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It is left to the O.K.H. to assemble as far as possible, first of
all the sections to march and, subsequently, the remaining
sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the Western

(Signed) Keitel."

THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn.
Before the Tribunal adjourns, the Tribunal would be very grateful
if the officers in charge of the Court could reduce the heat.

We will meet again at 2 o'clock.

(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal.

I might say that my attention has been called to the fact that I
misread a signature on one of the documents to which I adverted
this morning. It is Item 31 of the Schmundt minutes. I read the
name "Jodl" as being the signature on that item. I should have
read Keitel.

In the course of presenting details of the documents which are
being offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a
moment, and recall

                                                         [Page 24]

the setting in which these things took place. The world will never
forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which lead to
it. As this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938,
a frantic effort was being made by statesmen of the world to
preserve world peace. Little did they know of the evil plans and
designs in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators.

What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story
underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to spread upon the
pages of h1story the truth concerning the fraud and deceit
practised by the Nazi conspirators, in achieving their own ends.
The Pact of Munich was a stepping-stone towards further
aggression. One cannot think back without living again through the
dread of war, or the threat to the world, or the fear of war which
seized all peace-loving persons. The hope for peace which came
with the Munich Pact was the result of the snare, the deceitful
trap, carefully set by the defendants on trial. The evil character
of these men who were making preparations in this scheme for
aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents.

Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe
as to the time of day at which the attack should be launched.
Notes initialled by the defendant Jodl, dated 27th September,
reveal the difference in views. These notes are Item 54, on Page
90 in the translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these first
three paragraphs as follows:

The heading is --

    Only through Officer
    Conference Notes
    Berlin, 27th September, 1938.
    4 copies
    1st copy
    Time of attack 'Grun'
    Co-ordinated time of Attack by Army and Air Forces on X-Day.
    As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a co-
    ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X-day.
    The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It
    also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous
    night which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
    Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions.
    These could change the time of attack and also limit the area
    of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
    would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 hours
    due to low ceiling in Bavaria."

Then I will skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91:-

    "Thus it is proposed:
    Attack by the Army - independent of the attack by the Air
    Force at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission
    for limited operations to take place before then, however only
    to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
    The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them."

The initial at the end of that order is " J," meaning, I think,
clearly "Jodl".

On the same date, 27th September, the defendant Keitel sent a most

                                                         [Page 25]

memorandum to the defendant Hess, and the Reichsfuehrer S.S.,
Himmler, for the guidance of the Nazi Party officials. This
memorandum is Item 32 in the Schmundt files at Page 56 of the
English translation. I read the first four paragraphs of this

THE PRESIDENT: What is the item?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is Item 32 in the Schmundt files at Page 56. This
is the English version:-

    "As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and
    Chancellor has ordered mobilisation measures for the Armed
    Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
    issuing the mobilisation (X) order, or corresponding code
    Within the framework of these mobilisation measures it is
    necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
    the various Party authorities and their organisations, which
    are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilisation
    order, the advance measures or special code names.
    The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
    met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
    immediately and without being referred to higher authority.
    O.K.W. requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
    instructions to this effect, so that the mobilisation of the
    Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan."

Then I shall skip to the last paragraph:-

    "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that
    all measures not provided for in the plans which are
    undertaken by Party organisations, or Police units, as a
    result of the political situation, be reported in every case
    and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can
    be carried out in practice.
    The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Two additional entries from the defendant Jodl's files reveal the
extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all their
preparations for an attack; even during the period of negotiations
which culminated in the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in
the Jodl diary for 25th and 27th September, from Page 7 of the
translation of Document 1780-PS. The 26th September -

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the date of the visit of Mr.
Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you
can give it later on.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.


MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was 29th September,
and this answer was made three days before the Pact, the 26th
September as follows:

    "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the
    Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of
    the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not vet
    necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in
    before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the
    Czech frontier need be given on the Z7th only.

                                                         [Page 26]

    In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau,
    Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich
    Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for
    interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.
    Question by department 'Foreign Countries' whether Czechs are
    to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief
    of the Armed Forces High Command: Yes.
    1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
    General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
    and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will X-day be
    before the 30th.
    It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
    into military engagements because of false reports, before
    Prague replied.
    A question of Stumpf about Y-hour results in the reply that on
    account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention
    of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs
    the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of
    frequent fogs.
    The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders-in-
    chief, as to who is to have priority.
    The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
    to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about
    commitments against Prague.
    2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in
    an important speech at the Sportpalast."

Then the entry on the 27th September:

    "1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack
    being advanced to a line from which they can arrive in the
    assembly area by 30th September."

The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the
faithful Schmundt, and appears with Item 33 at Page 57 of the
file. I will read it in its entirety. It is the order which
brought the Nazi Army to a jumping off point for unmitigated

    28.9.38. MOST SECRET. MEMORANDUM: At 1300, 27th September, the
    Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, ordered the
    movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to
    their jumping off points.
    The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7
    divisions) must be ready to begin the operation 'Grun' On 30th
    September, the decision having been made one day previously by
    1200 noon.
    This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through
    Major Schmundt (pencil note by Schmundt)."

At this point with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position
around the body of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment
to examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military
preparations for action against Czechoslovakia had not been
carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skilfully
conceived campaign designed to promote several incidents in
Czechoslovakia. Using the tactics they had already developed by
underhand methods, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years
used many methods of propaganda and force to instil in the minds
of Czechoslovakians the programme of the Nazi might, forcing their
intentions of the present German decision on those living in
Sudetenland, and the areas bounded thereto on the North-west and
the South. I invite attention to the verbatim report in Document
998-PS and offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 91.

                                                         [Page 27]

This exhibit is entitled, "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia,"
and "The Czechoslovak Government Official Report for the
Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the
International Military Tribunal established according to the
agreement of the Four Great Powers of 8th August, 1945."

I believe that this report clearly includes all the provisions of
Article 21, of the Charter, and is a document of which the Court
will take judicial notice. Article 21 provides:
    "The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
    knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall
    also take judicial notice of official governmental documents
    and reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and
    documents of the committees set up in the various Allied
    countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records
    and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the
    United Nations."

Since, under that provision, the Court will take judicial notice
of this governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with
the leave of the Tribunal, merely summarise Pages 9 to 12 of this
report to show the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue
within Czechoslovakia.

Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of
the N.S.D.A.P. of the Nazi Party. In the years following the First
World War, a German National Social1st Workers Party, D.N.S.A.P.,
which maintained close contact with Hitler's N.S.D.A.P., became
active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ringleaders of the Sudeten
Volkssport, an organisation corresponding to the Nazi S.A. or
Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's
programme, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in
a greater Germany. Soon afterwards they were charged with planning
armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced
for conspiracy against the Czech Republic.

Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia
forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several
of its chiefs escaped across the border into Germany. For a year
thereafter, Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground.

On 1st October, 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the
Nazi conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein,
established the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which,
the following spring, became the Sudeten German Party, S.D.P.
Profiting from the experiences of the Czech National Socialist
Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He
rejected pan-Germanism and professed his respect for individual
liberties and his loyalty to honest democracy and to the Czech
State. His party, none the less, was built on the basis of the
Nazi Fuehrerprinzip, and he became its Fuehrer.

By 1937, when the powers of Hitler's Germany had become manifest,
Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note,
demanding, without definition, "complete Sudeten autonomy". The
S.D.P. laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would have
created a State within a State.

After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March, 1938, the
Henleinists, who were now openly organised after the Nazi model,
intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda
started in the Henlein Press.

The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the

                                                         [Page 28]

Henlein-dominated communities increased. A Storm Trooper
organisation, known as the F. S., Freiwilliger Selbstschutz or
Voluntary Vigilantes, modelled and trained on the principles of
the Nazi S.S., was established.

On 24th April, 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy
Vary, Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad
Programme. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and
substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten Germans to
profess German political philosophy, which, it was clear, meant
National Socialism.

As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every
technique of the Nazi fifth column. As summarised in Pages 12 to
16 of the Czech Government official report, these techniques

    (a)Espionage. - Military espionage was conducted by the
    S.D.P., the F.S. and by other members of the German minority
    on behalf of Germany. Czech defences were mapped and
    information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the
    German authorities.
    (b)Nazification of German organisations in Czechoslovakia. The
    Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the
    German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social
    cultural centres regularly underwent "Gleichschaltung", that
    is purification, by the  S.D.P. Among the organisations
    penetrated by the Henleinists were sports societies, rowing
    clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral societies.
    The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as
    many business institutions as possible, and bringing over to
    their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of
    factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case
    of Jewish ownership or direction, they attempted to secure the
    co-operation of the clerical and technical staffs of the
    (c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists
    maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials
    designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia.
    Meetings in Germany, at which Henleinists were exhorted to and
    instructed in fifth column activity, were camouflaged by being
    held in conjunction with "Sanger Feste" or choral festivals,
    gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings
    such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators
    needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of
    the Henlein1sts to supply them.
    (d) Propaganda. - Disruptive and subversive propaganda was
    directed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed
    in the German Press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a "nest of
    Bolshevism" and spread the false report of Russian troops and
    aeroplanes centred in Prague. Under direction from the Reich,
    the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the
    Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension and to
    the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was
    smuggled from Germany and widely d1stributed in the border
    regions. The Henlein Press, more or less openly, espoused Nazi
    ideology to the German population in the Sudetenland.
    (e) Murder and terrorism. - Nazi conspirators provided the
    Henleinists, and particularly the F.S., with money and arms
    with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of
    permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech
    officials were attacked. A boycott was established against
    Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen.

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