158 of the document book):

     "On 24th June, 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30
     p.m., I was informed that Soviet Russian planes were
     bombing Rahivo in Carpathian Russia and firing on
     trains in the vicinity with machine-gun fire. On the
     same afternoon news reached us that Soviet Russian
     planes were bombing Roschitze. The Crown Council, with
     the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening and,
     `on the strength of Soviet Russia's provocation,'
     decided to declare war on that country. I am convinced
     that the bombarding was carried out by German planes
     with Russian markings. My conclusion was based on the
     following facts:
     a) Lieutenant General Fuetterer and the German
     propaganda machine publicised this bombing on a very
     vast scale.
     b) Lieutenant-General Laszlo immediately gave me
     orders, through the Propaganda Sub-section of Section 2
     of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to obtain
     photographs of such fragments of the 'Soviet Russian
     bombs' as could still be found and to publish these
     photographs in the Press of the Fascist countries.
     c) Lieutenant-General Fuetterer, Major-General Laszlo,
     and Lieutenant-General Frimond spread, by a whispering
     campaign, the rumour that Slovakian pilots in Russian
     Service had bombed Roschitze. The accuracy of the hits
     was explained by the fact that these pilots were well
     acquainted with the terrain."
This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24th June, 1941, at
12:30 p.m. We have a document that establishes the fact that
long before this date the participation of Hungary in the
war against the Soviet Union had been decided.

The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains
the depositions of Ruskizai-Ruediger explains the reasons
for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be
that Ruskizai-Ruediger's viewpoint is not shared by
everybody, but still, as it is the testimony of the
Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this statement cannot, of
course, be without interest.

On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruskizai-
states that towards the end of May, 1941, he received an
order to supply, first of all, the troops concentrated in
the Transcarpathian Ukraine; two days afterwards a secret
meeting took place of the Army Corps Commanders, at the
headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff,
at which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was

                                                  [Page 294]
I quote from the testimony of Ruskizai-Ruediger (Page 108 of
the document book and Page 9 of the document itself). I am
only quoting the passages underlined, in order to save time:

     "General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, gave us an
     account of the military and political situation.
     It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by
     Germany is forthcoming, in which Roumania and Hungary
     will take an active part on the side of Germany."
Ruskizai-Ruediger further points out that:

     "The decision to declare war was taken by the Council
     of Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Barta
     had made their reports, and was ratified by the Crown
     Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament.
     These decisions caused no surprise, and were the result
     of the voluntary military collaboration with Germany
     which had actually existed for many years past.
     The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders
     of Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression
     against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their
     mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards
     followed the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine and
     the strategic organisation of this region as a military
     base in preparation for an attack on Soviet Russia."
Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German Military
Attache in Budapest, Krappe.

The former Lieutenant-General of the German Army, Guenther
Krappe, was the German Military Attache in Budapest from
November, 1939, to 30th April, 1941.

After that, Krappe commanded the 10th Corps of S.S. troops
of the Army Group "Vistula," and was captured by Red Army

I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement
made by Krappe in January of this year and presented as
Exhibit USSR 150. It should be noted that the main facts
mentioned in Krappe's statement coincide with those on
Ujszaszy's report.

I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page 4 of
Krappe's document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document

     "In October, 1940, I was ordered by the O.K.H. to
     report on the conditions of fortifications in the
     region bordering Russia, that is, in the Carpathian
     Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel
     Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were only
     simple anti-tank obstacles in existence, varying in
     depth from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction
     of barracks had just begun. The necessary surveys for
     erecting concrete pillboxes along the border and the
     highways would be made during the winter, and in the
     spring of 1941 it would be possible to proceed with the
     actual construction. It appeared to be a question of
     raising some 6,000,000 pengos.
     General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile
     trip through Mukashevo to Ujoksky Pass. I communicated
     the results of the inspection tour and of the
     information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin.
     Some time later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the
     necessary sum for the building of these fortifications
     had already been allotted."
In order to save time, Your Honours, I shall briefly
summarise the remaining part of Krappe's testimony: an
agreement was reached with the War Minister, Barta, to
organize war communications and war transports of the German
Army in Hungary. A special mission arrived which was
entrusted with these transports. At the same time, your
Honours, permission was received

                                                  [Page 295]
to establish jointly with the postal services, a special
communication system for military requirements, and,
furthermore, a number of German officers were attached to
the Hungarian Army for the mutual exchange of experience and
instruction. Krappe states that as from December, 1940,
Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the
increase of the German military potential. General Leeb, the
Chief of the Armament Department, was in charge.

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