Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-15.01 Last-Modified: 1999/09/14 [Page 185] FIFTEENTH DAY FRIDAY, 7th DECEMBER, 1945 MAJOR ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling, and ending with the infamous words: "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." The Court has already received in evidence and heard read material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral Assmann, which disclosed how, in December, 1939, the defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin. I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB 86. The Court will observe that that is a report by Raeder of the meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on 12th December, 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the defendants Keitel and Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. The report is headed "Norwegian Question", and the first sentence reads: "C.-in-C. Navy" - who of course was the defendant Raeder - "has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable." And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but I draw the Court's attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning: "The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more first, as the latter had known Quisling for a long while. C.-in-C. Navy" - that is, of course, Raeder - "suggests that if the Fuehrer formed a favourable impression, the O.K.W. should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation. (a) By peaceful means: that is to say, German Forces summoned by Norway; (b) To agree to do so by force." That was 12th December, the meeting at which Raeder made this report to Hitler. [Page 186] If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder's record of these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed "(b) Weserubung", these words: "Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer - " THE PRESIDENT: I have not got it. MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is Document C-66, the second page, headed "Weserubung", in the second paragraph. "Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg." And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page:- "At the crucial moment, R" - presumably Rosenberg - "hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14th December." That is, of course, Raeder's note, and it indicates the extent of his complicity in this conspiracy. The report continues "On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon Of 14th December, the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Until that moment the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be somewhat sceptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Crank in Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff." The Court may well think that the note of the defendant Raeder referring to "the crucial moment" was an appropriate one, because the Court will see that on that day, 14th December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further on in the document book, and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organisation - it is after the "D" documents - if the Court will turn to about ten lines from the bottom of the first page of Annex 1, dealing with Norway, the Court will see that there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December, and I am going to read now the section beginning: "Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16th December, and once more on the 18th December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasised repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict." As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations. The report continues "Should the enemy attempt" - there is a mis-translation here - "to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling [Page 187] and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which was based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs" - that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organisation - "the Minister for Foreign Affairs" - that is to say, Ribbentrop - "being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau" - which, of course, was Rosenberg's organisation. Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy". Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. The information that is available to the prosecution as to the events of January, 1940, is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Document C-63, which, for the purposes of the record, will be Exhibit GB 87. The Court will observe that that is an order - a memorandum - signed by the defendant Keitel, dated the 27th January, 1940. It is marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'" - which was another code name for the Weserubung Preparations - "Access only through an officer". It is headed: "C.-in-C. of the Navy" - that is to say, the defendant Raeder - "has a report on this." The document reads: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations. A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents, at the same time, the nucleus of a future operational staff." Then, at the end of the memorandum: "All further plans will be made under the cover name 'Weserubung'." I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention to the importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision. Prior to this date, 27th January, 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel's on 27th January, 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the O.K.W., had accepted the proposition of [Page 188] the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels. And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document 1809-PS, which will be, for the purposes of the record, Exhibit GB 88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the document book. There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set out in the diary, because the first three pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another part of the case. I invite the Court's attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl's diary, beginning at the bottom, 6th February. The entry under the date line of 6th February, 1940 starts: "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war." I would like to repeat that entry, if I may be permitted to do so "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war." The next entry to which I invite the Court's attention is the entry of the 21st February. THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean: "To carry out 'H'"? MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is a reference to another code word, "Hartmut", which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation. The entry of 21st February in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst and charges him with preparation of 'Weser Exercise'. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces." Then the next entry, on the next page - THE PRESIDENT: "Weser Exercise" - is that Norway too? MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is Norway too, my Lord, yes. That is a translation of "Weserubung". The entry on the next page, under the date of 28th February: "I propose, first to the Chief of O.K.W. and then to the Fuehrer, that Case Yellow" - which, as the Court knows, is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands - "and Weser Exercise" - the invasion of Norway and Denmark - "must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible." So the Court will observe that the new idea of 6th February, that the neutrality of Belgium might be observed, had been abandoned by 28th February. The next entry is of 29th February - I am not troubling the Court with further entries of 28th February, which relate to the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark. [Page 189] 29th February, the second paragraph "Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chief of Landesverteidigung, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff." And there, for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl's diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C- 174, which, for the purposes of the record, will be Exhibit GB 89. The Court will see, from that document, that it is Hitler's operation order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of 1st March, 1940, and it is headed: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, most Secret." Then, "Directive for Fall Weserubung." "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces-Fall Weserubung. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain." The second part of Paragraph 1 reads: "In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the Fall Weserubung will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it." There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page: "I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst." Paragraph 3: "The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter- measures. It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind. In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives." Then Paragraph 4 on the next page. "The Occupation of Denmark which is given the code name of "Weserubung Sud". [Page 190] "The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of Fyen immediately after occupation of Seeland. Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fyen to Skagen and to the East coast."
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