The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support
of, and collaboration with, each other in the establishment of a
"New Order", in Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into
the record parts of this far-reaching agreement.

   "The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
   condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
   world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore,
   decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in
   their efforts in Greater East Asia, and in the regions of
   Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and
   maintain a new order of things, calculated to promote the
   prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is
   the desire of the three Governments to extend this co-operation
   to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to
   give to their endeavours a direction similar to their own, in
   order that their aspirations towards world peace as the
   ultimate goal may thus be realised. Accordingly, the
   Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:-
   Article 1: Japan recognises and respects the leadership of
   Germany and Italy, in the establishment of a New Order in

                                                        [Page 262]
   Article 2: Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leader
   ship of Japan, in the establishment of a New Order in Greater
   East Asia.
   Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in
   their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
   assist one another with all political, economic and military
   means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a
   Power at present not involved in the Chinese-Japanese

I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6:-

   "The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon
   signature and shall remain in force for ten years, from the
   date of its coming into force."

Thus the Tripartite Pact of 27th September, 1940, was a bold
announcement to the world that the Fascist leaders of Germany,
Japan and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve
world domination, and to establish the "New Order" presaged by the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the ruthless Italian
conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria
early in 1938. I might also comment that this pact introduces the
"Fuehrerprinzip" into world politics.

I should like to read, in this connection, a statement by Cordell
Hull, Secretary of State in the United States at the time of the
signing of the Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the
official U.S. publication, Peace and War, U.S. Foreign Policy,
1931-1941, which has already been offered in evidence as Exhibit
USA 122. Mr. Hull's statement is Number 184 therein. It is also
our Document 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German
translation thereof are included in the document books. I now
quote statement by the Secretary of State, 27th September, 1940:-

   "The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of
   the Government of the United States, substantially alter a
   situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of
   the alliance merely makes dear to all a relationship which has
   long existed in effect, and to which this Government has
   repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in
   process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and
   that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government
   of the United States, in determining this country's policies."

I shall not attempt here to trace the relationship and
negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27th September,
1940. I shall note, however, one example of the type of German-
Japanese relationship existing before the formalisation of the
Tripartite Pact. This is the record of the conversation Of 31st
January, 1939, between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese
Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by the U.S. Chief of
Counsel in his opening address. This document, which is signed by
Himmler in crayon, is our Document 2195-PS. I offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA 150.

I now quote the file memorandum:

   "Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
   the following subjects
   1.The Fuehrer's speech, which pleased him very much, especially
   because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.
   2. We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
   triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mould. He also
   told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr),

                                                        [Page 263]

   was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration
   of Russia, and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine.
   However, this organisation was to become effective only in case
   of war.
   3.Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending ten
   Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. Their
   mission was to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians,
   whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier."

Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the
Fascist Triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and
economic alliance with Japan had been formalised, exhorted the
Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were
at war, and those with whom they contemplated war. In this the
conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed
in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis.
On 10th June, 1940, in fulfilment of her alliance with Germany,
Italy had carried out her "stab in the back" by declaring war
against France and Great Britain. These Nazi conspirators set
about to induce similar action by Japan, on the other side of the

As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese
collaboration was aimed, at various times, were the British
Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the United States of America. I shall deal with each of these
nations in the order named.

At least as early as 23rd February, 1941 - on the basis of
documents available to us - these Nazi conspirators undertook to
exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit
aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again, the figure of
the defendant Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23rd February,
1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese
Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open
hostilities against the British in the Far East, as soon as

The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already
been offered in connection with the presentation of the case on
aggression against the Soviet Union, as Exhibit USA 129. A part of
it has already been read into the record and I now intend to read
another portion. I shall again come back to this document when
dealing with the German-Japanese collaboration as regards the
United States.

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation,
Ribbentrop, on 2nd March, sent copies of an extract of the record
of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers, for
their strictly confidential and purely personal information, with
the further note that - and I quote:-

   "These statements are of fundamental significance for
   orientation in the general political situation facing Germany
   in early spring 1941."

I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English
translation of 1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that
page, and then skip to the last three sentences of the second

   "Extract from the report of the Conference of the Reich Foreign
   Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23rd February,
   After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the R.A.M. (Reich
   Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
   proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany, in
   the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in
   the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He" - that
   is, Ribbentrop
                                                        [Page 264]
   "regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for
   which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years
   already, had come into being only after various detours, but
   public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The
   main thing was, however, that they were together now."

Then, omitting a few lines:-

   "Now the German-Japanese Alliance had been concluded,
   Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
   Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
   its further development now stands in the foreground. How is
   the situation in this respect?"

Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the
argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First
outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against
England, he said - and I now quote the last two sentences in
Paragraph 4, on Page 2, of the English translation:-

   "Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape
   overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
   however, depends on various factors, above all on weather

And then, going on to the first full paragraph on Page 3 of the
English translation, I quote the defendant Ribbentrop again:-

   "The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter
   her. Besides, our strength was not only equal, but superior to
   a combined English-American Air Force at any time. The number
   of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true of
   our aeroplane production capacity. As far as quality was
   concerned, ours was always superior to the English (to say
   nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to
   enlarge this lead. On the Fuehrer's orders the anti-aircraft
   defence, too, would be greatly reinforced. Since the Army had
   been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous
   reserves had been piled up (the ammunition plants have been
   slowed down because of the immense stock of material),
   production would now be concentrated on submarines, aeroplanes
   and anti-aircraft guns.
   Every eventuality had been provided for; the war had been won,
   today, militarily, economically and politically. We had the
   desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for
   peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully
   convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick
   and victorious end. To this end, the co-operation with Japan
   was of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest, should
   come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key
   position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus
   secure her position in the Far East, a position which she could
   acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick

      1.Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against
      the centre of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-
      warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British
      people would be very serious, and this would contribute
      toward a quick ending of the war.
      2.A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep
      America out of the war. America, which at present is not
      armed and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any
      risks West of Hawaii,
                                                        [Page 265]
      could do this even less in such a case. If Japan would
      otherwise respect the American interests, there would not
      even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of
      lost prestige, to make war plausible to the Americans. It
      was very unlikely that America would declare war if she then
      would have to stand by helplessly, while Japan takes the
      Philippines without America being able to do anything about
      3.In view of the coming 'New World Order' it seems to be in
      the interest of Japan also to secure for herself, during the
      war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the
      time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me
      entirely and said that he would do everything to carry
      through this policy."

I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop's
argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had
already practically won the war, by herself. Nevertheless, he
suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more
quickly with Japan's aid, and that the moment was propitious for
Japan's entry. Then, referring to the spoils of the conquest, he
indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself,
during the war, the positions she wanted, implying that she would
have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent of that
statement I read to you earlier from the Fuehrer that "those who
wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking."

Continuing Ribbentrop's argument, and to show the real nature of
the German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two
paragraphs on Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS.

   "The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
   Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
   Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
   been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
   influence in China. Germany's victory on the continent had
   brought now, after the conclusion of the Three-Power Pact,
   great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated
   in the Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably
   weakened; Japan had been able to close in steadily on
   Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to
   the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our
   geographical situation, we would have to carry the main burden
   of the final battle in the future too. If an unwanted conflict
   with Russia should arise, we would have to carry the main
   burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan
   would find herself confronted by a world-coalition within a
   short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both
   nations was being determined now, for centuries to come. The
   same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries
   would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the
   end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
   Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
   emphasised the fact that Japan was determined to keep its
   imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed
   the great problems which would arise after the war, for the
   parties of the Three-Power Pact, from the shaping of a new
   order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would
   require a bold solution. Thereby no over-centralisation should
   take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of

                                                        [Page 266]

   parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this,
   the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free
   exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of
   influence on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere
   under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian
   sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he
   conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make
   trade agreements directly with the independent States in the
   European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy
   would trade directly and make trade agreements with the
   independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such
   as China, Thailand, Indo-China, etc. Furthermore, as between
   the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the
   other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador
   expressed agreement with this thought."

In the document I have just quoted from, we have seen the
instigation to war by the defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign
Minister. I shall return to him again in this connection.

I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called
military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of
further wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our
Document C-75, as Exhibit USA 151.

This document is a "Top Secret" order signed by the defendant
Keitel as Chief of the O.K.W., and entitled "Basic Order No. 24
regarding Collaboration with Japan". It is dated 5th March, 1941,
about a week and a-half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima,
that I have just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the
highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as to
the Foreign Office. We have turned up two copies of this order,
identical except for hand-written notations, presumably made by
the recipients. C-75, the document I have introduced, is Copy No.
2 of the Order distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Navy, the O.K.M. We also have Copy No. 4, designed
for the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab, the Operations Staff of the High
Command of the Armed Forces. The head of this Operations Staff was
the defendant Jodl. Copy No. 4 was found in the O.K.W. files at
Flensburg. It is our Document 384-PS, and was referred to by the
U.S. Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not burden
the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies of
the same order.

Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on
collaboration with Japan. I therefore propose to read it in its
entirety, some two pages of English translation.

"The Fuehrer had issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:

   1.It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three-
   Power Pact, to induce Japan, as soon as possible, to take
   active measures in the Fast East."
   "Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the
   centre of gravity of the interests of the United States of
   America will be diverted to the Pacific.
   The sooner she intervenes, the greater will be the prospects
   of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped
   preparedness for war, on the

                                                        [Page 267]
   part of her adversaries. The 'Barbarossa' operation will
   create particularly favourable political and military
   prerequisites for this."

Then there is a marginal note, "Slightly exaggerated".

   "2. To prepare the way for the collaboration - "

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