Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-16-responsibility-14-07
Last-Modified: 1997/05/13
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume Two, Chapter XIV
[Page 835]
Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat
logs the notation of any actions in violation of
International Law:
"There was an order -- I do not remember whether it was
in the form of a written or verbal instruction -- that
no events during a war patrol which contravened
established international agreements should be entered
in the war log. I believe that the reason for this
order was that eight copies were made of war logs and
were available to many authorities; there was always
the danger therefore that events of this nature would
become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for
reasons of propaganda that this should be so.
"Events of this nature were only to be reported if
asked for when commanding officers made their personal
reports; these were invariably made after every patrol
to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain
instances to Captain U-boats." (382-PS)
Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September
1942 (D-60) was apparently put into effect. The first case
is the sinking of a steam trawler, the "Noreen Mary," which
was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat
shows that
[Page 836]
at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (D-
645). At 2055 hours the log reads:
"Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].
"Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes."
(D-645)
There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay
stopped, and then, the final entry:
"Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the
stern." (D-645)
The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:
"Recognized success: Fishing vessel 'Noreen Mary' sunk
by flak."
An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on
board the "Noreen Mary" at the time of the sinking,
describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and
continues as follows:
"At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the
submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50
yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning
immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun.
We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north-
westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine
and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was
smooth, with light airs."
*******
"When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of
the conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought
at first the submarine was British, but when she opened
fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the
weight off gear, and increased to full speed, which was
about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her
machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or
three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and
had not had time to take cover. The submarine then
started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the
first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping
everything in steam and stopping the
"By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this
all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced
to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down
her port side with both guns firing continuously. We
were listing slowly to port all the time but did not
catch fire.
"The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat,
which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so,
so I abandoned
[Page 837]
the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which
was below the water line, for shelter. The ship was
listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210
she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men
left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not
know where the other three men had taken cover during
this time, as I did not hear or see them until they
were in the water.
"I swam around until I came across the broken bow of
our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to
scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not
submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and
when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with
a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention
was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained
there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged,
after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the
boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full
hour." (D-645)
The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second
Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each
other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The
affidavit continues:
"Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second
Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later
that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a
piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his
body. *** I had 14 shrapnel wounds."
*******
"This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in
the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville'
(torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran
ashore.
"As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties
were six killed, two missing, two injured." (D-645).
The next case is that of the ship "Antonico", which was
torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the
coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some
eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A
statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack
on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647):
"*** That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the
'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their
lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost
20 minutes; and that the witness already in the
lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the
'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the
same 'Antonico' and also because
[Page 838]
she was the aggressor's target; that the night was
dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine,
but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the
locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the
enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that
the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless
sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found
himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade
de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the
witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves
overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so
doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the
lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so
the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the
witness and his companions were about 20 meters in
distance from the submarine." (D-647)
The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may
be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising
should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no
more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.
A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave
propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on
11 March 1943, stated:
"Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting
for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in
these waters -- dangerous for the British and Americans
and for all the colored people who were at their beck
and-call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters
sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets
were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew
leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy
ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20
yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging.
The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea.
The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage.
Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The
sharks in the distance licked their teeth in
expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed from
Britain and America." (D-646-A)
This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to
seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with
regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction
of steamers.
After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of
a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS).
An official report certified by an official of the British
Admiralty
[Page 839]
sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings,
and those present, on the occasion of meetings between
Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that
he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate
states:
"*** I have compiled from them [captured documents the
attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz
attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list
of other senior officials who- attended the same
conferences is added when this information was
contained in the captured documents concerned. I
certify that the list is a true extract from the
collective documents which I have examined, and which
are in the possession of the British Admiralty,
London."
Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss,
was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among
hose who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel,
Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants,
Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from
the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the
rulers of the Reich and as undoubtedly aware of all major
decisions of policy.
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